Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector
Councils Continue to Evolve (10-JUL-07, GAO-07-706R).
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, damaging
critical infrastructure, such as oil platforms, pipelines, and
refineries; water mains; electric power lines; and cellular phone
towers. The infrastructure damage and resulting chaos disrupted
government and business functions alike, producing cascading
effects far beyond the physical location of the storm. Our
nation's critical infrastructures and key resources--including
those cyber and physical assets essential to national security,
national economic security, and national public health and
safety--continue to be vulnerable to a wide variety of threats.
Because the private sector owns approximately 85 percent of the
nation's critical infrastructure and key resources--banking and
financial institutions, telecommunications networks, and energy
production and transmission facilities, among others--it is vital
that the public and private sectors form effective partnerships
to successfully protect these assets. The Homeland Security Act
of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), giving
the department wide-ranging responsibilities for leading and
coordinating the overall national critical infrastructure
protection effort. The act required DHS to (1) develop a
comprehensive national plan for securing the nation's critical
infrastructures and key resources and (2) recommend measures to
protect critical infrastructure and key resources. Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) further defined
critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS and
those federal agencies--known as sector-specific
agencies--responsible for particular industry sectors, such as
transportation, energy, and communications. Under HSPD-7, DHS is
to establish uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and
methodologies to help ensure that critical infrastructure within
and across the 17 infrastructure sectors is protected. In
response, DHS developed the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP). Issued in June 2006, the NIPP is a base plan that is
to serve as a road map for how DHS and other relevant
stakeholders, such as owners and operators of key critical
infrastructure, should use risk management principles to
prioritize protection activities within and across sectors in an
integrated, coordinated fashion. The NIPP also requires that
sector-specific agencies develop annual reports that discuss the
sectors' status in implementing the plans. To protect critical
infrastructure, the NIPP describes a partnership model as the
primary means of coordinating government and private efforts.
This report discusses (1) the extent to which the sector-specific
plans meet NIPP and DHS requirements, (2) the government and
sector coordinating council members' views on the value of the
plans and DHS's review process, and (3) the key success factors
and challenges that sector representatives reported they
encountered in establishing and maintaining their councils.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-706R
ACCNO: A72346
TITLE: Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and
Sector Councils Continue to Evolve
DATE: 07/10/2007
SUBJECT: Critical infrastructure
Critical infrastructure protection
Homeland security
Local governments
Reporting requirements
Risk assessment
Risk management
Strategic planning
Policy evaluation
Program coordination
National Infrastructure Protection Plan
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GAO-07-706R
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Most Sector Plans We Reviewed Met NIPP and DHS Sector-Specif
* [4]Council Representatives Disagreed on the Value of the Plans
* [5]Long-standing Relationships Continue to Facilitate Councils,
* [6]Concluding Observations
* [7]Enclosure I: Criteria Used to Determine Completeness of Sect
* [8]Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [9](440592)
July 10, 2007
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
Subject: Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector
Councils Continue to Evolve
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, damaging critical
infrastructure, such as oil platforms, pipelines, and refineries; water
mains; electric power lines; and cellular phone towers. The infrastructure
damage and resulting chaos disrupted government and business functions
alike, producing cascading effects far beyond the physical location of the
storm. In 2004, authorities thwarted a terrorist plot to target financial
institutions in New York. In 2005, suicide bombers struck London's public
transportation system, disrupting the city's transportation and mobile
telecommunications infrastructure. Our nation's critical infrastructures
and key resources--including those cyber and physical assets essential to
national security, national economic security, and national public health
and safety--continue to be vulnerable to a wide variety of threats.
Because the private sector owns approximately 85 percent of the nation's
critical infrastructure and key resources--banking and financial
institutions, telecommunications networks, and energy production and
transmission facilities, among others--it is vital that the public and
private sectors form effective partnerships to successfully protect these
assets.1
1"Critical infrastructure" are systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security,
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters. Key resources are publicly or privately
controlled resources essential to minimal operations of the economy or
government, including individual targets whose destruction would not
endanger vital systems but could create a local disaster or profoundly
damage the nation's morale or confidence. For purposes of this report, we
will use the term "critical infrastructure" to also include key resources.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a key player in these
partnerships. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS, giving the
department wide-ranging responsibilities for leading and coordinating the
overall national critical infrastructure protection effort.2 The act
required DHS to (1) develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the
nation's critical infrastructures and key resources and (2) recommend
measures to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) further defined critical
infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS and those federal
agencies--known as sector-specific agencies--responsible for particular
industry sectors, such as transportation, energy, and communications.
Under HSPD-7, DHS is to establish uniform policies, approaches,
guidelines, and methodologies to help ensure that critical infrastructure
within and across the 17 infrastructure sectors is protected.3 The
directive further promotes the use of a risk management approach to
coordinate protection efforts. This approach includes using risk
assessments to set priorities for protective measures by the department;
sector-specific agencies; tribal, state, and local government agencies and
authorities with critical assets and resources in their jurisdiction;
owners and operators of these assets; and other entities.
In addition, HSPD-7 required DHS to develop a comprehensive and integrated
plan for securing the nation's critical infrastructures that outlines
national protection goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives
necessary to fulfilling these responsibilities. In response, DHS developed
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Issued in June 2006,
the NIPP is a base plan that is to serve as a road map for how DHS and
other relevant stakeholders, such as owners and operators of key critical
infrastructure, should use risk management principles to prioritize
protection activities within and across sectors in an integrated,
coordinated fashion. In particular, the NIPP--along with more detailed
guidance issued by DHS--required the individual sector-specific agencies,
working with relevant government and private representatives, to submit
sector-specific plans to DHS by the end of December 2006. The plans, which
were released on May 21, 2007, were to establish the means by which the
sectors will identify their critical assets, assess risks of terrorist
attacks or other hazards on to these assets, assess and prioritize those
assets which have national significance, and develop protective measures
for the sectors. The NIPP also requires that sector-specific agencies
develop annual reports that discuss the sectors' status in implementing
the plans. According to the NIPP, DHS is to use these individual plans and
reports to develop an annual cross-sector report, due each September, that
evaluates whether gaps exist in the protection plans and actions to be
taken to protect critical infrastructures on a national level. If gaps
exist, DHS is to work with the sectors to address them.
To protect critical infrastructure, the NIPP describes a partnership model
as the primary means of coordinating government and private efforts. For
each of the 17 sectors, the model requires formation a government
coordinating council--composed of representatives of federal, state,
local, or tribal agencies with purview over critical assets. The model
encourages voluntary formation of a sector coordinating council--composed
of representative owner-operators of critical assets (some of which may be
state or local agencies) or representatives from private sector trade
associations. There are 32 coordinating councils, 17 government and 15
private sector.4 These councils create the structure through which
respective groups from all levels of government and the private sector are
to collaborate in developing the sector-specific plans and implementing
efforts to protect critical infrastructure. The sector coordinating
councils are envisioned as a primary point of contact for government to
plan the entire range of infrastructure protection activities unique to
the sector. In addition, the NIPP also identified cross-sector councils
that are to promote coordination, communications, and the sharing of key
practices across the sectors.
2See Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
3These infrastructure sectors include agriculture and food; banking and
finance; chemical; commercial facilities; commercial nuclear reactors,
materials, and waste; communications; dams; defense industrial base;
drinking water and water treatment systems; emergency services; energy;
government facilities; information technology; national monuments and
icons; postal and shipping; public health and health care; and
transportation systems.
This report discusses (1) the extent to which the sector-specific plans
meet NIPP and DHS requirements, (2) the government and sector coordinating
council members' views on the value of the plans and DHS's review process,
and (3) the key success factors and challenges that sector representatives
reported they encountered in establishing and maintaining their councils.
To address these objectives, we reviewed the NIPP as well as the
sector-specific plan guidance to ascertain the elements required in the
plans. We obtained and reviewed 9 of the 17 draft plans against the
criteria in the NIPP and plan guidance.5 For more detail on the criteria
we used, see enclosure I. We conducted structured interviews with
representatives of the 17 government coordinating councils and the 15
sector coordinating councils to obtain views on the value of the plans and
the review process as well as the key success factors and challenges the
sectors reported that they had encountered in establishing and maintaining
their councils. These interviews were conducted with lead sector-specific
agency representatives for the 17 sectors: the departments of Agriculture,
Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, 6 the
Interior, and the Treasury and the Environmental Protection Agency, as
well as with the chairs, co-chairs, or steering committee members of the
15 sector coordinating councils. We also followed up with DHS officials to
determine the status of our outstanding recommendations on the Protected
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program. We conducted our work
from February to June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
Although the nine sector-specific plans we reviewed generally met NIPP
requirements and DHS's sector-specific plan guidance, eight plans did not
address incentives the sectors would use to encourage owners to conduct
risk assessments and some plans were more comprehensive than others when
discussing their physical, human, and cyber assets, systems, and
functions. Most of the plans included the required elements of the NIPP
risk management framework, such as security goals; and the methods the
sectors expect to use to prioritize infrastructure as well as to develop
and implement protective programs and assess threats, risks, and
vulnerabilities.7 However, some plans were more developed and
comprehensive, depending on the maturity of the sector and on how the
sector defines its assets and functions. While all of the plans described
the threat analyses that the sector conducts, eight of the plans did not
describe any incentives the sector would use to encourage owners to
conduct voluntary risk assessments, as required by the NIPP. These
incentives are important because a number of the industries in the sectors
are privately owned and not regulated, and the government must rely on
voluntary compliance with the NIPP. DHS officials said that the variance
in the plans can primarily be attributed to the levels of maturity and
cultures of the sectors, with the more mature sectors--sectors with
preexisting relationships and a history of working together--generally
having more comprehensive and complete plans than more newly established
sectors without similar prior relationships. The plans also varied in how
comprehensively they addressed not only their physical assets, systems,
and functions,8 but also their human and cyber assets, systems, and
functions, a requirement in the NIPP, because the sectors reported that
they had differing views on the extent to which they were dependent on
each of these assets. A comprehensive identification of all three
categories of assets is important, according to DHS sector-specific plan
guidance, because such an asset analysis provides the foundation on which
to conduct risk analyses and identify the appropriate mix of protective
programs and actions that will most effectively reduce the risk to the
nation's infrastructure. Yet, only one of the plans--drinking water and
water treatment systems--included all three categories of assets. For
example, because the communications sector limited its definition of
assets to networks, systems, and functions, it did not, as required by DHS
plan guidance, discuss how human assets fit into existing security
projects or are relevant to fill the gaps to meet the sector's security
goals. DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection officials acknowledged
the differences in how comprehensive the plans are, but said that these
initial plans are only a first step and that they will work with the
sectors to address differences in future updates. Given the disparity in
the plans, however, it is unclear the extent to which DHS will be able to
use them at this point to identify security gaps and critical
interdependencies across the sectors in order to plan future protective
measures. From reviewing these plans, it is also unclear how far along
each sector actually is in identifying assets, setting priorities, and
developing activities to protect key assets. DHS officials said that to
determine this, they will need to review the sectors' annual progress
reports, due in this month, that are to provide additional implementation
information.
4The government facilities and the national monuments and icons sectors do
not have sector councils because they do not have private sector
counterparts.
5We selected the nine plans to obtain a range of plans based on sector
characteristics, such as the maturity--sectors with pre-existing
relationships and a history of working together--and diversity of the
sector. The plans we reviewed were banking and finance, communications,
defense industrial base, energy, public health and healthcare, information
technology (IT), national monuments and icons, transportation systems, and
drinking water and water treatment systems. According to DHS officials,
differences between these draft plans and the final plans issued on May
21, 2007, were insignificant.
6DHS is the sector-specific agency for 10 sectors: information technology;
communications; transportation systems; chemical; emergency services;
commercial nuclear reactors, material, and waste; postal and shipping;
dams; government facilities; and commercial facilities.
7See enclosure I for the required elements on which we reviewed the plans.
Representatives of the government and sector coordinating councils had
differing views regarding the value of sector-specific plans and DHS's
review of those plans. While 10 of the 32 council representatives we
interviewed reported that they saw the plans as useful for the sector,
representatives of eight councils disagreed because they believed the
plans either did not represent a partnership among the necessary key
stakeholders, especially the private sector, or were not valuable because
the sector had already done so much work on its own and had progressed
beyond the plan. For example, the government facilities council
representative said that the plan was useful because relationships across
the sector were established during its development that have resulted in
enhanced coordination of previously disjointed security efforts. DHS's
Office of Infrastructure Protection officials agreed that the main benefit
of the plans was that the process of developing them helped the sectors
establish relationships between the private sector and the government and
among private sector stakeholders. In contrast, the representative from
the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector's coordinating council
said that because the sector's security has been robust for a long time,
the plan only casts the security of the sector in a different light. Also,
the drinking water and water treatment sector representative said that the
plan did not provide added value for the sector because the sector already
has a 30-year history of protection. DHS's Office of Infrastructure
Protection officials acknowledged that these sectors have a long history
of relationships with the federal government and in some cases have been
doing similar planning efforts and said that while the NIPP planning
process may not have been as valuable to these sectors, it was valuable to
DHS to have plans for all critical infrastructure sectors. Representatives
of 11 of 32 councils felt that the review process was too lengthy and said
that they had turned in their plans in advance of the December 31, 2006,
deadline established by the NIPP, but had to wait more than 5 months for
the plans to be approved. DHS Infrastructure Protection officials agreed
that the review process had been lengthy and that time periods allowed for
the sectors to respond to comments were too short. The officials said this
occurred because of the volume of work DHS had to undertake and because
some of the sector specific agencies did not communicate well with the
sectors since they were still learning to operate effectively with the
private sector, treating it as an equal partner under the NIPP model. The
officials said that they plan to refine the process as the sector-
specific agencies gain more experience working with the private sector.
Conversely, representatives from eight of 32 councils said the review
process for the plans worked well, despite the time it took, and five
council representatives were complimentary of the support they received
from DHS. The remaining council representatives did not offer views on
these issues.
8In the context of the NIPP, a "system" is a collection of assets,
resources, or elements that perform a process that provides infrastructure
services to the nation. A "function" is defined as the service, process,
capability, or operation performed by specific infrastructure assets,
systems, or networks.
As we reported last year,9 long-standing relationships were frequently
cited as most helpful in establishing councils. Council representatives
for 9 of the 32 councils continued to cite preexisting relationships as
helping them in establishing and maintaining their sector councils, and
two sectors noted that going through the process of establishing the
councils had, in turn, improved relationships, while seven said achieving
the necessary participation in the council is a continuing challenge. For
example, the dams, energy, and banking and finance sectors, among others,
said that existing relationships continue to help in maintaining their
councils. On the other hand, seven sector council representatives reported
difficulty in achieving and maintaining sector council membership, thus
limiting the ability of the councils to effectively represent the sector.
For example, the public health and health care sector representative said
that getting sector members to participate is a challenge and noted that
because of this, the first step in implementing the sector-specific plan
is to increase awareness about the council. In addition, 11 of the 32
council representatives reported continuing difficulties with sharing
information between the public and private sectors as a challenge.
Furthermore, 6 of the 32 council representatives expressed concerns about
the viability of the information system--the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN)--DHS intends to rely on to share information with the
sectors about critical infrastructure issues, as well as the effectiveness
of the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program--a
program that established procedures for the receipt, care, and storage of
information submitted to DHS. Although encouraging the sectors to use
HSIN, DHS's Infrastructure Protection officials said the system does not
provide the capabilities that were promised, including providing the level
of security expected by some sectors. Relatedly, in April 2007, we
reported that the HSIN system was built without appropriate coordination
with other information-sharing initiatives.10 Additionally, as we have
reported,11 potential submitters under the PCII program continue to fear
that the information, such as information on security vulnerabilities,
could be inadequately protected, used for future legal or regulatory
action, or inadvertently released. We previously recommended that, among
other things, DHS better (1) define its critical infrastructure
information needs and (2) explain how this information will be used to
attract more users. DHS concurred with our recommendations. In September
2006, DHS issued a final rule that established procedures governing the
receipt, validation, handling, storage, marking, and use of
critical-infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to DHS. DHS is
in the process of implementing our additional recommendations.
9GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government
and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors' Characteristics, GAO-07-39
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16, 2006).
10GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support
Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local
Information-Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16,
2007).
11GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More
Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure
Information, GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2006).
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that it could not
provide formal agency comments in the time allowed. However, DHS provided
technical comments that have been incorporated, as appropriate.
Background
DHS serves as the sector-specific agency for 10 of the sectors:
information technology; communications; transportation systems; chemical;
emergency services; nuclear reactors, material, and waste; postal and
shipping; dams; government facilities; and commercial facilities. Other
sector-specific agencies are the departments of Agriculture, Defense,
Energy, Health and Human Services, the Interior, the Treasury, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. (See table 1 for a list of
sector-specific agencies and a brief description of each sector).
Table 1: Designated Sector-Specific Agencies and Critical-Infrastructure
Sectors
Sector-specific
agency Sector Description
Departments of Agriculture and Provides for the fundamental need
Agriculture,a and food for food. The infrastructure
Health and Human includes supply chains for feed
Services, Food and and crop production. Carries out
Drug Administrationb the postharvesting of the food
supply, including processing and
retail sales.
Department of Defense Defense Supplies the military with the
industrial base means to protect the nation by
producing weapons, aircraft, and
ships and providing essential
services, including information
technology and supply and
maintenance.
Department of Energy Energy Provides the electric power used
by all sectors and the refining,
storage, and distribution of oil
and gas. The sector is divided
into electricity and oil and
natural gas.
Department of Health Public health and Mitigates the risk of disasters
and Human Services health care and attacks and also provides
recovery assistance if an attack
occurs. The sector consists of
health departments, clinics, and
hospitals.
Department of the National Memorializes or represents
Interior monuments and monuments, physical structures,
icons objects, or geographical sites
that are widely recognized to
represent the nation's heritage,
traditions, or values, or widely
recognized to represent important
national cultural, religious,
historical, or political
significance.
Department of the Banking and Provides the financial
Treasury finance infrastructure of the nation.
This sector consists of
commercial banks, insurance
companies, mutual funds,
government-sponsored enterprises,
pension funds, and other
financial institutions that carry
out transactions.
Environmental Drinking water Provides sources of safe drinking
Protection Agency and water water from more than 53,000
treatment systems community water systems and
properly treated wastewater from
more than 16,000 publicly owned
treatment works.
Department of Homeland Security:
Office of Chemical Transforms natural raw materials
Infrastructure into commonly used products
Protection benefiting society's health,
safety, and productivity. The
chemical sector produces more
than 70,000 products that are
essential to automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, food supply,
electronics, water treatment,
health, construction, and other
necessities.
Commercial Includes prominent commercial
facilities centers, office buildings, sports
stadiums, theme parks, and other
sites where large numbers of
people congregate to pursue
business activities, conduct
personal commercial transactions,
or enjoy recreational pastimes.
Dams Manages water retention
structures, including levees, more
than 77,000 conventional dams,
navigation locks, canals
(excluding channels), and similar
structures, including larger and
nationally symbolic dams that are
major components of other critical
infrastructures that provide
electricity and water.
Emergency Saves lives and property from
services accidents and disaster. This
sector includes fire, rescue,
emergency medical services, and
law enforcement organizations.
Nuclear reactors, Provides nuclear power, which
materials, and accounts for approximately 20
waste percent of the nation's electrical
generating capacity. The sector
includes commercial nuclear
reactors and non-power nuclear
reactors used for research,
testing, and training; nuclear
materials used in medical,
industrial, and academic settings;
nuclear fuel fabrication
facilities; the decommissioning of
reactors; and the transportation,
storage, and disposal of nuclear
materials and waste.
Office of Cyber Information Produces information technology
Security and technology and includes hardware
Communications manufacturers, software
developers, and service
providers, as well as the
Internet as a key resource.
Communications Provides wired, wireless, and
satellite communications to meet
the needs of businesses and
governments.
Transportation Postal and Delivers private and commercial
Security shipping letters, packages, and bulk
Administration assets. The U.S. Postal Service
and other carriers provide the
services of this sector.
Transportation Transportation Enables movement of people and
Security systems assets that are vital to our
Administration and economy, mobility, and security
U.S. Coast Guard with the use of aviation, ships,
rail, pipelines, highways,
trucks, buses, and mass transit.
Immigration and Government Ensures continuity of functions
Customs Enforcement, facilities for facilities owned and leased
Federal Protective by the government, including all
Service federal, state, territorial,
local, and tribal government
facilities located in the United
States and abroad.
Source: NIPP, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and the National
Strategy for Homeland Security.
aThe Department of Agriculture is responsible for food (including meat,
poultry, and eggs) and agriculture.
bThe Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug
Administration, is responsible for food and other than meat, poultry, and
egg products.
Most Sector Plans We Reviewed Met NIPP and DHS Sector-Specific Plan Guidance,
but Varied Depending on Their Maturity and How They Define Their Assets
The nine sector-specific plans we reviewed generally met NIPP requirements
and DHS's sector-specific plan guidance, however, the extent to which the
plans met this guidance, and therefore their usefulness in enabling DHS to
identify gaps and interdependencies across the sectors, varied depending
on the maturity of the sector and on how the sector defines its assets,
systems, and functions. As required by the NIPP risk management framework
(see fig. 1), sector-specific plans are to promote the protection of
physical, cyber, and human assets by focusing activities on efforts to (1)
set security goals; (2) identify assets, systems, networks, and functions;
(3) assess risk based on consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats; 12
(4) establish priorities based on risk assessments; (5) implement
protective programs; and (6) measure effectiveness.
Figure 1: NIPP Risk Management Framework
In addition to these NIPP risk management plan elements outlined above and
according to DHS's sector-specific plan guidance, the plans are also to
address the sectors' efforts to (1) implement a research and development
program for critical infrastructure protection and (2) establish a
structure for managing and coordinating the responsibilities of the
federal departments and agencies--otherwise known as sector-specific
agencies--identified in HSPD-7 as responsible for critical infrastructure
protection activities specified for the 17 sectors.13 Most of the plans
included the required elements of the NIPP risk management framework, such
as security goals and the methods the sectors expect to use to prioritize
infrastructure, as well as to develop and implement protective programs.
However, the plans varied in the extent to which they included key
information required for each plan element. For example, all of the plans
described the threat analyses that the sectors conduct, but only one of
the plans described any incentives used to encourage voluntary risk
assessments, as required by the NIPP. Such incentives are important
because a number of the industries in the sectors are privately owned and
not regulated, and the government must rely on voluntary compliance with
the NIPP. Additionally, although the NIPP called for each sector to
identify key protective programs, three of the nine plans did not address
this requirement. DHS officials told us that this variance in the plans
can, in large part, be attributed to the levels of maturity and culture of
the sectors, with the more mature sectors generally having more
comprehensive and complete plans than sectors without similar prior
working relationships. For example, plans for the banking and finance and
energy sector included most of the key information required for each plan
element. According to DHS officials, this is a result of these sectors'
having a history and culture of working with the government to plan and
accomplish many of the same activities that are being required for the
sector-specific plans. Therefore, these sectors were able to create plans
that were more comprehensive and developed than those of less mature
sectors, such as the public health and health care and agriculture and
food sectors.
12According to the NIPP, a "consequence" is the result of a terrorist
attack or hazard that reflects the level, duration, and nature of the loss
resulting from the incident. A "vulnerability" is a weakness in the
design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or network that
can be exploited by an adversary or disrupted by a natural hazard or
technological failure. A "threat" is the intention and capability of an
adversary to undertake actions that would be detrimental to critical
infrastructure and key resources.
The plans also varied in how comprehensively they addressed their
physical, human, and cyber assets, systems, and functions because sectors
reported having differing views on the extent to which they were dependent
on each of these assets, systems, and functions. According to DHS's
sector-specific plan guidance, a comprehensive identification of such
assets is important because it provides the foundation on which to conduct
risk analysis and identify the appropriate mix of protective programs and
actions that will most effectively reduce the risk to the nation's
infrastructure. Yet, only one of the plans--drinking water and water
treatment--specifically included all three categories of assets. For
example, because the communications sector limited its definition of
assets to networks, systems, and functions, it did not, as required by
DHS's plan guidance, include human assets in its existing security
projects and the gaps it needs to fill related to these assets to support
the sector's goals. In addition, the national monuments and icons plan
defined the sector as consisting of physical structures with minimal cyber
and telecommunications assets because these assets are not sufficiently
critical that damaging or destroying them would interfere with the
continued operation of the physical assets. In contrast, the energy sector
placed a greater emphasis on cyber attributes because it heavily depends
on these cyber assets to monitor and control its energy systems. DHS
officials also attributed the difference in the extent to which the plans
addressed required elements to the manner in which the sectors define
their assets and functions.
The plans, according to DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection
officials, are a first step in developing future protective measures. In
addition, these officials said that the plans should not be considered to
be reports of actual implementation of such measures. Given the disparity
in the plans, it is unclear the extent to which DHS will be able to use
them to identify gaps and interdependencies across the sectors in order to
plan future protective measures. It is also unclear, from reviewing the
plans, how far along each sector actually is in identifying assets,
setting priorities, and protecting key assets. DHS officials said that to
make this determination, they will need to review the sectors' annual
progress reports, due this month, that are to provide additional
information on plan implementation as well as identify sector priorities.
13See enclosure I for a full list of the requirements on which we
evaluated the plans.
Council Representatives Disagreed on the Value of the Plans and the Review
Process
Representatives of 10 of 32 councils said the plans were valuable because
they gave their sectors a common language and framework to bring the
disparate members of the sector together to better collaborate as they
move forward with protection efforts. For example, the government
facilities council representative said that the plan was useful because
relationships across the sector were established during its development
that have resulted in bringing previously disjointed security efforts
together in a coordinated way. The banking and finance sector's
coordinating council representative said that the plan was a helpful way
of documenting the history, the present state, and the future of the
sector in a way that had not been done before and that the plan will be a
working document to guide the sector in coordinating efforts. Similarly,
an energy sector representative said that the plan provides a common
format so that all participants can speak a common language, thus enabling
them to better collaborate on the overall security of the sector. The
representative also said that the plan brought the issue of
interdependencies between the energy sector and other sectors to light and
provided a forum for the various sectors to collaborate. Officials from
DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection agreed that the main benefit of
these plans was that the process of developing them helped the sectors to
establish relationships between the private sector and the government and
among private sector stakeholders that are key to the success of
protection efforts.
However, representatives of 8 of the 32 councils said the plans were not
useful to their sectors because (1) the plans did not represent a true
partnership between the federal and private sectors or were not meaningful
to all the industries represented by the sector or (2) the sector had
already taken significant protection actions, thus, developing the plan
did not add value. The remaining council representatives did not offer
views on this issue. Sector representatives for three transportation
modes--rail, maritime, and aviation--reported that their sector's plan was
written by the government and that the private sector did not participate
fully in the development of the plan or the review process. As a result,
the representatives did not believe that the plan was of value to the
transportation sector as a whole because it does not represent the
interests of the private sector. Similarly, agriculture and food
representatives said writing the plan proved to be difficult because of
the sector's diversity and size--more than 2,000,000 farms, one million
restaurants, and 150,000 meat processing plants. They said that one of the
sector's biggest challenges was developing a meaningful document that
could be used by all of the industries represented. As a result of these
challenges, the sector submitted two plans in December 2006 that
represented a best effort at the time, but the sector council said it
intends to use the remainder of the 2007 calendar year to create a single
plan that better represents the sector. In contrast, the coordinating
councils representative for the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste
sector said that because the sector's security has been robust for a long
time, the plan only casts the security of the sector in a different light,
and the drinking water and water treatment systems sector said that the
plan is a "snapshot in time" document for a sector that already has a
30-year history of protection, and thus the plan did not provide added
value for the sector. The Officials at DHS's Office of Infrastructure
Protection acknowledged that these sectors have a long history of working
together and in some cases have been doing similar planning efforts.
However, the officials said that the effort was of value to the government
because it now has plans for all 17 sectors and it can begin to use the
plans to address the NIPP risk management framework.
Representatives of 11 of 32 councils said the review process associated
with the plans was lengthy. They commented that they had submitted their
plans in advance of the December 31, 2006, deadline, but had to wait 5
months for the plan to be approved. Eight of them also commented that
while they were required to respond within several days to comments from
DHS on the draft plans, they had to wait relatively much longer during the
continuing review process for the next iteration of the draft. For
example, a drinking water and water treatment sector representative said
that the time the sector had to incorporate DHS's comments into a draft of
the plan was too short--a few days--and this led the sector to question
whether its members were valued partners to DHS. DHS Infrastructure
Protection officials agreed that the review process had been lengthy and
that the comment periods given to sector officials were too short. DHS
officials said this occurred because of the volume of work DHS had to
undertake and because some of the sector-specific agencies were still
learning to operate effectively with the private sector under a
partnership model in which the private sector is an equal partner. The
officials said that they plan to refine the process as the sector-specific
agencies gain more experience working with the private sector.
Conversely, representatives from eight of 32 councils said the review
process for the plans worked well, and five of these council
representatives were complimentary of the support they received from DHS.
The remaining council representatives did not offer views on this topic.
For example, an information technology (IT) sector coordinating council
representative said that the review and feedback process on their plan
worked well and that the Office of Infrastructure Protection has helped
tremendously in bringing the plans to fruition. However, sector
coordinating council representatives for six sectors also voiced concern
that the trusted relationships established between the sectors and DHS
might not continue if there were additional turnover in DHS, as has
occurred in the past. For example, the representative of one council said
they had established productive working relationships with officials in
the Offices of Infrastructure Protection and Cyber Security and
Communications, but were concerned that these relationships were dependent
on the individuals in these positions and that the relationships may not
continue without the same individuals in charge at DHS. As we have
reported in the past, developing trusted partnerships between the federal
government and the private sector is critical to ensure the protection of
critical infrastructure.14
Long-standing Relationships Continue to Facilitate Councils, but Some Council
Representatives Reported Information-Sharing Challenges
Nine of 32 sector representatives said that their preexisting
relationships with stakeholders helped in establishing and maintaining
their sector councils, and two noted that establishing the councils had
improved relationships. Such participation is critical to well-functioning
councils. For example, representatives from the dams, energy, and banking
and finance sector, among others, said that existing relationships
continue to help in maintaining their councils. In addition, the defense
industrial base representatives said the organizational infrastructure
provided by the sector councils is valuable because it allows for
collaboration. The representatives from the national monuments and icons
sector said that establishing the government sector council has
facilitated communication within the sector. We also reported previously
that long-standing relationships were a facilitating factor in council
formation and that 10 sectors had formed either a government council or
sector council that addressed critical infrastructure protection issues
prior to DHS's development of the NIPP.15 As a result, these 10 sectors
were more easily able to establish government coordinating councils and
sector coordinating councils under the NIPP model. Several councils also
noted that the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
(CIPAC), created by DHS in March 2006 to facilitate communication and
information sharing between the government and the private sector, has
helped facilitate collaboration because it allows the government and
industry to interact without being open to public scrutiny under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.16 This is important because previously,
meetings between the private sector and the government had to be open to
the public, hampering the private sector's willingness to share
information.
14GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing
with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-780 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004)
and Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical
Infrastructure Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
Conversely, seven sector council representatives reported difficulty in
achieving and maintaining sector council membership, thus limiting the
ability of the councils to effectively represent the sector. For example,
the public health and health care sector representative said that getting
the numerous sector members to participate is a challenge, and the
government representative noted that because of this, the first step in
implementing the sector-specific plan is to increase awareness about the
effort among sector members to encourage participation. Similarly, due to
the size of the commercial facilities sector, participation, while
critical, varies among its industries, according to the government council
representative. Meanwhile, the banking and finance sector representatives
said that the time commitment for private sector members and council
leaders makes participation difficult for smaller stakeholders, but
getting them involved is critical to an effective partnership. Likewise,
the IT sector representatives said engaging some government members in
joint council meetings is a continuing challenge because of the members'
competing responsibilities. Without such involvement, officials said, it
is difficult to convince the private sector representatives of the value
of spending their time participating on the council.
Additionally, obtaining state and local government participation in
government sector councils remains a challenge for five sectors. Achieving
such participation is critical because these officials are often the first
responders in case of an incident. Several government council
representatives said that a lack of funding for representatives from these
entities to travel to key meetings has limited state and local government
participation. Others stated that determining which officials to include
was a challenge because of the sheer volume of state and local
stakeholders. DHS Infrastructure Protection officials said that the agency
is trying to address this issue by providing funding for state and local
participation in quarterly sector council meetings and has created a
State, Local and Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council
(SLTTGCC)--composed of state, local, tribal, and territorial homeland
security advisers--that serves as a forum for coordination across these
jurisdictions on protection guidance, strategies, and programs.
Eleven of the 32 council representatives reported continuing challenges
with sharing information between the federal government and the private
sector. For example, six council representatives expressed concerns about
the viability of two of DHS's main information-sharing tools--the Homeland
Security Information Network (HSIN) or the Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) program. We reported in April 2007 that
the HSIN system was built without appropriate coordination with other
information-sharing initiatives.17 In addition, in a strategic review of
HSIN, DHS reported in April 2007 that it has not clearly defined the
purpose and scope of HSIN and that HSIN has been developed without
sufficient planning and program management. According to DHS
Infrastructure Protection officials, although they encouraged the sectors
to use HSIN, the system does not provide the capabilities that were
promised, including providing the level of security expected by some
sectors. As a result, they said the Office of Infrastructure Protection is
exploring an alternative that would better meet the needs of the sectors.
In addition, three council representatives expressed concerns about
whether information shared under the PCII program would be protected.
Although this program was specifically designed to establish procedures
for the receipt, care, and storage of critical infrastructure information
submitted voluntarily to the government, representatives said potential
submitters continue to fear that the information could be inadequately
protected, used for future legal or regulatory action, or inadvertently
released.
15See GAO-07-39.
16The Federal Advisory Committee Act (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2) was
enacted, in part, to control the advisory committee process and to open to
public scrutiny the manner in which government agencies obtain advice from
private individuals and groups. See 648 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-59 (D.D.C.
1986). Section 871 of the Homeland Security Act authorized a process under
which the Secretary could exempt an advisory committee from the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, S 871, 116 Stat. 2135,
2243.
In April 2006, we reported that DHS faced challenges implementing the
program, including being able to assure the private sector that submitted
information will be protected and specifying who will be authorized to
have access to the information, as well as to demonstrate to the critical
infrastructure owners the benefits of sharing the information to encourage
program participation.18 We recommended, among other things, that DHS
better (1) define its critical-infrastructure information needs and (2)
explain how this information will be used to attract more users. DHS
concurred with our recommendations. In September 2006 DHS issued a final
rule that established procedures governing the receipt, validation,
handling, storage, marking, and use of critical infrastructure information
voluntarily submitted to DHS. DHS is in the process of implementing our
additional recommendations.
Agency Comments
In commenting on a draft of this statement, DHS said that it could not
provide formal agency comments in the time allowed. However, DHS provided
technical comments that have been incorporated, as appropriate.
Concluding Observations
To date, DHS has issued a national plan aimed at providing a consistent
approach to critical infrastructure protection, ensured that all 17
sectors have organized to collaborate on protection efforts, and worked
with government and private sector partners to complete all 17
sector-specific plans. Nevertheless, our work has shown that sectors vary
in terms of how complete and comprehensive their plans are. Furthermore,
DHS recognizes that the sectors, their councils, and their plans must
continue to evolve. As they do, and as the plans are updated and annual
implementation reports are provided that begin to show the level of
protection achieved, it will be important that the plans and reports add
value, both to the sectors themselves and to the government as a whole.
This is critical because DHS is dependent on these plans and reports to
meet its mandate to evaluate whether gaps exist in the protection of the
nation's most critical infrastructure and key resources and, if gaps
exist, to work with the sectors to address them. Likewise, DHS must depend
on the private sector to voluntarily put protective measures in place for
many assets. It will also be important that sector councils have
representative members and that the sector-specific agencies have buy-in
from these members on protection plans and implementation steps. One step
DHS could take to implement our past recommendations to strengthen the
sharing of information is for the PCII program to better define its
critical infrastructure information needs and better explain how this
information will be used to build the private sector's trust and attract
more users. As we have previously reported, such sharing of information
and building of trusted relationships are crucial to the protection of the
nation's critical infrastructure.
17See GAO-07-455.
18See GAO-06-383.
We are sending copies of this report to selected congressional committees
with responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection issues; the
Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services,
Homeland Security, the Interior, and the Treasury; and the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency. We are also making copies
available to others upon request. This report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at [10]http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
Eileen R. Larence at (202) 512-8777 or at [11][email protected] . Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in enclosure II.
Eileen R. Larence
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Enclosures
Enclosure I: Criteria Used to Determine Completeness of Sector Specific Plans
We assessed the sector specific plans (SSPs) using 8 criteria, consisting
of 40 key information requirements. We extracted this information from the
requirements included in the NIPP as well as on the detailed
sector-specific plan guidance issued by DHS. Each criterion reflects a
component DHS required for the completion of the SSP. The 8 criteria we
used are listed below along with the corresponding 40 key information
requirements.
Section 1: Sector Profile and Goals
1 Did the sector include physical and human assets as part of its sector
profile?19
2 Does the SSP identify any regulations or key authorities relevant to the
sector that affect physical and human assets and protection?
3 Does the SSP show the relationships between the sector specific agency
and the private sector, other federal departments and agencies, and state
and local agencies that are either owner/operators of assets or provide a
supporting role to securing key resources?
4 Does the SSP contain sector-specific goals?
5 Does the SSP communicate the value of the plan to the private sector,
other owners, and operators?
Section 2: Identify Assets, Systems, Networks, and Functions
6 Does the SSP include a process for identifying the sector's assets and
functions, both now and in the future?
7 Does the SSP include a process to identify physical and human asset
dependencies and interdependencies?
8 Does the SSP describe the criteria being used to determine which assets,
systems, and networks are and are not of potential concern?
9 Does the SSP describe how the infrastructure information being
collected will be verified for accuracy and completeness?
19A companion engagement assessed the plans for inclusion of cyber assets.
Section 3: Assess Risks
10 Does the SSP discuss the risk assessment process, including
whether the sector is mandated by regulation or are primarily
voluntary in nature.
11 Does the SSP address whether a screening process (process to
determine whether a full assessment is required) for assets would
be beneficial for the sector, and if so, does it discuss the
methodologies or tools that would be used to do so?
12 Does the SSP identify how potential consequences of incidents,
including worst case scenarios, would be assessed?
13 Does the SSP describe the relevant processes and methodologies
used to perform vulnerability assessments?
14 Does the SSP describe any threat analyses that the sector
conducts?
15 Does the SSP describe any incentives used to encourage
voluntary performance of risk assessments?
Section 4: Prioritize Infrastructure
16 Does the SSP identify the party responsible for conducting a
risk-based prioritizing of the assets?
17 Does the SSP describe the process, current criteria, and
frequency for prioritizing sector assets?
18 Does the SSP provide a common methodology for comparing both
physical and human assets when prioritizing a sector's
infrastructure?
Section 5: Develop and Implement Protective Programs
19 Does the SSP describe the process that the SSA will use to work
with asset owners to develop effective long-term protective plans
for the sector's assets?
20 Does the SSP identify key protective programs (and their role) in the
sector's overall risk management approach?
21 Does the SSP describe the process used to identify and validate
specific program needs?
22 Does the SSP include the minimum requirements necessary for the sector
to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from an attack?
23 Does the SSP address implementation and maintenance of protective
programs for assets once they are prioritized?
24 Does the SSP address how the performance of protective programs is
monitored by the sector-specific agencies and security partners to
determine their effectiveness?
Section 6: Measure Progress
25 Does the SSP explain how the SSA will collect, verify and report the
information necessary to measure progress in critical infrastructure/key
resources protection?
26 Does the SSP describe how the SSA will report the results of its
performance assessments to the Secretary of Homeland Security?
27 Does the SSP call for the development and use of metrics that will
allow the SSA to measure the results of activities related to assets?
28 Does the SPP describe how performance metrics will be used to guide
future decisions on projects?
29 Does the SSP list relevant sector-level implementation actions that the
SSA and its security partners deem appropriate?
Section 7: Research and Development for Critical Infrastructure/Key
Resources Protection
30 Does the SSP describe how technology development is related to the
sector's goals?
31 Does the SSP identify those sector capability requirements that can be
supported by technology development?
32 Does the SSP describe the process used to identify physical and human
sector-related research requirements?
33 Does the SSP identify existing security projects and the gaps it needs
to fill to support the sector's goals?
34 Does the SSP identify which sector governance structures will be
responsible for R&D?
35 Does the SSP describe the criteria that are used to select new and
existing initiatives?
Section 8: Manage and Coordinate SSA Responsibilities
36 Does the SSP describe how the SSA intends to staff and manage its NIPP
responsibilities? (e.g., creation of a program management office)
37 Does the SSP describe the processes and responsibilities of updating,
reporting, budgeting, and training?
38 Does the SSP describe the sector's coordinating mechanisms and
structures?
39 Does the SSP describe the process for developing the sector-specific
investment priorities and requirements for critical infrastructure/key
resource protection?
40 Does the SSP describe the process for information sharing and
protection?
Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact : Eileen R. Larence (202) 512-8777
Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the contact named above, Susan
Quinlan, Assistant Director; R. E. Canjar; Landis Lindsey; E. Jerry
Seigler; and Edith Sohna made key contributions to this report.
(440592)
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