    Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to
    Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
    Terrorists (25-MAY-07, GAO-07-697).

    Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
    attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on
    the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for
    LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify,
    disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1)
    the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify,
    disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which
    LEAs have implemented this guidance.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-697
        ACCNO:   A69945
      TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack
    Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
    Prosecute Terrorists
         DATE:   05/25/2007
      SUBJECT:   Combating terrorism
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Federal aid to foreign countries
    	     International relations
    	     Law enforcement
    	     Law enforcement agencies
    	     Law enforcement personnel
    	     Police training
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism
    	     Terrorists
    	     Training utilization
    	     Program implementation
    	     Dept. of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance
    	     Program

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Product.                                                 **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-07-697

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background

              * [3]Department of Justice
              * [4]Department of Homeland Security
              * [5]Department of State
              * [6]National Security Council
              * [7]The 9/11 Commission
              * [8]The National Counterterrorism Center

         * [9]National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Ke

              * [10]National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assis
              * [11]The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Pl
              * [12]State Department Unable to Fully Implement National Strategy
              * [13]NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implement

         * [14]LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt,

              * [15]LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations Combat Terro

                   * [16]The FBI Has Made Some Effort to Increase Assistance to
                     Forei
                   * [17]CSI Works with Foreign Nations, but It Has Had
                     Limitations
                   * [18]State Has Expanded the ATA Program

              * [19]LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations Have Been Limited by S

                   * [20]Most LEAs Lacked Clearly Defined Roles and
                     Responsibilities
                   * [21]Executive Departments and LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance on
                     Sett
                   * [22]LEAs Are Not Systematically Assessing Their
                     Accomplishments
                   * [23]LEAs Generally Lacked Mechanisms for Collaboration
                     Abroad
                   * [24]LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments

         * [25]Conclusion
         * [26]Recommendations
         * [27]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * [28]GAO Comments
         * [29]GAO Comments
         * [30]GAO Contact
         * [31]Staff Acknowledgments
         * [32]GAO's Mission
         * [33]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [34]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [35]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [36]Congressional Relations
         * [37]Public Affairs

    Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and
    Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
    Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    May 2007

    COMBATING TERRORISM

    Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
    Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists

    GAO-07-697

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 7
    National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key Elements for
    a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration 13
    LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
    Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors 21
    Conclusion 44
    Recommendations 45
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 50
    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 52
    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice 53
    GAO Comments 61
    Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 63
    GAO Comments 67
    Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 68

    Table

    Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
    Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation Assistance to
    Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists 17

    Figure

    Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
    Exercises 27

    Abbreviations
    ATA Antiterrorism Assistance
    ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
    CBP Customs and Border Protection
    CIA Central Intelligence Agency
    CSI Container Security Initiative
    DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
    DHS Department of Homeland Security
    DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
    FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
    GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
    ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy
    INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
    INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
    JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Forces
    LEA Law enforcement agency
    LEGAT Legal Attache
    NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
    NSC National Security Council
    OIG Office of Inspector General
    RAP Regional Action Plans
    RSO Regional Security Officer
    S/CT Department of State/Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
    WMD Weapons of mass destruction
    USMS U.S. Marshals Service
    USSS United States Secret Service

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office
    Washington, DC 20548

    May 25, 2007

    The Honorable Christopher Shays
    Ranking Member
    Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
    Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
    House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Shays:

    Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), combating
    terrorism has become the nation's top national security goal and the
    highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law enforcement
    agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice (Justice),
    and Homeland Security (DHS)--including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)--operate
    from U.S. embassies overseas and assist foreign nation governments on a
    broad array of law enforcement issues, such as investigating crime,
    reducing illegal drug activity, controlling borders and immigration, and
    protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from attack. Three U.S. national
    strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, directed
    that law enforcement activities be increasingly focused on the prevention
    of further terrorist attacks, including helping foreign nations identify,
    disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This includes technical assistance,
    such as antiterrorism training and the provision of technologies used to
    identify terrorist threats, and operational assistance, such as joint
    U.S.-foreign nation investigations and operations against terrorists. This
    new focus on working with foreign nations to prevent terrorist attacks
    represents a notable shift from pre-9/11 objectives, with potentially
    significant implications for the strategies, resources, and overseas
    presence of U.S. LEAs. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
    (9/11), combating terrorism has become the nation's top national security
    goal and the highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law
    enforcement agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice
    (Justice), and Homeland Security (DHS)--including the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of
    Diplomatic Security (DS)--operate from U.S. embassies overseas and assist
    foreign nation governments on a broad array of law enforcement issues,
    such as investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity, controlling
    borders and immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from
    attack. Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
    terrorist attacks, directed that law enforcement activities be
    increasingly focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks,
    including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
    terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as antiterrorism
    training and the provision of technologies used to identify terrorist
    threats, and operational assistance, such as joint U.S.-foreign nation
    investigations and operations against terrorists. This new focus on
    working with foreign nations to prevent terrorist attacks represents a
    notable shift from pre-9/11 objectives, with potentially significant
    implications for the strategies, resources, and overseas presence of U.S.
    LEAs.

    Because of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the United
    States and its embassies, diplomats, and citizens abroad, you requested
    that we evaluate the federal government's efforts to implement national
    security strategies to use its LEAs to assist foreign nations in
    identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. Specifically, you
    asked us to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to
    identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which
    LEAs have implemented Because of the continuing threat of terrorist
    attacks against the United States and its embassies, diplomats, and
    citizens abroad, you requested that we evaluate the federal government's
    efforts to implement national security strategies to use its LEAs to
    assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
    terrorists. Specifically, you asked us to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs
    to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists
    and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance. We agreed
    that this review would be limited to U.S. law enforcement efforts overseas
    to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
    terrorists and would not focus on (1) U.S. domestic law enforcement
    efforts to combat terrorism; (2) other instruments of national
    power--including military, intelligence, diplomatic, or
    financial--currently being used to combat terrorism; and (3) U.S. efforts
    to combat terrorist financing, since we had recently completed a review of
    this effort.^1

    To assess the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations in identifying,
    disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists, we analyzed the National Security
    Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for
    Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism,^2 the 9/11
    Commission Report, and related legislation to determine if the strategies
    contained key elements that we have recommended^3 and the Government
    Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires, such as clearly defined
    objectives, roles and responsibilities, leveraged funding, and monitoring
    systems. We also discussed the guidance with representatives from State,
    Justice, and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with
    working with foreign nation counterparts. To assess the extent to which
    LEAs have implemented this guidance to assist foreign nations, we reviewed
    State, Justice, and DHS strategic plans and annual performance reports;
    requested all implementing guidance; and asked that each agency provide a
    listing of their general accomplishments in assisting foreign nations to
    identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also conducted detailed
    work in four countries with key roles in combating terrorism, where we met
    with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials. We are not naming the
    specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic and
    security concerns. After our work abroad, we reviewed and verified our
    overall observations with senior representatives from each department and
    agency. We also met with National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) officials
    to brief them on our observations and to determine the status of ongoing
    efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of national power, including
    LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials would not discuss the plan, its
    contents, or any issues raised in this report. According to NCTC
    officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under
    development as of March 1, 2007. During the course of our work we
    experienced considerable delays obtaining information from Justice and
    State, which resulted in this report being issued several months later
    than initially planned. We were eventually able to obtain information
    sufficient for answering our objectives. We conducted our work between
    August 2005 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    ^1GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate
    U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical
    Assistance Abroad, [38]GAO-06-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2005). The
    report found that the Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury lacked a
    strategic plan to carry out this effort; roles and responsibilities needed
    clarification; there was no mechanism to determine resource needs; and
    there was no monitoring system to assess progress.

    ^2In addition to the strategies discussed in this report, the White House
    has released a number of other strategies related to the War on Terrorism,
    including (1) the September 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy and (2)
    the May 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel. For this
    report, we focused on the strategies released shortly after the 9/11
    terrorist attacks that discussed the use of LEAs to combat terrorism and
    assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, in
    order to determine the extent to which LEAs had implemented these
    strategies in the 5 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also
    included any updates to these strategies to ensure that there was a
    strategic continuum in the use of LEAs to assist foreign nations to
    identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

    ^3GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
    Information for Management Decision Making, [39]GAO-05-927 (Washington,
    D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can
    Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
    [40]GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); GAO, Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [41]GAO-03-519T
    (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively
    Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,
    [42]GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).

    Results in Brief

    Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the President issued a series of
    national strategies, beginning in 2002 and updated in 2006, that provided
    broad direction for overseas U.S. law enforcement efforts to assist
    foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. These
    strategies collectively called for reorienting U.S. LEAs to proactively
    work to prevent terrorist attacks at home and abroad. However, they lacked
    key components, such as clearly defined objectives, roles and
    responsibilities, and procedures for working across agency boundaries
    toward a common goal, necessary for a strategic plan and for facilitating
    interagency collaboration. Further, they did not articulate which LEAs
    should implement the general guidance or how they should do so. For
    example, officials from seven LEAs as well as embassy officials in the
    four countries we visited told us that they had received little-to-no
    guidance from the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC,^4 or State,
    Justice, and DHS on how to implement the directive to assist foreign
    nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Only the FBI
    received and has issued some implementing guidance--for example, stating
    that it planned to increase its presence abroad and increase joint
    operations with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
    terrorists. While one of the three strategies tasked State with developing
    and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we found that
    State did not develop or coordinate a plan to use the combined
    capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. In
    December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
    Prevention Act of 2004 (the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act),^5 which charged
    the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power,
    including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had
    drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006.
    According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was
    still under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss
    the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.

    Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign
    nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, the FBI
    has increased its overseas activities, DHS has worked with foreign nations
    to implement the Container Security Initiative, and State has expanded its
    Antiterrorism Assistance program to improve foreign nation capacities to
    combat terrorism. Despite such actions, we found that because most LEAs,
    with the exception of the FBI, have not been given clear guidance, they
    lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities for helping foreign
    nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, in
    one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities
    between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations
    intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according
    to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs involved in these efforts. In
    addition, we found that departments and LEAs generally lacked guidance on
    setting funding priorities and providing resources to assist foreign
    nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, for
    example, we found that State's office responsible for coordinating all
    U.S. assistance to combat terrorism abroad was hampered by a lack of
    resources, limiting its ability to carry out this vital function. LEAs
    also lacked performance monitoring systems to determine the effectiveness
    of their technical or operational assistance and, as a result, found it
    difficult to assess whether they were making progress in their efforts to
    help foreign nations combat terrorism. In addition, embassies generally
    lacked formal structures for LEAs to share information and collaborate on
    operational efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
    prosecute terrorists; LEA and embassy officials told us that existing
    embassy structures do not provide a means for all LEAs at embassies to
    work collaboratively to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
    also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not
    conducted to identify technical and operational assistance needs in the
    four countries we visited, the full range of assistance that LEAs could
    provide may not be utilized to address foreign nations' needs for
    identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.

    ^4The NCTC was created by Congress as part of the Intelligence Reform and
    Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). NCTC's mission includes
    developing plans that coordinate the use all elements of national power,
    including LEAs, to combat terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks. As
    detailed in the background section of this report, the NCTC reports
    directly to the President on matters of strategic operational planning for
    counterterrorism and works under the policy direction of the NSC.

    ^5P.L. 108-458, section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 404o).

    To ensure that LEAs, a key element of national power, are fully focused on
    assisting foreign nations to identify and prevent future terrorist attacks
    and protect Americans around the world, we are making recommendations to
    the NCTC, NSC, and three executive departments with LEAs stationed abroad.
    We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the NSC,
    ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for combating
    terrorism (1) articulates a clear strategy to implement the national
    strategies' goal of using U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify,
    disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (2) clarifies roles and
    responsibilities for each LEA for implementing the goal; (3) provides
    guidance to LEAs on setting funding priorities and providing resources to
    assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (4)
    requires comprehensive needs assessments for foreign nations and tailored
    assistance programs to address those needs; and (5) requires a monitoring
    system to report on accomplishments or progress.

    In addition, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the
    Secretaries of Homeland Security and State each take the following two
    actions:

               o Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
               bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the
               national strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs
               to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and
               prosecuting terrorists.
               o Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective
               department and Congress accurate reporting on that department's
               accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements in its
               LEAs' efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism.

               We also recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with
               the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security
               take the following action:

               o Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to
               improve information-sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for
               assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists.

               We received written comments on a draft of this report from DHS,
               Justice, and State, which are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and
               IV.

               DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
               report and said it would take action to implement them based upon
               direction from the NSC and NCTC.

               Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
               interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will
               work with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan.
               Justice did not indicate whether it concurred with our
               recommendations that the Attorney General issue clear guidance to
               LEAs or establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help
               foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice also expressed concern
               that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational
               and technical assistance.

               State said it would consider working with relevant LEAs to improve
               the coordination of law enforcement activities overseas. State did
               not indicate whether it concurred with our recommendations that
               the Secretary of State issue clear guidance and establish a
               monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help foreign nations
               combat terrorism. State also indicated that we did not fully
               reflect the department's lack of resources necessary to carry out
               its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad
               and provided additional information on its Regional Strategic
               Initiatives and the role of DS.

               The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report and
               stated that it is in the process of implementing the plan in
               conjunction with other departments and agencies, including the law
               enforcement agencies. According to NCTC, it has already begun to
               implement the recommendations made to NCTC in our report. We also
               received technical comments from State, DHS, Justice, and NCTC,
               which we have incorporated throughout the report where
               appropriate.

    			  Background

               State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S.
               embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement
               issues, including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug
               cartels, visa and immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal
               and terrorist threats against U.S. embassies and personnel, and
               fugitive capture and extraditions. LEA assistance can include
               technical assistance, such as the provision of training in police
               techniques and legal reforms, as well as investigative or
               operational assistance, which can support efforts such as joint
               teams of U.S. and foreign nation LEAs working together to stop
               crimes, illegal drug operations, or terrorists attacks.

               LEAs face a number of challenges in working with foreign nations
               to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In particular,
               LEAs lack arrest authority overseas and therefore heavily rely on
               the cooperation of the foreign nation. The degree of cooperation
               and the capabilities of foreign nation law enforcement agencies
               vary widely. According to FBI officials, forging partnerships with
               foreign nation LEAs can be an arduous and sometimes impractical
               task. They said that the ability to engage in joint investigations
               with foreign nation LEAs was dictated both by the will and the
               ability of their counterparts to engage in complex investigative
               techniques.

    			  Department of Justice

               The Department of Justice's primary goal is preventing terrorist
               attacks within the United States and promoting the nation's
               security, as well as investigating and prosecuting those who have
               committed, or intend to commit, terrorist attacks in the United
               States. Four Justice LEAs have a permanent overseas presence,
               including the FBI; DEA; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
               and Explosives (ATF); and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).

               The FBI is charged with protecting the United States from
               terrorist attacks; preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist
               operations; improving efforts to combat terrorism with U.S. state
               and local LEAs by expanding the use of multiagency Joint Terrorism
               Task Forces (JTTF); and expanding operational partnerships with
               foreign nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
               disrupt and prevent terrorism. The FBI operates abroad through its
               Legal Attache (LEGAT) offices located in 59 U.S. missions around
               the world. The FBI's Web site states that LEGATs (1) coordinate
               international investigations with their foreign nation colleagues;
               (2) cover international leads for domestic U.S. investigations;
               (3) link U.S. and international resources in critical criminal and
               terrorist areas to protect Americans at home and abroad; and (4)
               coordinate FBI training, including counterterrorism classes, for
               police in their geographic regions. According to the FBI, a July
               2005 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Overseas and Domestic
               Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
               Federal Bureau of Investigations controls the interaction of the
               CIA and the FBI in regard to foreign counterterrorism operations
               abroad.

               DEA's mission is to target organizations that pose the greatest
               drug threats to American citizens. It cooperates closely with
               foreign nations to help them identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               those involved in the illegal drug trade to reduce the
               availability of illicit drugs. DEA has around 696 officials in 63
               countries.

               ATF's mission is to enforce regulations on the firearms and
               explosives industries, assist other LEAs during criminal and
               post-blast investigations, conduct ballistics analysis, and trace
               the origins of guns and bombs used during criminal activity. ATF
               provides ballistics training and tracing assistance to foreign
               nation police, and, ATF officials told us, its analytical
               capabilities could be used to trace the origins of explosives used
               in terrorist bombings, and to help identify and capture terrorist
               cells. ATF has a permanent presence in four countries with a total
               of 10 officials.

               The USMS's mission is to track, apprehend, and extradite fugitives
               domestically and internationally, as well as protect federal
               judicial officials, including judges, attorneys, and jurors. USMS
               officials told us that USMS has provided assistance and training
               to foreign nation LEAs in establishing systems for protecting
               judicial officials. USMS has a permanent presence in three
               countries with a total of 7 agents. In addition, USMS currently
               has 16 agents in Iraq and 5 in Afghanistan.

    			  Department of Homeland Security

               DHS's primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the
               United States and reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism by
               detecting, deterring, and mitigating terrorist threats. It is also
               responsible for border security, and extending the zone of
               security beyond U.S. borders by working with foreign nations to
               identify, prioritize, and interdict threats. We examined three DHS
               LEAs that work from U.S. embassies abroad, including ICE, Customs
               and Border Protection (CBP), and the United States Secret Service
               (USSS).

               ICE's primary mission is to protect the United States and uphold
               public safety by identifying criminal activities and eliminating
               vulnerabilities that pose a threat to U.S. borders. By
               investigating threats to U.S. border security, ICE seeks to
               eliminate the potential threat of terrorist acts against the
               United States. As of December 2006, ICE had 298 investigative
               agents in 52 offices in 41 countries.

               CBP's primary mission includes preventing terrorists and terrorist
               weapons from entering the United States. CBP officials generally
               operate at U.S. ports of entry along the U.S. borders with Mexico
               and Canada, but also operate in parts of the Caribbean and other
               countries around the world. CBP has 943 personnel deployed to 28
               countries abroad. The duties of these personnel include
               preclearing passengers flying to the United States, working at
               foreign nation maritime ports abroad in search of weapons of mass
               destruction, as well as working to address CBP activities
               in-country and general CBP related support at embassies. In
               addition, CBP works to protect global supply lines from terrorism
               through both bilateral and multilateral fora.

               The USSS's primary mission includes protecting the U.S. President,
               the Vice President, their families, and other high-ranking U.S.
               government officials from terrorism and other threats, as well as
               investigating and facilitating prosecution of financial and
               electronic crimes, counterfeit currency, and identity theft. USSS
               officials operate abroad with 54 agents staffed to 19 offices in
               15 countries.

    			  Department of State

               The Department of State's primary mission is to "create a more
               secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the
               American people and the international community."^6 According to
               State's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, State is charged with
               developing, coordinating, and implementing American
               counterterrorism policy. Within State, the Office of the
               Coordinator for Counterterrorism's (S/CT) mission is to develop
               and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all
               instruments of national power, including law enforcement,
               diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military. S/CT
               provides foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S.
               government activities to combat terrorism, including those of U.S.
               LEAs operating abroad.

    ^6Fiscal year 2004 to 2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan;
    source: http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm .

               DS is the department's law enforcement arm.^7 The Bureau's
               Regional Security Officers (RSO) are responsible for protecting
               the embassy, its diplomats, and their families from criminal and
               terrorist attacks. The RSO is the ambassador's senior advisor on
               law enforcement and security issues. RSOs investigate passport and
               visa fraud, conduct counterintelligence investigations, and can
               provide investigative assistance to local, state, and federal
               agencies. DS personnel also monitor and analyze terrorist
               activities and threats, train foreign police in antiterrorism
               procedures, and protect U.S. and foreign dignitaries. DS has
               approximately 590 RSO special agents assigned to 202 Foreign
               Service posts throughout the world, making it the most widely
               represented U.S. LEA overseas.

               National Security Council

               The National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC to improve the
               coordination of national security concerns among executive
               departments and agencies.^8 The act charges the NSC with more
               effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the
               departments and agencies related to national security.
               Specifically, the act states that the function of the NSC shall be
               to advise the President with respect to the integration of
               domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national
               security to enable the departments and agencies to cooperate more
               effectively in matters involving national security.

               The NSC is chaired by the President. According to the White House,
               its regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) include
               the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
               Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint
               Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the NSC, and
               the Director of National Intelligence is its intelligence advisor.
               The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management
               and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their
               responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and
               agencies, as well as other senior officials, are also invited to
               attend meetings when appropriate.

    ^7DS in its current form is an outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic
    Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. (P.L. 99-399; 22 U.S.C. 4801 et.
    seq.) It has a broad mandate, in furtherance of the Secretary of State's
    responsibilities under this Act, to protect and perform protection
    functions in relation to U.S. missions and personnel overseas. As relevant
    to this report, DS's specific law enforcement authorities are largely
    defined by 22 U.S.C. 2709, which confer on DS a lead law enforcement role
    with respect to passport and visa fraud.

    ^850 U.S.C. 402(a),(b).

               The 9/11 Commission

               The 9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission
               created by congressional legislation in late 2002 and charged with
               preparing a full and complete account of the circumstances
               surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for
               and the immediate response to the attacks.^9 The commission was
               also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against
               future terrorist attacks. On July 22, 2004, the commission
               released its [43]public report .

               The commission identified a number of weaknesses in the ability of
               U.S. LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to the United
               States. For example, it reported that the vast majority of LEAs
               did not consider protecting Americans from terrorist threats their
               primary goal. With the exception of one portion of the FBI, the
               commission found that very little of the U.S. law enforcement
               community was engaged in combating terrorism before the 9/11
               attacks, despite each agency's ability to make contributions to
               the U.S. effort. For example, the commission found that:

               o USMS had almost 4,000 agents on 9/11 and was expert in tracking
               fugitives, but its expertise was not used to identify and
               apprehend terrorists.
               o DEA had more than 4,500 agents on 9/11, and there were a number
               of occasions when DEA agents were able to introduce sources to the
               FBI or CIA for counterterrorism use, despite the agency having no
               direct mission to combat terrorism.
               o The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),^10 with its
               9,000 border patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000
               immigration special agents, had perhaps the greatest potential to
               develop an expanded role in counterterrorism. However, INS was
               instead focused on the formidable challenges posed by illegal
               entry over the southwest border, criminal aliens, and a growing
               backlog in applications for naturalizing immigrants.

    ^9Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-306,
    Title VI.

    ^10INS was abolished by the Homeland Security Act, and its
    responsibilities were divided among ICE, CBP, and Citizens and Immigration
    Services, which are now part of DHS.

               o USSS had the mission to protect the President and other
               high-ranking officials, and its agents did not become involved
               with counterterrorism efforts except when terrorist assassination
               plots were rumored or suspected.
               o The Customs Service (which is now part of DHS) deployed agents
               at all points of entry into the United States to screen imported
               goods and collect duties, and while these agents worked alongside
               INS agents, the two groups did not regularly cooperate on joint
               investigations.
               o ATF was used only occasionally by the FBI as a counterterrorism
               resource prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite its
               expertise in ballistics and explosives tracing. The ATF's
               laboratories, investigators, and analyses were critical to the
               investigation of the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade
               Center and the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
               Building in Oklahoma City.

               The commission noted that counterterrorism investigations often
               overlapped with or were cued by other criminal investigations,
               such as for money laundering or smuggling contraband, and that,
               because of this nexus between counterterrorism and criminal
               investigations, LEAs could fundamentally expand U.S. efforts to
               identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America.

               However, the commission found that numerous impediments to using
               U.S. LEAs to protect America from further terrorist attacks
               existed prior to 9/11. For example, the commission found that that
               no one was in charge of using the full capabilities of these
               agencies to identify and disrupt the terrorist threat; roles and
               responsibilities were not adequately defined; accountability was
               diffuse; and the federal government lacked a performance
               monitoring system to track LEA progress at identifying,
               disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. In addition, the
               commission found that LEAs were not oriented to prevent terrorist
               attacks. Finally, the commission found that these agencies
               cooperated only some of the time, and this cooperation did not
               amount to the type of joint action that harnessed the combined
               capabilities of all U.S. LEAs.

    			  The National Counterterrorism Center

               In recognition of these and other problems, the commission
               recommended that Congress authorize the creation of a single,
               centralized center for combating terrorism to coordinate all
               instruments of national power, including law enforcement, to
               prevent another attack. In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004
               Intelligence Reform Act, which created the NCTC and charged it
               with conducting "strategic operational planning" for
               counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of
               national power--including diplomatic, financial, military,
               intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement
               activities--within and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of
               preventing future attacks against America and its interests
               worldwide.

               The act defined strategic operational planning to include the
               counterterrorism mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be
               performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and
               the assignment of roles and responsibilities. It also required
               NCTC to monitor the implementation of strategic operational plans
               for each relevant U.S. government department or agency. The NCTC
               is a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
               and reports to the Director on matters of intelligence collection
               and analysis; however, on matters of strategic operational
               planning for counterterrorism, the Director of the NCTC reports
               directly to the President. As a result, the NCTC works under the
               policy direction of the NSC on matters of counterterrorism
               planning.

    			  National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key
    			  Elements for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration

               A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for
               U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists. However, the strategies lack essential
               elements of a strategic plan and for facilitating interagency
               collaboration, and they do not clearly delineate what role, if
               any, the various LEAs should play in assisting foreign nations to
               combat terrorism. While State was charged in the 2003 National
               Strategy for Combating Terrorism with developing and coordinating
               U.S. counterterrorism policy abroad, it did not develop a plan to
               do so, because, according to State officials, it lacked sufficient
               authority and resources. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act requires
               the NCTC to develop U.S. governmentwide strategic operational
               plans to combat terrorism. According to the act, NCTC's planning
               should include the mission, objectives, tasks to be performed,
               interagency coordination of operational activities, and the
               assignment of roles and responsibilities among participating
               agencies. NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act,
               they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the
               President in June 2006. According to NCTC officials, the
               implementing guidance for the plan was still under development as
               of March 1, 2007.

    			  National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist
    			  Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism

               A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level
               guidance for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt,
               and prosecute terrorists. For example, the National Security
               Strategy, issued in 2002 and updated in March 2006, states that
               the United States will continue to encourage regional partners to
               take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists, and
               help ensure that foreign nations have the law enforcement,
               military, political, and financial tools necessary to disrupt and
               destroy terrorist operations before they reach American borders.

               Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
               primarily focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from
               further terrorist attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the
               post 9/11 world, stating that, "Our Nation's highest law
               enforcement objective must be the prevention of terrorist acts--a
               significant shift from pre-9/11 objectives." The strategy also
               notes that, in a world where the terrorist threat pays no respect
               to traditional boundaries, the American strategy for homeland
               security cannot stop at the country's borders. It calls for a
               sustained and systematic international agenda to counter the
               global terrorist threat and improve homeland security, and
               identifies a number of initiatives in this area, including (1)
               intensifying international law enforcement cooperation and helping
               foreign nations fight terrorism and (2) augmenting the FBI's
               overseas presence by increasing the number of LEGATs around the
               world. It states that Justice, in cooperation with State, is to
               work with foreign nation counterparts on these law enforcement
               issues.

               Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in
               2003 and updated in 2006, focuses on the United States' efforts to
               combat terrorism abroad. It also provides greater detail on the
               objectives and strategies for U.S. LEAs in working with their
               foreign nation counterparts. According to the strategy, the United
               States is to:

               o Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence
               abroad to further the investigative and operational assistance
               related to the interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of
               terrorist suspects.
               o Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help
               foreign nation LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight
               terrorism through a variety of means, including (1) improved
               legislation, (2) technical assistance, (3) new investigative
               techniques, (4) intelligence sharing, and (5) law enforcement
               training.
               o Enhance operational assistance to expand international
               cooperation to combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law
               enforcement information.

               In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security
               Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both
               updated strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs
               to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and
               prosecuting terrorists abroad. For example, the National Strategy
               to Combat Terrorism supports intensifying training and other types
               of assistance to improve foreign nation LEA capacities to identify
               and disrupt terrorists threats, as well as implementing legal
               reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign nations have the necessary
               laws to carry out this effort, and that investigators,
               prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively prosecute
               terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that this
               approach has succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
               terrorist plots since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

    			  The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and
    			  Interagency Collaboration

               Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy
               to combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives,
               priorities, outcomes, milestones, and performance measures.^11 In
               March 2003, we reported that strategic plans should clearly define
               objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and
               responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that funding
               necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ
               monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed
               improvements. For example, our past work has found that
               identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal
               agency combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing
               national strategies related to terrorism.

               In addition, GPRA requires each federal agency to develop
               strategic plans that cover a period of at least 5 years and
               include the agency's mission statement; identify the agency's
               general goals and objectives; and describe how the agency intends
               to achieve those goals through its activities and human, capital,
               information, and other resources. Under GPRA, strategic plans are
               the starting point for agencies to set annual performance plans
               for programs and to measure the performance of the programs in
               achieving those goals. Our past work has found that GPRA has the
               potential for greatly enhancing agency performance. For example,
               managers can use performance information to identify problems in
               existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and
               to develop corrective actions.^12

    			  ^11 [54]GAO-03-519T .

    			  ^12 [55]GAO-05-927 .

               Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency
               collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1)
               define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually
               reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding
               needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and
               responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures,
               and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop
               mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7)
               reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
               agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual
               accountability for collaborative efforts through performance
               management systems.^13 We have specifically noted that, given the
               number of agencies involved in U.S. government efforts to combat
               terrorism, it is particularly important that there be mechanisms
               to coordinate across agencies.^14

               We found that while the national strategies, as well as their
               updates in 2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key
               strategic elements, including those to promote LEA collaboration
               in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists (see table 1). For example, none of the three national
               strategies established joint agency strategies that would
               capitalize on the unique capacity of each LEA to combat terrorism.
               Further, none of them identified funding needs or leveraged
               resources; reached agreement on roles and responsibilities; or
               established procedures to operate across agency boundaries.
               Moreover, none of the strategies included mechanisms to monitor,
               evaluate, and report on their overall results, nor did they
               reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
               agency plans and reports.

    			  ^13 [56]GAO-06-15 .

               ^14 [57]GAO-03-519T .

               Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
               Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation
               Assistance to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists

                                                          National     National
                                               National Strategy for Strategy for
                                               Security   Homeland    Combating
    Key elements                            Strategy   Security    Terrorism
    Common or joint strategy
    Goals and objectives
    Roles and responsibilities
    Performance measures
    Funding
    Policies to operate across agency
    boundaries
    Mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and
    report on results

               Legend: = Contains key element.

               Source: GAO analysis of U.S. national strategies.

    			  State Department Unable to Fully Implement National Strategy Goal

               According to the 2003 and 2006 versions of the National Strategy
               for Combating Terrorism, State has the lead role in coordinating
               the implementation of the strategy to combat terrorism abroad.
               However, we found that State's office charged with this
               mission--State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)--did not
               develop or implement a plan to use the combined capabilities of
               U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists. According to its mission statement, S/CT is
               to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using
               all instruments of national power, including law enforcement,
               diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military. S/CT is to
               provide foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S.
               government activities to combat terrorism, including those of U.S.
               LEAs operating abroad. This includes coordinating all U.S.
               government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with
               foreign governments and participating in the development,
               coordination, and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
               As discussed below, S/CT has undertaken a number of initiatives to
               coordinate U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, the deputy
               director of S/CT told us that the office lacked the staff,
               resources, and authority necessary to meet the national security
               goal of using LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
               and prosecute terrorists.

               In addition, we found that:

               o S/CT does not have the authority to direct Justice and DHS LEAs
               to undertake this new mission and therefore has limited ability to
               lead a coordinated governmentwide effort. According to State,
               Justice, and DHS officials, only the NSC and, since December 2004,
               the NCTC, have the authority to ensure that executive branch
               agencies are working toward the common objective of assisting
               foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
               o S/CT cites its bilateral consultations process as a key
               mechanism to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists. The consultations can include the
               participation of multiple U.S. departments and agencies. S/CT
               reported that it had led about 83 of these consultations with
               foreign nations between 2001 and 2005. We asked State for access
               to S/CT's records on the bilateral consultations for each of the
               four countries we visited, and found that S/CT had only conducted
               consultations for one of those countries. When we reviewed the
               2002 to 2005 documentation of consultations for that country, we
               found that much of the assistance was for counter-drug efforts or
               general capacity building of the country's legal system, such as
               training of police in basic investigative techniques. The
               assistance also included a $10 million effort to develop a special
               investigative group within the national police, focused on
               terrorist investigations and crisis response.^15 According to
               representatives from the national police force, the U.S.
               assistance brought about a significant improvement in their
               ability to investigate terrorist attacks, but it was not focused
               on improving their ability to identify and disrupt terrorist
               attacks. In addition, we reviewed the three bilateral
               consultations held between 2002 and 2005 for this country and
               found there was no discussion of any initiatives to use the
               combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to assist the foreign nation to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
               o The 2003 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism directed State to
               take the lead in developing specific regional strategies to defeat
               terrorism. State told us that, in response to a NSC tasking, it
               began developing interagency-coordinated Regional Action Plans
               (RAP). However, State officials told us the RAPs were incomplete,
               had never been implemented, and were now out of date. State said
               that it transferred management of the RAPs to the NCTC in 2005.
               However, none of the LEAs or embassy officials we met with said
               they had received any guidance based on the RAPs, nor any from the
               NCTC.

    ^15This effort was funded by State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
    program, which was created in 1983 to assist civilian security and law
    enforcement personnel in police procedures that address terrorism.

               o In 2006, S/CT began a new effort called the Regional Strategic
               Initiative that stressed a regional approach to combating
               terrorism. Four Regional Strategic Initiatives were established in
               2006: for Southeast Asia, Iraq and its surrounding region, the
               Horn of Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean. However, based on
               documentation we reviewed, the Southeast Asia initiative did not
               include the use of the combined capabilities of LEAs to assist
               foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. For
               example, in the documentation we reviewed--which focused on
               identifying terrorists transiting through a region where several
               high-profile attacks against U.S. interests had occurred--there
               was only one sentence dedicated to law enforcement, and it focused
               solely on DHS LEAs and border control issues.

               A March 2006 report by State's Office of Inspector General (OIG)
               found that S/CT faced significant problems in meeting its mandate
               to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism assistance to foreign nations.
               The OIG found that S/CT was viewed by many elements of the U.S.
               government as "marginal" to the Global War on Terror. It also
               found that the difficulty of helping to coordinate the wide scope
               of U.S. counterterrorism efforts abroad challenged S/CT and that
               it had not fulfilled its oversight role over U.S. assistance to
               foreign nations.^16

               The OIG also found that some S/CT components lacked sufficient
               resources to carry out their responsibilities and, specifically,
               that S/CT's regional affairs unit was under funded, and "scarcely"
               had the resources to meet its mandate to provide advice,
               coordination, and action on regional and bilateral
               counterterrorism issues. The OIG also stated that, if
               counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State
               could not afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed,
               with no career paths for its counterterrorism officers.

               The OIG found that, in accordance with State's mandate in the 2003
               National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, S/CT had worked hard to
               exercise its interagency lead in developing Regional Action Plans.
               However, according to the inspection report, observers reported to
               the OIG that the exercise did not produce concrete, comprehensive
               strategies, although it did produce a useful dialogue and the
               first detailed matrix of current and planned U.S. counterterrorism
               strategies in each region.

    ^16U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office
    of Inspector General, Inspection of the Office of the Coordinator for
    Counterterrorism, OIG Report ISP-I-06-25A (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22,
    2006).

               The OIG report made numerous recommendations intended to improve
               S/CT's ability to coordinate U.S. assistance to combat terrorism
               abroad. It made several recommendations about adding staff to
               individual units, but did not make broader recommendations on
               overall organizational structure or funding levels. According to
               an OIG official, as of January 26, 2007, S/CT was in the process
               of addressing all of the report's recommendations directed to it.

               In responding to our draft report, State indicated that S/CT
               continues to be hampered by the lack of resources discussed in the
               March 2006 State OIG report, limiting S/CT's ability to coordinate
               the U.S. government's international counterterrorism activities.
               In addition, State said that our draft did not give its new
               Regional Strategic Initiatives sufficient credit and that law
               enforcement coordination was a key aspect of the process. However,
               State did not provide us additional information to support this
               position and did not comment on our finding that the one Regional
               Strategic Initiative we reviewed showed little involvement by U.S.
               or foreign nation law enforcement agencies.

    			  NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing
    			  Guidance Is Still under Development

               In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform
               Act, creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic
               operational plans to combat terrorism using every element of
               national power, including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the
               NCTC is expected to (1) conduct strategic operational planning for
               counterterrorism activities; (2) integrate all instruments of
               national power in such planning, including law enforcement,
               diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial activities; (3)
               assign roles and responsibilities to lead departments and
               agencies; (4) ensure that agencies have access to intelligence and
               intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism
               plans and accomplish their assigned activities; and (5) monitor
               implementation of these operational plans.

               In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the
               lack of a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the
               national security strategy had been a void that stretched back for
               decades.^17 According to the director, what has long been missing
               is a plan to ensure that national strategies are implemented at
               the operational level in a coordinated, integrated fashion, and
               that there has been no formal process to translate the national
               strategies into strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to
               lead agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In
               addition, there has been no plan to ensure the coordination,
               integration, and synchronization of joint departmental operations,
               or any effort to monitor the combined impact of the multiple
               agencies engaged in implementing the national security strategy.

               NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had
               drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in
               June of 2006. According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance
               for the plan was still under development as of March 1, 2007, and
               they would not discuss the plan, its contents, or the implementing
               guidance.

    			  LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
    			  Prosecute Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors

               Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to assist
               foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists,
               including the expansion of the FBI presence abroad; assistance to
               help foreign nations identify and disrupt terrorist threats at
               certain maritime ports; and antiterrorism training to assist
               foreign nation law enforcement personnel. However, LEA efforts
               have been hindered by a lack of (1) clearly articulated roles and
               responsibilities to assist foreign nations in combating terrorism;
               (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources
               to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess progress
               at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and
               reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures to promote joint
               investigations and operations between U.S. and foreign nation LEAs
               and coordinate LEA technical assistance to foreign nation LEAs;
               and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to tailor LEA
               technical and operational assistance to specific foreign nation
               needs for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.

    ^17Admiral John Scott Redd, in testimony before the Senate Committee on
    Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006.

               LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations Combat Terrorism

               Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations
               combat terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to
               operationally assist foreign nations to identify and disrupt
               terrorist attacks before they occur, and it has responded to
               specific terrorist attacks by assisting foreign nations to
               identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In addition, new
               programs have been specifically designed to assist foreign nations
               to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats, such as the
               DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some existing
               technical assistance programs, like State's Antiterrorism
               Assistance (ATA) program, have been significantly expanded in an
               effort to improve foreign nation capabilities. While this list is
               not all inclusive, these represent some significant U.S. efforts
               to use U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
               found that these three efforts were limited by a variety of
               factors.

    			    The FBI Has Made Some Effort to Increase Assistance to Foreign
    				 Nations, but it  Faces Staffing Limitations

               In our past work, we found that, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
               the FBI has permanently realigned a substantial number of its
               domestic field agents from traditional criminal investigative
               programs to counterterrorism investigations.^18 In 2002, the FBI
               Director announced that, in keeping with its new priorities, the
               agency would move more than 500 field agent positions from its
               drug, violent crime, and white-collar crime programs to
               counterterrorism. The FBI has transferred more agent positions to
               work on counterterrorism than it had originally announced,
               including through the short-term reassignment of additional field
               agents from drug and other law enforcement areas. Prior to the
               FBI's change in priorities, about 25 percent of the FBI's field
               agent positions were allocated to counterterrorism,
               counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs. As a result of the
               staff reprogramming and funding for additional special agent
               positions received through various appropriations, the FBI
               staffing levels for these areas had increased domestically to
               about 36 percent in 2004 and represented the single largest
               concentration of FBI resources.

               The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the
               United States will augment the FBI's overseas presence. The FBI's
               Strategic Plan states that it will expand the role of its LEGAT
               offices overseas from that of a simple liaison office to one with
               a dynamic operational partnership with foreign nation
               counterparts. According to Justice and FBI documents and
               officials, this includes undertaking joint investigative and
               operational partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to identify and
               stop terrorist attacks against U.S. interests around the globe. We
               found that the FBI has both responded to specific terrorist
               attacks by operationally assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify
               and prosecute terrorists involved in those attacks, as well as
               tried to proactively assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
               and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the FBI
               provided limited but vital operational assistance to locate
               terrorist suspects and provided key evidence for their successful
               prosecution. In another country we visited, the FBI was working
               proactively with ICE and with foreign nation counterparts to track
               suspicious migrants and identify and disrupt potential terrorists
               before they entered the United States.

               In addition, in response to our requests for their accomplishments
               assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists, the FBI provided some anecdotal information on its
               cooperation with and assistance to foreign nations. For example,
               in one country where terrorists had attacked U.S. citizens,
               foreign nation authorities permitted the FBI to participate in
               witness interviews. In another example, foreign nation officials
               planning to provide amnesty to approximately 2,000 criminals
               allowed the FBI to document the criminals' biometric data prior to
               their release. In a third example, the FBI provided approximately
               $1 million worth of forensic equipment to support a foreign
               nation's law enforcement entities. However, FBI officials told us
               they lacked a centralized database or a performance monitoring
               system needed to collect, store, and report on their
               accomplishments and, therefore, were unable to provide us with a
               systematic or comprehensive set of accomplishments in assisting
               foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

               According to the FBI, it has increased the number of personnel and
               offices abroad since 2001. In May 2007, the FBI reported that,
               prior to 9/11, the FBI had 127 agents and 74 support personnel
               stationed in 44 LEGATs and four suboffices; however, as of May
               2007, the FBI stated that it now has 167 agents and 111 support
               positions staffing its 59 LEGATs and 14 suboffices abroad. In
               addition, the FBI has revised the number of countries covered by
               regional offices, in an effort to reduce the geographic span of
               coverage for the LEGAT offices. For example, before 2005, LEGAT
               Paris provided coverage for 17 countries in Africa. However, since
               the regional LEGAT office in Rabat, Morocco, LEGAT Paris has
               covered only France and Monaco.

               Despite these actions, we found that the impact of the FBI's
               expansion and realignment to combat terrorism has been limited in
               some posts overseas. We found during overseas work in 2006 that
               while the FBI has increased its overseas offices, not all of those
               offices had been staffed with permanent positions, or permanent
               positions remained unfilled. For example, although the FBI had
               permanent LEGAT offices in two countries where there had been
               terrorist attacks against American interests, we found at the time
               of our fieldwork in 2006 that temporary FBI staff were filling
               slots designated as permanent staff positions. Both FBI
               headquarters staff and agents in the field at all four countries
               we visited said that it was essential to have long-term rotations
               in a country in order to establish the types of working
               relationships with foreign country LEAs needed to effectively
               assist them to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

               Further, the LEGATs in three of the four countries we visited said
               they generally lacked the resources, time, and staff to develop
               the close, collaborative relationships necessary to develop joint
               investigations or operations. In one country we visited, where FBI
               rotations are generally limited to 1 year and the current LEGAT
               was there for only a 90-day tour, the LEGAT told us that he and
               his staff had little interaction with the national LEAs in the
               country because of their short tours. In contrast, in the fourth
               country, which had the greatest number of LEAs of any embassy we
               visited, and where the LEGAT office was more fully staffed with
               permanent FBI agents and analysts, the FBI was providing both
               investigative and operational assistance to the foreign nation to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

               FBI headquarters management, as well as two temporary duty agents
               in the field, told us in 2006 that, while the LEGAT positions were
               approved for the two countries that had temporary staff filling
               the permanent FBI slots, the FBI had difficulty filling the
               positions due to the bureau's lack of career incentives or
               overseas staffing culture. In 2006, the deputy assistant director
               of the counterterrorism division told us that the FBI has had
               difficulty staffing overseas LEGAT positions for years and that,
               despite recent transformation efforts, it has not yet solved the
               problem of staffing overseas positions by providing career rewards
               and incentives to agents or by developing a culture that promotes
               the importance and value of overseas duty. As a result, permanent
               FBI positions were either unfilled or staffed with nonpermanent
               staff on temporary duty, and the LEGATs have been limited in their
               ability to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists.

               In December 2006, FBI officials told us that, in an attempt to
               improve staffing at high-threat posts, the FBI Director
               implemented career incentives in June 2006 to encourage staff to
               volunteer for overseas placement.^19 In May 2007, the FBI stated
               that this career incentives package addressed the difficulties
               encountered in staffing the high threat LEGAT offices.^20

               In responding to our draft report in May 2007, the FBI stated that
               all of the LEGAT positions at its nine highest threat posts were
               now staffed with full-time, permanent LEGAT staff. Specifically,
               the FBI stated that it now has permanent, full-time FBI personnel
               assigned to the two high-threat countries where we found only
               temporary staff in 2006. However, the FBI provided no additional
               documentation to support this contention. In addition, the FBI
               observed that in two of the four locations we visited, both
               arguably high-threat posts, the respective LEGATs departed post
               out of the normal rotational cycles and with little advance
               notice, creating temporarily unfilled positions. However, in one
               of those posts, we were told that the position was difficult to
               fill and it would not be permanently filled for almost a year.

               The FBI stated that it also relies on short-term rotations of 2 to
               6 months and temporary short term assignments to supplement
               permanent staff. According to the FBI, through the use of
               deputies, assistant LEGATs and temporarily assigned personnel,
               LEGATs are able to establish and maintain liaison with principal
               law enforcement and intelligence/security services in designated
               foreign territories while meeting the FBI's international
               responsibilities in international terrorism, foreign
               counterintelligence, organized crime, and general criminal
               matters. However, FBI officials at headquarters and overseas in
               all four countries we visited agreed that the types of
               relationships necessary to facilitate joint investigations and
               operations with foreign nations cannot be built or sustained by
               agents on short-term, temporary assignments at overseas posts.

    			    CSI Works with Foreign Nations, but It Has Had Limitations

               CSI, which targets for inspection at foreign seaports high-risk
               cargo shipments before they leave for the United States, was
               created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S. law
               enforcement personnel to be physically colocated with foreign
               nation LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America.
               As more than 11 million cargo containers are off-loaded at U.S.
               seaports each year, CSI was developed to extend the U.S. zone of
               security outward by working with foreign nation counterparts to
               identify and examine sea containers that pose a risk for
               terrorism. Under the initiative, foreign governments allow CBP
               personnel to be stationed at foreign seaports to use intelligence
               and automated risk assessment information to target shipments
               identified as at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction
               (WMD) or other terrorist contraband. As of September 2006, CSI was
               in place at 50 ports overseas in 29 countries, with a 2007 goal of
               being operational in 58 ports.

    ^19Because these incentives had just been implemented, we did not assess
    their impact on staffing problems abroad.

    ^20Because FBI provided these comments after our audit time frames, we
    were unable to verify the FBI's statement.

               In 2005, we reported that CSI had led to improved information
               sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened
               level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the
               need to identify and disrupt terrorist threats.^21 However, we
               also found that several issues limited its effectiveness. These
               included the inability to fully staff some ports because of
               diplomatic constraints, such as the need for foreign government
               permission, and practical considerations, such as workspace
               limitations. In addition, the technologies used to detect WMDs
               have limitations. We concluded that, given these issues, CBP had
               limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI were
               effective at detecting and identifying terrorist WMDs.

               At the CSI location we visited, an ICE law enforcement agent was
               colocated at a foreign nation maritime port and worked directly
               with foreign nation law enforcement officials in their security
               area. The ICE official had been there 2 years and was learning the
               local language; he and foreign nation officials agreed that, by
               working closely together during that time, they had developed a
               trusting, collaborative relationship necessary to conduct joint
               investigations. While this effort had not led to the
               identification or disruption of terrorist-related shipments, the
               foreign nation customs control director said that, to his
               knowledge, this was the first time that a U.S. law enforcement
               official was colocated with foreign nation LEAs to conduct joint
               investigations to identify and disrupt terrorist threats against
               the United States. He recommended greater efforts to colocate U.S.
               law enforcement officers with other counterparts in the country.
               He also recommended that, to improve collaboration, U.S. officials
               should learn the local language and work within the local law
               enforcement offices for extended periods.

    ^21GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum
    Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection
    Efforts, [59]GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).

               State Has Expanded the ATA Program

               In 1983, State established the ATA program to train civilian
               security and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments
               in police procedures that address terrorism. DS administers the
               ATA program. DS officers work with the foreign country's
               government and a team from that country's U.S. mission to develop
               training in areas such as bomb detection, crime scene
               investigation, airport and building security, maritime
               protections, and VIP protection. (See fig. 1 for an example of ATA
               training to foreign nation LEAs.)

               Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
               Exercises

               According to State's Congressional Budget Justifications, after
               the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ATA program funding more than tripled,
               from approximately $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to over $122
               million in fiscal year 2006. A March 2006 report by State's OIG
               recognized that ATA funding and the number of students trained had
               increased. However, the report also stated that the program's
               procedures should be improved. Specifically, the report
               recommended that ATA courses should receive timely, independent,
               in-depth evaluations to establish and maintain quality control.^22

    ^22On November 16, 2006, we initiated a review of the ATA program,
    including the extent to which State has assessed program outcomes and
    achieved program objectives.

    			  LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations Have Been Limited by Several Factors

               LEA efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists have been limited by several factors.
               Specifically, we found that LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly
               defined roles and responsibilities to assist foreign nations; (2)
               guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources to
               assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess progress
               at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and
               reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures needed to
               promote joint investigations and operations between U.S. and
               foreign nation LEAs and coordinate LEA technical assistance to
               foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs
               assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to
               specific foreign nation needs for identifying, disrupting, and
               prosecuting terrorists.

    			    Most LEAs Lacked Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities

               Our past work has stressed the importance of a strategy to combat
               terrorism that would clearly define the roles and responsibilities
               of each agency for meeting specific objectives related to
               combating terrorism. Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort
               where interagency collaboration is essential, such as this effort
               to use the combined capabilities of each LEA to assist foreign
               nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, we have
               recommended that agencies agree on roles and responsibilities so
               each agency understands its role and how it supports the greater
               overall effort.

               We found that the national strategies' broad strategic objectives
               have not been clearly translated to agency-specific roles and
               responsibilities. In particular, with the exception of Justice and
               the White House issuing some guidance to the FBI, we found
               Justice, DHS, and State had not issued guidance to their component
               LEAs to implement this new national security goal of assisting
               foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists, and
               most U.S. LEAs--including ATF,^23 CBP, DEA, DS, ICE, USMS, and
               USSS--continued to operate based on their traditional objectives
               and guidance. As a result, LEAs lacked clearly defined roles and
               responsibilities for implementing the broad objective articulated
               in the national strategies to assist foreign nations to identify,
               disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

    ^23ATF officials told us that ATF incorporated terrorism-prevention into
    its strategic plan but that it had not received or issued guidance
    specific to assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
    terrorists.

               As of February 2007, no single LEA was in charge of coordinating
               or directing the efforts of all the U.S. LEAs to assist foreign
               nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. Some of the
               presidential directives governing LEA activities had not been
               updated since the mid to late 1990s, and with the exception of the
               FBI, none of the other LEAs had been provided guidance to make
               assisting foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist
               threats a primary mission.

               The FBI has been given some guidance on its roles and
               responsibilities from the White House and Justice. The FBI
               traditionally has had the general statutory authority to conduct,
               both domestically and overseas, investigations related to criminal
               and terrorist activities, including those overseas.^24 Under the
               general authority, the Attorney General, in regulations, has
               placed the FBI in the lead agency role for investigating crimes of
               terrorism in the United States.^25 In 1995, Presidential Decision
               Directive 39 confirmed the FBI's lead agency role in investigating
               terrorism. In 2002, the Attorney General issued guidance to the
               FBI that its new priority was to act to prevent terrorist
               attacks,^26 and the FBI has been in the process of transforming to
               meet that mission.

               In 2003, the Attorney General issued further guidance to the FBI
               authorizing it to work with foreign nations to provide
               investigative and technical assistance for combating terrorism.^27
               In turn, the FBI's 2004 to 2009 strategic plan reflects this new
               direction, stating that the FBI plans to increase its presence
               abroad and increase joint operations with foreign nations to
               combat terrorism. As a result of the guidance, FBI officials in
               Washington and in the countries we visited told us that FBI agents
               abroad were expected to work with foreign nations to identify,
               disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, with the exception of
               the LEGAT in one of the four countries we visited, FBI officials
               told us that the implementation of that goal was still in
               transition and that there was some uncertainty as to how to
               accomplish that goal, given their limited staff and other overseas
               duties.

    ^2418 U.S.C. 2331, 2332, and 3052; 28 U.S.C. 533; 28 U.S.C. 3052.

    ^2528 C.F.R. 0.85(l).

    ^26Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
    Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations.

    ^27Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations
    and Foreign Intelligence Collection.

               According to FBI officials, as of December 2006, the issue of
               roles and responsibilities for the LEAs remains unresolved and is
               still subject to on-going debates within the administration. DHS
               officials reiterated similar concerns and, in response to our
               preliminary findings, agreed that their roles and responsibilities
               related to combating terrorism abroad could be more clearly
               articulated to ensure understanding among DHS officials working
               abroad. In particular, DHS officials told us, in January 2007,
               that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have determined who will lead
               the effort to use the combined capabilities of the LEAs to assist
               foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, or
               clearly defined their roles and responsibilities. State indicated
               that it was not in charge of LEA efforts to assist foreign nations
               to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and referred us to
               Justice and DHS for such plans. State indicated that this was the
               responsibility of the NSC or the White House, and that neither
               entity had clearly defined or identified the roles and
               responsibilities of State, Justice, and DHS LEAs.

               We found other examples related to the lack of guidance on roles
               and responsibilities, including the following:

               o The DEA is a "single mission" agency dedicated to reducing the
               threat, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Although it has not
               been given the specific goal to assist foreign nations to
               identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists, in response to the
               9/11 terrorist attacks, it has expanded its intelligence
               capabilities and information sharing, and instituted a formal
               procedure to query its in-country sources on terrorist-related
               information, which is then shared with the FBI and other agencies
               involved with efforts to fight terrorism. In addition, in February
               of 2004, the Administrator of DEA testified before Congress that

               "During December 2001, the DEA formed a Special Coordination Unit
               at its Special Operations Division... [which] coordinates all DEA
               intelligence and investigations having a possible nexus to
               terrorism and shares information with agencies responsible for
               coordinating terrorist intelligence and investigations. DEA drug
               investigations have generated such narco-terrorist related
               intelligence and investigations both domestically and
               internationally."

               o While the strategic plans for both ICE and CBP generally charged
               them with preventing terrorists from entering the United States,
               neither agency is explicitly tasked with assisting foreign nations
               to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Overseas, we found
               that ICE and CBP were working proactively with foreign nation
               officials in one country we visited to identify terrorists threats
               bound for the United States. However, ICE officials, who comprise
               the primary DHS law enforcement presence abroad, were present in
               the remaining three countries we visited but were generally not
               assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify, disrupt, or prosecute
               terrorists. There were no CBP officials in these three countries.
               The lack of clear guidance was evident when we spoke with DHS
               officials abroad. For example, some ICE and CBP officials told us
               they were responsible for working with foreign nations to stop
               attacks, while other ICE and CBP officials said they did not have
               that responsibility. ICE officials told us in December 2006 that
               they were not working with foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
               and prosecute terrorists because neither the NSC, the NCTC, nor
               DHS had given them any directives or funding to do so.
               o Two LEAs--USMS and ATF--indicated that they had not been given
               clear roles in the U.S. effort to assist foreign nations to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists despite having the
               capabilities to do so. For example, officials from USMS, which
               specializes in tracking, capturing, and extraditing criminals,
               indicated they had unique skills and capabilities that could be
               used to identify and capture terrorists abroad. Similarly,
               officials from ATF, which specializes in tracing weapons and
               explosives, told us they could help identify bombs and other
               weapons used by terrorists.
               o The USSS has not been tasked with assisting foreign nations to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. According to USSS
               officials, the service does not currently have a role in combating
               terrorism abroad, nor does it want this role. However, it could
               provide assistance in investigative techniques and information
               sharing on terrorist-related cases. USSS officials said that the
               service wants to maintain its traditional focus and not assume new
               responsibilities related to combating terrorism.
               o RSOs are charged with providing a safe and secure environment
               for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.^28 A key responsibility
               for RSOs is identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks against
               U.S. embassies and personnel. However, the RSOs have been given no
               post 9/11 guidance from State on how to assist foreign nations to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs voiced
               confusion about this role. In three of the four countries we
               visited, RSOs told us that State has never given the RSOs the goal
               to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists, and RSOs have never been given a specific role or
               directives to implement this aspect of the national security
               strategy. However, we did find some cases where RSOs were
               undertaking initiatives to assist the foreign nation identify,
               disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In one country, the RSO was
               critical in embassy efforts to support the foreign nation to
               capture and prosecute terrorists responsible for attacks against
               Americans and others. In that same country, an assistant RSO
               stationed at a consulate, working with foreign nation police,
               exposed a criminal operation selling counterfeit and legitimate
               visas and other travel documents that could be used by terrorists
               to gain entry into the United States. In commenting on our
               findings, a senior official with DS agreed that the primary
               responsibility of RSOs was the protection of the embassy and its
               officials, and said that additional directives would be needed
               from the NSC if RSO responsibilities were to be expanded to
               include assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists. In commenting on the draft report, State
               indicated that broadening DS's law enforcement mandate to play a
               broader role could require statutory changes in addition to new
               directives.

               At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not provided
               guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign nations to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Ambassadors or deputy
               chiefs of missions at each embassy we visited voiced their concern
               that, despite combating terrorism being the embassy's highest
               priority, they received little to no guidance on how to design a
               coordinated assistance program using the full capacities of U.S.
               technical and operational assistance of LEAs, and ensure that LEAs
               had the necessary goals, skills, capabilities, and time to work
               closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist attacks.
               In all four countries, ambassadors and deputy chiefs of missions
               believed that the roles and responsibilities of LEAs for assisting
               foreign nations to identify and prevent future attacks needed to
               be clarified. Foreign nation officials in two of the countries we
               visited said that they were confused by the number of officers and
               agencies at embassies working on counterterrorism issues, and said
               they did not know which LEA was in charge, or which LEA to work
               with regarding specific terrorist threats.

    ^28RSO authorities are found in the State Department Basic Authorities Act
    (P.L. 84-885, section 37; 22 U.S.C. 2709) . RSOs are responsible for
    implementing and managing State's security and law enforcement programs
    for a geographic region, which includes at least one Foreign Service post.
    RSOs are resident at a particular post and may have constituent posts
    within their region for which they are responsible. The RSOs or Post
    Security Officers are responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management
    of security programs at their constituent posts (12 FAM 422.1). The RSOs
    responsibilities and duties are enumerated in 12 FAM 422.2 through 422.5.

               Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission, who are responsible for
               trying to coordinate law enforcement agencies at embassies, stated
               that--given the strategic importance of stopping further attacks,
               and the complexity of disparate U.S. programs and agencies that
               can be used to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists--they believed that State should consider
               appointing an officer with law enforcement experience or training
               who would be dedicated to helping embassies develop, implement,
               and monitor U.S. law enforcement efforts. They suggested that a
               "coordinator for combating terrorism" could be placed in
               high-threat posts to integrate LEA capabilities and ensure use of
               their full expertise to cover the range of vulnerabilities
               terrorists could exploit to harm U.S. interests.

               During our work in four countries, we found numerous issues
               related to the lack of clear guidance on roles and
               responsibilities of LEAs in assisting foreign nations to identify,
               disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example:

               o In the four countries we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of
               mission, and political officers, who were responsible for
               implementing this new national security goal, said that they lack
               the guidance, training, and funding to effectively use LEA
               technical or operational assistance to assist foreign nations. As
               a result, they questioned whether they could effectively implement
               and coordinate a joint U.S.-foreign nation assistance effort to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists that pose a threat to
               U.S. citizens and interests.
               o In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and
               responsibilities between ICE and the FBI led to both investigative
               and operational problems, according to foreign nation, ICE, and
               FBI officials. ICE was responsible for tracking special interest
               aliens, while the FBI was responsible for identifying terrorists
               trying to enter the United States. Because it was unclear whether
               some of these special interest aliens were migrants or potential
               terrorists--and ICE and FBI were not given clear guidance to
               determine which LEA had the lead role--foreign nation and agency
               officials noted instances where joint U.S.-foreign nation
               investigations or operations were poorly coordinated. As a result,
               ICE and FBI, unknowingly working with different foreign nation
               LEAs, moved in on the same subject. According to the foreign
               nation law enforcement and FBI officials, such actions may have
               compromised several of their investigations.
               o In another country we visited, neither DHS nor the former
               agencies that now largely constitute ICE and CBP--including the
               Customs Service and INS--were given a role when State designed the
               embassy's extensive program to assist in controlling and
               documenting migration flows across a known terrorist-rich border
               region, despite their expertise in border control, immigration,
               and customs issues. State officials told us that they were given
               no guidance to seek the expertise of DHS or these agencies when
               State designed the program in 2002. These agencies were
               subsequently abolished and their responsibilities divided among
               new entities in DHS, yet DHS officials told us in January 2007
               that they were unaware of the program and had never been consulted
               on it. According to embassy officials, the key goal of the program
               related to identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists
               crossing this border region, has not resulted in the prosecution
               of any terrorists.
               o In a third country that served as both a source country and a
               transit point for terrorists, the ambassador told us that, despite
               the need for DHS expertise to improve border control, he has
               delayed approving three full time DHS positions because of a
               mismatch between his and DHS's views on DHS's specific roles and
               responsibilities once in-country. The ambassador said that he
               believed the DHS representatives should be colocated with foreign
               nation police at airports, maritime ports, immigration offices,
               customs offices, and land borders to develop the strong
               collaborative relationships necessary to conduct joint
               investigations or operations. However, he was concerned that the
               DHS officials would principally work from the embassy.

               In commenting on our findings, officials from State, Justice, and
               DHS agreed that there was a lack of clear guidance instructing
               LEAs to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists. Officials noted that the NSC and now the NCTC have the
               authority to compel U.S. LEAs to work together in a coordinated,
               systematic fashion to help stop terrorist attacks. Officials said
               that no executive department has the authority to direct the LEAs
               from other departments to focus on this goal, and they noted that
               recommendations to individual agencies would not result in a
               unified multidepartmental effort to help foreign nations combat
               terrorism.

               In a February 2007 letter to GAO, the Senior Counsel for National
               Security Affairs at Justice stated that, for operational
               assistance to foreign nations, the FBI was designated the lead
               federal LEA with jurisdiction to investigate terrorism-related
               crimes. However, this view was not shared by other LEAs in
               Washington and in the embassies we visited. LEAs, including
               Justice's FBI, USMS, ATF, and DEA; DHS's ICE, CBP, and USSS; and
               State's RSOs all told us there was no lead LEA charged with using
               the combined capabilities of federal LEAs to assist foreign
               nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In December
               2006, FBI officials agreed that the issue of which LEA would lead
               this effort was still unresolved.

    			    Executive Departments and LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance on Setting
    				 Funding Priorities for Assisting Foreign Nations to Combat
    				 Terrorism

               Our guidelines on developing an effective collaborative strategy
               note the importance of identifying needs and addressing them by
               leveraging resources to meet strategic objectives. In addition, in
               our past work on agencies creating strategic plans to meet GPRA
               requirements, we reported that the alignment of activities and
               resources is critical.^29 In this review, however, we found that
               State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs lacked clear guidance on
               setting funding priorities to meet the national security goal of
               helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists.

               Officials from State, Justice, and DHS told us that they are
               attempting to fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with
               limited staffing and funds, and without guidance from the NSC on
               reprioritizing funds from other activities to assist foreign
               nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result,
               their efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists have been hindered. For example, a March 2006
               report by State's OIG found that S/CT lacked adequate resources to
               meet its mandate to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism assistance
               abroad. The OIG found that S/CT's regional affairs unit was
               under-funded to provide advice, coordination, and action on
               regional and bilateral counterterrorism issues and that, if
               counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State
               could not afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed.

               In addition, as noted above, while the FBI has reprioritized and
               realigned a significant amount of its resources domestically from
               criminal investigation to efforts to combat terrorism, we found
               that this realignment has been limited overseas. For example,
               senior FBI officials from the Counterterrorism Division and the
               Office of International Operations told us that they lacked funds
               to establish offices and permanently fill LEGAT positions in some
               high-threat posts. Furthermore, DHS officials from ICE and CBP
               agreed that NSC has not provided guidance on how to reprioritize
               funding to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists. As a result, officials said they were
               limited in their ability to undertake new initiatives in this area
               or to fully staff existing positions already approved by
               embassies.

    ^29GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
    Performance and Results Act, [60]GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
    1996).

               In the countries we visited, we observed that this lack of
               guidance limited the embassies' ability to assist foreign nations
               to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In four countries
               we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and others
               indicated that, due to the lack of guidance from either the NSC,
               NCTC, or their executive departments, LEA headquarters in
               Washington have generally not reallocated funding from lower
               priority activities to support the new national priority of
               assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists. In one country, the ambassador said that the most
               significant concern facing the embassy was the mismatch between
               U.S. objectives and available funding for assisting foreign
               nations to combat terrorism.

               In all four countries we visited, embassy, LEA, and foreign nation
               officials identified terrorist transit and border vulnerabilities
               as the primary challenges; yet, in three of these countries,
               officials said that, due to funding not being realigned to support
               the goal of assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism, they
               did not provide specific assistance to foreign nation LEAs to
               address these needs. Specifically, ICE officials in one country
               told us that because funding had not been reprioritized, ICE had
               not provided training to foreign nation LEAs to counter
               immigration, travel, and border threats. In another country,
               although the embassy wanted DHS officials to assist the foreign
               nation for port security, customs, and immigration, DHS officials
               from a regional office were unable to provide this assistance
               because funding limitations restricted their ability to visit the
               country, and, moreover, they were focused on performing their
               other responsibilities when they were able to visit.

               In all four countries we visited, there was more funding designed
               to assist foreign nations combat illegal drugs and criminals than
               to combat terrorism, despite the fact that efforts to combat
               terrorism were the highest priority of each embassy. For example,
               in one country with an extremely high terrorist threat to American
               interests globally, State provided more than six times the amount
               of funding to stop illicit drugs and crime ($220.2 million) than
               it did for antiterrorism assistance ($34.5 million) from fiscal
               years 2002 to 2006. We found similar issues at the other three
               embassies we visited. For instance, in one country, the deputy
               chief of mission told us that most of the training and assistance
               funding there was dedicated for counter narcotics efforts, even
               though drugs were no longer a key strategic concern in that
               country. From fiscal years 2002 to 2006, this country received
               $12.3 million in funding intended to combat drugs, compared with
               $8.8 million for assisting the foreign nation to combat terrorism.

               Based on a review of our findings, State Department officials
               representing offices involved with U.S. efforts to combat crime,
               drugs, and terrorism abroad, agreed that there was significantly
               more funding available for combating crime and drugs than for
               assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. However, officials
               said that some of the funding allotted to help foreign nations to
               combat crime and drugs was fungible and could be used to combat
               terrorism. We found that, in all four countries we visited,
               embassies used funding intended for objectives such as combating
               crime and drugs, and improving law enforcement and judicial
               capacity, to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists. In other instances, embassies allowed some
               key needs to not be fully addressed because funding had not been
               reprioritized from other activities.

               In a February 2007 letter to GAO, Justice stated that the ability
               of foreign nations to combat terrorism depends on having
               functioning law enforcement and judicial sector institutions and
               professionals capable of carrying out complex investigations and
               prosecutions. While these capabilities are not terrorism specific,
               they are often prerequisites to an ability to identify, disrupt,
               and prosecute terrorists, Justice stated. As a result, some
               general capacity building training can potentially provide a
               benefit to a foreign nation's ability to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists.

               LEAs Are Not Systematically Assessing Their Accomplishments or
    			  Progress in   Assisting Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt,
    			  and Prosecute Terrorists

               The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2004 Intelligence
               Reform Act, and GPRA all require the monitoring of LEA performance
               to measure progress toward stated goals and objectives. The
               National Strategy for Homeland Security addresses the need for
               accountability in the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. It
               states that every department or agency involved with combating
               terrorism will create performance monitoring systems that will
               allow agencies to measure their progress, make resource allocation
               decisions, and adjust priorities accordingly. In addition, the
               2004 Intelligence Reform Act charged the NCTC with monitoring the
               implementation of strategic operational plans to combat terrorism
               and obtaining information from each department, agency, or element
               of the U.S. government relevant for monitoring the progress of
               each entity in implementing such plans. Moreover, GPRA requires
               that agencies in charge of U.S. government programs and activities
               identify goals and report on the degree to which goals are met.
               Our own past work has also stressed the importance of a strategy
               to combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives,
               priorities, outcomes, milestones, and measures to use in
               monitoring performance.

               We found that none of the LEAs had in place a systematic method
               for determining progress or documenting their accomplishments in
               assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists, either for technical or operational assistance. As a
               result, these departments or agencies generally found it difficult
               to assess whether they were making progress implementing this
               national security goal, or to determine what was needed to improve
               their overall assistance to foreign countries.

               To ensure we fully reflected U.S. efforts in assisting foreign
               nations, we requested from all eight LEAs a comprehensive list of
               all key accomplishments from 2001 to 2005. However, LEA and
               executive department officials told us that, because they have no
               systematic method of documenting their efforts to assist foreign
               nations, they could provide anecdotal information but no
               comprehensive list of accomplishments.

               State, Justice, and DHS agreed they lacked systems to
               systematically document their accomplishments or assess their
               progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists. State said that its bureau performance
               plans, State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism, and U.S.
               mission performance plans allowed them to both monitor progress
               and document the department's accomplishments. According to
               State's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, each mission, including
               all the U.S. agencies located in the country, develops mission
               performance plans that outline the intended goals, priority
               initiatives, and performance indicators for the mission. However,
               based on our review of these documents, we found they were not
               sufficiently detailed to clearly determine the role of State,
               Justice, or DHS LEAs, or their accomplishments or progress, in
               meeting this national security goal.

               Justice, along with FBI, DEA, ATF,^30 and USMS officials, said
               that it was not monitoring its progress in assisting foreign
               nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. The FBI
               indicated that it was in the process of developing such a system.

               DHS officials told us that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have
               directed executive branch agencies to systematically assess their
               performance and progress in assisting foreign nations to identify,
               disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Officials from DHS, including
               those from ICE, CBP, and USSS, agreed that they had no performance
               measures at the national strategic level to measure LEA success at
               assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists, and that DHS was not compiling this information at the
               agency level.

               Due to the lack of performance information, we could not conduct
               or provide a full assessment of all three departments' LEAs'
               progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists.

               In one of the countries we visited, we met with the Director of
               State's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), which
               provides training to foreign nation LEAs from 12 countries in the
               region. The director said that, because no independent,
               governmentwide evaluations were being conducted of U.S. training
               efforts, it was impossible to determine whether the general
               training that was provided was improving the ability of the
               foreign nation to combat terrorism.

               In responding to our findings, State Bureau of International
               Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) officials involved
               with the administration of the ILEA program agreed that it was
               critical to conduct independent, long-term impact evaluations to
               verify that training was actually improving the foreign nation
               capabilities to combat terrorism. The officials indicated that, in
               the past, they had conducted such studies, but that funding for
               the evaluations was suspended in fiscal year 2003, and that
               without adequate funding, they had not been able to undertake
               these activities. The officials said that, without such studies,
               it was impossible to determine whether the training was actually
               increasing the ability of foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or
               prosecute terrorists. To be effective, impact studies should
               include assistance provided by all departments, such as that
               provided by State, Justice, and DHS.

    ^30In response to our draft report, ATF's technical comments stated that
    ATF has systems in place to monitor its progress and accomplishments in
    program areas, including assistance given to foreign nations; however, ATF
    did not provide us with documentation to support their position. Further,
    ATF does not have a specific program to assist foreign nations to
    identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

                 LEAs Generally Lacked Mechanisms for Collaboration Abroad

               We found in our past work that effective interagency collaboration
               is essential, as laid out in the national strategies and as
               provided for in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act. And we have
               identified necessary elements for collaboration across agencies.
               However, we found that LEAs abroad lacked formal mechanisms to
               promote collaboration among LEAs to combat terrorism.

               Domestically, to improve collaborative investigations and
               operations among various LEAs within the United States, the
               National Strategy for Homeland Security supported the expanded use
               of structures called Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF),^31 which
               combine the national and international investigative capacity of
               the federal government with state and local knowledge and
               capabilities in an effort to identify and detect terrorist groups
               and prevent them from carrying out attacks against the United
               States. The 9/11 Commission further supported the use of JTTFs,
               noting that, by expanding their use, the FBI could leverage the
               expertise, manpower, and resources of federal, state, and local
               LEAs.

               In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI expanded the
               number of JTTFs from 35 to over 100 by 2005. According to the FBI,
               JTTFs have played a central role in virtually every significant
               terrorism investigation, prevention, or interdiction within the
               United States. These include the conviction of Ramzi Yousef and
               Eyad Mahmoud Ismal for conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center
               bombing and the 2004 arrest in New York of Yassin Muhiddin Aref on
               money-laundering charges connected to a possible terrorist plot to
               kill a Pakistani diplomat.

               We found that State has generally not created structures, similar
               to JTTFs, at embassies to foster collaborative LEA efforts to
               assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists. FBI officials told us that neither the FBI nor State
               had considered implementing this model at embassies, but said that
               State should consider doing so. In addition, ambassadors, deputy
               chiefs of mission, and LEA officials abroad said that while they
               had received no directives from State to consider such a model,
               they supported implementing such a concept at the embassies we
               visited. In addition, DHS officials told us, in January 2007, that
               neither the NCTC nor the NSC had developed policies to facilitate
               joint LEA investigations and operations abroad. In three of the
               four embassies we visited, we found that the embassies still
               generally retained pre-9/11 structures for information sharing and
               collaboration among LEAs, and LEAs noted that the embassies had
               not been reoriented to harness the combined capabilities of all
               LEAs in a collective effort to prevent another terrorist attack on
               the United States or its interests.

    ^31Agencies and departments that participate in JTTFs include FBI, DEA,
    USMS, ATF, ICE, CBP, USSS, the Department of Defense, Coast Guard, the
    Department of Treasury, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Capitol
    Police, U.S. Park Police, and state and local partners, such as the state
    and local police.

               We were told by officials at the four embassies we visited, and by
               some State and LEA officials in Washington, that missions
               generally use law enforcement working groups to share information
               or to coordinate LEA activities at embassies. Based on our work at
               embassies, we found that these working groups did not function in
               an integrated, collaborative manner, and were not focused on joint
               investigative or operational efforts to identify and disrupt
               terrorist acts. We were told that these groups often met
               infrequently and usually discussed general, nonoperational
               information. For example, in one country we visited with an
               extremely high terrorist threat, an FBI official told us that the
               law enforcement working group had never been asked to try to
               identify or disrupt any of the terrorists on the most wanted lists
               of the departments of State or Defense, or of the foreign nation
               itself. In general, LEAs told us that terrorist information was
               not always shared or acted on across all key agencies at the
               missions, including the LEAs.

               While none of the embassies we visited had implemented formal
               structures that ensured information sharing and collaboration
               among all U.S. LEAs for assisting foreign nations to combat
               terrorism, one embassy did have a structure that included some
               collaborative LEA elements. At that embassy, the ambassador had
               created a fusion center and a working group to combat terrorism.
               The fusion center colocated FBI, DHS, and other assets in a common
               workspace. As potential terrorist information was received in the
               fusion center, each agency could check its databases for
               information needed to identify or locate the terrorists. This
               information was then operationalized through the members of the
               working group, who would use their contacts with the foreign
               nation to conduct joint investigations or operations. According to
               the ambassador and the LEAs, despite some continuing instances of
               coordination problems between some LEAs at the post, this
               structure had significantly improved coordination and operations
               among both U.S. and foreign nation LEAs.

               While ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and other embassy
               officials generally supported implementing formal structures for
               integrated, collaborative LEA efforts at embassies, they noted
               some challenges to doing so. For example, the RSO and LEGAT in one
               country we visited strongly supported a formal structure for
               integrated, collaborative LEA efforts at the embassy. The RSO said
               that for such a structure to work properly, all the agencies must
               be colocated in the same room, share space and telephones, and
               work together constantly on joint investigations and operations.

               However, according to the LEGAT, LEAs were not colocated at the
               embassy and several LEAs, such as USSS, ICE, CBP, and the
               Transportation Security Administration, were all located apart
               from the main embassy building at his post. As a result, the LEAs
               were not able to access the combined databases of each agency. He
               said that bringing these elements together would likely require
               construction of an additional secure facility and dedicated
               classified connections to each LEA's respective headquarters
               office. In addition, he also recommended that foreign nation law
               enforcement officials be included in a new collaborative LEA
               structure, but he noted that this would raise classification
               issues, since much of the terrorist related information cannot be
               shared with foreign nationals. Despite these challenges, he said
               creating a formal structure at the embassy for integrated
               collaboration, information-sharing, and joint operations could be
               very helpful. State officials, in commenting on our findings,
               stated that both security and space limitations could be a
               challenge to colocating LEAs at embassies.

    			    LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments

               In our past work, we found that identifying and addressing needs
               and leveraging resources was an essential element of a strategic
               plan and for interagency collaboration.^32 The United States
               provides a broad range of technical assistance to foreign nations
               related to legal reforms and improving the general capacity of
               police, prosecutors, and judges. State provides training programs
               under the ATA program, a training program designed to address
               foreign nation capabilities to combat terrorism, and the INL
               programs. In addition, the FBI provides some foreign nation
               training overseas and at its National Training Center at Quantico,
               VA. Justice also administers the International Criminal
               Investigative Training Assistance Program, which works to build
               the general capacity of foreign nation LEAs. It also administers
               the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training
               program, which, for example, through its Resident Legal Advisor
               program, assists foreign nations with legal reform efforts and can
               include assistance in crafting needed legislation and revising
               existing terrorism law, as well as assistance to prosecutors and
               judges in utilizing new and revised terrorism law to process
               terrorist suspects. In two of the four countries we visited, we
               found that Justice officials were working with foreign nations to
               draft new legislation. In one case, a Justice official assisted
               the foreign nation in passing legislation to make it a criminal
               offense to possess fraudulent passports; such passports can be
               used by terrorists to travel to the United States.

    ^32 [61]GAO/GGD-96-118 , [62]GAO-05-927, and [63]GAO-06-15 .

               We found a lack of a single, comprehensive country needs
               assessment, which considers all U.S. assistance for addressing the
               country's needs in combating terrorism. As a result, State,
               Justice, DHS, and their LEAs may not be tailoring and targeting
               their full range of training and assistance to assist foreign
               countries to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For
               example, according to embassy officials in three of the four
               countries we visited, terrorist transit across their borders was a
               key vulnerability, yet there was no comprehensive effort by State,
               Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to provide training to the foreign
               nation border patrols, immigration officers, and customs agents to
               identify and disrupt terrorists transiting their borders.

               In one of the countries we visited, the Director of State's ILEA
               stated that, to be effective, comprehensive governmentwide needs
               assessments should be conducted and that State, Justice, and DHS
               should coordinate their training programs to meet the key
               terrorism vulnerabilities in each country. This could include
               combined training of small, vetted units of police, prosecutors,
               and judges on how to collaboratively investigate and prosecute
               terrorists, as well as training needed to identify and capture
               terrorists involved with transnational travel.

               Further, in responding to our preliminary findings, State/INL
               officials involved with administering the ILEAs agreed that it was
               critical to conduct needs assessments. The officials indicated
               that, in the past, they had conducted such studies, but that
               funding was suspended in fiscal year 2003. The officials said
               that, without adequate funding, they had not been able to
               undertake these activities and, without such assessments, it was
               impossible to determine training needs.

               Moreover, we found that an embassy's ability to provide effective,
               targeted, and coordinated assistance to meet country needs could
               vary significantly. For example, in one country we visited,
               despite problems with the foreign nation's legal system that
               hindered terrorist prosecutions, the embassy had no on-going
               programs to assist the foreign nation to strengthen terrorism laws
               and train police, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to
               develop the capacity of the legal system to prosecute terrorists.
               Embassy officials told us that because of these limitations in the
               legal system, foreign nation LEAs were not the most effective
               instruments for combating terrorism, and instead the embassy
               relied on the use of the military and other assets to combat
               terrorism.

               In contrast, another embassy successfully employed a variety of
               State and Justice programs to assist the foreign nation to
               identify, arrest, and prosecute terrorists, despite limitations in
               the foreign nation's legal system that hindered successful
               prosecutions. In that country, the embassy, in close cooperation
               with the foreign nation, used State's ATA and INL assets to train
               a specialized unit of the local police to capture terrorist
               suspects. The U.S.-foreign nation team then assembled a small task
               force of foreign nation investigators, prosecutors, and judges,
               and, using Justice-administered funds, provided specialized
               training to develop a case using recently passed legislation. The
               case resulted in the successful prosecution of the terrorists
               accused of killing Americans and others at popular tourist sites.

               Conclusion

               Combating terrorism is the United States' top national security
               priority at home and at embassies abroad. Since 9/11, U.S.
               national strategies have consistently called for using all
               elements of national power to combat terrorism, including changing
               the role of LEAs. In particular, these strategies have called for
               expanding LEAs' overseas activities to include working with
               foreign nations and building their capacity toward a shared goal
               of identifying and disrupting terrorist plots, and bringing these
               terrorists to justice in courts of law. In response, some LEAs
               have taken steps to expand existing programs or initiate new
               technical assistance efforts to, among other things, help train
               foreign police, prosecutors, and judges. The FBI has made efforts
               to work more closely with foreign counterparts on operational
               efforts to detect and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur.

               However, while the national strategies have articulated this
               change in direction and emphasis, they have not provided specific
               roles, objectives, resources, or mechanisms for determining
               success. At the embassies we visited, ambassadors and deputy
               chiefs of mission voiced their concern that, despite
               counterterrorism being the embassy's highest priority, they
               received little to no guidance on how to determine country
               assistance needs in this area; design a coordinated assistance
               program using the full capacities of U.S. LEAs; and ensure that
               the LEAs had the necessary directives, capabilities, and time to
               work closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist
               attacks. As a result of these weaknesses, LEAs, a key element of
               national power, are not being fully used abroad to protect U.S.
               citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks.

               Looking forward, the United States needs to develop clear
               implementing guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA
               activities assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
               recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the
               NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for
               combating terrorism clearly articulates the specific objectives
               for each LEA, clarifies their roles and responsibilities, and
               proposes actions linked to available resources and directed at the
               most pressing needs for assisting foreign nations to identify,
               disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In addition, since these
               activities are central to the overall U.S. effort to combat
               terrorism, DHS, Justice, and State need to ensure that their
               component agencies have clear guidance to implement the national
               security strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs
               to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists, and also need to assess progress toward objectives and
               provide regular reporting to Congress on the results, impediments,
               and planned improvements.

    			  Recommendations

               We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with
               the NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan
               for combating terrorism:

               o Articulates a clear strategy to implement the national security
               goal of using the combined capabilities of LEAs to help foreign
               nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
               o Clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each LEA for (1)
               helping enhance the capabilities of foreign police, prosecutors,
               and judges for combating terrorism; and (2) working more closely
               with foreign nations on operational efforts to identify, disrupt,
               and prosecute terrorists.
               o Includes a mechanism for comprehensively (1) assessing the needs
               of foreign nations for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
               terrorists; (2) deciding which needs U.S. LEAs should help
               address; (3) determining which U.S. LEA programs or activities are
               best suited to address those needs; and (4) ensuring that U.S.
               LEAs are provided guidance on setting funding priorities and
               providing resources to address those needs.
               o Requires a monitoring system that provides the executive
               departments, LEAs, and Congress accurate reporting on
               accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements for LEAs
               assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists.

               We recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretaries of
               Homeland Security and State each:

               o Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
               bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the
               national security strategies' goal of using the full capabilities
               of LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists.
               o Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective
               department and Congress with accurate reporting on that
               department's accomplishments, impediments, and planned
               improvements in their LEAs' efforts to help foreign nations combat
               terrorism.

               We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
               U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security:

               o Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to
               improve information sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for
               assisting foreign nations combat terrorism.

               DHS, Justice, and State provided written comments on a draft of
               this report, which are reproduced in appendixes II, III, and IV.

    			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

               DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
               report. DHS said it would work closely with the NSC, NCTC,
               Justice, and State on planning efforts to enhance the ability of
               DHS LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. DHS also plans
               to issue implementing guidance and establish a monitoring system
               based upon direction from the NSC and NCTC.

               Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
               interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will
               work with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan.
               Justice did not indicate whether it concurred with our
               recommendations that the Attorney General issue clear guidance to
               LEAs or to establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to
               help foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice expressed concern
               that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational
               and technical assistance. Justice's written response also includes
               a February 16, 2007, Justice letter to GAO providing comments on a
               draft statement of fact we provided Justice on January 26, 2007.
               In its February 16, 2007, letter Justice raised several concerns
               about the information we provided in the draft statement of fact,
               including their contention that we (1) misunderstood the roles and
               responsibilities of Justice's overseas components, and (2) did not
               clearly define what we meant by assisting foreign nations to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Justice's letter was
               not based on a complete draft of our report, which we provided the
               department on March 27, 2007. In the March 27 draft report, we
               made several changes as a result of (1) Justice's February 16
               letter; (2) the comments we received during exit conferences with
               Justice, State, and DHS; and (3) our own internal review and
               fact-checking processes. Our report (1) clarified the roles and
               responsibilities of Justice's overseas components, and (2) more
               clearly defined what we meant by assisting foreign nations. In its
               May 11, 2007, letter formally commenting on our draft report,
               Justice continued to contend that our analysis did not clearly
               distinguish between operational and technical assistance. As a
               result, we have further clarified our discussion of these issues.
               Specifically, we have noted that the purpose of our review was to
               assess the federal government's efforts to implement the various
               national security strategies that generally guide law enforcement
               efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism, and to determine
               if the technical and operational assistance implemented by the
               various U.S. departments and agencies has been reoriented to
               assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists.

               The Department of State said it would consider working with
               relevant LEAs to improve the coordination of law enforcement
               activities overseas. State did not indicate whether it concurred
               with our recommendations that the Secretary of State issue clear
               guidance and establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to
               help foreign nations combat terrorism. State also indicated that
               we did not fully reflect the department's lack of resources
               necessary to carry out its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to
               combat terrorism abroad. As a result, we have incorporated State's
               position on this issue into our discussion of State's ability to
               effectively coordinate U.S. international counterterrorism
               activities. State also believed we had not sufficiently credited
               the department's Regional Strategic Initiatives as examples of
               coordinated, interagency efforts to guide overseas efforts to
               combat terrorism. However, State did not provide any additional
               information to support this contention. Finally, State also
               expressed concern about our characterization of the role DS
               special agents play when working overseas. We clarified our
               discussion of this point in the report, along the lines State
               suggested in its response.

               The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report. The
               NCTC stated that it is in the process of implementing its plan in
               conjunction with other departments and agencies, including the law
               enforcement agencies. According to NCTC, it has already begun to
               implement our recommendations to NCTC. For example, NCTC stated
               that its plan coordinates all instruments of national power,
               including law enforcement agencies, to combat terrorism. NCTC also
               said the plan provides direction and guidance to the various law
               enforcement agencies on their efforts to help foreign nations
               combat terrorism and includes coordination mechanisms and a
               monitoring system to track implementation of the plan. NCTC did
               not provide any documentation to verify these statements.

               We also received technical comments from DHS, Justice, State, and
               the NCTC, which we have incorporated throughout the report where
               appropriate.

               As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
               contents of the report earlier, we plan no further distribution
               until 30 days after the report date. At that time, we will send
               copies of the report to interested congressional committees and to
               the National Security Council, the Director of the NCTC, the
               Attorney General, and the Secretaries of State and Homeland
               Security. We will also make copies available to others upon
               request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
               the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

               If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
               contact Jess T. Ford on (202) 512-4128, e-mail fordj@gao.gov .
               Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
               Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other
               GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.

               Sincerely yours,

               Jess T. Ford
    			  Director, International Affairs and Trade

    			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

               To assess the guidance for law enforcement agencies (LEA) to
               assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
               terrorists, we reviewed the 2002 and 2006 versions of the National
               Security Strategy of the United States of America, the 2002
               National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2003 and 2006
               versions of the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, the 9/11
               Commission Report, and related legislation. To determine whether
               this strategic level guidance was translated into specific
               guidance for the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland
               Security, we analyzed their 5-year strategic plans and their
               annual performance reports. In addition, we analyzed the national
               strategies, strategic plans, and performance reports to determine
               if they contained key elements we have recommended^1 and that are
               provided for in the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
               These key elements include having clearly defined objectives and
               roles and responsibilities; leveraged funding; and monitoring
               systems related to assisting foreign governments to identify,
               disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also requested all guidance
               issued by State, Justice, and DHS to implement the national
               strategies' goal to make combating terrorism their priority, and
               any specific guidance to ensure their LEAs were assisting foreign
               nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. To verify
               that our analysis was accurate, we conducted detailed discussions
               with representatives from State, Justice, DHS, and the eight LEAs,
               along with embassy and LEA officials involved with working with
               foreign nation counterparts.

               To assess the extent to which LEAs have implemented the strategic
               guidance to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
               prosecute terrorists and determine if the departments and their
               LEAs were reporting on their progress in providing this
               assistance, we reviewed strategic plans and annual performance
               reports for State, Justice, and DHS and their component LEAs,
               where available. We also asked each department and agency to
               provide a list of its accomplishments in assisting foreign nations
               in this endeavor, including the number of terrorist plots that had
               been identified and disrupted, and the number of terrorists
               prosecuted as a result of this assistance, from 2001 to 2005. In
               addition, we asked for documentation on 11 cases highlighted by
               the State Department as successful examples of foreign nations
               identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists linked with
               high profile attacks against Americans. However, none of the
               agencies provided a comprehensive list of accomplishments or
               documentation of the role that U.S. assistance played in these
               cases.^2 We also conducted detailed interviews with officials from
               State, Justice, DHS, and their eight LEAs to further determine
               their progress and impediments to fully implementing this
               strategic guidance. In addition, we conducted detailed work in
               four countries with key roles in combating terrorism, where we met
               with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials to determine what
               role U.S. LEAs played in assisting the foreign country to
               identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We did not name the
               specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic
               and security concerns.

    ^1  [64]GAO-05-927, [65]GAO-06-15, and [66]GAO-03-519T.

               After our work abroad, we provided State, Justice, and DHS written
               summaries of our findings, and conducted follow-up meetings with
               department representatives to ensure that our findings accurately
               characterized any guidance provided by the White House, NSC, and
               NCTC, as well as State, Justice, and DHS. We also met with NCTC
               officials to brief them on our observations and to determine the
               status of their ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all
               elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism.
               NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was
               approved by the President in June 2006. According to NCTC
               officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under
               development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss the
               plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.

               During the course of our work we experienced considerable delays
               obtaining information from Justice and State, which resulted in
               this report being issued several months later than initially
               planned. We were eventually able to obtain information sufficient
               for answering our objectives. We conducted our work between August
               2005 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
               government auditing standards.

    ^2Although State Department officials said they were unable to find any
    relevant documents related to our case studies, we found detailed
    reporting on one of our case studies at an embassy we visited.

               Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    			  Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice

               Following are GAO's comments on the Department of Justice's letter
               dated May 11, 2007.

    			  Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    See comment 1.

    See comment 2.

    See comment 3.

    See comment 4.

    See comment 6.

    See comment 5.

    See comment 8.

    See comment 7.

    See comment 9.

    See comment 10.

    See comment 10.

    See comment 11.

    See comment 12.

    			  GAO Comments

    			               1. On March 27, 2007, we provided Justice a complete
                            draft report reflecting several changes stemming from
                            (1) the comments and suggestions we obtained during
                            exit conferences with Justice, DHS, and State; (2)
                            Justice's February 16, 2007 letter; and (3) our
                            internal review and fact checking process. As such, a
                            number of the comments and concerns Justice raised in
                            the February 16, 2007, letter were addressed in our
                            draft report.
                            2. In response to Justice's concern about our
                            distinction between operational and technical
                            assistance, we have clarified the language that
                            describes the purpose of our review. This report
                            assesses the federal government's efforts to
                            implement the various national security strategies
                            that generally guide law enforcement efforts to help
                            foreign nations combat terrorism overseas. As such,
                            our review focused on assessing the guidance and
                            implementation of those strategies. We also clarified
                            our definition of assistance to differentiate between
                            operational and technical assistance and made changes
                            throughout the report to clarify when our discussion
                            focuses on operational or technical assistance. Our
                            definition of what we mean by technical and
                            operational assistance is based on language Justice
                            suggested in its February 16, 2007, letter.
                            3. We no longer use the phrase "new strategy" in our
                            report because the various national strategies
                            guiding overseas efforts to combat terrorism were
                            first published more than 4 years ago.
                            4. We include a discussion of the FBI's strategic
                            guidance in the report.
                            5. Even if the LEAs are not specifically required by
                            law to develop plans guiding and coordinating their
                            technical assistance efforts, we believe this is a
                            best-practice and a fundamental aspect of good
                            governance.
                            6. The national strategies offer few details on which
                            department should have lead responsibility and do not
                            specify what supporting roles other departments and
                            agencies should play.
                            7. We modified our discussion of FBI LEGATs.
                            8. According to State Department's Strategic Plan for
                            2004 to 2009, each mission annually develops mission
                            performance plans that incorporate the activities of
                            all U.S. agencies and departments located in the
                            country. These plans outline the intended goals,
                            initiatives, and performance indicators for each
                            strategic objective of the mission, and the role that
                            each agency and department is expected to contribute
                            in order to attain each objective. As such, the plans
                            should include a discussion of the progress and
                            accomplishments of law enforcement efforts to help
                            foreign nations to combat terrorism.
                            9. We modified our discussion of Justice's overseas
                            personnel.
                            10. Our recent work on U.S. efforts to combat
                            terrorist financing found significant problems.
                            Specifically, the U.S. government lacks an integrated
                            strategy to coordinate the delivery of
                            counter-terrorism financing training and technical                        assistance to countries vulnerable to terrorist
                            financing. In addition, the effort does not have key
                            stakeholder acceptance of roles and procedures, a
                            strategic alignment of resources with needs, or a
                            process to measure performance.^1
                            11. We agree that general assistance to bolster
                            foreign law enforcement and judicial sectors is an
                            essential component of the broader U.S. effort to
                            combat overseas terrorism. However, the allocation of
                            resources for law enforcement programs specifically
                            targeted for combating terrorism did not seem to
                            match the preeminent role combating terrorism plays
                            in U.S. national security strategies and law
                            enforcement agencies' strategic guidance.
                            12. With the exception of the FBI, Justice LEAs
                            reported that they lacked clear implementing guidance
                            on how to carry out the broad guidance contained in
                            the Justice strategic plan and U.S. national security
                            strategies.

    ^1 [67]GAO-06-19 .

    			                Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    See comment 2.

    See comment 1.

    See comment 3.

    			  Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
               dated May 8, 2007.

    			  GAO Comments

    			               1. We added additional discussion of S/CT's lack of
                            resources.
                            2. Our discussion of Regional Strategic Initiatives
                            in the report was limited by the information State
                            provided on these activities. Although we asked to
                            review all four of the Regional Strategic Initiatives
                            completed during 2006, we were only able to review
                            one. State provided us no additional information to
                            support the claims it makes in its agency comments.
                            3. We modified the report to better reflect the role
                            and legal authority of Regional Security Officers.

    			  Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

     			  GAO Contact

               Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, (202)
               512-4128, email fordj@gao.gov .

    			  Staff Acknowledgments

               In addition to the individual named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant
               Director; Edward J. George; J. Addison Ricks; Diana Glod; Ernie
               Jackson; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report.

    			  GAO�s Mission

               The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
               investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
               meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
               the performance and accountability of the federal government for
               the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
               evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
               recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
               informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
               commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
               accountability, integrity, and reliability.

    			  Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

               The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
               no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each
               weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
               correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of
               newly posted products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and
               select "Subscribe to Updates."

    			  Order by Mail or Phone

               The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
               are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
               Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
               Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
               discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

               U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
               Washington, D.C. 20548

               To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000
    			  TDD: (202) 512-2537
    			  Fax: (202) 512-6061

    			  To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

               Contact:

               Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
    			  E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
    			  Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

    			  Congressional Relations

               Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202)
               512-4400 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
               Room 7125 Washington, D.C. 20548

    			  Public Affairs

               Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202)
               512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
               Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

    (320365)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697.

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
    fordj@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-07-697, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
    National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
    Government Reform, House of Representatives

    May 2007

    COMBATING TERRORISM

    Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
    Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists

    Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,
    directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of
    terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their
    efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
    terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist
    foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the
    extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.

    [68]What GAO Recommends

    We recommend that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) ensure that
    the implementing guidance for its NCTC's plan for combating terrorism
    articulates a clear strategy for using LEAs to help foreign nations combat
    terrorism. We also recommend that State, Justice, and DHS explore
    enhancements to overseas coordination mechanisms and develop clear
    guidance and performance monitoring to enhance efforts to help foreign
    nations combat terrorism.

    NCTC stated it had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS
    generally agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated they
    would consider ways to improve overseas coordination, but did not indicate
    whether they concurred with our other recommendations.

    Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies
    that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to
    assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
    However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement
    the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism
    or how they should do so. While one of the strategies tasked State with
    developing and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we
    found State did not develop or coordinate the development of a plan to use
    the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify,
    disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In December 2004, Congress passed the
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged
    the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power,
    including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had
    drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of
    2006. According to NCTC, State, Justice, and DHS officials, implementing
    guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the
    contents of the plan or the guidance.

    Some LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify,
    disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its
    Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports,
    and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
    However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the FBI,
    have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and
    responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
    prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles
    and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several
    joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist
    activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we
    found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign
    nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked
    performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing
    information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive
    needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full
    range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities
    in foreign countries.

    U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism Exercises

    References

    Visible links
      38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-19
      39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
      40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
      42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
      54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
      55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
      56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
      58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-578T
      59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-557
      60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
      61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118
      62. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
      63. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      64. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
      65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
      67. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-19
    *** End of document. ***