Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating
Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals (15-NOV-06, GAO-07-78). 
                                                                 
The prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in
Afghanistan imperils the stability of its government and	 
threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation once again into a	 
safe haven for traffickers and terrorists. To combat the drug	 
trade, the U.S. government developed a counternarcotics strategy 
consisting of five pillars--alternative livelihoods, elimination 
and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and justice, and  
public information. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 2005 directed GAO to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005  
funds administered by the U.S. Agency for International 	 
Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) for Afghan	 
counternarcotics programs. To comply with this mandate, we	 
examined progress under each counternarcotics pillar, challenges 
faced, and efforts to ensure that funds were used for intended	 
purposes. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent	 
USAID and State documents and met with cognizant U.S. and	 
international officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO
makes no recommendations in this report. USAID, State, Department
of Defense, and Department of Justice were provided a draft of	 
this report, but did not provide formal comments.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-78						        
    ACCNO:   A63386						        
  TITLE:     Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts,      
Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals		 
     DATE:   11/15/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Border security					 
	     Crop eradication					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     International relations				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Law enforcement personnel				 
	     Narcotics						 
	     Police						 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Security threats					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 

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GAO-07-78

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Afghanistan's Opium Industry
          * [4]The U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy
          * [5]U.S. Funding for Counternarcotics

     * [6]USAID and State Projects Made Progress, but Implementation D

          * [7]Alternative Livelihoods: Despite Efforts, Increased Security

               * [8]Regional Projects Under Way, but Results Varied
               * [9]Seed and Fertilizer Distributed, but Agricultural Credit
                 Pro

          * [10]Elimination and Eradication: Despite More Eradication, Culti

               * [11]Central Eradication Efforts Improved, but Fielding Was
                 Delay
               * [12]Governor-Led Eradication Improved, but PEP Teams Were
                 Not Fu

          * [13]Interdiction: Border Security Projects Begun, but State's Su

               * [14]Border Security Enhancements Ongoing
               * [15]State Support for Counternarcotics Police Delayed

          * [16]Law Enforcement and Justice Reform: Efforts Led to New Count

               * [17]Justice Prosecutors Reformed Counternarcotics Law, but
                 Coord
               * [18]Corrections Reform Program Ongoing
               * [19]Counternarcotics Center Delayed

          * [20]Public Information: Campaign Launched, but Not Fully Coordin

     * [21]U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Face Several Challenges

          * [22]U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts Jeopardized by Worsening Secur
          * [23]Afghan Infrastructure, Human Capital, and Government Institu

     * [24]USAID and State Made Efforts to Oversee the Use of Funds, bu

          * [25]Agencies Required Certifications, Clauses, and Vetting to He
          * [26]Efforts Made to Monitor Projects, but Access to Project Site

     * [27]Concluding Observations
     * [28]Agency Comments
     * [29]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * [30]Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [31]GAO Contact
          * [32]Staff Acknowledgments

               * [33]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

November 2006

AFGHANISTAN DRUG CONTROL

Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S.
Goals

GAO-07-78

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 5
USAID and State Projects Made Progress, but Implementation Delays Limited
Accomplishments 11
U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Face Several Challenges 28
USAID and State Made Efforts to Oversee the Use of Funds, but Lack of
Information and Security Limited Some Efforts 32
Concluding Observations 36
Agency Comments 36
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 38
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40

Tables

Table 1: Opium Production in Afghanistan, 2002 through 2006 8
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2005 Counternarcotics Assistance to Afghanistan
Administered by USAID and State by Pillar as of June 2006 (in millions) 11
Table 3: Fiscal Year 2005 Alternative Livelihoods Assistance as of June
2006 (in millions) 13
Table 4: Alternative Livelihoods Performance Data Reported as of September
30, 2006 14
Table 5: Fiscal Year 2005 Eradication Assistance as of June 2006 (in
millions) 16
Table 6: Fiscal Year 2005 Interdiction Assistance as of June 2006 (in
millions) 21
Table 7: Fiscal Year 2005 Law Enforcement/Justice Reform Assistance as of
June 2006 (in millions) 23
Table 8: Fiscal Year 2005 Public Information Assistance as of June 2006
(in millions) 26

Figures

Figure 1: Opium Poppy Seed Capsule 7
Figure 2: Five Pillar Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan 9
Figure 3: Map of Afghanistan Counternarcotics Projects 12
Figure 4: Cash-for-Work Road-Construction Project 14
Figure 5: Huey-II Helicopters in Kandahar 18
Figure 6: AEF Conducting Manual and Mechanized Eradication in Helmand 19
Figure 7: Khirmanjo, Tajikistan, Border Post Scheduled to Be Refurbished
22
Figure 8: Afghan Corrections Officer Training 25
Figure 9: Ministry of Justice Building under Construction in Wardak
Province 25
Figure 10: Public Information Campaign Stickers, Billboard, and Posters 27
Figure 11: Aftermath of April 7, 2006, Improvised Explosive Device Attack
on Government Vehicle in Helmand 29

Abbreviations

AEF Afghan Eradication Force

CJTF Criminal Justice Task Force

CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

CPEF Central Poppy Eradication Force

CSSP Corrections System Support Program

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

NIU National Interdiction Unit

PEP Poppy Elimination Program

UN United Nations

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

November 15, 2006

The Honorable Mitch McConnell Chairman The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Committee on Appropriations United States Senate

The Honorable Jim Kolbe Chairman The Honorable Nita M. Lowey Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives

The continued prevalence of opium poppy^1 cultivation and drug trafficking
in Afghanistan imperils the stability of the Afghan government and
threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation into a safe haven for
traffickers and terrorists. In 2005, opium poppy was cultivated in more
than three-quarters of Afghanistan's provinces. The estimated export value
of opium, morphine, and heroin equaled about half of the country's licit
economy, with drug profits reportedly funding terrorists and other
antigovernment entities.^2 As a result, counternarcotics--for which the
United Kingdom took the international lead in Afghanistan in 2002^3--has
become one of the top priorities of the United States. To combat opium
poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, and their negative effects on Afghan
stability and pursuit of democracy, in 2005, the U.S. government, working
with allied governments, developed a five-pillared counternarcotics
strategy addressing (1) alternative livelihoods, (2) elimination and
eradication, (3) interdiction, (4) law enforcement and justice reform, and
(5) public information. The overall goal of the strategy is to
significantly reduce Afghanistan's poppy cultivation, drug production, and
drug trafficking. In fiscal year 2005, the United States provided about
$782 million dollars for programs administered by the Departments of
Defense (Defense) and State (State), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for
counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan.^4

1Opium, which can be used to produce morphine and heroin, is derived from
the opium poppy.

^2United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005
(Nov. 2005). This report provides comprehensive survey results and
statistics on Afghanistan's 2004-2005 opium cultivation season.

^3In 2002, the international community established a security reform
agenda for Afghanistan with five pillars--establishing a national army,
reforming the police, countering illicit narcotics, reforming the judicial
system, and disarming militia groups--and designated a donor country to
take the lead in reforming each pillar. For more information see, GAO,
Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made
Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, [34]GAO-05-575 ,
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).

The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005^5 required the Comptroller General
to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by USAID and
State--about $532 million--for bilateral Afghanistan counternarcotics and
alternative livelihoods programs.^6 To comply with this mandate, we
examined (1) USAID's and State's progress in implementing counternarcotics
programs, projects, and activities under each pillar, and the factors, if
any, limiting implementation; (2) challenges faced by counternarcotics
efforts; and (3) the agencies' efforts to ensure that the funds were used
for intended purposes.

To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent USAID and State
planning, funding, and reporting documents for counternarcotics programs.
We discussed these programs with cognizant officials from the Departments
of Defense, Justice (Justice), and State; USAID; DEA in Washington, D.C.,
and Afghanistan; and with private contractors implementing U.S. projects
in Afghanistan. In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with officials from the
United Nations (UN) and the governments of Afghanistan and the United
Kingdom to discuss counternarcotics efforts. We traveled to the provinces
of Balkh, Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar to meet with U.S. and Afghan
officials to discuss various U.S.-funded projects. We determined the data
provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

^4Most of these funds were provided by the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief of 2005, P.L. 109-13, enacted on May 11, 2005.

^5P.L. 109-13, Sec. 2105.

^6We were not mandated to examine funds administered by Defense and DEA.

We conducted our review from September 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See
app. I for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.)

Results in Brief

USAID and State initiated a number of projects under each of the U.S.
counternarcotics strategy's five pillars, but delays in
implementation--due to the security situation, poor infrastructure, and
other factors--limited progress. Many projects have not been in place long
enough to fully assess progress toward the overall goal of significantly
reducing poppy cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking.

Alternative livelihoods. With $180 million, USAID implemented projects to
provide economic alternatives to poppy production and thus reduce the
amount of Afghanistan's economic activity attributable to the drug
industry. USAID supported regional alternative livelihoods projects,
distributed seed and fertilizer, and initiated a rural credit project.
USAID continued cash-for-work projects and supported business development
in targeted poppy areas. Results varied in the three principal alternative
livelihoods regions, in part because of the differing security risks and
access to infrastructure.

Elimination and eradication. With $258 million, State supported the Afghan
government's efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy crops
if prevention failed. State provided support for central and provincial
eradication efforts. Central government eradication efforts improved with
the reorganization of the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) into smaller,
more mobile units and the addition of purchased and leased transport and
logistical-support aircraft. However, the AEF's fielding was delayed from
early February 2006 until late March 2006 because of the need to address
coordination challenges, reducing the amount of eradication possible.
Provincial eradication efforts also improved when State began reimbursing
governors for provincial eradication expenses. However, teams designed to
help governors discourage farmers from growing poppy, the Poppy
Elimination Program (PEP) teams, were not fully fielded as of June 2006.

Interdiction. With $65 million, State assisted DEA-led efforts to help
build Afghan capacity to destroy drug labs, seize precursor chemicals and
opiates, and arrest major traffickers. State provided support for border
security enhancements in neighboring countries and the counternarcotics
police. In the neighboring countries of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan, State began border security projects; however, other
projects had not started as of June 2006. For example, State had not begun
planned support for the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and the Counter
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) because an NIU support facility and
ongoing police reform efforts were not completed.

Law enforcement and justice reform. With almost $24 million, State
supported the Afghan government's efforts to increase its capacity to
arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State
provided support for Department of Justice prosecutors, corrections
reform, and a planned justice center. The Justice prosecutors helped
develop and implement a new counternarcotics law. State support for
corrections reform, including the training of guards and refurbishment of
courthouses, is under way. State has delayed its support for the
operations and maintenance of a new counternarcotics justice facility
while its construction is completed.

Public information. With $5 million, State led a public information
campaign intended to convince the Afghan populace to reject poppy
cultivation and trade. State initially transferred funds to USAID to
initiate a campaign that used radio spots and print media over three
targeted phases, and which State continued and expanded. However, because
of delays with the PEP team implementation, the campaign was not able to
rely on planned support from the PEP teams.

The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are
tremendous challenges for the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in
Afghanistan. The security situation in Afghanistan continues to decline.
The central government faces threats from the Taliban, terrorist attacks,
and criminal activity. During the 2005-2006 growing season, eradication
forces were attacked several times and alternative livelihoods project
personnel were killed. Moreover, because of Afghanistan's lack of
infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental
institutions, addressing opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is
expected to take at least a decade. The nation has few roads and poor
access to power. The population is mostly illiterate and untrained.
According to U.S., International Monetary Fund, and other officials, the
government is plagued by corruption, has a weak judicial sector, and will
be unable to pay its recurring costs without foreign assistance for at
least 10 years.

USAID and State took steps to help ensure that U.S. assistance funds were
used as intended, but (1) documentation to help prevent terrorists and
criminals from benefiting from U.S. assistance was limited at best and (2)
monitoring the status of ongoing projects through site visits and other
efforts were constrained by the lack of security in many project areas and
poor or nonexistent infrastructure, such as roads. USAID and State are
required to adhere to an executive order and laws that ban, among other
things, assistance to terrorists, drug traffickers, and human rights
violators. To comply, USAID and State used certifications and contract
clauses to help ensure that the contractors, grantees, and other aid
recipients were aware of the legal requirements. However, USAID's and
State's vetting of Afghan nationals was limited because of incomplete or
nonexistent birth records and other identifying documentation, and the
difficulty of investigating widespread allegations of misconduct. USAID
and State also used contractor reporting and site visits to monitor the
performance of projects. Although USAID and State contractors submitted
required progress reports, external factors beyond the agencies' or
contractors' control, such as Afghanistan's poor security environment and
infrastructure, limited project monitoring by restricting access to
project sites.

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State, USAID,
Defense, and Justice. Each agency informed us that they were not providing
formal comments. However, USAID and Justice provided technical comments,
which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.

Background

Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited
natural resources, bordered by Pakistan to the east and south; Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran to the west. At
647,500 square kilometers, Afghanistan is slightly smaller than the state
of Texas. The country is divided into 34 provinces, more than 300
districts, and approximately 30,000 villages.

Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries; its population,
estimated at more than 31 million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural,
and mostly uneducated. Development indicators published by the World Bank
and the UN rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category,
including nutrition; infant, child, and maternal mortality; life
expectancy; and literacy.

Over the last two decades, conflict ravaged Afghanistan. The Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a prolonged and
destructive war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a protracted
civil war, by 1998, most of Afghanistan was under the control of the
fundamentalist Taliban group. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a
haven for terrorists. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States and a coalition of its allies invaded Afghanistan and
removed the Taliban from power.

Following the Taliban's removal, the coalition began the process of
establishing a new Afghan government.^7 To help rebuild the country and
create a stable Afghan society that would not be a threat to itself or
others, in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 the United States spent $1.6
billion on humanitarian and reconstruction projects. In June 2004 and
again in July 2005, we reported that U.S. humanitarian and short-term
assistance over the two-year period had helped Afghanistan's vulnerable
population, but that longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved limited
results in creating a stable Afghan society.^8

The United States and several other donor nations met in Geneva,
Switzerland, in April 2002, to help Afghanistan address threats to its
security. At the Geneva conference, the donors established a five-pillared
security reform agenda and designated a donor country to take the lead in
reforming each pillar. In a June 2005 report on efforts to establish the
army and police, we reported that there needed to be concurrent progress
in all security pillars, otherwise Afghanistan could again become a haven
for terrorists. Furthermore, we reported that limited progress had been
made in reforming Afghanistan's judiciary and combating illicit
narcotics.^9

Afghanistan's Opium Industry

Afghanistan is the world's largest supplier of opium and has been a source
of illegal opium for decades. Opium poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant
crop that is easily grown throughout Afghanistan's rugged territory. Opium
poppy, as seen in figure 1, is an annual crop with a six to seven month
planting cycle that starts earlier in the south and later in the north of
Afghanistan. It is planted between September and December and flowers
approximately three months after planting. After the flower's petals fall
away, the opium, an opaque, milky sap found in the plant's seed capsule,
is harvested between April and July. The sap can then be refined into
morphine and heroin. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
surveys indicate that the primary deterrent to farmers growing poppy is
the threat of eradication. The majority of eradication takes place after
the poppy plant has sprouted and before it is harvested, approximately a
two-month long period.

^7Presidential elections were held in October 2004. National Assembly and
provincial elections were held in September 2005.

^8GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Need,
[35]GAO-04-403 , (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004), and GAO, Afghanistan
Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other
Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals, [36]GAO-05-742
(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005).

^9 [37]GAO-05-575 .

Figure 1: Opium Poppy Seed Capsule

According to UNODC, in the three-year period, 2002 through 2004,
Afghanistan's opium harvest increased substantially. In 2005, the number
of hectares of opium poppy cultivation declined by over 20 percent, yet
the crop yield per hectare rose because of favorable weather conditions.
Thus, the estimated amount of potential opium produced declined only
slightly. In 2006, poppy cultivation increased to 165,000 hectares,
yielding a record poppy crop estimated at a potential 6,100 metric tons of
opium, or more than 90 percent of the world's illicit opium (see table 1).

Table 1: Opium Production in Afghanistan, 2002 through 2006

                                         2002   2003     2004    2005    2006 
Net opium poppy cultivation                                                
(hectares)                          74,000 80,000  131,000 104,000 165,000 
Potential opium production (metric                                         
tons)                                3,400  3,600    4,200   4,100   6,100 
Provinces where opium poppy is                                             
grown^a                                 24     28 32 (all)      25      28 

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Notes:

1 hectare equals 2.47 acres.

1 metric ton equals 2,204.6 pounds.

aIn 2005, the Afghan Government reorganized the country's administrative
divisions into 34 provinces. However, the 2005 UNODC opium survey was
designed, and its results are presented, according to the previous 32
provinces. The 2006 survey was based on 34 provinces.

State attributed the reduction in cultivation in 2005 to surplus opium
from previous years, public information efforts by President Karzai and
others, promised alternative livelihoods assistance, and farmers' fears of
eradication. However, eradication fears were not realized; only an
estimated 5,100 hectares of poppy were eradicated. Further, drug-related
corruption is a problem at all levels of government and remains pervasive
at the provincial and district levels. Conversely, the reasons for the
growth in 2006 cultivation are not fully known, but U.S. officials
described a combination of factors, including the relatively small amount
of eradication in 2005 and pressure from traffickers and the Taliban on
farmers to grow. For example, U.S. officials said that in southern
Afghanistan, farmers reported finding "night letters" from the Taliban
left on their doors threatening them if they did not cultivate poppy.
Moreover, UNODC reported that many farmers paid eradicators not to
eradicate their fields and that eradication was often a consensual
decision between eradicators and farmers.

The U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy

From 2002 through 2004, the United States saw increasing opium poppy
cultivation and drug trafficking as a growing threat to stability and
security of Afghanistan and provided approximately $380 million for
Afghan- and United Kingdom-led counternarcotics efforts. The United States
used these funds to train Afghan narcotics interdiction units, construct
border and highway checkpoint facilities, and supply operational support
and nonlethal equipment to Afghan eradication teams. These efforts failed
to have any significant effect on the illicit narcotics industry because
of limited security and stability across Afghanistan. As a result, the
U.S. government made counternarcotics a top priority and developed a
strategy in 2004 to reduce poppy cultivation, drug production, and
trafficking. This new strategy is comprised of five pillars, as
illustrated in figure 2. The five-pillar counternarcotics plan is intended
to offer incentives to stop the growing of opium poppy through alternative
livelihoods projects, combined with strong disincentives in the form of
forced eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement, while spreading the
Afghan government's antinarcotics message. These U.S. efforts are also
expected to build the Afghan government's capacity to conduct
counternarcotics efforts on its own.

Figure 2: Five Pillar Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan

The United States originally planned to use crop-dusting airplanes to
spray herbicide on the opium poppy before it could be harvested. However,
the Afghan government would not allow the use of herbicides. Consequently,
the United States and Afghanistan rely on manual eradication, such as
police on foot using sticks, sickles, and scythes to knock or cut down
poppy, and mechanized eradication, which involves police using tractors,
all-terrain vehicles, and other vehicles to drive over or plow up the
poppy. USAID also modified some of its projects to specifically focus on
counternarcotics in those provinces where opium poppy cultivation was
greatest. These alternative livelihoods projects are coordinated with
USAID's on-going reconstruction efforts, and several of the short term
cash-for-work projects stem from prior humanitarian assistance projects
designed to help vulnerable populations.

U.S. Funding for Counternarcotics

To accomplish U.S. counternarcotics goals in Afghanistan, the United
States provided about $782 million in fiscal year 2005, of which $532
million was administered by USAID and State,^10 as shown in table 2, and
over $250 million by Defense and DEA. The majority of USAID and State
funding was provided by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which was
enacted into law in May 2005.^11 Several federal and agency regulations
govern USAID's and State's use of these funds for counternarcotics
programs, prohibiting use of the funds to assist terrorists, drug
traffickers, or human rights violators. Though not explicitly addressed in
this report, funds administered by Defense and DEA are being expended on
projects, such as constructing the counternarcotics justice center and
supporting Afghan interdiction efforts.

^10USAID and State plan to use $350 million of the funds made available by
the Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L.
109-102), to continue their counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan.

^11State did not receive all of the supplemental appropriations until
August 2005 because it had to provide congressional notifications of its
spending plans. This process took about three months.

Table 2: Fiscal Year 2005 Counternarcotics Assistance to Afghanistan
Administered by USAID and State by Pillar as of June 2006 (in millions)

Pillar                                 Provided Obligated Expended^a 
Alternative Livelihoods (USAID)            $180      $162       $117 
Elimination/Eradication (State)             258       204         69 
Interdiction (State)                         65        44          2 
Law Enforcement/Justice Reform (State)       24        17          2 
Public Information (State)                    5         5          1 
Total                                      $532      $432       $191 

Source: USAID and State.

aAccording to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be
higher than reported figures due, in part, to delays in receiving bills
from other agencies, international organizations, and contractors.

USAID and State Projects Made Progress, but Implementation Delays Limited
Accomplishments

USAID and State established goals for each of the U.S. counternarcotics
strategy's five pillars, funded projects under each pillar, and made
progress toward some project objectives. However, the implementation of
several projects was hindered by the security situation, poor
infrastructure, and other factors. Moreover, USAID's and State's projects
(see fig. 3) had not been in place long enough to determine whether they
had contributed toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy
cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking.

Figure 3: Map of Afghanistan Counternarcotics Projects

Alternative Livelihoods: Despite Efforts, Increased Security Risks and
Infrastructure Limited Achievements

As shown in table 3, USAID provided $180 million to fund licit economic
alternatives to poppy cultivation and thus reduce the amount of
Afghanistan's economic activity attributable to the drug industry.
According to UNODC, as of 2006, 2.9 million Afghans were involved in a
narcotics industry that is equivalent to about half of Afghanistan's legal
economic activity.

Table 3: Fiscal Year 2005 Alternative Livelihoods Assistance as of June
2006 (in millions)

Project                                   Provided Obligated Expended 
Regional Alternative Livelihoods Projects                             
East                                           $53       $53      $37 
North                                           22        22        9 
South                                           50        50       35 
Other Alternative Livelihoods Projects                                
Seed and Fertilizer                             30        30       29 
Agricultural Credit                             16         0        0 
Other^a                                          8         7        6 
Total^b                                       $180      $162     $117 

Source: USAID.

aOther covers funds that were not allocated to the five project lines,
including program management and contributions to the World Bank for
alternative livelihoods projects.

bTotals may not add due to rounding.

  Regional Projects Under Way, but Results Varied

USAID provided about $125 million for regional alternative livelihoods
projects. The projects were split into three regions--Nangarhar, Laghman,
and Konar in the east; Badakshan and Takhar in the north; and Helmand,
Kandahar, Oruzgan in the south--and were implemented by different
contractors in an effort to ensure the projects were tailored to the
appropriate needs and potential of each region. In all the regions,
similar types of labor intensive, cash-for-work projects were implemented,
such as road repair, as illustrated in figure 4, and irrigation and
drainage canal rehabilitation. The contractors in each region were
supposed to develop longer-term projects more suited to their provinces. A
key element of these efforts was to develop industry "clusters." For
example, dairy, poultry, and livestock industries were associated with
feed development and production; veterinary services; and milk, meat, and
egg products being packaged, processed, and stored. Although
rehabilitating the agriculture sector is a priority in all of these
provinces, in the east, USAID is also exploring ways to expand and add
value to the marble industry and, in the north, USAID is focusing on
cattle and other livestock industries.

Figure 4: Cash-for-Work Road-Construction Project

As shown in table 4, USAID reported the following results for its
cash-for-work projects in the east, north, and south. USAID had not
established targets for all these activities in fiscal year 2006, but had
established targets in September 2006 for fiscal year 2007.

Table 4: Alternative Livelihoods Performance Data Reported as of September
30, 2006

Performance Indicator                           East  North  South   Total 
Roads repaired (in kilometers)                   306     38     73     417 
Irrigation and drainage canals rehabilitated                               
(in kilometers)                                2,432    543  1,494   4,469 
People employed                              153,698 25,339 39,783 218,820 
Cash-for-work wages (in millions)              $14.1   $1.0   $5.2   $20.3 

Source: Contractor reports provided to USAID.

Note: Data includes cash-for-work projects begun in 2005 and later
incorporated into the alternative livelihoods program.

As part of the longer-term objectives of developing business clusters,
USAID conducted numerous studies in all three regions to assess various
business sectors that could be sustainable in the respective regions, such
as dairy, fruits and nuts, flour mills, carpets, and other industries. In
Nangarhar, a business center was opened in April 2006 and is expected to
boost development in the region. The business center will provide computer
training and other services to local businessmen. Also, in Nangarhar and
Laghman, fruit and nut trees were planted on some 1,500 hectares of former
poppy-producing land.

The deteriorating security situation, the lack of infrastructure, and, in
northern Afghanistan, bad weather all contributed to delays in
implementing the alternative livelihoods projects. Contractors often
reported the security situation in a particular district or area forced
them to suspend projects for weeks or months at a time. For example, in
May 2005, four Afghan subcontractors working on cash-for-work projects in
the south were killed, which led the USAID contractor to leave the area
until September 2005. Contractors and potential investors cited the lack
of adequate roads and electricity as deterrents to investors. For example,
the poor condition of the road leading into Badakshan made it difficult to
obtain the use of heavy machinery for construction and other projects, as
many contractors were unable or unwilling to transport such equipment
there. In addition, the weather in Badakshan led to the delay of projects
because the area was snowed in for much of the winter, while flooding in
the summer limited activities.

  Seed and Fertilizer Distributed, but Agricultural Credit Project Delayed

USAID provided almost $30 million to purchase seed and fertilizer for
Afghan farmers to use as an alternative to growing poppy. The initial
quantity of wheat seed and fertilizer in the fall of 2005 was equally
distributed among all of Afghanistan's provinces and was intended to
demonstrate the central government's reach throughout Afghanistan. The
spring 2006 distribution of vegetable seeds was limited to the three
alternative livelihoods regions. According to USAID, this distribution of
seed and fertilizer targets farmers with access to both water to grow the
vegetables and markets to sell the produce. USAID reported that the fall
seed and fertilizer distribution reached all 34 provinces and 550,000
farmers. The spring seed and fertilizer project distributed vegetable
seeds and fertilizer to approximately 112,000 farmers in the east, north,
and south.

USAID provided almost $16 million for an agricultural-credit project.
Afghan farmers do not have access to credit for planting licit crops,
although drug traffickers provide credit to farmers for planting opium
poppies. USAID's project seeks to remedy this situation by providing loans
to farmers to grow licit crops. USAID planned to initiate this project by
mid-summer 2006, but the funding was not obligated until the fall.
According to USAID officials, the project was delayed while they searched
for a contractor who was able to initiate the project in all the targeted
regions.

Elimination and Eradication: Despite More Eradication, Cultivation Increased

As shown in table 5, State provided $258 million to support the Afghan
government's efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy crops
if prevention failed. In 2005, after central and provincial government
eradication efforts, an estimated 104,000 hectares of opium poppy were
cultivated. In 2006, this number increased to an estimated 165,000
hectares despite a threefold increase in eradication.

Table 5: Fiscal Year 2005 Eradication Assistance as of June 2006 (in
millions)

Dollars in millions                                                  
Project                                Provided Obligated Expended^a 
Central Government Support                                           
Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) support     $104       $68        $15 
Air mobility assets                         124       114         51 
Provincial Government Support                                        
Governor-led eradication                      6         6          0 
Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) teams        24        16          3 
Total                                      $258      $204        $69 

Source: Department of State.

aAccording to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be
higher than reported figures due, in part, to delays in receiving bills
from other agencies, international organizations, and contractors.

  Central Eradication Efforts Improved, but Fielding Was Delayed

State provided $104 million to support the AEF's operating costs and
purchase of additional equipment,^12 and $124 million to purchase and
lease aircraft to move the force around the country. These efforts were
intended to address the challenges faced by the AEF's predecessor, the
Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF). According to State officials, the
CPEF's operational procedures and lack of mobility made getting the force
into the field and supplying it difficult. For example, a senior State
official stated that because the CPEF operated as one large unit and
traveled in convoys on the roads, impassable roads slowed or stopped their
getting out to planned locations. Moreover, because the CPEF lacked
logistical support, they had to return to Kabul to re-supply. In 2005,
UNODC reported, but did not verify, that the CPEF eradicated about 210
hectares of opium poppy and the Afghan National Police eradicated about
890 hectares.

^12State purchased land vehicles, body armor, small arms, ammunition,
communications equipment, and other goods.

After the 2005 season, the CPEF was renamed the AEF and reorganized into
four smaller and more mobile units of 150 counternarcotics police each.
One half of this police force provided security while the rest served as
eradicators and support. The teams could be deployed in multiple areas of
the country simultaneously. In order to carry out its eradication efforts,
the force was expected to have the mobility to get into the field and the
logistics to remain there. State paid for a "wet lease"^13 of four
Russian-made aircraft and the purchase and operating costs of ten U.S.
Huey-II helicopters (see fig. 5). The leased aircraft were used primarily
for troop and cargo transport to support reconnaissance, establish camps,
and deploy the AEF, while the Huey-II helicopters provided enhanced
security, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation capacity, as well as
limited personnel and cargo transport for the AEF. The aircraft were also
used to provide additional lift and transport support to the PEP teams and
embassy personnel. The addition of airlift at airfields from Kabul,
Parvan, and Kandahar, and other vehicles allowed the AEF to travel more
easily and remain in the field for longer periods.

^13A lease for aircraft is termed a "wet lease" when the lease includes
the cost of the fuel, as well as operation, maintenance, and other costs
associated with usage of the aircraft.

Figure 5: Huey-II Helicopters in Kandahar

In 2006, UNODC reported the AEF eradicated an estimated 2,250 hectares of
opium poppy in Helmand and Badakshan provinces (see fig. 6).^14 Although
the AEF eradicated over ten times the amount eradicated by the CPEF in
2005, its initial deployment was delayed. According to USAID and State
officials, the governor of Helmand wanted additional alternative
livelihoods projects in place before allowing the AEF to begin working.
Moreover, State officials stated that because of the security risks in
Helmand, the AEF needed the Afghan National Police and Afghan National
Army to provide security. However, coordinating their efforts to assist
the AEF proved time-consuming. The combination of these challenges pushed
the AEF's fielding date back from early February 2006 until late March
2006. Because most poppy growth occurs over a two-month period, the AEF's
fielding delay prevented them from eradicating as much as it might have
had it been fielded in February, as intended.

^14State also reported about 35 hectares of eradication in Baghlan
province.

Figure 6: AEF Conducting Manual and Mechanized Eradication in Helmand

  Governor-Led Eradication Improved, but PEP Teams Were Not Fully Fielded

State provided $6 million for equipment and training to provincial
authorities to conduct eradication activities and $24 million to create
seven provincial PEP teams to discourage poppy cultivation in the
provinces where it is most prevalent--Badakshan, Balkh, Farah, Helmand,
Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Oruzgan. Beginning in 2003, at the initiative of
President Karzai, provincial governors were given the responsibility for
carrying out their own eradication efforts with the financial support of
the central government and donors. In 2005, governor-led eradication was
responsible for more eradication than the central government's efforts.
UNODC reported and verified about 4,000 hectares of governor-led
eradication.^15

In response to the larger amount of eradication conducted by governors
than the central government in 2005, State decided to increase support for
provincial authorities by reimbursing governor-led eradication efforts and
creating the PEP teams. In 2006, State began to reimburse provincial
authorities for their eradication expenses at a rate of $60 per hectare of
UNODC-verified eradication. However, when UNODC was not able to verify
provincial efforts, the governor was reimbursed based on his submitted
expenses.^16 According to State officials, they also wanted to enhance
governor efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation by creating the PEP teams
attached to the offices of the seven provincial governors where poppy
cultivation was greatest. The teams were planned to consist of seven
Afghan advisors hired by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics and two
international advisors hired by the United States. PEP teams were to
assist the provincial governors in discouraging farmers from growing poppy
and encouraging farmers to eradicate their own poppy fields by
coordinating antinarcotics public information messages, ensuring delivery
of assistance projects from all donors, and assisting with verification of
reported eradication. These teams were also designed to be closely
integrated with the public information campaign by helping to identify
local messages and local leaders to assist with the campaign, as well as
to assist central government counternarcotics efforts by reporting on any
obstacles that inhibit achieving provincial poppy reduction goals.

^15UNODC verifies eradication results with on-the-ground, trained
observers and aerial and satellite photography.

Even though the PEP teams were not fully fielded, governor-led
eradication, according to UNODC, more than tripled in 2006, to an
estimated 13,050 hectares. Governor-led eradication took place in 19
provinces and was again responsible for more eradication than central
eradication forces. Each PEP team was intended to be fully staffed and
provided security and housing by the end of 2005, however State did not
fully field the PEP teams because its contractor was unable to hire all of
the international advisors and supply each team with the required
security, housing, and equipment in time for the 2005 growing season. As
of June 2006, 11 of 14 international PEP advisors had been hired.
Moreover, the Afghan government did not hire all the required Afghan
nationals to staff each team. Because the teams were not fully fielded,
they were unable to work as intended with provincial officials to
coordinate alternative livelihoods projects, assist with eradication
verification as planned, or coordinate public information projects to
discourage poppy growing.

^16For example, expenses in Helmand included the rental fees for vehicles
and salaries of provincial eradicators.

Interdiction: Border Security Projects Begun, but State's Support of
Counternarcotics Police Delayed

As seen in table 6, State provided $65 million to support DEA-led
interdiction efforts^17 to help build Afghan capacity to destroy drug
labs, seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and arrest major traffickers.
State's efforts to enhance border security in neighboring countries that
serve as transit points for narcotics are under way. State also planned to
provide support for the CNPA and NIU, but these projects were delayed
while State awaited the results of recently completed police-reform
efforts and construction of a new facility.

Table 6: Fiscal Year 2005 Interdiction Assistance as of June 2006 (in
millions)

Project                         Provided Obligated Expended^a 
Border Security Enhancements         $41       $41         $2 
Counternarcotics Police Support       24         3          0 
Total                                $65       $44         $2 

Source: Department of State.

aAccording to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be
higher than reported figures due, in part, to delays in receiving bills
from other agencies, international organizations, and contractors.

  Border Security Enhancements Ongoing

State provided $41 million to enhance border security in the neighboring
countries that often serve as transit points for drug traffickers,
including $30 million in Pakistan, $9 million in Tajikistan, and $2
million in Turkmenistan. The planned assistance to Pakistan included the
purchase of vehicles and equipment for Pakistan's Frontier Corp to conduct
counternarcotics and border security and Pakistan's Anti Narcotics Force
to support poppy eradication and interdiction operations, as well as the
purchase of pre-fabricated steel bridges to increase mobility in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The planned assistance for Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan included the purchase of vehicles and other equipment,
upgrading of border posts, and the training of border police.

State moved forward with border security enhancements. In Pakistan, State
began purchasing vehicles, body armor, and surveillance gear for border
security forces. State also issued a request for proposals for the
purchase of the pre-fabricated bridges. In Tajikistan, State, working with
UNODC and International Organization for Migration, started to equip
forensics labs and a police-dog training center; ordered a variety of
equipment for border police, including a communications system,
ambulances, surveillance gear, and vehicles; and started refurbishing
border posts such as the one seen in figure 7. In Turkmenistan, State
transferred the funds to UNODC, with whom State was already working, to
properly equip a major border checkpoint and provide relevant training to
border control personnel. UNODC contracted with a company for construction
and equipment.

^17DEA focused most of its enforcement program and funding on (1)
expanding the Afghanistan aspects of Operation Containment, a
multi-national, law enforcement initiative that targets high-level drug
trafficking organizations; (2) deploying Foreign-deployed Advisory and
Support Teams (FAST) that work with the Afghans to carry out interdiction
operations; and (3) advising and training the NIU, the primary narcotics
investigators under the CNPA.

Figure 7: Khirmanjo, Tajikistan, Border Post Scheduled to Be Refurbished

  State Support for Counternarcotics Police Delayed

State planned to provide $24 million to support the NIU and leadership of
the CNPA, but the spending of these funds was delayed. Of these funds,
State planned to spend $12.5 million to provide mentors, housing,
equipment, and vehicles for the CNPA leadership, with the remaining funds
going to operate and maintain the NIU Center for two years after its
completion; provide equipment for the center; and for NIU vetting,
training, and administrative costs.

As of August 2006, State's support for the NIU was delayed while ongoing
police reform plans were finalized and Defense completed construction of
the NIU facility. Department of Defense-supported police reforms,
according to State officials, notably pay and rank reform, were only
recently completed, and State had been waiting until the CNPA's leadership
was determined to begin using its support funds. The NIU facility is
expected to be completed November 30, 2006, almost eight months later than
the original completion date due, in part, to building modifications.

Law Enforcement and Justice Reform: Efforts Led to New Counternarcotics Law and
Supported Strengthening Corrections System

As seen in table 7, State provided nearly $24 million to support the
Afghan government's efforts to increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute,
and punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State brought in senior
federal prosecutors from the Department of Justice to assist with
legislative reform efforts, such as the crafting of the new
counternarcotics law, and training investigators and prosecutors. State
also began the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) to develop a
professional, accountable, and centralized Afghan corrections system.
Under this program, State started training corrections personnel and
constructing new facilities. State also planned support for the Counter
Narcotics Justice Center, a counternarcotics court and detention facility.
However, construction of the facility was still under way.

Table 7: Fiscal Year 2005 Law Enforcement/Justice Reform Assistance as of
June 2006 (in millions)

Project                                      Provided Obligated Expended^a 
Justice prosecutors                                $2        $2         $0 
Corrections Reform and Counternarcotics                                    
Center                                             22        15          2 
Total                                             $24       $17         $2 

Source: Department of State.

aAccording to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be
higher than reported figures due, in part, to delays in receiving bills
from other agencies, international organizations, and contractors.

  Justice Prosecutors Reformed Counternarcotics Law, but Coordination Remained a
  Challenge

State transferred $2 million to the Department of Justice to continue to
pay for U.S. prosecutors from the Criminal Division's Senior Federal
Prosecutors' Program to provide legal and legislative assistance. The
prosecutors worked in several areas, including:

           o reform of key laws and implementation of regulations and
           authorities;
           o design, planning, and coordination of training in fundamentals
           and advanced areas of the criminal law with emphasis on
           counternarcotics and antimoney laundering enforcement; and
           o assessment of, mentoring of, and assistance to the Criminal
           Justice Task Force (CJTF), a specialized unit of investigators and
           prosecutors dedicated to working mid- and high-level narcotics and
           narcotics-related investigations and prosecutions.

           The Justice prosecutors, working with the government of
           Afghanistan, helped develop and implement a new comprehensive
           counternarcotics law that grants legal and investigative authority
           for mid- and high-level investigations and prosecutions to a new
           counternarcotics legal infrastructure apart from Afghanistan's
           national judicial system. The new law nationalized most drug
           crimes for investigation and prosecution by the CJTF and trial by
           the Central Narcotics Tribunal,^18 diminishing local influences
           and chances of intimidation. The new law and the legal authorities
           it provides are the centerpiece of CJTF training developed by the
           United States. The Justice prosecutors, along with their
           international partners, have mentored and guided the CJTF in the
           successful prosecution of three mid- and high-level traffickers.
           The Justice prosecutors are providing advice on the drafting of a
           more modern and flexible criminal procedure code. The Justice
           prosecutors were also instrumental in having the government of
           Afghanistan effect its first-ever extradition to the United States
           of an Afghan narcotics trafficker.
			  
			    Corrections Reform Program Ongoing

           State provided almost $16 million for the CSSP, which is designed
           to develop a professional, accountable, and centralized Afghan
           corrections system. The CSSP is expected to devise and conduct
           training for Afghan correctional officers and build and
           rehabilitate correctional facilities.

           The CSSP began training prison guards and constructing new
           buildings, with the award of the CSSP contract in March 2006. The
           contractor finished a survey of Afghan prisons, developed
           corrections training classes, trained its first 36 corrections
           officers at the Central Training Facility in Kabul, and continued
           training in three other provinces (see fig. 8). In addition, the
           CSSP contractor began construction of an attorney general's office
           and a courthouse in Wardak province (see fig. 9).

           Figure 8: Afghan Corrections Officer Training

           Figure 9: Ministry of Justice Building under Construction in
           Wardak Province
			  
			    Counternarcotics Center Delayed

           State provided $6 million to pay the operations and maintenance
           costs of the Counter Narcotics Justice Center--a counternarcotics
           court and administrative offices for the CJTF and Central
           Narcotics Tribunal, as well as a detention facility, which is
           still under construction. According to Defense, State, and
           Justice, original plans called for Defense to erect a temporary
           building for the Counter Narcotics Justice Center. However,
           interagency discussions led to the decision to build a permanent
           set of structures, which delayed expected completion while new
           plans were drafted and a new contractor was chosen. Ongoing
           discussions may further modify the construction.

           The Counter Narcotics Justice Center is expected to be completed
           in November 2006, over three months later than the original
           completion date for the permanent structures. Additional
           modifications to the construction design, should they be funded,
           will further delay the completion of the facility.
			  
			    Public Information: Campaign Launched, but Not Fully Coordinated
				 with PEP Teams

           As shown in table 8, State provided $5 million to support a public
           information campaign intended to convince the Afghan populace to
           reject poppy cultivation and trafficking. State transferred almost
           $1 million to USAID for a grantee to begin a public information
           campaign. The campaign was designed to (1) develop and produce
           media materials to raise awareness and promote behavior change
           regarding poppy planting in Afghanistan, (2) establish a regional
           network to disseminate the materials and monitor and assess the
           efficacy of the campaign, and (3) support the government of
           Afghanistan in its efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation. State
           also provided almost $4 million for a new contractor, hired in May
           2006, to continue and build on public information efforts.

           Table 8: Fiscal Year 2005 Public Information Assistance as of June
           2006 (in millions)

           Source: Department of State.

           aAccording to a Department of State official, actual expenditures
           may be higher than reported figures due, in part, to delays in
           receiving bills from other agencies, international organizations,
           and contractors.

           The 2005 campaign, which used radio spots and printed media, was
           developed to target key poppy-growing provinces over three phases
           concerning (1) pre-planting, (2) pre-eradication and the health
           impact of drugs, and (3) eradication and the rule of law. The
           grantee established regional offices in the seven provinces with
           PEP teams to disseminate materials and monitor the campaign. The
           grantee completed the campaign on time between July 15, 2005 and
           May 15, 2006. According to information provided by State, over the
           three phases, the campaign paid for 41 radio spots that often
           featured prominent Afghans and were broadcast almost 9,000 times
           and prepared millions of stickers, matchboxes, booklets, posters,
           banners, and billboards, as illustrated in figure 10, to publicize
           the counternarcotics message. The grantee used focus groups and
           surveys to assess its efforts. A survey conducted in November 2005
           of more than 2,200 Afghans reported that about 75 percent of
           respondents had heard counternarcotics radio messages. During the
           last two phases of the campaign, the grantee worked with and paid
           the salaries of the Ministry of Interior's media office personnel.

^18The Central Narcotics Tribunal is a specialized court that has
exclusive nationwide jurisdiction for the trial and appellate review of
mid- and high-level narcotics offenses.

Project                               Provided Obligated Expended^a 
2005-2006 Public Information Campaign       $5        $5         $1 

Figure 10: Public Information Campaign Stickers, Billboard, and Posters

Note: Actual stickers, billboards, and posters printed are in Pashto and
Dari.

Because of delays in getting PEP teams formed, the public-information
grantee was unable to rely on expected PEP support during the 2005-2006
poppy growing season. In several provinces, the grantee stated the PEP
teams did not coordinate their public information activities or were not
active in public information activities. In particular, the grantee had
expected the PEP teams to assist in compiling a map of the schools,
clinics, mosques, civil society organizations, and public gathering places
in the provinces to use in identifying community stakeholders for delivery
of public information materials. However, the grantee found most of the
PEP teams provided no support in building the maps, and the grantee had to
create them without the help of the provincial PEP teams. The new public
information contract requires the contractor to implement the campaign in
concert with the PEP teams.

U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Face Several Challenges

The deteriorating security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity,
including governmental institutions, are tremendous challenges to reducing
illicit drug production and trafficking. The worsening security situation
in Afghanistan threatens the achievement of the U.S. counternarcotics
strategy. Additionally, the narcotics trade continues to undermine
Afghanistan's fragile institutions by fostering persistent corruption and
criminal activities. Consequently, U.S. officials and others have
commented that combating narcotics in Afghanistan will take at least a
decade.

U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts Jeopardized by Worsening Security

Progress toward the achievement of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in
Afghanistan is threatened by the worsening security situation. USAID
predicates the success of its reconstruction plans on an improving
security situation, however, continued attacks prevent some projects from
being implemented. Moreover, as we reported previously, State officials
expect that drug processing and trafficking will continue until security
is established.^19 In early 2006,^20 Afghanistan and the international
community agreed to the Afghanistan Compact, which stated that "genuine
security remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and
development in Afghanistan."

^19 [38]GAO-05-575 .

^20The Afghanistan Compact was agreed to at the London Conference, which
took place from January 31 through February 1, 2006.

The central government faces various threats, including Taliban and
terrorist attacks, tribal violence, and criminal activity. In 2006, U.S.
officials acknowledged that violence was increasing, including the use of
improvised explosive devices, such as the one used against the vehicle in
figure 11, and suicide bombers.^21 U.S. military officials also stated the
presence and strength of the Taliban increased, particularly in the south;
that they demonstrated better command and control and fighting with
increased intensity; and that Afghanistan has seen the highest rates of
violence since the Taliban regime was removed from power in 2001.
Moreover, UN accessibility maps that denote the risk level of different
areas of Afghanistan also show that the security environment in many areas
of Afghanistan has worsened noticeably.

Figure 11: Aftermath of April 7, 2006, Improvised Explosive Device Attack
on Government Vehicle in Helmand

During the 2005-2006 growing season, eradication forces and alternative
livelihoods personnel were attacked several times and in some cases
killed, slowing or preventing their efforts.

           o In a two-week period in March 2006, Helmand had 20 confirmed
           security incidents, including 4 rocket attacks, 8 improvised
           explosive devices, 5 assassinations, and 3 incidents of
           intimidation against public officials. U.S. officials said that
           many of the incidents were related to the eradication campaign.
           o In April 2006, AEF came under direct attack and encountered
           improvised explosive devices and mines while eradicating in
           Helmand province, including a mine that exploded on April 10,
           killing two AEF security personnel and wounding two others.
           o In May 2006, the alternative livelihoods contractor in the north
           reported that two staff members were killed when their vehicle was
           struck by an improvised explosive device. USAID and contractor
           officials stated the attack may have occurred in retribution for
           the contractor's discovery of fraud on one of its cash-for-work
           projects, or may have been because of eradication occurring in the
           area.
           o That same month, AEF had a standoff with farmers in Badakshan
           province, and in June, came under small arms fire that injured two
           AEF police.
           o Also in May, in Nangarhar, where the security situation had been
           more permissive, the alternative livelihoods contractor reported
           that antigovernment groups were offering rewards for conducting
           attacks in the region.
           o In June 2006, State decided not to allow the PEP international
           advisors to move into their housing in Oruzgan province until the
           threat level diminished and construction of an office complex
           could begin.
           o During the first half of June 2006, the USAID contractor
           reported that Afghan nationals were threatened with retribution if
           they participated in alternative-livelihoods projects. This
           circumstance, combined with the travel restrictions resulting from
           the volatile security situation, restricted the progress of road
           construction and irrigation system repairs.
			  
			    Afghan Infrastructure, Human Capital, and Government Institutional
				 Capacities Are Limited

           Reducing opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan
           will take at least a decade, in part because of the need to
           address Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure, human capital, and
           government capacity. According to U.S., International Monetary
           Fund, and other officials, the impoverished country lacks adequate
           roads and access to power; its labor force is mostly illiterate
           and untrained; and the government, saddled with prevalent
           corruption, has a weak judicial sector and is not expected to be
           able to cover its own expenses in the near future. These
           limitations discourage investment in Afghanistan and make
           Afghanistan dependent on foreign assistance.

           The nation has few roads and poor access to power. Furthermore,
           the lack of roads makes it difficult for farmers to get goods to
           markets and the lack of electricity makes it difficult for farmers
           to store perishable goods. Afghanistan has one major highway, the
           "ring-road," but access to certain areas can still take weeks or
           more and, during winter months, some areas are completely
           inaccessible, according to U.S. and UN officials. In Badakshan,
           the alternative livelihoods contractor reported that significant
           upgrades to the primary road networks were needed in order to
           allow farmers to deliver fresh vegetables to market centers
           without the produce being bruised, smashed, or otherwise damaged.
           Further, project staff reported that they were unable to visit
           some field sites in the province at the end of April 2006 because
           of heavy rains that made the roads impassable. The lack of
           reliable power was cited as a major concern by potential
           investors. In the short term, USAID intends to provide generators
           for the industrial parks it is planning to build to assure
           investors of reliable power.

           Afghanistan's human capital provides another capacity problem as
           most of the population is illiterate and many are untrained. U.S.
           and UN officials stated that illiteracy is a tremendous problem,
           making it difficult to recruit police, prosecutors, and
           investigators, adding that even some provincial governors are
           illiterate. Furthermore, the high illiteracy further complicated
           efforts to train Afghans, and the lack of trained personnel meant
           that even government ministries had few adequately trained staff.
           For example, the UN provided the Afghans a small lab for drug
           testing, but it had to be staffed and funded by the UN.

           Capacity is also a challenge for Afghanistan's government;
           corruption is endemic, the judicial sector is weak, and the
           government is not expected to be able to support itself for at
           least 10 years, according to U.S. and other officials.

           o According to U.S. embassy officials, most Afghan public salaries
           are very low, which makes corruption more likely. Moreover,
           corrupt officials are rarely removed from their government jobs,
           but are instead reassigned. For example, as mentioned earlier,
           corrupt eradicators accepted bribes to skip certain poppy fields,
           which eliminated the biggest deterrent to poppy cultivation. In
           addition, corrupt judicial officials reduce the fear of legal
           repercussions for drug traffickers.
           o U.S. officials stated that rebuilding the judicial sector of
           Afghanistan lagged behind the other four security pillars--army,
           police, combating drugs, and disarmament. In 2005, we reported
           that overall justice sector reform was underfunded and
           understaffed.^22 To date, four years after the Geneva conference
           established the five-pillared security agenda, work to establish a
           permanent criminal code has not been completed.
           o According to State officials, the government will be unable to
           support its recurring costs without foreign assistance for at
           least 10 years. In 2004-2005, Afghan government revenues equaled
           less than one-third of its recurring expenditures. Consequently,
           Afghanistan remains dependent on other nations for over half of
           its budget.
			  
			    USAID and State Made Efforts to Oversee the Use of Funds, but 
				 Lack of Information and Security Limited Some Efforts

           In an effort to prevent counternarcotics funds from assisting
           terrorists, drug traffickers, or human rights violators in
           Afghanistan, USAID and State required that grantees sign
           antiterrorism and antitrafficking certifications, financial
           agreements contain antiterrorism and antitrafficking clauses, and
           Afghan security personnel receiving training be vetted for
           associations with prohibited activities when applicable. However,
           a lack of official records and reliable information limited
           efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and
           State made efforts to monitor ongoing projects to ascertain their
           status, security concerns and poor infrastructure limited the
           agencies' monitoring of sites outside Kabul.
			  
			    Agencies Required Certifications, Clauses, and Vetting to Help
				 Prevent Funds from Being Used for Prohibited Purposes, but
				 Lack of Information Hampered Vetting

           To comply with federal bans on assisting terrorists, drug
           traffickers, and human rights violators,^23 USAID and State
           required that grantees certify their nonsupport of prohibited
           individuals or groups; that financial agreements contain clauses
           outlining U.S. prohibitions; and that candidates for security
           training or assistance are vetted.

           o Certifications. USAID issued guidance requiring that recipients
           of all grants and cooperative agreements sign certifications
           attesting that they are not supporting, and have not supported,
           terrorists. In signing the certifications, recipients also
           acknowledged the steps they are to take to help prevent assistance
           from being provided to terrorists, including reviewing U.S. and UN
           lists of known terrorists. In addition, USAID and State require
           recipients of assistance to certify that they have not been
           convicted of, or involved in, a narcotics offense.^24 We reviewed
           USAID grants and contracts and found that the required
           certifications were included where required by USAID's
           regulations. According to State, its letter of agreement with the
           government of Afghanistan requires that each recipient of foreign
           assistance sign a certification disclosing any past
           narcotrafficking. State also included this requirement in fund
           transfers to USAID, Justice, and Defense.
           o Clauses. USAID requires that financial agreements, including
           contracts and grants, contain a clause intended to familiarize
           award recipients with their legal responsibilities to comply with
           the executive order and law prohibiting assistance to
           terrorists.^25 In addition, both USAID and State require that any
           financial agreement representing more than $100,000 contain a
           clause to familiarize award recipients with their legal
           responsibilities to comply with the law prohibiting assistance to
           drug traffickers. In our review of the 10 alternative livelihoods
           program grants and contracts, we found that each agreement
           included the clauses that were required.

           o Vetting. USAID and State require the vetting of individuals and
           organizations for involvement with drug trafficking, through the
           review of arrest records and assessment of the credibility of any
           trafficking allegations. State also requires the vetting of
           individuals and organizations against criminal and terrorist
           databases for any involvement in terrorism or human rights
           violations. According to State, the U.S. embassy runs initial
           screening of security force personnel against local databases and
           with nongovernmental organizations. State then forwards
           biographical data on security forces to the Bureau of Democracy,
           Human Rights and Labor and Bureau of South and Central Asian
           Affairs for vetting against classified and unclassified databases
           to identify criminal conduct, including that related to terrorism,
           narcotrafficking, and human rights violations. However, USAID's
           and State's vetting of Afghan nationals was constrained by limited
           or incomplete records and the difficulty of investigating
           widespread allegations of misconduct. According to State, USAID,
           and contract officials, after years of conflict, Afghanistan lacks
           many official records, such as birth, identification, and criminal
           records. According to U.S. officials, this lack of records forced
           them to rely on word of mouth to vet Afghan nationals. Moreover,
           rivals often accuse one another of criminality and affiliation
           with terrorists or drug traffickers, and it is difficult to
           investigate the truth of these allegations. To assist with future
           vetting, State plans to administer lie-detector tests to certain
           project participants. However, as of July 2006, State had not been
           able to initiate the testing.
			  
			    Efforts Made to Monitor Projects, but Access to Project Sites Is
				 Limited

           USAID and State monitor project performance through contractor
           reports, site visits, and information from third parties, such as
           the U.S. military or Afghan officials, as access to project sites
           outside Kabul is difficult because of security conditions and poor
           infrastructure. Contractors developed performance management
           plans, which include performance indicators, a monitoring and
           evaluation plan, and reporting requirements. Furthermore,
           according to U.S. officials, USAID and State used experienced U.S.
           firms and international organizations as the primary grantees and
           contractors. For example, State hired DynCorp International, a
           company that State uses to carry out counternarcotics efforts in
           Colombia and elsewhere, to implement its eradication efforts and
           used the UN to carry out some of the border security station
           rehabilitation in Tajikistan. USAID hired three U.S. firms already
           experienced with working in Afghanistan--Chemonics International;
           Development Alternatives, Inc.; and Planning and Development
           Collaboration International--to run its alternative livelihoods
           projects.

           USAID attempted to assess progress through various means. First,
           USAID's contractors submitted required biweekly reports detailing
           challenges and progress in their respective provinces. For
           example, in May 2006, the contractor in the south reported that
           "security concerns have dramatically decreased project
           activities... as such, no monitoring visits were conducted."
           During the same period, the contractor in the east reported they
           were able "to monitor active and completed cash-for-work
           projects." In addition to these reports, USAID assigned a project
           officer to each region's provincial reconstruction teams' compound
           to be responsible for monitoring the contract. They attempted to
           get to the field as often as possible to view the progress of
           projects and assist in developing new ones. USAID also relied on
           the local U.S. military commanders and Afghan officials to report
           on the status of any projects they saw. For example, the U.S.
           commander in Nangarhar told us during our visit that when he goes
           on routine patrols, he tries to visit any USAID projects in the
           vicinity of his patrol and provides any information from those
           patrols to the resident USAID representative.

           State contractors and other implementers of State-funded projects
           submitted the required reports on the progress and obstacles
           facing their projects. For example, DynCorp submits biweekly
           reports detailing the activities of the leased aircraft, AEF, and
           PEP teams, and reporting on problems, such as the challenges of
           hiring qualified international advisors for the PEP teams. In
           addition, State personnel stated that they regularly travel to
           program sites. For example, State staff made visits to the AEF
           while it was out in the field. Similarly, the Justice prosecutors
           stated that they work several times a week with the CJTF.

           Despite these efforts, external factors, such as security and
           Afghanistan's poor infrastructure, limited project monitoring by
           reducing USAID's, contractors', and, to a lesser extent, State's
           access to project sites. For example, in Helmand, the monitoring
           and evaluation plan developed by USAID's alternative livelihoods
           contractor could not be implemented because of the danger to both
           Afghans and foreign nationals traveling in the area. Additionally,
           USAID field staff were constrained by security rules and
           restrictions established by the military commanders in their
           areas. For example, in Nangarhar, monitoring staff must provide
           U.S. commanders 96-hours notice for trips outside the military
           camp, and these trips can be cancelled at any time if sufficient
           military personnel are not available to provide security. Poor
           infrastructure limits the ability to monitor projects. In northern
           Afghanistan, many roads are impassable during the winter months.
           Furthermore, many areas can only be reached via helicopter or on
           foot, as no roads exist. State projects in and around Kabul are
           more accessible, and, therefore, are easier to monitor.
           Additionally, the eradication efforts funded by State are being
           monitored by UNODC in cooperation with Afghanistan's government
           and are also confirmed through satellite and other imagery.
           However, UNODC was unable to send ground monitors to Helmand to
           verify governor-led eradication efforts there.
			  
   			  Concluding Observations

           Despite significant efforts by USAID and State, the deteriorating
           security situation in Afghanistan threatens the success of the
           U.S. counternarcotics goal of significantly reducing illicit drug
           cultivation, production, and trafficking. Unlike in our prior
           reports concerning other programs in Afghanistan, we found USAID
           and State had developed a strategy for counternarcotics tailored
           to Afghanistan's difficult environment. They reported some
           accomplishments in each of the strategy's five pillars;
           nevertheless, the opium poppy crop in 2006 grew by over 50
           percent, reaching a record amount. The worsening security
           situation, particularly because of the Taliban's resurgence,
           threatens to derail U.S. efforts by slowing or stopping projects.
           Moreover, the pace of U.S. efforts was further slowed by the
           country's persistent developmental challenges, including
           inadequate access to roads and limited government institutions.
           Given the difficulties of working in Afghanistan, sustainable
           progress toward the U.S. counternarcotics goal will likely take a
           decade or more of committed U.S. resources and efforts. Because
           many of the counternarcotics projects are still in the early
           stages of implementation, we have no recommendations at this time.
			  
			    Agency Comments

           We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to
           State, USAID, Defense, and Justice. Each agency informed us that
           they were not providing formal comments. However, USAID and
           Justice provided technical comments, which we have incorporated
           into the report where appropriate.

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-3149 or [email protected] . Contact
           points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
           Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff
           who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

           David Gootnick,
			  Director International Affairs and Trade
			  
			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

           To examine the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID)
           and Department of State's (State) progress in implementing
           counternarcotics programs, projects, and activities under each
           pillar, and the factors, if any, limiting implementation, we
           reviewed pertinent USAID and State planning, funding, and
           reporting documents for their counternarcotics programs in
           Afghanistan. Our review of these documents provided us with
           information regarding the program's structure, goals, objectives,
           progress, and limitations. In addition, we met with cognizant
           officials from Departments of Defense (Defense), Justice
           (Justice), and State; USAID; and Drug Enforcement Administration
           (DEA) in Washington, D.C. and Kabul, Afghanistan. In Kabul, we
           also met with officials from the United Nations (UN) and the
           governments of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom to discuss
           counternarcotics efforts. We traveled to the provinces of Balkh,
           Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar to meet with U.S. and Afghan
           officials and discussed various U.S.-funded projects. For example,
           in Helmand and Nangarhar, we met with the governors to discuss the
           progress of USAID's alternative livelihoods projects, visited
           several projects, and met with U.S. contractors implementing the
           projects. In Balkh, we met with the governor to discuss the
           governor-led eradication efforts and how U.S. assistance was being
           used. While in Kandahar, we met with State contractors and
           observed the aircraft being used to enhance the AEF's eradication
           efforts.

           To examine the challenges faced by counternarcotics efforts in
           Afghanistan, we reviewed USAID, State, and Defense documents
           addressing the status of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
           Additionally, we reviewed UN, International Monetary Fund, and
           academic reports regarding the current security and economic
           situation in Afghanistan, as well as discussing its past problems
           and outlook for the future. Specifically, we reviewed several
           months of UN reporting on the security situation in Afghanistan in
           regards to what precautions their personnel needed to take. In
           addition, we met with experts and attended academic symposia in
           Washington, D.C., regarding Afghanistan's current situation and
           the challenges it faces in the future.

           To examine USAID's and State's efforts to ensure that the fiscal
           year 2005 counternarcotics funds were used for intended purposes,
           we reviewed the contracts, grants, and other financial agreements
           by which these funds were obligated and expended. We reviewed
           USAID contracts and State financial instruments that received
           fiscal year 2005 counternarcotics funding. We met with USAID and
           State budget and financial officers in Washington, D.C., and Kabul
           to discuss the safeguards placed on the funds. Additionally, we
           talked to several contractors in Afghanistan about their
           monitoring plans and ability to implement them.

           To determine the reliability of the funding data, we compared data
           from multiple sources. For example, we compared the funding data
           we received from USAID and State with the appropriations language
           and congressional notifications. Although we did not audit the
           funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them, based on
           our examination of the documents received and our discussions with
           cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the funding data we
           obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
           report. To determine the reliability of United Nations Office on
           Drugs and Crime (UNODC) eradication and opium poppy cultivation
           data, we reviewed the methodology used to estimate the areas where
           opium poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan in 2005. In particular,
           we reviewed the sampling and estimation procedures used, the ways
           in which satellite imagery was incorporated into the estimate, and
           the procedures followed by the ground surveyors. We noted that the
           sampling methods were appropriate for generating estimates for
           Afghanistan as a whole, but that there were limitations to the
           estimates for particular provinces. Overall, we determined that
           the methodologies used by the UNODC were reasonable, and that the
           results were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
           report. To determine the reliability of Afghan public opinion
           survey data, we reviewed the survey methodology used by the Afghan
           Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research, and determined it
           to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. The information on
           foreign law in this report does not reflect our independent legal
           analysis, but is based on interviews and secondary sources.

           However, because of the security situation in Afghanistan, we
           could not independently verify or randomly test USAID or State
           project information at field locations. Nevertheless, based on our
           assessments of the data provided, our discussions with the
           cognizant officials, and limited field visits, we concluded that
           the counternarcotics program data provided to us were sufficiently
           reliable for the purposes of this report.
			  
			  Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact

           David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149
			  
			  Staff Acknowledgments

           Key contributors to this report were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus,
           Thomas Costa, Elizabeth Repko, Reid Lowe, and David Bruno.
			  
			  GAOï¿½s Mission

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^21In June 2004 and July 2005, we reported security was deteriorating. See
[46]GAO-04-403 and [47]GAO-05-742 .

^22 [48]GAO-05-575 .

^23Executive Order 13224 blocks property and prohibits transactions with
persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, and 18 USC
2339A and 2339B criminalizes the knowing provision of material support or
resources, including financial support, lodging, equipment,
transportation, training, and expert advice, to terrorists or foreign
terrorist organizations. Section 487 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended (codified at 22 USC 2291f), and Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 22, Part 140, implementing the act, prohibit assistance
to drug traffickers and require the President to take all reasonable steps
to ensure that U.S. assistance is not provided to drug traffickers. The
"Leahy Amendment," which has been regularly incorporated into foreign
operations appropriations bills, prohibits security assistance to foreign
security force units implicated in human rights violations.

^24The regulations implementing section 487 of the Foreign Assistance Act
(22 CFR 140), allow for certain exceptions, including assistance to small
farmers when part of a community-based alternative development project.

^25USAID issued the guidelines requiring the antiterrorism clause and
certification although it was not legally required to do so. State has not
issued, and is not required to issue, such guidance or procedures.

(320388)

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs


www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [50]GAO-07-78 , a report to congressional committees

November 2006

AFGHANISTAN DRUG CONTROL

Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S.
Goals

The prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in
Afghanistan imperils the stability of its government and threatens to turn
the conflict-ridden nation once again into a safe haven for traffickers
and terrorists. To combat the drug trade, the U.S. government developed a
counternarcotics strategy consisting of five pillars--alternative
livelihoods, elimination and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement
and justice, and public information.

The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2005 directed GAO to
examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State
(State) for Afghan counternarcotics programs. To comply with this mandate,
we examined progress under each counternarcotics pillar, challenges faced,
and efforts to ensure that funds were used for intended purposes. To
address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent USAID and State documents
and met with cognizant U.S. and international officials in Washington,
D.C., and Afghanistan.

GAO makes no recommendations in this report. USAID, State, Department of
Defense, and Department of Justice were provided a draft of this report,
but did not provide formal comments.

USAID and State received about $532 million in fiscal year 2005 funds and
initiated a number of projects under each counternarcotics pillar, but
delays in implementation limited progress. For example, State's provision
of aircraft enhanced the mobility of eradicators, but coordination
difficulties between Afghan officials and security forces delayed the
eradicators' fielding. Despite increased eradication and other U.S.
efforts, the poppy crop grew by 50 percent in 2006 to a record level.
However, many projects have not been in place long enough to assess
progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing drug
cultivation, production, and trafficking. For example, projects to provide
rural credit and to field teams to discourage poppy cultivation were not
in place prior to the 2005-2006 growing season.

The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are
tremendous challenges to the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in
Afghanistan. The security situation continues to decline; during the
2005-2006 growing season, eradicators were attacked several times and
alternative livelihoods project personnel were killed. Moreover, due to
Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning
governmental institutions, significantly reducing poppy cultivation and
drug trafficking is expected to take at least a decade.

USAID and State have made efforts to oversee the use of funds, including
the use of self certifications, contract clauses, and vetting, when
applicable. However, a lack of official records and reliable information
limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and
State have made efforts to monitor ongoing projects, security concerns and
poor infrastructure limited site visits.

Five Pillar Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan

References

Visible links

  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742
  37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  46. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403
  47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742
  48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78
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