Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO Access to	 
Information on Programs and Activities (25-APR-07, GAO-07-700T). 
                                                                 
In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on	 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February	 
2007, GAO stated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  
has not made its management or operational decisions transparent 
enough to allow Congress to be sure that the Department is	 
effectively, efficiently, and economically using its billions of 
dollars of annual funding. GAO also noted that its work for	 
Congress to assess DHS's operations has, at times, been 	 
significantly hampered by long delays in obtaining access to	 
program documents. Following the aforementioned testimonies, GAO 
was asked to testify about its access issues. This testimony	 
provides information on (1) the scope of GAO's work, (2) GAO	 
protocols for accessing agency information, (3) DHS processes for
working with GAO, (4) access issues GAO has encountered, and (5) 
steps GAO has taken to address these issues.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-700T					        
    ACCNO:   A68744						        
  TITLE:     Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO     
Access to Information on Programs and Activities		 
     DATE:   04/25/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Audit authority					 
	     Confidential communication 			 
	     Government information				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Information access 				 
	     Information disclosure				 
	     Information resources management			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Records						 

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GAO-07-700T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]GAO Performs a Broad Range of Work for Congress
     * [3]Auditing Standards and Our Protocols Address Accessing Infor
     * [4]DHS Has Implemented Burdensome Processes for Working with GA
     * [5]GAO Has Experienced Difficulties Accessing DHS Information
     * [6]GAO Has Taken and Suggested Steps to Resolve Access Issues w
     * [7]Contact Information
     * [8]GAO's Audit and Evaluation Authority
     * [9]GAO's Access-to-Records Authority
     * [10]GAO's Mission
     * [11]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [12]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [13]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [14]Congressional Relations
     * [15]Public Affairs

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations and
Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, April 25, 2007

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Observations on GAO Access to Information on Programs and Activities

Statement of Norman Rabkin, Managing Director
Homeland Security and Justice Issues

GAO--07-700T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss the subject of access by the Government
Accountability Office to information at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). My statement will provide information on the scope of our
work, our protocols regarding how we normally get access to agency
information, DHS processes for responding to our requests, access issues
we have encountered at DHS, and, finally, steps we have taken to address
these issues.

Summary

GAO's mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the
accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American
people. Since DHS began operations in 2003, we have provided major
analyses of the department's plans and programs for transportation
security, immigration, Coast Guard, and emergency management. We have also
reported on DHS's management functions such as human capital, financial
management, and information technology.

We have processes for obtaining information from departments and agencies
across the federal government that work well. DHS's adopted processes do
not work as smoothly. DHS's processes have impeded our efforts to carry
out our mission by delaying access to documents that we require to assess
the department's operations. This process involves multiple layers of
review by department- and component-level liaisons and attorneys regarding
whether to provide us the requested information.

We have occasionally worked with DHS management to establish a cooperative
process--for example, reviewing sensitive documents at a particular agency
location. We have agreed to these types of accommodations for accessing
information under certain circumstances because we believe that doing so
allows us not only to maintain a productive working relationship with the
department but also to meet the needs of our congressional requesters in a
timely manner. Further, such a relationship enables us to present the
progress and challenges of the department in a clear and impartial manner,
so that we can meet our shared objectives of improving our nation's
security preparedness.

We recognize that the department has legitimate interests in protecting
certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. We share
that interest as well and follow strict security guidelines in handling
such information. We similarly recognize that agency officials will need
to make judgments with respect to the manner and the processes they use in
response to our information requests. However, to date, because of the
processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often not been able to
do its work in a timely manner. We have been able to eventually obtain
information and to answer audit questions, but the delays we have
experienced at DHS have impeded our ability to conduct audit work
efficiently and to provide timely information to congressional clients.

GAO Performs a Broad Range of Work for Congress

GAO has broad statutory authority under title 31 of the United States Code
to audit and evaluate agency financial transactions, programs, and
activities.^1 To carry out these audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has
a broad statutory right of access to agency records. Using the authority
granted under title 31, we perform a range of work to support Congress
that, among other things, includes the following:

           o Evaluations of federal programs, policies, operations, and
           performance:

                        o For example, evaluations of transportation security
                        programs related to passenger-screening operations at
                        airports, our work to assess enforcement of
                        immigration laws, and our work on the U.S. Coast
                        Guard's Deepwater acquisition to replace its aging
                        fleet.

           o Management and financial audits to determine whether public
           funds are being spent efficiently, effectively, and in accordance
           with applicable laws:

                        o For example, DHS's appropriations acts for fiscal
                        years 2002 through 2006 have mandated that we review
                        expenditure plans for the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
                        Status Indicator Technology (U.S.VISIT) program.

           o Investigations to assess whether illegal or improper activities
           may have occurred:

                        o For example, we investigated the Federal Emergency
                        Management Agency's (FEMA) Individuals and Households
                        Program to determine the vulnerability of the program
                        to fraud and abuse in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina
                        and Rita.

           o Constructive engagements in which we work proactively with
           agencies, when appropriate, to help guide their efforts toward
           transformation and achieving positive results:

                        o For example, we have worked to establish such an
                        arrangement with the Transportation Security
                        Administration (TSA) on its design and implementation
                        of the Secure Flight Program for passenger
                        pre-screening for domestic flights whereby we could
                        review documents on system development as they were
                        being formulated and provide TSA with our preliminary
                        observations for its consideration. Congress mandated
                        TSA certify that the design and implementation of the
                        program would meet 10 specific criteria. Congress
                        also mandated that we review and comment on TSA's
                        certification. TSA's certification has not yet
                        occurred.

^1See appendix I for more information on key GAO audit and access
authorities.

Auditing Standards and Our Protocols Address Accessing Information

We carry out most of our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.^2 Our analysts and financial auditors are
responsible for planning, conducting, and reporting their work in a timely
manner without internal or external impairments. These standards require
that analysts and financial auditors promptly obtain sufficient,
competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable basis for any
related findings and conclusions. Therefore, prompt access to all records
and other information associated with these activities is needed for the
effective and efficient performance of our work.

Our work involves different collection approaches to meet the evidence
requirements of generally accepted government auditing standards. Such
evidence falls into four categories:

           o physical (the results of direct inspection or observation);
           o documentary (information created by and for an agency, such as
           letters, memorandums, contracts, management and accounting
           records, and other documents in various formats, including
           electronic databases);
           o testimonial (the results of face-to-face, telephone, or written
           inquiries, interviews, and questionnaires); and
           o analytical (developed by or for GAO through computations, data
           comparisons, and other analyses).

^2GAO, Government Auditing Standards, 2003 Revision, [16]GAO-03-673G
(Washington, D.C.; June 2003).

We have promulgated protocols describing how we will interact with the
agencies we audit.^3 We expect that agencies will promptly comply with our
requests for all categories of needed information. We also expect that we
will receive full and timely access to agency officials who have
stewardship over the requested records; to agency employees responsible
for the programs, issues, events, operations, and other factors covered by
such records; and to contractor personnel supporting such programs,
issues, events, and operations. In addition, we expect that we will have
timely access to an agency's facilities and other relevant locations while
trying to minimize interruptions to an agency's operations when conducting
work related to requests for information.

We provide an appropriate level of security to information obtained during
the course of our work. We are statutorily required to maintain the same
level of confidentiality of information as is required of the agency from
which it is received, and we take very seriously our obligation to
safeguard the wide range of sensitive information we routinely receive.
For example, we ensure that GAO employees have appropriate security
clearances to access information. We also have well-established security
policies and procedures.

Timely access to information, facilities, and other relevant locations is
in the best interests of both GAO and the agencies. We need to efficiently
use the time available to complete our work to minimize the impact on the
agency being reviewed and to meet the time frames of our congressional
clients. Therefore, we expect that an agency's leadership and internal
procedures will recognize the importance of and support prompt responses
to our requests for information. When we believe that delays in obtaining
requested access significantly impede our work, we contact the agency's
leadership for resolution and notify our congressional clients, as
appropriate.

^3GAO, GAO Agency Protocols, [17]GAO-05-35G (Washington, D.C.; Oct. 21,
2004).

DHS Has Implemented Burdensome Processes for Working with GAO

Unlike those of many other executive agencies, DHS's processes for working
with us includes extensive coordination among program officials, liaisons,
and attorneys at the departmental and component levels and centralized
control for all incoming GAO requests for information and outgoing
documents. In an April 2004 directive on GAO relations, DHS established a
department liaison to manage its relationship with us. In addition, DHS
has a GAO coordinator within all of its components and, within the DHS
General Counsel Office, an Assistant General Counsel for General Law who
provides advice on GAO relations. According to the directive, the
department liaison (1) receives and coordinates all GAO notifications of
new work, (2) participates in all entrance conferences, and (3) notifies
the Assistant General Counsel of new work to obtain participation of
counsel. The directive requires the Assistant General Counsel to
participate in all entrance meetings to ensure that the scope of any
request is clear and finite, and that mutual obligations between DHS and
GAO are met. The component coordinator handles all matters involving GAO
for the component, generally participates in GAO entrance meetings, and
seeks advice of component's counsel, as appropriate.

The following figure illustrates the coordination of information among DHS
officials described above when we make a request for information.
Typically when we begin an engagement, we send a letter to the department
liaison to notify DHS that we are starting a new engagement and we request
an entrance meeting to discuss the work. During the course of our review,
we provide written requests for meetings and documents to component
coordinators using a DHS-prescribed form. The component coordinators then
forward our requests to program officials and consult with component
counsel, who may consult with the Assistant General Counsel.

Figure 1. DHS Process for Working with GAO.

In a memo that transmitted the above directive to senior managers in DHS
components, the then-Under Secretary for Management emphasized the
importance of a positive working relationship between the two agencies.
The memo stated that failure to meet or brief GAO staffs in a timely
manner, as well as being viewed as nonresponsive to GAO document requests,
could result in tense and acrimonious interactions. The Under Secretary
also reminded senior officials that prompt and professional discharge of
their responsibilities to GAO requests could affect both DHS's funding and
restrictions attached to that funding.

GAO Has Experienced Difficulties Accessing DHS Information

In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February 2007, we
stated that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions
transparent enough to allow Congress to be sure that the department is
effectively, efficiently, and economically using its billions of dollars
of annual funding.^4 We also noted that our work for Congress to assess
DHS's operations has been significantly hampered by long delays in
obtaining access to program documents and officials. We emphasized that
for Congress, GAO, and others to independently assess the department's
efforts, DHS would need to become more transparent and minimize recurring
delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations.

At most federal agencies and in some cases within DHS, we obtain the
information we need directly from program officials, often on the spot or
very soon after making the request. For example, our work on the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI) has so far met with a very welcome degree of
access to both DHS officials and documents. SBI is a comprehensive
multiyear program established in November 2005 to secure U.S. borders and
reduce illegal immigration. One element of SBI is SBInet, the program
within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) responsible for
developing a comprehensive border protection system of tactical
infrastructure, rapid response capability, and technology. The fiscal year
2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act required that,
before DHS could obligate $950 million of the $1.2 billion appropriated
for SBInet, it had to prepare a plan for expending these funds, have it
reviewed by GAO, and then submit it to Congress for approval.^5 The plan
was to be submitted within 60 days of the act's passage.

CBP officials provided us office space at CBP headquarters, gave us access
to all levels of SBInet management, and promptly provided us with all the
documentation we requested, much of which was still in draft form and
predecisional. DHS met the 60-day requirement when it submitted its plan
to the Appropriations Committees on December 4, 2006. We met our
responsibilities by being able to review the plan as it developed over the
60-day period, and to provide the results of our review to the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees on December 7 and 13, 2006, respectively.

^4GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing
the Department of Homeland Security, [18]GAO-07-398T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 6, 2007); and GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic
Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, [19]GAO-07-452T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).

^5Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006).

In contrast to the access we were afforded in the above example, the
process used in most of our interactions with DHS is layered and
time-consuming. As discussed earlier, we are asked to submit each request
for documents to the component coordinator rather than directly to program
officials even if we have already met with these officials. Also as
mentioned earlier, the component coordinator often refers our request to
component counsel. And the Assistant General Counsel for General Law in
DHS's General Counsel's office may become involved. The result is that we
often wait for months for information that in many cases could be provided
immediately. In some cases, DHS does not furnish information until our
review is nearly finished, greatly impeding our ability to provide a full
and timely perspective on the program under review.

Each access issue with DHS requires that we make numerous and repetitive
follow-up inquiries. Sometimes, despite GAO's right of access to
information, DHS delays providing information as it vets concerns
internally, such as whether the information is considered deliberative or
predecisional. At other times, we experience delays without DHS expressing
either a concern or a cause for the delays. On other occasions, DHS is
unable to tell us when we might obtain requested information or even if we
will obtain it.

We have encountered access issues in numerous engagements, and the lengths
of delay are both varied and significant and have affected our ability to
do our work in a timely manner. We have experienced delays with DHS
components that include CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), FEMA, and TSA on different types of work such as information
sharing, immigration, emergency preparedness in primary and secondary
schools, and accounting systems. I have examples of two engagements to
share with you today that illustrate the types of delays we experience and
how they have affected the timing of our work.

My first example is of an engagement related to detention standards for
aliens in custody, where the team working on this engagement experienced
delays of up to 5 months in obtaining various documents. The objective of
this work, which is still under way and is being done for the House
Committee on Homeland Security, is to assess ICE efforts to review
facilities that house alien detainees, determine whether the facilities
have complied with DHS standards, and determine the extent that complaints
have been filed about conditions in the facilities. Some of the facilities
are owned and operated by DHS; others are operated under contract with
DHS. In order to determine the extent to which facilities are complying
with DHS standards, we requested that ICE provide copies of the reports of
inspections it conducted in 2006 at 23 detention facilities. We requested
those reports in December 2006 and did not receive the final four of the
inspection reports until just last week, after DHS departmental
intervention. We had several meetings and discussions with DHS officials
including program officials, liaisons, and attorneys, and we were never
provided a satisfactory answer about the reason for this 5-month delay. We
also experienced delays on this engagement obtaining a copy of the
contract for detainee phone services between ICE and the phone service
contractor. DHS took 1 month to provide the contract and redacted almost
the entire document because a DHS attorney contended the information was
"privileged." We followed up with DHS officials to communicate that our
authority provided for access to this type of information and then waited
another 2 weeks before we were able to get an unredacted copy of the
contract.

In another engagement being done at the request of the then-Chairman of
the House Committee on Government Reform, we are reviewing an emergency
preparedness exercise that DHS conducted in June 2006 called Forward
Challenge 06. The purpose of the exercise was to allow agencies to
activate their continuity of operations plans, deploy essential personnel
to an alternate site, and perform essential functions as a means of
assessing their mission readiness. Our objective is to determine the
extent to which participating agencies were testing the procedures,
personnel, and resources necessary to perform essential functions in their
continuity- of-operations plans during the exercise. We began our work a
few months before the exercise and had arranged with DHS to observe the
actual exercise. However, 2 days before its start, DHS officials told us
we would not be permitted to observe the exercise and stated that after
completion, they would instead brief us on the exercise and the lessons
they had learned from it. They provided that briefing in August 2006, at
which time we requested relevant documentation to support the claims the
DHS officials made to us.

Subsequently, in November 2006, DHS provided us with one-third of the
agency after-action reports we requested but redacted key information,
including the identity of the participating agencies. DHS, however, was
reluctant to provide us with the balance of the documents requested,
stating that it considered these to be "deliberative materials" and
expressing concern that sharing these with us would have a significant and
negative impact on participants' level of openness in future exercises.
Despite GAO's right of access to the information, the involvement of GAO
and DHS officials at the highest level, and a letter of support from the
former and current chairman of the committee, we did not receive access to
the requested documentation until March 2007. Our report for this
engagement was to be issued in November 2006; because we did not receive
the needed information until March 2007, we will not be able to issue our
analysis until later this year.

GAO Has Taken and Suggested Steps to Resolve Access Issues with DHS

We have made good faith efforts to resolve access issues. Specifically, we
have undertaken many steps to work with DHS to resolve delays as
expeditiously as possible and gain access to information needed for our
work. At our audit team level we have asked staff to set reasonable time
frames for requesting DHS to provide information and arrange for meeting
and when we encounter resistance, to ensure that the information we
request is critical to satisfying the audit objectives. When delays occur,
our approach is to involve various management levels at both GAO and DHS,
beginning with lower-level managers and working up to the Comptroller
General and the Secretary. At each level, our managers and legal staff
contact their counterpart liaisons and counsel, component heads, or DHS
senior managers, as appropriate, either by telephone, e-mail, or letter,
to communicate our access authority and need for the information to
satisfy audit objectives. Our communication efforts have generally
resulted in obtaining the requested or alternative information, or making
other accommodations.

We have proposed to DHS that the department take several steps that would
enhance the efficiency of its process. First, our staff should be able to
deal directly with program officials after we have held our initial
entrance conference. If these officials have concerns about providing us
requested information, they can involve DHS liaison or coordinators.
Second, to the extent that DHS counsel finds it necessary to screen
certain sensitive documents, it should do so on an exception basis. Other
documents should be provided directly to us without prior review or
approval by counsel. We provide DHS several opportunities to learn how we
are using the information its officials provide us--we provide routine
updates on our work to program officials; we provide program officials,
liaisons, and counsel a "statement of facts" that basically describes what
we learned during the engagement; and we formally provide DHS a copy of
our draft report that contains our evidence, conclusions, and
recommendations for its comment. There is no reason to hold information
back from us when it has been made available to contractors, other federal
agencies, state and local governments, or the public, or when its only
sensitivity is that DHS considers it confidential or classified. The
Secretary of DHS and the Under Secretary for Management have stated their
desire to work with us to resolve access issues. We are willing to work
with DHS to resolve any access-related concerns. Nevertheless, we remain
troubled that the design and implementation of the current DHS process is
routinely causing unnecessary delays.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions your or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.

Contact Information

For further information about this statement, please contact Norman J.
Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202)
512-8777 or [email protected].

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Linda
Watson, John Vocino, Jan Montgomery, Geoff Hamilton and Richard Ascarate.

Appendix I: Key GAO Audit and Access Authorities

GAO's Audit and Evaluation Authority

GAO has broad statutory authority under title 31 of the United States Code
to audit and evaluate agency financial transactions, programs, and
activities. Under 31 U.S.C. S 712, GAO has authority to investigate all
matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money.
Section 717 of title 31, U.S.C., authorizes GAO to evaluate the results of
programs and activities of federal agencies, on GAO's own initiative or
when requested by either house of Congress or a committee of jurisdiction.
Section 3523(a) of title 31 authorizes GAO to audit the financial
transactions of each agency, except as specifically provided by law.

GAO's Access-to-Records Authority

To carry out these audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad
statutory right of access to agency records. Under 31 U.S.C. S 716(a),
federal agencies are required to provide GAO with information about their
duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial transactions. When
an agency does not make a record available to GAO within a reasonable
period of time, GAO may issue a written request to the agency head
specifying the record needed and the authority for accessing the record.
Should the agency fail to release the record to GAO, GAO has the authority
to enforce its requests for records by filing a civil action to compel
production of records in federal district court.

A limitation in section 716, while not restricting GAO's basic statutory
right of access, acts to limit GAO's ability to compel production of
particular records through a court action. For example, GAO may not bring
such an action to enforce its statutory right of access to a record where
the President or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
certifies to the Comptroller General and Congress (1) that a record could
be withheld under one of two specified provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA)^1 and (2) disclosure to GAO reasonably could be
expected to impair substantially the operations of the government.

The first prong of this certification provision requires that such record
could be withheld under FOIA pursuant to either 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(5),
relating to inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency, or 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(7), relating to certain records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes.^2

1The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552, as amended, generally
requires agencies to disclose documents to the public, subject to certain
specified exemptions.

The second prong of the certification provision, regarding impairment of
government operations, presents a very high standard for the agency to
meet. The Senate report on this section 716 limitation stated:

"As the presence of this additional test [the second prong] makes clear,
the mere fact that materials sought are subject to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5) or
(7) and therefore exempt from public disclosure does not justify
withholding them from the Comptroller General. Currently GAO is routinely
granted access to highly sensitive information, including internal
memoranda and law enforcement files, and has established a fine record in
protecting such information from improper use or disclosure. Thus, in
order for the certification to be valid, there must be some unique or
highly special circumstances to justify a conclusion that possession by
the Comptroller General of the information could reasonably be expected to
substantially impair Government operations."^3

The committee report also points out that the Comptroller General's
statutory right of access to agency records is not diminished by the
certification provisions of the legislation. The certification simply
allows the President or Director of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to preclude the Comptroller General from seeking a judicial remedy
in certain limited situations.^4

2More specifically, this exemption category relates to records or
information compiled for law enforcement purpose, but only to the extent
that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings;
(B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected
to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a state,
local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which
furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a
record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in
the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful
national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a
confidential source; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines
for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F)
could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of
any individual.

^3S. Rep. No. 96-570, at 7-8 (1980).

^4 Id. at 7.

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-700T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin, at (202) 512-8777 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [27]GAO-07-700T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives

April25, 2007

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Observations on GAO Access to Information on Programs and Activities

In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February 2007, GAO
stated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not made its
management or operational decisions transparent enough to allow Congress
to be sure that the Department is effectively, efficiently, and
economically using its billions of dollars of annual funding. GAO also
noted that its work for Congress to assess DHS's operations has, at times,
been significantly hampered by long delays in obtaining access to program
documents. Following the aforementioned testimonies, GAO was asked to
testify about its access issues.

This testimony provides information on (1) the scope of GAO's work, (2)
GAO protocols for accessing agency information, (3) DHS processes for
working with GAO, (4) access issues GAO has encountered, and (5) steps GAO
has taken to address these issues.

This testimony identifies issues that Congress and DHS may wish to give
attention so that DHS may provided GAO timely access to information needed
to carry out its statutory responsibilities.

To carry out its audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad
statutory right of access to agency records. Auditing standards require
that analysts and financial auditors promptly obtain sufficient,
competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable basis for any
related findings and conclusions. Therefore, prompt access to all records
and other information associated with these activities is needed for the
effective and efficient performance of GAO's work. This is also necessary
in order for the Congress to be able to conduct its constitutional
responsibilities in a timely and effective manner.

Since DHS began operations in 2003, GAO has provided major analyses of the
department's plans and programs for transportation security, immigration,
Coast Guard, and emergency management. GAO has also reported on DHS's
management functions such as human capital, financial management, and
information technology.

GAO has processes it applies in working with departmental agencies across
the federal government that work well. DHS's adopted processes have
frequently impeded GAO's efforts to carry out its mission by delaying
access to documents required to assess the department's operations. This
process involves multiple layers of review by department- and
component-level liaisons and attorneys and results in frequent and
sometimes lengthy delays in obtaining information.

GAO recognizes that the department has legitimate interests in protecting
certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. GAO shares
that interest as well and follows strict security guidelines in handling
such information. GAO similarly recognizes that agency officials will need
to make judgments with respect to the manner and the processes they use in
response to GAO's information requests. However, to date, because of the
processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often not been able to
do its work in a timely manner. GAO has been able to eventually obtain
information and answer audit questions, but the delays experienced at DHS
impede GAO's ability to conduct audit work efficiently and to provide
timely information to congressional clients.

DHS process for working with GAO.

References

Visible links
  16. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-673G
  17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-35G
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-398T
  19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-452T
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-700T
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