Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to
Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists (25-MAY-07, GAO-07-697).
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on
the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for
LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1)
the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which
LEAs have implemented this guidance.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-697
ACCNO: A69945
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack
Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
Prosecute Terrorists
DATE: 05/25/2007
SUBJECT: Combating terrorism
Counterterrorism
Federal aid to foreign countries
International relations
Law enforcement
Law enforcement agencies
Law enforcement personnel
Police training
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Terrorists
Training utilization
Program implementation
Dept. of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program
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GAO-07-697
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Department of Justice
* [4]Department of Homeland Security
* [5]Department of State
* [6]National Security Council
* [7]The 9/11 Commission
* [8]The National Counterterrorism Center
* [9]National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Ke
* [10]National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assis
* [11]The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Pl
* [12]State Department Unable to Fully Implement National Strategy
* [13]NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implement
* [14]LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt,
* [15]LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations Combat Terro
* [16]The FBI Has Made Some Effort to Increase Assistance to
Forei
* [17]CSI Works with Foreign Nations, but It Has Had
Limitations
* [18]State Has Expanded the ATA Program
* [19]LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations Have Been Limited by S
* [20]Most LEAs Lacked Clearly Defined Roles and
Responsibilities
* [21]Executive Departments and LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance on
Sett
* [22]LEAs Are Not Systematically Assessing Their
Accomplishments
* [23]LEAs Generally Lacked Mechanisms for Collaboration
Abroad
* [24]LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments
* [25]Conclusion
* [26]Recommendations
* [27]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [28]GAO Comments
* [29]GAO Comments
* [30]GAO Contact
* [31]Staff Acknowledgments
* [32]GAO's Mission
* [33]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [34]Order by Mail or Phone
* [35]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [36]Congressional Relations
* [37]Public Affairs
Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
May 2007
COMBATING TERRORISM
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists
GAO-07-697
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 7
National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key Elements for
a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration 13
LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors 21
Conclusion 44
Recommendations 45
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 50
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 52
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice 53
GAO Comments 61
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 63
GAO Comments 67
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 68
Table
Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation Assistance to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists 17
Figure
Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
Exercises 27
Abbreviations
ATA Antiterrorism Assistance
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CSI Container Security Initiative
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Forces
LEA Law enforcement agency
LEGAT Legal Attache
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NSC National Security Council
OIG Office of Inspector General
RAP Regional Action Plans
RSO Regional Security Officer
S/CT Department of State/Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
USMS U.S. Marshals Service
USSS United States Secret Service
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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 25, 2007
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Shays:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), combating
terrorism has become the nation's top national security goal and the
highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law enforcement
agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice (Justice),
and Homeland Security (DHS)--including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)--operate
from U.S. embassies overseas and assist foreign nation governments on a
broad array of law enforcement issues, such as investigating crime,
reducing illegal drug activity, controlling borders and immigration, and
protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from attack. Three U.S. national
strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, directed
that law enforcement activities be increasingly focused on the prevention
of further terrorist attacks, including helping foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This includes technical assistance,
such as antiterrorism training and the provision of technologies used to
identify terrorist threats, and operational assistance, such as joint
U.S.-foreign nation investigations and operations against terrorists. This
new focus on working with foreign nations to prevent terrorist attacks
represents a notable shift from pre-9/11 objectives, with potentially
significant implications for the strategies, resources, and overseas
presence of U.S. LEAs. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11), combating terrorism has become the nation's top national security
goal and the highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law
enforcement agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice
(Justice), and Homeland Security (DHS)--including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS)--operate from U.S. embassies overseas and assist
foreign nation governments on a broad array of law enforcement issues,
such as investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity, controlling
borders and immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from
attack. Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, directed that law enforcement activities be
increasingly focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks,
including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as antiterrorism
training and the provision of technologies used to identify terrorist
threats, and operational assistance, such as joint U.S.-foreign nation
investigations and operations against terrorists. This new focus on
working with foreign nations to prevent terrorist attacks represents a
notable shift from pre-9/11 objectives, with potentially significant
implications for the strategies, resources, and overseas presence of U.S.
LEAs.
Because of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the United
States and its embassies, diplomats, and citizens abroad, you requested
that we evaluate the federal government's efforts to implement national
security strategies to use its LEAs to assist foreign nations in
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. Specifically, you
asked us to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which
LEAs have implemented Because of the continuing threat of terrorist
attacks against the United States and its embassies, diplomats, and
citizens abroad, you requested that we evaluate the federal government's
efforts to implement national security strategies to use its LEAs to
assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists. Specifically, you asked us to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs
to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists
and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance. We agreed
that this review would be limited to U.S. law enforcement efforts overseas
to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists and would not focus on (1) U.S. domestic law enforcement
efforts to combat terrorism; (2) other instruments of national
power--including military, intelligence, diplomatic, or
financial--currently being used to combat terrorism; and (3) U.S. efforts
to combat terrorist financing, since we had recently completed a review of
this effort.^1
To assess the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations in identifying,
disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists, we analyzed the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism,^2 the 9/11
Commission Report, and related legislation to determine if the strategies
contained key elements that we have recommended^3 and the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires, such as clearly defined
objectives, roles and responsibilities, leveraged funding, and monitoring
systems. We also discussed the guidance with representatives from State,
Justice, and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with
working with foreign nation counterparts. To assess the extent to which
LEAs have implemented this guidance to assist foreign nations, we reviewed
State, Justice, and DHS strategic plans and annual performance reports;
requested all implementing guidance; and asked that each agency provide a
listing of their general accomplishments in assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also conducted detailed
work in four countries with key roles in combating terrorism, where we met
with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials. We are not naming the
specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic and
security concerns. After our work abroad, we reviewed and verified our
overall observations with senior representatives from each department and
agency. We also met with National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) officials
to brief them on our observations and to determine the status of ongoing
efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of national power, including
LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials would not discuss the plan, its
contents, or any issues raised in this report. According to NCTC
officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under
development as of March 1, 2007. During the course of our work we
experienced considerable delays obtaining information from Justice and
State, which resulted in this report being issued several months later
than initially planned. We were eventually able to obtain information
sufficient for answering our objectives. We conducted our work between
August 2005 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
^1GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate
U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical
Assistance Abroad, [38]GAO-06-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2005). The
report found that the Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury lacked a
strategic plan to carry out this effort; roles and responsibilities needed
clarification; there was no mechanism to determine resource needs; and
there was no monitoring system to assess progress.
^2In addition to the strategies discussed in this report, the White House
has released a number of other strategies related to the War on Terrorism,
including (1) the September 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy and (2)
the May 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel. For this
report, we focused on the strategies released shortly after the 9/11
terrorist attacks that discussed the use of LEAs to combat terrorism and
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, in
order to determine the extent to which LEAs had implemented these
strategies in the 5 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also
included any updates to these strategies to ensure that there was a
strategic continuum in the use of LEAs to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
^3GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [39]GAO-05-927 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
[40]GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); GAO, Combating Terrorism:
Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [41]GAO-03-519T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,
[42]GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).
Results in Brief
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the President issued a series of
national strategies, beginning in 2002 and updated in 2006, that provided
broad direction for overseas U.S. law enforcement efforts to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. These
strategies collectively called for reorienting U.S. LEAs to proactively
work to prevent terrorist attacks at home and abroad. However, they lacked
key components, such as clearly defined objectives, roles and
responsibilities, and procedures for working across agency boundaries
toward a common goal, necessary for a strategic plan and for facilitating
interagency collaboration. Further, they did not articulate which LEAs
should implement the general guidance or how they should do so. For
example, officials from seven LEAs as well as embassy officials in the
four countries we visited told us that they had received little-to-no
guidance from the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC,^4 or State,
Justice, and DHS on how to implement the directive to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Only the FBI
received and has issued some implementing guidance--for example, stating
that it planned to increase its presence abroad and increase joint
operations with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. While one of the three strategies tasked State with developing
and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we found that
State did not develop or coordinate a plan to use the combined
capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. In
December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act),^5 which charged
the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power,
including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had
drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006.
According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was
still under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss
the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.
Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, the FBI
has increased its overseas activities, DHS has worked with foreign nations
to implement the Container Security Initiative, and State has expanded its
Antiterrorism Assistance program to improve foreign nation capacities to
combat terrorism. Despite such actions, we found that because most LEAs,
with the exception of the FBI, have not been given clear guidance, they
lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities for helping foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, in
one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities
between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations
intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according
to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs involved in these efforts. In
addition, we found that departments and LEAs generally lacked guidance on
setting funding priorities and providing resources to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, for
example, we found that State's office responsible for coordinating all
U.S. assistance to combat terrorism abroad was hampered by a lack of
resources, limiting its ability to carry out this vital function. LEAs
also lacked performance monitoring systems to determine the effectiveness
of their technical or operational assistance and, as a result, found it
difficult to assess whether they were making progress in their efforts to
help foreign nations combat terrorism. In addition, embassies generally
lacked formal structures for LEAs to share information and collaborate on
operational efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists; LEA and embassy officials told us that existing
embassy structures do not provide a means for all LEAs at embassies to
work collaboratively to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not
conducted to identify technical and operational assistance needs in the
four countries we visited, the full range of assistance that LEAs could
provide may not be utilized to address foreign nations' needs for
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.
^4The NCTC was created by Congress as part of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). NCTC's mission includes
developing plans that coordinate the use all elements of national power,
including LEAs, to combat terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks. As
detailed in the background section of this report, the NCTC reports
directly to the President on matters of strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism and works under the policy direction of the NSC.
^5P.L. 108-458, section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 404o).
To ensure that LEAs, a key element of national power, are fully focused on
assisting foreign nations to identify and prevent future terrorist attacks
and protect Americans around the world, we are making recommendations to
the NCTC, NSC, and three executive departments with LEAs stationed abroad.
We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the NSC,
ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for combating
terrorism (1) articulates a clear strategy to implement the national
strategies' goal of using U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (2) clarifies roles and
responsibilities for each LEA for implementing the goal; (3) provides
guidance to LEAs on setting funding priorities and providing resources to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (4)
requires comprehensive needs assessments for foreign nations and tailored
assistance programs to address those needs; and (5) requires a monitoring
system to report on accomplishments or progress.
In addition, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State each take the following two
actions:
o Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the
national strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs
to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and
prosecuting terrorists.
o Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective
department and Congress accurate reporting on that department's
accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements in its
LEAs' efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism.
We also recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with
the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security
take the following action:
o Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to
improve information-sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
We received written comments on a draft of this report from DHS,
Justice, and State, which are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and
IV.
DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
report and said it would take action to implement them based upon
direction from the NSC and NCTC.
Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will
work with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan.
Justice did not indicate whether it concurred with our
recommendations that the Attorney General issue clear guidance to
LEAs or establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help
foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice also expressed concern
that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational
and technical assistance.
State said it would consider working with relevant LEAs to improve
the coordination of law enforcement activities overseas. State did
not indicate whether it concurred with our recommendations that
the Secretary of State issue clear guidance and establish a
monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help foreign nations
combat terrorism. State also indicated that we did not fully
reflect the department's lack of resources necessary to carry out
its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad
and provided additional information on its Regional Strategic
Initiatives and the role of DS.
The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report and
stated that it is in the process of implementing the plan in
conjunction with other departments and agencies, including the law
enforcement agencies. According to NCTC, it has already begun to
implement the recommendations made to NCTC in our report. We also
received technical comments from State, DHS, Justice, and NCTC,
which we have incorporated throughout the report where
appropriate.
Background
State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S.
embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement
issues, including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug
cartels, visa and immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal
and terrorist threats against U.S. embassies and personnel, and
fugitive capture and extraditions. LEA assistance can include
technical assistance, such as the provision of training in police
techniques and legal reforms, as well as investigative or
operational assistance, which can support efforts such as joint
teams of U.S. and foreign nation LEAs working together to stop
crimes, illegal drug operations, or terrorists attacks.
LEAs face a number of challenges in working with foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In particular,
LEAs lack arrest authority overseas and therefore heavily rely on
the cooperation of the foreign nation. The degree of cooperation
and the capabilities of foreign nation law enforcement agencies
vary widely. According to FBI officials, forging partnerships with
foreign nation LEAs can be an arduous and sometimes impractical
task. They said that the ability to engage in joint investigations
with foreign nation LEAs was dictated both by the will and the
ability of their counterparts to engage in complex investigative
techniques.
Department of Justice
The Department of Justice's primary goal is preventing terrorist
attacks within the United States and promoting the nation's
security, as well as investigating and prosecuting those who have
committed, or intend to commit, terrorist attacks in the United
States. Four Justice LEAs have a permanent overseas presence,
including the FBI; DEA; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF); and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).
The FBI is charged with protecting the United States from
terrorist attacks; preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist
operations; improving efforts to combat terrorism with U.S. state
and local LEAs by expanding the use of multiagency Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTF); and expanding operational partnerships with
foreign nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
disrupt and prevent terrorism. The FBI operates abroad through its
Legal Attache (LEGAT) offices located in 59 U.S. missions around
the world. The FBI's Web site states that LEGATs (1) coordinate
international investigations with their foreign nation colleagues;
(2) cover international leads for domestic U.S. investigations;
(3) link U.S. and international resources in critical criminal and
terrorist areas to protect Americans at home and abroad; and (4)
coordinate FBI training, including counterterrorism classes, for
police in their geographic regions. According to the FBI, a July
2005 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Overseas and Domestic
Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigations controls the interaction of the
CIA and the FBI in regard to foreign counterterrorism operations
abroad.
DEA's mission is to target organizations that pose the greatest
drug threats to American citizens. It cooperates closely with
foreign nations to help them identify, disrupt, and prosecute
those involved in the illegal drug trade to reduce the
availability of illicit drugs. DEA has around 696 officials in 63
countries.
ATF's mission is to enforce regulations on the firearms and
explosives industries, assist other LEAs during criminal and
post-blast investigations, conduct ballistics analysis, and trace
the origins of guns and bombs used during criminal activity. ATF
provides ballistics training and tracing assistance to foreign
nation police, and, ATF officials told us, its analytical
capabilities could be used to trace the origins of explosives used
in terrorist bombings, and to help identify and capture terrorist
cells. ATF has a permanent presence in four countries with a total
of 10 officials.
The USMS's mission is to track, apprehend, and extradite fugitives
domestically and internationally, as well as protect federal
judicial officials, including judges, attorneys, and jurors. USMS
officials told us that USMS has provided assistance and training
to foreign nation LEAs in establishing systems for protecting
judicial officials. USMS has a permanent presence in three
countries with a total of 7 agents. In addition, USMS currently
has 16 agents in Iraq and 5 in Afghanistan.
Department of Homeland Security
DHS's primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States and reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism by
detecting, deterring, and mitigating terrorist threats. It is also
responsible for border security, and extending the zone of
security beyond U.S. borders by working with foreign nations to
identify, prioritize, and interdict threats. We examined three DHS
LEAs that work from U.S. embassies abroad, including ICE, Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), and the United States Secret Service
(USSS).
ICE's primary mission is to protect the United States and uphold
public safety by identifying criminal activities and eliminating
vulnerabilities that pose a threat to U.S. borders. By
investigating threats to U.S. border security, ICE seeks to
eliminate the potential threat of terrorist acts against the
United States. As of December 2006, ICE had 298 investigative
agents in 52 offices in 41 countries.
CBP's primary mission includes preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. CBP officials generally
operate at U.S. ports of entry along the U.S. borders with Mexico
and Canada, but also operate in parts of the Caribbean and other
countries around the world. CBP has 943 personnel deployed to 28
countries abroad. The duties of these personnel include
preclearing passengers flying to the United States, working at
foreign nation maritime ports abroad in search of weapons of mass
destruction, as well as working to address CBP activities
in-country and general CBP related support at embassies. In
addition, CBP works to protect global supply lines from terrorism
through both bilateral and multilateral fora.
The USSS's primary mission includes protecting the U.S. President,
the Vice President, their families, and other high-ranking U.S.
government officials from terrorism and other threats, as well as
investigating and facilitating prosecution of financial and
electronic crimes, counterfeit currency, and identity theft. USSS
officials operate abroad with 54 agents staffed to 19 offices in
15 countries.
Department of State
The Department of State's primary mission is to "create a more
secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the
American people and the international community."^6 According to
State's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, State is charged with
developing, coordinating, and implementing American
counterterrorism policy. Within State, the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism's (S/CT) mission is to develop
and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all
instruments of national power, including law enforcement,
diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military. S/CT
provides foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S.
government activities to combat terrorism, including those of U.S.
LEAs operating abroad.
^6Fiscal year 2004 to 2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan;
source: http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm .
DS is the department's law enforcement arm.^7 The Bureau's
Regional Security Officers (RSO) are responsible for protecting
the embassy, its diplomats, and their families from criminal and
terrorist attacks. The RSO is the ambassador's senior advisor on
law enforcement and security issues. RSOs investigate passport and
visa fraud, conduct counterintelligence investigations, and can
provide investigative assistance to local, state, and federal
agencies. DS personnel also monitor and analyze terrorist
activities and threats, train foreign police in antiterrorism
procedures, and protect U.S. and foreign dignitaries. DS has
approximately 590 RSO special agents assigned to 202 Foreign
Service posts throughout the world, making it the most widely
represented U.S. LEA overseas.
National Security Council
The National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC to improve the
coordination of national security concerns among executive
departments and agencies.^8 The act charges the NSC with more
effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the
departments and agencies related to national security.
Specifically, the act states that the function of the NSC shall be
to advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national
security to enable the departments and agencies to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving national security.
The NSC is chaired by the President. According to the White House,
its regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) include
the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the NSC, and
the Director of National Intelligence is its intelligence advisor.
The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their
responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and
agencies, as well as other senior officials, are also invited to
attend meetings when appropriate.
^7DS in its current form is an outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. (P.L. 99-399; 22 U.S.C. 4801 et.
seq.) It has a broad mandate, in furtherance of the Secretary of State's
responsibilities under this Act, to protect and perform protection
functions in relation to U.S. missions and personnel overseas. As relevant
to this report, DS's specific law enforcement authorities are largely
defined by 22 U.S.C. 2709, which confer on DS a lead law enforcement role
with respect to passport and visa fraud.
^850 U.S.C. 402(a),(b).
The 9/11 Commission
The 9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission
created by congressional legislation in late 2002 and charged with
preparing a full and complete account of the circumstances
surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for
and the immediate response to the attacks.^9 The commission was
also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against
future terrorist attacks. On July 22, 2004, the commission
released its [43]public report .
The commission identified a number of weaknesses in the ability of
U.S. LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to the United
States. For example, it reported that the vast majority of LEAs
did not consider protecting Americans from terrorist threats their
primary goal. With the exception of one portion of the FBI, the
commission found that very little of the U.S. law enforcement
community was engaged in combating terrorism before the 9/11
attacks, despite each agency's ability to make contributions to
the U.S. effort. For example, the commission found that:
o USMS had almost 4,000 agents on 9/11 and was expert in tracking
fugitives, but its expertise was not used to identify and
apprehend terrorists.
o DEA had more than 4,500 agents on 9/11, and there were a number
of occasions when DEA agents were able to introduce sources to the
FBI or CIA for counterterrorism use, despite the agency having no
direct mission to combat terrorism.
o The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),^10 with its
9,000 border patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000
immigration special agents, had perhaps the greatest potential to
develop an expanded role in counterterrorism. However, INS was
instead focused on the formidable challenges posed by illegal
entry over the southwest border, criminal aliens, and a growing
backlog in applications for naturalizing immigrants.
^9Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-306,
Title VI.
^10INS was abolished by the Homeland Security Act, and its
responsibilities were divided among ICE, CBP, and Citizens and Immigration
Services, which are now part of DHS.
o USSS had the mission to protect the President and other
high-ranking officials, and its agents did not become involved
with counterterrorism efforts except when terrorist assassination
plots were rumored or suspected.
o The Customs Service (which is now part of DHS) deployed agents
at all points of entry into the United States to screen imported
goods and collect duties, and while these agents worked alongside
INS agents, the two groups did not regularly cooperate on joint
investigations.
o ATF was used only occasionally by the FBI as a counterterrorism
resource prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite its
expertise in ballistics and explosives tracing. The ATF's
laboratories, investigators, and analyses were critical to the
investigation of the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center and the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City.
The commission noted that counterterrorism investigations often
overlapped with or were cued by other criminal investigations,
such as for money laundering or smuggling contraband, and that,
because of this nexus between counterterrorism and criminal
investigations, LEAs could fundamentally expand U.S. efforts to
identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America.
However, the commission found that numerous impediments to using
U.S. LEAs to protect America from further terrorist attacks
existed prior to 9/11. For example, the commission found that that
no one was in charge of using the full capabilities of these
agencies to identify and disrupt the terrorist threat; roles and
responsibilities were not adequately defined; accountability was
diffuse; and the federal government lacked a performance
monitoring system to track LEA progress at identifying,
disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. In addition, the
commission found that LEAs were not oriented to prevent terrorist
attacks. Finally, the commission found that these agencies
cooperated only some of the time, and this cooperation did not
amount to the type of joint action that harnessed the combined
capabilities of all U.S. LEAs.
The National Counterterrorism Center
In recognition of these and other problems, the commission
recommended that Congress authorize the creation of a single,
centralized center for combating terrorism to coordinate all
instruments of national power, including law enforcement, to
prevent another attack. In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004
Intelligence Reform Act, which created the NCTC and charged it
with conducting "strategic operational planning" for
counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of
national power--including diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement
activities--within and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of
preventing future attacks against America and its interests
worldwide.
The act defined strategic operational planning to include the
counterterrorism mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be
performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and
the assignment of roles and responsibilities. It also required
NCTC to monitor the implementation of strategic operational plans
for each relevant U.S. government department or agency. The NCTC
is a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and reports to the Director on matters of intelligence collection
and analysis; however, on matters of strategic operational
planning for counterterrorism, the Director of the NCTC reports
directly to the President. As a result, the NCTC works under the
policy direction of the NSC on matters of counterterrorism
planning.
National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key
Elements for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration
A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for
U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. However, the strategies lack essential
elements of a strategic plan and for facilitating interagency
collaboration, and they do not clearly delineate what role, if
any, the various LEAs should play in assisting foreign nations to
combat terrorism. While State was charged in the 2003 National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism with developing and coordinating
U.S. counterterrorism policy abroad, it did not develop a plan to
do so, because, according to State officials, it lacked sufficient
authority and resources. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act requires
the NCTC to develop U.S. governmentwide strategic operational
plans to combat terrorism. According to the act, NCTC's planning
should include the mission, objectives, tasks to be performed,
interagency coordination of operational activities, and the
assignment of roles and responsibilities among participating
agencies. NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act,
they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the
President in June 2006. According to NCTC officials, the
implementing guidance for the plan was still under development as
of March 1, 2007.
National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist
Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism
A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level
guidance for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. For example, the National Security
Strategy, issued in 2002 and updated in March 2006, states that
the United States will continue to encourage regional partners to
take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists, and
help ensure that foreign nations have the law enforcement,
military, political, and financial tools necessary to disrupt and
destroy terrorist operations before they reach American borders.
Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
primarily focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from
further terrorist attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the
post 9/11 world, stating that, "Our Nation's highest law
enforcement objective must be the prevention of terrorist acts--a
significant shift from pre-9/11 objectives." The strategy also
notes that, in a world where the terrorist threat pays no respect
to traditional boundaries, the American strategy for homeland
security cannot stop at the country's borders. It calls for a
sustained and systematic international agenda to counter the
global terrorist threat and improve homeland security, and
identifies a number of initiatives in this area, including (1)
intensifying international law enforcement cooperation and helping
foreign nations fight terrorism and (2) augmenting the FBI's
overseas presence by increasing the number of LEGATs around the
world. It states that Justice, in cooperation with State, is to
work with foreign nation counterparts on these law enforcement
issues.
Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in
2003 and updated in 2006, focuses on the United States' efforts to
combat terrorism abroad. It also provides greater detail on the
objectives and strategies for U.S. LEAs in working with their
foreign nation counterparts. According to the strategy, the United
States is to:
o Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence
abroad to further the investigative and operational assistance
related to the interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of
terrorist suspects.
o Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help
foreign nation LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight
terrorism through a variety of means, including (1) improved
legislation, (2) technical assistance, (3) new investigative
techniques, (4) intelligence sharing, and (5) law enforcement
training.
o Enhance operational assistance to expand international
cooperation to combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law
enforcement information.
In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security
Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both
updated strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs
to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and
prosecuting terrorists abroad. For example, the National Strategy
to Combat Terrorism supports intensifying training and other types
of assistance to improve foreign nation LEA capacities to identify
and disrupt terrorists threats, as well as implementing legal
reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign nations have the necessary
laws to carry out this effort, and that investigators,
prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively prosecute
terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that this
approach has succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorist plots since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and
Interagency Collaboration
Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy
to combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives,
priorities, outcomes, milestones, and performance measures.^11 In
March 2003, we reported that strategic plans should clearly define
objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and
responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that funding
necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ
monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed
improvements. For example, our past work has found that
identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal
agency combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing
national strategies related to terrorism.
In addition, GPRA requires each federal agency to develop
strategic plans that cover a period of at least 5 years and
include the agency's mission statement; identify the agency's
general goals and objectives; and describe how the agency intends
to achieve those goals through its activities and human, capital,
information, and other resources. Under GPRA, strategic plans are
the starting point for agencies to set annual performance plans
for programs and to measure the performance of the programs in
achieving those goals. Our past work has found that GPRA has the
potential for greatly enhancing agency performance. For example,
managers can use performance information to identify problems in
existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and
to develop corrective actions.^12
^11 [54]GAO-03-519T .
^12 [55]GAO-05-927 .
Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency
collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1)
define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually
reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding
needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and
responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures,
and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop
mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7)
reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual
accountability for collaborative efforts through performance
management systems.^13 We have specifically noted that, given the
number of agencies involved in U.S. government efforts to combat
terrorism, it is particularly important that there be mechanisms
to coordinate across agencies.^14
We found that while the national strategies, as well as their
updates in 2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key
strategic elements, including those to promote LEA collaboration
in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists (see table 1). For example, none of the three national
strategies established joint agency strategies that would
capitalize on the unique capacity of each LEA to combat terrorism.
Further, none of them identified funding needs or leveraged
resources; reached agreement on roles and responsibilities; or
established procedures to operate across agency boundaries.
Moreover, none of the strategies included mechanisms to monitor,
evaluate, and report on their overall results, nor did they
reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
agency plans and reports.
^13 [56]GAO-06-15 .
^14 [57]GAO-03-519T .
Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation
Assistance to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists
National National
National Strategy for Strategy for
Security Homeland Combating
Key elements Strategy Security Terrorism
Common or joint strategy
Goals and objectives
Roles and responsibilities
Performance measures
Funding
Policies to operate across agency
boundaries
Mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and
report on results
Legend: = Contains key element.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. national strategies.
State Department Unable to Fully Implement National Strategy Goal
According to the 2003 and 2006 versions of the National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism, State has the lead role in coordinating
the implementation of the strategy to combat terrorism abroad.
However, we found that State's office charged with this
mission--State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)--did not
develop or implement a plan to use the combined capabilities of
U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. According to its mission statement, S/CT is
to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using
all instruments of national power, including law enforcement,
diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military. S/CT is to
provide foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S.
government activities to combat terrorism, including those of U.S.
LEAs operating abroad. This includes coordinating all U.S.
government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with
foreign governments and participating in the development,
coordination, and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
As discussed below, S/CT has undertaken a number of initiatives to
coordinate U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, the deputy
director of S/CT told us that the office lacked the staff,
resources, and authority necessary to meet the national security
goal of using LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists.
In addition, we found that:
o S/CT does not have the authority to direct Justice and DHS LEAs
to undertake this new mission and therefore has limited ability to
lead a coordinated governmentwide effort. According to State,
Justice, and DHS officials, only the NSC and, since December 2004,
the NCTC, have the authority to ensure that executive branch
agencies are working toward the common objective of assisting
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
o S/CT cites its bilateral consultations process as a key
mechanism to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. The consultations can include the
participation of multiple U.S. departments and agencies. S/CT
reported that it had led about 83 of these consultations with
foreign nations between 2001 and 2005. We asked State for access
to S/CT's records on the bilateral consultations for each of the
four countries we visited, and found that S/CT had only conducted
consultations for one of those countries. When we reviewed the
2002 to 2005 documentation of consultations for that country, we
found that much of the assistance was for counter-drug efforts or
general capacity building of the country's legal system, such as
training of police in basic investigative techniques. The
assistance also included a $10 million effort to develop a special
investigative group within the national police, focused on
terrorist investigations and crisis response.^15 According to
representatives from the national police force, the U.S.
assistance brought about a significant improvement in their
ability to investigate terrorist attacks, but it was not focused
on improving their ability to identify and disrupt terrorist
attacks. In addition, we reviewed the three bilateral
consultations held between 2002 and 2005 for this country and
found there was no discussion of any initiatives to use the
combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to assist the foreign nation to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
o The 2003 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism directed State to
take the lead in developing specific regional strategies to defeat
terrorism. State told us that, in response to a NSC tasking, it
began developing interagency-coordinated Regional Action Plans
(RAP). However, State officials told us the RAPs were incomplete,
had never been implemented, and were now out of date. State said
that it transferred management of the RAPs to the NCTC in 2005.
However, none of the LEAs or embassy officials we met with said
they had received any guidance based on the RAPs, nor any from the
NCTC.
^15This effort was funded by State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
program, which was created in 1983 to assist civilian security and law
enforcement personnel in police procedures that address terrorism.
o In 2006, S/CT began a new effort called the Regional Strategic
Initiative that stressed a regional approach to combating
terrorism. Four Regional Strategic Initiatives were established in
2006: for Southeast Asia, Iraq and its surrounding region, the
Horn of Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean. However, based on
documentation we reviewed, the Southeast Asia initiative did not
include the use of the combined capabilities of LEAs to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. For
example, in the documentation we reviewed--which focused on
identifying terrorists transiting through a region where several
high-profile attacks against U.S. interests had occurred--there
was only one sentence dedicated to law enforcement, and it focused
solely on DHS LEAs and border control issues.
A March 2006 report by State's Office of Inspector General (OIG)
found that S/CT faced significant problems in meeting its mandate
to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism assistance to foreign nations.
The OIG found that S/CT was viewed by many elements of the U.S.
government as "marginal" to the Global War on Terror. It also
found that the difficulty of helping to coordinate the wide scope
of U.S. counterterrorism efforts abroad challenged S/CT and that
it had not fulfilled its oversight role over U.S. assistance to
foreign nations.^16
The OIG also found that some S/CT components lacked sufficient
resources to carry out their responsibilities and, specifically,
that S/CT's regional affairs unit was under funded, and "scarcely"
had the resources to meet its mandate to provide advice,
coordination, and action on regional and bilateral
counterterrorism issues. The OIG also stated that, if
counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State
could not afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed,
with no career paths for its counterterrorism officers.
The OIG found that, in accordance with State's mandate in the 2003
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, S/CT had worked hard to
exercise its interagency lead in developing Regional Action Plans.
However, according to the inspection report, observers reported to
the OIG that the exercise did not produce concrete, comprehensive
strategies, although it did produce a useful dialogue and the
first detailed matrix of current and planned U.S. counterterrorism
strategies in each region.
^16U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office
of Inspector General, Inspection of the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, OIG Report ISP-I-06-25A (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22,
2006).
The OIG report made numerous recommendations intended to improve
S/CT's ability to coordinate U.S. assistance to combat terrorism
abroad. It made several recommendations about adding staff to
individual units, but did not make broader recommendations on
overall organizational structure or funding levels. According to
an OIG official, as of January 26, 2007, S/CT was in the process
of addressing all of the report's recommendations directed to it.
In responding to our draft report, State indicated that S/CT
continues to be hampered by the lack of resources discussed in the
March 2006 State OIG report, limiting S/CT's ability to coordinate
the U.S. government's international counterterrorism activities.
In addition, State said that our draft did not give its new
Regional Strategic Initiatives sufficient credit and that law
enforcement coordination was a key aspect of the process. However,
State did not provide us additional information to support this
position and did not comment on our finding that the one Regional
Strategic Initiative we reviewed showed little involvement by U.S.
or foreign nation law enforcement agencies.
NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing
Guidance Is Still under Development
In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform
Act, creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic
operational plans to combat terrorism using every element of
national power, including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the
NCTC is expected to (1) conduct strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism activities; (2) integrate all instruments of
national power in such planning, including law enforcement,
diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial activities; (3)
assign roles and responsibilities to lead departments and
agencies; (4) ensure that agencies have access to intelligence and
intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism
plans and accomplish their assigned activities; and (5) monitor
implementation of these operational plans.
In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the
lack of a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the
national security strategy had been a void that stretched back for
decades.^17 According to the director, what has long been missing
is a plan to ensure that national strategies are implemented at
the operational level in a coordinated, integrated fashion, and
that there has been no formal process to translate the national
strategies into strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to
lead agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In
addition, there has been no plan to ensure the coordination,
integration, and synchronization of joint departmental operations,
or any effort to monitor the combined impact of the multiple
agencies engaged in implementing the national security strategy.
NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had
drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in
June of 2006. According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance
for the plan was still under development as of March 1, 2007, and
they would not discuss the plan, its contents, or the implementing
guidance.
LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
Prosecute Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors
Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists,
including the expansion of the FBI presence abroad; assistance to
help foreign nations identify and disrupt terrorist threats at
certain maritime ports; and antiterrorism training to assist
foreign nation law enforcement personnel. However, LEA efforts
have been hindered by a lack of (1) clearly articulated roles and
responsibilities to assist foreign nations in combating terrorism;
(2) guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources
to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess progress
at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and
reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures to promote joint
investigations and operations between U.S. and foreign nation LEAs
and coordinate LEA technical assistance to foreign nation LEAs;
and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to tailor LEA
technical and operational assistance to specific foreign nation
needs for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.
^17Admiral John Scott Redd, in testimony before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006.
LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations Combat Terrorism
Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations
combat terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to
operationally assist foreign nations to identify and disrupt
terrorist attacks before they occur, and it has responded to
specific terrorist attacks by assisting foreign nations to
identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In addition, new
programs have been specifically designed to assist foreign nations
to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats, such as the
DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some existing
technical assistance programs, like State's Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) program, have been significantly expanded in an
effort to improve foreign nation capabilities. While this list is
not all inclusive, these represent some significant U.S. efforts
to use U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
found that these three efforts were limited by a variety of
factors.
The FBI Has Made Some Effort to Increase Assistance to Foreign
Nations, but it Faces Staffing Limitations
In our past work, we found that, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
the FBI has permanently realigned a substantial number of its
domestic field agents from traditional criminal investigative
programs to counterterrorism investigations.^18 In 2002, the FBI
Director announced that, in keeping with its new priorities, the
agency would move more than 500 field agent positions from its
drug, violent crime, and white-collar crime programs to
counterterrorism. The FBI has transferred more agent positions to
work on counterterrorism than it had originally announced,
including through the short-term reassignment of additional field
agents from drug and other law enforcement areas. Prior to the
FBI's change in priorities, about 25 percent of the FBI's field
agent positions were allocated to counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs. As a result of the
staff reprogramming and funding for additional special agent
positions received through various appropriations, the FBI
staffing levels for these areas had increased domestically to
about 36 percent in 2004 and represented the single largest
concentration of FBI resources.
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the
United States will augment the FBI's overseas presence. The FBI's
Strategic Plan states that it will expand the role of its LEGAT
offices overseas from that of a simple liaison office to one with
a dynamic operational partnership with foreign nation
counterparts. According to Justice and FBI documents and
officials, this includes undertaking joint investigative and
operational partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to identify and
stop terrorist attacks against U.S. interests around the globe. We
found that the FBI has both responded to specific terrorist
attacks by operationally assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify
and prosecute terrorists involved in those attacks, as well as
tried to proactively assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the FBI
provided limited but vital operational assistance to locate
terrorist suspects and provided key evidence for their successful
prosecution. In another country we visited, the FBI was working
proactively with ICE and with foreign nation counterparts to track
suspicious migrants and identify and disrupt potential terrorists
before they entered the United States.
In addition, in response to our requests for their accomplishments
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists, the FBI provided some anecdotal information on its
cooperation with and assistance to foreign nations. For example,
in one country where terrorists had attacked U.S. citizens,
foreign nation authorities permitted the FBI to participate in
witness interviews. In another example, foreign nation officials
planning to provide amnesty to approximately 2,000 criminals
allowed the FBI to document the criminals' biometric data prior to
their release. In a third example, the FBI provided approximately
$1 million worth of forensic equipment to support a foreign
nation's law enforcement entities. However, FBI officials told us
they lacked a centralized database or a performance monitoring
system needed to collect, store, and report on their
accomplishments and, therefore, were unable to provide us with a
systematic or comprehensive set of accomplishments in assisting
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
According to the FBI, it has increased the number of personnel and
offices abroad since 2001. In May 2007, the FBI reported that,
prior to 9/11, the FBI had 127 agents and 74 support personnel
stationed in 44 LEGATs and four suboffices; however, as of May
2007, the FBI stated that it now has 167 agents and 111 support
positions staffing its 59 LEGATs and 14 suboffices abroad. In
addition, the FBI has revised the number of countries covered by
regional offices, in an effort to reduce the geographic span of
coverage for the LEGAT offices. For example, before 2005, LEGAT
Paris provided coverage for 17 countries in Africa. However, since
the regional LEGAT office in Rabat, Morocco, LEGAT Paris has
covered only France and Monaco.
Despite these actions, we found that the impact of the FBI's
expansion and realignment to combat terrorism has been limited in
some posts overseas. We found during overseas work in 2006 that
while the FBI has increased its overseas offices, not all of those
offices had been staffed with permanent positions, or permanent
positions remained unfilled. For example, although the FBI had
permanent LEGAT offices in two countries where there had been
terrorist attacks against American interests, we found at the time
of our fieldwork in 2006 that temporary FBI staff were filling
slots designated as permanent staff positions. Both FBI
headquarters staff and agents in the field at all four countries
we visited said that it was essential to have long-term rotations
in a country in order to establish the types of working
relationships with foreign country LEAs needed to effectively
assist them to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
Further, the LEGATs in three of the four countries we visited said
they generally lacked the resources, time, and staff to develop
the close, collaborative relationships necessary to develop joint
investigations or operations. In one country we visited, where FBI
rotations are generally limited to 1 year and the current LEGAT
was there for only a 90-day tour, the LEGAT told us that he and
his staff had little interaction with the national LEAs in the
country because of their short tours. In contrast, in the fourth
country, which had the greatest number of LEAs of any embassy we
visited, and where the LEGAT office was more fully staffed with
permanent FBI agents and analysts, the FBI was providing both
investigative and operational assistance to the foreign nation to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
FBI headquarters management, as well as two temporary duty agents
in the field, told us in 2006 that, while the LEGAT positions were
approved for the two countries that had temporary staff filling
the permanent FBI slots, the FBI had difficulty filling the
positions due to the bureau's lack of career incentives or
overseas staffing culture. In 2006, the deputy assistant director
of the counterterrorism division told us that the FBI has had
difficulty staffing overseas LEGAT positions for years and that,
despite recent transformation efforts, it has not yet solved the
problem of staffing overseas positions by providing career rewards
and incentives to agents or by developing a culture that promotes
the importance and value of overseas duty. As a result, permanent
FBI positions were either unfilled or staffed with nonpermanent
staff on temporary duty, and the LEGATs have been limited in their
ability to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists.
In December 2006, FBI officials told us that, in an attempt to
improve staffing at high-threat posts, the FBI Director
implemented career incentives in June 2006 to encourage staff to
volunteer for overseas placement.^19 In May 2007, the FBI stated
that this career incentives package addressed the difficulties
encountered in staffing the high threat LEGAT offices.^20
In responding to our draft report in May 2007, the FBI stated that
all of the LEGAT positions at its nine highest threat posts were
now staffed with full-time, permanent LEGAT staff. Specifically,
the FBI stated that it now has permanent, full-time FBI personnel
assigned to the two high-threat countries where we found only
temporary staff in 2006. However, the FBI provided no additional
documentation to support this contention. In addition, the FBI
observed that in two of the four locations we visited, both
arguably high-threat posts, the respective LEGATs departed post
out of the normal rotational cycles and with little advance
notice, creating temporarily unfilled positions. However, in one
of those posts, we were told that the position was difficult to
fill and it would not be permanently filled for almost a year.
The FBI stated that it also relies on short-term rotations of 2 to
6 months and temporary short term assignments to supplement
permanent staff. According to the FBI, through the use of
deputies, assistant LEGATs and temporarily assigned personnel,
LEGATs are able to establish and maintain liaison with principal
law enforcement and intelligence/security services in designated
foreign territories while meeting the FBI's international
responsibilities in international terrorism, foreign
counterintelligence, organized crime, and general criminal
matters. However, FBI officials at headquarters and overseas in
all four countries we visited agreed that the types of
relationships necessary to facilitate joint investigations and
operations with foreign nations cannot be built or sustained by
agents on short-term, temporary assignments at overseas posts.
CSI Works with Foreign Nations, but It Has Had Limitations
CSI, which targets for inspection at foreign seaports high-risk
cargo shipments before they leave for the United States, was
created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S. law
enforcement personnel to be physically colocated with foreign
nation LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America.
As more than 11 million cargo containers are off-loaded at U.S.
seaports each year, CSI was developed to extend the U.S. zone of
security outward by working with foreign nation counterparts to
identify and examine sea containers that pose a risk for
terrorism. Under the initiative, foreign governments allow CBP
personnel to be stationed at foreign seaports to use intelligence
and automated risk assessment information to target shipments
identified as at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) or other terrorist contraband. As of September 2006, CSI was
in place at 50 ports overseas in 29 countries, with a 2007 goal of
being operational in 58 ports.
^19Because these incentives had just been implemented, we did not assess
their impact on staffing problems abroad.
^20Because FBI provided these comments after our audit time frames, we
were unable to verify the FBI's statement.
In 2005, we reported that CSI had led to improved information
sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened
level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the
need to identify and disrupt terrorist threats.^21 However, we
also found that several issues limited its effectiveness. These
included the inability to fully staff some ports because of
diplomatic constraints, such as the need for foreign government
permission, and practical considerations, such as workspace
limitations. In addition, the technologies used to detect WMDs
have limitations. We concluded that, given these issues, CBP had
limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI were
effective at detecting and identifying terrorist WMDs.
At the CSI location we visited, an ICE law enforcement agent was
colocated at a foreign nation maritime port and worked directly
with foreign nation law enforcement officials in their security
area. The ICE official had been there 2 years and was learning the
local language; he and foreign nation officials agreed that, by
working closely together during that time, they had developed a
trusting, collaborative relationship necessary to conduct joint
investigations. While this effort had not led to the
identification or disruption of terrorist-related shipments, the
foreign nation customs control director said that, to his
knowledge, this was the first time that a U.S. law enforcement
official was colocated with foreign nation LEAs to conduct joint
investigations to identify and disrupt terrorist threats against
the United States. He recommended greater efforts to colocate U.S.
law enforcement officers with other counterparts in the country.
He also recommended that, to improve collaboration, U.S. officials
should learn the local language and work within the local law
enforcement offices for extended periods.
^21GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum
Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection
Efforts, [59]GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).
State Has Expanded the ATA Program
In 1983, State established the ATA program to train civilian
security and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments
in police procedures that address terrorism. DS administers the
ATA program. DS officers work with the foreign country's
government and a team from that country's U.S. mission to develop
training in areas such as bomb detection, crime scene
investigation, airport and building security, maritime
protections, and VIP protection. (See fig. 1 for an example of ATA
training to foreign nation LEAs.)
Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
Exercises
According to State's Congressional Budget Justifications, after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ATA program funding more than tripled,
from approximately $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to over $122
million in fiscal year 2006. A March 2006 report by State's OIG
recognized that ATA funding and the number of students trained had
increased. However, the report also stated that the program's
procedures should be improved. Specifically, the report
recommended that ATA courses should receive timely, independent,
in-depth evaluations to establish and maintain quality control.^22
^22On November 16, 2006, we initiated a review of the ATA program,
including the extent to which State has assessed program outcomes and
achieved program objectives.
LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations Have Been Limited by Several Factors
LEA efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists have been limited by several factors.
Specifically, we found that LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly
defined roles and responsibilities to assist foreign nations; (2)
guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess progress
at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and
reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures needed to
promote joint investigations and operations between U.S. and
foreign nation LEAs and coordinate LEA technical assistance to
foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs
assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to
specific foreign nation needs for identifying, disrupting, and
prosecuting terrorists.
Most LEAs Lacked Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities
Our past work has stressed the importance of a strategy to combat
terrorism that would clearly define the roles and responsibilities
of each agency for meeting specific objectives related to
combating terrorism. Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort
where interagency collaboration is essential, such as this effort
to use the combined capabilities of each LEA to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, we have
recommended that agencies agree on roles and responsibilities so
each agency understands its role and how it supports the greater
overall effort.
We found that the national strategies' broad strategic objectives
have not been clearly translated to agency-specific roles and
responsibilities. In particular, with the exception of Justice and
the White House issuing some guidance to the FBI, we found
Justice, DHS, and State had not issued guidance to their component
LEAs to implement this new national security goal of assisting
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists, and
most U.S. LEAs--including ATF,^23 CBP, DEA, DS, ICE, USMS, and
USSS--continued to operate based on their traditional objectives
and guidance. As a result, LEAs lacked clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for implementing the broad objective articulated
in the national strategies to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
^23ATF officials told us that ATF incorporated terrorism-prevention into
its strategic plan but that it had not received or issued guidance
specific to assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
As of February 2007, no single LEA was in charge of coordinating
or directing the efforts of all the U.S. LEAs to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. Some of the
presidential directives governing LEA activities had not been
updated since the mid to late 1990s, and with the exception of the
FBI, none of the other LEAs had been provided guidance to make
assisting foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist
threats a primary mission.
The FBI has been given some guidance on its roles and
responsibilities from the White House and Justice. The FBI
traditionally has had the general statutory authority to conduct,
both domestically and overseas, investigations related to criminal
and terrorist activities, including those overseas.^24 Under the
general authority, the Attorney General, in regulations, has
placed the FBI in the lead agency role for investigating crimes of
terrorism in the United States.^25 In 1995, Presidential Decision
Directive 39 confirmed the FBI's lead agency role in investigating
terrorism. In 2002, the Attorney General issued guidance to the
FBI that its new priority was to act to prevent terrorist
attacks,^26 and the FBI has been in the process of transforming to
meet that mission.
In 2003, the Attorney General issued further guidance to the FBI
authorizing it to work with foreign nations to provide
investigative and technical assistance for combating terrorism.^27
In turn, the FBI's 2004 to 2009 strategic plan reflects this new
direction, stating that the FBI plans to increase its presence
abroad and increase joint operations with foreign nations to
combat terrorism. As a result of the guidance, FBI officials in
Washington and in the countries we visited told us that FBI agents
abroad were expected to work with foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, with the exception of
the LEGAT in one of the four countries we visited, FBI officials
told us that the implementation of that goal was still in
transition and that there was some uncertainty as to how to
accomplish that goal, given their limited staff and other overseas
duties.
^2418 U.S.C. 2331, 2332, and 3052; 28 U.S.C. 533; 28 U.S.C. 3052.
^2528 C.F.R. 0.85(l).
^26Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations.
^27Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations
and Foreign Intelligence Collection.
According to FBI officials, as of December 2006, the issue of
roles and responsibilities for the LEAs remains unresolved and is
still subject to on-going debates within the administration. DHS
officials reiterated similar concerns and, in response to our
preliminary findings, agreed that their roles and responsibilities
related to combating terrorism abroad could be more clearly
articulated to ensure understanding among DHS officials working
abroad. In particular, DHS officials told us, in January 2007,
that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have determined who will lead
the effort to use the combined capabilities of the LEAs to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, or
clearly defined their roles and responsibilities. State indicated
that it was not in charge of LEA efforts to assist foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and referred us to
Justice and DHS for such plans. State indicated that this was the
responsibility of the NSC or the White House, and that neither
entity had clearly defined or identified the roles and
responsibilities of State, Justice, and DHS LEAs.
We found other examples related to the lack of guidance on roles
and responsibilities, including the following:
o The DEA is a "single mission" agency dedicated to reducing the
threat, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Although it has not
been given the specific goal to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists, in response to the
9/11 terrorist attacks, it has expanded its intelligence
capabilities and information sharing, and instituted a formal
procedure to query its in-country sources on terrorist-related
information, which is then shared with the FBI and other agencies
involved with efforts to fight terrorism. In addition, in February
of 2004, the Administrator of DEA testified before Congress that
"During December 2001, the DEA formed a Special Coordination Unit
at its Special Operations Division... [which] coordinates all DEA
intelligence and investigations having a possible nexus to
terrorism and shares information with agencies responsible for
coordinating terrorist intelligence and investigations. DEA drug
investigations have generated such narco-terrorist related
intelligence and investigations both domestically and
internationally."
o While the strategic plans for both ICE and CBP generally charged
them with preventing terrorists from entering the United States,
neither agency is explicitly tasked with assisting foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Overseas, we found
that ICE and CBP were working proactively with foreign nation
officials in one country we visited to identify terrorists threats
bound for the United States. However, ICE officials, who comprise
the primary DHS law enforcement presence abroad, were present in
the remaining three countries we visited but were generally not
assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify, disrupt, or prosecute
terrorists. There were no CBP officials in these three countries.
The lack of clear guidance was evident when we spoke with DHS
officials abroad. For example, some ICE and CBP officials told us
they were responsible for working with foreign nations to stop
attacks, while other ICE and CBP officials said they did not have
that responsibility. ICE officials told us in December 2006 that
they were not working with foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists because neither the NSC, the NCTC, nor
DHS had given them any directives or funding to do so.
o Two LEAs--USMS and ATF--indicated that they had not been given
clear roles in the U.S. effort to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists despite having the
capabilities to do so. For example, officials from USMS, which
specializes in tracking, capturing, and extraditing criminals,
indicated they had unique skills and capabilities that could be
used to identify and capture terrorists abroad. Similarly,
officials from ATF, which specializes in tracing weapons and
explosives, told us they could help identify bombs and other
weapons used by terrorists.
o The USSS has not been tasked with assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. According to USSS
officials, the service does not currently have a role in combating
terrorism abroad, nor does it want this role. However, it could
provide assistance in investigative techniques and information
sharing on terrorist-related cases. USSS officials said that the
service wants to maintain its traditional focus and not assume new
responsibilities related to combating terrorism.
o RSOs are charged with providing a safe and secure environment
for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.^28 A key responsibility
for RSOs is identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks against
U.S. embassies and personnel. However, the RSOs have been given no
post 9/11 guidance from State on how to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs voiced
confusion about this role. In three of the four countries we
visited, RSOs told us that State has never given the RSOs the goal
to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists, and RSOs have never been given a specific role or
directives to implement this aspect of the national security
strategy. However, we did find some cases where RSOs were
undertaking initiatives to assist the foreign nation identify,
disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In one country, the RSO was
critical in embassy efforts to support the foreign nation to
capture and prosecute terrorists responsible for attacks against
Americans and others. In that same country, an assistant RSO
stationed at a consulate, working with foreign nation police,
exposed a criminal operation selling counterfeit and legitimate
visas and other travel documents that could be used by terrorists
to gain entry into the United States. In commenting on our
findings, a senior official with DS agreed that the primary
responsibility of RSOs was the protection of the embassy and its
officials, and said that additional directives would be needed
from the NSC if RSO responsibilities were to be expanded to
include assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. In commenting on the draft report, State
indicated that broadening DS's law enforcement mandate to play a
broader role could require statutory changes in addition to new
directives.
At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not provided
guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Ambassadors or deputy
chiefs of missions at each embassy we visited voiced their concern
that, despite combating terrorism being the embassy's highest
priority, they received little to no guidance on how to design a
coordinated assistance program using the full capacities of U.S.
technical and operational assistance of LEAs, and ensure that LEAs
had the necessary goals, skills, capabilities, and time to work
closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist attacks.
In all four countries, ambassadors and deputy chiefs of missions
believed that the roles and responsibilities of LEAs for assisting
foreign nations to identify and prevent future attacks needed to
be clarified. Foreign nation officials in two of the countries we
visited said that they were confused by the number of officers and
agencies at embassies working on counterterrorism issues, and said
they did not know which LEA was in charge, or which LEA to work
with regarding specific terrorist threats.
^28RSO authorities are found in the State Department Basic Authorities Act
(P.L. 84-885, section 37; 22 U.S.C. 2709) . RSOs are responsible for
implementing and managing State's security and law enforcement programs
for a geographic region, which includes at least one Foreign Service post.
RSOs are resident at a particular post and may have constituent posts
within their region for which they are responsible. The RSOs or Post
Security Officers are responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management
of security programs at their constituent posts (12 FAM 422.1). The RSOs
responsibilities and duties are enumerated in 12 FAM 422.2 through 422.5.
Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission, who are responsible for
trying to coordinate law enforcement agencies at embassies, stated
that--given the strategic importance of stopping further attacks,
and the complexity of disparate U.S. programs and agencies that
can be used to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists--they believed that State should consider
appointing an officer with law enforcement experience or training
who would be dedicated to helping embassies develop, implement,
and monitor U.S. law enforcement efforts. They suggested that a
"coordinator for combating terrorism" could be placed in
high-threat posts to integrate LEA capabilities and ensure use of
their full expertise to cover the range of vulnerabilities
terrorists could exploit to harm U.S. interests.
During our work in four countries, we found numerous issues
related to the lack of clear guidance on roles and
responsibilities of LEAs in assisting foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example:
o In the four countries we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of
mission, and political officers, who were responsible for
implementing this new national security goal, said that they lack
the guidance, training, and funding to effectively use LEA
technical or operational assistance to assist foreign nations. As
a result, they questioned whether they could effectively implement
and coordinate a joint U.S.-foreign nation assistance effort to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists that pose a threat to
U.S. citizens and interests.
o In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and
responsibilities between ICE and the FBI led to both investigative
and operational problems, according to foreign nation, ICE, and
FBI officials. ICE was responsible for tracking special interest
aliens, while the FBI was responsible for identifying terrorists
trying to enter the United States. Because it was unclear whether
some of these special interest aliens were migrants or potential
terrorists--and ICE and FBI were not given clear guidance to
determine which LEA had the lead role--foreign nation and agency
officials noted instances where joint U.S.-foreign nation
investigations or operations were poorly coordinated. As a result,
ICE and FBI, unknowingly working with different foreign nation
LEAs, moved in on the same subject. According to the foreign
nation law enforcement and FBI officials, such actions may have
compromised several of their investigations.
o In another country we visited, neither DHS nor the former
agencies that now largely constitute ICE and CBP--including the
Customs Service and INS--were given a role when State designed the
embassy's extensive program to assist in controlling and
documenting migration flows across a known terrorist-rich border
region, despite their expertise in border control, immigration,
and customs issues. State officials told us that they were given
no guidance to seek the expertise of DHS or these agencies when
State designed the program in 2002. These agencies were
subsequently abolished and their responsibilities divided among
new entities in DHS, yet DHS officials told us in January 2007
that they were unaware of the program and had never been consulted
on it. According to embassy officials, the key goal of the program
related to identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists
crossing this border region, has not resulted in the prosecution
of any terrorists.
o In a third country that served as both a source country and a
transit point for terrorists, the ambassador told us that, despite
the need for DHS expertise to improve border control, he has
delayed approving three full time DHS positions because of a
mismatch between his and DHS's views on DHS's specific roles and
responsibilities once in-country. The ambassador said that he
believed the DHS representatives should be colocated with foreign
nation police at airports, maritime ports, immigration offices,
customs offices, and land borders to develop the strong
collaborative relationships necessary to conduct joint
investigations or operations. However, he was concerned that the
DHS officials would principally work from the embassy.
In commenting on our findings, officials from State, Justice, and
DHS agreed that there was a lack of clear guidance instructing
LEAs to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. Officials noted that the NSC and now the NCTC have the
authority to compel U.S. LEAs to work together in a coordinated,
systematic fashion to help stop terrorist attacks. Officials said
that no executive department has the authority to direct the LEAs
from other departments to focus on this goal, and they noted that
recommendations to individual agencies would not result in a
unified multidepartmental effort to help foreign nations combat
terrorism.
In a February 2007 letter to GAO, the Senior Counsel for National
Security Affairs at Justice stated that, for operational
assistance to foreign nations, the FBI was designated the lead
federal LEA with jurisdiction to investigate terrorism-related
crimes. However, this view was not shared by other LEAs in
Washington and in the embassies we visited. LEAs, including
Justice's FBI, USMS, ATF, and DEA; DHS's ICE, CBP, and USSS; and
State's RSOs all told us there was no lead LEA charged with using
the combined capabilities of federal LEAs to assist foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In December
2006, FBI officials agreed that the issue of which LEA would lead
this effort was still unresolved.
Executive Departments and LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance on Setting
Funding Priorities for Assisting Foreign Nations to Combat
Terrorism
Our guidelines on developing an effective collaborative strategy
note the importance of identifying needs and addressing them by
leveraging resources to meet strategic objectives. In addition, in
our past work on agencies creating strategic plans to meet GPRA
requirements, we reported that the alignment of activities and
resources is critical.^29 In this review, however, we found that
State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs lacked clear guidance on
setting funding priorities to meet the national security goal of
helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
Officials from State, Justice, and DHS told us that they are
attempting to fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with
limited staffing and funds, and without guidance from the NSC on
reprioritizing funds from other activities to assist foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result,
their efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists have been hindered. For example, a March 2006
report by State's OIG found that S/CT lacked adequate resources to
meet its mandate to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism assistance
abroad. The OIG found that S/CT's regional affairs unit was
under-funded to provide advice, coordination, and action on
regional and bilateral counterterrorism issues and that, if
counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State
could not afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed.
In addition, as noted above, while the FBI has reprioritized and
realigned a significant amount of its resources domestically from
criminal investigation to efforts to combat terrorism, we found
that this realignment has been limited overseas. For example,
senior FBI officials from the Counterterrorism Division and the
Office of International Operations told us that they lacked funds
to establish offices and permanently fill LEGAT positions in some
high-threat posts. Furthermore, DHS officials from ICE and CBP
agreed that NSC has not provided guidance on how to reprioritize
funding to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. As a result, officials said they were
limited in their ability to undertake new initiatives in this area
or to fully staff existing positions already approved by
embassies.
^29GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [60]GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
In the countries we visited, we observed that this lack of
guidance limited the embassies' ability to assist foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In four countries
we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and others
indicated that, due to the lack of guidance from either the NSC,
NCTC, or their executive departments, LEA headquarters in
Washington have generally not reallocated funding from lower
priority activities to support the new national priority of
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. In one country, the ambassador said that the most
significant concern facing the embassy was the mismatch between
U.S. objectives and available funding for assisting foreign
nations to combat terrorism.
In all four countries we visited, embassy, LEA, and foreign nation
officials identified terrorist transit and border vulnerabilities
as the primary challenges; yet, in three of these countries,
officials said that, due to funding not being realigned to support
the goal of assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism, they
did not provide specific assistance to foreign nation LEAs to
address these needs. Specifically, ICE officials in one country
told us that because funding had not been reprioritized, ICE had
not provided training to foreign nation LEAs to counter
immigration, travel, and border threats. In another country,
although the embassy wanted DHS officials to assist the foreign
nation for port security, customs, and immigration, DHS officials
from a regional office were unable to provide this assistance
because funding limitations restricted their ability to visit the
country, and, moreover, they were focused on performing their
other responsibilities when they were able to visit.
In all four countries we visited, there was more funding designed
to assist foreign nations combat illegal drugs and criminals than
to combat terrorism, despite the fact that efforts to combat
terrorism were the highest priority of each embassy. For example,
in one country with an extremely high terrorist threat to American
interests globally, State provided more than six times the amount
of funding to stop illicit drugs and crime ($220.2 million) than
it did for antiterrorism assistance ($34.5 million) from fiscal
years 2002 to 2006. We found similar issues at the other three
embassies we visited. For instance, in one country, the deputy
chief of mission told us that most of the training and assistance
funding there was dedicated for counter narcotics efforts, even
though drugs were no longer a key strategic concern in that
country. From fiscal years 2002 to 2006, this country received
$12.3 million in funding intended to combat drugs, compared with
$8.8 million for assisting the foreign nation to combat terrorism.
Based on a review of our findings, State Department officials
representing offices involved with U.S. efforts to combat crime,
drugs, and terrorism abroad, agreed that there was significantly
more funding available for combating crime and drugs than for
assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. However, officials
said that some of the funding allotted to help foreign nations to
combat crime and drugs was fungible and could be used to combat
terrorism. We found that, in all four countries we visited,
embassies used funding intended for objectives such as combating
crime and drugs, and improving law enforcement and judicial
capacity, to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. In other instances, embassies allowed some
key needs to not be fully addressed because funding had not been
reprioritized from other activities.
In a February 2007 letter to GAO, Justice stated that the ability
of foreign nations to combat terrorism depends on having
functioning law enforcement and judicial sector institutions and
professionals capable of carrying out complex investigations and
prosecutions. While these capabilities are not terrorism specific,
they are often prerequisites to an ability to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists, Justice stated. As a result, some
general capacity building training can potentially provide a
benefit to a foreign nation's ability to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists.
LEAs Are Not Systematically Assessing Their Accomplishments or
Progress in Assisting Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt,
and Prosecute Terrorists
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act, and GPRA all require the monitoring of LEA performance
to measure progress toward stated goals and objectives. The
National Strategy for Homeland Security addresses the need for
accountability in the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. It
states that every department or agency involved with combating
terrorism will create performance monitoring systems that will
allow agencies to measure their progress, make resource allocation
decisions, and adjust priorities accordingly. In addition, the
2004 Intelligence Reform Act charged the NCTC with monitoring the
implementation of strategic operational plans to combat terrorism
and obtaining information from each department, agency, or element
of the U.S. government relevant for monitoring the progress of
each entity in implementing such plans. Moreover, GPRA requires
that agencies in charge of U.S. government programs and activities
identify goals and report on the degree to which goals are met.
Our own past work has also stressed the importance of a strategy
to combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives,
priorities, outcomes, milestones, and measures to use in
monitoring performance.
We found that none of the LEAs had in place a systematic method
for determining progress or documenting their accomplishments in
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists, either for technical or operational assistance. As a
result, these departments or agencies generally found it difficult
to assess whether they were making progress implementing this
national security goal, or to determine what was needed to improve
their overall assistance to foreign countries.
To ensure we fully reflected U.S. efforts in assisting foreign
nations, we requested from all eight LEAs a comprehensive list of
all key accomplishments from 2001 to 2005. However, LEA and
executive department officials told us that, because they have no
systematic method of documenting their efforts to assist foreign
nations, they could provide anecdotal information but no
comprehensive list of accomplishments.
State, Justice, and DHS agreed they lacked systems to
systematically document their accomplishments or assess their
progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. State said that its bureau performance
plans, State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism, and U.S.
mission performance plans allowed them to both monitor progress
and document the department's accomplishments. According to
State's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, each mission, including
all the U.S. agencies located in the country, develops mission
performance plans that outline the intended goals, priority
initiatives, and performance indicators for the mission. However,
based on our review of these documents, we found they were not
sufficiently detailed to clearly determine the role of State,
Justice, or DHS LEAs, or their accomplishments or progress, in
meeting this national security goal.
Justice, along with FBI, DEA, ATF,^30 and USMS officials, said
that it was not monitoring its progress in assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. The FBI
indicated that it was in the process of developing such a system.
DHS officials told us that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have
directed executive branch agencies to systematically assess their
performance and progress in assisting foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Officials from DHS, including
those from ICE, CBP, and USSS, agreed that they had no performance
measures at the national strategic level to measure LEA success at
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists, and that DHS was not compiling this information at the
agency level.
Due to the lack of performance information, we could not conduct
or provide a full assessment of all three departments' LEAs'
progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists.
In one of the countries we visited, we met with the Director of
State's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), which
provides training to foreign nation LEAs from 12 countries in the
region. The director said that, because no independent,
governmentwide evaluations were being conducted of U.S. training
efforts, it was impossible to determine whether the general
training that was provided was improving the ability of the
foreign nation to combat terrorism.
In responding to our findings, State Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) officials involved
with the administration of the ILEA program agreed that it was
critical to conduct independent, long-term impact evaluations to
verify that training was actually improving the foreign nation
capabilities to combat terrorism. The officials indicated that, in
the past, they had conducted such studies, but that funding for
the evaluations was suspended in fiscal year 2003, and that
without adequate funding, they had not been able to undertake
these activities. The officials said that, without such studies,
it was impossible to determine whether the training was actually
increasing the ability of foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or
prosecute terrorists. To be effective, impact studies should
include assistance provided by all departments, such as that
provided by State, Justice, and DHS.
^30In response to our draft report, ATF's technical comments stated that
ATF has systems in place to monitor its progress and accomplishments in
program areas, including assistance given to foreign nations; however, ATF
did not provide us with documentation to support their position. Further,
ATF does not have a specific program to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
LEAs Generally Lacked Mechanisms for Collaboration Abroad
We found in our past work that effective interagency collaboration
is essential, as laid out in the national strategies and as
provided for in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act. And we have
identified necessary elements for collaboration across agencies.
However, we found that LEAs abroad lacked formal mechanisms to
promote collaboration among LEAs to combat terrorism.
Domestically, to improve collaborative investigations and
operations among various LEAs within the United States, the
National Strategy for Homeland Security supported the expanded use
of structures called Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF),^31 which
combine the national and international investigative capacity of
the federal government with state and local knowledge and
capabilities in an effort to identify and detect terrorist groups
and prevent them from carrying out attacks against the United
States. The 9/11 Commission further supported the use of JTTFs,
noting that, by expanding their use, the FBI could leverage the
expertise, manpower, and resources of federal, state, and local
LEAs.
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI expanded the
number of JTTFs from 35 to over 100 by 2005. According to the FBI,
JTTFs have played a central role in virtually every significant
terrorism investigation, prevention, or interdiction within the
United States. These include the conviction of Ramzi Yousef and
Eyad Mahmoud Ismal for conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and the 2004 arrest in New York of Yassin Muhiddin Aref on
money-laundering charges connected to a possible terrorist plot to
kill a Pakistani diplomat.
We found that State has generally not created structures, similar
to JTTFs, at embassies to foster collaborative LEA efforts to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. FBI officials told us that neither the FBI nor State
had considered implementing this model at embassies, but said that
State should consider doing so. In addition, ambassadors, deputy
chiefs of mission, and LEA officials abroad said that while they
had received no directives from State to consider such a model,
they supported implementing such a concept at the embassies we
visited. In addition, DHS officials told us, in January 2007, that
neither the NCTC nor the NSC had developed policies to facilitate
joint LEA investigations and operations abroad. In three of the
four embassies we visited, we found that the embassies still
generally retained pre-9/11 structures for information sharing and
collaboration among LEAs, and LEAs noted that the embassies had
not been reoriented to harness the combined capabilities of all
LEAs in a collective effort to prevent another terrorist attack on
the United States or its interests.
^31Agencies and departments that participate in JTTFs include FBI, DEA,
USMS, ATF, ICE, CBP, USSS, the Department of Defense, Coast Guard, the
Department of Treasury, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Capitol
Police, U.S. Park Police, and state and local partners, such as the state
and local police.
We were told by officials at the four embassies we visited, and by
some State and LEA officials in Washington, that missions
generally use law enforcement working groups to share information
or to coordinate LEA activities at embassies. Based on our work at
embassies, we found that these working groups did not function in
an integrated, collaborative manner, and were not focused on joint
investigative or operational efforts to identify and disrupt
terrorist acts. We were told that these groups often met
infrequently and usually discussed general, nonoperational
information. For example, in one country we visited with an
extremely high terrorist threat, an FBI official told us that the
law enforcement working group had never been asked to try to
identify or disrupt any of the terrorists on the most wanted lists
of the departments of State or Defense, or of the foreign nation
itself. In general, LEAs told us that terrorist information was
not always shared or acted on across all key agencies at the
missions, including the LEAs.
While none of the embassies we visited had implemented formal
structures that ensured information sharing and collaboration
among all U.S. LEAs for assisting foreign nations to combat
terrorism, one embassy did have a structure that included some
collaborative LEA elements. At that embassy, the ambassador had
created a fusion center and a working group to combat terrorism.
The fusion center colocated FBI, DHS, and other assets in a common
workspace. As potential terrorist information was received in the
fusion center, each agency could check its databases for
information needed to identify or locate the terrorists. This
information was then operationalized through the members of the
working group, who would use their contacts with the foreign
nation to conduct joint investigations or operations. According to
the ambassador and the LEAs, despite some continuing instances of
coordination problems between some LEAs at the post, this
structure had significantly improved coordination and operations
among both U.S. and foreign nation LEAs.
While ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and other embassy
officials generally supported implementing formal structures for
integrated, collaborative LEA efforts at embassies, they noted
some challenges to doing so. For example, the RSO and LEGAT in one
country we visited strongly supported a formal structure for
integrated, collaborative LEA efforts at the embassy. The RSO said
that for such a structure to work properly, all the agencies must
be colocated in the same room, share space and telephones, and
work together constantly on joint investigations and operations.
However, according to the LEGAT, LEAs were not colocated at the
embassy and several LEAs, such as USSS, ICE, CBP, and the
Transportation Security Administration, were all located apart
from the main embassy building at his post. As a result, the LEAs
were not able to access the combined databases of each agency. He
said that bringing these elements together would likely require
construction of an additional secure facility and dedicated
classified connections to each LEA's respective headquarters
office. In addition, he also recommended that foreign nation law
enforcement officials be included in a new collaborative LEA
structure, but he noted that this would raise classification
issues, since much of the terrorist related information cannot be
shared with foreign nationals. Despite these challenges, he said
creating a formal structure at the embassy for integrated
collaboration, information-sharing, and joint operations could be
very helpful. State officials, in commenting on our findings,
stated that both security and space limitations could be a
challenge to colocating LEAs at embassies.
LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments
In our past work, we found that identifying and addressing needs
and leveraging resources was an essential element of a strategic
plan and for interagency collaboration.^32 The United States
provides a broad range of technical assistance to foreign nations
related to legal reforms and improving the general capacity of
police, prosecutors, and judges. State provides training programs
under the ATA program, a training program designed to address
foreign nation capabilities to combat terrorism, and the INL
programs. In addition, the FBI provides some foreign nation
training overseas and at its National Training Center at Quantico,
VA. Justice also administers the International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program, which works to build
the general capacity of foreign nation LEAs. It also administers
the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training
program, which, for example, through its Resident Legal Advisor
program, assists foreign nations with legal reform efforts and can
include assistance in crafting needed legislation and revising
existing terrorism law, as well as assistance to prosecutors and
judges in utilizing new and revised terrorism law to process
terrorist suspects. In two of the four countries we visited, we
found that Justice officials were working with foreign nations to
draft new legislation. In one case, a Justice official assisted
the foreign nation in passing legislation to make it a criminal
offense to possess fraudulent passports; such passports can be
used by terrorists to travel to the United States.
^32 [61]GAO/GGD-96-118 , [62]GAO-05-927, and [63]GAO-06-15 .
We found a lack of a single, comprehensive country needs
assessment, which considers all U.S. assistance for addressing the
country's needs in combating terrorism. As a result, State,
Justice, DHS, and their LEAs may not be tailoring and targeting
their full range of training and assistance to assist foreign
countries to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For
example, according to embassy officials in three of the four
countries we visited, terrorist transit across their borders was a
key vulnerability, yet there was no comprehensive effort by State,
Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to provide training to the foreign
nation border patrols, immigration officers, and customs agents to
identify and disrupt terrorists transiting their borders.
In one of the countries we visited, the Director of State's ILEA
stated that, to be effective, comprehensive governmentwide needs
assessments should be conducted and that State, Justice, and DHS
should coordinate their training programs to meet the key
terrorism vulnerabilities in each country. This could include
combined training of small, vetted units of police, prosecutors,
and judges on how to collaboratively investigate and prosecute
terrorists, as well as training needed to identify and capture
terrorists involved with transnational travel.
Further, in responding to our preliminary findings, State/INL
officials involved with administering the ILEAs agreed that it was
critical to conduct needs assessments. The officials indicated
that, in the past, they had conducted such studies, but that
funding was suspended in fiscal year 2003. The officials said
that, without adequate funding, they had not been able to
undertake these activities and, without such assessments, it was
impossible to determine training needs.
Moreover, we found that an embassy's ability to provide effective,
targeted, and coordinated assistance to meet country needs could
vary significantly. For example, in one country we visited,
despite problems with the foreign nation's legal system that
hindered terrorist prosecutions, the embassy had no on-going
programs to assist the foreign nation to strengthen terrorism laws
and train police, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to
develop the capacity of the legal system to prosecute terrorists.
Embassy officials told us that because of these limitations in the
legal system, foreign nation LEAs were not the most effective
instruments for combating terrorism, and instead the embassy
relied on the use of the military and other assets to combat
terrorism.
In contrast, another embassy successfully employed a variety of
State and Justice programs to assist the foreign nation to
identify, arrest, and prosecute terrorists, despite limitations in
the foreign nation's legal system that hindered successful
prosecutions. In that country, the embassy, in close cooperation
with the foreign nation, used State's ATA and INL assets to train
a specialized unit of the local police to capture terrorist
suspects. The U.S.-foreign nation team then assembled a small task
force of foreign nation investigators, prosecutors, and judges,
and, using Justice-administered funds, provided specialized
training to develop a case using recently passed legislation. The
case resulted in the successful prosecution of the terrorists
accused of killing Americans and others at popular tourist sites.
Conclusion
Combating terrorism is the United States' top national security
priority at home and at embassies abroad. Since 9/11, U.S.
national strategies have consistently called for using all
elements of national power to combat terrorism, including changing
the role of LEAs. In particular, these strategies have called for
expanding LEAs' overseas activities to include working with
foreign nations and building their capacity toward a shared goal
of identifying and disrupting terrorist plots, and bringing these
terrorists to justice in courts of law. In response, some LEAs
have taken steps to expand existing programs or initiate new
technical assistance efforts to, among other things, help train
foreign police, prosecutors, and judges. The FBI has made efforts
to work more closely with foreign counterparts on operational
efforts to detect and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur.
However, while the national strategies have articulated this
change in direction and emphasis, they have not provided specific
roles, objectives, resources, or mechanisms for determining
success. At the embassies we visited, ambassadors and deputy
chiefs of mission voiced their concern that, despite
counterterrorism being the embassy's highest priority, they
received little to no guidance on how to determine country
assistance needs in this area; design a coordinated assistance
program using the full capacities of U.S. LEAs; and ensure that
the LEAs had the necessary directives, capabilities, and time to
work closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist
attacks. As a result of these weaknesses, LEAs, a key element of
national power, are not being fully used abroad to protect U.S.
citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks.
Looking forward, the United States needs to develop clear
implementing guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA
activities assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the
NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for
combating terrorism clearly articulates the specific objectives
for each LEA, clarifies their roles and responsibilities, and
proposes actions linked to available resources and directed at the
most pressing needs for assisting foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In addition, since these
activities are central to the overall U.S. effort to combat
terrorism, DHS, Justice, and State need to ensure that their
component agencies have clear guidance to implement the national
security strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs
to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists, and also need to assess progress toward objectives and
provide regular reporting to Congress on the results, impediments,
and planned improvements.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with
the NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan
for combating terrorism:
o Articulates a clear strategy to implement the national security
goal of using the combined capabilities of LEAs to help foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
o Clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each LEA for (1)
helping enhance the capabilities of foreign police, prosecutors,
and judges for combating terrorism; and (2) working more closely
with foreign nations on operational efforts to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists.
o Includes a mechanism for comprehensively (1) assessing the needs
of foreign nations for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists; (2) deciding which needs U.S. LEAs should help
address; (3) determining which U.S. LEA programs or activities are
best suited to address those needs; and (4) ensuring that U.S.
LEAs are provided guidance on setting funding priorities and
providing resources to address those needs.
o Requires a monitoring system that provides the executive
departments, LEAs, and Congress accurate reporting on
accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements for LEAs
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
We recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and State each:
o Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the
national security strategies' goal of using the full capabilities
of LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists.
o Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective
department and Congress with accurate reporting on that
department's accomplishments, impediments, and planned
improvements in their LEAs' efforts to help foreign nations combat
terrorism.
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security:
o Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to
improve information sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for
assisting foreign nations combat terrorism.
DHS, Justice, and State provided written comments on a draft of
this report, which are reproduced in appendixes II, III, and IV.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
report. DHS said it would work closely with the NSC, NCTC,
Justice, and State on planning efforts to enhance the ability of
DHS LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. DHS also plans
to issue implementing guidance and establish a monitoring system
based upon direction from the NSC and NCTC.
Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will
work with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan.
Justice did not indicate whether it concurred with our
recommendations that the Attorney General issue clear guidance to
LEAs or to establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to
help foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice expressed concern
that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational
and technical assistance. Justice's written response also includes
a February 16, 2007, Justice letter to GAO providing comments on a
draft statement of fact we provided Justice on January 26, 2007.
In its February 16, 2007, letter Justice raised several concerns
about the information we provided in the draft statement of fact,
including their contention that we (1) misunderstood the roles and
responsibilities of Justice's overseas components, and (2) did not
clearly define what we meant by assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Justice's letter was
not based on a complete draft of our report, which we provided the
department on March 27, 2007. In the March 27 draft report, we
made several changes as a result of (1) Justice's February 16
letter; (2) the comments we received during exit conferences with
Justice, State, and DHS; and (3) our own internal review and
fact-checking processes. Our report (1) clarified the roles and
responsibilities of Justice's overseas components, and (2) more
clearly defined what we meant by assisting foreign nations. In its
May 11, 2007, letter formally commenting on our draft report,
Justice continued to contend that our analysis did not clearly
distinguish between operational and technical assistance. As a
result, we have further clarified our discussion of these issues.
Specifically, we have noted that the purpose of our review was to
assess the federal government's efforts to implement the various
national security strategies that generally guide law enforcement
efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism, and to determine
if the technical and operational assistance implemented by the
various U.S. departments and agencies has been reoriented to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
The Department of State said it would consider working with
relevant LEAs to improve the coordination of law enforcement
activities overseas. State did not indicate whether it concurred
with our recommendations that the Secretary of State issue clear
guidance and establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to
help foreign nations combat terrorism. State also indicated that
we did not fully reflect the department's lack of resources
necessary to carry out its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to
combat terrorism abroad. As a result, we have incorporated State's
position on this issue into our discussion of State's ability to
effectively coordinate U.S. international counterterrorism
activities. State also believed we had not sufficiently credited
the department's Regional Strategic Initiatives as examples of
coordinated, interagency efforts to guide overseas efforts to
combat terrorism. However, State did not provide any additional
information to support this contention. Finally, State also
expressed concern about our characterization of the role DS
special agents play when working overseas. We clarified our
discussion of this point in the report, along the lines State
suggested in its response.
The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report. The
NCTC stated that it is in the process of implementing its plan in
conjunction with other departments and agencies, including the law
enforcement agencies. According to NCTC, it has already begun to
implement our recommendations to NCTC. For example, NCTC stated
that its plan coordinates all instruments of national power,
including law enforcement agencies, to combat terrorism. NCTC also
said the plan provides direction and guidance to the various law
enforcement agencies on their efforts to help foreign nations
combat terrorism and includes coordination mechanisms and a
monitoring system to track implementation of the plan. NCTC did
not provide any documentation to verify these statements.
We also received technical comments from DHS, Justice, State, and
the NCTC, which we have incorporated throughout the report where
appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of the report earlier, we plan no further distribution
until 30 days after the report date. At that time, we will send
copies of the report to interested congressional committees and to
the National Security Council, the Director of the NCTC, the
Attorney General, and the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Jess T. Ford on (202) 512-4128, e-mail [email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other
GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the guidance for law enforcement agencies (LEA) to
assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists, we reviewed the 2002 and 2006 versions of the National
Security Strategy of the United States of America, the 2002
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2003 and 2006
versions of the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, the 9/11
Commission Report, and related legislation. To determine whether
this strategic level guidance was translated into specific
guidance for the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland
Security, we analyzed their 5-year strategic plans and their
annual performance reports. In addition, we analyzed the national
strategies, strategic plans, and performance reports to determine
if they contained key elements we have recommended^1 and that are
provided for in the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
These key elements include having clearly defined objectives and
roles and responsibilities; leveraged funding; and monitoring
systems related to assisting foreign governments to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also requested all guidance
issued by State, Justice, and DHS to implement the national
strategies' goal to make combating terrorism their priority, and
any specific guidance to ensure their LEAs were assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. To verify
that our analysis was accurate, we conducted detailed discussions
with representatives from State, Justice, DHS, and the eight LEAs,
along with embassy and LEA officials involved with working with
foreign nation counterparts.
To assess the extent to which LEAs have implemented the strategic
guidance to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists and determine if the departments and their
LEAs were reporting on their progress in providing this
assistance, we reviewed strategic plans and annual performance
reports for State, Justice, and DHS and their component LEAs,
where available. We also asked each department and agency to
provide a list of its accomplishments in assisting foreign nations
in this endeavor, including the number of terrorist plots that had
been identified and disrupted, and the number of terrorists
prosecuted as a result of this assistance, from 2001 to 2005. In
addition, we asked for documentation on 11 cases highlighted by
the State Department as successful examples of foreign nations
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists linked with
high profile attacks against Americans. However, none of the
agencies provided a comprehensive list of accomplishments or
documentation of the role that U.S. assistance played in these
cases.^2 We also conducted detailed interviews with officials from
State, Justice, DHS, and their eight LEAs to further determine
their progress and impediments to fully implementing this
strategic guidance. In addition, we conducted detailed work in
four countries with key roles in combating terrorism, where we met
with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials to determine what
role U.S. LEAs played in assisting the foreign country to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We did not name the
specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic
and security concerns.
^1 [64]GAO-05-927, [65]GAO-06-15, and [66]GAO-03-519T.
After our work abroad, we provided State, Justice, and DHS written
summaries of our findings, and conducted follow-up meetings with
department representatives to ensure that our findings accurately
characterized any guidance provided by the White House, NSC, and
NCTC, as well as State, Justice, and DHS. We also met with NCTC
officials to brief them on our observations and to determine the
status of their ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all
elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism.
NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was
approved by the President in June 2006. According to NCTC
officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under
development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss the
plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.
During the course of our work we experienced considerable delays
obtaining information from Justice and State, which resulted in
this report being issued several months later than initially
planned. We were eventually able to obtain information sufficient
for answering our objectives. We conducted our work between August
2005 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
^2Although State Department officials said they were unable to find any
relevant documents related to our case studies, we found detailed
reporting on one of our case studies at an embassy we visited.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of Justice's letter
dated May 11, 2007.
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
See comment 6.
See comment 5.
See comment 8.
See comment 7.
See comment 9.
See comment 10.
See comment 10.
See comment 11.
See comment 12.
GAO Comments
1. On March 27, 2007, we provided Justice a complete
draft report reflecting several changes stemming from
(1) the comments and suggestions we obtained during
exit conferences with Justice, DHS, and State; (2)
Justice's February 16, 2007 letter; and (3) our
internal review and fact checking process. As such, a
number of the comments and concerns Justice raised in
the February 16, 2007, letter were addressed in our
draft report.
2. In response to Justice's concern about our
distinction between operational and technical
assistance, we have clarified the language that
describes the purpose of our review. This report
assesses the federal government's efforts to
implement the various national security strategies
that generally guide law enforcement efforts to help
foreign nations combat terrorism overseas. As such,
our review focused on assessing the guidance and
implementation of those strategies. We also clarified
our definition of assistance to differentiate between
operational and technical assistance and made changes
throughout the report to clarify when our discussion
focuses on operational or technical assistance. Our
definition of what we mean by technical and
operational assistance is based on language Justice
suggested in its February 16, 2007, letter.
3. We no longer use the phrase "new strategy" in our
report because the various national strategies
guiding overseas efforts to combat terrorism were
first published more than 4 years ago.
4. We include a discussion of the FBI's strategic
guidance in the report.
5. Even if the LEAs are not specifically required by
law to develop plans guiding and coordinating their
technical assistance efforts, we believe this is a
best-practice and a fundamental aspect of good
governance.
6. The national strategies offer few details on which
department should have lead responsibility and do not
specify what supporting roles other departments and
agencies should play.
7. We modified our discussion of FBI LEGATs.
8. According to State Department's Strategic Plan for
2004 to 2009, each mission annually develops mission
performance plans that incorporate the activities of
all U.S. agencies and departments located in the
country. These plans outline the intended goals,
initiatives, and performance indicators for each
strategic objective of the mission, and the role that
each agency and department is expected to contribute
in order to attain each objective. As such, the plans
should include a discussion of the progress and
accomplishments of law enforcement efforts to help
foreign nations to combat terrorism.
9. We modified our discussion of Justice's overseas
personnel.
10. Our recent work on U.S. efforts to combat
terrorist financing found significant problems.
Specifically, the U.S. government lacks an integrated
strategy to coordinate the delivery of
counter-terrorism financing training and technical assistance to countries vulnerable to terrorist
financing. In addition, the effort does not have key
stakeholder acceptance of roles and procedures, a
strategic alignment of resources with needs, or a
process to measure performance.^1
11. We agree that general assistance to bolster
foreign law enforcement and judicial sectors is an
essential component of the broader U.S. effort to
combat overseas terrorism. However, the allocation of
resources for law enforcement programs specifically
targeted for combating terrorism did not seem to
match the preeminent role combating terrorism plays
in U.S. national security strategies and law
enforcement agencies' strategic guidance.
12. With the exception of the FBI, Justice LEAs
reported that they lacked clear implementing guidance
on how to carry out the broad guidance contained in
the Justice strategic plan and U.S. national security
strategies.
^1 [67]GAO-06-19 .
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 2.
See comment 1.
See comment 3.
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated May 8, 2007.
GAO Comments
1. We added additional discussion of S/CT's lack of
resources.
2. Our discussion of Regional Strategic Initiatives
in the report was limited by the information State
provided on these activities. Although we asked to
review all four of the Regional Strategic Initiatives
completed during 2006, we were only able to review
one. State provided us no additional information to
support the claims it makes in its agency comments.
3. We modified the report to better reflect the role
and legal authority of Regional Security Officers.
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, (202)
512-4128, email [email protected] .
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant
Director; Edward J. George; J. Addison Ricks; Diana Glod; Ernie
Jackson; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report.
GAO�s Mission
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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697.
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Highlights of GAO-07-697, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives
May 2007
COMBATING TERRORISM
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,
directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of
terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their
efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the
extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.
[68]What GAO Recommends
We recommend that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) ensure that
the implementing guidance for its NCTC's plan for combating terrorism
articulates a clear strategy for using LEAs to help foreign nations combat
terrorism. We also recommend that State, Justice, and DHS explore
enhancements to overseas coordination mechanisms and develop clear
guidance and performance monitoring to enhance efforts to help foreign
nations combat terrorism.
NCTC stated it had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS
generally agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated they
would consider ways to improve overseas coordination, but did not indicate
whether they concurred with our other recommendations.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies
that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement
the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism
or how they should do so. While one of the strategies tasked State with
developing and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we
found State did not develop or coordinate the development of a plan to use
the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In December 2004, Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged
the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power,
including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had
drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of
2006. According to NCTC, State, Justice, and DHS officials, implementing
guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the
contents of the plan or the guidance.
Some LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its
Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports,
and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the FBI,
have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and
responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles
and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several
joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist
activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we
found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign
nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked
performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing
information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive
needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full
range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities
in foreign countries.
U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism Exercises
References
Visible links
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-19
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-578T
59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-557
60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
62. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
63. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
64. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
67. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-19
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