Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE
Port Act (26-APR-07, GAO-07-754T).
The United States has a vital national interest in maritime
security. The safety and economic security of the United States
depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world's
waterways and ports. In an effort to further the progress made
through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act)
was passed and became effective in October 2006. This testimony,
which is based on past GAO work, synthesizes the results of this
work as it pertains to the following: (1) overall port security,
(2) facility security at U.S. ports, (3) the international supply
chain and cargo container security, and (4) customs revenue
collection efforts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-754T
ACCNO: A68854
TITLE: Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of
the SAFE Port Act
DATE: 04/26/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Background investigations
Container security
Employees
Facility security
Harbors
Homeland security
Human capital management
Human capital planning
Inspection
Maritime security
Port security
Requirements definition
Tanks (containers)
Terrorism
Transportation workers
Program implementation
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GAO-07-754T
* [1]Summary
* [2]Prior Actions Have Improved Port Security, but Challenges Re
* [3]Area Committees and Interagency Operational Centers Have Bec
* [4]Area Plans Are in Place but Do Not Address Natural Disaster
* [5]Maritime Security Exercises Require a Broader Scope and Part
* [6]Coast Guard Is in Process of Evaluating the Security of Fore
* [7]Port Facility Security Efforts Are Long Standing, but Additi
* [8]Coast Guard Faces Challenges in Monitoring Compliance of Mar
* [9]TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the TWIC Program, but
* [10]Multiple Background Check Programs for Transportation Worker
* [11]Container Security Programs Maturing, but Implementation Cha
* [12]Automated Targeting System Continues to Require Management A
* [13]The CSI Program Has Matured but Challenges Remain
* [14]DOE Has Made Progress with Megaports Program
* [15]Secure Freight Initiative Only Recently Announced
* [16]C-TPAT Maturing, but Validation and Other Management Challen
* [17]DHS's Emphasis on Security Issues Has Contributed to Diminis
* [18]Although Improving, CBP Failed to Maintain Mandated Staffing
* [19]CBP Lacks a Strategic Workforce Plan, but Some Steps Taken t
* [20]CBP's Public Reporting Does Not Ensure Accountability for Cu
* [21]Concluding Observations
* [22]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
* [23]GAO's Mission
* [24]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [25]Order by Mail or Phone
* [26]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [27]Congressional Relations
* [28]Public Affairs
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism;
Committee on Homeland Security; House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT
Thursday, April 26, 2007
MARITIME SECURITY
Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act
Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director
Homeland Security and Justice
GAO-07-754T
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss port security and revenue
functions related to provisions of the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act).^1 The nation's ports are the doorway for
more than 80 percent of our foreign trade. Worldwide, some 30 large ports,
spread across North America, Asia, and Europe constitute the world's
primary, interdependent trading web. Much of this trade--particularly
high-value cargo--enters and leaves in cargo containers. In 2004, for
example, $423 billion worth of goods traveling to the United States
arrived in 15.8 billion container loads. Similarly, ports are vital for
our energy supplies. In 2005, 55 percent of the nation's crude oil supply
and all of the liquefied natural gas supply was imported on seagoing
tankers. The trade that passes through ports also generates substantial
revenue for the U.S. government.
In our post September 11, 2001, environment, however, the potential
security weaknesses presented by these economic doorways have become
readily apparent. Ports present potential terrorist targets: they are
sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, often close to urban
areas, and contain facilities that represent opportunities for inflicting
significant damage as well as causing economic mayhem. Further, they are
conduits for weapons prepared elsewhere and concealed in cargo designed to
move quickly to many locations beyond the ports themselves. At this time,
the U.S. government does not require that all cargo destined for the
United States be checked until it arrives.
Since the 9/11 attacks, a new port security framework has taken form. Much
of this framework was set in place by the Maritime Transportation Security
Act (MTSA).^2 Enacted in November 2002, MTSA was designed, in part, to
help protect the nation's ports and waterways from terrorist attacks
through a wide range of security improvements. Among the major
requirements included in MTSA were (1) conducting vulnerability
assessments for port facilities and vessels; (2) developing security plans
to mitigate identified risks for the national maritime system, ports, port
facilities, and vessels; (3) developing the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC), a biometric identification card to help
restrict access to secure areas to only authorized personnel; and (4)
establishment of a process to assess foreign ports, from which vessels
depart on voyages to the United States. Much of this framework is
administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), itself a
creation of the new security environment brought on by the September 11,
2001, attacks. This framework also attempts to balance security priorities
with the need to facilitate legitimate trade.
^1Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1184 (2006).
^2Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
One of the latest additions to this port security framework is the SAFE
Port Act, which was passed and took effect in October of 2006. The act
made a number of adjustments to programs within this framework, creating
additional programs or lines of effort and altering others. The SAFE Port
Act created and codified new programs and initiatives, and amended some of
the original provisions of MTSA. The SAFE Port Act included provisions
that (1) codified the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)--two programs
administered by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to help reduce any
threats stemming from cargo containers; (2) established port security
interagency operational centers at all high risk ports; (3) set an
implementation schedule and fee restrictions for TWIC; (4) required that
all containers entering high volume U.S. ports be scanned for radiation
sources by December 31, 2007; and (5) required additional data be made
available to CBP for targeting cargo containers for inspection. The SAFE
Port Act also mandated GAO to report to Congress on some topics related to
maritime security, including (1) the security of ports overseas in the
Caribbean Basin; (2) the background check program for transportation
workers, including those seeking access to ports and other sensitive
areas; and (3) the extent to which DHS continues to collect revenues at
ports given the new emphasis on security.^3 This statement summarizes our
work on these three mandates, though all of them have been, or will be,
addressed in separate reports.
Over the past several years, we have examined and reported on many of the
programs in this new port security framework. This statement is designed
both to provide an overview of what we have learned about these programs
and to describe, to the extent we have information available, what DHS is
doing as a result of the SAFE Port Act requirements and the challenges it
faces in doing so. This statement discusses more than a dozen programs and
lines of effort, as shown in table 1.
^3The SAFE Port Act had an additional requirement that GAO report on DHS
pre-screening for charter and leased aircraft. Today's statement, with its
primary emphasis on maritime security and other activities at seaports,
does not address this other reporting requirement.
Table 1: Summary of Programs and Lines of Effort Included in this
Statement
Program Description
Overall port security
Area Maritime Security Committees consisting of key port
Committees stakeholders who share information and
develop port security plans.
Interagency Operational Command centers where agencies share
Centers information, coordinate their activities,
and coordinate joint efforts.
Area Maritime Security Plans Plan laying out local port vulnerabilities,
responsibilities, and some response actions.
Port security exercises Exercises among various port stakeholders to
test the effectiveness of port security
plans.
Evaluations of security at Coast Guard officers visiting and assessing
foreign ports security conditions at foreign ports.
Port facility security
Port facility security plans Facilities are required to have security
plans and security officers.
Port facility security Coast Guard reviews of port facility
compliance monitoring security plans and their compliance with
such plans.
Transportation Worker Biometric identification cards to be issued
Identification Credential to port workers to help secure access to
areas of ports.
Background checks DHS requirements for persons who enter
secure or restricted areas or transport
hazardous cargo.
International supply chain--container security
Automated Targeting System Risk based decision system to determine
cargo containers requiring inspection.
Container Security Initiative Stationing CBP officers at foreign ports to
help identify and inspect high risk cargo
containers.
Megaports Initiative Radiation detection technology at foreign
ports to stop the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
Secure Freight Initiative Combines Container Security Initiative
scanning with Megaports Initiative radiation
detection at foreign ports.
Customs-Trade Partnership Partnership between private companies and
Against Terrorism CBP to improved international supply chain
security.
Customs revenue functions
Customs and Border Protection Collect revenues applied to incoming cargo
as appropriate based on tariffs and other
laws and regulations.
Source: GAO.
This statement is organized into four main areas, as follows:
o Programs related to overall port security, such as those for
developing security plans, coordinating among stakeholders, and
conducting exercises to test security procedures.
o Programs related more specifically to security at individual
facilities, such as examining security measures and ensuring that
only properly cleared individuals have access to port areas.
o Programs related more specifically to the international supply
chain and to cargo container security, such as screening
containers at ports both here and abroad.
o The extent to which DHS--and more specifically, CBP--has
maintained the customs revenue function formerly managed by the
Department of the Treasury at ports.
This statement is based primarily on a body of work we have completed in
response to congressional requests and mandates for analysis of maritime,
port, and cargo security efforts of the federal government. The end of
this report has a list of relevant GAO reports and testimonies. As such,
the timeliness of the data that was the basis for our prior reporting
varies depending on when our products were issued. In several cases, such
as CBP's maintenance of effort on the customs revenue function, our
findings are based on recent work specifically conducted in response to
SAFE Port Act requirements. We conducted all of our work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards, and the scope and
methodology for this work can be found in the respective products.
Similarly, agency comments on the findings we cite can be found in the
respective products. While this body of work does not cover all the
provisions of the SAFE Port Act, it does cover a wide range of these
provisions.
Summary
Regarding overall port security, the Coast Guard has generally implemented
key requirements laid out in MTSA. It has established area maritime
security committees, written area maritime security plans, conducted
exercises to test such plans, and visited foreign ports to assess their
compliance with international port security standards. In addition, the
SAFE Port Act called for changes in several programs related to developing
and testing security plans and coordinating information across agency
lines. For example, it called for establishing interagency operational
centers at all high-risk ports in the United States within 3 years. Three
ports currently have such centers, which are designed to have a unified
command structure that can act on a variety of incidents ranging from
possible terrorist attacks to search and rescue and environmental response
operations. Several new interagency operational centers are about to come
on line, but in continuing the expansion, DHS may face such challenges as
creating effective working relationships and dealing with potential
coordination problems. Additionally, the SAFE Port Act required the
establishment of a Port Security Exercise Program to test and evaluate the
capabilities of various governmental and nongovernmental entities when
faced with emergencies, and to improve the communication of lessons
learned during the exercises. We have not specifically reviewed the
implementation of these new requirements, but our past work suggests that
the need to increase the already substantial exercise program, the need to
quickly and thoroughly complete after action reports and the increased
need for interagency coordination for the exercises may challenge port
security stakeholders' efforts. The act also called for expanding a
program in which the Coast Guard works with other countries to assess--and
where needed, strengthen--their security procedures. The Coast Guard has
developed plans for meeting these requirements, but it is likely to face
challenges in developing sufficient staff to deal with the increased
workload.
Regarding security at individual facilities at ports, MTSA has generally
been implemented in that facilities have written and implemented security
plans and the Coast Guard has inspected such facilities to verify
compliance and take enforcement actions where necessary. However, the MTSA
required transportation worker identification card has been plagued by
delays. The SAFE Port Act called for such steps as mandating the frequency
of Coast Guard inspections of facilities, requiring unannounced
inspections, and directing the implementation of the initial phase of the
transportation worker identification card program by mid-2007. The Coast
Guard, which is responsible for the facility inspection program, is likely
to face challenges in putting enough trained inspectors in place,
especially since many experienced inspectors are scheduled to rotate to
other duties. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the agency
responsible for implementing the identification card, told us it has drawn
up plans and schedules for implementing the program as required and has
also brought on additional expertise to deal with past problems in the
program's development. The effectiveness of these steps is not likely to
be known until the deadlines approach. While DHS has created the Screening
Coordination Office (SCO) to better coordinate the various background
checks, it will be challenged to fully coordinate all the DHS screening
programs, ensuring that the cost and benefits of potentially eliminating
or keeping different screening programs are properly considered, and
coordinating with other federal screening programs outside DHS.
Regarding the security of containers that move through ports, CBP has
developed a layered security strategy to identify and inspect suspicious
containers, and to work with both foreign governments and private firms to
improve the security of the international supply chain. Many of the
provisions in the SAFE Port Act dealing with container security served to
codify existing programs in DHS--such as a program to place CBP officials
in foreign ports to help target suspicious containers and a program where
private companies agree to improve the security of their supply chains in
exchange for reduced scrutiny over their shipments--it also expanded and
provided additional guidance for those programs. The SAFE Port Act also
required pilot programs to test new technologies or combine existing
technologies for scanning cargo containers. In our prior work on container
security programs, we found that progress had been made, but challenges
could affect ongoing efforts. Examples of progress made include increasing
the number of foreign ports where U.S. officials are located and a rapid
growth in the number of companies agreeing to take steps to secure their
supply chains. Examples of challenges include ensuring adequate staff are
available, and the inability to directly test the security measures used
by different companies in their supply chains, particularly overseas.
Since DHS was formed, it has focused on homeland security issues,
including striving to prevent terrorists entering or attacking the United
States through its ports, but has not provided the same focus on ensuring
the maintenance of customs revenue functions. Although it has improved
recently, CBP has not maintained the mandated staffing levels for
performing customs revenue functions, due in part to homeland security
priorities. Despite a legislative mandate to at least maintain minimum
specific numbers of staff in certain key customs revenue positions, the
numbers of staff in several of these positions have declined since the
formation of DHS. The numbers of staff in other positions that can help
improve the performance of customs revenue functions have declined also.
Further, CBP has not produced a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it
has a sufficient number of staff with the necessary skills and
competencies to effectively perform customs revenue functions. While CBP
has made recent efforts to improve the management of its human capital for
performing customs revenue functions, gaps in these efforts remain.
Finally, CBP's public reporting on its performance of customs revenue
functions does not ensure accountability. For example, despite being the
second largest revenue generator for the U.S. government, CBP does not
publicly report on performance measures related to its customs revenue
functions in its annual plans and Performance and Accountability Reports,
the official documents agencies issue to Congress and the public to report
program performance.
We have reviewed many of the MTSA and SAFE Port Act related programs and
made recommendations to the appropriate agencies to develop strategic
plans, better plan their use of human capital, establish performance
measures, and otherwise improve the operations of these programs. In
general, these agencies have concurred with our recommendations and are
making progress implementing them.
Prior Actions Have Improved Port Security, but Challenges Remain
Port security in general has improved as a result of the development of
organizations and programs such as Area Maritime Security Committees (area
committees), Area Maritime Security Plans (area plans), maritime security
exercises, and the International Port Security Program, but challenges to
successful implementation of these efforts remain. Additionally,
management of these programs will need to address additional requirements
directed by the SAFE Port Act. Area committees and interagency operational
centers have improved information sharing, but the types and ways
information is shared varies. Area plans are limited to security incidents
and could benefit from unified planning to include an all-hazards
approach. Maritime security exercises would benefit from timely and
complete after action reports, increased collaboration across federal
agencies, and broader port level coordination. The Coast Guard's
International Port Security Program is currently evaluating the
antiterrorism measures maintained at foreign seaports.
Area Committees and Interagency Operational Centers Have Become Important Forums
for Coordination and Information-Sharing across Agencies
Two main types of forums have developed as ways for agencies to coordinate
and share information about port security--area committees and interagency
operational centers. Area committees serve as a forum for port
stakeholders, facilitating the dissemination of information through
regularly scheduled meetings, issuance of electronic bulletins, and
sharing key documents. MTSA provided the Coast Guard with the authority to
create area committees--composed of federal, state, local, and industry
members--that help to develop the area plan for the port. As of June 2006,
the Coast Guard had organized 46 area committees. Each has flexibility to
assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of its port area,
resulting in variations in the number of participants, the types of state
and local organizations involved, and the way in which information is
shared. Some examples of information shared includes assessments of
vulnerabilities at specific port locations, information about potential
threats or suspicious activities, and Coast Guard strategies intended for
use in protecting key infrastructure.
Interagency operational centers are currently located at three
ports--Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego,
California. These centers are designed to unite maritime intelligence and
operational efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants.^4
Unlike area committees, they are operational in nature with a unified or
joint command structure designed to receive information from multiple
sources and act on it. However, the centers fulfill varying missions and
operations, and thus share different types of information. For example,
the Charleston center is led by the Department of Justice and focused
solely on port security, while the San Diego center is led by the Coast
Guard with missions expanding beyond port security to also include search
and rescue activities, drug interdiction, and environmental response.
In past work, we have reported that these two types of forums have both
been helpful in fostering cooperation and information-sharing.^5 We
reported that area committees provided a structure to improve the
timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing between
federal and nonfederal stakeholders. These committees were an improvement
over previous information-sharing efforts because they established a
formal structure and new procedures for sharing information. In contrast
to area committees, interagency operational centers can provide continuous
information about maritime activities and involve various agencies
directly in operational decisions using this information. While we have
reported that interagency operational centers have improved information
sharing, our past work has also shown the types of information and the way
information is shared varies at the operational centers depending on their
purpose and mission, leadership and organization, membership, technology,
and resources.
^4Existing interagency operations centers are led by the Coast Guard or
DOJ, and can include participation by representatives of organizations
such as the Navy, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, other
federal agencies, state and local law enforcement, or port security
personnel. The Charleston center was created through an appropriation in
the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (Pub. L. No.
108-7, 117 Stat. 11,53 (2003.)); the Norfolk and San Diego centers were
established as "Joint Harbor Operations Centers" between the Coast Guard
and Navy.
^5See GAO, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information
Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention,
[29]GAO-05-394 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005); Maritime Security:
Enhancements Made, but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key
Challenges, [30]GAO-05-448T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005); Maritime
Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving, [31]GAO-06-933T
(Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006).
The SAFE Port Act called for an expansion of interagency operational
centers, directing the Secretary of DHS to establish such centers at all
high-risk priority ports no later than 3 years after the Act's enactment.
In addition to authorizing the appropriation of funds and requiring DHS to
report on potential cost-sharing at the centers, it directs the new
interagency operational centers to utilize the same compositional and
operational characteristics of existing centers, such as the pilot project
operational centers for port security. Currently two more centers are
expected to be functional within weeks. These will be located in
Jacksonville, Florida, and Seattle, Washington. Like the centers in San
Diego and Norfolk, they will both be operated jointly by the Coast Guard
and the Navy. In addition, the Coast Guard has developed its own
operational centers, called sector command centers, as part of an effort
to reorganize and improve its awareness of the maritime domain. These are
located at 35 ports to monitor information and to support planned future
operations, and some of these sector command centers may include other
agencies on either a regular or an ad hoc basis.
Information sharing efforts, whether through area committees or
interagency operational centers, face challenges in several areas. These
challenges include:
o Obtaining security clearances for port security stakeholders.
The lack of federal security clearances among port security
stakeholders has been routinely cited as a barrier to information
sharing, one of the primary goals of both the area committees and
interagency operational centers. In previous reviews, we found
that the inability to share classified information may limit the
ability to deter, prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist
attack. The Coast Guard has seen improvements based on its efforts
to sponsor security clearances for members of area committees. In
addition, the SAFE Port Act includes a specific provision
requiring DHS to sponsor and expedite security clearances for
participants in interagency operational centers. However, the
extent to which these efforts will ultimately improve information
sharing remains unclear.
o Creating effective working relationships. Another challenge
associated with establishing interagency operational centers at
all high risk ports is the difficulty associated with encouraging
various federal, state and local agencies to collaborate and share
information effectively under new structures and procedures. While
some of the existing operational centers found success with
existing interagency relationships, other high-risk ports might
face challenges establishing new working relationships among port
stakeholders and implementing their own interagency operational
centers.
o Addressing potential overlapping responsibilities. Overlapping
leadership roles between the Coast Guard and FBI have been seen
during port security exercises. While the SAFE Port Act designates
the Coast Guard Captain of the Port as the incident commander in
the event of a transportation security incident, the FBI also has
leadership responsibilities in terrorist incidents.^6 It is
important that actions across the various agencies are clear and
coordinated.
o Determining relationships among various centers. The
relationship between the interagency operations centers and the
recently developed Coast Guard sector command centers is still to
be determined. We have not studied this issue in depth, but it may
bear watching.
Area Plans Are in Place but Do Not Address Natural Disasters
Area plans are another MTSA requirement, and the specific provisions of
the plans have been specified by regulation and Coast Guard directive.
Implementing regulations for MTSA specified that area plans include, among
other things, operational and physical security measures in place at the
port under different security levels, details of the security incident
command and response structure, procedures for responding to security
threats including provisions for maintaining operations in the port, and
procedures to facilitate the recovery of the marine transportation system
after a security incident. A Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circular (NVIC) provided a common template for area plans and specified
the responsibilities of port stakeholders under the plans.^7 Currently, 46
area plans are in place at ports around the country. The Coast Guard
approved the plans by June 1, 2004, and MTSA requires that they be updated
at least every 5 years.
^6The Captain of the Port is a Coast Guard officer who enforces, within
their respective areas, port safety and security and marine environmental
protection regulations. There are 41 Captains of the Port nationwide.
^7NVICs provide detailed guidance about enforcement or compliance with
certain Coast Guard safety regulations and programs. NVIC 9-02, most
recently revised on October 27, 2005, detailed requirements for area
plans.
The SAFE Port Act added a requirement to area plans. To ensure that the
waterways are cleared and the flow of commerce through United States ports
is reestablished as efficiently and quickly as possible after a security
incident, the act specified that area plans include a salvage response
provision identifying salvage equipment capable of restoring operational
trade capacity. None of our past or current work specifically addresses
the extent to which area plans now include this provision. We have,
however, conducted other work that has a broader bearing on the scope of
area plans, and thus potentially on this provision as well.
In a recent report examining how ports are dealing with planning for
natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes, we noted that area
plans cover security issues but do not include other issues that could
have a major impact on a port's ability to support maritime commerce.^8 As
currently written, area plans are concerned with deterring and, to a
lesser extent, responding to security incidents. We found, however, that
unified consideration of all risks faced by a port, both natural and
man-made, may be beneficial. Because of the similarities between the
consequences of terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters,
much of the planning for protection, response, and recovery capabilities
is similar across all emergency events. Combining terrorism and other
threats can enhance the efficiency of port planning efforts because of the
similarity in recovery plans for both natural and security-related
disasters. This approach also allows port stakeholders to estimate the
relative value of different mitigation alternatives. The exclusion of
certain risks from consideration, or the separate consideration of a
particular type of risk, gives rise to the possibility that risks will not
be accurately assessed or compared, and that too many or too few resources
will be allocated toward mitigation of a particular risk. As ports
continue to revise and improve their planning efforts, available evidence
indicates that, if ports take a system-wide approach, thinking
strategically about using resources to mitigate and recover from all forms
of disaster, they will be able to achieve the most effective results. Area
plans provide a useful foundation for establishing an all-hazards
approach. While the SAFE Port Act does not call for expanding area plans
in this manner, it does contain a requirement that natural disasters and
other emergencies be included in the scenarios to be tested in the Port
Security Exercise Program. Based on our work, we found there are
challenges in using area committees and plans as the basis for broader
all-hazards planning. These challenges include:
^8GAO, Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports
in Disaster Planning and Recovery, [32]GAO-07-412 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
28, 2007).
o Determining the extent that security plans can serve all-hazards
purposes. We recommended that DHS encourage port stakeholders to
use area committees and area plans to discuss all-hazards
planning. While MTSA and its implementing regulations are focused
on transportation security incidents rather than natural disasters
and other types of emergencies, we believe that area plans provide
a useful foundation for establishing an all-hazards approach. Some
federal officials indicated that separate existing plans can
handle the range of threats that ports face. However, there would
need to be an analysis of gaps between different types of
planning. Finally, DHS noted that most emergency planning should
properly remain with state and local emergency management planners
and were cautious about the federal government taking on a larger
role.
Maritime Security Exercises Require a Broader Scope and Participation
MTSA regulations require the Coast Guard Captain of the Port and the area
committee to conduct or participate in exercises to test the effectiveness
of area plans once each calendar year, with no more than 18 months between
exercises. These exercises are designed to continuously improve
preparedness by validating information and procedures in the area plan,
identifying weaknesses and strengths, and practicing command and control
within an incident command/unified command framework. Such exercises have
been conducted for the past several years. For example, in fiscal year
2004, the Coast Guard conducted 85 port-based terrorism exercises that
addressed a variety of possible scenarios. In August 2005, the Coast Guard
and the TSA initiated the Port Security Training Exercise Program
(PortSTEP)--an exercise program designed to involve the entire port
community, including public governmental agencies and private industry,
and intended to improve connectivity of various surface transportation
modes and enhance area plans. Between August 2005 and October 2007, the
Coast Guard expects to conduct PortSTEP exercises for 40 area committees
and other port stakeholders.
The SAFE Port Act included several new requirements related to security
exercises. It required the establishment of a Port Security Exercise
Program to test and evaluate the capabilities of governments and port
stakeholders to prevent, prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, and
recover from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies
at facilities regulated by the MTSA. It also required the establishment of
a port security exercise improvement plan process that would identify,
disseminate, and monitor the implementation of lessons learned and best
practices from port security exercises. Finally, it added natural
disasters, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, to be included in the list
of scenarios to be tested.
Our work has not specifically examined compliance with these new
requirements, but our review of these requirements and our work in
examining past exercises suggests that implementing a successful exercise
program faces several challenges.^9 These challenges include:
o Setting the scope of the program. It will be necessary to
determine how exercise requirements in the SAFE Port Act differ
from area committee exercises that are currently performed.
Exercises currently conducted by area committees already test the
ability of a variety of port stakeholders to work together in the
event of a port incident. The potential exists for these efforts
to be duplicated under the SAFE Port Act exercise requirements. On
the other hand, the SAFE Port Act exercise requirements clearly
move beyond previous requirements by including natural disasters
and other emergencies in the list of scenarios to be exercised.
Ensuring that these scenarios are exercised as part of a
comprehensive security program may require a wider scope when
exercise planning commences.
o Completing after-action reports in a timely and thorough manner.
In past work, we found that after-action reports were generally
submitted late and that many failed to assess each objective that
was being exercised. Inability to provide timely and complete
reports on exercises represents a lost opportunity to share
potentially valuable information across the organization as well
as plan and prepare for future exercises.
o Ensuring that all relevant agencies participate. While exercise
preparation and participation is time-consuming, joint exercises
are necessary to resolve potential role and incident command
conflicts as well as determine whether activities would proceed as
planned. Our work has shown that past exercises have not
necessarily been conducted in this manner.
^9GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from
Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, [33]GAO-05-170 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005); Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy
Commodity Tankers, GAO-07-286SU (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2007); Port
Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster
Planning and Recovery, [34]GAO-07-412 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007).
Coast Guard Is in Process of Evaluating the Security of Foreign Ports
The security of domestic ports is also dependent on security at foreign
ports where cargoes bound for the United States originate. To help secure
the overseas supply chain, MTSA required the Coast Guard to develop a
program to assess security measures in foreign ports and, among other
things, recommend steps necessary to improve security measures in their
ports. The Coast Guard established this program, called the International
Port Security Program, in April 2004. Under this program, the Coast Guard
and host nations review the implementation of security measures in the
host nations' ports against established security standards, such as the
International Maritime Organization's International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code.^10 Coast Guard teams have been established to
conduct country visits, discuss security measures implemented, and collect
and share best practices to help ensure a comprehensive and consistent
approach to maritime security in ports worldwide. The conditions of these
visits, such as timing and locations, are negotiated between the Coast
Guard and the host nation. Coast Guard officials also make annual visits
to the countries to obtain additional observations on the implementation
of security measures and ensure deficiencies found during the country
visits are addressed.^11 As of April 2007, the Coast Guard reported that
it has visited 86 countries under this program and plans to complete 29
more visits by the end of fiscal year 2007.^12
^10The International Port Security Program uses the ISPS Code as the
benchmark by which it measures the effectiveness of a country's
anti-terrorism measures in a port. The code was developed after the
September 11, 2001, attacks and established measures to enhance the
security of ships and port facilities with a standardized and consistent
security framework. The ISPS code requires facilities to conduct an
assessment to identify threats and vulnerabilities and then develop
security plans based on the assessment. The requirements of this code are
performance-based; therefore compliance can be achieved through a variety
of security measures.
^11In addition to the Coast Guard visiting the ports of foreign countries
under this program, countries can also make reciprocal visits to U.S.
ports to observe U.S. implementation of the ISPS Code, obtaining ideas for
implementation of the Code in their ports and sharing best practices for
security.
^12There are approximately 140 countries that are maritime trading
partners with the United States.
The SAFE Port Act and other congressional directions have called for the
Coast Guard to increase the pace of its visits to foreign countries.
Although MTSA did not set a timeframe for completion of these visits, the
Coast Guard initially set a goal to visit all countries that conduct
maritime trade with the United States by December 2008. In September 2006,
the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 DHS Appropriations
Act directed the Coast Guard to "double the amount" at which it was
conducting its visits.^13 Subsequently, in October 2006, the SAFE Port Act
required the Coast Guard to reassess security measures at the foreign
ports every 3 years. Coast Guard officials said they will comply with the
more stringent requirements and will reassess countries on a 2-year cycle.
With the expedited pace, the Coast Guard now expects to assess all
countries by March 2008, after which reassessments will begin.
We are currently conducting a review of the Coast Guard's international
enforcement programs, such as the International Port Security Program.^14
Although this work is still in process and not yet ready to be included in
this testimony, we have completed a more narrowly scoped review required
under the SAFE Port Act regarding security at ports in the Caribbean
Basin.^15 As part of this work, we looked at the efforts made by the Coast
Guard in the region under the program and the Coast Guard's findings from
the country visits it made in the region. For the countries in this region
for which the Coast Guard had issued a final report, the Coast Guard
reported that most had "substantially implemented the security code,"
while one country that was just recently visited was found to have not yet
implemented the code and will be subject to a reassessment. At the
facility level, the Coast Guard found several facilities needing
improvements in areas such as access controls, communication devices,
fencing, and lighting. Because our review of the Coast Guard's
International Port Security Program is still ongoing, we have not yet
reviewed the results of the Coast Guard's findings in other regions of the
world.
^13See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 142 (2006).
^14This work is being conducted at the request of the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate.
^15Section 233 (c) of the SAFE Port Act requires GAO to report on various
aspects relating to the security of ports in the Caribbean Basin. The act
required GAO to provide this report to specified cognizant Senate and
House Committees. To satisfy this requirement, GAO's findings for this
work were presented in briefings to the cognizant committees by April 13,
2007. GAO will release a public report containing the briefing materials
in June 2007.
While our larger review is still not complete, Coast Guard officials have
told us they face challenges in carrying out this program in the Caribbean
Basin. These challenges include:
o Ensuring sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel.
Coast Guard officials said the faster rate at which foreign ports
will now be reassessed will require hiring and training new
staff--a challenge they expect will be made more difficult because
experienced personnel who have been with the program since its
inception are being transferred to other positions as part of the
Coast Guard's rotational policy. These officials will need to be
replaced with newly assigned personnel. Another related challenge
is that the unique nature of the program requires the Coast Guard
to provide specialized training to those joining the program,
since very few people in the Coast Guard have had international
experience or extensive port security experience.
o Addressing host nation sovereignty issues. In making
arrangements to visit the ports of foreign countries, Coast Guard
officials stated that they have occasionally encountered initial
reluctance by some countries to allow the Coast Guard to visit
their ports due to concerns over sovereignty. In addition, the
conditions of the visits, such as timing and locations, are
negotiated between the Coast Guard and the host nation. Thus the
Coast Guard team making the visit could potentially be precluded
from seeing locations that were not in compliance.
Port Facility Security Efforts Are Long Standing, but Additional Challenges Have
Emerged
Many long-standing programs to improve facility security at ports are
underway, but new challenges to their successful implementation have
emerged. The Coast Guard is required to conduct assessments of security
plans and facility inspections, but faces challenges to staff and train
staff to meet the additional requirements of the SAFE Port Act. TSA's TWIC
program has addressed some of its initial program challenges, but will
continue to face additional challenges as the program rollout continues.
Many steps have been taken to ensure transportation workers are properly
screened, but redundancies in various background checks have decreased
efficiency and highlighted the need for increased coordination.
Coast Guard Faces Challenges in Monitoring Compliance of Maritime Facilities
MTSA and its implementing regulations requires owners and operators of
covered maritime facilities (such as power stations, chemical
manufacturing facilities, and refineries that are located on waterways and
receive foreign vessels) to conduct assessments of their security
vulnerabilities, develop security plans to mitigate these vulnerabilities,
and implement measures called for in the security plans. Under the Coast
Guard regulations, these plans are to include such items as measures for
access control, responses to security threats, and drills and exercises to
train staff and test the plan.^16 The plans are "performance-based,"
meaning the Coast Guard has specified the outcomes it is seeking to
achieve and has given facilities responsibility for identifying and
delivering the measures needed to achieve these outcomes. Facility owners
were to have their plans in place by July 1, 2004.
The Coast Guard performs inspections of facilities to make sure they are
in compliance with their security plans. In 2005, we reported that the
Coast Guard completed initial compliance inspections at all MTSA regulated
facilities by the end of 2004 and found that approximately 97 percent of
maritime facility owners or operators were in compliance with MTSA
requirements.^17 The most frequently cited deficiencies related to
insufficient controls over access, not ensuring the facility was operating
in compliance with security requirements, not complying with facility
security officer requirements (such as possessing the required security
knowledge or carrying out all duties as assigned), and having insufficient
security measures for restricted areas. The Coast Guard reported taking
enforcement actions and imposing operational controls, such as suspending
certain facility operations, for identified deficiencies.
Coast Guard guidance calls for the Coast Guard to conduct on-site facility
inspections to verify continued compliance with the plan on an annual
basis. The SAFE Port Act required the Coast Guard to conduct at least two
inspections of each facility annually, and it required that one of these
inspections be unannounced. We are currently conducting a review of the
Coast Guard's efforts for ensuring facilities' compliance with various
MTSA requirements and are not yet in a position to report our findings.^18
However, our previous work showed the Coast Guard faces challenges in
carrying out its strategy to review and inspect facilities for compliance
with their security plans, and these challenges could be amplified with
the additional requirements called for by the SAFE Port Act.^19 These
challenges include:
^16Requirements for security plans for facilities are found in 33 C.F.R.
Part 105, Subpart D.
^17See GAO, Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal
Requirements, Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges,
[35]GAO-05-327 (Washington, D.C.: March 2005).
o Ensuring that sufficient trained inspectors are available.
Because security measures are performance-based, evaluating them
involves a great deal of subjectivity. For example, inspectors do
not check for compliance with a specific procedure; instead, they
have to make a judgment about whether the steps the owner or
operator has taken provide adequate security. Performance-based
plans provide flexibility to owners and operators, but they also
place a premium on the skills and experience of inspectors to
identify deficiencies and recommend corrective action. This
complexity makes it a challenge for the Coast Guard to ensure that
its inspectors are trained appropriately and have sufficient
guidance to make difficult judgments about whether owners and
operators have taken adequate steps to address vulnerabilities.
Additionally, once proficient at their job, inspectors often face
reassignment. Further, the rotation period has been shortened by 1
year--from 4 years to 3.
o Evaluating compliance activities so they can be improved. In our
previous work we also recommended that the Coast Guard evaluate
its compliance inspection efforts taken during the initial 6-month
period after July 1, 2004, and use the results as a means to
strengthen its long-term strategy for ensuring compliance.^20
While the Coast Guard agreed with this recommendation, and has
taken some steps to evaluate its compliance efforts, it has not
conducted a comprehensive evaluation of these efforts to date.
Without knowledge that the current approach to MTSA facility
oversight is effective, the Coast Guard will be further challenged
in planning future oversight activities.
^18This work is being conducted at the request of the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate.
^19See GAO, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New
Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, [36]GAO-04-838
(Washington, D.C.: June 2004).
^20Ibid.
TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the TWIC Program, but Challenges Remain
MTSA required the Secretary of DHS to, among other things, issue a
transportation worker identification card that uses biometrics, such as
fingerprints, to control access to secure areas of seaports and vessels.
When MTSA was enacted, TSA had already initiated a program to create an
identification credential that could be used by workers in all modes of
transportation. This program, called the TWIC program, is designed to
collect personal and biometric information to validate workers'
identities, conduct background checks on transportation workers to ensure
they do not pose a threat to security, issue tamper-resistant biometric
credentials that cannot be counterfeited, verify these credentials using
biometric access control systems before a worker is granted unescorted
access to a secure area, and revoke credentials if disqualifying
information is discovered, or if a card is lost, damaged, or stolen. TSA,
in partnership with the Coast Guard, is focusing initial implementation on
the maritime sector.
We have reported several times on the status of this program and the
challenges that it faces.^21 Most recently, we reported that TSA has made
progress in implementing the TWIC program and addressing problems we
previously identified regarding contract planning and oversight and
coordination with stakeholders.^22 For example, TSA reported that it added
staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the
contract and developed plans for conducting public outreach and education
efforts.
The SAFE Port Act contained a requirement for implementing the first major
phase of the TWIC program by mid-2007. More specifically, it required TSA
to implement TWIC at the 10 highest risk ports by July 1, 2007, conduct a
pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies in the maritime
environment, issue regulations requiring TWIC card readers based on the
findings of the pilot, and periodically report to Congress on the status
of the program. TSA is taking steps to address these requirements, such as
establishing a rollout schedule for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC
cards at ports and conducting a pilot program to test TWIC access control
technologies.
^21See GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate
Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106 (Washington, D.C.:
December 2004); and Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key
Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential Program, GAO-06-982 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006).
^22GAO, Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges
Remain, [37]GAO-07-681T (Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007).
As TSA begins enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards this year, it is
important that the agency establish clear and reasonable timeframes for
implementing TWIC. Further, TSA could face additional challenges as the
TWIC implementation progresses. These challenges include:
o Monitoring the effectiveness of contract planning and oversight.
While the steps that TSA reports taking are designed to address
the contract planning and oversight problems that we have
previously identified and recommendations we have made, the
effectiveness of these steps will not be clear until
implementation of the TWIC program begins.
o Ensuring a successful enrollment process. Significant challenges
remain in enrolling about 770,000 persons at about 3,500
facilities in the TWIC program. Sufficient communication and
coordination to ensure that all individuals and organizations
affected by the TWIC program are aware of their responsibilities
will require concerted effort on the part of TSA and the
enrollment contractor.
o Addressing access control technologies. TSA and industry
stakeholders need to address challenges regarding TWIC access
control technologies to ensure that the program is implemented
effectively. Without fully testing all aspects of the technology
TSA may not be able ensure that the TWIC access control technology
can meet the requirements of the system. Given the differences
among the facilities and locations where the technology is to be
implemented, it may be difficult to test all scenarios.
Multiple Background Check Programs for Transportation Workers Need to Be
Coordinated
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the federal government
has taken steps to ensure that transportation workers, many of whom
transport hazardous materials or have access to secure areas in locations
such as ports, are properly screened to ensure they do not pose a security
risk. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001 prohibited states
from issuing hazardous material endorsements for a commercial driver's
license without an applicant background check.^23 Background checks are
also part of the TWIC program discussed above. Concerns have been raised,
however, that transportation workers may face a variety of background
checks, each with different standards. A truck driver, for example, is
subject to background checks for all of the following: unescorted access
to a secure area at a port, unescorted access to a secure area at an
airport, expedited border crossings, hauling hazardous materials, or
hauling arms or ammunition for the Department of Defense or cargo for the
U.S. Postal Service. In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission reported that
having too many different biometric standards, travel facilitation
systems, credentialing systems, and screening requirements hampers the
development of information crucial for stopping terrorists from entering
the country, is expensive, and is inefficient.^24 The Commission
recommended that a coordinating body raise standards, facilitate
information-sharing, and survey systems for potential problems. In August
2004, Homeland Security Directive 11 announced a new U.S. policy to
"implement a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related
screening--in immigration, law enforcement, intelligence,
counterintelligence, and protection of the border, transportation systems,
and critical infrastructure--that supports homeland security, at home and
abroad."
^23Pub. L. No. 107-56, S 1012(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 396-97 (2001).
DHS has taken steps, both at the department level and within its various
agencies, to consolidate, coordinate, and harmonize such background check
programs.^25 At the department level, DHS created SCO in July 2006 to
coordinate DHS background check programs. SCO is in the early stages of
developing its plans for this coordination. In December 2006, SCO issued a
report identifying common problems, challenges, and needed improvements in
the credentialing programs and processes across the department. The office
awarded a contract in April 2007 that will provide the methodology and
support for developing an implementation plan to include common design and
comparability standards and related milestones to coordinate DHS screening
and credentialing programs. DHS components are currently in the initial
stages of a number of their own initiatives. For example, In January 2007,
TSA determined that the background checks required for three other DHS
programs satisfied the background check requirement for the TWIC
program.^26 An applicant who has already undergone a background check in
association with any of these three programs does not have to undergo an
additional background check and pays a reduced fee to obtain a TWIC card.
Similarly, the Coast Guard plans to consolidate four credentials and
require that all pertinent information previously submitted by an
applicant at a Coast Guard Regional Examination Center be submitted to TSA
through the TWIC enrollment process.
^24Final Report of the National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States.
^25The term "harmonize" is used to describe efforts to increase efficiency
and reduce redundancies by aligning the background check requirements to
make the programs more consistent.
The SAFE Port Act required us to conduct a study of DHS background check
programs similar to the one required of truck drivers to obtain a
hazardous material endorsement. Our work on other projects indicates that
DHS is likely to face additional challenges in coordinating its background
check programs. These challenges include:
o Ensuring its plans are sufficiently complete without being
overly restrictive. The varied background check programs related
to transportation workers may have substantially different
standards or requirements. SCO will be challenged to coordinate
DHS's background check programs in such a way that any common set
of standards developed to eliminate redundant checks meets the
varied needs of all the programs without being so strict that it
unduly limits the applicant pool or so intrusive that potential
applicants are unwilling to take part.
o Ensuring that accurate performance information is available.
Without knowing the potential costs and benefits associated with
the number of redundant background checks that would be eliminated
through harmonization, DHS lacks the performance information that
would allow its program managers to compare their program results
with goals. Thus, DHS faces challenges in determining where to
target program resources to improve performance. DHS could benefit
from a plan that includes, at a minimum, a discussion of the
potential costs and benefits associated with the number of
redundant background checks that would be eliminated through
harmonization.
o Coordinating across the broader universe of federal background
check programs. Many other federal agencies also have background
check programs, making coordination a cross-cutting,
government-wide issue. DHS could face challenges harmonizing
background check programs within DHS and other federal agencies.
^26TSA determined that the background checks required for the hazardous
materials endorsement (an endorsement that authorizes an individual to
transport hazardous materials for commerce) and the Free and Secure Trade
card (a voluntary CBP program that allows commercial drivers to receive
expedited border processing) satisfy the background check requirements for
TWIC. TSA also determined that an individual issued a Merchant Mariner
Document (issued between Feb. 3, 2003, and Mar. 26, 2007) was not subject
to an additional background check for TWIC.
Container Security Programs Maturing, but Implementation Challenges Continue
Several container security programs have been established and matured
through the development of strategic plans, human capital strategies, and
performance measures. However, these programs continue to face technical
and management challenges in implementation. As part of its layered
security strategy, CBP developed the Automated Targeting System (ATS), but
this system has faced quality assurance challenges since its inception. In
the past, CSI has lacked sufficient staff to meet requirements. C-TPAT has
faced challenges with validation quality and management in the past, in
part due to its rapid growth. The Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports
Initiative faces ongoing operational and technical challenges in the
installation and maintenance of radiation detection equipment at ports.
Automated Targeting System Continues to Require Management Action
As part of its responsibility for preventing terrorists and weapons of
mass destruction from entering the United States, CBP addresses potential
threats posed by the movement of oceangoing containers. CBP inspectors at
seaports help determine which containers entering the country will undergo
inspections and then perform physical inspections of such containers. To
carry out this responsibility, CBP uses a layered security strategy that
attempts to focus resources on potentially risky cargo containers while
allowing other cargo containers to proceed without disrupting commerce.
The ATS is one key element of this strategy. CBP uses ATS to review
documentation, including electronic manifest information submitted by the
ocean carriers on all arriving shipments, to help identify containers for
additional inspection.^27 CBP requires the carriers to submit manifest
information 24 hours prior to a United States-bound sea container being
loaded onto a vessel in a foreign port. ATS is a complex mathematical
model that uses weighted rules that assign a risk score to each arriving
shipment based on manifest information. CBP inspectors use these scores to
help them make decisions on the extent of documentary review or physical
inspection to conduct.
^27Cargo manifests are prepared by the ocean carrier to describe the
contents of a container.
In our previous work on ATS we found that CBP lacked important internal
controls for the administration and implementation of ATS.^28 Despite
ATS's importance to CBP's layered security strategy, CBP was still in the
process of implementing the following key controls: (1) performance
metrics to measure the effectiveness of ATS, (2) a comparison of the
results of randomly conducted inspections with the results of its ATS
inspections, and (3) a simulation and testing environment. At that time
CBP was also in the process of addressing recommendations contained in a
2005 peer review.
The SAFE Port Act required that the CBP Commissioner take actions to
improve ATS. These requirements included such steps as (1) having an
independent panel review the effectiveness and capabilities of ATS; (2)
considering future iterations of ATS that would incorporate smart
features; (3) ensuring that ATS has the capability to electronically
compare manifest and other available data to detect any significant
anomalies and facilitate their resolution; (4) ensuring that ATS has the
capability to electronically identify, compile, and compare select data
elements following a maritime transportation security incident; and (5)
developing a schedule to address recommendations made by GAO and the
Inspectors General of the Department of the Treasury and DHS. From our
findings and the further changes to the program enacted by the SAFE Port
Act, we identified the following challenge faced by CBP:
o Implementing the program while internal controls are being
developed. The missing internal controls would provide CBP with
critical information on how well it screens containers. CBP's
vital mission does not, however, allow it to halt its screening
efforts while it put these controls in place. CBP thus faces the
challenge of ensuring that it inspects the highest-risk containers
even though it lacks information to optimally allocate inspection
resources.
^28The Comptroller General's internal control standards state that
internal control activities help ensure that management's directives are
carried out. Further, they state that the control objectives should be
effective and efficient in accomplishing the agency's control objectives.
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[38]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1, 11 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
The CSI Program Has Matured but Challenges Remain
In response to the threat that a cargo container could be used to smuggle
a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States, the U.S.
Customs Service (now CBP) initiated the CSI in January 2002 to detect and
deter terrorists from smuggling WMDs via containers before they reach
domestic seaports. Under this initiative, foreign governments allow CBP
personnel to be stationed at foreign seaports to identify container
shipments at risk of containing WMD. CBP personnel refer high-risk
shipments to host government officials, who determine whether to inspect
the shipment before it leaves for the United States. Host government
officials examine shipments with nonintrusive inspection equipment and, if
they deem it necessary, open the cargo containers to physically examine
the contents inside.^29 Since our last report on the CSI program, CBP has
increased the number of seaports that participate in the program from 34
to 50, with plans to expand to a total of 58 ports by the end of this
fiscal year.^30
In our previous work, we identified numerous issues affecting the
effectiveness of the CSI program. On the positive side, we praised some of
the positive interaction and information sharing we found among CBP
officials and host nation officials at CSI ports--something that could
lead to better targeting and inspections. In some cases where we found
problems, CBP took steps to implement our recommendations, such as
developing a strategic plan, a human capital strategy, and performance
measures. In other cases, CBP found it more difficult to implement our
recommendations. For example, they deferred establishing minimum technical
requirements for nonintrusive inspection equipment used by host nations at
CSI ports.
The SAFE Port Act formalized CSI into law and specified factors to be
considered in designating seaports as CSI, including risk level, cargo
volume, results of Coast Guard assessments, and the commitment of the host
government to sharing critical information with DHS. The act also called
for DHS to establish minimum technical criteria for the use of
nonintrusive inspection equipment in conjunction with CSI and to require
that seaports receiving CSI designation operate such equipment in
accordance with these criteria. Another provision related to container
cargo requires DHS to ensure that integrated scanning systems, using
nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment, are
fully deployed to scan all containers before their arrival in the United
States as soon as possible, but not before DHS determines that such
systems meet a number of criteria. The SAFE Port Act addresses a number of
the issues we have previously identified, but our work suggests that CBP
may face continued challenges going forward. These challenges include:
^29A core element of CSI is the use of technology to scan high risk
containers to ensure that examinations can be done rapidly without slowing
down the movement of trade. This technology can include equipment such as
large scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices.
^30See GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum
Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection
Efforts, GAO-05-557, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).
o Ensuring sufficient staff are available for targeting. Although
CBP's goal is to target all U.S. bound containers at CSI seaports
before they depart for the United States, we previously reported
that it has not been able to place enough staff at some CSI ports
to do so.^31 Since then, CBP has provided additional support to
deployed CSI staff by using staff in the United States (at the
National Targeting Center) to screen containers for various risk
factors and potential inspection.
o Developing an international consensus on technical requirements.
There are no internationally recognized minimum technical
requirements for the detection capability of nonintrusive
inspection equipment used to scan containers. Consequently, host
nations at CSI seaports use various types of nonintrusive
inspection equipment and the detection capabilities of such
equipment can vary. Because the inspection a container receives at
a CSI seaport could be its only scan before entering the United
States, it is important that the detection equipment used meets
minimum technical requirements to provide some level of assurance
that the presence of WMDs can be detected.
o Ensuring that designated high-risk containers are inspected. We
also found that some containers designated as high risk did not
receive an inspection at the CSI seaport. Containers designated as
high risk by CSI teams that are not inspected overseas (for a
variety of reasons) are supposed to be referred for inspection
upon arrival at the U.S. destination port. However, CBP officials
noted that between July and September 2004, only about 93 percent
of shipments referred for domestic inspection were inspected at a
U.S. seaport. According to CBP, it is working on improvements in
its ability to track such containers to assure that they are
inspected.
^31 GAO-05-557.
DOE Has Made Progress with Megaports Program
Another component in the efforts to prevent terrorists from smuggling
weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers from overseas locations is
the Megaports Initiative, initiated by the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration in 2003. The goal of this
initiative is to enable foreign government personnel at key seaports to
use radiation detection equipment to screen shipping containers entering
and leaving these ports, regardless of the containers' destination, for
nuclear and other radioactive material that could be used against the
United States or its allies. DOE installs radiation detection equipment,
such as radiation portal monitors and handheld radioactive isotope
identification devices, at foreign seaports that is then operated by
foreign government officials and port personnel working at these ports.
Through April 2007, DOE had completed installations of radiation detection
equipment at nine ports: Freeport, Bahamas; Piraeus, Greece; Puerto
Cortes, Honduras; Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Port Qasim, Pakistan;
Manila, the Philippines; Port of Singapore; Algeciras, Spain; and Colombo,
Sri Lanka. Additionally, DOE has signed agreements to begin work and is in
various stages of implementation at ports in 15 other countries: Belgium,
Columbia, China, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Israel, Jamaica, Mexico,
Oman, Panama, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and
the United Kingdom. Further, in an effort to expand cooperation, DOE is
engaged in negotiations with approximately 20 additional countries in
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and South America.
When we reported on this program in March 2005, DOE had made limited
progress in gaining agreements to install radiation detection equipment at
the highest priority seaports.^32 At that time, DOE had completed work at
only two ports and signed agreements to initiate work at five other ports.
We also noted that DOE's cost projections for the program were uncertain,
in part because they were based on DOE's $15 million estimate for the
average cost per port. This per port cost estimate may not be accurate
because it was based primarily on DOE's radiation detection assistance
work at Russian land borders, airports, and seaports and did not account
for the fact that the costs of installing equipment at individual ports
vary and are influenced by factors such as a port's size, its physical
layout, and existing infrastructure. Since our review, DOE has developed a
strategic plan for the Megaports Initiative and is in the process of
revising its per port cost estimate.
^32For additional information, see GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE
Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at
Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, [39]GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
31, 2005).
As DOE continues to implement its Megaports Initiative, it faces several
operational and technical challenges specific to installing and
maintaining radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. These
challenges include:
o Ensuring the ability to detect radioactive material. Certain
factors can affect the general capability of radiation detection
equipment to detect nuclear material. For example, some nuclear
materials can be shielded with lead or other dense materials to
prevent radiation from being detected. In addition, one of the
materials of greatest proliferation concern, highly enriched
uranium, is difficult to detect because of its relatively low
level of radioactivity.
o Overcoming the physical layout of ports. In its effort to screen
cargo containers at foreign ports for radioactive and nuclear
materials, DOE faces technical challenges related to these ports'
physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations. To address a
part of these challenges at some ports, DOE is testing at
Freeport, Bahamas, a device used to transport cargo containers
between port locations--known as a straddle carrier--that is
outfitted with radiation detection equipment.
o Sustaining equipment in port environments. Additionally,
environmental conditions specific to ports, such as the existence
of high winds and sea spray, can affect the radiation detection
equipment's performance and long-term sustainability. To minimize
the effects of these conditions, DOE has used steel plates to
stabilize radiation portal monitors placed in areas with high
winds, such as in Rotterdam, and is currently evaluating
approaches to combat the corrosive effects of sea spray on
radiation detection equipment.
Secure Freight Initiative Only Recently Announced
In another provision related to container security and the work to address
WMD and related risks, the SAFE Port Act specified that new integrated
scanning systems that couple nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation
detection equipment must be pilot tested at three international seaports.
It also required that, once fully implemented, the pilot integrated
scanning system scan 100 percent of containers destined for the United
States that are loaded at such ports. To fulfill these requirements, DHS
and DOE jointly announced the formation of a pilot program called the
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) in December 2006, as an effort to build
upon existing port security measures by enhancing the U.S. government's
ability to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials overseas
and better assess the risk of inbound containers. In essence, SFI builds
upon the CSI and Megaports programs.
According to agency officials, the initial phase of the initiative will
involve the deployment of a combination of existing container scanning
technology--such as x-ray and gamma ray scanners used by host nations at
CSI ports to locate high density objects that could be used to shield
nuclear materials, inside containers--and radiation detection equipment.
The ports chosen to receive this integrated technology are: Port Qasim in
Pakistan; Puerto Cortes in Honduras; and Southampton in the United
Kingdom. Three other ports located in Singapore, the Republic of Korea,
and Oman will receive more limited deployment of these technologies as
part of the pilot program. According to DHS, containers from these ports
will be scanned for radiation and other risk factors before they are
allowed to depart for the United States. If the scanning systems indicate
that there is a concern, both CSI personnel and host country officials
will simultaneously receive an alert and the specific container will be
inspected before that container continues to the United States. The
determination about what containers are inspected will be made by CBP
officials, either on the scene locally or at CBP's National Targeting
Center.
We have not yet reviewed the efforts made under SFI. However, in carrying
it out, the agencies may likely have to deal with the challenges
previously identified for the CSI and Megaports programs. Per the SAFE
Port Act, DHS is to report by April 2008 on, among other things, the
lessons learned from the SFI pilot ports and the need for and the
feasibility of expanding the system to other CSI ports, and every 6 months
thereafter, DHS is to report on the status of full-scale deployment of the
integrated scanning systems to scan all containers bound for the United
States before their arrival.
C-TPAT Maturing, but Validation and Other Management Challenges Remain
C-TPAT, initiated in November 2001, is designed to complement other
container security programs as part of a layered security strategy. C-TPAT
is a voluntary program that enables CBP officials to work in partnership
with private companies to review the security of their international
supply chains and improve the security of their shipments to the United
States. In return for committing to improving the security of their
shipments by joining the program, C-TPAT members receive benefits that
result in reduced scrutiny of their shipments, such as a reduced number of
inspections or shorter wait times for their shipments. Since C-TPAT's
inception, CBP has certified 6,375 companies, and as of March 2007, it had
validated the security of 3,950 of them (61.9 percent).
CBP initially set a goal of validating all companies within their first 3
years as C-TPAT members, but the program's rapid growth in membership made
the goal unachievable. CBP then moved to a risk-based approach to
selecting members for validation, considering factors such as the company
having foreign supply chain operations in a known terrorist area or
involving multiple foreign suppliers. CBP further modified its approach to
selecting companies for validation to achieve greater efficiency by
conducting "blitz" operations to validate foreign elements of multiple
members' supply chains in a single trip. Blitz operations focus on factors
such as C-TPAT members within a certain industry, supply chains within a
certain geographic area or foreign suppliers to multiple C-TPAT members.
Risks remain a consideration, according to CBP, but the blitz strategy
drives the decision of when a member company will be validated.
In our previous work, we raised a number of concerns about the overall
management of the program and the effectiveness of the validation
process.^33 We found that CBP had not established key internal controls
necessary to manage the programs. Since that time, CBP has worked to
develop a strategic plan, a human capital strategy, and performance
measures. We also found that validations lacked sufficient rigor to meet
C-TPAT stated purpose of the validations--to ensure that members' security
measures are reliable, accurate and effective. Since that time, CBP has
developed new validation tools, and we have ongoing work to assess what
progress is being made.
^33See GAO, Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced
Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, [40]GAO-05-404
(Washington, D.C.: March 2005); and Container Security: Expansion of Key
Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success
Factors, [41]GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).
The SAFE Port Act formalized C-TPAT into law. In addition, it included a
new goal that CBP validate C-TPAT members' security measures and supply
chain security practices within 1 year of their certification and
revalidate those members no less than once in every 4 years. CBP faces
several challenges in addressing this requirement and dealing with the
concerns we previously identified. These challenges include:
o Conducting validations within 1 year. The goal of completing
validations within a year of members' certification is a
challenge. While CBP has belatedly reached some of its earlier
staffing goals, consistent membership growth has led to a steady
backlog of validation requirements.
o Ensuring sound validations. CBP's standard for validations--to
ensure that members' security measures are reliable, accurate and
effective--is hard to achieve. Since C-TPAT is a voluntary rather
than a mandatory program, there are limits on how intrusive CBP
can be in its validations. Further, CBP lacks jurisdiction over
foreign companies operating outside the United States in a
member's foreign supply chain; therefore its ability to review the
complete supply chain of a member is questionable.
o Measuring outcomes and results. Challenges developing C-TPAT
outcome-based performance measures persist because of difficulty
measuring deterrent effect. CBP has contracted with the University
of Virginia for help in developing useful measures.
DHS's Emphasis on Security Issues Has Contributed to Diminished Attention on
Customs Revenue Functions
While DHS's priority mission since its inception has been homeland
security, various DHS components have other nonsecurity functions. CBP,
which is responsible for border security, also collects customs duties and
other revenues. In forming DHS, there was concern that moving the customs
revenue functions from Treasury into the new CBP would diminish attention
given to these functions. In recognition of that concern, Congress
required the newly created DHS not reduce the number of staff in key
positions related to customs revenue functions.^34 CBP is the second
largest revenue generator for the U.S. government, collecting nearly $30
billion in customs revenue in fiscal year 2006. The SAFE Port Act required
us to study the extent to which CBP had been able to carry out its customs
revenue functions. We recently completed this study,^35 in which we found
three key weaknesses related to CBP's performance of customs revenue
functions (1) CBP failed to maintain the legislatively mandated staffing
levels for performing customs revenue functions, (2) CBP lacks a strategic
workforce plan to help ensure it has a sufficient number of staff with the
necessary skills and competencies to effectively perform customs revenue
functions, and (3) CBP does not publicly report on its performance of
customs revenue functions, which would help ensure accountability.
Although Improving, CBP Failed to Maintain Mandated Staffing Levels for Customs
Revenue Positions
Staff resources contributing to customs revenue functions generally
declined since the formation of DHS in March 2003, in part due to
department priorities focused on homeland security and recruiting and
retention problems for some positions. As shown in figure 1, since
September 2003, CBP has not maintained the mandated number of staff in
each of the nine designated customs revenue positions, although recent
efforts by CBP increased the number of staff to the mandated levels in
most of these positions as of December 2006. For example, the number of
Import Specialists on board dropped from 984 in March 2003 to a low of 892
in March 2006, and grew to 1,000 in December 2006. CBP was below the
mandated staff levels for three customs revenue positions as of December
2006, ranging from 2 to 34 positions below the baseline. Recently, CBP
took several steps such as opening job announcements and closely
monitoring its customs revenue staffing levels to increase the number of
customs revenue staff by more than 130 to 2,273.^36
34The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 412, 116
Stat. 2135, 2179) required DHS to maintain a least the March 2003 number
of staff in each of nine specific customs revenue positions and their
associated support positions. The nine designated customs revenue
positions are Import Specialists, Fines and Penalties Specialists,
attorneys of the Office of Regulations and Rulings, Customs (Regulatory)
Auditors, International Trade Specialists, and Financial Systems
Specialists. When DHS was formed in March 2003, it employed 2,263 people
in customs revenue positions and 1,006 additional associated support
staff.
^35GAO, Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve
Workforce Planning and Accountability, [42]GAO-07-529 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 12, 2007).
Figure 1: Number of Customs Revenue Positions for Which CBP Maintained the
Mandated Staffing Levels
The number of support staff--which includes a variety of management,
technical, and administrative support positions--associated with the
customs revenue positions has also declined overall, and the declines for
some positions have been substantial. For example, the Import Specialist
position lost 94 of its 407 mandated level for support staff. As shown in
figure 2, CBP has maintained the mandated support staff levels for few of
the customs revenue positions, with six of eight positions being below the
mandated level in September 2006.
^36 See appendix I for more information on staff levels over time.
Figure 2: Number of Customs Revenue Positions for Which CBP Has Maintained
Mandated Associated Support Staffing Levels
Lastly, other positions within DHS such as CBP Officers, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Investigators, and Office of Inspector General
(OIG) Auditors contribute to performing or improving customs revenue
functions, but their contributions have declined over time. For example,
before the formation of DHS, there were about 65 Treasury OIG Auditors
focused on customs issues. Since the formation of DHS, the DHS OIG has
prioritized audits in other areas such as homeland security and, more
recently, disaster assistance, and the number of Auditors focusing on
customs issues declined to 15 as of February 2007. Because of other
priorities, DHS OIG Auditors have not conducted any assessments of
high-risk areas within customs revenue functions and have not done any
performance audits focused on improving these functions.
CBP Lacks a Strategic Workforce Plan, but Some Steps Taken to Improve Its Human
Capital Management as It Faces Key Challenges
CBP lacks a strategic workforce plan to guide its efforts to perform
customs revenue functions but has taken some recent steps to improve its
human capital management amid external and internal challenges. CBP has
not performed an assessment to determine the critical workforce skills and
competencies needed to perform customs revenue functions. In addition, CBP
has not yet determined how many staff it needs in customs revenue
positions, their associated support positions, and other positions that
contribute to the protection of customs revenue. Further, CBP has not
developed a strategic workforce plan to inform and guide its human capital
efforts to perform its current and emerging customs revenue functions. CBP
has recently taken some steps to improve staffing for customs revenue
functions, but gaps exist in these efforts. CBP has proposed revising the
roles and responsibilities for Import Specialists and is working to
develop legislatively mandated resource allocation models to determine
ideal staffing levels for performing various agency functions. For
example, the SAFE Port Act requires CBP to determine optimal staffing
levels required to carry out CBP's commercial operations. According to
CBP, this model, which is due in June 2007, will suggest the ideal
staffing level for the customs revenue positions as well as some other
trade-related positions. However, the resource allocation models being
developed will not assess the deployment of customs revenue staff across
the more than 300 individual ports--an important consideration since about
75 percent of customs revenue staff work at ports of entry.
Additionally, external and internal challenges heighten the importance of
such strategic workforce planning. First, the workload for some customs
revenue positions has increased. For example, the growing number of free
trade agreements has had a pronounced effect on some customs revenue
positions, including attorneys in CBP's Office of Regulations and Rulings
who participate in every phase of the negotiation and implementation of
the free trade agreements--from participating in negotiating sessions
through issuing binding rulings regarding the proper interpretation of the
CBP regulations implementing the agreement. In addition, some customs
revenue positions have seen an expansion of revenue-related as well as
nonrevenue-related responsibilities. For instance, with the formation of
DHS, the Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures Specialists from the former
Customs Service became responsible for administering fines and penalties
for violations of immigration and agriculture laws in addition to their
existing responsibilities related to customs law. Also, staff in some
customs revenue positions told us they have been assigned work that is
unrelated to customs revenue functions. For example, one port has not had
a Secretary/Receptionist position for 5 years. As a result, that function
was given to Import Specialists on a rotational basis.
CBP's Public Reporting Does Not Ensure Accountability for Customs Revenue
Functions
Despite being the second largest revenue generator for the U.S.
government, CBP does not publicly report on its performance of customs
revenue functions in its annual plans and performance reports, thus
failing to help ensure accountability. We have previously found that good
management practices dictate linking performance measures to strategic
goals and objectives in an effort to improve performance and
accountability. Good management practices also suggest publicly reporting
this information so that Congress can make informed decisions and so that
taxpayers have a better understanding of what the government is providing
in return for their tax dollars, or in this case, how well it is
collecting customs revenue. CBP's strategic planning documents recognize
the importance of customs revenue protection by establishing it as a
strategic objective and identifying a revenue-related performance measure.
However, we found that CBP does not use this measure or publicly report on
results related to its customs revenue functions in its annual plans and
Performance and Accountability Reports, the official documents agencies
issue to Congress and the public to report program performance. According
to a CBP official, CBP does not report on customs revenue functions in its
Performance and Accountability Reports because these functions do not
directly address its long-term goal of facilitating trade.
In our recent report, we made three recommendations. We recommended that
the CBP Commissioner develop a strategic workforce plan and work with the
Office of Management and Budget to establish and report on performance
measures related to customs revenue functions in its Performance and
Accountability Reports. We also recommended that the DHS Inspector General
should identify areas of high risk related to customs revenue functions.
The department concurred with our recommendation to develop a strategic
workforce plan and partially concurred with our recommendation to
establish and report on specific customs revenue performance measures and
agreed to take action to implement these recommendations by March 31,
2008. The DHS Inspector General also concurred with our recommendation and
agreed to take action to implement it by September 30, 2007.
Concluding Observations
MTSA established a maritime security framework that the Coast Guard
implemented with area maritime security committees, area maritime security
plans, and exercises to test the plans. In addition, various agencies
showed initiative in establishing other programs related to maritime
security--such as the Coast Guard, DOD and DOJ establishing interagency
operations centers; CBP implementing CSI and C-TPAT; and DOE establishing
the Megaports Inititive. In some cases, agencies have struggled to
implement programs required by MTSA or other legislation--such as TSA
delays with the TWIC program and CBP not meeting required staffing levels
for customs revenue functions. The SAFE Port Act further defined and
strengthened this maritime security framework--and created additional
requirements for agencies at a time when their programs are still
maturing. We have reviewed many of the MTSA and SAFE Port Act related
programs and made recommendations to develop strategic plans, better plan
their use of human capital, establish performance measures, and otherwise
improve the operations of these programs. In general, these agencies have
concurred with our recommendations and are making progress implementing
them. We will continue to monitor these programs and provide Congress with
oversight and insight into maritime security.
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions that you
or other Members of the Subcommittee have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
For information about this testimony, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell,
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-9610, or
[email protected] . Contact points for our Office of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include
Jonathan Bachman, Jason Bair, Fredrick Berry, Christine Broderick,
Stockton Butler, Steven Calvo, Christopher Currie, Wayne Ekblad, Maria
Gomez, Christopher Hatscher, Monica Kelly, Tracey King, Daniel Klabunde,
Gary Malavenda, Robert Rivas, and Stan Stenersen.
Appendix I: Change in Number of Staff Performing Customs Revenue Functions
This appendix provides information on the number of staff in specific
customs revenue functions positions from the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) until late in 2006. The change in the number of
staff in customs revenue positions and their associated support staff
varies by position. Figure 3 shows the change in the number of staff in
customs revenue positions; figure 4 shows the change in the number of
associated support staff.
Figure 3: Change in Number of Staff in Customs Revenue Positions from
March 2003 Baseline, as of December 2006
Note: Number in parentheses is the mandated baseline staff level for each
position.
Figure 4: Change in Number of Associated Support Staff from March 2003
Baseline, by Customs Revenue Position, as of September 2006
Note: Number in parentheses is the mandated baseline staff level for each
position.
Related GAO Products:
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges
Remain. [44]GAO-07-681T . Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007.
Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce
Planning and Accountability. [45]GAO-07-529 . Washington, D.C.: April 12,
2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in
Disaster Planning and Recovery. [46]GAO-07-412 . Washington, D.C.: March
28, 2007.
Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before
Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program.
[47]GAO-06-982 . Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving.
[48]GAO-06-933T . Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of
Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. [49]GAO-06-591T .
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. [50]GAO-05-840T .
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment
Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.
[51]GAO-05-557 . Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.
[52]GAO-05-466T . Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. [53]GAO-05-448T . Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with
Limited Assurance of Improved Security. [54]GAO-05-404 . Washington, D.C.:
March 11, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but
Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. [55]GAO-05-394 .
Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing
Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports.
[56]GAO-05-375 . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2005.
Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal Requirements,
Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges. [57]GAO-05-327 .
Washington, D.C.: March 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. [58]GAO-05-170 . Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. [59]GAO-05-106 . Washington, D.C.:
December 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. [60]GAO-04-838 . Washington,
D.C.: June 2004.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater
Attention to Critical Success Factors. [61]GAO-03-770 . Washington, D.C.:
July 25, 2003.
(440614)
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Highlights of [69]GAO-07-754T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism; Committee on Homeland
Security; House of Representatives
April 26, 2007
MARITIME SECURITY
Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act
The United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The
safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial
part upon the secure use of the world's waterways and ports. In an effort
to further the progress made through the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port
Act) was passed and became effective in October 2006.
This testimony, which is based on past GAO work, synthesizes the results
of this work as it pertains to the following:
o overall port security,
o facility security at U.S. ports,
o the international supply chain and cargo container security, and
o customs revenue collection efforts.
[70]What GAO Recommends
While this testimony makes no recommendations, in the past GAO has made
many recommendations on issues covered in this statement. The Department
of Homeland Security is in various stages of implementing these
recommendations.
With the Coast Guard generally implementing earlier port security
requirements, the SAFE Port Act called for changes to several ongoing
programs. For example, it called for interagency operational centers at
high-risk ports within 3 years. Three centers currently operate, but
agency coordination will pose a challenge. Also, the act established a
port security exercise program, but more exercises could challenge
stakeholders' ability to maintain coordination and quickly report results.
Additionally, an expansion of foreign port security assessments may be
challenged by greater workloads and the need for additional staff.
Many port facility security requirements are being implemented, but not
always on schedule. While the Coast Guard has approved, and verified
through inspection, facility security plans, the SAFE Port Act requires
inspections more often and some without notice. The Coast Guard will be
challenged by the number of trained inspectors it needs. Worker
credentialing programs were also modified by the act. One such program has
seen substantial delays in the past, but is receiving more support.
Efforts to avoid duplication in these programs will be challenged by the
need for extensive coordination within and among federal departments.
The SAFE Port Act codified existing major container security programs and
also added guidance for these programs. It also required programs to test
new technologies or combine existing technologies for scanning containers.
While more container security activity is occurring overseas, challenges
remain in the continued implementation of these efforts. These challenges
include the inability to directly test the security measures used by
different companies in their supply chains, particularly overseas.
Since its formation, the Department of Homeland Security has faced
challenges in maintaining its customs revenue functions. For example, the
Department failed to maintain the legislatively mandated staffing levels,
lacks a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it has a sufficient number
of skilled staff to effectively perform customs revenue functions, and
does not publicly report on its performance of customs revenue functions,
which would help ensure accountability.
Cargo Container Transportation and Screening
References
Visible links
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30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-448T
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-412
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-170
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-412
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-327
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-838
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-681T
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-375
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42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-529
44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-681T
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47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-982
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T
49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-591T
50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-840T
51. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-557T
52. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-466T
53. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-448T
54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-404
55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-394
56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-375
57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-327
58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-170
59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-106
60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-838
61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-770
69. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-754T
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