Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to 
Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute	 
Terrorists (25-MAY-07, GAO-07-697).				 
                                                                 
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on
the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for	 
LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1)	 
the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify,	 
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which	 
LEAs have implemented this guidance.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-697 					        
    ACCNO:   A69945						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack       
Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and	 
Prosecute Terrorists						 
     DATE:   05/25/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Combating terrorism				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     International relations				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Law enforcement agencies				 
	     Law enforcement personnel				 
	     Police training					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Terrorists 					 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Dept. of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 

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GAO-07-697

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Department of Justice
          * [4]Department of Homeland Security
          * [5]Department of State
          * [6]National Security Council
          * [7]The 9/11 Commission
          * [8]The National Counterterrorism Center

     * [9]National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Ke

          * [10]National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assis
          * [11]The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Pl
          * [12]State Department Unable to Fully Implement National Strategy
          * [13]NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implement

     * [14]LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt,

          * [15]LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations Combat Terro

               * [16]The FBI Has Made Some Effort to Increase Assistance to
                 Forei
               * [17]CSI Works with Foreign Nations, but It Has Had
                 Limitations
               * [18]State Has Expanded the ATA Program

          * [19]LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations Have Been Limited by S

               * [20]Most LEAs Lacked Clearly Defined Roles and
                 Responsibilities
               * [21]Executive Departments and LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance on
                 Sett
               * [22]LEAs Are Not Systematically Assessing Their
                 Accomplishments
               * [23]LEAs Generally Lacked Mechanisms for Collaboration
                 Abroad
               * [24]LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments

     * [25]Conclusion
     * [26]Recommendations
     * [27]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [28]GAO Comments
     * [29]GAO Comments
     * [30]GAO Contact
     * [31]Staff Acknowledgments
     * [32]GAO's Mission
     * [33]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [34]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [35]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [36]Congressional Relations
     * [37]Public Affairs

Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

May 2007

COMBATING TERRORISM

Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists

GAO-07-697

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 7
National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key Elements for
a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration 13
LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors 21
Conclusion 44
Recommendations 45
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 50
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 52
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice 53
GAO Comments 61
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 63
GAO Comments 67
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 68

Table

Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation Assistance to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists 17

Figure

Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
Exercises 27

Abbreviations
ATA Antiterrorism Assistance
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CSI Container Security Initiative
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Forces
LEA Law enforcement agency
LEGAT Legal Attache
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NSC National Security Council
OIG Office of Inspector General
RAP Regional Action Plans
RSO Regional Security Officer
S/CT Department of State/Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
USMS U.S. Marshals Service
USSS United States Secret Service

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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

May 25, 2007

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Shays:

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), combating
terrorism has become the nation's top national security goal and the
highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law enforcement
agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice (Justice),
and Homeland Security (DHS)--including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)--operate
from U.S. embassies overseas and assist foreign nation governments on a
broad array of law enforcement issues, such as investigating crime,
reducing illegal drug activity, controlling borders and immigration, and
protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from attack. Three U.S. national
strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, directed
that law enforcement activities be increasingly focused on the prevention
of further terrorist attacks, including helping foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This includes technical assistance,
such as antiterrorism training and the provision of technologies used to
identify terrorist threats, and operational assistance, such as joint
U.S.-foreign nation investigations and operations against terrorists. This
new focus on working with foreign nations to prevent terrorist attacks
represents a notable shift from pre-9/11 objectives, with potentially
significant implications for the strategies, resources, and overseas
presence of U.S. LEAs. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11), combating terrorism has become the nation's top national security
goal and the highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law
enforcement agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice
(Justice), and Homeland Security (DHS)--including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS)--operate from U.S. embassies overseas and assist
foreign nation governments on a broad array of law enforcement issues,
such as investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity, controlling
borders and immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from
attack. Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, directed that law enforcement activities be
increasingly focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks,
including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as antiterrorism
training and the provision of technologies used to identify terrorist
threats, and operational assistance, such as joint U.S.-foreign nation
investigations and operations against terrorists. This new focus on
working with foreign nations to prevent terrorist attacks represents a
notable shift from pre-9/11 objectives, with potentially significant
implications for the strategies, resources, and overseas presence of U.S.
LEAs.

Because of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the United
States and its embassies, diplomats, and citizens abroad, you requested
that we evaluate the federal government's efforts to implement national
security strategies to use its LEAs to assist foreign nations in
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. Specifically, you
asked us to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which
LEAs have implemented Because of the continuing threat of terrorist
attacks against the United States and its embassies, diplomats, and
citizens abroad, you requested that we evaluate the federal government's
efforts to implement national security strategies to use its LEAs to
assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists. Specifically, you asked us to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs
to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists
and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance. We agreed
that this review would be limited to U.S. law enforcement efforts overseas
to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists and would not focus on (1) U.S. domestic law enforcement
efforts to combat terrorism; (2) other instruments of national
power--including military, intelligence, diplomatic, or
financial--currently being used to combat terrorism; and (3) U.S. efforts
to combat terrorist financing, since we had recently completed a review of
this effort.^1

To assess the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations in identifying,
disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists, we analyzed the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism,^2 the 9/11
Commission Report, and related legislation to determine if the strategies
contained key elements that we have recommended^3 and the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires, such as clearly defined
objectives, roles and responsibilities, leveraged funding, and monitoring
systems. We also discussed the guidance with representatives from State,
Justice, and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with
working with foreign nation counterparts. To assess the extent to which
LEAs have implemented this guidance to assist foreign nations, we reviewed
State, Justice, and DHS strategic plans and annual performance reports;
requested all implementing guidance; and asked that each agency provide a
listing of their general accomplishments in assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also conducted detailed
work in four countries with key roles in combating terrorism, where we met
with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials. We are not naming the
specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic and
security concerns. After our work abroad, we reviewed and verified our
overall observations with senior representatives from each department and
agency. We also met with National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) officials
to brief them on our observations and to determine the status of ongoing
efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of national power, including
LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials would not discuss the plan, its
contents, or any issues raised in this report. According to NCTC
officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under
development as of March 1, 2007. During the course of our work we
experienced considerable delays obtaining information from Justice and
State, which resulted in this report being issued several months later
than initially planned. We were eventually able to obtain information
sufficient for answering our objectives. We conducted our work between
August 2005 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

^1GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate
U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical
Assistance Abroad, [38]GAO-06-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2005). The
report found that the Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury lacked a
strategic plan to carry out this effort; roles and responsibilities needed
clarification; there was no mechanism to determine resource needs; and
there was no monitoring system to assess progress.

^2In addition to the strategies discussed in this report, the White House
has released a number of other strategies related to the War on Terrorism,
including (1) the September 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy and (2)
the May 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel. For this
report, we focused on the strategies released shortly after the 9/11
terrorist attacks that discussed the use of LEAs to combat terrorism and
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, in
order to determine the extent to which LEAs had implemented these
strategies in the 5 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also
included any updates to these strategies to ensure that there was a
strategic continuum in the use of LEAs to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

^3GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [39]GAO-05-927 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
[40]GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); GAO, Combating Terrorism:
Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [41]GAO-03-519T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,
[42]GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).

Results in Brief

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the President issued a series of
national strategies, beginning in 2002 and updated in 2006, that provided
broad direction for overseas U.S. law enforcement efforts to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. These
strategies collectively called for reorienting U.S. LEAs to proactively
work to prevent terrorist attacks at home and abroad. However, they lacked
key components, such as clearly defined objectives, roles and
responsibilities, and procedures for working across agency boundaries
toward a common goal, necessary for a strategic plan and for facilitating
interagency collaboration. Further, they did not articulate which LEAs
should implement the general guidance or how they should do so. For
example, officials from seven LEAs as well as embassy officials in the
four countries we visited told us that they had received little-to-no
guidance from the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC,^4 or State,
Justice, and DHS on how to implement the directive to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Only the FBI
received and has issued some implementing guidance--for example, stating
that it planned to increase its presence abroad and increase joint
operations with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. While one of the three strategies tasked State with developing
and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we found that
State did not develop or coordinate a plan to use the combined
capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. In
December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act),^5 which charged
the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power,
including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had
drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006.
According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was
still under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss
the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.

Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, the FBI
has increased its overseas activities, DHS has worked with foreign nations
to implement the Container Security Initiative, and State has expanded its
Antiterrorism Assistance program to improve foreign nation capacities to
combat terrorism. Despite such actions, we found that because most LEAs,
with the exception of the FBI, have not been given clear guidance, they
lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities for helping foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, in
one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities
between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations
intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according
to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs involved in these efforts. In
addition, we found that departments and LEAs generally lacked guidance on
setting funding priorities and providing resources to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, for
example, we found that State's office responsible for coordinating all
U.S. assistance to combat terrorism abroad was hampered by a lack of
resources, limiting its ability to carry out this vital function. LEAs
also lacked performance monitoring systems to determine the effectiveness
of their technical or operational assistance and, as a result, found it
difficult to assess whether they were making progress in their efforts to
help foreign nations combat terrorism. In addition, embassies generally
lacked formal structures for LEAs to share information and collaborate on
operational efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists; LEA and embassy officials told us that existing
embassy structures do not provide a means for all LEAs at embassies to
work collaboratively to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not
conducted to identify technical and operational assistance needs in the
four countries we visited, the full range of assistance that LEAs could
provide may not be utilized to address foreign nations' needs for
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.

^4The NCTC was created by Congress as part of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). NCTC's mission includes
developing plans that coordinate the use all elements of national power,
including LEAs, to combat terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks. As
detailed in the background section of this report, the NCTC reports
directly to the President on matters of strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism and works under the policy direction of the NSC.

^5P.L. 108-458, section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 404o).

To ensure that LEAs, a key element of national power, are fully focused on
assisting foreign nations to identify and prevent future terrorist attacks
and protect Americans around the world, we are making recommendations to
the NCTC, NSC, and three executive departments with LEAs stationed abroad.
We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the NSC,
ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for combating
terrorism (1) articulates a clear strategy to implement the national
strategies' goal of using U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (2) clarifies roles and
responsibilities for each LEA for implementing the goal; (3) provides
guidance to LEAs on setting funding priorities and providing resources to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (4)
requires comprehensive needs assessments for foreign nations and tailored
assistance programs to address those needs; and (5) requires a monitoring
system to report on accomplishments or progress.

In addition, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State each take the following two
actions:

           o Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
           bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the
           national strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs
           to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and
           prosecuting terrorists.
           o Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective
           department and Congress accurate reporting on that department's
           accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements in its
           LEAs' efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism.

           We also recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with
           the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security
           take the following action:

           o Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to
           improve information-sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for
           assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists.

           We received written comments on a draft of this report from DHS,
           Justice, and State, which are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and
           IV.

           DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
           report and said it would take action to implement them based upon
           direction from the NSC and NCTC.

           Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
           interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will
           work with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan.
           Justice did not indicate whether it concurred with our
           recommendations that the Attorney General issue clear guidance to
           LEAs or establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help
           foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice also expressed concern
           that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational
           and technical assistance.

           State said it would consider working with relevant LEAs to improve
           the coordination of law enforcement activities overseas. State did
           not indicate whether it concurred with our recommendations that
           the Secretary of State issue clear guidance and establish a
           monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help foreign nations
           combat terrorism. State also indicated that we did not fully
           reflect the department's lack of resources necessary to carry out
           its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad
           and provided additional information on its Regional Strategic
           Initiatives and the role of DS.

           The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report and
           stated that it is in the process of implementing the plan in
           conjunction with other departments and agencies, including the law
           enforcement agencies. According to NCTC, it has already begun to
           implement the recommendations made to NCTC in our report. We also
           received technical comments from State, DHS, Justice, and NCTC,
           which we have incorporated throughout the report where
           appropriate.
			  
			  Background

           State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S.
           embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement
           issues, including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug
           cartels, visa and immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal
           and terrorist threats against U.S. embassies and personnel, and
           fugitive capture and extraditions. LEA assistance can include
           technical assistance, such as the provision of training in police
           techniques and legal reforms, as well as investigative or
           operational assistance, which can support efforts such as joint
           teams of U.S. and foreign nation LEAs working together to stop
           crimes, illegal drug operations, or terrorists attacks.

           LEAs face a number of challenges in working with foreign nations
           to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In particular,
           LEAs lack arrest authority overseas and therefore heavily rely on
           the cooperation of the foreign nation. The degree of cooperation
           and the capabilities of foreign nation law enforcement agencies
           vary widely. According to FBI officials, forging partnerships with
           foreign nation LEAs can be an arduous and sometimes impractical
           task. They said that the ability to engage in joint investigations
           with foreign nation LEAs was dictated both by the will and the
           ability of their counterparts to engage in complex investigative
           techniques.
			  
			  Department of Justice

           The Department of Justice's primary goal is preventing terrorist
           attacks within the United States and promoting the nation's
           security, as well as investigating and prosecuting those who have
           committed, or intend to commit, terrorist attacks in the United
           States. Four Justice LEAs have a permanent overseas presence,
           including the FBI; DEA; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
           and Explosives (ATF); and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).

           The FBI is charged with protecting the United States from
           terrorist attacks; preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist
           operations; improving efforts to combat terrorism with U.S. state
           and local LEAs by expanding the use of multiagency Joint Terrorism
           Task Forces (JTTF); and expanding operational partnerships with
           foreign nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
           disrupt and prevent terrorism. The FBI operates abroad through its
           Legal Attache (LEGAT) offices located in 59 U.S. missions around
           the world. The FBI's Web site states that LEGATs (1) coordinate
           international investigations with their foreign nation colleagues;
           (2) cover international leads for domestic U.S. investigations;
           (3) link U.S. and international resources in critical criminal and
           terrorist areas to protect Americans at home and abroad; and (4)
           coordinate FBI training, including counterterrorism classes, for
           police in their geographic regions. According to the FBI, a July
           2005 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Overseas and Domestic
           Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
           Federal Bureau of Investigations controls the interaction of the
           CIA and the FBI in regard to foreign counterterrorism operations
           abroad.

           DEA's mission is to target organizations that pose the greatest
           drug threats to American citizens. It cooperates closely with
           foreign nations to help them identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           those involved in the illegal drug trade to reduce the
           availability of illicit drugs. DEA has around 696 officials in 63
           countries.

           ATF's mission is to enforce regulations on the firearms and
           explosives industries, assist other LEAs during criminal and
           post-blast investigations, conduct ballistics analysis, and trace
           the origins of guns and bombs used during criminal activity. ATF
           provides ballistics training and tracing assistance to foreign
           nation police, and, ATF officials told us, its analytical
           capabilities could be used to trace the origins of explosives used
           in terrorist bombings, and to help identify and capture terrorist
           cells. ATF has a permanent presence in four countries with a total
           of 10 officials.

           The USMS's mission is to track, apprehend, and extradite fugitives
           domestically and internationally, as well as protect federal
           judicial officials, including judges, attorneys, and jurors. USMS
           officials told us that USMS has provided assistance and training
           to foreign nation LEAs in establishing systems for protecting
           judicial officials. USMS has a permanent presence in three
           countries with a total of 7 agents. In addition, USMS currently
           has 16 agents in Iraq and 5 in Afghanistan.
			  
			  Department of Homeland Security

           DHS's primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the
           United States and reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism by
           detecting, deterring, and mitigating terrorist threats. It is also
           responsible for border security, and extending the zone of
           security beyond U.S. borders by working with foreign nations to
           identify, prioritize, and interdict threats. We examined three DHS
           LEAs that work from U.S. embassies abroad, including ICE, Customs
           and Border Protection (CBP), and the United States Secret Service
           (USSS).

           ICE's primary mission is to protect the United States and uphold
           public safety by identifying criminal activities and eliminating
           vulnerabilities that pose a threat to U.S. borders. By
           investigating threats to U.S. border security, ICE seeks to
           eliminate the potential threat of terrorist acts against the
           United States. As of December 2006, ICE had 298 investigative
           agents in 52 offices in 41 countries.

           CBP's primary mission includes preventing terrorists and terrorist
           weapons from entering the United States. CBP officials generally
           operate at U.S. ports of entry along the U.S. borders with Mexico
           and Canada, but also operate in parts of the Caribbean and other
           countries around the world. CBP has 943 personnel deployed to 28
           countries abroad. The duties of these personnel include
           preclearing passengers flying to the United States, working at
           foreign nation maritime ports abroad in search of weapons of mass
           destruction, as well as working to address CBP activities
           in-country and general CBP related support at embassies. In
           addition, CBP works to protect global supply lines from terrorism
           through both bilateral and multilateral fora.

           The USSS's primary mission includes protecting the U.S. President,
           the Vice President, their families, and other high-ranking U.S.
           government officials from terrorism and other threats, as well as
           investigating and facilitating prosecution of financial and
           electronic crimes, counterfeit currency, and identity theft. USSS
           officials operate abroad with 54 agents staffed to 19 offices in
           15 countries.
			  
			  Department of State

           The Department of State's primary mission is to "create a more
           secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the
           American people and the international community."^6 According to
           State's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, State is charged with
           developing, coordinating, and implementing American
           counterterrorism policy. Within State, the Office of the
           Coordinator for Counterterrorism's (S/CT) mission is to develop
           and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all
           instruments of national power, including law enforcement,
           diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military. S/CT
           provides foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S.
           government activities to combat terrorism, including those of U.S.
           LEAs operating abroad.
			  
^6Fiscal year 2004 to 2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan;
source: http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm .

           DS is the department's law enforcement arm.^7 The Bureau's
           Regional Security Officers (RSO) are responsible for protecting
           the embassy, its diplomats, and their families from criminal and
           terrorist attacks. The RSO is the ambassador's senior advisor on
           law enforcement and security issues. RSOs investigate passport and
           visa fraud, conduct counterintelligence investigations, and can
           provide investigative assistance to local, state, and federal
           agencies. DS personnel also monitor and analyze terrorist
           activities and threats, train foreign police in antiterrorism
           procedures, and protect U.S. and foreign dignitaries. DS has
           approximately 590 RSO special agents assigned to 202 Foreign
           Service posts throughout the world, making it the most widely
           represented U.S. LEA overseas.
			  
           National Security Council

           The National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC to improve the
           coordination of national security concerns among executive
           departments and agencies.^8 The act charges the NSC with more
           effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the
           departments and agencies related to national security.
           Specifically, the act states that the function of the NSC shall be
           to advise the President with respect to the integration of
           domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national
           security to enable the departments and agencies to cooperate more
           effectively in matters involving national security.

           The NSC is chaired by the President. According to the White House,
           its regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) include
           the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
           Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint
           Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the NSC, and
           the Director of National Intelligence is its intelligence advisor.
           The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management
           and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their
           responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and
           agencies, as well as other senior officials, are also invited to
           attend meetings when appropriate.
			  
^7DS in its current form is an outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. (P.L. 99-399; 22 U.S.C. 4801 et.
seq.) It has a broad mandate, in furtherance of the Secretary of State's
responsibilities under this Act, to protect and perform protection
functions in relation to U.S. missions and personnel overseas. As relevant
to this report, DS's specific law enforcement authorities are largely
defined by 22 U.S.C. 2709, which confer on DS a lead law enforcement role
with respect to passport and visa fraud.

^850 U.S.C. 402(a),(b).

           The 9/11 Commission

           The 9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission
           created by congressional legislation in late 2002 and charged with
           preparing a full and complete account of the circumstances
           surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for
           and the immediate response to the attacks.^9 The commission was
           also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against
           future terrorist attacks. On July 22, 2004, the commission
           released its [43]public report .

           The commission identified a number of weaknesses in the ability of
           U.S. LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to the United
           States. For example, it reported that the vast majority of LEAs
           did not consider protecting Americans from terrorist threats their
           primary goal. With the exception of one portion of the FBI, the
           commission found that very little of the U.S. law enforcement
           community was engaged in combating terrorism before the 9/11
           attacks, despite each agency's ability to make contributions to
           the U.S. effort. For example, the commission found that:

           o USMS had almost 4,000 agents on 9/11 and was expert in tracking
           fugitives, but its expertise was not used to identify and
           apprehend terrorists.
           o DEA had more than 4,500 agents on 9/11, and there were a number
           of occasions when DEA agents were able to introduce sources to the
           FBI or CIA for counterterrorism use, despite the agency having no
           direct mission to combat terrorism.
           o The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),^10 with its
           9,000 border patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000
           immigration special agents, had perhaps the greatest potential to
           develop an expanded role in counterterrorism. However, INS was
           instead focused on the formidable challenges posed by illegal
           entry over the southwest border, criminal aliens, and a growing
           backlog in applications for naturalizing immigrants.
			  
^9Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-306,
Title VI.

^10INS was abolished by the Homeland Security Act, and its
responsibilities were divided among ICE, CBP, and Citizens and Immigration
Services, which are now part of DHS.

           o USSS had the mission to protect the President and other
           high-ranking officials, and its agents did not become involved
           with counterterrorism efforts except when terrorist assassination
           plots were rumored or suspected.
           o The Customs Service (which is now part of DHS) deployed agents
           at all points of entry into the United States to screen imported
           goods and collect duties, and while these agents worked alongside
           INS agents, the two groups did not regularly cooperate on joint
           investigations.
           o ATF was used only occasionally by the FBI as a counterterrorism
           resource prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite its
           expertise in ballistics and explosives tracing. The ATF's
           laboratories, investigators, and analyses were critical to the
           investigation of the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade
           Center and the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
           Building in Oklahoma City.

           The commission noted that counterterrorism investigations often
           overlapped with or were cued by other criminal investigations,
           such as for money laundering or smuggling contraband, and that,
           because of this nexus between counterterrorism and criminal
           investigations, LEAs could fundamentally expand U.S. efforts to
           identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America.

           However, the commission found that numerous impediments to using
           U.S. LEAs to protect America from further terrorist attacks
           existed prior to 9/11. For example, the commission found that that
           no one was in charge of using the full capabilities of these
           agencies to identify and disrupt the terrorist threat; roles and
           responsibilities were not adequately defined; accountability was
           diffuse; and the federal government lacked a performance
           monitoring system to track LEA progress at identifying,
           disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. In addition, the
           commission found that LEAs were not oriented to prevent terrorist
           attacks. Finally, the commission found that these agencies
           cooperated only some of the time, and this cooperation did not
           amount to the type of joint action that harnessed the combined
           capabilities of all U.S. LEAs.
			  
			  The National Counterterrorism Center

           In recognition of these and other problems, the commission
           recommended that Congress authorize the creation of a single,
           centralized center for combating terrorism to coordinate all
           instruments of national power, including law enforcement, to
           prevent another attack. In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004
           Intelligence Reform Act, which created the NCTC and charged it
           with conducting "strategic operational planning" for
           counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of
           national power--including diplomatic, financial, military,
           intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement
           activities--within and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of
           preventing future attacks against America and its interests
           worldwide.

           The act defined strategic operational planning to include the
           counterterrorism mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be
           performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and
           the assignment of roles and responsibilities. It also required
           NCTC to monitor the implementation of strategic operational plans
           for each relevant U.S. government department or agency. The NCTC
           is a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
           and reports to the Director on matters of intelligence collection
           and analysis; however, on matters of strategic operational
           planning for counterterrorism, the Director of the NCTC reports
           directly to the President. As a result, the NCTC works under the
           policy direction of the NSC on matters of counterterrorism
           planning.
			  
			  National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key
			  Elements for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration

           A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for
           U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists. However, the strategies lack essential
           elements of a strategic plan and for facilitating interagency
           collaboration, and they do not clearly delineate what role, if
           any, the various LEAs should play in assisting foreign nations to
           combat terrorism. While State was charged in the 2003 National
           Strategy for Combating Terrorism with developing and coordinating
           U.S. counterterrorism policy abroad, it did not develop a plan to
           do so, because, according to State officials, it lacked sufficient
           authority and resources. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act requires
           the NCTC to develop U.S. governmentwide strategic operational
           plans to combat terrorism. According to the act, NCTC's planning
           should include the mission, objectives, tasks to be performed,
           interagency coordination of operational activities, and the
           assignment of roles and responsibilities among participating
           agencies. NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act,
           they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the
           President in June 2006. According to NCTC officials, the
           implementing guidance for the plan was still under development as
           of March 1, 2007.
			  
			  National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist
			  Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism

           A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level
           guidance for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt,
           and prosecute terrorists. For example, the National Security
           Strategy, issued in 2002 and updated in March 2006, states that
           the United States will continue to encourage regional partners to
           take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists, and
           help ensure that foreign nations have the law enforcement,
           military, political, and financial tools necessary to disrupt and
           destroy terrorist operations before they reach American borders.

           Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
           primarily focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from
           further terrorist attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the
           post 9/11 world, stating that, "Our Nation's highest law
           enforcement objective must be the prevention of terrorist acts--a
           significant shift from pre-9/11 objectives." The strategy also
           notes that, in a world where the terrorist threat pays no respect
           to traditional boundaries, the American strategy for homeland
           security cannot stop at the country's borders. It calls for a
           sustained and systematic international agenda to counter the
           global terrorist threat and improve homeland security, and
           identifies a number of initiatives in this area, including (1)
           intensifying international law enforcement cooperation and helping
           foreign nations fight terrorism and (2) augmenting the FBI's
           overseas presence by increasing the number of LEGATs around the
           world. It states that Justice, in cooperation with State, is to
           work with foreign nation counterparts on these law enforcement
           issues.

           Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in
           2003 and updated in 2006, focuses on the United States' efforts to
           combat terrorism abroad. It also provides greater detail on the
           objectives and strategies for U.S. LEAs in working with their
           foreign nation counterparts. According to the strategy, the United
           States is to:

           o Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence
           abroad to further the investigative and operational assistance
           related to the interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of
           terrorist suspects.
           o Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help
           foreign nation LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight
           terrorism through a variety of means, including (1) improved
           legislation, (2) technical assistance, (3) new investigative
           techniques, (4) intelligence sharing, and (5) law enforcement
           training.
           o Enhance operational assistance to expand international
           cooperation to combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law
           enforcement information.

           In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security
           Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both
           updated strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs
           to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and
           prosecuting terrorists abroad. For example, the National Strategy
           to Combat Terrorism supports intensifying training and other types
           of assistance to improve foreign nation LEA capacities to identify
           and disrupt terrorists threats, as well as implementing legal
           reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign nations have the necessary
           laws to carry out this effort, and that investigators,
           prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively prosecute
           terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that this
           approach has succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
           terrorist plots since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
			  
			  The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and
			  Interagency Collaboration

           Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy
           to combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives,
           priorities, outcomes, milestones, and performance measures.^11 In
           March 2003, we reported that strategic plans should clearly define
           objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and
           responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that funding
           necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ
           monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed
           improvements. For example, our past work has found that
           identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal
           agency combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing
           national strategies related to terrorism.

           In addition, GPRA requires each federal agency to develop
           strategic plans that cover a period of at least 5 years and
           include the agency's mission statement; identify the agency's
           general goals and objectives; and describe how the agency intends
           to achieve those goals through its activities and human, capital,
           information, and other resources. Under GPRA, strategic plans are
           the starting point for agencies to set annual performance plans
           for programs and to measure the performance of the programs in
           achieving those goals. Our past work has found that GPRA has the
           potential for greatly enhancing agency performance. For example,
           managers can use performance information to identify problems in
           existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and
           to develop corrective actions.^12
			  
			  ^11 [54]GAO-03-519T .

			  ^12 [55]GAO-05-927 .

           Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency
           collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1)
           define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually
           reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding
           needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and
           responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures,
           and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop
           mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7)
           reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
           agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual
           accountability for collaborative efforts through performance
           management systems.^13 We have specifically noted that, given the
           number of agencies involved in U.S. government efforts to combat
           terrorism, it is particularly important that there be mechanisms
           to coordinate across agencies.^14

           We found that while the national strategies, as well as their
           updates in 2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key
           strategic elements, including those to promote LEA collaboration
           in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists (see table 1). For example, none of the three national
           strategies established joint agency strategies that would
           capitalize on the unique capacity of each LEA to combat terrorism.
           Further, none of them identified funding needs or leveraged
           resources; reached agreement on roles and responsibilities; or
           established procedures to operate across agency boundaries.
           Moreover, none of the strategies included mechanisms to monitor,
           evaluate, and report on their overall results, nor did they
           reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
           agency plans and reports.
			  
			  ^13 [56]GAO-06-15 .

           ^14 [57]GAO-03-519T .

           Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
           Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation
           Assistance to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists

                                                      National     National   
                                           National Strategy for Strategy for 
                                           Security   Homeland    Combating   
Key elements                            Strategy   Security    Terrorism   
Common or joint strategy                                                   
Goals and objectives                                                       
Roles and responsibilities                                                 
Performance measures                                                       
Funding                                                                    
Policies to operate across agency                                          
boundaries                                                                 
Mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and                                       
report on results                                                          

           Legend: = Contains key element.

           Source: GAO analysis of U.S. national strategies.
			  
			  State Department Unable to Fully Implement National Strategy Goal

           According to the 2003 and 2006 versions of the National Strategy
           for Combating Terrorism, State has the lead role in coordinating
           the implementation of the strategy to combat terrorism abroad.
           However, we found that State's office charged with this
           mission--State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)--did not
           develop or implement a plan to use the combined capabilities of
           U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists. According to its mission statement, S/CT is
           to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using
           all instruments of national power, including law enforcement,
           diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military. S/CT is to
           provide foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S.
           government activities to combat terrorism, including those of U.S.
           LEAs operating abroad. This includes coordinating all U.S.
           government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with
           foreign governments and participating in the development,
           coordination, and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
           As discussed below, S/CT has undertaken a number of initiatives to
           coordinate U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, the deputy
           director of S/CT told us that the office lacked the staff,
           resources, and authority necessary to meet the national security
           goal of using LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
           and prosecute terrorists.

           In addition, we found that:

           o S/CT does not have the authority to direct Justice and DHS LEAs
           to undertake this new mission and therefore has limited ability to
           lead a coordinated governmentwide effort. According to State,
           Justice, and DHS officials, only the NSC and, since December 2004,
           the NCTC, have the authority to ensure that executive branch
           agencies are working toward the common objective of assisting
           foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
           o S/CT cites its bilateral consultations process as a key
           mechanism to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists. The consultations can include the
           participation of multiple U.S. departments and agencies. S/CT
           reported that it had led about 83 of these consultations with
           foreign nations between 2001 and 2005. We asked State for access
           to S/CT's records on the bilateral consultations for each of the
           four countries we visited, and found that S/CT had only conducted
           consultations for one of those countries. When we reviewed the
           2002 to 2005 documentation of consultations for that country, we
           found that much of the assistance was for counter-drug efforts or
           general capacity building of the country's legal system, such as
           training of police in basic investigative techniques. The
           assistance also included a $10 million effort to develop a special
           investigative group within the national police, focused on
           terrorist investigations and crisis response.^15 According to
           representatives from the national police force, the U.S.
           assistance brought about a significant improvement in their
           ability to investigate terrorist attacks, but it was not focused
           on improving their ability to identify and disrupt terrorist
           attacks. In addition, we reviewed the three bilateral
           consultations held between 2002 and 2005 for this country and
           found there was no discussion of any initiatives to use the
           combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to assist the foreign nation to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
           o The 2003 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism directed State to
           take the lead in developing specific regional strategies to defeat
           terrorism. State told us that, in response to a NSC tasking, it
           began developing interagency-coordinated Regional Action Plans
           (RAP). However, State officials told us the RAPs were incomplete,
           had never been implemented, and were now out of date. State said
           that it transferred management of the RAPs to the NCTC in 2005.
           However, none of the LEAs or embassy officials we met with said
           they had received any guidance based on the RAPs, nor any from the
           NCTC.
			  
^15This effort was funded by State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
program, which was created in 1983 to assist civilian security and law
enforcement personnel in police procedures that address terrorism.
			  
           o In 2006, S/CT began a new effort called the Regional Strategic
           Initiative that stressed a regional approach to combating
           terrorism. Four Regional Strategic Initiatives were established in
           2006: for Southeast Asia, Iraq and its surrounding region, the
           Horn of Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean. However, based on
           documentation we reviewed, the Southeast Asia initiative did not
           include the use of the combined capabilities of LEAs to assist
           foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. For
           example, in the documentation we reviewed--which focused on
           identifying terrorists transiting through a region where several
           high-profile attacks against U.S. interests had occurred--there
           was only one sentence dedicated to law enforcement, and it focused
           solely on DHS LEAs and border control issues.

           A March 2006 report by State's Office of Inspector General (OIG)
           found that S/CT faced significant problems in meeting its mandate
           to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism assistance to foreign nations.
           The OIG found that S/CT was viewed by many elements of the U.S.
           government as "marginal" to the Global War on Terror. It also
           found that the difficulty of helping to coordinate the wide scope
           of U.S. counterterrorism efforts abroad challenged S/CT and that
           it had not fulfilled its oversight role over U.S. assistance to
           foreign nations.^16

           The OIG also found that some S/CT components lacked sufficient
           resources to carry out their responsibilities and, specifically,
           that S/CT's regional affairs unit was under funded, and "scarcely"
           had the resources to meet its mandate to provide advice,
           coordination, and action on regional and bilateral
           counterterrorism issues. The OIG also stated that, if
           counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State
           could not afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed,
           with no career paths for its counterterrorism officers.

           The OIG found that, in accordance with State's mandate in the 2003
           National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, S/CT had worked hard to
           exercise its interagency lead in developing Regional Action Plans.
           However, according to the inspection report, observers reported to
           the OIG that the exercise did not produce concrete, comprehensive
           strategies, although it did produce a useful dialogue and the
           first detailed matrix of current and planned U.S. counterterrorism
           strategies in each region.
                   
^16U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office
of Inspector General, Inspection of the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, OIG Report ISP-I-06-25A (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22,
2006).

           The OIG report made numerous recommendations intended to improve
           S/CT's ability to coordinate U.S. assistance to combat terrorism
           abroad. It made several recommendations about adding staff to
           individual units, but did not make broader recommendations on
           overall organizational structure or funding levels. According to
           an OIG official, as of January 26, 2007, S/CT was in the process
           of addressing all of the report's recommendations directed to it.

           In responding to our draft report, State indicated that S/CT
           continues to be hampered by the lack of resources discussed in the
           March 2006 State OIG report, limiting S/CT's ability to coordinate
           the U.S. government's international counterterrorism activities.
           In addition, State said that our draft did not give its new
           Regional Strategic Initiatives sufficient credit and that law
           enforcement coordination was a key aspect of the process. However,
           State did not provide us additional information to support this
           position and did not comment on our finding that the one Regional
           Strategic Initiative we reviewed showed little involvement by U.S.
           or foreign nation law enforcement agencies.
			  
			  NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing
			  Guidance Is Still under Development

           In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform
           Act, creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic
           operational plans to combat terrorism using every element of
           national power, including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the
           NCTC is expected to (1) conduct strategic operational planning for
           counterterrorism activities; (2) integrate all instruments of
           national power in such planning, including law enforcement,
           diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial activities; (3)
           assign roles and responsibilities to lead departments and
           agencies; (4) ensure that agencies have access to intelligence and
           intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism
           plans and accomplish their assigned activities; and (5) monitor
           implementation of these operational plans.

           In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the
           lack of a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the
           national security strategy had been a void that stretched back for
           decades.^17 According to the director, what has long been missing
           is a plan to ensure that national strategies are implemented at
           the operational level in a coordinated, integrated fashion, and
           that there has been no formal process to translate the national
           strategies into strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to
           lead agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In
           addition, there has been no plan to ensure the coordination,
           integration, and synchronization of joint departmental operations,
           or any effort to monitor the combined impact of the multiple
           agencies engaged in implementing the national security strategy.

           NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had
           drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in
           June of 2006. According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance
           for the plan was still under development as of March 1, 2007, and
           they would not discuss the plan, its contents, or the implementing
           guidance.
			  
			  LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
			  Prosecute Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors

           Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to assist
           foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists,
           including the expansion of the FBI presence abroad; assistance to
           help foreign nations identify and disrupt terrorist threats at
           certain maritime ports; and antiterrorism training to assist
           foreign nation law enforcement personnel. However, LEA efforts
           have been hindered by a lack of (1) clearly articulated roles and
           responsibilities to assist foreign nations in combating terrorism;
           (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources
           to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess progress
           at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and
           reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures to promote joint
           investigations and operations between U.S. and foreign nation LEAs
           and coordinate LEA technical assistance to foreign nation LEAs;
           and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to tailor LEA
           technical and operational assistance to specific foreign nation
           needs for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.
			  
^17Admiral John Scott Redd, in testimony before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006.
           
           LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations Combat Terrorism

           Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations
           combat terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to
           operationally assist foreign nations to identify and disrupt
           terrorist attacks before they occur, and it has responded to
           specific terrorist attacks by assisting foreign nations to
           identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In addition, new
           programs have been specifically designed to assist foreign nations
           to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats, such as the
           DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some existing
           technical assistance programs, like State's Antiterrorism
           Assistance (ATA) program, have been significantly expanded in an
           effort to improve foreign nation capabilities. While this list is
           not all inclusive, these represent some significant U.S. efforts
           to use U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
           found that these three efforts were limited by a variety of
           factors.
			  
			    The FBI Has Made Some Effort to Increase Assistance to Foreign
				 Nations, but it  Faces Staffing Limitations

           In our past work, we found that, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
           the FBI has permanently realigned a substantial number of its
           domestic field agents from traditional criminal investigative
           programs to counterterrorism investigations.^18 In 2002, the FBI
           Director announced that, in keeping with its new priorities, the
           agency would move more than 500 field agent positions from its
           drug, violent crime, and white-collar crime programs to
           counterterrorism. The FBI has transferred more agent positions to
           work on counterterrorism than it had originally announced,
           including through the short-term reassignment of additional field
           agents from drug and other law enforcement areas. Prior to the
           FBI's change in priorities, about 25 percent of the FBI's field
           agent positions were allocated to counterterrorism,
           counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs. As a result of the
           staff reprogramming and funding for additional special agent
           positions received through various appropriations, the FBI
           staffing levels for these areas had increased domestically to
           about 36 percent in 2004 and represented the single largest
           concentration of FBI resources.

           The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the
           United States will augment the FBI's overseas presence. The FBI's
           Strategic Plan states that it will expand the role of its LEGAT
           offices overseas from that of a simple liaison office to one with
           a dynamic operational partnership with foreign nation
           counterparts. According to Justice and FBI documents and
           officials, this includes undertaking joint investigative and
           operational partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to identify and
           stop terrorist attacks against U.S. interests around the globe. We
           found that the FBI has both responded to specific terrorist
           attacks by operationally assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify
           and prosecute terrorists involved in those attacks, as well as
           tried to proactively assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
           and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the FBI
           provided limited but vital operational assistance to locate
           terrorist suspects and provided key evidence for their successful
           prosecution. In another country we visited, the FBI was working
           proactively with ICE and with foreign nation counterparts to track
           suspicious migrants and identify and disrupt potential terrorists
           before they entered the United States.

           In addition, in response to our requests for their accomplishments
           assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists, the FBI provided some anecdotal information on its
           cooperation with and assistance to foreign nations. For example,
           in one country where terrorists had attacked U.S. citizens,
           foreign nation authorities permitted the FBI to participate in
           witness interviews. In another example, foreign nation officials
           planning to provide amnesty to approximately 2,000 criminals
           allowed the FBI to document the criminals' biometric data prior to
           their release. In a third example, the FBI provided approximately
           $1 million worth of forensic equipment to support a foreign
           nation's law enforcement entities. However, FBI officials told us
           they lacked a centralized database or a performance monitoring
           system needed to collect, store, and report on their
           accomplishments and, therefore, were unable to provide us with a
           systematic or comprehensive set of accomplishments in assisting
           foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

           According to the FBI, it has increased the number of personnel and
           offices abroad since 2001. In May 2007, the FBI reported that,
           prior to 9/11, the FBI had 127 agents and 74 support personnel
           stationed in 44 LEGATs and four suboffices; however, as of May
           2007, the FBI stated that it now has 167 agents and 111 support
           positions staffing its 59 LEGATs and 14 suboffices abroad. In
           addition, the FBI has revised the number of countries covered by
           regional offices, in an effort to reduce the geographic span of
           coverage for the LEGAT offices. For example, before 2005, LEGAT
           Paris provided coverage for 17 countries in Africa. However, since
           the regional LEGAT office in Rabat, Morocco, LEGAT Paris has
           covered only France and Monaco.

           Despite these actions, we found that the impact of the FBI's
           expansion and realignment to combat terrorism has been limited in
           some posts overseas. We found during overseas work in 2006 that
           while the FBI has increased its overseas offices, not all of those
           offices had been staffed with permanent positions, or permanent
           positions remained unfilled. For example, although the FBI had
           permanent LEGAT offices in two countries where there had been
           terrorist attacks against American interests, we found at the time
           of our fieldwork in 2006 that temporary FBI staff were filling
           slots designated as permanent staff positions. Both FBI
           headquarters staff and agents in the field at all four countries
           we visited said that it was essential to have long-term rotations
           in a country in order to establish the types of working
           relationships with foreign country LEAs needed to effectively
           assist them to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

           Further, the LEGATs in three of the four countries we visited said
           they generally lacked the resources, time, and staff to develop
           the close, collaborative relationships necessary to develop joint
           investigations or operations. In one country we visited, where FBI
           rotations are generally limited to 1 year and the current LEGAT
           was there for only a 90-day tour, the LEGAT told us that he and
           his staff had little interaction with the national LEAs in the
           country because of their short tours. In contrast, in the fourth
           country, which had the greatest number of LEAs of any embassy we
           visited, and where the LEGAT office was more fully staffed with
           permanent FBI agents and analysts, the FBI was providing both
           investigative and operational assistance to the foreign nation to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

           FBI headquarters management, as well as two temporary duty agents
           in the field, told us in 2006 that, while the LEGAT positions were
           approved for the two countries that had temporary staff filling
           the permanent FBI slots, the FBI had difficulty filling the
           positions due to the bureau's lack of career incentives or
           overseas staffing culture. In 2006, the deputy assistant director
           of the counterterrorism division told us that the FBI has had
           difficulty staffing overseas LEGAT positions for years and that,
           despite recent transformation efforts, it has not yet solved the
           problem of staffing overseas positions by providing career rewards
           and incentives to agents or by developing a culture that promotes
           the importance and value of overseas duty. As a result, permanent
           FBI positions were either unfilled or staffed with nonpermanent
           staff on temporary duty, and the LEGATs have been limited in their
           ability to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists.

           In December 2006, FBI officials told us that, in an attempt to
           improve staffing at high-threat posts, the FBI Director
           implemented career incentives in June 2006 to encourage staff to
           volunteer for overseas placement.^19 In May 2007, the FBI stated
           that this career incentives package addressed the difficulties
           encountered in staffing the high threat LEGAT offices.^20

           In responding to our draft report in May 2007, the FBI stated that
           all of the LEGAT positions at its nine highest threat posts were
           now staffed with full-time, permanent LEGAT staff. Specifically,
           the FBI stated that it now has permanent, full-time FBI personnel
           assigned to the two high-threat countries where we found only
           temporary staff in 2006. However, the FBI provided no additional
           documentation to support this contention. In addition, the FBI
           observed that in two of the four locations we visited, both
           arguably high-threat posts, the respective LEGATs departed post
           out of the normal rotational cycles and with little advance
           notice, creating temporarily unfilled positions. However, in one
           of those posts, we were told that the position was difficult to
           fill and it would not be permanently filled for almost a year.

           The FBI stated that it also relies on short-term rotations of 2 to
           6 months and temporary short term assignments to supplement
           permanent staff. According to the FBI, through the use of
           deputies, assistant LEGATs and temporarily assigned personnel,
           LEGATs are able to establish and maintain liaison with principal
           law enforcement and intelligence/security services in designated
           foreign territories while meeting the FBI's international
           responsibilities in international terrorism, foreign
           counterintelligence, organized crime, and general criminal
           matters. However, FBI officials at headquarters and overseas in
           all four countries we visited agreed that the types of
           relationships necessary to facilitate joint investigations and
           operations with foreign nations cannot be built or sustained by
           agents on short-term, temporary assignments at overseas posts.
			  
			    CSI Works with Foreign Nations, but It Has Had Limitations

           CSI, which targets for inspection at foreign seaports high-risk
           cargo shipments before they leave for the United States, was
           created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S. law
           enforcement personnel to be physically colocated with foreign
           nation LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America.
           As more than 11 million cargo containers are off-loaded at U.S.
           seaports each year, CSI was developed to extend the U.S. zone of
           security outward by working with foreign nation counterparts to
           identify and examine sea containers that pose a risk for
           terrorism. Under the initiative, foreign governments allow CBP
           personnel to be stationed at foreign seaports to use intelligence
           and automated risk assessment information to target shipments
           identified as at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction
           (WMD) or other terrorist contraband. As of September 2006, CSI was
           in place at 50 ports overseas in 29 countries, with a 2007 goal of
           being operational in 58 ports.
			  
^19Because these incentives had just been implemented, we did not assess
their impact on staffing problems abroad.

^20Because FBI provided these comments after our audit time frames, we
were unable to verify the FBI's statement.

           In 2005, we reported that CSI had led to improved information
           sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened
           level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the
           need to identify and disrupt terrorist threats.^21 However, we
           also found that several issues limited its effectiveness. These
           included the inability to fully staff some ports because of
           diplomatic constraints, such as the need for foreign government
           permission, and practical considerations, such as workspace
           limitations. In addition, the technologies used to detect WMDs
           have limitations. We concluded that, given these issues, CBP had
           limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI were
           effective at detecting and identifying terrorist WMDs.

           At the CSI location we visited, an ICE law enforcement agent was
           colocated at a foreign nation maritime port and worked directly
           with foreign nation law enforcement officials in their security
           area. The ICE official had been there 2 years and was learning the
           local language; he and foreign nation officials agreed that, by
           working closely together during that time, they had developed a
           trusting, collaborative relationship necessary to conduct joint
           investigations. While this effort had not led to the
           identification or disruption of terrorist-related shipments, the
           foreign nation customs control director said that, to his
           knowledge, this was the first time that a U.S. law enforcement
           official was colocated with foreign nation LEAs to conduct joint
           investigations to identify and disrupt terrorist threats against
           the United States. He recommended greater efforts to colocate U.S.
           law enforcement officers with other counterparts in the country.
           He also recommended that, to improve collaboration, U.S. officials
           should learn the local language and work within the local law
           enforcement offices for extended periods.
			  
^21GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum
Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection
Efforts, [59]GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).
          
           State Has Expanded the ATA Program
  
           In 1983, State established the ATA program to train civilian
           security and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments
           in police procedures that address terrorism. DS administers the
           ATA program. DS officers work with the foreign country's
           government and a team from that country's U.S. mission to develop
           training in areas such as bomb detection, crime scene
           investigation, airport and building security, maritime
           protections, and VIP protection. (See fig. 1 for an example of ATA
           training to foreign nation LEAs.)

           Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
           Exercises

           According to State's Congressional Budget Justifications, after
           the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ATA program funding more than tripled,
           from approximately $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to over $122
           million in fiscal year 2006. A March 2006 report by State's OIG
           recognized that ATA funding and the number of students trained had
           increased. However, the report also stated that the program's
           procedures should be improved. Specifically, the report
           recommended that ATA courses should receive timely, independent,
           in-depth evaluations to establish and maintain quality control.^22

^22On November 16, 2006, we initiated a review of the ATA program,
including the extent to which State has assessed program outcomes and
achieved program objectives.
			  
			  LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations Have Been Limited by Several Factors

           LEA efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists have been limited by several factors.
           Specifically, we found that LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly
           defined roles and responsibilities to assist foreign nations; (2)
           guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources to
           assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess progress
           at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and
           reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures needed to
           promote joint investigations and operations between U.S. and
           foreign nation LEAs and coordinate LEA technical assistance to
           foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs
           assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to
           specific foreign nation needs for identifying, disrupting, and
           prosecuting terrorists.
			  
			    Most LEAs Lacked Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities

           Our past work has stressed the importance of a strategy to combat
           terrorism that would clearly define the roles and responsibilities
           of each agency for meeting specific objectives related to
           combating terrorism. Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort
           where interagency collaboration is essential, such as this effort
           to use the combined capabilities of each LEA to assist foreign
           nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, we have
           recommended that agencies agree on roles and responsibilities so
           each agency understands its role and how it supports the greater
           overall effort.

           We found that the national strategies' broad strategic objectives
           have not been clearly translated to agency-specific roles and
           responsibilities. In particular, with the exception of Justice and
           the White House issuing some guidance to the FBI, we found
           Justice, DHS, and State had not issued guidance to their component
           LEAs to implement this new national security goal of assisting
           foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists, and
           most U.S. LEAs--including ATF,^23 CBP, DEA, DS, ICE, USMS, and
           USSS--continued to operate based on their traditional objectives
           and guidance. As a result, LEAs lacked clearly defined roles and
           responsibilities for implementing the broad objective articulated
           in the national strategies to assist foreign nations to identify,
           disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
			  
^23ATF officials told us that ATF incorporated terrorism-prevention into
its strategic plan but that it had not received or issued guidance
specific to assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.

           As of February 2007, no single LEA was in charge of coordinating
           or directing the efforts of all the U.S. LEAs to assist foreign
           nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. Some of the
           presidential directives governing LEA activities had not been
           updated since the mid to late 1990s, and with the exception of the
           FBI, none of the other LEAs had been provided guidance to make
           assisting foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist
           threats a primary mission.

           The FBI has been given some guidance on its roles and
           responsibilities from the White House and Justice. The FBI
           traditionally has had the general statutory authority to conduct,
           both domestically and overseas, investigations related to criminal
           and terrorist activities, including those overseas.^24 Under the
           general authority, the Attorney General, in regulations, has
           placed the FBI in the lead agency role for investigating crimes of
           terrorism in the United States.^25 In 1995, Presidential Decision
           Directive 39 confirmed the FBI's lead agency role in investigating
           terrorism. In 2002, the Attorney General issued guidance to the
           FBI that its new priority was to act to prevent terrorist
           attacks,^26 and the FBI has been in the process of transforming to
           meet that mission.

           In 2003, the Attorney General issued further guidance to the FBI
           authorizing it to work with foreign nations to provide
           investigative and technical assistance for combating terrorism.^27
           In turn, the FBI's 2004 to 2009 strategic plan reflects this new
           direction, stating that the FBI plans to increase its presence
           abroad and increase joint operations with foreign nations to
           combat terrorism. As a result of the guidance, FBI officials in
           Washington and in the countries we visited told us that FBI agents
           abroad were expected to work with foreign nations to identify,
           disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, with the exception of
           the LEGAT in one of the four countries we visited, FBI officials
           told us that the implementation of that goal was still in
           transition and that there was some uncertainty as to how to
           accomplish that goal, given their limited staff and other overseas
           duties.
			  
^2418 U.S.C. 2331, 2332, and 3052; 28 U.S.C. 533; 28 U.S.C. 3052.

^2528 C.F.R. 0.85(l).

^26Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations.

^27Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations
and Foreign Intelligence Collection.

           According to FBI officials, as of December 2006, the issue of
           roles and responsibilities for the LEAs remains unresolved and is
           still subject to on-going debates within the administration. DHS
           officials reiterated similar concerns and, in response to our
           preliminary findings, agreed that their roles and responsibilities
           related to combating terrorism abroad could be more clearly
           articulated to ensure understanding among DHS officials working
           abroad. In particular, DHS officials told us, in January 2007,
           that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have determined who will lead
           the effort to use the combined capabilities of the LEAs to assist
           foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, or
           clearly defined their roles and responsibilities. State indicated
           that it was not in charge of LEA efforts to assist foreign nations
           to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and referred us to
           Justice and DHS for such plans. State indicated that this was the
           responsibility of the NSC or the White House, and that neither
           entity had clearly defined or identified the roles and
           responsibilities of State, Justice, and DHS LEAs.

           We found other examples related to the lack of guidance on roles
           and responsibilities, including the following:

           o The DEA is a "single mission" agency dedicated to reducing the
           threat, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Although it has not
           been given the specific goal to assist foreign nations to
           identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists, in response to the
           9/11 terrorist attacks, it has expanded its intelligence
           capabilities and information sharing, and instituted a formal
           procedure to query its in-country sources on terrorist-related
           information, which is then shared with the FBI and other agencies
           involved with efforts to fight terrorism. In addition, in February
           of 2004, the Administrator of DEA testified before Congress that

           "During December 2001, the DEA formed a Special Coordination Unit
           at its Special Operations Division... [which] coordinates all DEA
           intelligence and investigations having a possible nexus to
           terrorism and shares information with agencies responsible for
           coordinating terrorist intelligence and investigations. DEA drug
           investigations have generated such narco-terrorist related
           intelligence and investigations both domestically and
           internationally."

           o While the strategic plans for both ICE and CBP generally charged
           them with preventing terrorists from entering the United States,
           neither agency is explicitly tasked with assisting foreign nations
           to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Overseas, we found
           that ICE and CBP were working proactively with foreign nation
           officials in one country we visited to identify terrorists threats
           bound for the United States. However, ICE officials, who comprise
           the primary DHS law enforcement presence abroad, were present in
           the remaining three countries we visited but were generally not
           assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify, disrupt, or prosecute
           terrorists. There were no CBP officials in these three countries.
           The lack of clear guidance was evident when we spoke with DHS
           officials abroad. For example, some ICE and CBP officials told us
           they were responsible for working with foreign nations to stop
           attacks, while other ICE and CBP officials said they did not have
           that responsibility. ICE officials told us in December 2006 that
           they were not working with foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
           and prosecute terrorists because neither the NSC, the NCTC, nor
           DHS had given them any directives or funding to do so.
           o Two LEAs--USMS and ATF--indicated that they had not been given
           clear roles in the U.S. effort to assist foreign nations to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists despite having the
           capabilities to do so. For example, officials from USMS, which
           specializes in tracking, capturing, and extraditing criminals,
           indicated they had unique skills and capabilities that could be
           used to identify and capture terrorists abroad. Similarly,
           officials from ATF, which specializes in tracing weapons and
           explosives, told us they could help identify bombs and other
           weapons used by terrorists.
           o The USSS has not been tasked with assisting foreign nations to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. According to USSS
           officials, the service does not currently have a role in combating
           terrorism abroad, nor does it want this role. However, it could
           provide assistance in investigative techniques and information
           sharing on terrorist-related cases. USSS officials said that the
           service wants to maintain its traditional focus and not assume new
           responsibilities related to combating terrorism.
           o RSOs are charged with providing a safe and secure environment
           for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.^28 A key responsibility
           for RSOs is identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks against
           U.S. embassies and personnel. However, the RSOs have been given no
           post 9/11 guidance from State on how to assist foreign nations to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs voiced
           confusion about this role. In three of the four countries we
           visited, RSOs told us that State has never given the RSOs the goal
           to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists, and RSOs have never been given a specific role or
           directives to implement this aspect of the national security
           strategy. However, we did find some cases where RSOs were
           undertaking initiatives to assist the foreign nation identify,
           disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In one country, the RSO was
           critical in embassy efforts to support the foreign nation to
           capture and prosecute terrorists responsible for attacks against
           Americans and others. In that same country, an assistant RSO
           stationed at a consulate, working with foreign nation police,
           exposed a criminal operation selling counterfeit and legitimate
           visas and other travel documents that could be used by terrorists
           to gain entry into the United States. In commenting on our
           findings, a senior official with DS agreed that the primary
           responsibility of RSOs was the protection of the embassy and its
           officials, and said that additional directives would be needed
           from the NSC if RSO responsibilities were to be expanded to
           include assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists. In commenting on the draft report, State
           indicated that broadening DS's law enforcement mandate to play a
           broader role could require statutory changes in addition to new
           directives.

           At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not provided
           guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign nations to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Ambassadors or deputy
           chiefs of missions at each embassy we visited voiced their concern
           that, despite combating terrorism being the embassy's highest
           priority, they received little to no guidance on how to design a
           coordinated assistance program using the full capacities of U.S.
           technical and operational assistance of LEAs, and ensure that LEAs
           had the necessary goals, skills, capabilities, and time to work
           closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist attacks.
           In all four countries, ambassadors and deputy chiefs of missions
           believed that the roles and responsibilities of LEAs for assisting
           foreign nations to identify and prevent future attacks needed to
           be clarified. Foreign nation officials in two of the countries we
           visited said that they were confused by the number of officers and
           agencies at embassies working on counterterrorism issues, and said
           they did not know which LEA was in charge, or which LEA to work
           with regarding specific terrorist threats.
			  
^28RSO authorities are found in the State Department Basic Authorities Act
(P.L. 84-885, section 37; 22 U.S.C. 2709) . RSOs are responsible for
implementing and managing State's security and law enforcement programs
for a geographic region, which includes at least one Foreign Service post.
RSOs are resident at a particular post and may have constituent posts
within their region for which they are responsible. The RSOs or Post
Security Officers are responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management
of security programs at their constituent posts (12 FAM 422.1). The RSOs
responsibilities and duties are enumerated in 12 FAM 422.2 through 422.5.
			  
           Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission, who are responsible for
           trying to coordinate law enforcement agencies at embassies, stated
           that--given the strategic importance of stopping further attacks,
           and the complexity of disparate U.S. programs and agencies that
           can be used to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists--they believed that State should consider
           appointing an officer with law enforcement experience or training
           who would be dedicated to helping embassies develop, implement,
           and monitor U.S. law enforcement efforts. They suggested that a
           "coordinator for combating terrorism" could be placed in
           high-threat posts to integrate LEA capabilities and ensure use of
           their full expertise to cover the range of vulnerabilities
           terrorists could exploit to harm U.S. interests.

           During our work in four countries, we found numerous issues
           related to the lack of clear guidance on roles and
           responsibilities of LEAs in assisting foreign nations to identify,
           disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example:

           o In the four countries we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of
           mission, and political officers, who were responsible for
           implementing this new national security goal, said that they lack
           the guidance, training, and funding to effectively use LEA
           technical or operational assistance to assist foreign nations. As
           a result, they questioned whether they could effectively implement
           and coordinate a joint U.S.-foreign nation assistance effort to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists that pose a threat to
           U.S. citizens and interests.
           o In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and
           responsibilities between ICE and the FBI led to both investigative
           and operational problems, according to foreign nation, ICE, and
           FBI officials. ICE was responsible for tracking special interest
           aliens, while the FBI was responsible for identifying terrorists
           trying to enter the United States. Because it was unclear whether
           some of these special interest aliens were migrants or potential
           terrorists--and ICE and FBI were not given clear guidance to
           determine which LEA had the lead role--foreign nation and agency
           officials noted instances where joint U.S.-foreign nation
           investigations or operations were poorly coordinated. As a result,
           ICE and FBI, unknowingly working with different foreign nation
           LEAs, moved in on the same subject. According to the foreign
           nation law enforcement and FBI officials, such actions may have
           compromised several of their investigations.
           o In another country we visited, neither DHS nor the former
           agencies that now largely constitute ICE and CBP--including the
           Customs Service and INS--were given a role when State designed the
           embassy's extensive program to assist in controlling and
           documenting migration flows across a known terrorist-rich border
           region, despite their expertise in border control, immigration,
           and customs issues. State officials told us that they were given
           no guidance to seek the expertise of DHS or these agencies when
           State designed the program in 2002. These agencies were
           subsequently abolished and their responsibilities divided among
           new entities in DHS, yet DHS officials told us in January 2007
           that they were unaware of the program and had never been consulted
           on it. According to embassy officials, the key goal of the program
           related to identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists
           crossing this border region, has not resulted in the prosecution
           of any terrorists.
           o In a third country that served as both a source country and a
           transit point for terrorists, the ambassador told us that, despite
           the need for DHS expertise to improve border control, he has
           delayed approving three full time DHS positions because of a
           mismatch between his and DHS's views on DHS's specific roles and
           responsibilities once in-country. The ambassador said that he
           believed the DHS representatives should be colocated with foreign
           nation police at airports, maritime ports, immigration offices,
           customs offices, and land borders to develop the strong
           collaborative relationships necessary to conduct joint
           investigations or operations. However, he was concerned that the
           DHS officials would principally work from the embassy.

           In commenting on our findings, officials from State, Justice, and
           DHS agreed that there was a lack of clear guidance instructing
           LEAs to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists. Officials noted that the NSC and now the NCTC have the
           authority to compel U.S. LEAs to work together in a coordinated,
           systematic fashion to help stop terrorist attacks. Officials said
           that no executive department has the authority to direct the LEAs
           from other departments to focus on this goal, and they noted that
           recommendations to individual agencies would not result in a
           unified multidepartmental effort to help foreign nations combat
           terrorism.

           In a February 2007 letter to GAO, the Senior Counsel for National
           Security Affairs at Justice stated that, for operational
           assistance to foreign nations, the FBI was designated the lead
           federal LEA with jurisdiction to investigate terrorism-related
           crimes. However, this view was not shared by other LEAs in
           Washington and in the embassies we visited. LEAs, including
           Justice's FBI, USMS, ATF, and DEA; DHS's ICE, CBP, and USSS; and
           State's RSOs all told us there was no lead LEA charged with using
           the combined capabilities of federal LEAs to assist foreign
           nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In December
           2006, FBI officials agreed that the issue of which LEA would lead
           this effort was still unresolved.
			  
			    Executive Departments and LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance on Setting
				 Funding Priorities for Assisting Foreign Nations to Combat
				 Terrorism

           Our guidelines on developing an effective collaborative strategy
           note the importance of identifying needs and addressing them by
           leveraging resources to meet strategic objectives. In addition, in
           our past work on agencies creating strategic plans to meet GPRA
           requirements, we reported that the alignment of activities and
           resources is critical.^29 In this review, however, we found that
           State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs lacked clear guidance on
           setting funding priorities to meet the national security goal of
           helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists.

           Officials from State, Justice, and DHS told us that they are
           attempting to fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with
           limited staffing and funds, and without guidance from the NSC on
           reprioritizing funds from other activities to assist foreign
           nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result,
           their efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists have been hindered. For example, a March 2006
           report by State's OIG found that S/CT lacked adequate resources to
           meet its mandate to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism assistance
           abroad. The OIG found that S/CT's regional affairs unit was
           under-funded to provide advice, coordination, and action on
           regional and bilateral counterterrorism issues and that, if
           counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State
           could not afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed.

           In addition, as noted above, while the FBI has reprioritized and
           realigned a significant amount of its resources domestically from
           criminal investigation to efforts to combat terrorism, we found
           that this realignment has been limited overseas. For example,
           senior FBI officials from the Counterterrorism Division and the
           Office of International Operations told us that they lacked funds
           to establish offices and permanently fill LEGAT positions in some
           high-threat posts. Furthermore, DHS officials from ICE and CBP
           agreed that NSC has not provided guidance on how to reprioritize
           funding to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists. As a result, officials said they were
           limited in their ability to undertake new initiatives in this area
           or to fully staff existing positions already approved by
           embassies.
			  
^29GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [60]GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).

           In the countries we visited, we observed that this lack of
           guidance limited the embassies' ability to assist foreign nations
           to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In four countries
           we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and others
           indicated that, due to the lack of guidance from either the NSC,
           NCTC, or their executive departments, LEA headquarters in
           Washington have generally not reallocated funding from lower
           priority activities to support the new national priority of
           assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists. In one country, the ambassador said that the most
           significant concern facing the embassy was the mismatch between
           U.S. objectives and available funding for assisting foreign
           nations to combat terrorism.

           In all four countries we visited, embassy, LEA, and foreign nation
           officials identified terrorist transit and border vulnerabilities
           as the primary challenges; yet, in three of these countries,
           officials said that, due to funding not being realigned to support
           the goal of assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism, they
           did not provide specific assistance to foreign nation LEAs to
           address these needs. Specifically, ICE officials in one country
           told us that because funding had not been reprioritized, ICE had
           not provided training to foreign nation LEAs to counter
           immigration, travel, and border threats. In another country,
           although the embassy wanted DHS officials to assist the foreign
           nation for port security, customs, and immigration, DHS officials
           from a regional office were unable to provide this assistance
           because funding limitations restricted their ability to visit the
           country, and, moreover, they were focused on performing their
           other responsibilities when they were able to visit.

           In all four countries we visited, there was more funding designed
           to assist foreign nations combat illegal drugs and criminals than
           to combat terrorism, despite the fact that efforts to combat
           terrorism were the highest priority of each embassy. For example,
           in one country with an extremely high terrorist threat to American
           interests globally, State provided more than six times the amount
           of funding to stop illicit drugs and crime ($220.2 million) than
           it did for antiterrorism assistance ($34.5 million) from fiscal
           years 2002 to 2006. We found similar issues at the other three
           embassies we visited. For instance, in one country, the deputy
           chief of mission told us that most of the training and assistance
           funding there was dedicated for counter narcotics efforts, even
           though drugs were no longer a key strategic concern in that
           country. From fiscal years 2002 to 2006, this country received
           $12.3 million in funding intended to combat drugs, compared with
           $8.8 million for assisting the foreign nation to combat terrorism.

           Based on a review of our findings, State Department officials
           representing offices involved with U.S. efforts to combat crime,
           drugs, and terrorism abroad, agreed that there was significantly
           more funding available for combating crime and drugs than for
           assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. However, officials
           said that some of the funding allotted to help foreign nations to
           combat crime and drugs was fungible and could be used to combat
           terrorism. We found that, in all four countries we visited,
           embassies used funding intended for objectives such as combating
           crime and drugs, and improving law enforcement and judicial
           capacity, to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists. In other instances, embassies allowed some
           key needs to not be fully addressed because funding had not been
           reprioritized from other activities.

           In a February 2007 letter to GAO, Justice stated that the ability
           of foreign nations to combat terrorism depends on having
           functioning law enforcement and judicial sector institutions and
           professionals capable of carrying out complex investigations and
           prosecutions. While these capabilities are not terrorism specific,
           they are often prerequisites to an ability to identify, disrupt,
           and prosecute terrorists, Justice stated. As a result, some
           general capacity building training can potentially provide a
           benefit to a foreign nation's ability to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists.
			  
           LEAs Are Not Systematically Assessing Their Accomplishments or 
			  Progress in   Assisting Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt,
			  and Prosecute Terrorists

           The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2004 Intelligence
           Reform Act, and GPRA all require the monitoring of LEA performance
           to measure progress toward stated goals and objectives. The
           National Strategy for Homeland Security addresses the need for
           accountability in the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. It
           states that every department or agency involved with combating
           terrorism will create performance monitoring systems that will
           allow agencies to measure their progress, make resource allocation
           decisions, and adjust priorities accordingly. In addition, the
           2004 Intelligence Reform Act charged the NCTC with monitoring the
           implementation of strategic operational plans to combat terrorism
           and obtaining information from each department, agency, or element
           of the U.S. government relevant for monitoring the progress of
           each entity in implementing such plans. Moreover, GPRA requires
           that agencies in charge of U.S. government programs and activities
           identify goals and report on the degree to which goals are met.
           Our own past work has also stressed the importance of a strategy
           to combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives,
           priorities, outcomes, milestones, and measures to use in
           monitoring performance.

           We found that none of the LEAs had in place a systematic method
           for determining progress or documenting their accomplishments in
           assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists, either for technical or operational assistance. As a
           result, these departments or agencies generally found it difficult
           to assess whether they were making progress implementing this
           national security goal, or to determine what was needed to improve
           their overall assistance to foreign countries.

           To ensure we fully reflected U.S. efforts in assisting foreign
           nations, we requested from all eight LEAs a comprehensive list of
           all key accomplishments from 2001 to 2005. However, LEA and
           executive department officials told us that, because they have no
           systematic method of documenting their efforts to assist foreign
           nations, they could provide anecdotal information but no
           comprehensive list of accomplishments.

           State, Justice, and DHS agreed they lacked systems to
           systematically document their accomplishments or assess their
           progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists. State said that its bureau performance
           plans, State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism, and U.S.
           mission performance plans allowed them to both monitor progress
           and document the department's accomplishments. According to
           State's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, each mission, including
           all the U.S. agencies located in the country, develops mission
           performance plans that outline the intended goals, priority
           initiatives, and performance indicators for the mission. However,
           based on our review of these documents, we found they were not
           sufficiently detailed to clearly determine the role of State,
           Justice, or DHS LEAs, or their accomplishments or progress, in
           meeting this national security goal.

           Justice, along with FBI, DEA, ATF,^30 and USMS officials, said
           that it was not monitoring its progress in assisting foreign
           nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. The FBI
           indicated that it was in the process of developing such a system.

           DHS officials told us that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have
           directed executive branch agencies to systematically assess their
           performance and progress in assisting foreign nations to identify,
           disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Officials from DHS, including
           those from ICE, CBP, and USSS, agreed that they had no performance
           measures at the national strategic level to measure LEA success at
           assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists, and that DHS was not compiling this information at the
           agency level.

           Due to the lack of performance information, we could not conduct
           or provide a full assessment of all three departments' LEAs'
           progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists.

           In one of the countries we visited, we met with the Director of
           State's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), which
           provides training to foreign nation LEAs from 12 countries in the
           region. The director said that, because no independent,
           governmentwide evaluations were being conducted of U.S. training
           efforts, it was impossible to determine whether the general
           training that was provided was improving the ability of the
           foreign nation to combat terrorism.

           In responding to our findings, State Bureau of International
           Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) officials involved
           with the administration of the ILEA program agreed that it was
           critical to conduct independent, long-term impact evaluations to
           verify that training was actually improving the foreign nation
           capabilities to combat terrorism. The officials indicated that, in
           the past, they had conducted such studies, but that funding for
           the evaluations was suspended in fiscal year 2003, and that
           without adequate funding, they had not been able to undertake
           these activities. The officials said that, without such studies,
           it was impossible to determine whether the training was actually
           increasing the ability of foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or
           prosecute terrorists. To be effective, impact studies should
           include assistance provided by all departments, such as that
           provided by State, Justice, and DHS.
			  
^30In response to our draft report, ATF's technical comments stated that
ATF has systems in place to monitor its progress and accomplishments in
program areas, including assistance given to foreign nations; however, ATF
did not provide us with documentation to support their position. Further,
ATF does not have a specific program to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

             LEAs Generally Lacked Mechanisms for Collaboration Abroad

           We found in our past work that effective interagency collaboration
           is essential, as laid out in the national strategies and as
           provided for in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act. And we have
           identified necessary elements for collaboration across agencies.
           However, we found that LEAs abroad lacked formal mechanisms to
           promote collaboration among LEAs to combat terrorism.

           Domestically, to improve collaborative investigations and
           operations among various LEAs within the United States, the
           National Strategy for Homeland Security supported the expanded use
           of structures called Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF),^31 which
           combine the national and international investigative capacity of
           the federal government with state and local knowledge and
           capabilities in an effort to identify and detect terrorist groups
           and prevent them from carrying out attacks against the United
           States. The 9/11 Commission further supported the use of JTTFs,
           noting that, by expanding their use, the FBI could leverage the
           expertise, manpower, and resources of federal, state, and local
           LEAs.

           In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI expanded the
           number of JTTFs from 35 to over 100 by 2005. According to the FBI,
           JTTFs have played a central role in virtually every significant
           terrorism investigation, prevention, or interdiction within the
           United States. These include the conviction of Ramzi Yousef and
           Eyad Mahmoud Ismal for conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center
           bombing and the 2004 arrest in New York of Yassin Muhiddin Aref on
           money-laundering charges connected to a possible terrorist plot to
           kill a Pakistani diplomat.

           We found that State has generally not created structures, similar
           to JTTFs, at embassies to foster collaborative LEA efforts to
           assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists. FBI officials told us that neither the FBI nor State
           had considered implementing this model at embassies, but said that
           State should consider doing so. In addition, ambassadors, deputy
           chiefs of mission, and LEA officials abroad said that while they
           had received no directives from State to consider such a model,
           they supported implementing such a concept at the embassies we
           visited. In addition, DHS officials told us, in January 2007, that
           neither the NCTC nor the NSC had developed policies to facilitate
           joint LEA investigations and operations abroad. In three of the
           four embassies we visited, we found that the embassies still
           generally retained pre-9/11 structures for information sharing and
           collaboration among LEAs, and LEAs noted that the embassies had
           not been reoriented to harness the combined capabilities of all
           LEAs in a collective effort to prevent another terrorist attack on
           the United States or its interests.
			  
^31Agencies and departments that participate in JTTFs include FBI, DEA,
USMS, ATF, ICE, CBP, USSS, the Department of Defense, Coast Guard, the
Department of Treasury, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Capitol
Police, U.S. Park Police, and state and local partners, such as the state
and local police.
	
           We were told by officials at the four embassies we visited, and by
           some State and LEA officials in Washington, that missions
           generally use law enforcement working groups to share information
           or to coordinate LEA activities at embassies. Based on our work at
           embassies, we found that these working groups did not function in
           an integrated, collaborative manner, and were not focused on joint
           investigative or operational efforts to identify and disrupt
           terrorist acts. We were told that these groups often met
           infrequently and usually discussed general, nonoperational
           information. For example, in one country we visited with an
           extremely high terrorist threat, an FBI official told us that the
           law enforcement working group had never been asked to try to
           identify or disrupt any of the terrorists on the most wanted lists
           of the departments of State or Defense, or of the foreign nation
           itself. In general, LEAs told us that terrorist information was
           not always shared or acted on across all key agencies at the
           missions, including the LEAs.

           While none of the embassies we visited had implemented formal
           structures that ensured information sharing and collaboration
           among all U.S. LEAs for assisting foreign nations to combat
           terrorism, one embassy did have a structure that included some
           collaborative LEA elements. At that embassy, the ambassador had
           created a fusion center and a working group to combat terrorism.
           The fusion center colocated FBI, DHS, and other assets in a common
           workspace. As potential terrorist information was received in the
           fusion center, each agency could check its databases for
           information needed to identify or locate the terrorists. This
           information was then operationalized through the members of the
           working group, who would use their contacts with the foreign
           nation to conduct joint investigations or operations. According to
           the ambassador and the LEAs, despite some continuing instances of
           coordination problems between some LEAs at the post, this
           structure had significantly improved coordination and operations
           among both U.S. and foreign nation LEAs.

           While ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and other embassy
           officials generally supported implementing formal structures for
           integrated, collaborative LEA efforts at embassies, they noted
           some challenges to doing so. For example, the RSO and LEGAT in one
           country we visited strongly supported a formal structure for
           integrated, collaborative LEA efforts at the embassy. The RSO said
           that for such a structure to work properly, all the agencies must
           be colocated in the same room, share space and telephones, and
           work together constantly on joint investigations and operations.

           However, according to the LEGAT, LEAs were not colocated at the
           embassy and several LEAs, such as USSS, ICE, CBP, and the
           Transportation Security Administration, were all located apart
           from the main embassy building at his post. As a result, the LEAs
           were not able to access the combined databases of each agency. He
           said that bringing these elements together would likely require
           construction of an additional secure facility and dedicated
           classified connections to each LEA's respective headquarters
           office. In addition, he also recommended that foreign nation law
           enforcement officials be included in a new collaborative LEA
           structure, but he noted that this would raise classification
           issues, since much of the terrorist related information cannot be
           shared with foreign nationals. Despite these challenges, he said
           creating a formal structure at the embassy for integrated
           collaboration, information-sharing, and joint operations could be
           very helpful. State officials, in commenting on our findings,
           stated that both security and space limitations could be a
           challenge to colocating LEAs at embassies.
			  
			    LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments

           In our past work, we found that identifying and addressing needs
           and leveraging resources was an essential element of a strategic
           plan and for interagency collaboration.^32 The United States
           provides a broad range of technical assistance to foreign nations
           related to legal reforms and improving the general capacity of
           police, prosecutors, and judges. State provides training programs
           under the ATA program, a training program designed to address
           foreign nation capabilities to combat terrorism, and the INL
           programs. In addition, the FBI provides some foreign nation
           training overseas and at its National Training Center at Quantico,
           VA. Justice also administers the International Criminal
           Investigative Training Assistance Program, which works to build
           the general capacity of foreign nation LEAs. It also administers
           the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training
           program, which, for example, through its Resident Legal Advisor
           program, assists foreign nations with legal reform efforts and can
           include assistance in crafting needed legislation and revising
           existing terrorism law, as well as assistance to prosecutors and
           judges in utilizing new and revised terrorism law to process
           terrorist suspects. In two of the four countries we visited, we
           found that Justice officials were working with foreign nations to
           draft new legislation. In one case, a Justice official assisted
           the foreign nation in passing legislation to make it a criminal
           offense to possess fraudulent passports; such passports can be
           used by terrorists to travel to the United States.
			  
^32 [61]GAO/GGD-96-118 , [62]GAO-05-927, and [63]GAO-06-15 .

           We found a lack of a single, comprehensive country needs
           assessment, which considers all U.S. assistance for addressing the
           country's needs in combating terrorism. As a result, State,
           Justice, DHS, and their LEAs may not be tailoring and targeting
           their full range of training and assistance to assist foreign
           countries to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For
           example, according to embassy officials in three of the four
           countries we visited, terrorist transit across their borders was a
           key vulnerability, yet there was no comprehensive effort by State,
           Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to provide training to the foreign
           nation border patrols, immigration officers, and customs agents to
           identify and disrupt terrorists transiting their borders.

           In one of the countries we visited, the Director of State's ILEA
           stated that, to be effective, comprehensive governmentwide needs
           assessments should be conducted and that State, Justice, and DHS
           should coordinate their training programs to meet the key
           terrorism vulnerabilities in each country. This could include
           combined training of small, vetted units of police, prosecutors,
           and judges on how to collaboratively investigate and prosecute
           terrorists, as well as training needed to identify and capture
           terrorists involved with transnational travel.

           Further, in responding to our preliminary findings, State/INL
           officials involved with administering the ILEAs agreed that it was
           critical to conduct needs assessments. The officials indicated
           that, in the past, they had conducted such studies, but that
           funding was suspended in fiscal year 2003. The officials said
           that, without adequate funding, they had not been able to
           undertake these activities and, without such assessments, it was
           impossible to determine training needs.

           Moreover, we found that an embassy's ability to provide effective,
           targeted, and coordinated assistance to meet country needs could
           vary significantly. For example, in one country we visited,
           despite problems with the foreign nation's legal system that
           hindered terrorist prosecutions, the embassy had no on-going
           programs to assist the foreign nation to strengthen terrorism laws
           and train police, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to
           develop the capacity of the legal system to prosecute terrorists.
           Embassy officials told us that because of these limitations in the
           legal system, foreign nation LEAs were not the most effective
           instruments for combating terrorism, and instead the embassy
           relied on the use of the military and other assets to combat
           terrorism.

           In contrast, another embassy successfully employed a variety of
           State and Justice programs to assist the foreign nation to
           identify, arrest, and prosecute terrorists, despite limitations in
           the foreign nation's legal system that hindered successful
           prosecutions. In that country, the embassy, in close cooperation
           with the foreign nation, used State's ATA and INL assets to train
           a specialized unit of the local police to capture terrorist
           suspects. The U.S.-foreign nation team then assembled a small task
           force of foreign nation investigators, prosecutors, and judges,
           and, using Justice-administered funds, provided specialized
           training to develop a case using recently passed legislation. The
           case resulted in the successful prosecution of the terrorists
           accused of killing Americans and others at popular tourist sites.
			  
           Conclusion
 
           Combating terrorism is the United States' top national security
           priority at home and at embassies abroad. Since 9/11, U.S.
           national strategies have consistently called for using all
           elements of national power to combat terrorism, including changing
           the role of LEAs. In particular, these strategies have called for
           expanding LEAs' overseas activities to include working with
           foreign nations and building their capacity toward a shared goal
           of identifying and disrupting terrorist plots, and bringing these
           terrorists to justice in courts of law. In response, some LEAs
           have taken steps to expand existing programs or initiate new
           technical assistance efforts to, among other things, help train
           foreign police, prosecutors, and judges. The FBI has made efforts
           to work more closely with foreign counterparts on operational
           efforts to detect and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur.

           However, while the national strategies have articulated this
           change in direction and emphasis, they have not provided specific
           roles, objectives, resources, or mechanisms for determining
           success. At the embassies we visited, ambassadors and deputy
           chiefs of mission voiced their concern that, despite
           counterterrorism being the embassy's highest priority, they
           received little to no guidance on how to determine country
           assistance needs in this area; design a coordinated assistance
           program using the full capacities of U.S. LEAs; and ensure that
           the LEAs had the necessary directives, capabilities, and time to
           work closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist
           attacks. As a result of these weaknesses, LEAs, a key element of
           national power, are not being fully used abroad to protect U.S.
           citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks.

           Looking forward, the United States needs to develop clear
           implementing guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA
           activities assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
           recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the
           NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for
           combating terrorism clearly articulates the specific objectives
           for each LEA, clarifies their roles and responsibilities, and
           proposes actions linked to available resources and directed at the
           most pressing needs for assisting foreign nations to identify,
           disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In addition, since these
           activities are central to the overall U.S. effort to combat
           terrorism, DHS, Justice, and State need to ensure that their
           component agencies have clear guidance to implement the national
           security strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs
           to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists, and also need to assess progress toward objectives and
           provide regular reporting to Congress on the results, impediments,
           and planned improvements.
			  
			  Recommendations

           We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with
           the NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan
           for combating terrorism:

           o Articulates a clear strategy to implement the national security
           goal of using the combined capabilities of LEAs to help foreign
           nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
           o Clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each LEA for (1)
           helping enhance the capabilities of foreign police, prosecutors,
           and judges for combating terrorism; and (2) working more closely
           with foreign nations on operational efforts to identify, disrupt,
           and prosecute terrorists.
           o Includes a mechanism for comprehensively (1) assessing the needs
           of foreign nations for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
           terrorists; (2) deciding which needs U.S. LEAs should help
           address; (3) determining which U.S. LEA programs or activities are
           best suited to address those needs; and (4) ensuring that U.S.
           LEAs are provided guidance on setting funding priorities and
           providing resources to address those needs.
           o Requires a monitoring system that provides the executive
           departments, LEAs, and Congress accurate reporting on
           accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements for LEAs
           assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists.

           We recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretaries of
           Homeland Security and State each:

           o Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
           bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the
           national security strategies' goal of using the full capabilities
           of LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists.
           o Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective
           department and Congress with accurate reporting on that
           department's accomplishments, impediments, and planned
           improvements in their LEAs' efforts to help foreign nations combat
           terrorism.

           We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
           U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security:

           o Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to
           improve information sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for
           assisting foreign nations combat terrorism.

           DHS, Justice, and State provided written comments on a draft of
           this report, which are reproduced in appendixes II, III, and IV.
			  
			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
           report. DHS said it would work closely with the NSC, NCTC,
           Justice, and State on planning efforts to enhance the ability of
           DHS LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. DHS also plans
           to issue implementing guidance and establish a monitoring system
           based upon direction from the NSC and NCTC.

           Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
           interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will
           work with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan.
           Justice did not indicate whether it concurred with our
           recommendations that the Attorney General issue clear guidance to
           LEAs or to establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to
           help foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice expressed concern
           that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational
           and technical assistance. Justice's written response also includes
           a February 16, 2007, Justice letter to GAO providing comments on a
           draft statement of fact we provided Justice on January 26, 2007.
           In its February 16, 2007, letter Justice raised several concerns
           about the information we provided in the draft statement of fact,
           including their contention that we (1) misunderstood the roles and
           responsibilities of Justice's overseas components, and (2) did not
           clearly define what we meant by assisting foreign nations to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Justice's letter was
           not based on a complete draft of our report, which we provided the
           department on March 27, 2007. In the March 27 draft report, we
           made several changes as a result of (1) Justice's February 16
           letter; (2) the comments we received during exit conferences with
           Justice, State, and DHS; and (3) our own internal review and
           fact-checking processes. Our report (1) clarified the roles and
           responsibilities of Justice's overseas components, and (2) more
           clearly defined what we meant by assisting foreign nations. In its
           May 11, 2007, letter formally commenting on our draft report,
           Justice continued to contend that our analysis did not clearly
           distinguish between operational and technical assistance. As a
           result, we have further clarified our discussion of these issues.
           Specifically, we have noted that the purpose of our review was to
           assess the federal government's efforts to implement the various
           national security strategies that generally guide law enforcement
           efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism, and to determine
           if the technical and operational assistance implemented by the
           various U.S. departments and agencies has been reoriented to
           assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists.

           The Department of State said it would consider working with
           relevant LEAs to improve the coordination of law enforcement
           activities overseas. State did not indicate whether it concurred
           with our recommendations that the Secretary of State issue clear
           guidance and establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to
           help foreign nations combat terrorism. State also indicated that
           we did not fully reflect the department's lack of resources
           necessary to carry out its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to
           combat terrorism abroad. As a result, we have incorporated State's
           position on this issue into our discussion of State's ability to
           effectively coordinate U.S. international counterterrorism
           activities. State also believed we had not sufficiently credited
           the department's Regional Strategic Initiatives as examples of
           coordinated, interagency efforts to guide overseas efforts to
           combat terrorism. However, State did not provide any additional
           information to support this contention. Finally, State also
           expressed concern about our characterization of the role DS
           special agents play when working overseas. We clarified our
           discussion of this point in the report, along the lines State
           suggested in its response.

           The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report. The
           NCTC stated that it is in the process of implementing its plan in
           conjunction with other departments and agencies, including the law
           enforcement agencies. According to NCTC, it has already begun to
           implement our recommendations to NCTC. For example, NCTC stated
           that its plan coordinates all instruments of national power,
           including law enforcement agencies, to combat terrorism. NCTC also
           said the plan provides direction and guidance to the various law
           enforcement agencies on their efforts to help foreign nations
           combat terrorism and includes coordination mechanisms and a
           monitoring system to track implementation of the plan. NCTC did
           not provide any documentation to verify these statements.

           We also received technical comments from DHS, Justice, State, and
           the NCTC, which we have incorporated throughout the report where
           appropriate.

           As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of the report earlier, we plan no further distribution
           until 30 days after the report date. At that time, we will send
           copies of the report to interested congressional committees and to
           the National Security Council, the Director of the NCTC, the
           Attorney General, and the Secretaries of State and Homeland
           Security. We will also make copies available to others upon
           request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
           the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact Jess T. Ford on (202) 512-4128, e-mail [email protected] .
           Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
           Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other
           GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.

           Sincerely yours,

           Jess T. Ford
			  Director, International Affairs and Trade
			  
			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

           To assess the guidance for law enforcement agencies (LEA) to
           assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
           terrorists, we reviewed the 2002 and 2006 versions of the National
           Security Strategy of the United States of America, the 2002
           National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2003 and 2006
           versions of the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, the 9/11
           Commission Report, and related legislation. To determine whether
           this strategic level guidance was translated into specific
           guidance for the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland
           Security, we analyzed their 5-year strategic plans and their
           annual performance reports. In addition, we analyzed the national
           strategies, strategic plans, and performance reports to determine
           if they contained key elements we have recommended^1 and that are
           provided for in the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
           These key elements include having clearly defined objectives and
           roles and responsibilities; leveraged funding; and monitoring
           systems related to assisting foreign governments to identify,
           disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also requested all guidance
           issued by State, Justice, and DHS to implement the national
           strategies' goal to make combating terrorism their priority, and
           any specific guidance to ensure their LEAs were assisting foreign
           nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. To verify
           that our analysis was accurate, we conducted detailed discussions
           with representatives from State, Justice, DHS, and the eight LEAs,
           along with embassy and LEA officials involved with working with
           foreign nation counterparts.

           To assess the extent to which LEAs have implemented the strategic
           guidance to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
           prosecute terrorists and determine if the departments and their
           LEAs were reporting on their progress in providing this
           assistance, we reviewed strategic plans and annual performance
           reports for State, Justice, and DHS and their component LEAs,
           where available. We also asked each department and agency to
           provide a list of its accomplishments in assisting foreign nations
           in this endeavor, including the number of terrorist plots that had
           been identified and disrupted, and the number of terrorists
           prosecuted as a result of this assistance, from 2001 to 2005. In
           addition, we asked for documentation on 11 cases highlighted by
           the State Department as successful examples of foreign nations
           identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists linked with
           high profile attacks against Americans. However, none of the
           agencies provided a comprehensive list of accomplishments or
           documentation of the role that U.S. assistance played in these
           cases.^2 We also conducted detailed interviews with officials from
           State, Justice, DHS, and their eight LEAs to further determine
           their progress and impediments to fully implementing this
           strategic guidance. In addition, we conducted detailed work in
           four countries with key roles in combating terrorism, where we met
           with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials to determine what
           role U.S. LEAs played in assisting the foreign country to
           identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We did not name the
           specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic
           and security concerns.
			  
^1  [64]GAO-05-927, [65]GAO-06-15, and [66]GAO-03-519T.

           After our work abroad, we provided State, Justice, and DHS written
           summaries of our findings, and conducted follow-up meetings with
           department representatives to ensure that our findings accurately
           characterized any guidance provided by the White House, NSC, and
           NCTC, as well as State, Justice, and DHS. We also met with NCTC
           officials to brief them on our observations and to determine the
           status of their ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all
           elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism.
           NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was
           approved by the President in June 2006. According to NCTC
           officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under
           development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss the
           plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.

           During the course of our work we experienced considerable delays
           obtaining information from Justice and State, which resulted in
           this report being issued several months later than initially
           planned. We were eventually able to obtain information sufficient
           for answering our objectives. We conducted our work between August
           2005 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
           government auditing standards.
			  
^2Although State Department officials said they were unable to find any
relevant documents related to our case studies, we found detailed
reporting on one of our case studies at an embassy we visited.

           Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
			  
			  Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice
			  
           Following are GAO's comments on the Department of Justice's letter
           dated May 11, 2007.
			  
			  Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 6.

See comment 5.

See comment 8.

See comment 7.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.

See comment 10.

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

			  
			  GAO Comments
			  
			               1. On March 27, 2007, we provided Justice a complete
                        draft report reflecting several changes stemming from
                        (1) the comments and suggestions we obtained during
                        exit conferences with Justice, DHS, and State; (2)
                        Justice's February 16, 2007 letter; and (3) our
                        internal review and fact checking process. As such, a
                        number of the comments and concerns Justice raised in
                        the February 16, 2007, letter were addressed in our
                        draft report.
                        2. In response to Justice's concern about our
                        distinction between operational and technical
                        assistance, we have clarified the language that
                        describes the purpose of our review. This report
                        assesses the federal government's efforts to
                        implement the various national security strategies
                        that generally guide law enforcement efforts to help
                        foreign nations combat terrorism overseas. As such,
                        our review focused on assessing the guidance and
                        implementation of those strategies. We also clarified
                        our definition of assistance to differentiate between
                        operational and technical assistance and made changes
                        throughout the report to clarify when our discussion
                        focuses on operational or technical assistance. Our
                        definition of what we mean by technical and
                        operational assistance is based on language Justice
                        suggested in its February 16, 2007, letter.
                        3. We no longer use the phrase "new strategy" in our
                        report because the various national strategies
                        guiding overseas efforts to combat terrorism were
                        first published more than 4 years ago.
                        4. We include a discussion of the FBI's strategic
                        guidance in the report.
                        5. Even if the LEAs are not specifically required by
                        law to develop plans guiding and coordinating their
                        technical assistance efforts, we believe this is a
                        best-practice and a fundamental aspect of good
                        governance.
                        6. The national strategies offer few details on which
                        department should have lead responsibility and do not
                        specify what supporting roles other departments and
                        agencies should play.
                        7. We modified our discussion of FBI LEGATs.
                        8. According to State Department's Strategic Plan for
                        2004 to 2009, each mission annually develops mission
                        performance plans that incorporate the activities of
                        all U.S. agencies and departments located in the
                        country. These plans outline the intended goals,
                        initiatives, and performance indicators for each
                        strategic objective of the mission, and the role that
                        each agency and department is expected to contribute
                        in order to attain each objective. As such, the plans
                        should include a discussion of the progress and
                        accomplishments of law enforcement efforts to help
                        foreign nations to combat terrorism.
                        9. We modified our discussion of Justice's overseas
                        personnel.
                        10. Our recent work on U.S. efforts to combat
                        terrorist financing found significant problems.
                        Specifically, the U.S. government lacks an integrated
                        strategy to coordinate the delivery of
                        counter-terrorism financing training and technical                        assistance to countries vulnerable to terrorist
                        financing. In addition, the effort does not have key
                        stakeholder acceptance of roles and procedures, a
                        strategic alignment of resources with needs, or a
                        process to measure performance.^1 
                        11. We agree that general assistance to bolster
                        foreign law enforcement and judicial sectors is an
                        essential component of the broader U.S. effort to
                        combat overseas terrorism. However, the allocation of
                        resources for law enforcement programs specifically
                        targeted for combating terrorism did not seem to
                        match the preeminent role combating terrorism plays
                        in U.S. national security strategies and law
                        enforcement agencies' strategic guidance.
                        12. With the exception of the FBI, Justice LEAs
                        reported that they lacked clear implementing guidance
                        on how to carry out the broad guidance contained in
                        the Justice strategic plan and U.S. national security
                        strategies.
								
^1 [67]GAO-06-19 .								

			                Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
								 
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 3.

			  
			  Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
           dated May 8, 2007.
			  
			  GAO Comments
			  
			               1. We added additional discussion of S/CT's lack of
                        resources.
                        2. Our discussion of Regional Strategic Initiatives
                        in the report was limited by the information State
                        provided on these activities. Although we asked to
                        review all four of the Regional Strategic Initiatives
                        completed during 2006, we were only able to review
                        one. State provided us no additional information to
                        support the claims it makes in its agency comments.
                        3. We modified the report to better reflect the role
                        and legal authority of Regional Security Officers.
			  
			  Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

 			  GAO Contact

           Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, (202)
           512-4128, email [email protected] .
			  
			  Staff Acknowledgments

           In addition to the individual named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant
           Director; Edward J. George; J. Addison Ricks; Diana Glod; Ernie
           Jackson; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report.
			  
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(320365)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697.

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-07-697, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives

May 2007

COMBATING TERRORISM

Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists

Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,
directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of
terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their
efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the
extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.

[68]What GAO Recommends

We recommend that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) ensure that
the implementing guidance for its NCTC's plan for combating terrorism
articulates a clear strategy for using LEAs to help foreign nations combat
terrorism. We also recommend that State, Justice, and DHS explore
enhancements to overseas coordination mechanisms and develop clear
guidance and performance monitoring to enhance efforts to help foreign
nations combat terrorism.

NCTC stated it had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS
generally agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated they
would consider ways to improve overseas coordination, but did not indicate
whether they concurred with our other recommendations.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies
that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement
the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism
or how they should do so. While one of the strategies tasked State with
developing and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we
found State did not develop or coordinate the development of a plan to use
the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In December 2004, Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged
the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power,
including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had
drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of
2006. According to NCTC, State, Justice, and DHS officials, implementing
guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the
contents of the plan or the guidance.

Some LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its
Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports,
and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the FBI,
have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and
responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles
and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several
joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist
activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we
found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign
nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked
performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing
information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive
needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full
range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities
in foreign countries.

U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism Exercises

References

Visible links
  38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-19
  39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
  40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
  41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
  42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
  54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
  55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
  56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
  57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
  58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-578T
  59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-557
  60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
  61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
  62. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
  63. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
  64. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
  65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
  66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
  67. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-19
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