Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment
Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces (31-JUL-07, GAO-07-711).
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to
develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD)
recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this
effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to
train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the
property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the
U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether
DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to
the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO
reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and
interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-711
ACCNO: A73697
TITLE: Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded
Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces
DATE: 07/31/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Data integrity
Foreign aid programs
Iraq War and reconstruction
Military forces
Military training
Property and supply management
Protective equipment
Records management
Policies and procedures
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
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GAO-07-711
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Account
* [4]MNF-I Cannot Fully Account for Iraqi Forces' Receipt of Equi
* [5]Conclusions
* [6]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [7]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [8]GAO Contact
* [9]Staff Acknowledgments
* [10]Order by Mail or Phone
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
July 2007
STABILIZING IRAQ
DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security
Forces
GAO-07-711
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2
Background 3
DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Accountability
Procedures Apply to the Train-and-Equip Program for Iraq 6
MNF-I Cannot Fully Account for Iraqi Forces' Receipt of Equipment 8
Conclusions 12
Recommendations for Executive Action 12
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 13
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 16
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 18
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 20
Figures
Figure 1: Military Chain of Command in Iraq 5
Figure 2: Efforts to Account for Equipment Distributed to Iraqi Security
Forces 9
Figure 3: Discrepancies of MNSTC-I Reports of Selected Equipment Issued to
Iraqi Security Forces, June 2004 through September 2005 10
Abbreviations
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
DOD Department of Defense
IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction and Fund
ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund
MNC-I Multinational Corps-Iraq
MNF-I Multinational Force-Iraq
MNSTC-I Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
July 31, 2007
Congressional Committees
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop
the Iraqi security forces, including at least $2.8 billion to purchase and
transport equipment to Iraqi forces.1 DOD recently requested an additional
$2 billion to continue these efforts. In the fall of 2003, the Coalition
Provisional Authority and the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) shared
responsibility for the U.S. program to train and equip the Iraqi security
forces, composed of both military and police forces.2 After the collapse
of many Iraqi forces in the spring of 2004, the United States restructured
the multinational force and increased resources to develop Iraqi forces.
The train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under the authority of the
Department of Defense (DOD) and is implemented by MNF-I's major
subordinate commands, including the Multinational Security Transition
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).
This report (1) examines the property accountability3 procedures DOD and
MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2)
assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment
issued to Iraqi security forces. Our work focused on accountability
requirements for the transportation and distribution of U.S.-provided
equipment; we did not review any requirements relevant to the procurement
of this equipment.
To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed documentation and interviewed
current and former officials from DOD, MNF-I and U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM). We also analyzed MNSTC-I property book records as of January
2007.4 We performed our work from March 2006 through July 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix
I of this report. Because of broad-based congressional interest in this
issue, we performed our work under the authority of the Comptroller
General of the United States to conduct reviews on his own initiative. The
work performed for this review has also contributed to several related GAO
products on Iraq.5
1This amount includes funds from the Iraq Security Forces Fund only. The
$2.8 billion figure is current as of March 2007. For the Iraq
Reconstruction and Relief Fund, DOD does not report funds for Iraqi
forces' equipment as a separate line item.
2The Coalition Provisional Authority was the U.N.-recognized authority led
by the United States and the United Kingdom that was responsible for the
temporary governance of Iraq. Multinational Force-Iraq was known as
Combined Joint Task Force-7 until May 2004.
3DOD defines accountability as the obligation imposed by law, lawful
order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping
accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or funds, with
or without physical possession (DODI 5000.64, Accountability and
Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property, E2.2).
Results in Brief
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability
procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq.
Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional
security assistance programs, which, according to DOD officials, allowed
DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program. These officials
stated that, since the funding did not go through traditional security
assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally
applicable to these programs--including registering small arms transferred
to foreign governments--did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently
have an order or orders comprehensively specifying accountability
procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi security forces.
DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi security forces' receipt of
U.S.-provided equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability.
First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment
distributed to the Iraqi security forces from June 2004 until December
2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a consolidated property book
system to track the issuance of equipment to the Iraqi security forces and
attempted to recover past records. Our analysis found a discrepancy of at
least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I
commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that
this lapse was due to an insufficient number of staff and the lack of a
fully operational network to distribute equipment, among other reasons.
Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently
collected supporting documents that confirm when the equipment was
received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units
receiving the equipment. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater
emphasis on collecting this documentation. However, our review of the 2007
property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete
records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic
spreadsheets, which are an inefficient data management tool given the
large amount of data and limited personnel available to maintain the
system. MNSTC-I plans to move the property book records from a spreadsheet
system to a database management system by summer 2007.
4Property books as defined by MNSTC-I differ from official property books
as defined by the U.S. Army. MNSTC-I officials stated that the property
books are asset visibility tools.
5GAO, Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and
Findings, GAO-07-385T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2007); Securing,
Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,
GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2007); and Stabilizing Iraq: An
Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 11, 2006).
To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches Iraqi forces, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) determine what DOD
accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program and (2)
after defining the required accountability procedures, ensure that
sufficient staff, functioning distribution networks, and proper technology
are available to meet the new requirements.
DOD concurred with both of our recommendations and is currently reviewing
policies and procedures for equipment accountability to ensure proper
accountability is in place for the Iraq train-and-equip program.
Background
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop
the Iraqi security forces, first under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund (IRRF) and later through the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF).6 DOD
has apportioned about $2.8 billion in ISFF funds to purchase and transport
equipment to Iraqi military and police forces.7 DOD does not report IRRF
funds for Iraqi forces' equipment and transportation as a separate line
item.8 DOD has requested an additional $2 billion to develop Iraqi
security forces in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget
requests.
6See the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, P.L. 108-106; Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13; Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006,
P.L. 109-234; Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, P.L.
109-289, and U.S. Troops Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery and
Iraq Accountability Act, 2007, P.L. 110-28.
7Data current as of March 4, 2007.
The United States restructured the multinational force and increased
resources to train and equip the Iraqi forces after they collapsed during
an insurgent uprising in the spring of 2004. This collapse ensued when
MNF-I transferred security responsibilities to the Iraqi forces before
they were properly trained and equipped to battle insurgents. Iraqi
security forces include the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force under the
Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Police, National Police, and Border
Enforcement under the Ministry of Interior.
The train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under DOD authority and is
implemented by MNF-I's major subordinate commands, including MNSTC-I and
Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) (see fig. 1). This differs from
traditional security assistance programs, which operate under State
Department authority and are managed in country by the DOD under the
direction and supervision of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission.
8The Gulf Regional Division of the Army Corps of Engineers prepares DOD's
reports on IRRF funding.
Figure 1: Military Chain of Command in Iraq
aMNC-I's major subordinate commands include multinational divisions
responsible for seven different geographic areas of operations.
bThe Gulf Regional Division is responsible for helping the Iraqi
government rebuild the country's infrastructure.
MNSTC-I was established in June 2004 to assist in the development,
organization, training, equipping, and sustainment of Iraqi security
forces. MNC-I is responsible for the tactical command and control of MNF-I
operations in Iraq. MNC-I's major subordinate commands were responsible
for distributing equipment to some Iraqi security forces in 2003 and 2004.
DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Accountability Procedures
Apply to the Train-and-Equip Program for Iraq
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD equipment
accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program
for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq under IRRF
and ISFF but outside traditional security assistance programs, which,
according to DOD officials, allowed DOD a large degree of flexibility in
managing the program. DOD defines accountability as the obligation imposed
by law, lawful order or regulation accepted by an organization or person
for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents or
funds, with or without physical possession.9 DOD officials stated that,
since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance
programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these
programs--including the registration of small arms transferred to foreign
governments--did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have an
order or orders comprehensively specifying accountability procedures for
equipment distributed to Iraqi military forces under the Ministry of
Defense, according to MNSTC-I officials.
According to DOD officials, because Iraq train-and-equip program funding
did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the equipment
procured with these funds was not subject to DOD accountability
regulations that normally apply in the case of these programs. For
traditional security assistance programs, DOD regulations specify
accountability procedures for storing, protecting, transporting, and
registering small arms and other sensitive items transferred to foreign
governments. For example, the Security Assistance Management Manual, which
provides guidance for traditional security assistance programs, states
that the U.S. government's responsibility for equipment intended for
transfer to a foreign government under the Foreign Military Sales program
does not cease until the recipient government's official representative
assumes final control over the items.10 Other regulations referenced by
the Security Assistance Management Manual prescribe minimum standards and
criteria for the physical security of sensitive conventional arms and
require the registration of small arms transferred outside DOD control.11
9See DODI 5000.64, Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment
and Other Accountable Property, E2.2.
10See DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, C7.5. The
Foreign Military Sales program is a traditional security assistance
program under which eligible recipient governments purchase from the U.S.
government defense articles, services, or training. In the latter part of
2006, Iraq signed a foreign military sales agreement with the United
States that allows Iraq to use Iraqi funds to procure U.S. defense goods
and services. Such foreign military sales are subject to specific DOD
accountability regulations.
During our review, DOD officials expressed differing opinions about
whether DOD regulations applied to the train-and-equip program for Iraq.
For example, we heard conflicting views on whether MNF-I must follow the
DOD regulation that requires participants to provide small arms serial
numbers to a DOD-maintained registry.12 Although DOD has not specified
whether this regulation applies, MNSTC-I began to consolidate weapons'
serial numbers in an electronic format in July 2006 and provide them to
the DOD-maintained registry, according to MNSTC-I officials.
Moreover, MNF-I issued two orders13 in 2004 to its subordinate commands
directing steps to account for all equipment distributed to Iraqi security
forces, including military and police. Although these orders are no longer
in effect and have not been replaced,14 they directed coalition forces
responsible for issuing equipment to the Iraqi security forces to record
the serial numbers of all sensitive items such as weapons and radios,
enter relevant information onto a Department of the Army hand receipt, and
obtain signatures from the Iraqi security official receiving the items,
among other tasks. Army regulations state that hand receipts maintain
accountability by documenting the unit or individual that is directly
responsible for a specific item. According to a former MNSTC-I official,
hand receipts are critical to maintaining property accountability.
However, the orders did not require the consolidation of all records for
equipment distributed by the coalition to the Iraqi security forces.
11DOD 5100.76-M, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms,
Ammunition, and Explosives, C1.1.1; DOD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics
Management System, C18.7.4.3; and DOD 4000.25-2-M, Military Standard
Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures, C12.7.4.3.
12DOD 4000.25-2-M, Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting
Procedures, C12.7.4.3; and DOD 4000.25-M Defense Logistics Management
System, C18.7.4.3.
13MNF-I Directive 04-015, OST Supply and Equipment Distribution Guidance
(May 2004): MNC-I FRAGO 155 [12 June 2004 DTU] to MNC-I OPORD 04-01, Iraqi
Security Force Property Accountability Requirements (June 2004). In March
2004, MNF-I's predecessor, the Combined Joint Task Force-7, also issued an
order requiring property accountability procedures for an element of the
Iraqi security forces. CJTF-7 FRAGO 447, ICDC Property Accountability, to
CJTF-7 OPORD 04-01.
14MNF-I officials could not provide us with the exact date that the orders
ceased to be in effect because that information was lost during a computer
failure. However, they did confirm that by November 2005 the orders were
no longer in effect. According to former and current MNSTC-I officials,
these orders covered equipment that MNF-I issued to Iraqi forces that was
provided by a variety of sources, including the United States, Iraq, and
other coalition countries, as well as weapons captured and redistributed
to Iraqi forces since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
According to officials in the MNSTC-I Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,
although these orders were valid when they were issued in 2004, they are
no longer in effect. In addition, these orders have not been replaced with
a comprehensive order or orders that address the equipment distributed to
Iraqi security forces, according to MNSTC-I officials. For forces under
the Ministry of Interior, MNF-I issued two new orders in December 2005 to
address the problem of limited records for equipment distributed to
Ministry of Interior forces.15 Among other guidance, the orders
established accountability procedures for equipment MNC-I and MNSTC-I
distribute to Ministry of Interior forces, such as Iraqi police and
national police. In addition, MNF-I issued other orders related to some
types of equipment. However, according to MNSTC-I officials, MNF-I has not
issued an order or orders that address the accountability of all equipment
distributed by coalition forces to Iraqi military forces under the
Ministry of Defense.
MNF-I Cannot Fully Account for Iraqi Forces' Receipt of Equipment
Two factors led to DOD's lack of full accountability for the equipment
issued to Iraqi security forces (see fig. 2). First, until December 2005,
MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed
to Iraqi security forces. Second, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected
supporting documents that confirm the dates the equipment was received,
the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the
equipment.
15MNF-I FRAGO 05-411, Materiel Accountability System for Minister of
Interior (MOI) Civil Security Forces, (Dec. 21, 2005). MNF-I FRAGO 05-401,
Pacing Item Equipment Accountability Support From MNC-I (Dec. 18, 2005).
Figure 2: Efforts to Account for Equipment Distributed to Iraqi Security Forces
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
First, until December 2005, no centralized set of records for equipment
distributed to Iraqi security forces existed. MNSTC-I did not consistently
collect equipment distribution records as required in the property
accountability orders for several reasons. The lack of a fully operational
network to distribute the equipment, including national and regional level
distribution centers, hampered MNSTC-I�s ability to collect and maintain
appropriate equipment accountability records. According to former
MNSTC-I officials, a fully operational distribution network was not
established until mid-2005, over 1 year after MNF-I began distributing large
quantities of equipment to the Iraqi security forces. In addition, staffing
weaknesses hindered the development of property accountability
procedures, according to former MNSTC-I and other officials. For
example, according to the former MNSTC-I commander, several months
passed after MNSTC-I�s establishment before the command received the
needed number of staff. As a result, MNSTC-I did not have the personnel
necessary to record information on individual items distributed to Iraqi
forces. Further, according to MNSTC-I officials, the need to rapidly equip
Iraqi forces conducting operations in a combat environment limited
MNSTC-I�s ability to fully implement accountability procedures.16
16See GAO-07-308SP for more information on these problems.
Our analysis of MNSTC-I's property book system17 indicates that MNSTC-I
does not have complete records confirming Iraqi forces' receipt of the
equipment, particularly for Iraqi military forces. MNSTC-I established
separate property books for equipment issued to Iraq's security
ministries--the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior--beginning in
late 2005. At that time, they also attempted to recover past records.
MNSTC-I officials acknowledge that the property books did not contain
records for all of the equipment distributed and that existing records
were incomplete or lacked supporting documentation. We identified
discrepancies between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and
MNSTC-I property book records (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Discrepancies of MNSTC-I Reports of Selected Equipment Issued to
Iraqi Security Forces, June 2004 through September 2005
Note: Some equipment was NATO-funded and/or Iraqi funded. However, neither
source specifies the amount and MNSTC-I officials do not know the amount
of the non-U.S.-funded equipment.
17We reviewed MNSTC-I property book records as of January 2007. MNSTC-I
maintains its proerty book records in an electronic spreadsheet format.
Although the former MNSTC-I commander reported that about 185,000 AK-47
rifles, 170,000 pistols, 215,000 items of body armor, and 140,000 helmets
were issued to Iraqi security forces as of September 2005,18 the MNSTC-I
property books contain records for only about 75,000 AK-47 rifles, 90,000
pistols, 80,000 items of body armor, and 25,000 helmets.19 Thus, DOD and
MNF-I cannot fully account for about 110,000 AK-47 rifles, 80,000 pistols,
135,000 items of body armor, and 115,000 helmets reported as issued to
Iraqi forces as of September 22, 2005. Our analysis of the MNSTC-I
property book records found that DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for at
least 190,000 weapons reported as issued to Iraqi forces as of September
22, 2005.
The second factor leading to the lapse in accountability is MNSTC-I's
inability to consistently collect supporting documents that confirm when
the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, and the
Iraqi units receiving the equipment. We requested and received a sample of
documents confirming equipment received by Iraqi units during specific
weeks in February, April, July, and November 2006. Due to the limited
number of these records, we cannot generalize the information across all
of MNSTC-I records. Our preliminary review of this sample found that in
the period prior to June 2006, MNSTC-I provided only a few supporting
documents confirming that Iraqi units had received the equipment. For the
period after June 2006, we found that MNSTC-I possessed more supporting
documents. According to MNSTC-I officials who rotated in country in June
2006, the command began to place greater emphasis on collecting
documentation of Iraqi receipt of equipment. However, MNSTC-I officials
also stated that security constraints make it difficult for them to travel
within Iraq and collect hard copies of all documentation. They depend
instead on warehouse staff to send the receipts via scanner, fax or
computer.
Furthermore, the property books consist of extensive electronic
spreadsheets--the January 2007 property book records for the Ministry of
Defense contained 227 columns and 5,342 rows. Staff identify erroneous
entries through periodic manual checks and report errors to the property
book officer, according to MNSTC-I officials. Although MNSTC-I issued a
draft Standard Operating Procedures handbook to help assigned personnel
input data accurately and produce relevant reports, these procedures
require multiple steps and could lead to the unintentional inclusion of
incorrect data in calculations and reports, making them prone to error.
MNSTC-I officials acknowledged they have identified numerous mistakes due
to incorrect manual entries, which required them to find the original
documentation to reverify the data and correct the entries. MNSTC-I
officials also have acknowledged that the spreadsheet system is an
inefficient management tool given the large size of the program, large
amount of data, and limited number of personnel available to maintain the
system. MNSTC-I plans to move the property book records from a spreadsheet
system to a database management system by summer 2007.
18To assess the reliability of the former MNSTC-I commander's data, we
compared the data to classified information and interviewed former MNSTC-I
officials about their procedures for collecting the data. Although we
could not fully determine the reliability and accuracy of these data, we
determined that they were sufficiently reliable to make broad comparisons
against the MNSTC-I property books.
19These numbers incorporate records MNSTC-I recovered from earlier phases
of the train-and-equip program for Iraq.
Conclusions
Complete and accurate records are an essential component of a property
accountability system for equipment issued to Iraqi security forces.
However, DOD and MNF-I cannot ensure that Iraqi security forces received
the equipment as intended. DOD's and MNF-I's lack of clear and consistent
guidance contributed to partial data collection in the field. Further,
insufficient staffing, the lack of a fully developed network to distribute
the equipment, and inadequate technology have hampered record keeping and
data collection. Given DOD's request for an additional $2 billion to
develop Iraqi security forces, improving accountability procedures can
help ensure that the equipment purchased with these funds reaches the
intended recipients. In addition, adequate accountability procedures can
help MNF-I identify Iraqi forces' legitimate equipment needs, thereby
supporting the effective development of these forces.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that U.S. funded equipment reaches the Iraqi security
forces as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following two actions:
o Determine which DOD accountability procedures apply or should
apply to the program.
o After defining the required accountability procedures, ensure
that sufficient staff, functioning distribution networks, standard
operating procedures, and proper technology are available to meet
the new requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Defense for
review and comment. We received written comments from the DOD that
are reprinted in appendix II.
DOD concurred with both of our recommendations and indicated that
they are currently reviewing policies and procedures for equipment
accountability to ensure that proper accountability is in place
for the Iraqi train-and-equip program. DOD also indicated that it
is important to ensure that proper staffing, financial management,
property distribution, information management and communications
systems are in working order.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others on
request. In addition, this report is available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade
List of Committees
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable John F. Tierney
Chairman
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Relations
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures
that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Multinational Force-Iraq
(MNF-I) may have applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for
Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the
U.S.-funded equipment issued to Iraqi security forces. Our work
focused on the accountability requirements for the transportation
and distribution of U.S.-funded equipment and did not review any
requirements relevant to the procurement of this equipment. We
performed our work from March 2006 through July 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
To examine the laws and regulations that govern property
accountability, we reviewed the relevant legislation that has
appropriated funds to train and equip Iraqi security forces,
pertinent DOD regulations, and applicable U.S. military orders. We
interviewed officials from the Department of State and DOD,
including the office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness; Defense Security and Cooperation
Agency; the Defense Logistics Agency; Tank-automotive and
Armaments Command; and Defense Reconstruction and Support Office.
We also interviewed current and former officials from MNF-I,
including Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I), and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).
We reviewed MNF-I's accountability procedures for the U.S.-funded
equipment it has issued to the Iraqi security forces, and we
reviewed documentation from and interviewed current and former
officials with the U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I
in Baghdad, Iraq; Tampa, Florida; Washington, D.C.; and Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. To provide our analysis on the amount of
equipment reported by MNF-I as issued to the Iraqi security
forces, we interviewed key officials to gain an understanding of
the MNSTC-I property book data and information reported by the
former MNSTC-I commander. To assess the reliability of the former
MNSTC-I commander's data, we compared the data to classified
information and interviewed former MNSTC-I officials about their
procedures for collecting the data. Although we could not fully
determine the reliability and accuracy of these data, we
determined that they were sufficiently reliable to make broad
comparisons against the MNSTC-I property books and to assess major
discrepancies between the two reports. In assessing the documents
supporting the January 2007 MNSTC-I property books, we were
limited by MNSTC-I's inability to scan large amounts of these
supporting paper documents and provide them to us electronically.
We obtained a sample by requesting supporting documents for 1 week
in each of the following months--February, April, July, and
November of 2006 (a month in every quarter)--to develop a
judgmental sample.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Judy A. McCloskey
(Assistant Director), Nanette J. Barton, Lynn Cothern, Martin De
Alteriis, Mattias Fenton, Mary Moutsos, and Jason Pogacnik made
significant contributions to this report. David Bruno, Monica
Brym, and Brent Helt also provided assistance.
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[17]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-711 .
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Highlights of [18]GAO-07-711 , a report to congressional committees
July 2007
STABILIZING IRAQ
DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security
Forces
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop
Iraqi security forces. DOD recently requested an additional $2 billion to
continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I),
are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi
forces.
This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and
MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2)
assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment
issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO
reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current
and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.
[19]What GAO Recommends
To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches Iraqi security forces as
intended, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) determine what
DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program and (2)
after defining these procedures, ensure that sufficient staff, functioning
distribution networks, and proper technology are available to meet the new
requirements.
DOD concurred with both recommendations.
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability
procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq.
Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional
security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility
in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials
stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security
assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally
applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not
currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability
procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces.
DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of
U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability.
First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment
distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I
established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the
Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a
discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the
former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials
stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a
fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since
the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected
supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the
quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items.
Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the
supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property
books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records.
Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets,
which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data
and limited personnel to maintain the system.
Efforts to Account for Equipment Distributed to the Iraqi Security Forces
References
Visible links
11. http://www.gao.gov/
12. http://www.gao.gov/
13. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
14. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07711.htm#mailto:[email protected]
15. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07711.htm#mailto:[email protected]
16. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07711.htm#mailto:[email protected]
17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-711
18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-711
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