Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy	 
Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of	 
Fighting Fires (01-JUN-07, GAO-07-655). 			 
                                                                 
Annual appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland	 
fires have increased substantially over the past decade, in	 
recent years totaling about $3 billion. The Forest Service within
the Department of Agriculture and four agencies within the	 
Department of the Interior (Interior) are responsible for	 
responding to wildland fires on federal lands. GAO determined	 
what steps federal agencies have taken, in response to findings  
from previous studies, to (1) address key operational areas that 
could help contain the costs of preparing for and responding to  
wildland fires and (2) improve their management of their	 
cost-containment efforts. To address these objectives, GAO	 
reviewed previous cost-containment studies and other agency	 
documents and interviewed agency officials.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-655 					        
    ACCNO:   A70165						        
  TITLE:     Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a       
Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs  
of Fighting Fires						 
     DATE:   06/01/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost control					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal agencies					 
	     Financial management				 
	     Forest fires					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Public lands					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Wildfires						 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 

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GAO-07-655

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]To Help Contain Costs, Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Step

          * [4]System to Help Identify and Set Priorities for Lands Needing
          * [5]Agencies Have Addressed Few of the Problems Identified in Th

               * [6]Determining the Appropriate Type and Quantity of Wildland
                 Fi
               * [7]Acquiring Firefighting Assets Cost-Effectively
               * [8]Using Firefighting Assets Effectively and Efficiently

          * [9]Agencies May Miss Opportunities to Increase Their Use of Low

               * [10]Steps to Improve Policies Regarding Firefighting
                 Strategies
               * [11]Steps to Improve Tools That Managers Use to Select
                 Firefight

          * [12]Agencies Have Updated Guidance for Sharing Suppression Costs

     * [13]Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies'

          * [14]Agencies Lack Clear Cost-Containment Goals and Objectives
          * [15]Agencies Lack a Clear Strategy to Contain Wildland Fire Cost
          * [16]Performance Measures for Containing Costs Have Improved, but
          * [17]Agencies Have Yet to Establish an Effective Oversight and Ac

     * [18]Conclusions
     * [19]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [20]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [21]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * [22]Appendix II: Selected GAO Products and Other Reports Reviewe

          * [23]GAO Products
          * [24]Federal or State Firefighting Entity Reports
          * [25]Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General Repo
          * [26]National Academy of Public Administration Reports

     * [27]Appendix III: Comments from the Forest Service and the Depar

          * [28]GAO's Comments

     * [29]Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [30]GAO Contact
          * [31]Staff Acknowledgments

               * [32]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

June 2007

WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT

Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to
Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires

GAO-07-655

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
To Help Contain Costs, Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Steps to Target
Operational Areas Identified as Needing Improvement, but Results Are
Unknown 11
Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Management of
Wildland Fire Cost-Containment Efforts 25
Conclusions 32
Recommendations for Executive Action 33
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35
Appendix II Selected GAO Products and Other Reports Reviewed 37
GAO Products 37
Federal or State Firefighting Entity Reports 38
Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General Reports 38
National Academy of Public Administration Reports 39
Appendix III Comments from the Forest Service and the Department of the
Interior 40
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 47

Table

Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations and
Distribution, by Wildland Fire Activity, Fiscal Years 1996 through 2005 7

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

June 1, 2007 June 1, 2007

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate

The Honorable Larry E. Craig
United States Senate

The federal government's cost of preparing for and responding to wildland
fires, which burn millions of acres each year, has increased substantially
over the past decade. Five federal land management agencies--the Forest
Service within the Department of Agriculture (Agriculture) and the Bureau
of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Park Service, and
Fish and Wildlife Service within the Department of the Interior
(Interior)--are responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands.
A firefighting agency's response to a wildland fire can range from
monitoring the fire while letting it burn to aggressively suppressing it.
In choosing a response, agency officials must assess a number of factors
that can affect the size and severity of the fire as well as the value of
threatened resources, such as communities, watersheds, or natural
resources. In recent years, accumulations of fuels, due in part to past
suppression policies, and severe drought and weather in some areas of the
country have contributed to more-severe fires and longer fire seasons. At
the same time, wildland fires have increasingly threatened not only
federal lands and public resources, such as forests and watersheds, but
also nonfederal lands and resources, including homes and other structures,
as development has continued to expand into areas in or near
wildlands--commonly known as the wildland-urban interface. Consequently,
preparing for and responding to wildland fires has become more costly.
Over the past decade, annual wildland fire appropriations to prepare for
and suppress wildland fires, including appropriations for reducing fuels,
have increased from an average of $1.1 billion from fiscal years 1996
through 2000 to more than $2.9 billion from fiscal years 2001 through
2005; The federal government's cost of preparing for and responding to
wildland fires, which burn millions of acres each year, has increased
substantially over the past decade. Five federal land management
agencies--the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture
(Agriculture) and the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service within the Department
of the Interior (Interior)--are responsible for managing wildland fires on
federal lands. A firefighting agency's response to a wildland fire can
range from monitoring the fire while letting it burn to aggressively
suppressing it. In choosing a response, agency officials must assess a
number of factors that can affect the size and severity of the fire as
well as the value of threatened resources, such as communities,
watersheds, or natural resources. In recent years, accumulations of fuels,
due in part to past suppression policies, and severe drought and weather
in some areas of the country have contributed to more-severe fires and
longer fire seasons. At the same time, wildland fires have increasingly
threatened not only federal lands and public resources, such as forests
and watersheds, but also nonfederal lands and resources, including homes
and other structures, as development has continued to expand into areas in
or near wildlands--commonly known as the wildland-urban interface.
Consequently, preparing for and responding to wildland fires has become
more costly. Over the past decade, annual wildland fire appropriations to
prepare for and suppress wildland fires, including appropriations for
reducing fuels, have increased from an average of $1.1 billion from fiscal
years 1996 through 2000 to more than $2.9 billion from fiscal years 2001
through 2005; adjusted for inflation, the appropriations increased from
$1.3 billion to $3.1 billion.^1

Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, federal agency officials,
and others have expressed concerns about the mounting federal wildland
fire expenditures. Over the last decade, these concerns have led federal
agencies (including the Forest Service, Interior, the Agriculture Office
of Inspector General, and GAO) and other organizations (including the
National Association of State Foresters and the National Academy of Public
Administration^2) to conduct numerous reviews of the federal wildland fire
program. These reviews generally sought to identify the reasons for
worsening wildland fire severity and increasing expenditures and to
recommend possible steps that federal agencies could take to contain
costs. Despite the dozens of studies conducted, problems identified, and
hundreds of recommendations for agency action, concerns remain about the
increasing costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires and the
effectiveness of the agencies' efforts to contain those costs.

In this context, we examined the responsible federal agencies' efforts to
contain wildland fire costs. This report discusses steps the Forest
Service and Interior agencies have taken, in response to findings from
previous studies, to (1) address key operational areas that could help
contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires and
(2) improve their management of their cost-containment efforts.

To address these issues, we reviewed selected studies--most conducted
since 2000 by federal, state, and nongovernmental entities--that evaluated
issues related to wildland fire cost containment, including studies of
several large fires. We reviewed the issues these studies identified as
needing improvement to help contain costs and categorized them into broad
areas corresponding to key operational areas of preparing for and
responding to wildland fires. To corroborate our understanding and
categorization of the issues and the steps that federal agencies have
taken to address the issues, we interviewed officials from the Forest
Service, Bureau of Land Management, and Office of Wildland Fire
Coordination within Interior at the national offices in Washington, D.C.,
and at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho.^3 We also
reviewed program documents from the Forest Service and Interior agencies.
These documents, along with Congressional Research Service reports,
provided information on the costs of preparing for and responding to
wildland fires. Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in more
detail, and appendix II lists many of the studies we reviewed. We
performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards, which included an assessment of data reliability, from
May 2006 through May 2007.

^1Federal expenditures are a more direct measure of the federal
government's investment in wildland fire activities, but the Forest
Service and Interior agencies were unable to provide us with consistent
data on these expenditures for the years we reviewed. As a result, we are
instead reporting appropriations data. We adjusted the appropriations
dollars for inflation, using the chain-weighted gross domestic product
price index with fiscal year 2005 as the base year.

^2The National Association of State Foresters is a nonprofit organization
representing the directors of the forestry agencies of the 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and 8 United States territories. The National
Academy of Public Administration is an independent, nonpartisan
organization chartered by Congress to help federal, state, and local
governments improve the management and administration of government
agencies.

Results in Brief

The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of steps
to address issues that previous studies identified as needing improvement
to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but the effects of
these steps on containing costs are unknown, in part because many of the
steps are not yet complete. These issues are generally related to the key
operational areas of reducing accumulated fuels, acquiring and using
firefighting personnel and equipment, and selecting firefighting
strategies. Concerns have also been raised about the framework used to
share firefighting costs between federal and nonfederal entities.

           o Reducing accumulated fuels. Federal firefighting agencies have
           made progress in developing a system to help them better identify
           and set priorities for lands needing treatment to reduce
           accumulated fuels. Many studies have identified fuel reduction as
           important for containing wildland fire costs because accumulated
           fuels can contribute to more-severe and more costly fires. The
           agencies' new system, LANDFIRE, is scheduled for completion in
           2009, but the agencies have yet to decide how they will keep data
           in the system current. Forest Service and Interior officials told
           us they recognize the importance of ensuring that data are
           periodically updated, and they are developing a plan to operate
           and maintain the system, including determining how often data will
           be updated.
			  
^3The National Interagency Fire Center is the nation's support center for
wildland firefighting. Representatives from each of the five wildland
firefighting agencies, as well as from the National Association of State
Foresters, National Weather Service, and Office of Aircraft Services, are
located there and work together to coordinate and support wildland fire
and disaster operations.

           o Acquiring and using firefighting assets. Federal firefighting
           agencies have also taken some steps to improve how they acquire
           and use firefighting personnel, aviation resources, equipment, and
           supplies--assets that constitute a major cost of responding to
           wildland fires--but much remains to be done. Agencies have
           computerized their systems for dispatching and monitoring
           firefighting assets and for gathering and analyzing cost data,
           although project officials could not quantify the savings
           resulting from such efforts. Agencies have not yet improved their
           systems for determining the appropriate type and quantity of
           firefighting assets needed for the fire season or for effectively
           and efficiently procuring them.
           o Selecting firefighting strategies. The agencies have clarified
           certain policies and are improving analytical tools that assist
           agency officials in identifying and implementing an appropriate
           response to a given fire, but shortcomings remain. Officials have
           a wide spectrum of strategies available to them when responding to
           wildland fires, some of which can be significantly more costly
           than others. For individual fires, studies have found that
           officials may not always consider the full range of available
           strategies and may not select the most appropriate one, which
           would consider the cost of suppression; value of structures and
           other resources threatened by the fire; and, where appropriate,
           any potential benefits to natural resources. The agencies use the
           term "appropriate management response" for a strategy that
           considers these factors. The agencies updated their policies in
           2004 to require officials to consider the full spectrum of
           available strategies when selecting a firefighting strategy, but
           studies have identified several policies that limit the agencies'
           use of less aggressive strategies, which typically cost less. The
           agencies are also continuing to refine existing tools, and to
           develop new ones, for analyzing both fuel and predicted weather
           conditions to model expected fire behavior, information that
           officials can use to identify appropriate suppression strategies.
           These tools are still being designed and tested, however, and it
           is not yet clear to what extent these tools will affect officials'
           selection of firefighting strategies.
           o Sharing wildland fire costs. We and others have also reported
           that the existing framework for sharing firefighting costs between
           federal and nonfederal entities insulates state and local
           governments from the cost of protecting homes and communities in
           or near wildlands, which may reduce those governments' incentive
           to adopt building codes and land use requirements that could help
           reduce the cost of suppressing wildland fires. Federal agencies,
           working with some nonfederal entities, have recently taken steps
           to clarify guidance and better ensure that firefighting costs are
           shared consistently for fires that threaten both federal and
           nonfederal lands and resources. It is unclear, however, how the
           agencies will ensure that this guidance is followed in the field.

           The agencies have also taken steps to address previously
           identified weaknesses in their management of cost-containment
           efforts, but they have neither clearly defined their
           cost-containment goals and objectives nor developed a strategy for
           achieving them--steps that are fundamental to sound program
           management. To manage their cost-containment efforts effectively,
           the Forest Service and Interior agencies should, at minimum, have
           (1) clearly defined goals and measurable objectives, (2) a
           strategy to achieve the goals and objectives, (3) performance
           measures to track progress, and (4) a framework for holding the
           appropriate agency officials accountable for achieving the
           goals.^4 First, although the agencies have established a broad
           goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost considering
           firefighter and public safety and the resources and structures to
           be protected, they have established neither clear criteria by
           which to weigh the relative importance of these often-competing
           priorities, nor measurable objectives by which to determine if
           they are meeting their goals. Without such criteria and
           objectives, according to agency officials we interviewed and
           reports we reviewed, officials in the field lack a clear
           understanding of the relative importance that the agencies'
           leadership places on containing costs and, therefore, are likely
           to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of the
           costs of suppression. Second, the agencies have not developed a
           vision of how the various cost-containment steps they are taking
           relate to one another or determined the extent to which these
           steps will be effective. Third, the agencies are working to
           develop a better performance measure for containing costs, but the
           measure may take a number of years to fully refine, and, moreover,
           the agencies have yet to identify the cost-containment goals they
           are trying to achieve. Finally, the agencies have also taken, or
           are beginning to take, steps to improve their oversight and
           accountability framework--such as requiring officials to evaluate
           firefighting teams according to how well they contained
           costs--although the extent to which these steps will assist the
           agencies in containing costs is unknown.
			  
^4Principles of sound program management for federal agencies are
established in, among other sources, the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 and GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, [33]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).

           Without clear goals and a strategy for containing wildland fire
           costs, the agencies are unable to effectively and efficiently
           manage their myriad ongoing efforts to contain wildland fire
           costs. To help them do so, and to assist Congress in its oversight
           role, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Agriculture and
           the Interior work together to direct their respective agencies to
           (1) establish clearly defined goals and measurable objectives for
           containing wildland fire costs, (2) develop a strategy to achieve
           these goals and objectives, (3) establish performance measures
           that are aligned with these goals and objectives, and (4)
           establish a framework to ensure that officials are held
           accountable for achieving the goals and objectives. Because of the
           importance of these actions and continuing concerns about the
           agencies' response to the increasing cost of wildland fires--and
           so that the agencies can use the results of these actions to
           prepare for the 2008 fire season--the agencies should provide
           Congress with this information no later than November 2007.

           In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service and
           Interior generally disagreed with the characterization of many of
           our findings; they neither agreed nor disagreed with our
           recommendations. In particular, the Forest Service and Interior
           stated that they did not believe we had accurately portrayed some
           of the significant actions they had taken to contain wildland fire
           costs, and they identified several agency documents that they
           believe provide clearly defined goals and objectives that make up
           their strategy to contain costs. We added further clarifying
           language, where appropriate, to more accurately characterize some
           of the agencies' actions. Although documents cited by the agencies
           provide overarching goals and objectives, we believe that they
           lack the clarity and specificity needed by their land management
           and firefighting officials in the field to help manage and contain
           wildland fire costs. We believe that our recommendations, if
           effectively implemented, would help the agencies better manage
           their cost-containment efforts and improve their ability to
           contain wildland fire costs. The Forest Service and Interior's
           joint comments, and our evaluation of them, are included in
           appendix III.
			  
			  Background

           Wildland fires triggered by lightning are both natural and
           inevitable and play an important ecological role in the nation's
           landscapes. These fires shape the composition of forests and
           grasslands, periodically reduce vegetation densities, and
           stimulate seedling regeneration and growth in some species. Over
           the past century, however, various land use and management
           practices--including fire suppression, grazing, and timber
           harvest--have reduced the normal frequency of fires in many forest
           and rangeland ecosystems and contributed to abnormally dense,
           continuous accumulations of vegetation. Such accumulations not
           only can fuel uncharacteristically large or severe wildland fires,
           but also can threaten human lives, health, property, and
           infrastructure as more homes and communities are built in or near
           areas at risk from wildland fires. Over the past decade, the
           number of acres burned annually by wildland fires in the United
           States has substantially increased.

           Federal appropriations to the Forest Service and Interior agencies
           to prepare for and respond to wildland fires, including
           appropriations for fuel treatments have almost tripled, from an
           average of $1.1 billion from fiscal years 1996 through 2000 to
           more than $2.9 billion from fiscal years 2001 through 2005 (see
           table 1). Adjusting for inflation, the average annual
           appropriations for these periods increased from $1.3 billion to
           $3.1 billion. The Forest Service received about 70 percent and
           Interior about 30 percent of the funds appropriated.

Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations and
Distribution, by Wildland Fire Activity, Fiscal Years 1996 through 2005

Dollars                                                                      
in                                                                           
millions                                                                     
                                            Distribution of appropriations, by
                 Total appropriations      wildland fire activity (percentage)
Fiscal                                                                       
year      Nominal Inflation-adjusted^a  Preparedness^b Suppression^c Other^d 
1996       $772.3               $924.8           55.2%         44.8%     N/A 
1997      1,081.9              1,273.3            42.8          57.2     N/A 
1998      1,119.3              1,301.6            42.5          57.5     N/A 
1999      1,159.2              1,330.6            45.9          54.1     N/A 
2000      1,588.9              1,787.6            36.8          63.2     N/A 
2001      2,863.6              3,147.4            32.4          67.6     N/A 
2002      2,269.1              2,447.2            39.8          31.0   29.2% 
2003      3,195.6              3,378.1            27.8          53.9    18.4 
2004      3,293.8              3,394.1            28.1          52.7    19.2 
2005      2,998.6              2,998.6            31.2          46.4    22.4 

Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Research Service data.

Note: N/A, not applicable.

aWe adjusted the appropriations dollars for inflation, using the
chain-weighted gross domestic product price index with fiscal year 2005 as
the base year.

bIncludes appropriations for hiring, training, and paying fire
organization personnel; for acquiring needed equipment; and for prevention
activities, including public education efforts.

cIncludes emergency supplemental and contingent appropriations that
Congress provided to fund suppression activities in years when agencies'
suppression expenditures exceeded the funds initially appropriated.

dIncludes appropriations for fuel reduction activities for fiscal years
2002 through 2005; fuel reduction activities were limited before fiscal
year 2002 and are included in the suppression column.

Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost of
preparing for and responding to them, have led federal agencies to
fundamentally reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. For
decades, federal agencies aggressively suppressed wildland fires and were
generally successful in decreasing the number of acres burned. In some
parts of the country, however, rather than eliminating severe wildland
fires, decades of suppression contributed to the disruption of ecological
cycles and began to change the structure and composition of forests and
rangelands, thereby making lands more susceptible to fire. Increasingly,
the agencies have recognized the role that fire plays in many ecosystems
and the role that it could play in the agencies' management of forests and
watersheds. The agencies worked together to develop a federal wildland
fire management policy in 1995, which for the first time formally
recognized the essential role of fire in sustaining natural systems. This
policy was subsequently reaffirmed and updated in 2001. The agencies, in
conjunction with Congress, also began developing the National Fire Plan in
2000.^5 To align their policies and to ensure a consistent and coordinated
effort to implement the federal wildland fire policy and National Fire
Plan, Agriculture and Interior also established the Wildland Fire
Leadership Council in 2002.^6 In addition to noting the negative effects
of past successes in suppressing wildland fires, the policy and plan also
recognized that continued development in the wildland-urban interface has
placed more structures at risk from wildland fire at the same time that it
has increased the complexity and cost of wildland fire suppression. Forest
Service and university researchers estimated in 2005 that about 44 million
homes in the lower 48 states are located in the wildland-urban interface.

^5The National Fire Plan is a joint interagency effort to respond to
wildland fires. Its core comprises several strategic documents, including
(1) a September 2000 report from the Secretaries of Agriculture and the
Interior to the President in response to the wildland fires of 2000, (2)
congressional direction accompanying substantial new appropriations in
fiscal year 2001, and (3) several approved and draft strategies to
implement all or parts of the plan.

^6The Wildland Fire Leadership Council is composed of senior Agriculture
and Interior officials, including the Agriculture Undersecretary for
Natural Resources and Environment; the Interior Assistant Secretary for
Policy, Management, and Budget; the Interior Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Business Management and Wildland Fire; and the heads of the five
federal firefighting agencies. Other members include representatives of
the Intertribal Timber Council, the National Association of State
Foresters, and the Western Governors' Association.

To help address these trends, current federal policy directs agencies to
consider land management objectives--identified in land and fire
management plans developed by each local unit, such as a national forest
or a Bureau of Land Management district--and the structures and resources
at risk when determining whether or how to suppress a wildland fire. When
a fire starts, the land manager at the affected local unit is responsible
for determining the strategy that will be used to respond to the fire. A
wide spectrum of strategies is available to choose from, some of which can
be significantly more costly than others. For example, the agencies may
fight fires ignited close to communities or other high-value areas more
aggressively than fires on remote lands or at sites where fire may provide
ecological or fuel-reduction benefits. In some cases, the agencies may
simply monitor a fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure
that the fire continues to pose little threat to important resources, a
practice known as "wildland fire use."

An incident commander is responsible for implementing the suppression
strategy selected by the land manager, including determining the tactics
to use and ordering the firefighting assets needed to carry out the
strategy. For large and complex fires, an incident management team
comprising not only an incident commander but also a cadre of personnel to
handle command, planning, logistics, operations, and finance functions
manages suppression operations. The incident management team orders
firefighting assets--including personnel, aircraft, equipment, and
supplies--through a three-tiered system of local, regional, and national
dispatch centers.

Because one firefighting agency alone cannot handle all wildland fires
that may burn in its jurisdiction and because a single fire may burn
across federal, state, and local jurisdictions, the five federal land
management agencies work together with tribal, state, and local
firefighting entities to respond to a fire. These entities develop
agreements, often called master agreements, that guide cooperative fire
protection efforts and include provisions for sharing the costs of these
efforts. When a fire is first detected, firefighting entities normally
follow a principle of "closest available resource," whereby, regardless of
jurisdiction, the closest available firefighting personnel and equipment
respond to the fire. As the fire continues to burn, these entities use an
interagency incident management system with an organizational structure
that expands to meet a fire's complexity and demands; this system enables
entities to share firefighting assets and facilitates an effective
response.

Since the mid-1990s, when annual federal expenditures for wildland fire
suppression approached $1 billion for the first time, numerous studies
have been conducted examining steps that federal agencies could take to
contain wildland fire suppression costs (see app. II). Some of these
studies were produced in response to direction from Congress, some were
initiated by the agencies themselves, and the National Academy of Public
Administration conducted a series of five studies beginning in 2000. In
addition, Agriculture's Inspector General, the National Association of
State Foresters, and GAO have all examined the agencies' efficiency and
effectiveness in wildland firefighting. In 2005, the Forest Service hired
a consultant to review 22 recent reports and to evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of the reports' more than 300 recommendations.

Because previous reports have, year after year, identified many of the
same issues as needing improvement and recommended similar steps to
address those issues, some recent studies have concluded that the agencies
lack the leadership commitment to make the changes needed to contain
wildland fire costs. The National Association of State Foresters, for
example, reported that strong national leadership and a mechanism to hold
officials throughout the agencies accountable for their decisions are
needed to effectively contain wildland fire costs. The report concluded,
however, that the Forest Service and Interior agencies had made little
progress in developing a broad and effective response and appeared to lack
the leadership commitment to make needed changes. An independent panel
convened by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council reached a similar
conclusion. Further, the Agriculture Inspector General reported that
shortcomings identified in Forest Service management, although not
specific to the wildland fire program, have proven resistant to change. In
particular, the Inspector General noted that the Forest Service delegates
broad authority to field units but does not have adequate internal
controls, including appropriate performance measures, to ensure that
agency policies are followed.

To Help Contain Costs, Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Steps to Target
Operational Areas Identified as Needing Improvement, but Results Are Unknown

Dozens of studies by federal agencies and other organizations examining
federal agencies' management of wildland fire have repeatedly identified a
number of similar issues related to wildland fire operations as needing
improvement to help contain wildland fire costs. These issues generally
fall into one of three operational areas--reducing accumulated fuels,
acquiring and using firefighting assets, and selecting firefighting
strategies. Recent studies have also raised concerns about the framework
used to share the cost of fighting fires between federal and nonfederal
entities. Federal agencies have a number of efforts under way to address
needs for improvement, but in part because many of the efforts are
incomplete, the results of these efforts are unknown.

System to Help Identify and Set Priorities for Lands Needing Fuel Treatment Is
under Development but Not Yet Completed

Numerous studies have reported that reducing accumulated vegetation and
other fuels, although not directly part of wildland firefighting, is a key
area needing attention if the agencies are to effectively contain wildland
fire preparedness and suppression costs. These fuels can contribute to
larger and more-severe wildland fires and, consequently, to increasing
preparedness and suppression costs. The studies also identified several
factors that hindered the agencies' ability to effectively reduce fuels.
For example, we issued a number of reports, beginning in 1999, that found
that the agencies lacked (1) basic data needed to identify and prioritize
lands needing fuel reduction treatment; (2) a sound framework to ensure
that funds appropriated to reduce fuels were spent in an effective,
efficient, and timely manner; and (3) a cohesive strategy for addressing
accumulated fuels and wildland fire problems.^7 Other organizations,
including the Agriculture Inspector General and the National Association
of State Foresters, reported similar findings. A 2001 update of the
federal wildland fire management policy also reported that no centralized
database was available to agency officials and scientists for compiling
consistent information and using that information for long-term
monitoring, research, or planning.

^7GAO, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats, [34]GAO/RCED-99-65 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
2, 1999); Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to
Reduce Risks to Communities and Resources, [35]GAO-02-259 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002); Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions
Required to Better Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction,
[36]GAO-03-805 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2003); Wildland Fire
Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to
Completing a Cohesive Strategy, [37]GAO-05-147 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14,
2005); and Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to
Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats,
[38]GAO-06-671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006).

To help address these shortcomings, the agencies are developing a
geospatial data and modeling system, called LANDFIRE, but the agencies
have yet to decide how they will keep data in the system current.
LANDFIRE--about a $39 million undertaking shared by the Forest Service and
Interior--is intended to produce consistent and comprehensive maps and
data describing vegetation, wildland fuels, and fire regimes across the
United States.^8 The agencies will be able to use this information to help
identify fuel accumulations and fire hazards across the nation, help set
nationwide priorities for fuel reduction projects, and assist in
identifying the appropriate response when wildland fires do occur.
According to Forest Service and Interior officials, the agencies completed
mapping the western United States in April 2007; mapping of the eastern
states is scheduled to be completed by 2008 and of Alaska and Hawaii by
2009. The agencies are developing, but have not yet finalized, a plan for
routinely updating data to reflect changes to fuels, including from
landscape-altering events, such as hurricanes, disease, or wildland fires
themselves. Such a step is critical for keeping the system both current
and relevant over the long term and for ensuring that the funds invested
in LANDFIRE will be of more than short-term value. Forest Service and
Interior officials told us that they recognize the importance of ensuring
that data are periodically updated, and they are developing a plan to
operate and maintain the system, including determining how often data will
be updated. The officials expect to submit this plan in June 2007 to the
Wildland Fire Leadership Council for approval.

The agencies have yet to develop a cohesive strategy, including long-term
options and associated funding, to address accumulated fuels and wildland
fire problems, although they agreed with our recommendation that they do
so. In February 2006, the agencies completed a document titled Protecting
People and Natural Resources: A Cohesive Fuels Treatment Strategy. Our
review of this document, however, showed that it did not include long-term
options and associated funding, which are key elements of an effective
cohesive strategy. Officials from the Office of Management and Budget told
us they would not allow the firefighting agencies to publish long-term
funding estimates until the agencies had sufficiently reliable data on
which to base those estimates. As a result, we recommended that the
agencies develop a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps,
together with related time frames, that they would take to complete a
cohesive strategy. Such a strategy and tactical plan would help Congress
and the agencies in making informed decisions about effective and
affordable long-term approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire
problems, but as of April 2007, the agencies had developed neither a
cohesive strategy nor a tactical plan. Because containing costs is one of
several goals of the wildland fire program, developing a cohesive strategy
that addresses all aspects of the agencies' preparation for and response
to wildland fires is fundamental if the agencies are to contain costs.

^8A fire regime generally classifies the role that wildland fire plays in
a particular ecosystem on the basis of certain characteristics, such as
the average number of years between fires and the typical severity of fire
under historic conditions.

Agencies Have Addressed Few of the Problems Identified in Their Acquisition and
Use of Firefighting Assets

Federal firefighting agencies have taken some steps to improve how they
acquire and use firefighting personnel, aviation resources, equipment, and
supplies--an area that studies have identified as needing improvement to
better contain costs, especially because firefighting assets constitute a
major cost of responding to wildland fires--but much remains to be done.
Issues identified as needing improvement included that (1) federal
agencies lacked a shared or integrated system for effectively determining
the appropriate type and quantity of firefighting assets needed for a fire
season; (2) the agencies' processes and systems for acquiring firefighting
assets lacked controls to ensure that the agencies were procuring assets
cost-effectively; and (3) the agencies sometimes used firefighting assets
ineffectively or inefficiently, often in response to political or social
pressures.

  Determining the Appropriate Type and Quantity of Wildland Firefighting Assets
  for a Fire Season

Studies have reported that the agencies do not use a shared or integrated
system for determining the appropriate type and quantity of firefighting
assets--personnel, aviation resources, equipment, and supplies--that they
need during a fire season to respond effectively and efficiently to
wildland fires. This problem is part of a larger issue: the agencies have
no standardized budgeting and resource allocation process. In 2001, a team
of Forest Service, Interior, and state officials evaluated the processes
used by the Forest Service and Interior agencies to determine wildland
fire budget needs and to allocate resources among fire management
activities. The team found a number of problems.^9 First, agencies'
budgeting and resource allocation systems differed from one to the other,
and as a result, it was difficult to evaluate and compare information
across agencies. Yet given the cooperative firefighting system used in the
United States, a common federal budgeting and allocation system would help
ensure that each agency's resources and firefighting assets are considered
when determining type, quantity, and location of firefighting assets
needed for a fire season. Second, the systems to budget and allocate
resources for different fire management activities within an agency, such
as fuel reduction and wildland fire response, were not integrated, even
though these programs can complement one another in achieving overall land
management goals and objectives. For example, funds spent to reduce
accumulated fuels may help reduce the number of severe wildland fires and,
accordingly, wildland firefighting costs. Third, the team found that some
of the systems used by individual agencies did not provide managers with
the tools to determine the most cost-effective type and quantity of
firefighting assets or where they should be located to most effectively
respond to wildland fires. Determining the appropriate types, quantity,
and location of firefighting assets is key to carrying out a rapid,
effective, and efficient response. The review team recommended that
Agriculture and Interior develop and implement a common interagency
process that would identify resource needs for the full scope of fire
management activities and develop the most cost-effective allocation of
fire program resources across and within these activities. In 2002, the
National Academy of Public Administration similarly reported that the
agencies needed a national budgeting methodology to analyze the cost,
benefit, number, composition, location, mobility, productivity, and
seasonality of each type of firefighting asset.^10

9U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and U.S. Department of
the Interior, Developing an Interagency, Landscape-Scale Fire Planning
Analysis and Budget Tool (Washington, D.C.: November 2001).

Although the agencies are working on two efforts that could potentially
improve their ability to determine the appropriate type and quantity of
firefighting assets needed for a fire season, it is unclear whether these
efforts will actually do so. The first effort is development of a Fire
Program Analysis (FPA) system, which was proposed and funded to help the
agencies

           o determine national budget needs by analyzing budget alternatives
           at the local level--using a common, interagency process for fire
           management planning and budgeting--and aggregating the results;
			  
^10National Academy of Public Administration, Wildfire Suppression:
Strategies for Containing Costs (Washington, D.C.: September 2002).	
		  
           o determine the relative costs and benefits for the full scope of
           fire management activities, including potential trade-offs among
           investments in fuel reduction, fire preparedness, and fire
           suppression activities; and
           o identify, for a given budget level, the most cost-effective mix
           of personnel and equipment to carry out these activities.

           Recent design modifications to the system, however, raise
           questions about the agencies' ability to fully achieve these key
           goals. A midcourse review of the developing system resulted in the
           Wildland Fire Leadership Council's approving in December 2006
           modifications to the system's design. FPA and senior Forest
           Service and Interior officials told us they believed the
           modifications will allow the agencies to meet the key goals. The
           officials said they expected to have a prototype developed for the
           council's review in June 2007 and to substantially complete the
           system by June 2008. We have yet to systematically review the
           modifications, but after reviewing agency reports on the
           modifications and interviewing knowledgeable officials, we have
           concerns that the modifications may not allow the agencies to meet
           FPA's key goals. For example, under the redesigned system, local
           land managers will use a different method to analyze and select
           various budget alternatives, and it is unclear whether this method
           will identify the most cost-effective allocation of resources. In
           addition, it is unclear how the budget alternatives for local
           units will be meaningfully aggregated on a nationwide basis, a key
           FPA goal.

           The agencies are also working together to develop national
           strategies for the organization, procurement, and management of
           aviation resources and firefighting crews. Although national
           Forest Service and Interior officials originally indicated that
           these strategies would be completed by the end of 2006, as of
           March 2007, the strategies were unfinished. Agency officials said
           that it could be another year before the strategies are completed.
			  
			    Acquiring Firefighting Assets Cost-Effectively

           Studies also reported that federal firefighting agencies lacked
           effective systems for acquiring needed firefighting assets
           cost-effectively, that is, ensuring that vendors provided
           equipment of sufficient quality at competitive prices. Once the
           agencies have determined the type and quantity of firefighting
           assets needed, they must decide where and how to acquire these
           assets. They have a variety of procurement options to choose from:

           o National contracts are used for assets that can be deployed
           anywhere in the nation, including some firefighting crews;
           aviation resources, such as large helicopters and air tankers; and
           camp resources, such as catering and shower facilities.
           o Regional contracts are similar to national contracts, but they
           are executed at the regional or state level.
           o Emergency equipment rental agreements are often developed before
           the fire season, but they are executed only when needed; they are
           used for assets such as firefighting crews, engines, bulldozers,
           water tenders, and other equipment.
           o Fire caches store firefighting equipment and other items that
           can be delivered to a fire; 11 national caches are strategically
           located around the country.
           o Buying teams support an incident management team at a fire by
           procuring services and supplies and renting land and equipment
           locally.

           Several studies reported, however, that despite the agencies'
           growing reliance on contracted personnel and equipment to carry
           out firefighting activities, the agencies' acquisition systems had
           several shortcomings. The National Academy of Public
           Administration reported that the agencies' acquisition process was
           unable to help federal firefighting agencies determine the best
           source for needed firefighting assets--for example, in-house or
           contracted. The academy, the Forest Service, and other
           organizations also reported problems with the Forest Service's
           process for developing contracts and rental agreements for
           emergency equipment, observing, for example, that requirements
           varied from contract to contract and did not ensure that the
           agencies obtained the most cost-effective assets. Further,
           inadequate administration and oversight of the agreements by the
           agencies resulted in poor contractor performance and high rental
           rates. A 2003 interagency report recommended that the Forest
           Service and Interior agencies establish national standards for
           agreements and strengthen national control and oversight to better
           ensure standard operating procedures and policies. Nevertheless,
           when the Agriculture Inspector General evaluated the same issue in
           2005, it found that the problems remained.^11 The Inspector
           General reported that the Forest Service's administration of the
           agreements provided the agency with neither the best value nor the
           best vendor for its dollar. Further, although the Forest Service
           identified potential vendors and equipment before a fire season,
           the agency did not use a competitive bidding process to improve
           either the price or equipment quality.
			  
^11U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report: Forest Service Emergency Equipment Rental Agreement, Report No.
08601-40-SF (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).

           Despite planned improvements in the acquisition process, the
           agencies have made limited progress in implementing needed
           changes. The effort to improve acquisition practices--led by the
           Forest Service--is initially focused on developing a nationwide
           Web-based system for managing the rental agreements for emergency
           equipment. Such a system would make it easier to locate reliable,
           cost-effective firefighting assets. The agencies could use the
           system to help choose suppliers at the time of a fire--using
           information provided by contractors on equipment specifications,
           price, and other information--and to evaluate and record
           contractor performance afterward. A Forest Service official said
           that when fully implemented, the system will let the agencies
           better evaluate "best value," rather than just lowest price for
           firefighting assets, although the official said that it may be
           difficult to measure the system's effect on containing costs. This
           effort faces some challenges, however. First, while testing a
           prototype, the Forest Service found problems that are likely to
           delay completion of the system by more than a year, until fiscal
           year 2009. Moreover, although using this system will be mandatory
           for the Forest Service, it will not be required for either
           Interior or state agencies, according to Forest Service officials,
           and Interior agencies have expressed concerns about the security
           of a Web-based system. The Forest Service and Bureau of Land
           Management have also begun an effort to evaluate the national
           cache system to ensure that the appropriate types and quantities
           of items are maintained in the caches. A strategic plan has been
           developed but, according to the Forest Service national manager in
           charge of the effort, no changes to the cache system have been
           made. Finally, a senior Forest Service acquisition official said
           that the agencies also planned to improve national and regional
           contracts, but they have not begun these efforts.
			  
			    Using Firefighting Assets Effectively and Efficiently

           The agencies have taken steps to develop and implement systems to
           help improve the effective and efficient use of firefighting
           assets--another area that studies have identified as needing
           improvement. Studies have reported that agencies sometimes used
           more, or more-costly, firefighting assets than necessary, often in
           response to political or social pressures. For example,
           firefighting assets may sit idle at a fire rather than be released
           for use elsewhere because managers are concerned that they will be
           unable to recall an asset if they need it later, or air tankers
           may drop flame retardants when on-the-ground conditions may not
           warrant such drops. Agency and other studies reported that to more
           effectively use their firefighting assets, the agencies needed to
           improve their systems for (1) requesting, deploying, tracking, and
           releasing firefighting assets for a fire and (2) recording and
           analyzing data about the cost and use of these assets at the time
           of the fire. The studies also recommended that agencies should
           make greater use of local incident commanders to reduce the need
           to mobilize more-costly incident management teams.

           The agencies have implemented two systems to help improve the use
           of their firefighting assets. They completed implementation of a
           computer-based dispatching system called the Resource Ordering and
           Status System, or ROSS, in December 2006. For many years, agencies
           used a manual, paper-based system for requesting and assigning
           firefighting assets; ROSS was designed to allow the agencies to
           more effectively and efficiently monitor firefighting assets
           during a fire or other incident.^12 A project official told us
           that he could not quantify the actual cost savings resulting from
           ROSS, but he provided us with a cost-benefit analysis for the
           project. This analysis indicated potential cost savings from
           increasing the use of local firefighting assets, which could
           hasten response and thus perhaps reduce fire size, and from
           reducing the personnel needed to dispatch resources. In addition,
           the agencies can also use ROSS to identify individuals qualified
           and available to serve in various firefighting positions, which
           may help increase the agencies' use of local incident commanders
           and reduce the need to mobilize more-costly incident management
           teams.

           The agencies have also implemented a system, known as I-Suite, to
           improve the accuracy and completeness of cost and other data
           needed to effectively monitor and manage firefighting assets. The
           National Wildfire Coordinating Group^13 chartered a task group in
           April 2001 to evaluate and recommend a data management application
           to address what was identified as a perennial problem for incident
           management teams: lack of data management tools to use at a fire.
           I-Suite, completed by the Forest Service in October 2006, is a set
           of computer applications designed to automate and improve business
           practices at a fire through a common system to track and analyze
           information about firefighting assets, such as personnel hours
           worked, contractor costs, and fire costs. According to a Forest
           Service official, I-Suite has helped contain costs by reducing the
           number of timekeepers needed to process records for personnel and
           equipment and has improved the accuracy of payment documents,
           although officials could not quantify the cost savings. Only the
           Forest Service, however, requires that I-Suite be used on all
           fires; Interior has recommended but not mandated its use, and
           I-Suite is optional for state-managed fires.
			  
^12This effort came not in response to reports issued since 2000 but
rather from investigations and interagency management reviews of disasters
in 1994 involving the loss of life and property. Findings from the
investigations and reviews at that time cited shortcomings in the dispatch
systems for fire and other incidents, insufficient documentation on the
status of firefighting personnel and equipment, and the inability to
mobilize appropriate resources in a timely manner. The Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Interior, in a December 1995 policy memorandum,
directed the agencies to correct the deficiencies in the dispatch process.

^13The purpose of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group is to
coordinate programs of the participating federal and state wildfire
management agencies.

           In addition to implementing these systems, the agencies have taken
           other steps to improve the agencies' use of aviation resources,
           which can account for about one-third of all firefighting costs on
           a large fire. In 2004, the agencies assigned a helicopter
           coordinator to the national dispatch center in Boise, Idaho, to
           monitor helicopter use and help identify situations where less
           expensive helicopters could be deployed. An estimated $1.8 million
           in savings were identified in 2005 as a direct result of the
           helicopter coordinator's efforts. In 2006, the agencies began
           testing a computer program to assist the helicopter coordinator in
           identifying the best-value helicopter, given a particular fire's
           elevation and the temperature. Also beginning in 2006, the
           national dispatch center assumed control of national aviation
           resources, including helicopters and air tankers, rather than
           leaving them under the control of regions or incident management
           teams. National control of these assets will allow the agencies to
           evaluate where best to deploy them from a national perspective,
           rather than from a regional or local perspective. National
           aviation officials said that this step is important because little
           incentive exists at the local level to contain costs. Interagency
           guidance states that the assignment of national assets will be
           reviewed daily, and national dispatch center officials will make
           the final decision.

           Agencies May Miss Opportunities to Increase Their Use of Lower-Cost
			  Firefighting Strategies

           The Forest Service and Interior agencies have taken steps, and are
           considering taking additional steps, to improve their policies on
           how firefighting strategies are chosen and the analytical tools
           managers in the field use to compare alternative strategies,
           issues that previous studies have identified as needing
           improvement to help contain costs. Although the agencies have made
           some progress, considerable work remains if they are to seize
           additional opportunities to increase their use of less aggressive
           strategies, which typically cost less.

           Land managers and incident management teams have a wide spectrum
           of strategies available to them when responding to wildland fires,
           some of which can be significantly more costly than others. These
           strategies range from having a few personnel monitor a fire while
           allowing it to burn to achieve ecological benefits, a practice
           known as wildland fire use, to mobilizing all available personnel
           and equipment to try to control the entire perimeter of the fire
           or otherwise suppress it as quickly as possible. In selecting a
           strategy for a particular fire, land managers are required to
           consider the cost of suppression; value of structures and other
           resources threatened by the fire; and, where appropriate,
           potential ecological benefits. The agencies use the term
           "appropriate management response" for a strategy that considers
           these factors.

           Previous studies have raised concerns that federal policies and
           shortcomings in the agencies' analytical tools are limiting the
           ability of land managers and incident management teams to use the
           full spectrum of available strategies, including less costly ones.
           Interagency policy, for example, directs land managers to select
           firefighting strategies in accordance with local federal units'
           land and fire management plans. If a plan has not been developed
           and approved, the policy directs land managers to suppress the
           fire. A 2006 Agriculture Inspector General report also found that
           for the Forest Service, several existing policies unduly restrict
           land and fire managers from using lower-cost firefighting
           strategies. In particular, Forest Service policy prohibits (1)
           managing a fire for both suppression and wildland fire use
           concurrently, (2) deciding to let a fire burn after initially
           deciding to suppress it, and (3) considering potential ecological
           or fuel-reduction benefits of letting a fire burn certain areas if
           the decision has already been made to suppress it. Interior
           agencies face similar constraints. Previous studies also reported
           that key elements of the analytical tools agency managers use to
           compare alternative firefighting strategies are based on
           subjective or incomplete information; these tools may therefore
           not provide accurate information that would enable managers to
           select the appropriate firefighting strategy, that is, one that
           neither unnecessarily increases suppression costs nor
           unnecessarily places resources at risk.
			  
			    Steps to Improve Policies Regarding Firefighting Strategies

           The agencies have taken steps to clarify their policies on, and to
           emphasize the importance of, selecting appropriate firefighting
           strategies. For example, in 2004, the agencies updated their
           Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations to
           require that land managers consider the full range of strategies
           available in developing their response to a wildland fire. They
           also have emphasized the importance of considering appropriate
           firefighting strategies in the action plans they develop annually
           to provide guidance for the pending fire season. In addition,
           agency officials told us that since 2000 they have substantially
           increased wildland fire use, a strategy at one end of the response
           spectrum. For example, Forest Service officials estimated that the
           agency managed approximately 250,000 acres for wildland fire use
           in fiscal year 2005--compared with less than 70,000 acres annually
           in fiscal years 2000 through 2002--but we were unable to verify
           the reliability of these data. According to one Forest Service
           official, this trend represented an improvement, but opportunities
           remained to further increase wildland fire use.

           Considerable work remains if the agencies are to fulfill the
           potential of using less costly strategies. First, the Forest
           Service and Interior agencies are working together to revise their
           policies--revisions that could allow different areas of the same
           fire to be managed for suppression and wildland fire use
           concurrently and could allow a fire that was previously being
           suppressed to be managed instead for wildland fire use. It is
           still too early, however, to determine how the policies may change
           or the extent to which any changes will help contain costs.
           Second, Agriculture's Inspector General recently reported that the
           agencies lack qualified staff to manage wildland fire use
           fires.^14 A wildland fire use official for the Forest Service
           estimated that for trained staff to be located in the field where
           decisions are made about whether to suppress a fire or manage it
           for wildland fire use, the agency needed about 300 wildland fire
           use managers. As of fall 2006, the Forest Service had fewer than
           100 qualified managers, although about another 100 were being
           trained. Senior Forest Service officials said that once these
           managers were trained, they believed that the agency would have
           sufficient staff trained in wildland fire use. An Interior
           official said that Interior also needed more personnel qualified
           in wildland fire use, but this official did not have any estimate
           of additional staff needed. Third, we recently reported that
           although 95 percent of the agencies' land management units had
           completed fire management plans that could allow them to select
           lower-cost firefighting strategies, the agencies did not require
           that these plans be updated to reflect new data, such as data from
           LANDFIRE.^15 If the plans do not contain accurate information on
           current fuel conditions, land managers and incident management
           teams may be more likely to select more-aggressive firefighting
           strategies. Fourth, although agency policy directs land managers
           to consider the full range of available strategies, our
           discussions with agency officials and review of a recent
           Agriculture Inspector General report show that the agencies lack a
           method for ensuring that land managers follow this direction.
			  
^14U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs, Report No.
08601-44-SF (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2006).

^15 [55]GAO-07-427T .

             Steps to Improve Tools That Managers Use to Select Firefighting Strategies

           Federal firefighting agencies, led by the Forest Service, are also
           taking steps to improve decision-support tools that help land
           managers select appropriate firefighting strategies, but
           shortcomings with these tools remain. If firefighters are unable
           to contain a fire during initial attack, land managers are
           directed to analyze alternative strategies for suppressing it. The
           agencies have taken steps in recent years to improve the current
           tool for conducting such an analysis, which is known as wildland
           fire situation analysis. Forest Service researchers, for example,
           have made wildland fire situation analysis a Web-based system, and
           they have created different versions of the tool, which provide
           additional elements for land managers to use for larger or
           more-severe fires. The Web-based version, first released in 2005,
           has several advantages, according to a Forest Service researcher.
           First, the Web-based version is updated centrally, thus ensuring
           that land managers in the field are using the most up-to-date
           version. Second, it provides an easier means for managers near a
           fire to share information with experts elsewhere about a fire's
           expected behavior and the likely values at risk, and can provide a
           way for senior officials to review the basis for strategic
           decisions while there is still time to change them. Third, the
           Web-based version also includes some geospatial mapping
           capabilities, which helps land managers and incident management
           teams quickly identify key geographic features, roads, structures,
           and other resources that may be threatened by the fire.

           Many critical inputs to wildland fire situation analysis are
           estimates, whose accuracy depends to a great extent on the
           knowledge and experience of land managers in the field, and this
           knowledge and experience can vary. The firefighting strategy
           ultimately used--which greatly influences a fire's final cost--is
           chosen largely on the basis of these estimates. First, the range
           of firefighting strategies considered in the analysis depends on
           the knowledge and experience of the land managers in the field who
           identify possible alternatives. Second, estimating the probability
           of success for each alternative is critical to making an informed
           decision in selecting a firefighting strategy; yet this estimate
           is based on the manager's subjective assessment of fuel
           conditions, topography, weather predictions, and the availability
           of firefighting resources. Third, the expected suppression cost
           for each alternative is also an estimate, often based on the cost
           per acre of suppressing previous fires in the area--which may or
           may not be an accurate predictor of future costs--and on the final
           size of the fire, which is also an estimate. Finally, land
           managers identify structures and other resources that may be
           threatened by the fire, but, agency officials told us, there is no
           consistent method for estimating the value of the identified
           structures and resources. Senior Forest Service and Interior
           officials told us that professional judgment is an inherent
           element of managing wildland fires, and local managers' estimates
           and predictions are important in selecting appropriate
           firefighting strategies, but that they also recognized the
           importance of establishing robust processes and tools to assist
           managers in making informed decisions.

           Forest Service researchers are developing a new tool, called the
           wildland fire decision support system, which may alleviate some of
           these shortcomings. The exact capabilities of the new tool are
           still being determined, but it is expected to greatly increase the
           analytical power available to land managers. For example, the new
           tool will likely allow managers in the field to predict the
           probability that a wildland fire will reach certain
           areas--considering the fire's current location, adjacent fuel
           conditions, and forecast weather conditions--and to identify
           nearby structures and other highly valued resources. The results
           of this analysis can be combined to provide land managers and
           incident management teams with a map illustrating the probability
           that a particular wildland fire, barring any suppression actions,
           will burn a certain area within a specified time and which
           structures or other resources may therefore be threatened. In
           addition, the tool is expected to improve the precision of the
           cost estimates for different suppression strategies. Having such
           information would better help land managers and incident
           management teams understand the resources threatened by a wildland
           fire, the costs associated with different firefighting strategies,
           and the probability of successfully suppressing the fire, and it
           could result in less intensive, and therefore less costly,
           responses. Although the new tool will not be available to managers
           in the field before 2009, Forest Service researchers have begun to
           use several of its components to provide analysis to land
           managers. The researcher leading this effort said that information
           on predicted fire spread and the locations of structures and other
           highly valued resources at risk has been provided for more than 70
           fires since 2005 and that the information contributed to strategic
           decisions that likely reduced costs, although he was unable to
           estimate the impact. For example, for a 2006 fire in Idaho, he
           said that managers in the field used the information to identify
           where best to position firefighting assets and to determine that
           fewer assets were needed than initially projected, thus reducing
           costs.

           Several challenges have been identified, however, to the full
           development and deployment of the wildland fire decision support
           system. First, the fire spread probability model relies on data
           from LANDFIRE about fuel conditions, and, as we previously
           discussed, the agencies have yet to decide how they will keep data
           on fuel conditions updated over time. If LANDFIRE data do not
           reflect current fuel conditions, land managers and incident
           management teams are unlikely to trust the fire spread probability
           maps, which we believe could result in the selection of
           more-aggressive and more-costly firefighting strategies than
           necessary. Second, according to the lead researcher, successful
           deployment of the system requires (1) training staff in the field
           to use it, (2) acquiring new computer hardware capable of quickly
           running data-intensive calculations, and (3) ensuring adequate
           bandwidth in field locations to allow remote access to complex
           Web-based applications. Third, although the tool would help
           managers estimate the probability that particular locations will
           burn, an element of risk is inherent in decisions about
           firefighting strategies. According to the lead agency researcher,
           whether the wildland fire decision support system results in less
           aggressive and less costly strategy decisions will depend greatly
           on the framework the agencies establish to define acceptable
           levels of risk and to ensure that managers in the field select
           appropriate strategies.
			  
			  Agencies Have Updated Guidance for Sharing Suppression Costs with
			  Nonfederal Entities but Have No Clear Plan for Ensuring That
			  Appropriate Cost-Sharing Methods Are Used

           Finally, we and others have reported that federal and nonfederal
           entities need to work together to better share wildland fire
           suppression costs.^16 For example, we reported that agencies
           lacked clear guidance on how federal and nonfederal entities
           should share the cost of fighting fires that burned or threatened
           both federal and nonfederal lands, an issue of increasing
           importance because of the rising number of homes in the
           wildland-urban interface and the increasing costs of protecting
           these homes from fires. We further reported that the existing
           framework for sharing costs insulates state and local governments
           from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface, which
           may reduce those governments' incentive to adopt building codes
           and land use requirements that could help reduce the cost of
           suppressing wildland fires.
			  
^16GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns
about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities, [56]GAO-06-570
(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006).

           Federal agencies, working with nonfederal entities, have recently
           taken steps to clarify guidance and better ensure that
           firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires that threaten
           both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. In early 2007,
           the Forest Service and Interior agencies approved an updated
           template that land managers can use when developing master
           agreements--which establish the framework for sharing costs
           between federal and nonfederal entities--as well as agreements on
           how to share costs for a specific fire. It may take several years
           to fully incorporate this new guidance into master agreements
           because they are normally updated every 5 years. Although the
           guidance states that managers must document their rationale for
           selecting a particular cost-sharing method, according to
           officials, the agencies have no clear plan for how they will
           provide oversight to ensure that appropriate cost-sharing methods
           are used.
			  
			  Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Management
			  of Wildland Fire Cost-Containment Efforts

           To effectively manage their cost-containment efforts, the Forest
           Service and Interior agencies should, at a minimum, have (1)
           clearly defined goals and measurable objectives, (2) a strategy to
           achieve these goals and objectives, (3) performance measures to
           track their progress, and (4) a framework for holding the
           appropriate agency officials accountable for achieving the
           goals.^17 The agencies, however, have yet to clearly define their
           goals or establish measurable objectives for containing costs or
           to develop a strategy for achieving those goals. In addition,
           while the agencies have adopted a new cost-containment performance
           measure and have taken, or are planning to take, steps to improve
           accountability within the agencies for containing costs, the
           extent to which these steps will help contain costs is unknown.
			  
			  Agencies Lack Clear Cost-Containment Goals and Objectives

           Federal firefighting agencies have yet to establish clear goals
           and measurable objectives for their wildland fire cost-containment
           efforts. Since 2000, the agencies have issued many
           documents--including updates to the federal wildland fire policy,
           agency strategic plans, and annual interagency fire and aviation
           operations plans--that recognize the importance of cost
           containment. These documents may have raised awareness in the
           agencies about containing costs, but none of them clearly states
           the agencies' cost-containment goals and objectives. For example,
           several key documents--including the 2001 Review and Update of the
           1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, the Interagency
           Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, and the Forest
           Service's and Interior's policy manuals--state that wildland fires
           are to be suppressed at minimum cost, considering firefighter and
           public safety and resources to be protected. The agencies,
           however, have established neither clear criteria by which to weigh
           the relative importance of the often-competing elements of this
           broad goal, nor measurable objectives by which to determine if
           they are meeting the goal. Without such criteria and objectives,
           the importance of containing costs, relative to the other
           elements, is not clear. As a result, according to agency officials
           we interviewed and reports we reviewed, managers in the field lack
           a clear understanding of the relative importance that the
           agencies' leadership places on containing costs and are therefore
           likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without due
           consideration of the costs of suppression.
			  
^17Principles of sound program management for federal agencies are
established in, among other sources, the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 and [57]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1.

           Agencies Lack a Clear Strategy to Contain Wildland Fire Costs

           The Forest Service and Interior agencies have also yet to
           establish an overall cost-containment strategy. Without a strategy
           designed to achieve clear cost-containment goals, the agencies (1)
           have no assurance that the variety of steps they are taking to
           help contain wildland fire costs are prioritized so that the most
           important steps are undertaken first and (2) are unable to
           determine to what extent these steps will help contain costs and
           if a different approach may therefore be needed. The agencies have
           issued several documents addressing the increased costs and
           severity of wildland fires, but none of the documents we reviewed
           provided an overall strategy for how the agencies would contain
           costs. For example, the 2005 Quadrennial Fire and Fuel Review
           Report identifies several factors contributing to more-severe
           fires and higher costs but does not indicate the steps the
           agencies would take to respond effectively to those factors. In
           contrast, a March 2003 document, Large Fire Cost Reduction Action
           Plan, lists many steps the agencies planned to take to help
           contain costs but does not indicate to what extent the steps would
           in fact do so. Although senior fire officials in both the Forest
           Service and Interior said the agencies did not have a written
           strategy for containing costs, some of these officials said they
           believed the steps they were taking were useful and reflected a
           sound approach to containing costs.
			  
			  Performance Measures for Containing Costs Have Improved, but
			  Concerns Remain

           Recent reports, as well as Office of Management and Budget
           reviews, have raised concerns that the Forest Service's and
           Interior agencies' performance measures do not allow the agencies
           to measure their progress effectively or report their
           accomplishments in containing wildland fire costs. The Forest
           Service, in its strategic plan for fiscal years 2004 through 2008,
           established as its primary cost-containment performance measure
           the percentage of large fires in which the value of protected
           resources exceeded the cost of suppression. This measure, however,
           evaluates neither the effectiveness nor the efficiency of the
           agencies' suppression activities. For example, the Forest Service
           might carry out suppression activities that cost less than the
           value of the resources protected, but those actions might not
           contribute to containing the fire and might therefore be
           unnecessary. In other cases, the agency might have been able to
           protect the same resources by taking different, less costly
           actions. The Forest Service has recognized the shortcomings of
           this performance measure and has not reported any results for the
           measure in its annual performance and accountability reports for
           fiscal years 2004 through 2006. Unlike the Forest Service,
           Interior has not adopted any performance measures related to
           containing wildland fire costs in its strategic plan. In
           conjunction with the Forest Service and nonfederal partners,
           however, Interior adopted a performance measure in the May 2002
           10-Year Comprehensive Strategy as part of the National Fire Plan
           to track the average suppression cost per acre for wildland fires
           (1) in different size classes and fire regimes, (2) near and away
           from the wildland-urban interface, and (3) in areas with and
           without approved fire management plans. Such information,
           collected and tracked over time, could assist the agencies in
           gauging their progress in containing costs. However, the agencies
           have not reported the results of this measure, in part because of
           difficulties in obtaining accurate data, according to Forest
           Service officials.

           To address these concerns, federal firefighting agencies have
           adopted a new performance measure that may improve their ability
           to evaluate their progress in containing costs.^18 Since 2005, the
           agencies, led by the Forest Service, have been developing a
           measure known as the stratified cost index. This index is based on
           models that estimate suppression costs for a particular fire on
           the basis of the costs of previous fires with similar
           characteristics.^19 The new performance measure identifies the
           percentage of fires whose suppression costs exceeded the cost
           estimated by the stratified cost index. The Forest Service has
           reported that 31 of 117 fires (26 percent) in fiscal year 2005
           cost significantly more than predicted by the stratified cost
           index, and that 24 fires (21 percent) cost significantly less than
           predicted by the index. In part because of the development of the
           index, the Office of Management and Budget recently recognized
           that the Forest Service has improved the wildland fire program's
           performance measures, although it also stated that further
           improvement is needed.

^18The Forest Service used this measure in its July 2006 submission to the
Office of Management and Budget and has indicated that it will also adopt
the measure in its revised strategic plan, which is currently being
developed. The Forest Service and Interior agencies, along with their
nonfederal partners, also adopted this measure in a December 2006 update
to the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, although data for Interior are not
yet available.

           Several concerns have been raised about the stratified cost index.
           First, although the agencies have improved their data on
           suppression costs and fire characteristics in recent years,
           additional improvement is needed. In particular, cost data for
           "fire complexes"--that is, two or more fires burning in proximity
           that are managed as a single incident--are particularly difficult
           to identify. Thus, the costs of many of the largest fires are not
           included in the models, limiting their effectiveness. Second, the
           wide variation in the costs of past fires with similar
           characteristics means that the models' ability to estimate
           suppression costs is limited. For example, although the models
           estimated an average cost of $317 per acre for fires in fiscal
           year 2005, the range of estimated costs was $88 to $1,132.^20 This
           range is expected to narrow over time as data from more fires are
           incorporated into the models. Third, to date, the models are based
           solely on fires managed by the Forest Service. Forest Service
           researchers are developing, at Interior's request, similar models
           for fires managed by the Interior agencies. However, it will be
           several years, at the earliest, before enough data have been
           collected for the model to be useful. In addition, we are
           concerned that because the stratified cost index is based on costs
           from previous fires--and because the agencies have only recently
           emphasized the importance of using less aggressive suppression
           strategies--the index does not include data from many fires where
           less costly firefighting strategies were used. As a result, the
           index may not accurately identify fires where more, or
           more-expensive, resources were used than needed. According to
           Forest Service officials, data from recent fires will be added to
           the models annually; therefore, over time, the models should
           include more fires where less aggressive firefighting strategies
           were used.
			  
^19Forest Service researchers have developed two regression models to
date, one for the western United States (Forest Service regions 1 through
6) and one for the eastern United States (Forest Service regions 8 and 9).
Characteristics affecting suppression costs include fire size; fuel types;
fire intensity; physical terrain; proximity to the nearest community;
total value of structures close to the fire; and special management
considerations, such as whether the fire was burning in a wilderness or
other designated area.	

^20The range of $88 to $1,132 per acre reflects one standard deviation
from the mean; several fires' cost per acre were outside of this range.

           Agencies Have Yet to Establish an Effective Oversight and
			  Accountability Framework

           Federal firefighting agencies lack effective oversight mechanisms
           to increase accountability for containing costs, according to
           previous studies. Even though land managers and incident
           management teams make critical decisions affecting suppression
           costs, previous studies have found that managers and teams have
           few incentives to consider cost containment in making those
           decisions. Some of these and other studies have also reported that
           despite longtime recognition of the lack of incentives, the
           agencies have not yet established effective oversight mechanisms
           to increase managers' and teams' accountability. The agencies, for
           example, do not consistently review decisions made in the field
           that affect suppression costs. The studies reported that the lack
           of a clear and valid measure evaluating both the benefits and
           costs of alternative suppression strategies was a key impediment
           to the agencies' establishing more effective oversight mechanisms.
           In addition, an independent panel convened by the Wildland Fire
           Leadership Council concluded that the current budget framework was
           perceived as providing a "blank check" for firefighting and
           provided few incentives for the agencies to contain costs. To
           increase such incentives, the panel recommended that the agencies
           allocate suppression funds on a regional basis and penalize
           regions that exceed their allocation by reducing the funds from
           the region's other accounts, such as those for land management
           activities.

           Federal firefighting agencies have taken a number of steps to
           establish or improve oversight mechanisms, but the extent to which
           these steps will assist the agencies in containing costs is
           unknown. These steps include:

           o Reviewing the costs of large fires. The Forest Service has
           reviewed the costs of many large fires, a practice that could help
           identify instances where officials could have taken less costly
           actions. Since 2003, the Forest Service has directed its regional
           offices to review all fires in each region that cost more than $2
           million to suppress, and directed the Washington, D.C., office to
           review fires costing more than $5 million. Agriculture's Inspector
           General, however, recently reported that the Forest Service
           reviewed only 11 of the 91 fires (12 percent) requiring regional
           review and 7 of the 50 fires (14 percent) requiring national
           review.^21 Forest Service officials told us they did not review
           more of these fires because it would have taken too much staff
           time to complete all of the reviews. They therefore decided to
           conduct fewer but more-detailed reviews. These officials also said
           that they are in the process of changing their policy to require
           regional reviews of fires costing more than $5 million and
           national reviews of fires costing more than $10 million. In
           addition, Congress directed the Forest Service to establish an
           outside independent review panel to examine, beginning in fiscal
           year 2004, Forest Service fires with suppression costs that
           exceeded $10 million. Together, these reviews identified many
           steps that local land managers and incident management teams could
           have taken to help contain costs. However, some studies have
           questioned the effectiveness of these reviews because, for
           example, managers were not required to respond to the issues the
           reviews raised or to implement the recommended steps. Forest
           Service officials told us that, beginning with fires that occurred
           in fiscal year 2006, land managers are required to respond to
           recommendations made in the reviews, either by agreeing to
           implement a recommendation or by explaining why not.
           o Clarifying land managers' responsibility for containing costs.
           The agencies have issued guidance clarifying that land managers,
           not incident management teams, have primary responsibility for
           containing wildland fire costs, but they have not yet determined
           how the land managers are to be held accountable for doing so.
           Rather, the agencies have taken several incremental steps intended
           to assist land managers in carrying out this responsibility.
           First, a Forest Service official told us that because many land
           managers lack both wildland fire experience and the time to
           closely monitor incident management teams, the agencies require
           that an "incident business advisor" be assigned to fires expected
           to cost more than $5 million and recommend that an advisor be
           assigned to fires expected to cost more than $1 million. An
           incident business advisor represents the land manager's interest
           in containing costs by observing firefighting operations and
           working with the incident management team to identify ways those
           operations could be more cost-effective. For example, an incident
           business advisor may observe the types and quantity of
           firefighting personnel and equipment assigned to a fire and how
           they are used, observe how equipment and supplies are procured,
           and ensure that the most expensive personnel and equipment are
           released first as a fire comes under control. The overall impact
           of incident business advisors has most likely been moderate,
           Forest Service officials told us, in large part because the
           advisors do not examine the firefighting strategies being used.
           Second, the agencies require land managers to include cost
           containment as a consideration when they delegate authority to an
           incident management team to fight a particular fire and to
           evaluate the team for how well it achieves the land managers'
           goals. These requirements are intended to provide a mechanism for
           land managers to hold a team accountable for achieving
           cost-containment goals. The Forest Service officials told us,
           however, that there is no clear method of evaluating the
           cost-effectiveness of the firefighting actions taken by the
           incident management team. Moreover, land managers may be reluctant
           to identify instances where firefighting actions were not
           cost-effective, since poor performance by the incident management
           team also reflects poorly on the land managers. Third, the
           agencies have adopted policies requiring land managers to consider
           expected fire suppression costs when developing land and fire
           management plans. Decisions made in these plans can affect future
           suppression costs, and this requirement is intended to ensure that
           managers consider this impact. It is too early to determine the
           effectiveness of this requirement.
			  
^21U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs.
			  
           o Establishing a comptroller to monitor costs. In August 2006, the
           Chief of the Forest Service established a comptroller position to
           oversee Forest Service wildland fire suppression expenditures. The
           current comptroller, the Associate Deputy Chief for State and
           Private Forestry, told us that the duties of the position are not
           defined, although in 2006 he reviewed several high-cost fires,
           including fires in California and Washington. During these
           reviews, to identify opportunities for achieving firefighting
           goals at a lower cost, the comptroller discussed with managers in
           the field, and with the appropriate regional foresters, the
           firefighting strategies selected and the quantity of firefighting
           assets used. The comptroller told us he believed these efforts
           were helpful, in part because managers in the field were aware
           that their decisions could be reviewed, but he could not provide
           an example where his involvement led directly to a change in
           strategy or tactics that could have reduced costs. The role of the
           comptroller for 2007 and later is still being determined. The
           Forest Service has also indicated that, beginning with fires in
           2007, it will designate a small team to monitor fires having the
           potential to be costly or otherwise complex and to work with field
           managers and regional officials to represent the Chief's interest
           in containing costs.

           Although the agencies have taken some steps to improve their
           oversight of wildland fire costs, they have made little progress
           in two key areas identified by previous studies. First, the
           agencies have yet to establish a clear measure to evaluate the
           benefits and costs of alternative firefighting strategies, even
           though some studies have concluded that absence of such a measure
           fundamentally hinders the agencies' ability to provide effective
           oversight. Second, the agencies considered the recommendation to
           provide budgetary incentives to regions to contain wildland fire
           costs but decided against pursuing it, in part because of concerns
           that transferring funds from other appropriations accounts would
           violate appropriations law. The co-chair of the Wildland Fire
           Leadership Council panel recently testified before the Senate
           Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that the panel continues
           to believe that this recommendation provides the greatest
           opportunity for the agencies to contain wildland fire costs.
			  
			  Conclusions

           Continuing concerns over the last decade about the mounting
           federal cost of preparing for and responding to wildland fires
           have spurred numerous studies and actions by federal wildland fire
           agencies to address areas needing improvement, but little in the
           way of a coordinated and focused effort to rein in these costs.
           Although the agencies have taken--and continue to take--steps
           intended to contain wildland fire costs, the effect of these steps
           on containing costs is unknown, in part because the agencies lack
           a clear vision for what they want to achieve. Without clearly
           defined cost-containment goals and objectives, federal land and
           fire managers in the field are more likely to select strategies
           and tactics that favor suppressing fires quickly over those that
           seek to balance the benefits of protecting the resources at risk
           and the costs of protecting them. Further, without clear goals,
           the agencies will be unable to develop consistent standards by
           which to measure their performance. Perhaps most important,
           without a clear vision of what they are trying to achieve and a
           systematic approach for achieving it, the agencies--and Congress
           and the American people--have little assurance that
           cost-containment efforts will lead to substantial improvement.
           Because cost-containment goals should be considered in relation to
           other wildland fire program goals--such as protecting life,
           resources, and property--it is important that the agencies
           integrate cost-containment goals within the overall cohesive
           strategy for responding to wildland fires that we previously
           recommended. The conditions that have contributed to increasing
           wildland fire severity and expenditures are complex, have been
           decades in the making, and will take decades to resolve.
           Developing an effective and affordable strategy for addressing
           these conditions is therefore critical, particularly in light of
           the large federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges
           facing the nation.
			  
			  Recommendations for Executive Action

           Without clear goals and a strategy for containing wildland fire
           costs, the agencies are unable to effectively and efficiently
           manage their myriad ongoing efforts to contain wildland fire
           costs. Thus, to help manage these efforts and to assist Congress
           in its oversight role, we recommend that the Secretaries of
           Agriculture and the Interior work together to direct their
           respective agencies to take the following four actions:

           o Establish clearly defined goals and measurable objectives for
           containing wildland fire costs.
           o Develop a strategy to achieve these goals and objectives.
           o Establish performance measures that are aligned with these goals
           and objectives.
           o Establish a framework to ensure that officials are held
           accountable for achieving these goals and objectives.

           Because of the importance of these actions and continuing concerns
           about the agencies' response to the increasing cost of wildland
           fires--and so that the agencies can use the results of these
           actions to prepare for the 2008 fire season--the agencies should
           provide this information to Congress no later than November 2007.
			  
			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service and
           Interior generally disagreed with the characterization of many of
           our findings; they neither agreed nor disagreed with our
           recommendations. In particular, the Forest Service and Interior
           stated that they did not believe we had accurately portrayed some
           of the significant actions they had taken to contain wildland fire
           costs, and they identified several agency documents that they
           believe provide clearly defined goals and objectives that make up
           their strategy to contain costs. We acknowledge that the agencies
           have established a broad goal of suppressing fires at minimum
           cost, considering firefighter and public safety and resources to
           be protected, but we also found that the agencies have established
           neither clear criteria by which to weigh the relative importance
           of these often-competing priorities nor measurable objectives by
           which to determine if they are meeting this goal. Our review
           suggests that without measurable objectives, the importance of
           containing costs relative to the other program priorities is not
           clear and that managers in the field are therefore likely to
           select firefighting strategies without due consideration of
           suppression costs. Therefore, we continue to believe that our
           recommendations, if effectively implemented, would help the
           agencies better manage their cost-containment efforts and improve
           their ability to contain wildland fire costs. The Forest Service
           and Interior's joint comments, and our evaluation of them, are
           included in appendix III.

           As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
           of this report until 30 days from the report date. At that time,
           we will send copies of this report to interested congressional
           committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, the
           Chief of the Forest Service, the Director of the Bureau of Land
           Management, and other interested parties. We will also make copies
           available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
           available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
           [39]http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
           report are listed in appendix V.

           Robin M. Nazzaro
			  Director, Natural Resources and Environment
			  
			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

           To determine the steps that federal agencies have taken to address
           the areas identified by previous studies, we first reviewed
           selected studies--most conducted since 2000 by federal, state, and
           nongovernmental entities--that examined issues related to wildland
           fire cost containment. Studies reviewed included independent
           reviews by GAO, the Department of Agriculture (Agriculture) Office
           of Inspector General, the National Academy of Public
           Administration, the National Association of State Foresters, and
           the Wildland Fire Leadership Council, as well as studies by the
           Forest Service and Department of the Interior (Interior) agencies,
           including several reviews of individual wildland fires. Forest
           Service and Interior officials at the national offices in
           Washington, D.C., reviewed our list of studies and agreed that we
           had included those key to addressing issues related to cost
           containment. We reviewed the issues these studies identified as
           needing improvement to help contain costs and categorized them
           into broad operational areas corresponding to key aspects of
           preparing for and responding to wildland fires. To determine the
           steps that federal agencies have taken to address these
           issues--and to corroborate our understanding and categorization of
           the issues--we interviewed officials from the Forest Service,
           Bureau of Land Management, and Office of Wildland Fire
           Coordination within Interior at the national offices and at the
           National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho. To determine the
           current status and results or intended results of the steps that
           the agencies identified, we reviewed relevant agency documents,
           including agency policies, manuals, other guidance, implementation
           strategies, and project plans. We also interviewed pertinent
           agency officials and nonagency officials, including those from the
           National Academy of Public Administration and state
           representatives on the Wildland Fire Leadership Council's
           independent panel.

           To determine steps that the agencies have taken to improve their
           management of their cost-containment efforts, we reviewed wildland
           fire program reviews by the Office of Management and Budget,
           agency documents--including strategic plans and performance and
           accountability reports, federal wildland fire policy documents,
           and National Fire Plan documents--and interviewed agency
           officials. We also interviewed officials from the Office of
           Management and Budget. To determine management steps that agencies
           are required to take and best management practices, we reviewed
           relevant statutes and guidance, including the Government
           Performance and Results Act of 1993 and GAO's Standards for
           Internal Control in the Federal Government,^1 as well as other GAO
           reports on improving federal agency management.

           We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted
           government auditing standards, which included an assessment of
           data reliability, from May 2006 through May 2007.
			  
^1GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[58]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

           Appendix II: Selected GAO Products and Other Reports Reviewed

           To identify areas potentially in need of improvement for federal
           firefighting agencies to contain the costs of fighting wildland
           fires, we reviewed dozens of reports, most issued since 2000. In
           addition to our own reports on wildland fire issues, we also
           reviewed reports prepared or commissioned by Agriculture,
           Interior, the Agriculture Office of Inspector General, the
           National Association of State Foresters, and the National Academy
           of Public Administration. The following list does not include all
           of the reports we reviewed but is intended to illustrate the range
           of related topics that we examined.
			  
			  GAO Products

           Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders
           Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts. [40]GAO-07-427T . Washington,
           D.C.: January 30, 2007.

           Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns
           about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities.
           [41]GAO-06-570 . Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006.

           Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to
           Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats.
           [42]GAO-06-671R . Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006.

           Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but
           Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy.
           [43]GAO-05-147 . Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.

           Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better
           Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction.
           [44]GAO-03-805 . Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2003.

           Forest Service: Little Progress on Performance Accountability
           Likely Unless Management Addresses Key Challenges. [45]GAO-03-503
           . Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003.

           Wildland Fire Management: Improved Planning Will Help Agencies
           Better Identify Fire-Fighting Preparedness Needs. [46]GAO-02-158 .
           Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002.

           Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to
           Reduce Risks to Communities and Resources. [47]GAO-02-259 .
           Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2002.

           Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address
           Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. [48]GAO/RCED-99-65 . Washington,
           D.C.: April 2, 1999.
			  
			  Federal or State Firefighting Entity Reports

           Secretary of Agriculture Independent Cost-Control Review Panel. FY
           2005 Large Cost Wildfires Report. Washington, D.C.: April 2006.

           System Planning Corporation. Prioritizing Wildland Fire Cost
           Containment Strategies. A report prepared for the U.S. Department
           of Agriculture, Forest Service. Arlington, VA: March 2006.

           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; U.S. Department of
           the Interior; and the National Association of State Foresters.
           Quadrennial Fire and Fuel Review Report. Washington, D.C.: June
           2005.

           Secretary of Agriculture Independent Cost-Control Review Panel. FY
           2004 Large Cost Wildfires Report. Washington, D.C.: March 2005.

           Wildland Fire Leadership Council. Large Fire Suppression Costs:
           Strategies for Cost Management. Washington, D.C.: August 2004.

           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and U.S.
           Department of the Interior. Developing an Interagency,
           Landscape-Scale Fire Planning Analysis and Budget Tool.
           Washington, D.C.: November 2001.

           National Association of State Foresters. Cost Containment on Large
           Fires: Efficient Utilization of Wildland Fire Suppression
           Resources. Washington, D.C.: July 2000.
			  
			  Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General Reports

           Audit Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs. Report
           No. 08601-44-SF. Washington, D.C.: November 2006.

           Audit Report: Implementation of the Healthy Forests Initiative.
           Report No. 08601-6-AT. Washington, D.C.: September 2006.

           Management Challenges. Washington, D.C.: August 2006.

           Audit Report: Forest Service Emergency Equipment Rental
           Agreements. Report No. 08601-40-SF. Washington, D.C.: July 2005.
			  
			  National Academy of Public Administration Reports

           Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Enhancing Hazard Mitigation
           Capacity. Washington, D.C.: January 2004.

           Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Utilizing Local Firefighting
           Forces. Washington, D.C.: December 2003.

           Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Improving Equipment and Services
           Acquisition. Washington, D.C.: September 2003.

           Wildfire Suppression: Strategies for Containing Costs. Washington,
           D.C.: September 2002.

           Managing Wildland Fire: Enhancing Capacity to Implement the
           Federal Interagency Policy. Washington, D.C.: December 2001.
			  
			  Appendix III: Comments from the Forest Service and the Department of the
Interior

See comment 1

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 2.

See comment 5.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

GAO's Comments

                        1. Our draft report stated that the effects of the
                        steps the agencies are taking to contain costs, not
                        the steps themselves, are unknown. We recognized that
                        the agencies established--in several documents,
                        including the federal wildland fire management
                        policy--a broad goal of suppressing fires at minimum
                        cost, considering firefighter and public safety and
                        resources to be protected. However, because the
                        different components of this broad goal often
                        compete, our review suggests that it is also
                        important for the agencies to establish clear
                        criteria by which to weigh the relative importance of
                        the components, as well as to establish clear
                        objectives to measure their progress. We therefore
                        recommended that the agencies take these steps. We
                        believe that the importance of establishing clear
                        goals and objectives will increase as the agencies
                        continue their transition to using less aggressive
                        firefighting strategies under their "appropriate
                        management response" policy.
                        2. We fully considered the agencies' comments and
                        clarified our draft report as appropriate to address
                        the four key areas raised (see comments 3 through 6).
                        3. Our draft report discussed the agencies'
                        transition to using less aggressive firefighting
                        strategies in appropriate circumstances, although it
                        did not use the phrase "appropriate management
                        response." We have added this phrase to the report.
                        Our review, however, found that several agency
                        policies limit the agencies' use of such strategies,
                        a finding also recently reported by the Department of
                        Agriculture Office of Inspector General.
                        4. We continue to believe that the modifications may
                        not allow the agencies to meet key FPA goals. As we
                        noted in our draft report, the agencies believe that
                        the modifications will achieve key FPA goals, but
                        because they provided no analysis, we also stated
                        that it is possible that the modifications may not do
                        so. The paragraph that the agencies cite in their
                        comments clearly acknowledges a difference between
                        the two designs. However, this paragraph consists of
                        summary, general assertions about the benefits of the
                        modifications, and the agencies provided no detailed,
                        comparative supporting analysis. Thus, it remains
                        unclear how or how much the designs differ in
                        identifying the most cost-effective alternatives,
                        either locally or nationally. We remain concerned
                        because, as officials told us, the agencies have not
                        yet done a formal comparison of the differences
                        between the modified and the original design.
                        5. We removed from the report the statement
                        questioning the agencies' ability to complete the
                        LANDFIRE system. Our draft report stated that the
                        agencies recognized the importance of updating
                        LANDFIRE data and expected to submit a plan for doing
                        so in June 2007 to the Wildland Fire Leadership
                        Council for approval. The plan, however, is not yet
                        final, and it is therefore not clear how data will be
                        updated.
                        6. We acknowledge that the stratified cost index is
                        an improvement over the agencies' previous
                        performance measures, but our report also raises
                        several concerns about the index. The Forest Service
                        and Interior seem to have misinterpreted our concern
                        about the agencies' lack of goals. Our concern does
                        not pertain to the stratified cost index performance
                        measure itself. Rather, we believe that in general,
                        for performance measures to be useful, they must
                        accurately measure progress toward established goals
                        and objectives, and we found that the agencies had
                        not established clear cost-containment goals and
                        objectives. We agree with the Forest Service and
                        Interior that the index was not intended to precisely
                        estimate suppression costs and have removed the word
                        precisely from the report. The Forest Service and
                        Interior also disagree with our statements that
                        Interior had not adopted a performance measure
                        related to containing costs in its strategic plan and
                        that it would be several years before Interior would
                        have sufficient data for the stratified cost index to
                        be useful. Our review of Interior's strategic plans
                        for 2003 through 2008 and for 2007 through 2012, the
                        most recent plan available, did not identify any
                        performance measure related to cost containment,
                        including the stratified cost index. We do
                        acknowledge that Interior is developing a stratified
                        cost index, but our discussions with a key official
                        developing this index indicates that to date it is
                        based on data from few fires and that it will be
                        several years for sufficient data to be available to
                        refine the index's underlying models.
                        7. We acknowledge that the agencies have clarified
                        their guidance, as we previously recommended. The
                        guidance is an important first step in ensuring that
                        suppression costs are shared equitably between
                        federal and nonfederal entities. We agree that the
                        agencies need to work with their nonfederal partners
                        and that there may be disagreement about which
                        cost-sharing method is appropriate in a given
                        situation. Nonetheless, we believe that it is
                        important that the federal agencies provide
                        sufficient oversight of, and support to, their
                        officials in the field as this guidance is
                        implemented. Without such oversight and support, we
                        believe that the guidance they have adopted may not
                        address a concern our May 2006 review
                        identified--that inconsistent application of
                        cost-sharing methods was leading to inequities in how
                        the federal government was treating nonfederal
                        entities in different states.
                        8. Our draft report acknowledged several of the
                        actions the agencies cite to enhance their oversight
                        of wildland fire costs but also found that the
                        agencies had not established a clear measure to
                        evaluate the benefits and costs of alternative
                        firefighting strategies, a key shortcoming identified
                        by previous studies. As the agencies continue the
                        transition to appropriate management response, such a
                        measure is critical if--as the agencies state in
                        their comments--appropriate management response is to
                        be a performance-based approach. We continue to
                        believe that such a measure is needed to help the
                        agencies evaluate decisions about firefighting
                        strategies and to hold officials accountable for
                        those decisions.
								
			  Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact

           Robin M. Nazzaro, (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]
			  
			  Staff Acknowledgments

           In addition to the contact person named above, David P. Bixler,
           Assistant Director; Ellen W. Chu; Brian Chung; Elizabeth Curda;
           Jonathan Dent; Janet Frisch; Timothy Guinane; Carol Henn; Kevin
           Jackson; Richard Johnson; Chester Joy; and John Warner made key
           contributions to this report.
			  
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(360717)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? [59]GAO-07-655 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [60]GAO-07-655 , a report to congressional requesters

June 2007

WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT

Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to
Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires

Annual appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires have
increased substantially over the past decade, in recent years totaling
about $3 billion. The Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture
and four agencies within the Department of the Interior (Interior) are
responsible for responding to wildland fires on federal lands. GAO
determined what steps federal agencies have taken, in response to findings
from previous studies, to (1) address key operational areas that could
help contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires
and (2) improve their management of their cost-containment efforts. To
address these objectives, GAO reviewed previous cost-containment studies
and other agency documents and interviewed agency officials.

[61]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior take
several steps to improve their management of cost-containment efforts,
including establishing clearly defined goals and measurable objectives and
a strategy to achieve them, and provide this information to Congress in
preparation for the 2008 fire season. The Forest Service and Interior
generally disagreed with GAO's findings, stating that GAO did not
accurately portray some of the agencies' actions to contain costs. They
neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations.

The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of steps
to address key operational areas previously identified as needing
improvement to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but the
effects on containing costs are unknown, in part because many of these
steps are not yet complete. First, federal firefighting agencies are
developing a system to help them better identify and set priorities for
lands needing treatment to reduce fuels, but they have yet to decide how
they will keep data in the system current. Second, federal agencies have
taken some steps to improve how they acquire and use personnel, equipment,
and other firefighting assets--such as implementing a computerized system
to more efficiently dispatch and track available firefighting assets--but
have not yet completed the more fundamental step of determining the
appropriate type and quantity of firefighting assets needed for the fire
season. Third, the agencies have clarified certain policies and are
improving analytical tools that assist officials in identifying and
implementing an appropriate response to a given fire, but several other
policies limit the agencies' use of less aggressive firefighting
strategies, which typically cost less. Fourth, federal agencies, working
with nonfederal entities, have recently taken steps to clarify guidance to
better ensure that firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires
that threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources, but it is
unclear how the agencies will ensure that this guidance is followed.

The agencies have also taken steps to address previously identified
weaknesses in their management of cost-containment efforts, but they have
neither clearly defined their cost-containment goals and objectives nor
developed a strategy for achieving them--steps that are fundamental to
sound program management. Although the agencies have established a broad
goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost--considering
firefighter and public safety and resources and structures to be
protected--they have no defined criteria by which to weigh the relative
importance of these often-competing priorities. As a result, according to
agency officials and reports, officials in the field lack a clear
understanding of the relative importance the agencies' leadership places
on containing costs and therefore are likely to select firefighting
strategies without due consideration of the costs of suppression. The
agencies also have yet to develop a vision of how the various
cost-containment steps they are taking relate to one another or to
determine the extent to which these steps will be effective. The agencies
are working to develop a better cost-containment performance measure, but
the measure may take a number of years to fully refine. Finally, the
agencies have taken, or are beginning to take, steps to improve their
oversight and increase accountability--such as requiring agency officials
to evaluate firefighting teams according to how well they contained
costs--although the extent to which these steps will assist the agencies
in containing costs is unknown.

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