Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier
Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts
Can Be Strengthened (11-MAY-07, GAO-07-729).
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to
evaluate the security of foreign airports and air carriers that
service the United States are of great importance, particularly
considering that flights bound for the United States from foreign
countries continue to be targets of coordinated terrorist
activity, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006 liquid
explosives terrorist plot. For this review, GAO evaluated the
results of foreign airport and air carrier evaluations; actions
taken and assistance provided by TSA when security deficiencies
were identified; TSA's oversight of its foreign airport and air
carrier evaluation programs; and TSA's efforts to address
challenges in conducting foreign airport and air carrier
evaluations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport
and air carrier evaluation results and interviewed TSA officials,
foreign aviation security officials, and air carrier
representatives.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-729
ACCNO: A69495
TITLE: Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These
Efforts Can Be Strengthened
DATE: 05/11/2007
SUBJECT: Air transportation
Airport security
Airports
Aviation security
Foreign governments
Homeland security
Inspection
Internal controls
International cooperation
International relations
Performance measures
Security assessments
Standards
Terrorism
Security standards
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GAO-07-729
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]DHS Responsibilities for Ensuring the Security of U.S.-Bound
* [4]TSA's Process for Assessing Aviation Security Measures at Fo
* [5]TSA's Process for Inspecting Air Carriers with Service to th
* [6]TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Compli
* [7]TSA Data Identified That More than One-Third of Foreign Airp
* [8]The Secretary of Homeland Security Took Action against Forei
* [9]More than Two-Thirds of Fiscal Year 2005 Air Carrier Inspect
* [10]TSA Took Enforcement Action against Some Air Carriers with S
* [11]TSA Officials Cite Difficulties in Drawing Conclusions about
* [12]TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representativ
* [13]TSA Assisted Foreign Officials in Addressing Security Defici
* [14]On-Site Consultation and Recommendations for Corrective
Acti
* [15]Aviation Security Training and Technical Assistance
* [16]Foreign Officials We Contacted Generally Viewed TSA's
Assist
* [17]TSA Provided Assistance to Air Carriers That Did Not Comply
* [18]Opportunities Exist for TSA to Strengthen Oversight of the F
* [19]Additional Controls Are Needed to Track the Status of
Schedu
* [20]TSA Did Not Consistently Document Foreign Governments'
Progr
* [21]TSA Did Not Adequately Maintain Information to Link
Enforcem
* [22]TSA Did Not Have Outcome-Based Performance Measures to
Asses
* [23]TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Li
* [24]TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance its Ability to Conduct Foreig
* [25]Harmonization of Security Standards and Assessment and Inspe
* [26]TSA Is Taking Steps to Address Sovereignty Concerns Raised b
* [27]Conclusions
* [28]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [29]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [30]Results of Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments and
* [31]Foreign Airport Assessment Results
* [32]Air Carrier Inspection Results
* [33]Actions Taken by TSA when Foreign Airports and Air Carriers
* [34]Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies
* [35]Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies
* [36]Oversight of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier
* [37]Challenges That Affected TSA's Ability to Conduct Foreign Ai
* [38]Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program: U.S.-based Carr
* [39]Security Directives
* [40]Model Security Program
* [41]Emergency Amendments
* [42]Department of State: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
* [43]Program Background
* [44]Program Selection
* [45]Selection of Countries
* [46]Determination of Type of Training
* [47]Program Assistance
* [48]Recipient Countries
* [49]Relationship to TSA
* [50]U.S. Trade and Development Agency
* [51]Program Background
* [52]Selection of Projects
* [53]Program Assistance
* [54]Early Investment Analysis
* [55]Annex 17 Workshops
* [56]Recipients
* [57]Participation by TSA
* [58]Department of Transportation--Safe Skies for Africa Program
* [59]Background
* [60]Selection of Participants
* [61]Program Assistance
* [62]General
* [63]Equipment
* [64]Security Advisor
* [65]Recipients
* [66]Collaboration with TSA
* [67]Department of State--Bureau of International Narcotics and La
* [68]Background
* [69]Selection of Participants
* [70]Program Assistance
* [71]Recipient Countries
* [72]TSA Participation
* [73]Department of State--Western Hemisphere Affairs--Organization
* [74]Background
* [75]Program Assistance
* [76]Recipient Countries
* [77]Department of Justice-International Criminal Investigative T
* [78]Background
* [79]Selection of Participants
* [80]Program Assistance
* [81]Recipients
* [82]TSA Participation
* [83]GAO Contacts
* [84]Acknowledgments
* [85]GAO's Mission
* [86]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [87]Order by Mail or Phone
* [88]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [89]Congressional Relations
* [90]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
May 2007
AVIATION SECURITY
Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance
Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened
GAO-07-729
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 5
Background 12
TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Complied with All
Aviation Security Standards, and When Deemed Necessary, DHS and TSA Took
Enforcement Action on Those That Did Not 26
TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representatives in
Addressing Security Deficiencies, but Can Strengthen Oversight of the
Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs 34
TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its
Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections
48
Conclusions 64
Recommendations for Executive Action 65
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 66
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 68
Results of Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier
Inspections and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to Noncompliance 68
Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies and Oversight
of Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Efforts 72
Challenges That Affected TSA's Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections and Actions Taken to Address those
Challenges 75
Appendix II International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and
Recommended Practices Used by TSA to Conduct Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign
Airport Assessments 77
Appendix III TSA Security Requirements for U.S.-Based and Foreign Carriers
Operating Out of Foreign Airports 93
Appendix IV U.S. Government Aviation Security Training and Technical
Assistance Programs for Foreign Entities 96
Department of State: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program 96
U.S. Trade and Development Agency 98
Department of Transportation--Safe Skies for Africa Program 100
Department of State--Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs--Organization of American States Inter-American Committee against
Terrorism 102
Department of State--Western Hemisphere Affairs--Organization of American
States--Inter-American Committee against Terrorism 104
Department of Justice-International Criminal Investigative Training and
Assistance Program 105
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 107
Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 111
Related Products 112
Tables
Table 1: Positions That Play a Key Role in TSA's Foreign Airport and Air
Carrier Inspection Programs 14
Table 2: Comparison of the Severity of Security Deficiencies and
Corrective Action Taken at One Secretarial Action Airport and One
Non-Secretarial Action Airport 30
Table 3: Budgeted and Available International Inspectors by IFO, by Month
for Fiscal Year 2005 50
Table 4: Budgeted Number of Inspectors, Total Scheduled Foreign Airport
Visits, and Average Number of Scheduled Foreign Airport Visits per
Inspector, by IFO, for Fiscal Year 2005 51
Table 5: Description and Status of TSA-European Commission Aviation
Security Working Groups 59
Table 6: Elements of the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program
Applicable to International Operations 93
Table 7: Elements of the Foreign Air Carrier Model Security Program
Applicable to International Operations 95
Figures
Figure 1: Airport Assessment Activities 17
Figure 2: Process for Taking Secretarial Action against a Foreign Airport
20
Figure 3: Air Carrier Inspection Process 24
Abbreviations
AEA Association of European Airlines
AOSSP Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Conference
ATA Anti-Terrorism Assistance
CICTE Inter-American Committee against Terrorism
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
DOT Department of Transportation
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAARS Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System
FSD Federal Security Director
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IFO international field office
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IPSI International Principal Security Inspector
OAS Organization of American States
PARIS Performance and Results Information System
PART Performance Assessment Rating Tool
PSI Principal Security Inspector
SOP standard operating procedures
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSAR Transportation Security Administration Representative
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USTDA United States Trade and Development Agency
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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 11, 2007
The Honorable John L. Mica
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
Flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to be
targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated in August 2006
when British officials uncovered an alleged terrorist plot to detonate
liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft departing from the United
Kingdom for the United States. Similar terrorist activity was uncovered in
December 2003 when U.S. intelligence officials identified terrorists'
intent on carrying out attacks on U.S.-bound flights originating from
foreign airports. Such conditions highlight the continued need for the
United States to coordinate efforts with foreign governments to help
ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights. Given that there were more than
650,000 flights to the United States from foreign locations during
calendar year 2005, the security of foreign airports and air carriers that
service the United States is integral to the security of U.S. commercial
aviation.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency with
primary responsibility for securing the nation's civil aviation system,^1
has several efforts under way with other nations to help ensure the
security of U.S.-bound flights. For example, TSA, through its foreign
airport assessment program, determines whether foreign airports that
provide service to the United States are maintaining and carrying out
effective security measures. Additionally, TSA, through its air carrier
inspection program, determines whether air carriers, U.S.-based or
foreign, that service the United States are complying with applicable
security requirements. According to TSA officials, the foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs enable TSA to inform the
public about foreign airports that do not maintain and carry out effective
security measures so that the public can make informed decisions when
planning their travel.
^1See 49 U.S.C S 114(d).
TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports
using the aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted by
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).^2 ICAO standards and
recommended practices address operational issues at an airport, such as
ensuring that passengers and baggage are properly screened and that
unauthorized individuals do not have access to restricted areas of an
airport. ICAO standards also address nonoperational issues, such as
ensuring that a foreign government has implemented a national civil
aviation security program for regulating security procedures at its
airports and ensuring that airport officials implementing security
controls go through background investigations, are appropriately trained,
and are certified according to a foreign government's national civil
aviation security program. Member states have agreed to comply with ICAO
standards, and are strongly encouraged to comply with ICAO recommended
practices. While TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct foreign
airport assessments at intervals it considers necessary, TSA may not
perform an assessment of security measures at a foreign airport without
permission from the host government. TSA also conducts security
inspections of foreign and U.S.-based air carriers with service to the
United States from foreign countries to ensure compliance with applicable
security requirements, including those set forth in the air carriers'
TSA-approved security programs.^3 As of October 2006, there were a total
of 924 air carrier stations located in 268 airports around the world that
service the United States and that TSA may seek to inspect.^4
2ICAO was formed following the 1944 Convention on International Civil
Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention). In 1947, ICAO became a
specialized agency of the United Nations. A primary objective of ICAO is
to provide for the safe, orderly, and efficient development of
international civil aviation. There are currently 189 signatory nations to
the ICAO convention, including the United States. Nations that are members
to the ICAO convention agree to cooperate with other member states to meet
standardized international aviation security measures. The international
aviation security standards and recommended practices are detailed in
Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation adopted by
ICAO.
^3Domestic and foreign air carriers that operate to, from, or within the
United States must establish and maintain security programs approved by
TSA in accordance with requirements set forth in regulation at 49 C.F.R.
parts 1544 and 1546. See 49 U.S.C. SS 44903 44906. In conducting air
carrier inspections, TSA may consider compliance with air carriers'
TSA-approved security programs as well as any applicable laws,
regulations, security directives, and emergency amendments. See 49 C.F.R.
SS 1544.3 1546.3.
Considering the high volume of flights arriving in the United States from
foreign locations and the history of terrorist threats against commercial
aviation, TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs are important elements in ensuring the security of inbound
flights. Given the vulnerability of U.S.-bound flights to acts of
terrorism, this report addresses the following questions: (1) What were
the results of TSA's fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessments and air
carrier inspections, and what actions were taken, if any, when TSA
identified that foreign airports and air carriers were not complying with
security standards? (2) How, if at all, did TSA assist foreign countries
and air carriers in addressing any deficiencies identified during foreign
airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and to what extent did
TSA provide oversight of its assessment and inspection efforts? (3) What
challenges, if any, affected TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections, and what actions have TSA and
others taken to address these challenges? In April 2007, we issued a
report that contained sensitive security information regarding TSA's
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. This report
provides the results of our April 2007 report with the sensitive security
information removed.
To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed TSA guidance for
conducting and reporting the results of foreign airport assessments and
air carrier inspections. We also obtained and analyzed the results of 128
foreign airport assessments and 529 air carrier inspections conducted by
TSA during fiscal year 2005 to determine the extent to which foreign
airports and air carriers operating overseas complied with aviation
security standards.^5 We assessed the reliability of TSA's air carrier
inspection data for fiscal year 2005 and concluded that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We also interviewed
TSA's Office of Security Operations and its Transportation Sector Network
Management officials, both in headquarters and the field,^6 who are
responsible for planning, coordinating, overseeing, and carrying out
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, to obtain
information on TSA's efforts to help foreign officials address airport
security deficiencies and TSA's efforts to overcome challenges identified
by TSA officials in conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections. Additionally, we visited three European, three Asian, and one
other North American country where we met with host government aviation
security officials, air carrier representatives, airport officials,
aviation industry representatives, and TSA officials to obtain their
perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection programs. We also accompanied TSA officials during an airport
assessment and air carrier inspection at an airport in the Caribbean. In
addition, we interviewed 16 foreign aviation security officials stationed
in their countries' embassies in Washington, D.C., to obtain their
perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection programs. However, information obtained from our interviews
with host government and aviation industry representatives cannot be
generalized beyond those contacted because we did not use a probability
sampling method to select these officials for interviews. We also
conducted phone interviews with four Federal Security Directors (FSD)^7
and seven TSA aviation security inspectors based in U.S. airports to
discuss their involvement in foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections. Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to
all FSDs in U.S. airports or to domestic inspectors who support foreign
airport assessments and air carrier inspections because we did not use a
probability sampling method to select these officials for interviews. We
also met with officials from ICAO, the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference
(APEC), the Association of European Airlines (AEA), the European
Commission, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) regarding their
perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection programs and the process and standards they use, if any, to
conduct their own airport assessments.^8 Additionally, we interviewed
officials from the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department
of Transportation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to learn
about the aviation security training and technical assistance they provide
to foreign governments.
^4An air carrier station refers to those locations at an airport where an
air carrier conducts its operations.
^5Complete foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results
for fiscal year 2006 were not available when we initiated our review.
^6TSA's international field offices are located in Dallas, Frankfurt, Los
Angeles, Miami, and Singapore.
^7FSDs are the ranking TSA authorities responsible for the leadership and
coordination of TSA security activities at commercial airports in the
United States.
We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. More details about
the scope and methodology of our work are contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief
Based on the results of TSA's fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessments
and air carrier inspections, some foreign airports and air carriers
complied with all relevant aviation security standards, while others did
not, and when deemed necessary, the Secretary of Homeland Security and TSA
took enforcement action against those that were not in compliance. Of the
128 foreign airports with air carriers that provide service to the United
States and that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA found that at
the completion of the assessment, 46 (about 36 percent) complied with all
ICAO standards and recommended practices, whereas 82 (about 64 percent)
did not meet at least one ICAO standard or recommended practice. The most
common area of noncompliance for foreign airports was related to quality
control--mechanisms to assess and address security vulnerabilities at
airports. For example, one airport did not meet quality control standards
because it did not have a mechanism in place to ensure that airport
officials implementing security controls were appropriately trained and
able to effectively perform their duties. According to TSA, access control
measures and passenger and checked baggage screening are critical elements
of effective security at foreign airports because these measures are
intended to prevent terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as
weapons and explosives, onto aircraft. However, even if a foreign airport
does not meet multiple aviation security standards, including critical
standards, TSA may determine that such deficiencies do not warrant review
by the Secretary of Homeland Security.^9 Nonetheless, if TSA determines
that secretarial action may be warranted and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, based on TSA's assessment, determines that a foreign airport
does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, then he or
she must take action. These actions may include issuing a letter to
foreign government officials stating that they have 90 days to improve
security measures to meet ICAO standards or notifying the public that a
foreign airport does not maintain and carry out effective security
measures. For example, during fiscal year 2005, the Secretary of Homeland
Security determined that 2 of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed
were not maintaining and carrying out effective security measures. In
response, DHS notified the general public of these determinations by the
Secretary. During fiscal year 2005, of the 529 inspections of air carriers
operating out of foreign airports, there were 373 inspections (about 71
percent) for which TSA did not identify any security violations and 156
inspections (about 29 percent) for which TSA found that the air carrier
did not comply with at least one TSA security requirement. There were a
total of 419 instances of noncompliance identified during these 156
inspections.^10 In some cases, the security deficiencies identified during
these inspections were corrected or addressed immediately. When security
deficiencies were not resolved immediately, TSA inspectors, at times,
recommended enforcement action. Enforcement action included issuing
letters of warning or correction to air carriers or imposing civil
penalties--monetary fines--on air carriers. Of the 419 security violations
identified during fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspections, 259 (about 62
percent) were corrected or addressed immediately, and 76 (about 18
percent) were recommended for enforcement action. TSA could not readily
identify the enforcement actions that were taken for the remaining 84 (20
percent) security violations. Enforcement actions taken by TSA as a result
of fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspections consisted of 26 enforcement
actions and 14 letters of correction.^11 Civil penalties ranging from
$18,000 to $25,000 were recommended for 7 enforcement actions. Although
TSA has not conducted its own analysis of foreign airport assessment and
air carrier inspection results, TSA officials stated that our analysis of
the results was consistent with their assumptions regarding the most
prominent security deficiencies identified among foreign airports and air
carriers. However, TSA officials stated that it is difficult to draw
conclusions about the results--such as whether the results are generally
positive or negative--considering the differences in the capabilities and
willingness of foreign officials to address security deficiencies. TSA
officials further stated that the cumulative results of the assessments
and inspections may be helpful in identifying the aviation security
training needs of foreign aviation security officials. While TSA does not
have its own program to provide aviation security training and technical
assistance to foreign aviation security officials, TSA officials stated
that they could use the results of TSA's foreign airport assessments to
refer foreign officials to training and technical assistance programs
offered by ICAO and several other U.S. government agencies.
^8APEC is a multilateral organization that aims to sustain economic growth
in the Asia-Pacific region through a commitment to open trade, investment,
and economic reform. APEC's transportation subgroups work to achieve a
balance between trade and security issues related to the operation of
regional transportation systems. AEA represents more than 30 airlines and
works in partnership with stakeholders in the aviation industry to ensure
the sustainable growth of the European airline industry in a global
context. ECAC, created in 1955, currently has 42 members and seeks to
promote aviation safety, security, and economic development of its
members. One way ECAC contributes to this effort is by conducting audits
of airports and air carriers when requested to do so by a country in
accordance with aviation security standards agreed upon by ECAC members.
IATA is composed of over 260 airlines and aims to help airlines simplify
processes and increase passenger convenience while reducing costs and
improving efficiency.
^9According to TSA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard Operating
Procedures, if security concerns and deficiencies identified by TSA during
assessments are considered "not serious enough for secretarial action
(e.g., the measure barely satisfies the minimum international standard and
could be improved)," TSA may develop an action plan for addressing these
deficiencies without seeking a determination for further action from the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
^10Specific details regarding the nature of security deficiencies TSA
identified during air carrier inspections are sensitive security
information and are not discussed in this report.
During fiscal year 2005, TSA helped improve security at foreign airports
by assisting foreign officials and air carrier representatives in
addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments and
inspections. However, TSA's oversight of the foreign airport assessment
and air carrier inspection programs could be strengthened. TSA assisted
foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during
airport assessments in various ways, including providing on-site
consultation to help foreign officials immediately address security
deficiencies, making recommendations to help foreign officials sustain
security improvements, and helping foreign governments obtain aviation
security training and technical assistance. To help air carriers address
security deficiencies that were identified, TSA often provided on-site
consultation. For example, during one inspection, TSA inspectors
identified a security deficiency related to catering carts, after which
the inspectors immediately notified the air carrier of the deficiency and
made a recommendation for better securing catering carts in the future.^12
TSA also assigned a principal security inspector to each U.S. carrier and
foreign carrier that provides service to the United States whose
responsibility was to counsel air carriers and provide clarification on
TSA security requirements when necessary. TSA has several controls in
place to ensure that the agency is meeting internal requirements for
implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs, such as requiring inspectors to use standard operating
procedures for coordinating with host government officials for scheduling,
conducting, and reporting the results of foreign airport assessments.
However, additional controls--including controls for tracking,
documenting, and measuring the impact of TSA's assessment and inspection
activities--would help strengthen its oversight of these programs. First,
TSA does not have controls in place to track the status of scheduled
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, including whether
the assessments and inspections were actually conducted or whether they
were deferred or canceled, which could make it difficult for TSA to ensure
that scheduled assessments and inspections are completed. Second, TSA does
not always document the results of follow-up conducted by TSA
international staff to determine progress made by foreign governments in
addressing security deficiencies identified by TSA. Documentation of such
follow-up would enable TSA to have access to updated information on the
security of foreign airports that provide service to the United States.
Third, TSA does not always track the status of air carrier inspections
from initiation through completion, which prevents TSA from determining
whether appropriate action was taken against air carriers that violated
security requirements. Finally, TSA does not have outcome-based
performance measures in place to measure the impact that its efforts have
had on helping foreign airport officials and air carrier representatives
comply with aviation security standards and requirements. Federal
standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest that
agencies should document key decisions in a way that is complete and
accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced from initiation, through
processing, to after completion. Starting in August 2006, TSA officials
began to develop controls for tracking the status of scheduled foreign
airport visits, such as tracking the number of days remaining until
inspectors are to visit a particular foreign airport. However, in February
2007, TSA officials acknowledged that additional refinements to the
tracking system were needed. TSA officials also stated that developing
performance measures to assess the impact of assessment and
inspection-related efforts on security at foreign airports would be
useful, but they identified several concerns about developing such
measures. For example, TSA officials stated that whether foreign officials
improve security at their airports is not within TSA's control and,
therefore, developing a performance measure related to TSA's contributions
to improving foreign airport security may not be appropriate. However,
other federal agencies, such as the Department of State, have developed
performance measures for foreign assistance programs for which the outcome
is not entirely within the agency's control. Even without full control
over such measures, it would be useful for TSA to develop outcome-based
measures for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs--such as the percentage of security deficiencies that were
addressed as a result of TSA on-site assistance and TSA recommendations
for corrective action--to identify any aspects of these programs that need
improvement. Also, with additional oversight of the foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs, TSA would have better
assurance that these programs are operating as intended.
^11The number of enforcement actions is not equal to the number of
violations identified because TSA can issue one enforcement action for
multiple violations, and TSA could not readily identify what action, if
any, was taken for some violations.
^12The specific details of the catering cart security deficiency
identified by TSA inspectors are sensitive security information and,
therefore, are not discussed in this report.
TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its ability
to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections,
including a lack of available inspectors, concerns regarding the resource
burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits
by TSA and others, and concerns unique to specific host governments, such
as sovereignty--more specifically, concerns that TSA assessments and
inspections infringe upon a host government's authority to regulate
airports and air carriers within its borders. According to TSA officials,
TSA deferred approximately 30 percent of the foreign airport
visits--including airport assessments and air carrier inspections--that
were scheduled for fiscal year 2005, due to the lack of available
inspectors and concerns raised by host government officials. TSA officials
stated that two key factors affected the availability of inspectors during
fiscal year 2005. First, TSA was operating with fewer inspectors than the
agency budgeted for fiscal year 2005. Specifically, three of the five
international field offices were operating with fewer inspectors than they
were budgeted during at least 9 months out of the fiscal year. According
to TSA, the shortage of inspectors was due to the high turnover rate for
inspectors and the lengthy process for hiring additional inspectors to
fill vacant positions. Second, TSA scheduled more foreign airport
visits--which includes both airport assessments and air carrier
inspections--than the budgeted number of inspectors could have reasonably
conducted. According to TSA, each inspector can reasonably conduct between
8 and 12 foreign airport visits per year depending on the amount of time
inspectors remain on site to help foreign authorities address any security
deficiencies. However, all five international field offices scheduled more
than 12 foreign airport visits per inspector during fiscal year 2005; one
international field office scheduled more than 24 visits per inspector.
TSA officials said that their internal policy regarding the frequency with
which the agency is to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections drove their decision to schedule more foreign airport visits
than inspectors could reasonably have conducted. According to TSA
officials, this internal policy was developed by the Federal Aviation
Administration, which was responsible for conducting foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections prior to TSA. TSA officials also
stated that the Federal Aviation Administration had more available
inspectors to conduct assessments and inspections than TSA. Given the lack
of available international inspectors, TSA also used domestic
inspectors--that is, inspectors who typically conduct security inspections
at U.S. airports--to conduct 33 percent of the scheduled foreign airport
visits for fiscal year 2005. However, TSA officials stated that the use of
domestic inspectors is undesirable because these inspectors lack
experience conducting assessments in the international environment. During
October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling
foreign airport assessments to better allocate its limited inspector
resources by focusing on foreign airports that pose the greatest security
risk to U.S.-bound air travel. Another potential benefit to TSA's new
risk-based approach to scheduling is that it may allow TSA to reduce its
reliance on domestic inspectors. Our analysis shows that TSA's risk-based
approach is consistent with generally accepted risk management principles.
TSA has also taken steps to address concerns regarding the resource burden
placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits. Host
government officials in three of the seven foreign countries we visited,
and representatives of various air carrier associations, stated that
countries are subjected to multiple assessments and inspections each year
by TSA, ICAO, the European Commission, and others, and because foreign
government officials and air carrier representatives have to escort the
various inspectors during the assessment and inspections, the frequency of
airport visits is burdensome on the host government and air carriers.
TSA's risk-based approach for scheduling airport assessments should help
address some host governments' concerns regarding the resource burden. TSA
has also begun to explore other opportunities to alleviate the resource
burden placed on host governments. Specifically, when the opportunity is
available, TSA is considering conducting joint assessments and using the
results of some host government or third party assessments to adjust the
frequency of TSA visits; collectively, these efforts may reduce the number
of airport visits experienced by some countries. However, TSA officials
stated that they are cautious about using the results of other entities'
assessments because TSA has not independently evaluated the quality of the
assessments conducted by these other entities and because these other
entities base their assessments on different aviation security standards
than TSA. TSA headquarters officials stated that working with host
governments to harmonize aviation security standards as well as the
process used to conduct assessments--that is, developing similar standards
and assessment processes that provide the same level of security--would
facilitate TSA's use of host government and third party assessment
results. TSA has made efforts to harmonize security standards and
inspection processes with the European Commission, although, as of
February 2007, a time frame for completion of these efforts had not yet
been established. TSA has also harmonized some security
standards--particularly those related to the screening of liquids, gels,
and aerosols--with several European countries, Australia, and Canada. In
addition to working to address concerns regarding the resource burden
placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits, TSA has
taken steps to address some country-specific challenges that have limited
TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport visits. For example, TSA said
that officials from one country viewed TSA's airport assessments as an
infringement on their country's sovereignty, and therefore would not allow
TSA to conduct assessments of airports in their country. However, TSA
officials negotiated with officials in this country so that assessments
are conducted under the guise of a TSA "visit" to--versus an "assessment"
of--the airport, although officials from that country prohibit TSA
inspectors from assessing airport perimeter security and the contents of
their national aviation security programs. TSA officials stated that when
unique concerns arise in the future, they will continue to work with
countries on a case-by-case basis to try to address their concerns.
In our April 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, we
made several recommendations to assist TSA in strengthening oversight of
the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. These
include developing and implementing controls to track the status of
scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections from
initiation through completion, including reasons why assessments and
inspections were deferred or canceled; developing and implementing a
standard process for tracking and documenting host governments' progress
in addressing security deficiencies identified during airport assessments;
and developing performance measures to evaluate the impact that TSA
assistance and enforcement actions have had on improving foreign airport
and air carrier compliance with applicable aviation security standards. We
provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) for review. DHS, in its written comments, concurred with our
findings and recommendations, and stated that the recommendations will
help strengthen TSA's oversight of foreign airport assessments and air
carrier inspections. DHS described some actions that TSA is taking to
implement these recommendations, including enhancing its tracking system
to include the reason for deferment or cancellation of an airport
assessment or an air carrier inspection; developing a system whereby
outstanding deficiencies noted during an assessment will be tracked along
with deficiency specific information, deadlines, and current status; and
developing outcome-based performance measures for the foreign airport
assessment program and air carrier inspection activities.
Background
DHS Responsibilities for Ensuring the Security of U.S.-Bound Flights from
Foreign Countries
Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed,
and the President signed into law, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, which established TSA and gave the agency responsibility for
securing all modes of transportation, including the nation's civil
aviation system, which includes domestic and international commercial
aviation operations.^13 In accordance with 49 U.S.C. S 44907, TSA assesses
the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports served by a
U.S. air carrier, from which a foreign air carrier serves the United
States, that pose a high risk of introducing danger to international air
travel, and at other airports deemed appropriate by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.^14 This provision of law also identifies measures that
the Secretary must take in the event that he or she determines that an
airport is not maintaining and carrying out effective security measures
based on TSA assessments.^15 TSA also conducts inspections of U.S. air
carriers and foreign air carriers servicing the United States from foreign
airports pursuant to its authority to ensure that air carriers
certificated or permitted to operate to, from, or within the United States
meet applicable security requirements, including those set forth in an air
carrier's TSA-approved security program.^16
13See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
^1449 U.S.C. S 44907. Prior to the establishment of DHS in March 2003,
authority for conducting foreign airport assessments resided with the
Secretary of Transportation. Although assessments were originally
conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration, TSA assumed
responsibility for conducting the assessments following the enactment of
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November 2001. In March
2003, TSA transferred from the Department of Transportation to DHS.
^15 See 49 U.S.C. S 44907(d)-(e).
The Secretary of DHS delegated to the Assistant Secretary of TSA the
responsibility for conducting foreign airport assessments but retained
responsibility for making the determination that a foreign airport does
not maintain and carry out effective security measures. Currently, TSA's
Security Operations and Transportation Sector Network Management divisions
are jointly responsible for conducting foreign airport assessments and air
carrier inspections. Table 1 highlights the roles and responsibilities of
certain TSA positions within these divisions that are responsible for
implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs.
^16Domestic and foreign air carriers that operate to, from, or within the
United States must establish and maintain security programs approved by
TSA in accordance with requirements set forth in regulation at 49 C.F.R
parts 1544 and 1546. See 49 U.S.C SS 44903 44906. Prior to TSA being
established in February 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration
conducted these air carrier inspections.
Table 1: Positions That Play a Key Role in TSA's Foreign Airport and Air
Carrier Inspection Programs
Office/division Position Duties
Security Operations Aviation Security Inspectors are primarily
Inspector responsible for performing and
reporting the results of both
foreign airport assessments and
the air carrier inspections, and
will provide on-site assistance
and make recommendations for
security enhancements. Inspectors
are also deployed in response to
specific incidents or to monitor
for identified threats.
Inspectors are based in one of
TSA's five international field
offices (IFO)^a.
Transportation Sector Transportation TSARs communicate with foreign
Network Management Security government officials to address
Administration transportation security matters
Representative and to conduct foreign airport
(TSAR) assessments. Specifically, the
TSARs serve as on-site
coordinators for TSA responses to
terrorist incidents and threats
to U.S. assets at foreign
transportation modes. TSARs also
serve as principal advisors on
transportation security affairs
to U.S. ambassadors and other
embassy officials responsible for
transportation issues to ensure
the safety and security of the
transportation system. For the
foreign airport assessment
program, TSARs are often involved
in arranging pre-assessment
activities, assessment visits,
and follow-up visits.
Additionally, TSARs are
responsible for completing
portions of the airport
assessment reports and reviewing
completed assessment reports.
TSARs also help host government
officials address security
deficiencies that are identified
during assessments.
Transportation Sector International IPSIs are responsible for
Network Management Security Principal assisting foreign air carriers in
Inspector (IPSI) complying with TSA security
requirements by providing
counseling and clarification to
airlines on TSA requirements and
providing requested information
to TSA about these air carriers.
Transportation Sector Principal Security PSIs are responsible for
Network Management Inspector (PSI) assisting U.S.-based air carriers
in complying with TSA security
requirements by providing
oversight to airlines on TSA
requirements and providing
requested information to TSA
about these air carriers.
Source: TSA.
aIFO managers are responsible for the overall planning of assessment
visits that take place in their respective regions. TSA's IFOs are located
in Dallas, Miami, Frankfurt, Singapore and Los Angeles.
bTSARs are located in Athens, Bangkok, Beijing, Brussels, Buenos Aires,
Dallas, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Manila, Miami, Paris, Rome, Singapore,
Sydney, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C.
TSA's Process for Assessing Aviation Security Measures at Foreign Airports
TSA conducts foreign airport assessments to determine the extent to which
foreign airports maintain and carry out effective security measures in
order to ensure the security of flights bound for the United States.
Specifically, TSA assesses foreign airports using 86 of the 106 aviation
security standards and recommended practices adopted by ICAO, a United
Nations organization representing nearly 190 countries.^17 (See app. II
for a description of the 86 ICAO standards and recommended practices TSA
uses to assess security measures at foreign airports.^18) While TSA is
authorized under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments at
intervals it considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment of
security measures at a foreign airport without permission from the host
government. During fiscal year 2005, TSA scheduled assessments by
categorizing airports into two groups. Category A airports--airports that
did not exhibit operational issues in the last two TSA assessments--were
assessed once every 3 years, while category B airports--airports that did
exhibit operational issues in either of the last two TSA assessments, or
were not previously assessed--were assessed annually. Based on
documentation provided by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, TSA assessed
aviation security measures in place at 128 foreign airports that
participated voluntarily in TSA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program.^19
TSA's assessments of foreign airports are conducted by a team of
inspectors, which generally includes one team leader and one team member.
According to TSA, it generally takes 3 to 7 days to complete a foreign
airport assessment. However, the amount of time required to conduct an
assessment varies based on several factors, including the size of the
airport, the number of air carrier station inspections to be conducted at
the airport,^20 the threat level to civil aviation in the host country,
and the amount of time it takes inspectors to travel from the
international field office (IFO) to the airport where the assessment will
take place. An additional 2 weeks is required for inspectors to complete
the assessment report after they return to the IFO.
^17 International aviation security standards and recommended practices
are detailed in Annex 17 and Annex 14 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, as adopted by ICAO. An ICAO standard is a specification
for the safety or regularity of international air navigation, with which
member states agree to comply; whereas, a recommended practice is any
desirable specification for safety, regularity, or efficiency of
international air navigation, with which member states are strongly
encouraged to comply. Member states are expected to make a genuine effort
to comply with recommended practices. TSA has chosen the 86 standards that
it sees as most critical. See 49 U.S.C. S 44907(a)(2)(C) (requiring that
TSA conduct assessments using a standard that results in an analysis of
the security measures at the airport based at least on the standards and
appropriate recommended practices of ICAO Annex 17 in effect on the date
of the assessment).
^18 Segments of Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil
Aviation, Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Unlawful Acts
of Interference, Seventh Edition, April 2002 and Annex 14, Aerodrome
Design and Operations, Volume I, have been reproduced in appendix II with
permission of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
^19 Based on documentation provided by TSA, TSA also conducted five
foreign airport surveys during fiscal year 2005. Surveys are generally
conducted at foreign airports that are scheduled to provide new service to
the United States. Unlike airport assessments, airport surveys only
address whether foreign airports are meeting critical ICAO standards and
recommended practices, such as those associated with passenger and checked
baggage screening. Also unlike assessment reports, survey reports do not
identify whether foreign officials took steps to address security
deficiencies that were identified at the airport. Because of these
differences, we did not include the results of the foreign airport surveys
in our analysis.
As shown in figure 1, regarding the process for conducting a foreign
airport assessment, before TSA can assess the security measures at a
foreign airport, the Transportation Security Administration Representative
(TSAR) must first obtain approval from the host government to allow TSA to
conduct an airport assessment and to schedule the date for an on-site
visit to the foreign airport. During the assessment, the team of
inspectors uses several methods to determine a foreign airport's level of
compliance with international security standards, including conducting
interviews with airport officials, examining documents pertaining to the
airport's security measures, and conducting a physical inspection of the
airport. For example, the inspectors are to examine the integrity of
fences, lighting, and locks by walking the grounds of the airport.
Inspectors also make observations regarding access control procedures,
such as looking at employee and vehicle identification methods in secure
areas, as well as monitoring passenger and baggage screening procedures in
the airport. At the close of an airport assessment, inspectors brief
foreign airport and government officials on the results of the assessment.
TSA inspectors also prepare a report summarizing their findings on the
airport's overall security posture and security measures, which may
contain recommendations for corrective action and must be reviewed by the
TSAR, the IFO manager, and TSA headquarters officials.
^20 According to TSA, the airport assessment period is extended by 8 to 12
hours for each air carrier inspection that is conducted.
Figure 1: Airport Assessment Activities
If the inspectors report that an airport's security measures do not meet
minimum international security standards, particularly critical standards,
such as those related to passenger and checked baggage screening and
access controls, TSA headquarters officials are to inform the Secretary of
Homeland Security.^21 If the Secretary, based on TSA's airport assessment
results, determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out
effective security measures, he or she must, after advising the Secretary
of State, take secretarial action. Figure 2 describes in detail the types
of secretarial action the Secretary may take during such instances. There
are three basic types of secretarial action:
o 90-day action--The Secretary notifies foreign government
officials that they have 90 days to address security deficiencies
that were identified during the airport assessment and recommends
steps necessary to bring the security measures at the airport up
to ICAO standards.^22
o Public notification--If, after 90 days, the Secretary finds that
the government has not brought security measures at the airport up
to ICAO standards, the Secretary notifies the general public that
the airport does not maintain and carry out effective security
measures.^23
o Modification to air carrier operations--If, after 90 days, the
Secretary finds that the government has not brought security
measures at the airport up to ICAO standards:
o The Secretary may withhold, revoke, or prescribe
conditions on the operating authority of U.S.-based
and foreign air carriers operating at that airport,
following consultation with appropriate host
government officials and air carrier representatives,
and with the approval of the Secretary of State.
o The President may prohibit a U.S.-based or foreign
air carrier from providing transportation between the
United States and any foreign airport that is the
subject of a secretarial determination.
^21According to TSA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard
Operating Procedures, if security concerns and deficiencies are considered
"not serious enough for secretarial action (e.g., the measure barely
satisfies the minimum international standard and could be improved)," TSA
may develop an action plan for addressing the deficiencies identified
without seeking a determination from the Secretary of Homeland Security.
^22The Secretary may bypass the 90-day action and immediately provide
public notification or withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on an air
carrier's operating authority if the Secretary determines, after
consultation with the Secretary of State, that a condition exists that
threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew
traveling to or from the airport. S 44907(d)(2)(A)(ii).
^23 Public notification includes publication of the airport's identity in
the Federal Register, posting and displaying the airport's identity
prominently at all U.S. airports at which scheduled air carrier operations
are provided regularly, and notifying news media of the airport's
identity. 49 U.S.C. S 44907(d)(1)(A). U.S. and foreign air carriers
providing transportation between the United States and the airport shall
also provide written notice that the airport is not maintaining and
carrying out effective security measures on or with the ticket to each
passenger buying a ticket. S 44907(d)(1)(B).
o Suspension of service-- The Secretary, with approval of the
Secretary of State, shall suspend the right of any U.S.-based or
foreign air carrier to provide service to or from an airport if
the Secretary determines that a condition exists that threatens
the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling
to or from the airport, and the public interest requires an
immediate suspension of transportation between the United States
and that airport.^24
^24 Invoking this action does not require that the Secretary base the
determination upon TSA's airport assessment results, though an assessment
may provide the basis for invoking this action.
Figure 2: Process for Taking Secretarial Action against a Foreign Airport
TSA's Process for Inspecting Air Carriers with Service to the United States from
Foreign Airports
Along with conducting airport assessments, the same TSA inspection team
also conducts air carrier inspections when visiting a foreign airport to
ensure that air carriers are in compliance with TSA security
requirements.^25 Both U.S. and foreign air carriers with service to the
United States are subject to inspection. As of February 2007, TSA guidance
required TSA to inspect each U.S. air carrier station once a year, except
for those airports in which TSA has determined to be an "extraordinary"
location,^26 where inspections are to occur twice a year. Foreign air
carriers are to be inspected twice in a 3-year period at each foreign
airport, except in extraordinary locations, where they are to be inspected
annually.^27 According to documentation provided by TSA, during fiscal
year 2005, TSA conducted 529 inspections of foreign and U.S. air carriers
serving the United States from foreign airports. When conducting
inspections, TSA inspectors examine compliance with applicable security
requirements, including TSA-approved security programs,^28 emergency
amendments to the security programs, and security directives.^29 Air
carrier security programs are based on the Aircraft Operator Standard
Security Program for U.S.-based air carriers and the Model Security
Program for foreign air carriers, which serve as guidance for what an air
carrier needs to include in its own security program. The Aircraft
Operator Standard Security Program is designed to provide for the safety
of passengers and their belongings traveling on flights against acts of
criminal violence, air piracy, and the introduction of explosives,
incendiaries, weapons, and other prohibited items onboard an aircraft.
Likewise, the Model Security Program is designed to prevent prohibited
items from being carried aboard aircraft, prohibit unauthorized access to
airplanes, ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized
carrier representative, and ensure the proper handling of cargo to be
loaded onto passenger flights. When TSA determines that additional
security measures are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or to a
specific threat against civil aviation, TSA may issue a security directive
or an emergency amendment to an air carrier security program that sets
forth additional mandatory security requirements.^30 Air carriers are
required to comply with each applicable security directive or emergency
amendment issued by TSA, along with the requirements already within their
security programs and any other requirements set forth in applicable law.
Appendix III provides additional information on security requirements for
U.S. and foreign air carriers serving the United States from foreign
airports.
^25TSA may conduct air carrier inspections separately from airport
assessments because foreign airports are generally assessed no more than
once a year by TSA, while some air carriers are inspected twice a year by
TSA.
^26Extraordinary locations are identified through threat analysis
conducted by TSA's Office of Intelligence and are contained in the
Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program. The list of extraordinary
locations is sensitive security information and, therefore, is not
included in this report.
^27Over the course of our review, TSA was in the process of developing new
guidelines for determining the frequency of overseas air carrier
inspections. The draft guidelines would require TSA to inspect both U.S.
and foreign air carriers once a year, unless the air carrier operates out
of a foreign airport that TSA determines has a relatively high
vulnerability level, in which case TSA would inspect the air carrier twice
a year. TSA had not finalized the draft air carrier inspection guidelines
as of February 2007.
^28TSA requires that each air carrier adopt and implement a TSA-approved
security program for all scheduled passenger and public charter operations
at locations within the United States, from the United States to a
non-U.S. location, or from a non-U.S. location to the United States. See
49 C.F.R. pts. 1544-46.
^29See 49 C.F.R. SS 1544.3, 1546.3.
Although U.S.-based and foreign air carriers are guided by different
standards within the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program and the
Model Security Program, inspections for both of these entities are
similar. As in the case of airport assessments, air carrier inspections
are conducted by a team of inspectors, which generally includes one team
leader and one team member. An inspection of an air carrier typically
takes 1 or 2 days, but can take longer depending on the extent of service
by the air carrier. Inspection teams may spend several days at a foreign
airport inspecting air carriers if there are multiple airlines serving the
United States from that location. During an inspection, inspectors are to
review applicable security manuals, procedures, and records; interview air
carrier station personnel; and observe air carrier employees processing
passengers from at least one flight from passenger check-in until the
flight departs the gate to ensure that the air carrier is in compliance
with applicable requirements. Inspectors evaluate a variety of security
measures, such as passenger processing including the use of No-Fly and
Selectee lists,^31 checked baggage acceptance and control, aircraft
security, and passenger screening. Inspectors record inspection results
into TSA's Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) system, a
database containing security compliance information on TSA-regulated
entities. If an inspector finds that an air carrier is violating any
applicable security requirements, additional steps are to be taken to
record those specific violations and, in some cases, pursue them with
further investigation. Figure 3 provides an overview of the air carrier
inspection and documentation process, including the options for what type
of penalty, if any, should be imposed on air carriers for identified
security violations.
^30When circumstances require that air carriers take immediate action to
mitigate a known or potential threat or vulnerability, TSA may issue
security directives to impose additional security requirements on U.S. air
carriers and emergency amendments to impose additional requirements on
foreign air carriers. See 49 C.F.R. SS 1544.105(d), 1544.305, 1546.105(d).
^31The No-Fly list contains the names of individuals that pose, or are
suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation or national security and
are precluded from boarding an aircraft. The Selectee list includes those
individuals of interest that do not meet the criteria to be placed on the
No-Fly list. Individuals on the Selectee list will be subjected to
additional screening. There is also a separate selectee process--the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System--by which individuals who
meet certain criteria are selected for additional screening.
Figure 3: Air Carrier Inspection Process
When an inspector identifies a violation of a security requirement, a
record of the violation is opened in PARIS. According to guidance issued
by TSA to inspectors, there are various enforcement tools available to
address instances of noncompliance discovered during an inspection:
o On-the-spot counseling is generally to be used for noncompliance
that is minor and technical in nature, and can be remedied
immediately at the time it is discovered. When this course of
action is taken, the inspector notes that the noncompliance issue
was closed with TSA counseling in the finding record and no
further action is required.
o Administrative action is generally to be used for violations or
alleged violations that are unintentional, not the result of
substantial disregard for security, where there are no aggravating
factors present, or first-time violations. An administrative
action results in either a letter of correction or a warning
notice being issued to the air carrier.
o Civil penalties in the form of fines are generally to be used in
response to cases involving egregious violations, gross
negligence, or where administrative action and counseling did not
adequately resolve the noncompliance. Fines can range between
$2,500 and $25,000 based on the severity of the violation.^32 If
the violation is severe enough, TSA may also recommend revocation
of the air carrier's certification to fly into the United States,
but this action has not yet been taken by TSA.
If a violation is resolved with on-the-spot counseling, that fact is
recorded in the finding record of PARIS and the matter is closed. However,
if the inspector opts to pursue administrative action or a civil penalty
against the air carrier, an enforcement investigation record is opened,
and an investigation is conducted. Based on the investigation findings,
the inspector recommends either an administrative action or a civil
penalty, depending on the finding and the circumstances. If the
investigation does not provide evidence that a violation occurred, the
matter is closed with no action taken.
If the inspector makes a recommendation for an administrative action, the
supervisory inspector or IFO manager will typically review the
recommendation and, if appropriate, approve and issue the action. The
supervisory inspector may also recommend that the action be changed to no
action or to a civil penalty. In the case of the latter, the case will be
referred to the Office of Chief Counsel for further review.
^32TSA has statutory authority to issue fines and penalties to individual
air carriers for not complying with established security procedures. See
49 U.S.C. S 46301. In general, the penalty for an aviation security
violation is found at 49 U.S.C. S 46301(a)(4), which states that the
maximum civil penalty for violating chapter 449 of title 49, United States
Code, (49 U.S.C. S 44901 et seq.) or another requirement under title 49
administered by the Assistant Secretary, TSA, shall be $10,000. The
maximum civil penalty shall be $25,000 in the case of a person operating
an aircraft for the transportation of passengers or property for
compensation.
In those cases where the inspector recommends that a civil penalty be
assessed on the air carrier, it is referred to the Office of Chief Counsel
for review. The office is responsible for ensuring that the action is
legally sufficient, and that the recommended fine is consistent with
agency guidelines. TSA's Office of Chief Counsel makes the final
determination for any legal enforcement action. The office may approve the
proposed action or make a recommendation for other actions, including
administrative action or no action at all.
TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Complied with All Aviation
Security Standards, and When Deemed Necessary, DHS and TSA Took Enforcement
Action on Those That Did Not
Based on the results of TSA's foreign airport assessments, during fiscal
year 2005, some foreign airports and air carriers complied with all
relevant aviation security standards, while others did not. The most
common area of noncompliance for foreign airports was related to quality
control--mechanisms to assess and address security vulnerabilities at
airports. The Secretary of Homeland Security determined that the security
deficiencies at two foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 were
so serious that he subsequently notified the general public that these
airports did not meet international aviation security standards. In
addition to assessing the security measures implemented by the airport
authority at foreign airports, TSA also inspected the security measures
put in place by air carriers at foreign airports. When security
deficiencies identified during air carrier inspections could not be
corrected or addressed immediately, TSA inspectors recommended enforcement
action. TSA officials stated that while it is difficult to determine
whether the assessment and inspection results are generally positive or
negative, the cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection results may be helpful in identifying the aviation security
training needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does not have
its own program through which aviation security training and technical
assistance are formally provided to foreign aviation security officials.
However, TSA officials stated that they could use the results of TSA's
foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials to training and
technical assistance programs offered by ICAO and several other U.S.
government agencies.
TSA Data Identified That More than One-Third of Foreign Airports Complied with
All Relevant ICAO Standards during Fiscal Year 2005, and the Remaining Airports
Had Security Deficiencies
Of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA data
show that at the completion of these assessments, 46 (about 36 percent)
complied with all ICAO standards reviewed by TSA,^33 while 82 (about 64
percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard reviewed by TSA.^34 For
these 82 foreign airports, the average number of standards not met was
about 5, and the number of standards not met by an individual airport
ranged from 1 to 22. Foreign airports were most frequently not meeting
ICAO standards related to quality control. TSA data show that about 39
percent of foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not
comply with at least one ICAO quality control standard, which include
mechanisms to assess and address security vulnerabilities at airports. For
example, one airport did not meet an ICAO quality control standard because
it did not have a mechanism in place to ensure that airport officials
implementing security controls were appropriately trained and able to
effectively perform their duties. In another instance, an airport did not
comply with an ICAO quality control standard because, during its previous
two assessments, inspectors found that the airport did not require or have
records of background investigations conducted for individuals
implementing security controls at the airport. Another area in which
airports were not meeting ICAO quality control standards was the absence
of a program to ensure the quality and effectiveness of their National
Civil Aviation Security Program. TSA officials stated that quality control
deficiencies may be prevalent among foreign airports in part because there
is no international guidance available to aviation security officials to
help them develop effective quality control measures. However, TSA
officials stated that ICAO and other regional aviation security
organizations offer training courses to help aviation security officials
worldwide in developing effective quality control measures.
^33TSA assessed foreign airports against 64 required ICAO standards and 22
recommended ICAO practices for aviation security. For the purpose of this
report, we refer to both standards and recommended practices as standards.
^34TSA found that 104 of the 128 foreign airports initially did not meet
at least 1 ICAO standard. The average number of ICAO standards not met by
these 104 airports was about 6, and the range of standards not met by an
individual airport was 1 to 24. However, by the completion of TSA's
assessment, 22 of these 104 airports had taken corrective action that
enabled them to meet all ICAO standards; thus leaving 82 airports that did
not meet at least 1 ICAO standard at the completion of the assessment
period. In addition to conducting airport assessments of foreign airports,
TSA also conducts surveys of foreign airports. Surveys are conducted at
airports that plan to provide new service to the United States.
TSA data also identified that at the completion of the assessment, nearly
half of the foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet
at least one of the 17 ICAO standards that TSA characterized as "critical"
to aviation security.^35 According to TSA, access control, screening of
checked baggage, and screening of passengers and their carry-on items are
critical aspects of aviation security because these measures are intended
to prevent terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as weapons and
explosives, onto aircraft. TSA data identified that some foreign airports
assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet at least one access control
standard. TSA data also identified that some foreign airports did not meet
ICAO standards related to checked baggage screening. One of the baggage
screening deficiencies TSA identified involved foreign airports not taking
steps to prevent checked baggage from being tampered with after the
baggage had been screened, prior to the baggage being placed on the
aircraft. TSA data also identified that some foreign airports assessed
during fiscal year 2005 did not meet ICAO standards related to passenger
screening. One of the passenger-screening problems identified by TSA
involved screening personnel not resolving hand-held metal detector or
walk-through metal detector alarms to determine whether the individuals
being screened were carrying prohibited items.
The Secretary of Homeland Security Took Action against Foreign Airports That Did
Not Maintain and Carry Out Effective Security Measures
Even if a foreign airport does not meet multiple aviation security
standards, including critical standards, TSA may determine that such
deficiencies do not warrant review by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
However, if TSA determines that secretarial action may be warranted and
the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on TSA's assessment, determines
that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out effective security
measures, he or she must take secretarial action. Since the inception of
DHS in March 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security has taken action
against five foreign airports he determined were not maintaining and
carrying out effective security measures, four of which received 90-day
action letters. The Secretary notified the public of his determination
with respect to two of these airports--Port-au-Prince Airport in Haiti^36
and Bandara Ngurah Rai International Airport in Bali, Indonesia^37--both
of which were assessed during fiscal year 2005.
^35At the beginning of the assessment, TSA found that 88 airports did not
meet at least one critical ICAO standard. However, by the end of the
assessment period, 27 airports took corrective action that allowed them to
meet all critical standards, leaving 61 foreign airports not meeting at
least one critical ICAO standard after TSA completed its assessment.
TSA officials told us that the decision to take secretarial action against
an airport is not based solely on the number and type of security
deficiencies identified during TSA airport assessments.^38 Rather, the
secretarial action decision is based on the severity of the security
deficiencies identified, as well as past compliance history, threat
information, and the capacity of the host government to take corrective
action.^39 For example, there were other foreign airports assessed during
fiscal year 2005 that did not comply with about the same number and type
of critical ICAO standards as the five airports that received secretarial
action. However, according to the former Deputy Director of TSA's
Compliance Division, secretarial action was not taken against these
airports either because the security deficiencies were determined to be
not as severe, the host country officials were capable of taking immediate
corrective action to address the deficiencies, or TSA did not perceive
these airports to be in locations at high risk of terrorist activity.
Table 2 demonstrates how two foreign airports--one for which secretarial
action was taken and the other for which no secretarial action was
taken--have about the same number and types of critical deficiencies, but
differ in the severity of the deficiencies and their capability to take
immediate corrective action to address identified deficiencies.
^36See 70 Fed. Reg. 3,378 (Jan. 24, 2005). Based on subsequent assessments
by TSA, the Secretary found that Port-au-Prince International Airport
maintains and carries out effective security measures. See 71 Fed. Reg.
42,103 (July 25, 2006).
^37See 71 Fed. Reg. 3,107 (Jan. 19, 2006). The airport in Bali was
subjected to both a public notification and a 90-dayaction, whereas for
Haiti, the Secretary by-passed the 90-day action and immediately notified
the public that the airport in Haiti did not maintain and carry out
effective security measures. The identity of the foreign airports that
were subjected to 90-day actions, but did not also subjected to public
notification, is classified.
^38The number of ICAO standards not met by the five secretarial action
airports at the completion of TSA's assessment ranged from 11 to 18, and
the number of critical standards not met by these airports range from 3 to
6. The assessment reports for these airports included some standards that
did not provide information whether or not the standard had been met at
the completion of TSA's assessment. Therefore, those standards were
excluded when calculating these range values.
^39TSA officials stated that noncompliance with an ICAO standard, which is
required, has more influence on a secretarial action determination than
noncompliance with an ICAO recommended practice, which is only suggested.
Table 2: Comparison of the Severity of Security Deficiencies and
Corrective Action Taken at One Secretarial Action Airport and One
Non-Secretarial Action Airport
Non-secretarial action
Secretarial action airport airport
ICAO standard 4.7.1--Each Contracting State shall ensure that security
not met by the restricted areas are established at each airport serving
airport international civil aviation and that procedures and
identification systems are implemented in respect of
persons and vehicles.
Severity of the o Security guards failed o Vehicles that did not
deficiency to check identification have proper permits were
(ID) badges properly for parked in a restricted
pedestrians and vehicles area.
entering restricted o A door that leads from
areas. the ticket counter to the
o Guards allowed 54 airside was left open and
vehicles to enter a unattended.
restricted area requiring
vehicles operators to
only show a letter
identifying them as a
very important person
(VIP).
o Guards were not
conducting walking or
mobile patrols of areas
around or in the airport.
o Guards did not prevent
persons without proper
identification from
entering restricted
areas.
o The airport did not
have a program in place
to audit the
identification system.
Immediate o No immediate action was o The airport director
corrective taken to address the immediately removed the
action taken by deficiency. vehicles from the
the airport to restricted area and
address the informed vehicle operators
deficiency that they would not be
allowed to park in the
restricted area until they
obtained an authorized
vehicle permit.
ICAO standard 4.3.1--Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
not met by the ensure that originating passengers and their cabin baggage
airport are screened prior to boarding an aircraft engaged in
international civil aviation operations.
Severity of the o Screeners allowed o Screeners allowed
deficiency individuals who set off individuals who set off
walk-through metal walk-through metal
detector alarms to pass detector alarms to pass
through the screening through the screening
checkpoint without checkpoint without
determining the cause for determining the cause for
the alarms. the alarms.
o Screeners were not o Screeners were not using
using the hand-held metal the hand-held metal
detector correctly. detector correctly.
o Screeners were o Screeners did not
conducting full-body physically inspect all
pat-down searches cell phones.
incorrectly. o Screeners did not rotate
o X-ray screeners were positions at the
inattentive and did not checkpoint.
routinely identify o The airport did not
carry-on bags for further sufficiently staff the
inspection. security checkpoint.
Immediate o Even after TSA o After TSA inspectors
corrective inspectors demonstrated demonstrated how to
action taken by how to properly screen properly resolve metal
the airport to passengers and resolve detector alarms, prior to
address the metal detector alarms, the completion of the
deficiency screeners were still not assessment, the inspectors
able to screen passengers observed that screeners
and carry-on items were screening passengers
correctly. and their carry-on items
correctly.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA foreign airport assessment results.
According to TSA, secretarial actions are lifted when the Secretary, in
part based on TSA's assessment of the airport, determines that the airport
is carrying out and maintaining effective security measures. TSA lifted
the secretarial action at Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti in July 2006, 19
months after the public notification was issued. During this 19-month
period, TSA assisted Haitian officials in developing a national civil
aviation security plan and provided training on how to properly screen
passengers and their carry-on baggage. According to the former Deputy
Director of TSA's Compliance Division, although TSA determined earlier
during 2006 that all of the security deficiencies at the airport had been
addressed by Haitian officials, based on specific intelligence information
regarding threats to the airport in Haiti, the Secretary delayed lifting
the secretarial action until July 2006. As of February 2007, the public
notification for the airport in Bali was still in place. TSA officials
stated that they are in frequent contact with Indonesian officials to
discuss Indonesia's progress in addressing security deficiencies at the
airport. TSA officials also stated that they are awaiting Indonesian
officials' request for TSA to conduct an airport assessment to determine
whether the security deficiencies at the airport in Bali have been
addressed.
More than Two-Thirds of Fiscal Year 2005 Air Carrier Inspections Identified
Compliance with All TSA Security Requirements, while the Remaining Inspections
Identified Some Security Deficiencies
In addition to assessing the security measures implemented by the airport
authority at foreign airports, TSA also inspected the security measures
put in place by air carriers at foreign airports. According to air carrier
inspection data maintained by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, of the 529
inspections of air carriers operating out of foreign airports, there were
373 inspections (about 71 percent) for which the air carrier complied with
all TSA security requirements, and 156 inspections (about 29 percent) for
which the air carrier did not comply with at least one TSA security
requirement.^40 For these 156 inspections, the average number of TSA
requirements not met was about 3, and the number of TSA requirements not
met by an individual inspected air carrier ranged from 1 to 18. The total
number of security requirements against which air carriers were inspected
generally ranged from about 20 to 80, depending on the location of the
foreign airport in which the air carrier operated, the extent of a
carrier's operation at the airport, and whether the carrier was a
U.S.-based or foreign-based carrier.^41 During fiscal year 2005 air
carrier inspections, TSA identified security deficiencies in several
areas, including aircraft security and passenger and checked baggage
screening.^42
^40Specifically, 108 of the 385 U.S. air carrier inspections and 48 of the
144 foreign air carrier inspections resulted in violations of at least one
TSA security requirement.
^41During fiscal year 2005, there were a total of 78 security requirements
that TSA could have imposed on U.S.-based air carriers operating at
foreign airports and a total of 55 security requirements that TSA could
have imposed on foreign air carriers. However, depending on the location
of the foreign airport in which the air carrier operated and the extent of
an air carrier's operations at the airport, not all of the security
requirements were applicable to all air carriers.
Because TSA has authority to regulate air carriers that provide service to
the United States from foreign airports, TSA inspected air carriers
against specific security requirements established by TSA and included in
the air carriers' TSA-approved security programs. TSA officials told us
that they view operational security requirements for air carriers as
critical--as opposed to documentary requirements associated with the air
carrier's approved security program--because these requirements are
designed to prevent terrorists from carrying weapons, explosives, or other
dangerous items onto aircraft.
TSA Took Enforcement Action against Some Air Carriers with Security Deficiencies
That Could Not Be Addressed Immediately
When TSA inspectors identify deficiencies that cannot be corrected or
addressed immediately, the inspectors are to recommend enforcement action.
Based on data provided by TSA, TSA inspectors identified 419 violations
(security deficiencies) as a result of the 156 air carrier inspections
conducted during fiscal year 2005 where TSA identified at least one
security deficiency. Data from TSA showed that 259 violations (about 62
percent) were corrected or addressed immediately. TSA inspectors submitted
76 violations (about 18 percent) for investigation because the violations
were considered serious enough to warrant an enforcement action.^43 TSA
can impose three types of enforcement action on air carriers that violate
security requirements--a warning letter, a letter of correction, or a
monetary civil penalty. Based on information included in TSA's
investigation module within PARIS, for the 47 investigations we could link
to fiscal year 2005 inspections,^44 warning letters were issued in 26
cases, and letters of correction were issued in 14 cases. Fines ranging
from $18,000 to $25,000 were recommended in the 7 cases where inspectors
recommended civil penalties be imposed. Of those, fines ranging from
$4,000 to $15,000 were ultimately levied in 3 cases, in 1 case a warning
notice was issued instead of a civil penalty, and in 2 cases no action was
taken.^45 As of December 2006, 1 case remained unresolved.
^42The percentage of air carrier inspections that resulted in these and
other types of security deficiencies is sensitive security information
and, therefore, is not discussed in this report.
^43TSA could not readily identify what enforcement actions were
recommended for the remaining 84 (about 20 percent) security violations
identified during fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspections.
^44The number of enforcement actions is not equal to the number of
violations identified because TSA can issue one enforcement action for
multiple violations and TSA could not readily identify what action, if
any, was taken for some violations.
TSA Officials Cite Difficulties in Drawing Conclusions about Foreign Airport
Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Results
TSA officials stated that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the
cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
results--such as whether the results are generally positive or
negative--because the primary concern is not whether security deficiencies
are identified. Instead, TSA officials are more concerned about whether
foreign countries have the capability and willingness to address security
deficiencies. According to TSA, some foreign countries do not have the
aviation security expertise or financial resources to adequately address
security deficiencies. TSA officials also stated that some foreign
countries do not regard aviation security as a high priority, and
therefore do not intend to correct security deficiencies identified during
TSA assessments. Further, TSA officials stated that foreign officials'
capability and willingness also influence the extent to which air carriers
comply with security requirements. Although TSA has not conducted its own
analysis of foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results,
TSA officials stated that our analysis of the results was consistent with
their assumptions regarding the most prominent security deficiencies
identified at foreign airports and among air carriers. Additionally, TSA
officials stated that the cumulative foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection results may be helpful in identifying the aviation
security training needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does
not have an internally funded program in place that is specifically
intended to provide aviation security training and technical assistance to
foreign aviation security officials. However, TSA officials stated that
they coordinate with other federal agencies, such as the Department of
State and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, to identify global and
regional training needs and provide instructors for the aviation security
training courses these federal agencies offer to foreign officials. (See
app. IV for a description of the aviation security training and technical
assistance programs offered by U.S. government agencies.) While TSA does
not always determine which foreign countries would receive aviation
security training and technical assistance offered by other federal
agencies, TSA officials stated that they could use the cumulative results
of TSA's foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials to these
assistance programs.
^45 An additional fiscal year 2005 enforcement action based on a fiscal
year 2004 inspection was resolved with a letter of correction issued in
lieu of a $25,000 civil penalty.
TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representatives in Addressing
Security Deficiencies, but Can Strengthen Oversight of the Foreign Airport
Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
TSA used various methods to help foreign officials and air carrier
representatives address security deficiencies identified during TSA
assessments and inspections. However, opportunities remain for TSA to
enhance oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection programs. To help foreign airport officials and host government
officials address security deficiencies identified during foreign airport
assessments, TSA inspectors provided on-site consultation to help address
security deficiencies in the short term, made recommendations for
addressing security deficiencies over the long term, and recommended
aviation security training and technical assistance opportunities for
foreign officials to help them meet ICAO standards. During fiscal year
2005, TSA resolved 259 of the 419 security deficiencies identified during
TSA inspections through on-site consultation. Additionally, TSA assigned
all U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers to a principal security
inspector and international principal security inspector, respectively, to
provide counseling or clarification regarding TSA security requirements.
Although TSA has assisted foreign airport officials and air carrier
representatives in addressing security deficiencies, TSA did not track the
status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections,
document foreign governments' progress in addressing security deficiencies
at foreign airports, track enforcement actions taken in response to air
carrier violations, and measure the impact of the foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs on security. Such
information would have provided TSA better assurance that the foreign
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs are operating as
intended.
TSA Assisted Foreign Officials in Addressing Security Deficiencies at Foreign
Airports in Various Ways, and Foreign Officials Generally Viewed TSA's
Assistance as Beneficial
TSA officials stated that while the primary mission of the foreign airport
assessment program is to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by
assessing whether foreign airports are complying with ICAO standards, a
secondary mission of the program is to assist foreign officials in
addressing security deficiencies that TSA identified during its foreign
airport assessments. As part of the foreign airport assessment program,
TSA officials assisted foreign authorities in addressing security
deficiencies in various ways, including
o providing on-site consultation to help airport officials or the
host government immediately address security deficiencies,
o making recommendations to airport officials or the host
government for corrective action intended to help sustain security
improvements, and
o helping to secure aviation security training and technical
assistance for foreign governments.
On-Site Consultation and Recommendations for Corrective Action
Based on our review of TSA foreign airport assessment reports, during
fiscal year 2005, TSA provided on-site consultation to help foreign
officials immediately address security deficiencies that were identified
during airport assessments and made recommendations to help foreign
officials sustain security improvements in the longer term. One type of
security deficiency identified during TSA's fiscal year 2005 foreign
airport assessments involved a particular passenger checkpoint screening
function.^46 As a short-term solution to this security deficiency, on at
least two occasions, TSA inspectors provided on-site training to instruct
screeners on proper passenger screening techniques. As a longer-term
solution, the assessment reports identify that in some cases, TSA
inspectors recommended that the airport conduct remedial training for
screeners and routinely test screeners who work at the passenger
checkpoint to determine if they are screening passengers correctly.
Another security deficiency identified at foreign airports during fiscal
year 2005 related to the security of airport perimeters.^47 After
identifying this deficiency, inspectors consulted with foreign airport
officials who, in a few cases, took immediate action to address the
deficiency. According to the assessment reports, in some cases, TSA
inspectors recommended measures that would help the airport sustain
perimeter security in the longer term. In cases when a short-term solution
may not be feasible, TSA inspectors may have only recommended longer-term
corrective action. For example, in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended
that foreign airport officials embark upon a longer-term construction
project to address a particular type of security deficiency.^48
Aviation Security Training and Technical Assistance
During fiscal year 2005, TSA also assisted foreign governments in securing
training and technical assistance provided by TSA and other U.S.
government agencies to help improve security at foreign airports,
particularly at airports in developing countries. For example, four of the
seven TSA Representatives--TSARs---with whom we met said that they had
assisted foreign governments in obtaining training either through the
State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program or through the U.S.
Trade and Development Agency's aviation security assistance programs. The
goals of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program are to (1) build the
capacity of foreign countries to fight terrorism; (2) establish security
relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen cooperative
anti-terrorism efforts; and (3) share modern, humane, and effective
anti-terrorism techniques. The State Department addresses the
capacity-building goal of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program by
offering a selection of 25 training courses to foreign officials, 1 of
which focuses on airport security. The State Department provided the
airport security course, which is taught by TSA instructors, to seven
foreign countries during fiscal year 2005--Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican
Republic, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. The
U.S. Trade and Development Agency also provides aviation security training
and technical assistance to help achieve its goal of facilitating economic
growth and trade in developing countries. During fiscal year 2005, the
U.S. Trade and Development Agency provided aviation security training for
government officials in Haiti, Malaysia, and sub-Saharan Africa. During
the same year, the agency held regional workshops for various countries
worldwide on developing quality control programs. Government officials
from two of the five countries we visited identified the importance of
obtaining quality control training, particularly given that they have not
yet established their own quality control function. Appendix IV includes a
detailed description of aviation security training and technical
assistance provided to foreign officials by the State Department and the
U.S. Trade and Development Agency, as well as other U.S. government
agencies.
^46The specific passenger checkpoint screening deficiency identified by
TSA is sensitive security information and, therefore, is not identified in
this report.
^47The specific airport perimeter security deficiency identified by TSA is
sensitive security information and, therefore, is not identified in this
report.
^48The specific security deficiency for which TSA inspectors recommended
the construction project is sensitive security information and, therefore,
is not identified in this report.
Foreign Officials We Contacted Generally Viewed TSA's Assistance as Beneficial
Government and airport officials from five of the seven foreign countries
we visited and officials from 5 of the 16 foreign embassies we visited
stated that TSA's airport assessments and the resulting assistance
provided by TSA have helped strengthen airport security in their
countries. For example, officials from one country said that TSA
assessments enabled them to identify and address security deficiencies.
Specifically, officials stated that the government could not independently
identify security deficiencies because it did not have its own airport
assessment program--a condition that TSA officials told us exists in many
countries. Airport officials in another country stated that TSA's airport
assessments and on-site assistance led to immediate improvements in the
way in which passengers were screened at their airport, particularly with
regard to the pat-down search procedure. Embassy officials representing
another country also stated that TSA's assessments reinforce the results
of other assessments of their airports. In addition, these officials
stated that they appreciated the good rapport and cooperative
relationships they have with TSA inspection officials. Airport officials
in another country we visited stated that TSA assisted them in developing
their aviation security management program, and that the results of TSA's
assessments provided them with examples of where they need to concentrate
more efforts on meeting ICAO standards. Government officials in this same
country said that the TSAR has helped them to comply with ICAO standards
related to the contents of a member state's national aviation security
program. At the recommendation of the TSAR, these officials also planned
to participate in an aviation security workshop provided by the
Organization of American States,^49 which they also felt would be
beneficial in helping the government formulate its national aviation
security programs and associated security regulations.
TSA Provided Assistance to Air Carriers That Did Not Comply with Applicable
Security Requirements
In addition to assisting foreign officials in addressing security
deficiencies identified during airport assessments, TSA also assisted air
carrier representatives in addressing security deficiencies that were
identified during air carrier inspections. Of the 419 instances in which
TSA inspectors identified noncompliance with TSA security requirements
during fiscal year 2005, TSA data show 259 were resolved through
counseling--that is, the security deficiencies were resolved as a result
of on-site assistance or consultation provided by TSA. For example, during
one inspection, TSA observed that the security contractor employed by the
air carrier was not properly searching the aircraft cabin for suspicious,
dangerous, or deadly items prior to boarding. TSA instructed the
contractor to fully inspect those locations that were not searched
properly, and obtained assurance that the air carrier would provide
information to the contractors to ensure proper searches were conducted.
In another instance, inspectors identified a security deficiency related
to catering carts. The inspectors notified appropriate catering facility
officials, who stated that the security deficiency was highly unusual and
that it would not happen again. The inspectors also informed the air
carrier of the finding and recommended that during the carrier's internal
audits, they ensure that catering carts are properly secured.
In addition to counseling provided by inspectors when deficiencies are
identified, TSA assigns each air carrier to either a PSI, for U.S.-based
air carriers, or an IPSI, for foreign air carriers with service to the
United States, to assist air carriers in complying with TSA security
requirements. Although PSIs and IPSIs do not participate in air carrier
inspections, they do receive the inspection results for the air carriers
that they work with. According to the three PSIs and four IPSIs with whom
we met, PSIs and IPSIs provide counsel to the air carriers and provide
clarification when necessary on TSA security requirements. For example,
they provide air carriers with clarification on the requirements contained
in security directives and emergency amendments issued by TSA. Several of
the foreign air carriers we met with told us that the IPSIs are generally
responsive to their requests. In other instances, when an air carrier
cannot comply with a TSA security requirement--such as when complying with
a TSA security requirement would cause the air carrier to violate a host
government security requirement--the air carrier will work with the IPSI
or PSI to develop alternative security procedures that are intended to
provide a level of security equivalent to the level of security provided
by TSA's requirements, according to the PSIs and IPSIs with whom we met.
These alternative procedures are reviewed by the PSI or IPSI and then
approved by TSA headquarters officials.^50
49The Organization of American States is made up of 35 member states,
including the independent nations of North, Central, and South America and
the Caribbean, and is a forum for strengthening democracy, promoting human
rights, and confronting shared problems among its members, such as
poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs, and corruption.
Opportunities Exist for TSA to Strengthen Oversight of the Foreign Airport
Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
TSA has several controls in place to ensure that the agency is
implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs as intended. However, there are opportunities for TSA to improve
its oversight of these programs to help ensure that the status and
disposition of scheduled foreign airports assessments and air carrier
inspections is documented and to assess the impact of the assessment and
inspection programs. Regarding the foreign airport assessment program, TSA
required inspectors and TSARs to follow standard operating procedures when
scheduling and conducting foreign airport assessments. These procedures
outline the process for coordinating with host government officials to
schedule assessments, conduct foreign airport assessments, and report the
results of the assessments. TSA also provided inspectors with a job aide
to help them ensure that all relevant ICAO standards are addressed during
an assessment. The job aide prompts inspectors as to what specific
information they should obtain to help determine whether the foreign
airport is meeting ICAO standards. For example, in assessing measures
related to passenger-screening checkpoints, the job aide prompts the
inspector to describe the means by which the airport ensures there is no
mixing or contact between screened and unscreened passengers. In addition
to the standard operating procedures and the job aide, TSA requires
inspectors to use a standard format for reporting the results of foreign
airport assessments and has implemented a multilayered review process to
help ensure that airport assessment reports are complete and accurate.
^50During fiscal year 2005, air carriers made 22 requests for alternative
procedures. TSA approved 18 requests and 4 requests were withdrawn by the
air carrier.
With regard to the air carrier inspection program, TSA uses the automated
Performance and Results Information System to compile inspection results.
PARIS contains results of air carrier inspections conducted by TSA at
airports in the United States as well as inspections conducted at foreign
airports. For air carrier inspections conducted at foreign airports, a
series of prompts guides inspectors regarding what security standards U.S.
carriers and foreign carriers operating overseas must meet. PARIS also
includes a review process whereby completed inspection results can be
reviewed by a supervisory inspector before being approved for release into
the database.
While TSA has controls such as these in place for the foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs to ensure consistent
implementation and documentation, we identified four additional controls
that would strengthen TSA's oversight of the foreign airport assessment
and air carrier inspection programs:
o tracking the status of scheduled airport assessments and air
carrier inspections,
o documenting foreign governments' progress in addressing security
deficiencies,
o tracking air carrier violations, and
o measuring the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection programs.
Additional Controls Are Needed to Track the Status of Scheduled Airport
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections
TSA has established some controls for tracking the status of scheduled
airport assessments and air carrier inspections, but additional controls
are needed. TSA provided us with a list of foreign airport assessments
that were scheduled to take place during fiscal year 2005 and identified
which of the assessments were actually conducted and which assessments
were deferred or canceled. We compared the list of scheduled assessments
provided by TSA to the fiscal year 2005 airport assessment reports we
reviewed and identified several discrepancies. Specifically, there were 10
airport assessments that TSA identified as having been conducted, but when
we asked TSA officials to provide the reports for these assessments, they
could not, and later categorized these assessments as deferred or
canceled. Conversely, there was 1 airport assessment that TSA identified
as having been deferred, but according to the assessment reports we
reviewed, this assessment was actually conducted during fiscal year 2005.
There were also five foreign airports for which TSA provided us with the
fiscal year 2005 assessment report, but were not included on TSA's list of
assessments scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Further, there were three
foreign airports listed under one IFO as having been deferred, whereas
these same airports were listed under another IFO as having been canceled
during fiscal year 2005.^51 TSA also did not maintain accurate information
on the status of air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005.
TSA provided us with a list of all air carrier inspections conducted
during fiscal year 2005. We compared the list to the results contained in
the PARIS database and found numerous inconsistencies. Specifically, we
identified 46 air carrier inspections at 18 airports that were not
included on TSA's list, but were included in PARIS as having been
conducted during fiscal year 2005.
Federal standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest
that agencies should document key decisions in a way that is complete and
accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced from initiation, through
processing, to after completion. TSA officials acknowledged that they have
not always maintained accurate and complete data on the status of
scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier assessments, in part
due to the lack of a central repository in which to maintain assessment
information and the lack of standardization in the way in which each IFO
manager maintains assessment information. Additionally, IFOs had not
always documented the reasons why assessments and inspections were
deferred or canceled. TSA officials stated that in August 2006 they began
standardizing and refining the existing databases used by IFO staff for
tracking the status of foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections by including data elements such as the dates of previous and
planned assessments. TSA officials also stated that IFO staff are now
encouraged to identify the reasons why assessments and inspections were
deferred or canceled in the comment section of the database. While TSA has
made some improvements to the way in which it tracks the status of
scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, there
are opportunities for additional refinements to TSA's tracking system. For
example, according to our review of TSA's fiscal year 2007 foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection schedules, TSA did not provide an
explanation for why 13 of 34 foreign airport visits--that is, either
assessments or inspections--had not been conducted according to schedule.
TSA officials acknowledged that their assessment and inspection tracking
system is a work in progress and that they need to make additional
decisions regarding the tracking system, such as which data elements to
include. Without adequate controls in place for tracking which scheduled
assessments and inspections were actually conducted and which were
deferred or canceled, it may be difficult for TSA to ensure that all
scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections are actually
conducted.
^51The areas of responsibility for the IFOs are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, a foreign airport assessment should be listed only under one
IFO.
TSA Did Not Consistently Document Foreign Governments' Progress in Addressing
Security Deficiencies
TSARs--the primary liaisons between the U.S. government and foreign
governments on transportation security issues--are responsible for
following up on progress made by foreign officials in addressing security
deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Although the TSARs we
interviewed stated that they conducted such follow-up, the TSARs did not
consistently document the progress foreign governments had made in
addressing airport security deficiencies. We found 199 instances in the
128 fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports we reviewed where
it was written that the TSAR would follow up or was recommended to follow
up on the progress made by foreign officials in addressing security
deficiencies identified during airport assessments. However, TSA may not
be able to determine whether TSARs had actually followed up on these
security deficiencies because TSARs did not consistently document their
follow-up activities. We interviewed 8 of the 20 TSARs stationed at
embassies throughout the world and one Senior Advisor and DHS attache. Six
of those TSARs stated that they followed up on outstanding security
deficiencies in various ways,^52 depending on the severity of the
deficiency and the confidence that the TSAR had in the host government's
ability to correct the deficiency. For example, one TSAR told us that for
less critical security deficiencies, she may inquire about the foreign
government's status in addressing the deficiency via electronic mail or
telephone call. On the other hand, for a critical deficiency, the TSAR
said she may follow up in person on the host government's progress in
addressing the deficiency. However, another TSAR stated that she only
follows up on the foreign government's progress in addressing national
program issues. She stated that she does not follow up on operational
security deficiencies--such as screening of passengers and checked
baggage--because she believes this is the responsibility of the TSA
inspection staff. While 4 of the 8 TSARs we interviewed told us that they
were able to follow up on the status of most or all security deficiencies
within their area of responsibility, not all of these TSARs reported the
results of their follow-up to TSA inspection staff, in part because they
were not required to do so. In addition, TSARs stated that when they did
document the results of their follow-up, it was not done consistently. For
example, follow-up results were sometimes documented in weekly trip
reports (generally electronic mail messages) TSARs send to their immediate
supervisor in TSA headquarters or in action plans.^53 In addition, these
weekly reports did not always contain information from the TSARs'
follow-up activities with host government or airport officials. Federal
standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest that
agencies should document key activities in such a way that maintains the
relevance, value, and usefulness of these activities to management in
controlling operations and making decisions. TSA headquarters officials
acknowledged that it is important to consistently document foreign
governments' status in addressing security deficiencies identified during
TSA assessments, because this information could be helpful to TSA
inspection staff when determining where to focus their attention during
future assessments. Additionally, documenting foreign governments'
progress toward addressing deficiencies would enable TSA to have current
information on the security status of foreign airports that service the
United States. TSA established a working group in September 2006 to
explore how the results of TSAR follow-up should be documented and used by
TSA inspection staff. Because of the logistical challenges of coordination
among working group members who are located around the world, TSA has not
set a time frame for when the working group is expected to complete its
efforts.
^52 Three of the TSARs did not mention conducting follow-up activities
during their interview, in part because we did not specifically ask about
conducting follow-up activities during these interviews.
^53TSARs may assist foreign officials in developing action plans to
address deficiencies identified by TSA during airport assessments.
According to TSA guidance, TSARs are to assist foreign officials in
developing action plans when the security deficiencies identified are
significant, but do not pose an immediate or serious threat to aviation
security. During fiscal year 2005, TSA developed an action plan for 1
foreign airport. Action plans are to include (1) the security deficiencies
identified at the airport, (2) the corresponding recommended corrective
actions agreed upon by TSA and host government officials to address each
deficiency, (3) host government officials' progress in implementing
corrective actions, (4) date when host government is expected to complete
the corrective action, and (5) the host government office or agency
responsible for implementing the corrective action.
TSA Did Not Adequately Maintain Information to Link Enforcement Actions with
Specific Air Carrier Security Violations
TSA does not maintain air carrier inspection data in a way that would
enable the agency to determine what enforcement actions were taken in
response to identified security violations and thus could not readily
determine whether appropriate penalties, if any, were given to air
carriers that violated security requirements. We found two factors that
contributed to this situation. First, information on violations and
findings was not consistently recorded, and second, TSA does not link
enforcement actions to inspection findings. For example, when an inspector
identifies a violation during an inspection, that information is recorded
in the inspections database in PARIS and a record is to be opened in the
findings database.^54 The findings database record includes information
related to the violation, including whether the violation was closed with
counseling or an investigation was opened. However, we found that
information is not maintained in a way that enables TSA to readily
determine the enforcement action that was taken in response to a
particular violation. For example, the findings database did not include
information on the action taken by TSA inspectors for all security
violations that were identified in the inspections database. Specifically,
the inspections database indicated that during fiscal year 2005, 419 air
carrier violations were identified during 156 inspections. However, the
findings database only identified the actions taken by TSA inspectors for
335 violations. On further analysis we found that of the 156 inspections
where violations were identified, the number of violations for 79 (51
percent) of those inspections were not properly recorded in the findings
database. We determined that for 66 inspections, the number of violations
identified in the findings database was less than the number of violations
identified in the inspections database. Therefore, there is no record of
what action was taken, if any, by TSA inspectors to address the additional
violations identified during these inspections. We also determined that
for 13 inspections, the number of violations identified in the findings
database was greater than the number of violations identified in the
inspections database. Another reason TSA could not readily identify what
enforcement actions were taken in response to specific security violations
was that TSA often issued one enforcement action for multiple security
violations, where inspectors were not required to identify each individual
violation that was addressed by a particular enforcement action. Without
being able to readily identify what enforcement action was taken in
response to specific security violations, TSA has limited assurance that
the inspected air carriers received appropriate penalties, if deemed
necessary, and that identified security violations were resolved. TSA
officials told us that they are currently developing updates to PARIS that
will automatically open a finding each time a violation is recorded in the
inspection database. By doing so, this will require a link between a
violation and the planned course of action to resolve the violation.
However, TSA has not established a time frame for when these updates will
be implemented.
^54PARIS is a Web-based method for entering, storing, and retrieving
performance activities and information on TSA-regulated entities,
including air carriers. PARIS includes profiles for each entity,
inspections conducted by TSA, and investigations that are prompted by
incidents or inspection findings.
TSA Did Not Have Outcome-Based Performance Measures to Assess the Impact of
the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
TSA is taking steps to assess whether the goals of the foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs are being met, but
identified several concerns about doing so. As previously discussed, the
goal of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs
are to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by evaluating the extent
to which foreign governments and air carriers are complying with
applicable security requirements. The Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 requires executive branch departments to use performance
measures to assess progress toward meeting program goals and to help
decision makers assess program accomplishments and improve program
performance. Performance measures can be categorized either as outcome
measures, which describe the intended result of carrying out a program or
activity, or as output measures, which describe the level of activity that
will be provided over a period of time, or as efficiency measures, which
show the relationship between outcome or output of a program and the
resources used to implement program activities--inputs.
TSA developed the following output and efficiency measures to evaluate its
international aviation regulatory and enforcement efforts, which include
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections:
o percentage of countries with last-point-of-departure service to
the United States that are provided aviation security assistance
at the national or airport level,
o percentage of countries that do not have last-point-of-departure
service to the United States that are provided aviation security
assistance at the national or airport level, and
o average number of international inspections conducted annually
per inspector.
While output measures are useful in determining the number of foreign
countries for which TSA has provided aviation security assistance and the
rate at which such assistance is being provided, outcome-based measures
would be particularly useful because they could be used to determine the
extent to which TSA has helped to improve security at foreign airports
that service the United States. However, TSA officials identified several
challenges in developing outcome measures, particularly measures for the
foreign airport assessment program. TSA officials said that it is
difficult to develop meaningful outcome measures because TSA does not have
control over whether foreign authorities implement and meet ICAO
standards. Additionally, TSA officials stated that if the agency develops
outcome measures for the foreign airport assessment program, it would
suggest that TSA has control over whether foreign airports meet ICAO
standards, which these officials believe may give the appearance that TSA
does not respect the sovereignty of the countries it assesses. TSA
officials further stated that if foreign officials perceive that TSA has
no regard for their country's sovereignty, foreign officials may prohibit
TSA from conducting assessments in their countries. We recognize that
whether or not foreign governments meet ICAO standards is not within TSA's
control and that foreign officials' concerns about sovereignty are
important. However, TSA officials have acknowledged that the assistance
the agency provides and, in rare cases, secretarial actions contribute to
whether foreign governments meet ICAO standards. Also, there is precedent
within the federal government for developing outcome-oriented performance
measures to evaluate efforts that are not within an agency's control but
can be influenced by the agency. For example, the State Department
developed performance measures and targets for its Anti-Terrorism
Assistance Program to evaluate the agency's impact on helping foreign
countries improve their anti-terrorism capabilities. Specifically, during
fiscal year 2006, the State Department set a performance target that two
of the six countries that received assistance through the Anti-Terrorism
Assistance Program would achieve a capability to effectively deter,
detect, and counter terrorist organizations and threats and sustain those
capabilities. Another performance target for the program that is beyond
the State Department's control is for all 191 United Nations member states
to implement a particular United Nations resolution that requires all
states to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism.
TSA headquarters officials, including the Director of Compliance and Area
Directors, who oversee implementation of the foreign airport assessment
program, questioned whether it would be appropriate to measure
improvements made by foreign countries as a result of the assessment
program. They stated that the primary purpose of the foreign airport
assessment program is not to help foreign officials improve security at
their airports; rather, the primary purpose of the foreign airport
assessment program is to identify--not correct--security deficiencies at
foreign airports and inform the Secretary of Homeland Security of such
deficiencies. These officials also stated that the agency's efforts to
assist foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies are voluntary
and, therefore, do not warrant performance measurement. Although TSA may
not be required to assist foreign officials in addressing security
deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments, TSA is in fact
using its inspector and TSAR resources to this end. Consistent with the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, developing performance
measures and associated targets, such as the percentage of security
deficiencies that were addressed as a result of TSA on-site assistance and
TSA recommendations for corrective action, would enable TSA to evaluate
the impact of its assistance on improving security at foreign airports and
be held more accountable for the way in which it uses its resources. TSA
could also evaluate the impact that secretarial actions have on helping
foreign airports address security deficiencies in order to meet ICAO
standards.
Another challenge faced by TSA officials in developing outcome-based
measures for the foreign airport assessment program is the lack of an
automated system to collect and compile assessment results. TSA officials
stated that in the absence of an automated system to input data and
information obtained from airport assessments, they do not have enough
resources to manually compile and analyze airport assessment data that
could be used to feed into outcome measures. Currently, TSA headquarters
maintains airport assessment reports either electronically or in hard
copy, which makes it difficult to conduct systematic analysis of
assessment results across foreign airports and over time to evaluate the
impact TSA's airport assessment program has had on helping foreign
countries meet ICAO standards. TSA officials told us that $1 million was
budgeted to develop a secured, automated database--the Foreign Airport
Assessment Reporting System--to track airport assessment results. However,
TSA officials stated that the development of the Foreign Airport
Assessment Reporting System has been slow due to challenges TSA has
experienced in linking the existing electronic systems in which previous
airport assessment reports are stored with the new database. However, upon
completion of the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System, which is
scheduled for fiscal year 2008, TSA expects that the database will enhance
standardization of assessment reports as well as accessibility to the
results of previous foreign airport assessments. TSA also expects that the
Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System will enable TSA to conduct
analysis of foreign airport assessment results.
As with the foreign airport assessment program, TSA has also not developed
outcome-based performance measures for its overseas air carrier inspection
program. However, TSA officials have begun to collect and analyze data on
air carrier inspections that could be used to measure the impact of TSA's
inspection program on helping air carriers comply with TSA security
requirements. During fiscal year 2006, TSA officials who manage PARIS
began analyzing air carrier inspection results in an effort to assist the
agency in evaluating the impact that enforcement actions--including
on-site counseling, administrative actions, and civil penalties--have had
on ensuring air carrier compliance with TSA security requirements. These
officials plan to assess whether there is a relationship between the
severity of civil penalties and the reoccurrence of security violations.
The analysis that is being conducted by these officials is consistent with
our reviews of agency compliance inspection programs, which have cited the
need for evaluations of enforcement activities and the effectiveness of
using sanctions such as civil penalties to increase compliance.^55
However, while the TSA officials managing PARIS are conducting such
analysis of performance information, officials who manage the air carrier
inspection program did not intend to use the results of this analysis to
develop performance measures or to influence program decisions. According
to TSA officials, considering that overall compliance rates are very high
among air carriers, and the number of enforcement actions taken by TSA is
relatively low, there may not be enough data to conduct meaningful
analysis of the impact of enforcement actions. In addition, TSA officials
said that they were not convinced that air carrier compliance is
influenced by enforcement actions, especially since air carriers are known
to intentionally set aside funds when developing their annual budgets in
anticipation that they will be fined for some type of security violation
during the year. One TSA official stated that air carrier compliance with
TSA security requirements is not always within the air carrier's control
and is largely influenced by the security measures in place at the
airport, as well as restrictions placed on air carriers by host government
laws and regulations. When analyzing the fiscal year 2005 air carrier
inspection results, we identified only one instance where noncompliance
due to a conflict between TSA requirements and host government law
resulted in an inspector requesting that enforcement action be taken
against the air carrier.^56 However, TSA chose not to take enforcement
action against the air carrier and instead decided to work with the host
government to resolve the conflict. Despite the concerns raised by TSA
officials, using the analysis of air carrier inspection results to develop
performance measures, TSA managers may not be able to identify which
approaches for improving air carrier compliance are working well and which
approaches could be improved upon.
^55GAO, Aviation Security: Better Management Controls are Needed to
Improve FAA's Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts, [91]GAO-04-646
(Washington D.C.: July 2004), and GAO, Pipeline Safety: Management of the
Office of Pipeline Safety Enforcement Program Needs Further Strengthening,
[92]GAO-04-801 (Washington D.C.: July 2004).
^56In this instance, host government law precluded the air carrier from
complying with TSA requirements for checked baggage screening.
TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its Ability to
Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections
TSA is taking action to address challenges--particularly the lack of
available inspectors and various host government concerns--that have
limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections according to schedule. TSA has developed a risk-based approach
to scheduling foreign airport assessments, and is in the process of
developing a risk-based approach for scheduling air carrier inspections,
to enhance the agency's ability to focus its limited inspector resources
on higher-risk airports. The risk-based scheduling approach is also
expected to reduce the number of visits TSA conducts at low-risk foreign
airports, which may help address some host governments' concerns regarding
the resource burden that results from frequent airport assessments by TSA
and others. Harmonization--that is, mutual recognition and acceptance--of
TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European Commission) aviation
security standards and assessment and inspection processes may also help
TSA address host government concerns regarding resource burden.
Specifically, when the opportunity is available, TSA is considering
conducting joint assessments with some host governments or third parties,
such as the European Commission, which would reduce the number of airport
visits experienced by some countries. In addition to addressing concerns
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of
frequent airport visits, TSA has taken steps to address some
country-specific challenges that have limited TSA's ability to conduct
foreign airport visits.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance its Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections on Schedule, but Staffing Challenges
Remain
Various challenges have affected TSA's ability to maintain its schedule of
conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. The
ability to conduct these assessments and inspections as scheduled is
important, according to TSA officials, because foreign airport and air
carrier compliance with applicable security requirements may deteriorate
significantly between assessments. As time between visits increases, the
likelihood may also increase that security deficiencies at foreign
airports and among air carriers may arise and go undetected and
unaddressed. TSA officials also stated that conducting assessments and
inspections on a consistent basis helps to ensure that foreign countries
continue to comply with ICAO standards and are operating with effective
security measures. TSA data show that the agency deferred 90 of the 303
(about 30 percent) foreign airport visits that were scheduled for fiscal
year 2005, which include both foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections.^57 According to TSA, these deferments resulted primarily from
a lack of available inspectors to conduct the assessments and inspections.
Our analysis identified that the reported shortage of available inspectors
reflected the fact that (1) the inspector staff available to conduct the
assessments and inspections was less than the number authorized at each of
TSA's five IFOs at some point during fiscal year 2005 and (2) TSA
scheduled more foreign airport visits during the fiscal year than
available inspectors could complete.
TSA officials cited several reasons why the IFOs operated in fiscal year
2005 with fewer inspectors than had been budgeted. First, TSA officials
stated that due to State Department limitations on the number of
inspectors that can be staffed at IFOs overseas, TSA did not have the
budgeted number of inspectors on board to complete assessments and
inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005.^58 Second, TSA officials
stated that significant turnover among international inspectors and the
subsequent lengthy process for filling vacant inspector positions also
contributed to the lack of available inspectors. TSA officials attributed
the turnover of international inspectors to various factors, including
TSA's policy that limits the term of international inspectors at overseas
IFOs to 4 years, the lack of opportunities for career advancement when
stationed at an IFO, and unique difficulties inspectors experience when
living and working overseas, such as disruptions to family life. As of
January 2007, TSA officials did not have any specific efforts under way to
help reduce turnover of international inspectors. Further, TSA officials
stated that it takes an average of about 6 months to fill a vacant
inspector position, due to the lengthy process for vetting newly hired
inspectors. Specifically, once hired, international inspectors must be
processed through the State Department, which entails applying for and
receiving medical clearances, security clearances, a diplomatic passport,
and visas. TSA officials stated that expediting the process of filling
vacant positions is largely outside of TSA's control. However, TSA
assigned a headquarters official to oversee this process to identify
opportunities for accelerating it. Table 3 shows the number of inspectors
budgeted for and available at the IFOs each month during fiscal year 2005.
^57As discussed previously, TSA did not maintain accurate or complete data
on the number of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections
scheduled for a particular fiscal year. Therefore, our calculations may
not include all of the assessments and inspections that were conducted,
deferred, and canceled during fiscal year 2005.
^58The State Department bases the number of American positions overseas on
the mission priorities of the embassy, the programmatic and administrative
costs associated with increases in staffing, and security issues related
to the number of Americans posted overseas. According to the State
Department, the average cost of putting an American position overseas will
be approximately $430,000. U.S. Office of Management and Budget,
Department of State and International Assistance Programs, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: February
2005).
Table 3: Budgeted and Available International Inspectors by IFO, by Month
for Fiscal Year 2005
Number of international inspectors
Brussels/Frankfurt Dallas Los Angeles Miami Singapore
Budgeted staffing for fiscal year 2005
16 5 4 10 4
Month Actual staffing levels for fiscal year 2005
October 15 5 2 8 3
November 16 4 2 8 3
December 16 4 2 8 3
January 16 4 2 8 3
February 16 4 2 8 3
March 16 4 2 8 3
April 16 4 2 8 3
May 16 4 2 9 3
June 16 4 2 9 3
July 16 4 2 10 2
August 16 4 3 10 1
September 16 4 3 10 1
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: The bold numbers represent months when, according to TSA, IFOs
operated below their budgeted number of inspectors.
Even if TSA had been operating at its budgeted inspector staffing level,
the agency may still have deferred some of the foreign airport assessments
and air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005 because,
according to TSA officials, internal policy required them to schedule more
foreign airport visits than the budgeted number of inspectors could
reasonably have conducted. According to TSA officials, this internal
policy was developed by the Federal Aviation Administration, which was
responsible for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections prior to TSA. TSA officials also stated that the Federal
Aviation Administration had more available inspectors to conduct
assessments and inspections than TSA. TSA officials stated that each
international inspector should reasonably be able to conduct between 8 and
12 foreign airport visits per year,^59 depending on the amount of time
inspectors remain on site to assist foreign officials and air carrier
representatives in addressing security deficiencies that are identified
during assessments and inspections. However, according to data provided by
TSA, each of the 5 IFOs scheduled more than 12 foreign airport visits per
inspector for fiscal year 2005. Table 4 shows the average number of
foreign airport visits scheduled per international inspector for fiscal
year 2005.
Table 4: Budgeted Number of Inspectors, Total Scheduled Foreign Airport
Visits, and Average Number of Scheduled Foreign Airport Visits per
Inspector, by IFO, for Fiscal Year 2005
Total number of Average number of foreign
Budgeted number foreign airport airport visitsscheduled per
IFO of inspectors visits scheduled inspector a
Brussels/ 16 110 13.8
Frankfurt
Dallas 5 60 24.0
Los Angeles 3 19 12.7
Miami 10 84 16.8
Singapore 3 30 20.0
Total 37 303 16.4
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: TSA did not maintain accurate or complete data on the number of
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections scheduled for a
particular fiscal year. Therefore, our calculations may not include all of
the assessments and inspections that were conducted, deferred, and
canceled during fiscal year 2005.
aThe average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per inspector was
calculated by multiplying the total number of foreign airport visits that
were scheduled by 2 (assuming that 2 inspectors conduct each visit), then
dividing that number by the total number of budgeted inspectors.
TSA officials acknowledged that for fiscal year 2005 they scheduled more
foreign airport visits than the budgeted level of inspectors could have
reasonably conducted. However, TSA has taken steps to compensate for the
shortage of international inspectors by utilizing domestic inspectors to
help complete the foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections
that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Specifically, domestic
inspectors were used to assist with about 34 percent of foreign airport
assessments and about 35 percent of air carrier inspections.^60 However,
despite the use of domestic inspectors, TSA still had to defer foreign
airport assessments and air carrier inspections. TSA headquarters
officials and IFO staff further stated that the heavy reliance on domestic
inspectors to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections is not desirable because domestic inspectors lack experience
conducting assessments using ICAO standards or inspecting foreign
operations of air carriers, as well as working in the international
environment. Additionally, using domestic inspectors sometimes presents
challenges in planning and coordinating foreign airport visits.
Specifically, it can be difficult to obtain clearance from the State
Department and host government to allow domestic inspectors to enter
foreign countries because TSA may not always be able to provide sufficient
notice that domestic inspectors will be participating in airport visits,
particularly when the need for a domestic inspector is determined on short
notice. Moreover, according to TSA officials, the availability of domestic
inspectors may change unexpectedly when they are needed to remain in the
United States. TSA officials also said that domestic inspectors may not be
available for the entire 4-week period that it takes to prepare for,
conduct, and write reports for foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections. Last, TSA officials stated that compared to international
inspectors, some domestic inspectors are not effective at taking notes
while conducting observations at foreign airports, nor are some domestic
inspectors effective at preparing foreign airport reports--specifically,
their word choices for describing security conditions at airports are not
always sensitive to the concerns of foreign officials. According to TSA
officials, if foreign officials take offense at the way in which TSA
portrays the security deficiencies at their airports, foreign officials
may no longer allow TSA to conduct airport assessments in their countries.
TSA officials stated that they enhanced the notetaking module for the
training provided to personnel conducting assessments and inspections
overseas. However, for the reasons discussed above, TSA international
officials plan to lessen their reliance on domestic inspectors.
^59 Airport visits include visits to a foreign airport to conduct an
airport assessment in conjunction with air carrier inspections or to
conduct solely an airport assessment or air carrier inspections.
^60As of June 2006, there were 65 domestic inspectors stationed at 52 U.S.
airports who were eligible to conduct foreign airport assessments and
inspections of air carriers operating out of foreign airports. There were
approximately 700 domestic inspectors stationed at U.S. airports at the
beginning of fiscal year 2006. According to TSA, teams consisting only of
domestic inspectors were used to conduct about 2 percent of foreign
airport assessments and only 1 percent of air carrier inspections during
fiscal year 2005.
During October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to
scheduling foreign airport assessments in order to focus its limited
inspector resources on higher- risk airports. Another potential benefit to
TSA's new approach is that it may allow TSA to reduce its reliance on
domestic inspectors. The objectives of TSA's risk-based scheduling
approach are to (1) determine the appropriate frequency of foreign airport
visits, and (2) identify the appropriate number of inspectors needed for
each IFO based on the deployment availability of inspectors, the
risk-based priority of each location, and the number of visits required
each year.
Under the risk-based approach, when fully implemented, foreign airports
are categorized based on risk level, and depending on the category in
which they are placed, are scheduled to be assessed once a year, once
every 2 years, or once every 3 years. According to information provided by
TSA, under this approach, the number of foreign airport assessments
scheduled each year will decrease by about 38 percent (from 170 to 105
assessments).^61 TSA officials stated that the reduction in the number of
annual foreign airport assessments will help enable inspectors to complete
foreign airport assessments according to schedule. Based on our analysis,
TSA's risk-based approach for scheduling foreign airport assessments is
consistent with generally accepted risk management principles.
While it appears that this risk-based approach will reduce the number of
foreign airport assessments international inspectors are expected to
conduct in a year, it is too soon to determine the impact of this approach
on TSA's ability to complete scheduled foreign airport visits--including
assessments and inspections--for two key reasons. First, TSA has not yet
finalized its risk-based approach to scheduling air carrier inspections.
In February 2007, TSA officials stated that the draft version of the
risk-based approach to scheduling air carrier inspections was being vetted
through the agency, but they do not expect the final version to be
approved until spring 2007. TSA officials stated that in developing the
risk-based approach for scheduling air carrier inspections, they
determined that, unlike the situation with airports, using previous
inspection results was not the best way to determine air carrier
vulnerability. Rather, TSA officials expect to use foreign airport
assessment results to determine the vulnerability of air carriers
operating out of those airports, especially considering that the security
status of foreign airports influences TSA's decision to impose additional
security requirements on air carriers operating out of foreign airports.
Risk-Based Approach
A risk-based approach entails consideration of terrorist threats,
vulnerability of potential terrorist targets to those threats, and the
consequences of those threats being carried out when deciding how to
allocate resources to defend against these threats. Risk-based,
priority-driven decisions can help inform decision makers in allocating
finite resources to the areas of greatest need.
^61Under the previous scheduling approach, foreign airports that exhibited
no operational issues in the previous two assessments were assessed once
every 3 years. Foreign airports that had not been previously assessed,
subjected to secretarial action within the last 5 years, or exhibited
operational issues in either of the two previous assessments were assessed
once a year. Operational issues are weaknesses in the security system at
an airport that pose a direct threat to the safety and security of
passengers, aircraft, and crew (i.e., screening and access control
measures).
In addition, it is uncertain how TSA's upcoming audits of foreign repair
stations will affect the workload of international inspectors. In December
2003, Congress passed the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization
Act (Vision 100), which mandated that TSA issue regulations to ensure the
security of foreign and domestic repair stations and, in coordination with
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), complete a security review and
audit of foreign repair stations certified by FAA within 18 months of
issuing the regulations.^62 Currently, there are approximately 665
FAA-certified repair stations in foreign countries that TSA is required to
audit.^63 Of these, 93 are deemed substantial with regard to safety and
security in that they perform work on the airframe, flight controls, or
propulsion systems. In addition, another 38 are located in countries that,
pursuant to Vision 100, TSA and FAA must give priority to because they
have been identified as posing the most significant security risks. TSA
plans to initiate security audits of the repair stations during fiscal
year 2007. Specifically, TSA expects to conduct 127 audits of foreign
repair stations during the initial year, focusing on those located in
high-threat areas. According to TSA, the majority of repair stations
deemed substantial (65 of 93)--are located on or near foreign airports
already subject to assessment by TSA. TSA expects that it will take
inspectors 3 days to complete initial audits if the foreign repair
stations are collocated with foreign airports being assessed, and 5 days
to complete for stations which are not collocated. According to TSA, the
agency's fiscal year 2006 funding levels were sufficient to allow for an
additional 13 international inspector positions, including a program
manager position, to supplement its current international inspector staff
and help meet the requirement to conduct foreign repair station security
audits. As of January 2007, all 13 positions were filled, but TSA had not
yet begun to conduct these audits. Therefore, it is not yet known how
these audits and additional inspector positions will actually affect
overall inspector workload or TSA's ability to complete its foreign
assessments and inspections as scheduled.
^62See Pub. L. No. 108-176, S 611(b)(1), 117 Stat. 2490, 2571-72 (2003)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. S 44924). As of March 2007, TSA had not issued
final regulations to satisfy this requirement.
^63FAA-approved repair stations in foreign countries are facilities
located overseas that perform maintenance and repairs on aircraft operated
by U.S. air carriers or aircraft registered in the United States.
Harmonization of Security Standards and Assessment and Inspection Processes
Would Help TSA Address Host Government Concerns Regarding Resource Burdens
Harmonization of TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European
Commission) security standards and the processes used to assess foreign
airports and air carriers would address concerns regarding the resource
burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits
conducted by TSA and others. Officials from 3 of the 7 foreign countries
we visited in March 2006, as well as officials representing the European
Commission--the executive arm of the European Union (which is composed of
27 countries^64), stated that the frequency of airport assessments and air
carrier inspections conducted by TSA and others had placed a significant
resource burden on the host government. In addition, a representative of
the Association of European Airlines and IATA stated that frequent
security inspections by TSA, the host government, and other countries, as
well as safety inspections, including inspections conducted by FAA,
burdened the limited personnel resources available to air carriers.
Specifically, for each inspection, the air carrier must assign one of its
employees to escort the inspection team around the airport. (In general,
TSA officials must be accompanied by host government officials when
conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections because
TSA officials are not allowed to enter restricted areas of the airport
unescorted.) Belgian officials, for example, proposed to shorten TSA's
fiscal year 2006 assessment of the airport in Brussels, stating that being
assessed by TSA, as well as ICAO, the European Commission, and the
European Civil Aviation Conference^65 within a short span of time would
pose a significant resource burden on the Belgian aviation security
department. Host government officials in Germany raised concerns regarding
the resource burden placed on their aviation security department due to
the frequency of TSA visits. German officials said that TSA scheduled 10
airport visits between January 2006 and September 2006, which German
officials viewed as excessive. In addition to individual European
countries, the Director of Security for the Protection of Persons, Goods,
and Installations for the European Commission's Directorate General of
Transport and Energy wrote a letter to the TSA Assistant Secretary dated
March 9, 2006, expressing concern about the frequency of TSA airport
assessments and air carrier inspections in Europe. The Director suggested
that TSA consider the high level of quality control exercised within the
European Union by the European Commission as well as the European Union
member states when determining the frequency of airport assessment visits
and that TSA and the European Commission embark upon a joint effort to
improve coordination of airport visits to alleviate the resource burden
placed on member states. TSA's risk-based approach for scheduling foreign
airport assessments could help address some host governments' concerns
regarding the resource burden placed on them in part due to the frequency
of airport assessments conducted by TSA.
^64The 27 member states of the European Union are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland,
Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
^65Founded in 1955 as an intergovernmental organization, ECAC aims to
promote the continued development of a safe, efficient, and sustainable
European air transport system. In so doing, ECAC conducts assessments of
airports within member states, at the request of officials from its member
states. ECAC derived the standards by which airports are assessed from
ICAO Annex 17 civil aviation security standards. However, ECAC officials
stated that their standards are more prescriptive than those of ICAO.
In addition to implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling, there are
other potential opportunities for TSA to address host country concerns
regarding the resource burden experienced as a result of frequent airport
visits. Industry representatives and some host government officials stated
that if TSA and other inspecting entities either conducted joint airport
assessments and air carrier inspections or used the results of each
other's assessments and inspections in lieu of conducting their own, the
frequency of airport visits could be reduced, in turn reducing the
resource burden placed on host governments and air carriers. Airports
Council International officials we interviewed, who represent airport
operators worldwide, stated that if TSA and other inspecting entities were
to conduct joint assessments, the resource burden experienced by airport
operators would also be reduced. Moreover, officials from 2 of the 7
countries we visited suggested that TSA review the results of airport
assessments conducted by the host government or by third parties either in
lieu of conducting its own airport assessments or to target its
assessments on specific security standards. These officials said that by
doing this, TSA could reduce the length of the assessment period, thereby
reducing the resource burden placed on host government officials.
According to TSA, the agency must physically observe security operations
at foreign airports to determine whether airports are maintaining and
carrying out effective security measures in order to satisfy its statutory
mandate to conduct assessments of foreign airports. This interpretation
precludes TSA from relying solely on third party or host government
assessments to make this determination.^66 However, TSA officials stated
that they may be able to use host government or third party
assessments--provided that foreign officials make these assessments
available to TSA--to help refine the agency's risk-based approach to
scheduling foreign airport assessments, such that TSA would be able to
focus its limited inspection resources on foreign airports that pose the
greatest security risk to the United States. For example, instead of
visiting a foreign airport that TSA considers low risk once every 3 years,
TSA, hypothetically, could visit such airports once every 5 years, and
review third party or host government assessments between visits to help
determine whether the airport is maintaining and carrying out effective
security measures. This would enable TSA to reduce the number of visits to
foreign airports, thus addressing host government officials' concerns
regarding the resource burden they experience as a result of frequent
airport assessments. However, three of the five IFO managers we
interviewed said that the option of using host government assessments is
not currently available to them because host governments in their areas of
responsibility generally do not have airport assessment programs in place.
These IFO managers said that even if host governments had assessment
programs in place, they would be cautious about using the assessment
reports and conducting joint assessments for one of two reasons: (1) TSA
has not independently evaluated the quality of the assessments conducted
by host governments and third parties or the quality of the inspectors
conducting these assessments, and (2) host governments and third party
inspectors base their assessments on different aviation security standards
than TSA. Similarly, foreign government officials and industry
representatives have cited differences in security standards as an
impediment to conducting joint assessments and using host government or
third party assessments.
^66According to TSA officials, TSA conducts its foreign airport
assessments in a manner consistent with how the Federal Aviation
Administration conducted its assessments before this responsibility
transferred to TSA pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA). See International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, S 551, 99 Stat. 190, 222-25 (authorizing the
Secretary of Transportation to conduct assessments of the effectiveness of
the security measures maintained at foreign airports); see also H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 99-237, pp. 124-29 (1985).
TSA headquarters officials stated that harmonization of airport and air
carrier security standards and airport assessment and air carrier
inspection processes would make them less cautious about using other
assessment reports and conducting joint assessments. To this end, TSA has
taken steps toward harmonizing airport assessment processes and some
airport and air carrier security standards with the European Commission.
In May 2006, in responding to the European Commission's concerns regarding
the frequency of TSA airport assessments and air carrier inspections in
Europe, the TSA Assistant Secretary suggested that TSA and the European
Commission develop working groups to address these concerns. Further, in
June 2006, TSA initiated efforts with the European Commission that will
enable each party to learn more about the other party's quality control
programs. As part of these efforts, TSA and the European Commission
established six working groups. TSA and the European Commission have not
established firm time frames for when the working groups are to complete
their efforts. The objectives and the status of the working groups are
described in table 5.
Harmonization
In the homeland security context, "harmonization" is a broad term used to
describe countries' efforts to coordinate their security practices to
enhance security and increase efficiency by avoiding duplication of
effort. Harmonization efforts can include countries' mutually recognizing
and accepting each other's existing practices--which could represent
somewhat different approaches to achieve the same outcome, as well as
working to develop uniform standards.
Table 5: Description and Status of TSA-European Commission Aviation
Security Working Groups
Title of working Purpose of working Status of working group efforts
group group as of January 2007
SSI Agreement Facilitate sharing o TSA and the European
of Sensitive Commission agreed upon the
Security Information verbiage of the
(SSI) between TSA information-sharing
and the European agreement. The agreement is
Commission. in the final formal approval
stages at TSA, the European
Commission, and the
Department of State.
Observer Facilitate TSA o TSA and the European
Participation on observation of Commission are currently in
Inspections European Union the process of identifying
airport assessments mutually agreeable dates for
and European a European Commission
Commission observer to join a TSA
observation of TSA inspection of a U.S.
assessments of U.S. airport.
airports. o Final dates and location
for TSA participation in
European Commission audit
are to be determined.
o European Commission
representatives expressed an
interest in viewing the
PARIS database, which is a
compilation of U.S.
inspection findings.
o The European Commission is
in the process of developing
a database for its
inspection findings.
Risk Based Assessment Establish a o TSA developed a risk-based
Methodology risk-based methodology for scheduling
methodology for foreign airport assessments.
scheduling U.S. o TSA and the European
airport assessment Commission will determine
visits to European next steps.
member states.
Audit Schedules Determine how TSA o TSA and the European
and the European Commission agreed to share
Commission will audit schedule information
provide advance on a quarterly basis.
notice of the dates o The level of detail on
for planned airport audit schedules that will be
assessment visits. shared is to be determined.
Data Interoperability Facilitate the o TSA and the European
exchange of Commission developed a data
information interoperability template
regarding supply outlining the purpose, key
chain data objectives, and challenges
monitoring between of data interoperability.
the United States o This working group may be
and the European restructured to focus on
Commission.^a cargo harmonization.
Compare and Contrast Assess which of o To accomplish a meaningful
U.S./European TSA's and the comparison, TSA and the
Commission Aviation European European Commission have
Security Requirements Commission's developed a matrix to
aviation security reflect major aviation
measures are security categories and
comparable (not measures. Once the SSI
identical) and agreement is finalized, TSA
determine where and the European Commission
significant will complete the comparison
differences exist. matrix.
Source: TSA.
aA supply chain involves the flow of information, product, and funds
between different parties involved in the development and provision of
goods. These parties include manufacturers, suppliers, transporters,
warehouses, retailers, and customers.
In December 2006, the TSA Assistant Secretary stated that the agency had
primarily coordinated with the European Commission on harmonizing aviation
security standards because airports in the European Union generally have a
high level of security. The Assistant Secretary further stated that TSA
should not focus its inspector resources on foreign airports that are
known to have a high level of security, such as several European airports;
rather, TSA should focus its limited resources on foreign airports that
are known to be less secure. The Assistant Secretary added that a number
of options for better leveraging inspector resources are being considered
by one of the European Commission-TSA working groups, including scheduling
European Commission and TSA assessments to overlap for 1 or 2 days to
enable both parties to share their assessment results, which could enable
TSA to shorten the length of its assessments. The Assistant Secretary also
stated that TSA could eventually recognize European Commission airport
assessments as equivalent to those conducted by TSA and have TSA
inspectors shadow European Commission assessment teams to periodically
validate the results. However, in January 2007, European Union member
states reached consensus that they would not share the results of European
Commission assessments of their airports with TSA until the following
occur: (1) TSA and the European Commission agree upon protocols for
sharing sensitive security information; (2) TSA inspectors shadow European
Commission inspectors on an assessment of a European airport, and European
Commission inspectors shadow TSA inspectors on an assessment of a U.S.
airport; and (3) TSA agrees to provide the European Commission with the
results of U.S. airport assessments. TSA and European Commission officials
stated that they expect information-sharing protocols to be established
and shadowing of airport assessments to take place during spring 2007. TSA
officials also stated that once the information-sharing protocols are
finalized, they would be willing to provide European Union member states
with the results of U.S. airport assessments.
Aviation industry representatives stated that in addition to facilitating
joint assessments and use of third party assessments, harmonization of
aviation security standards between countries would enhance the efficiency
and effectiveness of international aviation security efforts. For example,
IATA representatives we interviewed stated that they have met with TSA
officials about harmonizing the list of items prohibited onboard aircraft
with the European Commission. IATA officials stated that having different
security requirements to follow for different countries leads to
confusion, and perhaps noncompliance with security requirements, among air
carriers. The Chairman of the Security Committee for the Association of
European Airlines stated that there are numerous redundancies in the
international aviation security system that could be reduced through
harmonization, particularly with regard to screening transfer
passengers--passengers who have a layover en route from their originating
airport to their destination airport. For example, for a passenger
traveling from Frankfurt to Chicago who has to change planes in New York,
upon landing in New York, the passenger must be rescreened and have his or
her checked baggage rescreened before boarding the flight for Chicago.
According to officials from various air carrier and airport operator
associations, the rescreening of transfer passengers is costly and is only
required because individual countries do not formally recognize each
other's aviation security measures as providing an equivalent level of
security. Air carrier representatives also stated that because air
carriers must use their limited resources to implement redundant security
measures, they are not able to focus their resources on implementing other
security measures that may be more effective at preventing a terrorist
from carrying out an attack.^67 The TSA Assistant Secretary agreed that
rescreening transfer passengers that originate from airports that have a
high level of security may be unnecessarily redundant. The Assistant
Secretary said that TSA plans to assess the effectiveness of the checked
baggage screening system commonly used at European airports to determine
if that system provides at least the same level of security as TSA's
baggage screening system. However, TSA officials said that even if the
agency determines that the baggage screening system in place at European
airports provides an equivalent level of security, TSA would still have to
rescreen checked baggage for transfer passengers arriving from Europe
because the Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires passengers
and baggage on flights originating in the United States to be screened by
U.S. government employees.^68 According to an attorney in TSA's Office of
Chief Counsel, Congress would have to change the law in order for TSA to
discontinue the screening of transfer passengers.
TSA also made efforts to harmonize some aviation security measures with
other countries outside of the European Union. For example, TSA officials
worked with Canadian officials to develop a common set of security
requirements for air carriers that have flights between the United States
and Canada. Additionally, in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid
explosives terrorist plot, TSA initially banned all liquids, gels, and
aerosols from being carried through the checkpoint and, in September 2006,
began allowing passengers to carry on small, travel-size liquids and gels
(3 fluid ounces or less) using a single quart-size, clear plastic, zip-top
bag. In an effort to harmonize its liquid screening procedures with other
countries, in November 2006, TSA revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid
ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols onboard aircraft, which is
equivalent to 100 milliliters--the amount permitted by the 27 countries in
the European Union, as well as Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and
Iceland. According to the Assistant Secretary of TSA, this means that
approximately half of the world's air travelers will be governed by
similar measures with regard to this area of security. ICAO also adopted
the liquid, gels, and aerosol screening procedures implemented by TSA and
others as a recommended practice. As we reported in March 2007, DHS has
also taken steps toward harmonizing international air cargo security
practices.^69 As part of this effort, TSA has worked through ICAO to
develop uniform international air cargo security standards.
^67These officials, at the time of the interview, were not able to offer
specific examples of other security measures that would be more effective
at preventing a terrorist attack.
^68Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S 44901(a), the screening of all passengers and
property that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft with a flight or
flight segment originating in the United States shall take place before
boarding and shall be carried out by a federal government employee (or by
private screeners under contract to TSA as part of the Screener
Partnership Program in accordance with S 44920).
TSA Is Taking Steps to Address Sovereignty Concerns Raised by Foreign Officials
on a Case-by-Case Basis
In addition to concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host
governments as a result of frequent airport visits by TSA and others, TSA,
on a case-by-case basis, has also had to address host government concerns
regarding sovereignty--more specifically, concerns that TSA assessments
and inspections infringe upon a host government's authority to regulate
airports and air carriers within its borders. According to TSA officials
and representatives of the European Commission, several foreign
governments have stated that they consider TSA's foreign airport
assessments as an infringement on their sovereignty. For example,
government officials in one country have prevented TSA from assessing the
security at their airports and from inspecting non-U.S. air carriers
because they do not believe TSA has the authority to assess airports
outside of the United States and that the host government is the sole
regulator of air carriers that are based out of their country.^70 Based on
the results of air carrier inspections provided to us by TSA, we found
that during fiscal year 2005, TSA conducted only one inspection of an air
carrier that was based out of this particular country. According to TSA,
officials from this country allowed TSA to conduct this particular
inspection to accommodate TSA's request to inspect the security of air
carriers that had flights originating in Europe and arriving in
Washington, D.C., during the January 2005 U.S. presidential inauguration
activities. We also found that TSA conducted assessments of four airports
in this particular country during fiscal year 2005. TSA officials said
that they were able to conduct these assessments under the guise of a TSA
"visit" to--versus an "assessment" of--the airport. TSA officials,
however, stated that because officials from this country do not believe
TSA has the authority to assess the security at their airports, these
officials would not accept--neither orally nor in writing--the results of
TSA airport assessments. TSA officials also stated that officials from
this country prohibited TSA inspectors from assessing airport perimeter
security as well as the contents of the country's individual airport
security programs.
^69GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S. Bound Air Cargo
Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, [93]GAO-07-337SU
(Washington, D.C.: March 2007).
TSA officials identified that there are at least 3 additional countries
that raised concerns regarding sovereignty. According to TSA, officials
from one of these countries stated that they did not know of any
international requirements compelling them to allow TSA to assess their
airport and that TSA had too many internal flaws to assess airports in
other countries. In response to this country's concerns, TSA sent a
representative to meet with the country's Minister of Transportation. At
the meeting, the Minister granted TSA future access to the country's
airports for assessments after being offered the opportunity to visit U.S.
airports to observe security measures. Additional countries, according to
TSA, were concerned about their sovereignty being violated and TSA
gathering intelligence information for the U.S. government through the
airport assessment program. TSA officials stated that when unique concerns
arise in the future, they will continue to work with countries on a
case-by-case basis to try to address their concerns.
^70 TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct assessments of foreign
airports. See 49 U.S.C. S 44907. Although TSA does not have any authority
to compel a foreign airport or government to submit to a TSA assessment,
the agency does have authority (in conjunction with other appropriate U.S.
government entities such as FAA and the Department of State) to impose
restrictions on air travel between that airport and the United States in
the event it is not permitted to conduct an assessment. See id.
Conclusions
The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on
U.S.-bound flights from the United Kingdom illustrates the continuing
threat of international terrorism to commercial aviation and the
importance of TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs. As part of these programs, TSA has provided on-site consultation
and made recommendations to foreign officials on how to resolve security
deficiencies. In rare cases, DHS and TSA have taken more aggressive action
by notifying the traveling public that an airport does not meet minimum
international standards or issuing warning letters and letters of
correction to air carriers. While foreign government officials and air
carrier representatives acknowledged that TSA's efforts have helped to
strengthen the security of U.S.-bound flights, there are several
opportunities for TSA to strengthen oversight of its foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs. First, although TSA has
made some efforts to improve its tracking of foreign airport assessments
and air carrier inspections, until additional controls are in place to
track the status of foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections, such as whether scheduled assessments and inspections were
actually conducted, TSA has limited assurance that all assessments and
inspections are accounted for and that appropriate action was taken for
airports and air carriers that did not comply with security standards.
Second, while TSA has helped to strengthen security at foreign airports by
providing assistance to foreign officials, because TSA does not
consistently track and document foreign officials' progress in addressing
security deficiencies, it may be difficult for TSA to assess the impact of
its efforts on meeting program goals--to ensure that foreign airports and
air carriers servicing the United States are meeting, at a minimum,
applicable ICAO standards and TSA's security requirements, respectively.
Third, although TSA has established some output performance measures and
targets related to the assessment and inspection programs, the current
measures do not enable TSA to draw particularly meaningful conclusions
about the impact of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection programs on the security of U.S.-bound flights and how to most
effectively direct its improvement efforts.
TSA has faced several challenges in meeting the goals of its assessment
and inspection programs, including a lack of available staff and concerns
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of
frequent airport visits conducted by TSA and others. TSA's development of
a risk-based approach to scheduling airport assessments and air carrier
inspections is a step in the right direction to address host government
concerns and better leverage limited inspector resources. However, it is
too soon to determine the extent to which the risk-based approach will
help to improve TSA's ability to complete scheduled foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections, and the extent to which the
approach will alleviate host government concerns regarding the frequency
of airport visits. The collaboration between TSA and the European
Commission regarding opportunities for conducting joint airport
assessments and sharing assessment results, as well as efforts to
harmonize aviation security standards--including those related to the
screening of liquids, gels, and aerosols--with the European Commission and
others, are key steps toward addressing host government concerns regarding
the resource burden that results from frequent assessments by TSA and
others. It will be important for TSA to continue working with foreign
officials to address their concerns, such as sovereignty issues, in order
to continue assessing the security at foreign airports that service the
United States.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen oversight of TSA's foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection programs, in our April 2007 report that contained
sensitive security information, we recommended that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the
Transportation Security Administration to take the following five actions:
o develop controls to track the status of scheduled foreign
airport assessments from initiation through completion, including
the reasons why assessments were deferred or canceled;
o develop controls to track the status of scheduled air carrier
inspections from initiation through completion, including the
reasons why inspections were deferred or canceled, as well as the
final disposition of any investigations that result from air
carrier inspections;
o develop a standard process for tracking and documenting host
governments' progress in addressing security deficiencies
identified during TSA airport assessments;
o develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the
impact TSA assistance has on improving foreign airport compliance
with ICAO standards; and
o develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the
impact TSA assistance and enforcement actions have on improving
air carrier compliance with TSA security requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
On April 13, 2007, we received written comments on the draft report, which
are reproduced in full in appendix V. DHS generally concurred with the
findings and recommendations in the report and stated that the
recommendations will help strengthen TSA's oversight of foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections.
With regard to our recommendations that TSA develop controls to track the
status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections from
initiation through completion, including the reasons for any deferments or
cancellations, and the final disposition of investigations related to air
carrier inspections, DHS stated that TSA plans to enhance its tracking
system to include the reason for any deferment or cancellation of an
airport assessment or an air carrier inspection. The tracking system also
incorporates the risk-based methodology and criteria for scheduling
foreign airport assessments that TSA adopted in October 2006. Enhancing
the tracking system should provide TSA greater assurance that airport
assessments and air carrier inspections are conducted within applicable
time frames. If properly implemented and monitored, this tracking system
should address the intent of our recommendation. Regarding the disposition
of investigations related to air carrier inspections, DHS stated that
TSA's Office of Chief Counsel currently documents the final disposition of
investigations in PARIS, but TSA will enhance PARIS to ensure that
inspection activities are linked to investigations so that comprehensive
enforcement information is readily available. A clear link between
violations identified as a result of an inspection and the final
disposition of those violations is important for maintaining comprehensive
inspection and enforcement information. As we reported, TSA often pursued
one enforcement action in response to multiple violations, and inspectors
were not required to identify which violations were included in the
enforcement action. Without being able to readily identify what
enforcement action was taken in response to specific security violations,
TSA cannot readily ensure that air carriers receive appropriate penalties,
and that security violations are resolved.
Concerning our recommendation that TSA develop a standard process for
tracking and documenting host governments' progress in addressing security
deficiencies identified during assessments, TSA stated that it is
currently developing a system whereby outstanding deficiencies identified
during an assessment will be tracked along with deficiency-specific
information, deadlines, and current status. TSA plans to archive this
information for future trend analysis and to provide a historical
understanding of each airport's security posture. This effort, if properly
implemented, will provide additional relevant, useful information to TSA
in performing its oversight responsibilities.
TSA concurred with our recommendation that it develop outcome-oriented
performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance has on
improving foreign airport compliance with international security
standards, and on improving air carrier compliance with TSA security
requirements. TSA is considering several elements to include in the
performance measures, such as the number of assessments conducted,
corrective actions recommended, TSA assistance provided, and corrective
actions achieved. TSA indicated that its outcome-based performance
measures would be structured to recognize the collaborative nature of the
process, particularly where corrective action by a foreign government is
concerned. Such outcome-based performance measures, if properly developed
and utilized, will enable TSA to determine the impact of its airport
assessment program and assistance provided for improving security at
foreign airports. Likewise, these types of measures can be applied to air
carrier inspections at foreign airports to determine he impact that such
inspections have on compliance, and to identify which approaches to for
improving air carrier compliance with security requirements work well and
which could be improved upon.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3404 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VI. This report will also be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
Cathleen A. Berrick
Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine efforts by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
ensure the security of international aviation, and in particular flights
bound for the United States from other countries, we addressed the
following questions: (1) What were the results of TSA's fiscal year 2005
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and what actions
were taken, if any, when TSA identified that foreign airports and air
carriers were not complying with security standards? (2) How, if at all,
did TSA assist foreign countries and air carriers in addressing any
deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections, and to what extent did TSA provide oversight of its
assessment and inspection efforts? (3) What challenges, if any, affected
TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections, and what actions have TSA and others taken to address these
challenges?
Results of Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier
Inspections and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to Noncompliance
Foreign Airport Assessment Results
To determine the results of TSA's foreign airport assessments we reviewed
128 fiscal year 2005 assessment reports, the most recent year for which
complete foreign airport assessment reports were available.^1 To determine
the extent to which foreign airports complied with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices, we
looked at the following information contained in the reports:
(1) ICAO standards or recommended practices with which the airport
did not comply;
(2) whether issues of noncompliance were "old" (identified during
the previous assessment) or "new" (identified during the current
assessment);
(3) explanation of the problems that existed that caused the
airport not to comply with ICAO standards or recommended
practices, and, if provided, any actions taken by the host
government to address the problems;
(4) TSA's recommendations for how the airport could correct
security deficiencies in order to meet ICAO standards or
recommended practices; and
(5) whether issues of noncompliance remained "open" (unresolved)
or "closed" (resolved) prior to the completion of the assessment.
^1Based on the assessment reports TSA provided us, we determined that TSA
conducted 128 foreign airport assessments at 126 unique airports during
fiscal year 2005; that is, 2 foreign airports were assessed twice during
fiscal year 2005.
We developed an electronic data collection instrument to capture
information from copies of the assessment reports. All data collection
instrument entries, with the exception of the problem descriptions and
recommendations, were verified to ensure they had been copied correctly
from the assessment reports. Considering that we only intended to discuss
the problem descriptions and the recommendations anecdotally, and given
the resources available to verify this information, we verified that the
problem descriptions and recommendations had been copied correctly for a
random sample of 20 assessment reports from fiscal year 2005.
We analyzed the data to determine the frequency with which foreign
airports complied with particular categories of ICAO standards and
recommended practices, such as passenger screening, checked baggage
screening, access controls, etc., and the number of airports that resolved
deficiencies upon completion of the assessment.
Air Carrier Inspection Results
To determine the results of TSA's air carrier inspections, we obtained
inspection data from TSA's Performance and Results Information System
(PARIS).^2 For the purposes of our review, we analyzed the results of
inspections conducted in fiscal year 2005 to be consistent with the
analysis performed on the results of foreign airport assessments for
fiscal year 2005.
^2 The PARIS database, established in July 2003, provides TSA a Web-based
method for entering, storing, and retrieving performance activities and
information on TSA-regulated entities, including air carriers. PARIS
includes profiles for each entity, inspections conducted by TSA, and
investigations that are prompted by incidents or inspection findings.
TSA's inspections database contained information on 529 air carrier
inspections at 145 foreign airports in 71 countries conducted by TSA
during fiscal year 2005. Specifically, the inspections database included
the date and location of the inspection, the inspected air carrier, the
security requirements being inspected, as well as the inspector's
determination as to whether the air carrier was or was not in compliance
with security requirements. Prior to conducting any analysis, we assessed
the reliability of the inspection data by performing electronic testing
for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness. Our testing revealed a
few errors, such as inconsistencies in the names of individual air
carriers or incorrectly identifying the airport as the assessed entity
rather than the air carrier. We also found instances of inspections
conducted at domestic airports that were included in the data; those
inspection records were removed. We also interviewed agency officials
familiar with the data, and worked with them to resolve the data problems
we identified. Based on our electronic testing and discussions with agency
officials, we found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of our report. For our analysis, we also added additional information to
the inspection records to include the country where the inspection
occurred, and whether the air carrier being inspected was a U.S.-based air
carrier or a foreign air carrier. Finally, to facilitate our analysis, we
grouped the security requirements being inspected into several categories,
such as aircraft security, cargo, checked baggage, passenger and carry-on
screening and special procedures.
Actions Taken by TSA when Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Did Not Comply with
Security Requirements
To determine the actions taken by TSA when foreign airports did not comply
with ICAO standards and recommended practices, we reviewed TSA's Foreign
Airport Assessment Program Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). We also
reviewed relevant statutory provisions that identify specific actions to
be taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security when the Secretary
determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry-out
effective security measures. ^3
To determine the actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply
with TSA security requirements, we reviewed fiscal year 2005 information
from the findings and investigations databases in PARIS. As with the
inspection data, to facilitate our analysis, we included additional
information in the findings database, such as the country where the
inspection occurred, and whether the air carrier being inspected was a
U.S.-based air carrier or a foreign air carrier. Further, we grouped the
security requirements being inspected into several categories, such as
aircraft security, cargo, checked baggage, passenger and carry-on
screening, and special procedures.
^3See 49 U.S.C. S 44907.
To assess the reliability of the findings data, we performed electronic
testing for obvious errors and completeness and interviewed agency
officials knowledgeable about the data. We identified two issues of
concern during our reliability assessment. First, we found that the
findings database is not linked to the inspections database to allow for
ready determination of the actions taken by TSA in response to specific
deficiencies. Second, the findings database did not consistently include
accurate information on actions taken in response to findings. According
to TSA officials knowledgeable about the data, the findings database
should contain information on actions taken by TSA for each response of
"not in compliance" in the inspections database. However, we found that in
half of the inspections where deficiencies were identified, such
information was not properly recorded in the findings database.
Considering the amount of information excluded from the findings database
and that this information could not be readily provided by TSA, we
determined that the findings data were not sufficiently reliable for
conducting evaluative analysis of the actions taken by TSA when security
violations were identified during air carrier inspections. However, we
determined that the findings data were sufficiently reliable for
conducting descriptive analysis of TSA's actions, while including
appropriate statements as to its reliability, and for anecdotal purposes.
To assess the reliability of the investigations data included in PARIS, we
conducted electronic testing and interviewed agency officials
knowledgeable about the data. We found that information in the
investigations database is not recorded in such a way that one can readily
determine which air carrier inspection, and in particular which specific
security violations identified, were the impetus behind a particular
investigation. TSA officials explained that inspectors are not required to
link an investigation to the inspection which it stemmed from. When we
performed our analysis, TSA officials were, however, able to provide links
to inspections for some of the investigations. For the remainder of the
investigations data, we attempted to make the link between inspections and
investigations by using information from the inspections database such as
the date when the investigation record was created and the narrative
fields, which in some cases identified whether the investigation was a
result of an inspection or some other offense, such as an air carrier
allowing a passenger on the No-Fly list to board a U.S.-bound flight.^4
Our analysis of actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply with
security requirements is, therefore, based on those investigations that we
were able to link to fiscal year 2005 inspection activity. We found these
data to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.
For additional information on actions taken by TSA when foreign airports
and air carriers did not comply with security requirements, we interviewed
TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of Security
Operations--the division responsible for conducting foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections and making recommendations for
corrective action--and the Transportation Security Network Management
division--the unit responsible for working with foreign officials to
coordinate TSA foreign airport visits and monitoring host government and
air carrier progress in addressing security deficiencies.
Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies and Oversight of
Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Efforts
Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies
To identify actions taken by TSA to help foreign officials address
security deficiencies identified at foreign airports during the fiscal
year 2005 airport assessments, we obtained and analyzed information from
the fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports. To obtain
information on TSA's efforts to assist air carrier representatives in
addressing identified security deficiencies, we reviewed information in
the findings and investigations databases from TSA's PARIS. As previously
discussed, we assessed the reliability of the findings and investigations
data by performing electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and
completeness, and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the
data. While we identified errors during our reliability assessment, many
of which remained unresolved, we determined that the findings and
investigations data were sufficiently reliable for anecdotal descriptions
of the assistance TSA provided air carriers to help them address security
deficiencies.
^4The No-Fly list contains the names of individuals that pose, or are
suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation for national security and
are precluded from boarding an aircraft.
To obtain additional information on actions taken by TSA to address
security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and
air carrier inspections, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials from
the Office of Security Operations and the Transportation Sector Network
Management division. We also made site visits to TSA's five international
field offices (IFO) located in Los Angeles, Dallas, Miami, Frankfurt, and
Singapore, where we met with the IFO managers; international aviation
security inspectors, who conduct foreign airport assessments and air
carrier inspections; 10 of the 20 TSA Representatives (TSAR), who schedule
TSA airport visits and follow up on host governments' progress in
addressing security deficiencies; and 4 of the 6 International Principal
Security Inspectors (IPSI), who are responsible for assisting foreign air
carriers in understanding and complying with TSA security requirements. We
also met with 3 of the 15 Principal Security Inspectors (PSI) located at
TSA headquarters that are responsible for helping U.S. air carriers
understand and comply with TSA security requirements. During each of these
interviews, we discussed these officials' responsibilities related to the
foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, including
their role in assisting foreign officials and air carrier representatives
in correcting security deficiencies identified during assessments and
inspections. Information from our interviews with government officials,
members of the aviation industry, and TSA officials and inspectors cannot
be generalized beyond those that we spoke with because we did not use
statistical sampling techniques in selecting individuals to interview. To
obtain a greater understanding of the foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection processes, as well as the assistance TSA provides, we
accompanied a team of TSA inspectors and a TSAR during the assessment of
E.T. Joshua International Airport in Kingstown, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and the inspection of Caribbean Sun Airlines at that location.
Moreover, we identified and met with officials from other U.S. government
agencies that assist foreign officials in enhancing security at foreign
airports. Specifically, we met with officials from the Department of
Justice, Department of State, Department of Transportation, and the U.S.
Trade and Development Administration.
Oversight of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
To obtain information on the extent to which TSA provided oversight of its
assessment and inspection efforts, we reviewed the agency guidance for
each program. We also reviewed sections of the fiscal year 2005 foreign
airport assessment reports for completeness and general consistency with
TSA guidance for preparing assessment reports. In addition, we reviewed
the inspections, findings, and investigations databases in PARIS for
completeness and the ability to track air carrier inspection activity from
initiation through completion, including actions taken against air
carriers who did not comply with security requirements. We compared TSA's
guidance and reporting mechanisms for the assessment and inspection
programs with federal standards for internal controls and associated
guidance.^5 We also met with TSA headquarters officials, IFO managers,
TSARs, and aviation security inspectors to discuss the extent to which
they documented assessment and inspection activity from initiation through
completion and follow-up activity for unresolved security deficiencies.
We obtained additional information on TSA's oversight of the foreign
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, particularly with
regard to assessing the impact of these programs, by reviewing TSA's
fiscal year 2006 Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) submissions.
The Office of Management and Budget describes PART as a diagnostic tool
meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal programs as
part of the executive budget formulation process. PART includes
information on an agency's program goals and performance measures used to
assess whether program goals are being met. We compared the program goals
identified in TSA's PART submission with the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which identifies requirements for the types of
measures federal agencies should use to assess the performance of their
programs. We also interviewed TSA headquarters and field officials to
obtain their perspectives on appropriate ways to assess the performance of
the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs.
^5GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, [96]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999), and
GAO, Internal Control: Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool,
[97]GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
Challenges That Affected TSA's Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments
and Air Carrier Inspections and Actions Taken to Address those Challenges
To identify challenges that affected TSA's ability to conduct foreign
airport assessments and air carrier inspections at foreign airports, we
met with TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of Security
Operations and the Transport Sector Network Management division regarding
their efforts to obtain access to foreign airports to conduct assessments
and inspections. We also visited the embassies of 16 nations and the
Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, D.C., to obtain
perspectives of foreign transportation security officials on TSA's airport
assessment and air carrier inspection program.^6 In addition, we conducted
site visits to meet with aviation security officials in Belgium, Canada,
Germany, the Philippines, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Thailand, and
the United Kingdom to discuss their perspectives on TSA's foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection activity. We selected these
locations because they met one or more of the following criteria: a
relatively high volume of passengers fly to the United States each year,
TSA assigned a relatively high threat ranking to the country, the country
received aviation security training or technical assistance from a U.S.
government agency, or a TSA international field office was located in the
country. We also met with individuals representing 11 air carriers,
including both U.S. and foreign airlines,^7 to obtain their perspectives
on TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspections programs.
Additionally, we met with officials from the European Commission, the
European Civil Aviation Commission, and ICAO to discuss similar efforts
these organizations have in place to ensure compliance with international
aviation security standards. Information from our interviews with foreign
government officials and members of the aviation industry cannot be
generalized beyond those that we spoke with because we did not use
statistical sampling techniques in selecting individuals to interview. We
also reviewed documentation associated with TSA's risk-based methodology
for scheduling foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections,
which TSA intended to address some of the challenges in conducting
assessments and inspections, and compared the methodology to our risk
management guidance.
^6 We visited the embassies of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the
Netherlands, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.
^7 We met with officials from American Airlines, British Airways,
Caribbean Sun Airlines, Continental Micronesia, Delta Air Lines,
Lufthansa, Northwest Airlines, Philippine Airlines, Singapore Airlines,
Thai Airways International, and Virgin Atlantic.
In addition, we interviewed 4 Federal Security Directors^8 and 7 aviation
security inspectors stationed in the United States to discuss their
support of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs as well as the impact, if any, that their involvement in these
programs has had on their operations at U.S. airports.
We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
^8The Federal Security Director is the ranking TSA authority responsible
for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the
nation's commercial airports.
Appendix II: International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and
Recommended Practices Used by TSA to Conduct Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign
Airport Assessments
Appendix III: TSA Security Requirements for U.S.-Based and Foreign
Carriers Operating Out of Foreign Airports
Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program: U.S.-based Carriers
The aircraft operator standard security program (AOSSP) is designed to
provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on flights
against acts of criminal violence and air piracy, and the introduction of
explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other prohibited items on board an
aircraft. TSA requires that each air carrier adopt and implement a
security program approved by TSA for scheduled passenger and public
charter operations at locations within the United States, from the United
States to a non-U.S. location, or from a non-U.S. location to the United
States, and from a non-U.S. location to a non-U.S. location (for example,
an intermediate stop such as Singapore to Tokyo to the United States). The
AOSSP developed by TSA and used by U.S.-based carriers is divided into
chapters and lays out security requirements for operations. Table 6
summarizes requirements applicable to flights operating from a non-U.S.
location to the United States.
Table 6: Elements of the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program
Applicable to International Operations
Chapter Types of requirements
Introduction and Defines roles and responsibilities for the
definitions positions of Ground Security Coordinator,
In-flight Security Coordinator, and the
Federal Flight Deck Officer.
Incidents, suspicious Requires procedures for notification of the
activities, and threat Transportation Security Operations Center and
information law enforcement agencies to report incidents
and suspicious activities as well as
procedures to ensure the security of aircraft
upon receipt of specific or credible threats.
Prescreening procedures and Requires air carriers to implement passenger
passenger identification prescreening on flights to match passenger
checks names against the No-Fly and Selectee
screening lists, check of all passenger
identification, and control of entry into the
sterile area.
Passengers designated as In addition to the above requirements, defines
selectee passengers requirements for screening the checked baggage
of selectee passengers.
International flights Requires measures specific to checked baggage
acceptance, protective escorts, jump seat
access, prohibited items, flights departing to
a non-U.S. location, flights departing a
non-U.S. location, and crew member vetting.
Cargo security measures Requires measures specific to the acceptance
of cargo for shipment, cargo screening
procedures, accompanied courier consignments,
cargo for subsequent transfer to another
carrier, control of access to cargo,
notification procedures, and cargo security
measures at non-U.S. locations.
Catering security measures Requires procedures to ensure security of
catering loaded onto a flight, or security at
catering facilities.
Additional requirements at Some locations outside of the United States
extraordinary locations have been designated by TSA as requiring
extraordinary security measures. These
measures include items such as aircraft
security, passenger prescreening, screening
selectee passengers, and the questioning of
enplaning passengers.
Aircraft and area security Requires measures to prevent unauthorized
access to aircraft, search departing aircraft
prior to passengers enplaning, sealing
procedures for vehicles transporting checked
baggage, access controls to areas such as
baggage rooms and other nonpublic areas, and
criminal history records check of air carrier
employees.
Training Outlines security training requirements for
Ground Security Coordinators, In-flight
Security Coordinator, crew members, air
carrier employees, and authorized
representatives.
Screening Outlines requirements for air carriers to
conduct additional screening at locations
outside of the United States where screening
does not meet requirements.
Source: TSA.
Security Directives
When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to
respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil
aviation, TSA may issue a Security Directive setting forth mandatory
measures. Each air carrier required to have a TSA-approved security
program must comply with each Security Directive issued to it by TSA,
within the time frame prescribed in the Security Directive for
compliance.^1
Model Security Program
TSA requires that the security program of a foreign air carrier provide
passengers a level of protection similar to the level of protection
provided by U.S. air carriers serving the same airports.^2 The security
program must be designed to prevent or deter the carriage onboard
airplanes of any prohibited item, prohibit unauthorized access to
airplanes, ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized
agent of the air carrier, and ensure the proper handling of cargo and
checked baggage to be loaded onto passenger flights. In addition, carriers
are requested to provide an acceptable level of security for passengers by
developing and implementing procedures to prevent acts of unlawful
interference.
TSA's foreign air carrier model security program was prepared to assist
foreign airlines in complying with security requirements for operations
into and out of the United States. Table 7 summarizes requirements
applicable to foreign carriers' flights operating from a non-U.S. location
to the United States.
^1 The specific Security Directives are sensitive security information
and, therefore, are not identified in this report.
^2See 49 C.F.R. S 1546.103(a)(3). 49 U.S.C. S 44906, however, provides
that TSA shall not approve the security program of a foreign air carrier
unless it requires the foreign carrier in its operations to and from
airports in the United States to adhere to the identical security measures
required of air carriers serving the same airports.
Table 7: Elements of the Foreign Air Carrier Model Security Program
Applicable to International Operations
Area of requirement Description
Screening of passengers Sets forth requirements for screening of
and carry-on baggage passengers and their property as well as the
transport of armed individuals and weapons.
Checked baggage Sets forth requirements for accepting, handling,
and screening of checked luggage, including
restricting access to baggage areas, conducting
passenger baggage matches, and the transport of
misdirected baggage.
Cargo Requires procedures be in place to ensure no
unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, or
dangerous articles or persons are included in
cargo. In addition, sets forth requirements to
ensure that once cargo is accepted, it is
safeguarded to prevent unauthorized access or
tampering.
Security of aircraft and Sets forth requirements for preventing access to
facilities aircraft while it is unattended and conducting a
search of the aircraft interior prior to
boarding. This also includes requirements for
authorized personnel to possess and display
proper identification.
Addressing and reporting Requires air carriers to implement procedures to
acts of unlawful respond to threats of hijacking and bomb threats.
interference In addition it requires that the carrier
establish a procedure for reporting threats when
they are received.
Contingency planning Requires air carriers to establish procedures to
implement additional security measures (regarding
checked baggage, passenger, and carry-on baggage
screening, aircraft security, and cargo handling)
when conditions warrant.
Training Sets forth requirements for air carriers to
ensure that employees (screeners, crew members,
or other air carrier employees) receive adequate
training in those security areas for which they
have responsibilities.
Source: TSA.
Emergency Amendments
When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to
respond to an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety
in air transportation, it may issue an emergency amendment. An emergency
amendment mandates additional actions beyond those in the air carrier's
security program. When TSA issues an emergency amendment, it also issues a
notice indicating the reasons for the amendment to be adopted. Air
carriers are required to comply with emergency amendments immediately.^3
^3The specific emergency amendments are sensitive security information
and, therefore, are not identified in this report.
Appendix IV: U.S. Government Aviation Security Training and Technical
Assistance Programs for Foreign Entities
Department of State: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
Program Background
The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program seeks to
provide partner countries the training, equipment, and technology they
need to combat terrorism and prosecute terrorists and terrorist
supporters. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program was established in 1983.
Program Selection
Selection of Countries
Countries must meet at least one of the four following criteria to
participate in the ATA program:
o The country or region must be categorized as having a critical
or high threat of terrorism and unable to protect U.S. facilities
and personnel within the country
o There are important U.S. policy interests with the prospective
country, which may be supported through the provision of
antiterrorism assistance. For example, officials in one country
received assistance through the ATA program because they allowed
the United States to establish air bases in their country.
o The prospective country must be served by a U.S. air carrier, or
is the last point of departure for flights to the United States.
o The prospective country cannot be engaged in gross human rights
violations.
The State Department determines whether and what training and assistance
to provide countries based on needs assessments done by State Department
personnel along with a team of interagency subject matter experts. The
assessment team evaluates prospective program participants using 25
Antiterrorism Critical Capabilities. Program officials stated that the
assessment is a snapshot of the country's antiterrorism capabilities,
including equipment, personnel, and available training. ATA program
officials stated that the assessment includes a review at several levels,
including tactical capabilities (people and resources), operational
management capabilities (overall management and ability), and strategic
capabilities.
Antiterrorism Critical Capabilities
1. Land Border Security
2. Land Port of Entry Security
3. Maritime Border Security
4. Maritime Port of Entry Security
5. Air Space Security
6. Airport of Entry Security
7. Critical Infrastructure Protection
8. National Leadership Security
9. Diplomatic Community Security
10. Preventative Intelligence
11. National Level Major Incident Command and Control
12. Police Special Operations
13. Explosive Incidents Countermeasures
14. Mass Casualty Incident Management
15. Kidnapping/Hostage Incident Management
16. Police Investigative Capability
17. Post Blast Investigations
18. Mass Casualty Incident Management
19. Crime Science and Evidence Management
20. Forensic Examination and Analysis
21. Financial Investigations
22. Prosecutorial Capability
23. Critical Digital Infrastructure Security
24. Cyber Crime Investigations
25. Institutionalization of Anti/Counter Terrorism Training
Two of the 25 capabilities reviewed during the needs assessments are
related to aviation security. Those are Airspace Security and Air Port of
Entry Security. The first is an assessment of how a country controls what
goes through its airspace. The second is an assessment of security at the
country's main airport. According to program officials, when doing an
assessment, the ATA team will usually visit the busiest airport within the
country to examine the operational security of the airport and assesses
training provided to airport security management.
Program Assistance
The results of the needs assessments determine what type of assistance the
State Department will offer to countries participating in the ATA program.
The various types of training and assistance offered through the program
include crisis management and response, cyber-terrorism, dignitary
protection, bomb detection, border control, kidnap intervention and
hostage negotiation and rescue, response to incidents involving weapons of
mass destruction, counter terrorist finance, interdiction of terrorist
organizations, and airport security. During fiscal year 2005, 146
countries received antiterrorism training through the ATA program; 7
countries received training for aviation security.
The ATA program offers one course in aviation security, "Airport Security
Management." This is a 1-week seminar that is generally taught in-country.
According to State Department officials, TSA employees teach the course.
State Department officials stated that this course helps countries to meet
internationally recognized aviation security standards established by
ICAO. State Department officials stated that while most countries'
officials know about ICAO, and can obtain ICAO manuals and standards, many
of the countries do not have the resources or equipment to operationalize
ICAO standards. State Department officials stated that the ATA program
offers countries the resources to implement ICAO standards.
Recipient Countries
For fiscal year 2005, aviation security training was provided to 7
countries through the ATA program, Philippines ($94,723), Kazakhstan
($98,200), Bahamas ($95,000), Barbados ($45,900), Dominican Republic
($45,900), Qatar ($98,046), and United Arab Emirates ($95,000).
Relationship to TSA
TSA employees teach in-country aviation security training to foreign
officials through the ATA program. In addition, ATA uses TSA staff as
subject matter experts when performing needs assessments.
U.S. Trade and Development Agency
Program Background
The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) works to advance economic
development and U.S. commercial interests in developing and middle-income
countries. The agency funds various forms of technical assistance,
training, and business workshops to support the development of a modem
infrastructure and a fair and open trading environment. USTDA's use of
foreign assistance funds to support sound investment policy and decision
making in host countries is intended to create an enabling environment for
trade, investment, and sustainable economic development. In carrying out
its mission, USTDA gives emphasis to economic sectors that may benefit
from U.S. exports of goods and services. For example, according to USTDA,
the agency obligated approximately 24 percent of its program funding in
support of transportation sector projects. More specifically, according to
USTDA, 5.6 percent of the agency's budget is obligated toward projects in
the aviation security sector. The general goals of USTDA's work in the
aviation security field are to help foreign airports achieve "Category I"
status (the FAA classification for an airport that meets minimum safety
standards, which allows foreign air carriers to fly from their country of
origin directly to the United States), to help countries prepare to pass
and adhere to ICAO standards, and to offer training to increase aviation
security.
Selection of Projects
According to USTDA, assistance projects and recipients are selected within
the framework of USTDA's development and commercial mandate. Generally,
projects are not selected based strictly on security (i.e., not selected
based on threat) but on the likelihood of a country implementing the
recommended actions to obtain greater aviation safety and security. USTDA
projects are developed through consultations by USTDA staff and U.S. and
foreign embassies, foreign officials (public or private) that have
decision-making authority to implement the assistance project, or U.S.
industry officials that identify a need for assistance. According to
USTDA, when developing the project, the agency evaluates a number of
factors, including the priority the government places on the project and
if the entity has the technical capability to implement the project.
According to USTDA, this evaluation is conducted in order to ensure that
U.S. taxpayers' dollars are wisely used on projects that will help
strengthen a foreign countries' ability to transport passengers and goods
to the United States.
After an initial evaluation by USTDA staff, USTDA employs a technical
expert to conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed assistance
project. That technical evaluation can take two forms: a Desk Study or a
Definitional Mission. The Desk Study is completed for proposals where
sufficient information is provided that allows for a technical expert to
make an informed decision as to whether or not USTDA should fund the
project. If the project proposal does not contain sufficient detail to
evaluate without conducting a field site visit, USTDA then employs a small
business contractor--or consultant--to conduct a Definitional Mission,
which, according to USTDA, costs between $25,000 and $40,000. The
consultant undertaking the Definitional Mission takes 1 to 2 weeks to meet
with the stakeholders in the foreign country, including the potential
grant recipients, in order to review project ideas and generate additional
project opportunities. Upon return from the site visits, the consultant
prepares a report for USTDA on the findings of the Definitional Mission.
According to USTDA, consultants typically assess more than one proposed
assistance project at a time when in the field. To avoid conflicts of
interest, the consultant that undertakes the Definitional Mission is
prohibited from participating in any of the follow-on work, including the
early investment analysis or training recommended in the report.
Program Assistance
Early Investment Analysis
Early investment analysis is the main form of USTDA assistance. According
to USTDA, the cost of such assistance typically ranges from $100,000 to
$500,000. These technical assistance programs may take from 6 to 18 months
to complete. The studies are undertaken by U.S. consulting firms under a
grant program and are intended to evaluate the technical, financial,
environmental, legal, and other critical aspects of infrastructure
development projects that are of interest to potential lenders and
investors. Host country project sponsors select the U.S. companies,
normally through open competitions.
Annex 17 Workshops
USTDA organizes Annex 17 workshops to help bring developing countries into
compliance with lCAO Annex 17. These workshops are designed to give
countries assistance before lCAO inspections so that they meet minimum
standards and pass inspections. According to USTDA, the workshops suggest
ways that relatively poor countries can meet ICAO standards with a low
level of technological sophistication. According to USTDA, the workshops
focus on enhancing training and improving human resources related to
aviation security.
Recipients
According to USTDA, for fiscal year 2005, the agency awarded Chile
($359,000), Haiti ($150,000), Iraq ($243,000), Malaysia ($100,000),
Tanzania ($371,000), Ukraine ($625,000), West Africa Regional Training
($353,000) and Worldwide Aviation Security training ($596,000) grant
assistance in the aviation security sector.
Participation by TSA
USTDA consults with TSA on an ongoing basis. USTDA used TSA personnel as
instructors for the Annex 17 workshops.
Department of Transportation--Safe Skies for Africa Program
Background
The Department of Transportation (DOT) manages the Safe Skies for Africa
presidential initiative (Safe Skies), which started in 1998. Safe Skies is
a technical program that assists participating countries in meeting
international aviation safety and security standards. According to DOT
officials, Safe Skies is a small program with an annual budget-- including
operating and administrative costs--between $1 million and $3 million.
According to DOT officials, approximately one-fourth of the Safe Skies
budget goes toward aviation security. Funding for Safe Skies is provided
by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).
Selection of Participants
The original Safe Skies participants were selected in 1998 by an
interagency committee made up of Department of Defense, Department of
Transportation, State Department, and the U.S. Trade and Development
Agency. The committee held a series of meetings to consider priority lists
created by each agency, cables exchanged with U.S. embassies across
sub-Saharan Africa, and responses to questionnaires sent to various
states. The committee selected countries that it believed had the highest
likelihood of successfully complying with international aviation safety
and security standards set by ICAO and requirements set by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and TSA. The committee also considered U.S.
trade interests and regional diversity issues. In the end, countries from
across sub-Saharan Africa were selected to participate in the program.
Since 1998 only two countries have been added to the list of Safe Skies
participants. Both Uganda and Djibouti became Safe Skies countries after
President Bush announced the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative in
2003.^1
Program Assistance
General
All Safe Skies countries receive some degree of aid, with priority going
to those countries that demonstrate political will. DOT gauges political
will based on consultations with embassies and TSA and whether a country
implements recommended safety and security practices. The Administration's
priorities are communicated through the State Department. According to
DOT, all participants except Zimbabwe have had aviation security, safety,
and air navigation surveys of their civil aviation systems performed at
their airports by U.S. government subject -matter experts.
Equipment
Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has provided $5 million in
additional resources for DOT to provide security equipment to Safe Skies
countries. DOT officials stated that they worked with their TSA (formerly
FAA security) colleagues to perform site visits to help agency officials
determine country-specific security equipment needs for the screening of
passengers and baggage.
Security Advisor
According to DOT, Safe Skies has an East Africa aviation security advisor
stationed in Nairobi, Kenya to provide direct advice and technical
assistance to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in meeting ICAO
standards and to assist these states in addressing potential threats to
civil aviation.
^1 East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) includes military
training for border and coastal security, programs to strengthen control
of the movement of people and goods across borders, aviation security
capacity building, assistance for regional efforts against terrorist
financing, and police training. EACTI also includes an education program
to counter extremist influence and a robust outreach program. According to
DOT, with the exception of Djibouti, which has a separate funding course,
the Economic Support Funds used to support the remainder of the Safe Skies
countries can only be used to support those aviation security technical
assistance and capacity-building activities performed by nonmilitary and
nonpolice personnel.
Recipients^2
According to DOT, fiscal year 2005 recipients of Safe Skies assistance
were Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde,^3 Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, Namibia,
Tanzania, and Uganda.
Collaboration with TSA
TSA and DOT responsibilities are laid out in a 2004 TSA-DOT memorandum of
agreement. Under this agreement, TSA provides advice, technical
assistance, and training through the TSA Enforcement Academy, in addition
to providing an aviation security advisor to Safe Skies. These activities
are funded by DOT, with funds that were appropriated to USAID and
transferred to DOT for the purposes of implementing Safe Skies. TSA also
works in partnership with DOT to prioritize recipient countries based on
need.
Department of State--Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs--Organization of American States Inter-American Committee against
Terrorism
Background
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of
the Department of State has a program under way aimed at combating alien
smuggling and improving border security. The part of the program relating
to border security contains elements relating to maritime security and
airport security. These efforts are undertaken in cooperation with the
Organization of American States' (OAS) Inter-American Committee against
Terrorism (CICTE). The INL-OAS efforts began with maritime security and
were broadened to include aviation security in 2003.
^2According to DOT, Safe Skies offers technical assistance and training
for both aviation safety and security and does not track funding levels by
activity.
^3According to DOT, Cape Verde is the only Safe Skies country that has
successfully achieved FAA Category 1 status for safety oversight in
accordance with ICAO aviation security standards. Cape Verde also met ICAO
standards for security oversight and TSA security requirements for
providing direct service to the United States. As such, DOT provides
limited assistance to Cape Verde to sustain its safety and security
status.
Selection of Participants
INL officials worked with CICTE officials to select the appropriate OAS
member countries to receive training. As of August 2006, the aviation
security effort under way was focused on Caribbean nations, and fiscal
year 2006 funding was also intended to provide funding for some Central
and South American nations. Roughly $264,000 was spent in 2004, $187,110
in 2005, and $236,610 in 2006 on aviation security.
Program Assistance
INL funds pay for aviation security training courses, and the courses are
taught by TSA officials. These training courses are aimed at helping
countries to develop national civil aviation security programs and other
essential plans based on the ICAO standards as well as crisis management.
INL funds were used to pay for national development workshops for
Caribbean countries. These workshops were taught by TSA staff who spent 1
week in each Caribbean country. While in country, TSA representatives
reviewed the country's security program, looked for deficiencies within
the security program, and attempted to build a program that would resolve
the deficiencies they identified. According to OAS, participants in these
workshops identified recommendations to improve aviation security and
combat terrorism and submitted the recommendations to their respective
governments. The workshops addressed enhancements to the national security
program, national legislation, oversight, national security committees,
and program approval processes. According to OAS, in 2006, these workshops
took place in Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines. According to OAS, starting in September 2006, this program
began functioning in Central America, where national development workshops
were planned to take place in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
According to OAS, in addition to the national development workshops, this
program also offers a 5-day crisis management workshop for midlevel to
senior-level aviation management and other government officials. INL,
through CICTE, also funds aviation security courses that are taught by
ICAO instructors.
Recipient Countries
According to OAS, the recipient countries of CICTE-sponsored aviation
security training for calendar year 2006 were Antigua and Barbuda,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad andTobago, and Uruguay. ^4
TSA Participation
TSA officials are the instructors for the on-site workshops. CICTE
established an memorandum of agreement with TSA, and discussed the best
approach for helping OAS members develop a long-term international
aviation security program. CICTE and TSA decided that in-country,
on-the-ground visits would be the best approach, since these allow CICTE
and TSA to see which problems are present.
Department of State--Western Hemisphere Affairs--Organization of American
States--Inter-American Committee against Terrorism
Background
According to OAS, during the fourth quarter of 2006, CICTE received grant
funding to provide aviation security training courses for the nine
countries that will host the 2007 Cricket World Cup.
Program Assistance
According to OAS, grant funding was used to support two aviation security
training courses--the Basic Security Training Course and the Aviation
Security Training Course. The Basic Security Training Course is a 7-day
course focused on improving aviation security screeners' ability to detect
threat items using X-ray machines, metal detection portals, physical
search techniques, and explosive trace detection technologies.
^4The Department of State did not fund workshops directly, but rather
through a grant to OAS/CICTE; thus the specific cost information is not
available. Further, many countries received assistance at workshops held
for multiple countries at the same time and it is difficult to
disaggregate cost information.
According to OAS, the Aviation Security Training Course is a 9-day course
that addresses concepts and principles of managing aviation security
operations within the unique environment of an international airport.
Course content is also based on ICAO standards and recommended practices
and focused on the protection of passengers, crew, ground personnel, the
general public, the aircraft, and airport facilities. According to OAS,
practical exercises are used to reinforce classroom learning. This course
provided training to midlevel managers and supervisors who are responsible
for aviation security program planning, oversight, and operations.
According to OAS, TSA instructors train these officials in identifying
vulnerabilities at their airports, developing preventive measures, and
allocating resources to handle the flow of passengers while maintaining
adequate security.
Recipient Countries
The recipient countries for calendar year 2006 and the first half of 2007
are Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis,
and St. Lucia.
Department of Justice-International Criminal Investigative Training and
Assistance Program
Background
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) aims to develop law enforcement
agencies and systems. Training is only one component of ICITAP's holistic
approach to this mission. ICITAP has an ongoing relationship with the
Department of State to offer various types of training. Since 2000, ICITAP
facilitated Department of State-initiated aviation security training in
Ghana and the Dominican Republic, and conducted an assessment in Benin.
Selection of Participants
The Department of Justice's involvement can begin when a foreign
government makes a request to the U.S. embassy for training to rectify
perceived weaknesses in aviation security. The embassy then collaborates
with DOJ to put together a proposal for action, which is then sent to the
Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement. INL attempts to obtain a country-specific appropriation for
the project, and alerts DOJ as to whether funding is available. According
to DOJ, INL sometimes targets certain countries for assistance and then
asks ICITAP to prepare proposals and budgets to support training
activities and technical assistance to improve law enforcement capacity in
the host countries.
Program Assistance
ICITAP assistance included on-site aviation security needs assessments,
with ICITAP serving as facilitator and current and former TSA (previously
FAA) employees performing the aviation security needs assessments. The
assessment was based on standards laid out in ICAO Annex 17. The
assessment attempted to broadly gauge the adequacy of the available
security systems and each country's ability to manage the systems.
Recipients
As of February 2007, the most recent recipients are Benin ($79,500 in
2002),^5 Ghana ($79,500 in 2002), and the Dominican Republic ($32,000 in
2003).
In 2003, as a result of information gathered from TSA's foreign airport
assessment report, ICITAP provided drug interdiction training to customs
officials in Ghana stationed at the airport. According to DOJ, INL granted
$79,500 each to Ghana and Benin for the purpose of providing airport
security training.
TSA Participation
Former and current TSA officials have conducted needs assessments and
provided training to foreign officials through ICITAP.
^5Not all money was used due to inability to place an aviation security
expert on site.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the person named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant
Director; Amy Bernstein; Kristy Brown; Alisha Chugh; Emily Hanawalt;
Christopher Jones; Stanley Kostyla; Kyle Lamborn; Thomas Lombardi; Jeremy
Manion; and Linda Miller made key contributions to this report.
Related Related Products
Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in
the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened. [98]GAO-07-660 . Washington,
D.C.: April 30, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA's Change to its Prohibited Items List Has Not
Resulted in Any Reported Public Safety Incidents, but the Impact of the
Change on Screening Operations is Uncertain. [99]GAO-07-623R . Washington,
D.C.: April 25, 2007.
Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Service Drive Changes to
Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation
of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved. [100]GAO-07-634 . Washington, D.C.:
April 16, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for
Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be
Systematically Reassessed. [101]GAO-07-299 . Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2007.
Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key
Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. [102]GAO-07-448T .
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Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures
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Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding Uncertainties
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Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
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Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better
Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying
Less than Lethal Weapons. [106]GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening, but Challenges Remain. [107]GAO-06-371T . Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made
Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at
U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. [108]GAO-06-597T . Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. [109]GAO-06-166 . Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect
Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's Secure
Flight Program. [110]GAO-06-374T . Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved
Planning and Controls. [111]GAO-06-203 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo
Security. [112]GAO-06-76 . Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of
Federal Security Directors Is Needed. [113]GAO-05-935 . Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.
[114]GAO-05-781 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully
Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program Testing
in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More Fully
Inform the Public. [115]GAO-05-864R . Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. [116]GAO-05-896T . Washington, D.C.:
July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
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May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
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Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. [119]GAO-05-365 . Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial
Data for the Secure Flight Program. [120]GAO-05-324 . Washington, D.C.:
Feb.23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize Resources.
[121]GAO-05-357T . Washington, D.C.: Feb.15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow
Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services.
[122]GAO-05-126 . Washington, D.C.: Nov.19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
Success. [123]GAO-05-144 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. [124]GAO-04-728 .
Washington, D.C.: Jun. 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed to
Strengthen Acquisition Function. [125]GAO-04-544 . Washington, D.C.: May
28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
[126]GAO-04-785T . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter
Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. [127]GAO-04-519 .
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility
to Implement Innovative Approaches. [128]GAO-04-505T . Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation Security
Efforts. [129]GAO-04-592T . Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System. [130]GAO-04-504T . Washington, D.C.: Mar.
17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. [131]GAO-04-499R . Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces
Significant Implementation Challenges. [132]GAO-04-385 . Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger
and Baggage Screening Operations. [133]GAO-04-440T . Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-based
Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. [134]GAO-04-341R .
Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. [135]GAO-04-285T . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of
Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
[136]GAO-04-242 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. [137]GAO-04-232T . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and
Challenges Remaining. [138]GAO-03-1173 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges
Ahead. [139]GAO-03-1150T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. [140]GAO-03-1154T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges. [141]GAO-03-843 . Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities to
Address Key Agency Challenges. [142]GAO-03-653T . Washington, D.C.: Apr.
10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. [143]GAO-03-616T . Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports' Planned Capital Development. [144]GAO-03-497T . Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
Results-Oriented Culture. [145]GAO-03-190 . Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17,
2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's
Enforcement Approach. [146]GAO-03-22 . Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
Cargo System. [147]GAO-03-344 . Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation
Issues. [148]GAO-03-253 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
Affected Some Development Projects. [149]GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: Oct.
15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect
Competition. [150]GAO-03-171T . Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
and Long-Term Challenges. [151]GAO-02-971T . Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25,
2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots.
[152]GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. [153]GAO-01-1171T . Washington, D.C.: Sept.
25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. [154]GAO-01-1165T . Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts.
[155]GAO-01-1158T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. [156]GAO-01-1162T . Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
Security. [157]GAO-01-1166T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.
(440454)
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Highlights of GAO-07-729, a report to congressional requesters
May 2007
AVIATION SECURITY
Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance
Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to evaluate the
security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the United
States are of great importance, particularly considering that flights
bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to be targets
of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated by the alleged August
2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot.
For this review, GAO evaluated the results of foreign airport and air
carrier evaluations; actions taken and assistance provided by TSA when
security deficiencies were identified; TSA's oversight of its foreign
airport and air carrier evaluation programs; and TSA's efforts to address
challenges in conducting foreign airport and air carrier evaluations. To
conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport and air carrier evaluation
results and interviewed TSA officials, foreign aviation security
officials, and air carrier representatives.
[164]What GAO Recommends
In an April 2007 report that contained sensitive information, GAO
recommended, and the Department of Homeland Security agreed, that TSA
develop controls for tracking and documenting information and establish
outcome-based performance measures to strengthen oversight of its foreign
airport and air carrier evaluation programs.
Of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA
found that about 36 percent complied with all applicable security
standards, while about 64 percent did not comply with at least one
standard. The security deficiencies identified by TSA at two foreign
airports were such that the Secretary of Homeland Security notified the
public that the overall security at these airports was ineffective. Of the
529 overseas air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005,
for about 71 percent, TSA did not identify any security violations, and
for about 29 percent, TSA identified at least one security violation. TSA
took enforcement action--warning letters, correction letters, or monetary
fines--for about 18 percent of the air carrier security violations. TSA
addressed most of the remaining 82 percent of security violations through
on-site consultation.
TSA assisted foreign officials and air carrier representatives in
addressing identified deficiencies through on-site consultation,
recommendations for security improvements, and referrals for training and
technical assistance. However, TSA's oversight of the foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be strengthened. For
example, TSA did not have adequate controls in place to track whether
scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted, deferred,
or canceled. TSA also did not always document foreign officials' progress
in addressing security deficiencies identified by TSA. Further, TSA did
not always track what enforcement actions were taken against air carriers
with identified security deficiencies. TSA also did not have outcome-based
performance measures to assess the impact of its assessment and inspection
programs on the security of U.S.-bound flights. Without such controls, TSA
may not have reasonable assurance that the foreign airport assessment and
air carrier inspection programs are operating as intended.
TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its ability
to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections,
including a lack of available inspectors, concerns regarding the resource
burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits
by TSA and others, and host government concerns regarding sovereignty. In
October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling
foreign airport assessments, which should allow TSA to focus its limited
inspector resources on higher-risk airports. TSA is also exploring
opportunities to conduct joint airport assessments with the European
Commission and use the results of airport assessments conducted by the
European Commission to potentially adjust the frequency of TSA airport
visits.
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