    Hurricane Katrina: EPA's Current and Future Environmental
    Protection Efforts Could Be Enhanced by Addressing Issues and
    Challenges Faced on the Gulf Coast (25-JUN-07, GAO-07-651).

    In 2005, Hurricane Katrina's impact on the Gulf Coast included
    damage to the environment from chemical and hazardous materials
    releases. Also, the widespread demolition and renovation
    activities still under way in New Orleans may release asbestos
    fibers into the air, posing a potential additional health risk.
    This report, conducted at the Comptroller General's initiative,
    addresses (1) the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) actions
    to assess and mitigate Katrina's environmental impacts, (2) the
    extent to which EPA has assurance that public health is protected
    from asbestos inhalation risks in New Orleans, (3) the extent to
    which EPA's environmental health risk communications provided
    useful information to the public, and (4) challenges EPA faces in
    addressing environmental impacts.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-651
        ACCNO:   A71347
      TITLE:     Hurricane Katrina: EPA's Current and Future Environmental
    Protection Efforts Could Be Enhanced by Addressing Issues and
    Challenges Faced on the Gulf Coast
         DATE:   06/25/2007
      SUBJECT:   Air quality
    	     Asbestos
    	     Chemicals
    	     Demolition
    	     Environmental cleanups
    	     Environmental monitoring
    	     Government information dissemination
    	     Hazardous substances
    	     Health hazards
    	     Hurricane Katrina
    	     Impacted areas
    	     National response plan
    	     Pollution control
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Public health
    	     Risk assessment
    	     Waste disposal
    	     Water quality
    	     Louisiana

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    GAO-07-651

         * [1]Report to Congressional Committees

              * [2]June 2007

         * [3]HURRICANE KATRINA

              * [4]EPA's Current and Future Environmental Protection Efforts
                Could Be Enhanced by Addressing Issues and Challenges Faced on
                the Gulf Coast

         * [5]Contents

              * [6]Results in Brief
              * [7]Background
              * [8]EPA Has Taken Numerous Actions to Mitigate and Assess the
                Environmental Impacts of Katrina

                   * [9]EPA Has Conducted a Variety of Activities to Mitigate the
                     Impacts of Oil Spills and Hazardous Materials Releases
                   * [10]EPA Has Sampled the Air, Water, and Sediment and Soil in
                     Affected Gulf Coast Areas to Identify and Assess
                     Environmental Contamination Caused by the Storm

              * [11]EPA's Air Monitoring for Releases of Asbestos Fibers in New
                Orleans Does Not Adequately Address Neighborhoods with
                Substantial Building Demolition and Renovation Activities

                   * [12]EPA's Clean Air Act Asbestos Regulation Covering
                     Building Demolition Activities Seeks to Minimize the
                     Significant Human Health Risks Associated with Exposure to
                     Asbestos Fibers in the Air
                   * [13]EPA Has Issued "No Action Assurances" for Certain Clean
                     Air Act Asbestos Requirements Governing the Demolition of
                     Buildings to Help Expedite the Gulf Coast Cleanup
                   * [14]Current Asbestos Monitoring Is Not Sufficient to Assess
                     the Potential Public Health and Environmental Impacts of
                     Demolition and Renovation Activities

              * [15]Some Shortcomings in EPA's Communications on Environmental
                Health Risks Have Limited the Communications' Usefulness to the
                Public

                   * [16]EPA's Insufficient Disclosure about Its Decisions
                     Regarding Sampling of Contaminants Limited Residents'
                     Understanding of the Potential Health Risks of Returning
                     Home
                   * [17]Some Information EPA Provided to Residents in Its Public
                     Service Communications Was Unclear and Inconsistent

              * [18]EPA Faced Challenges in Assessing and Mitigating Some
                Environmental Impacts of the Gulf Coast Hurricanes

                   * [19]Funding Issues Delayed Cleanups at National Wildlife
                     Refuges for More Than a Year
                   * [20]EPA Has a Limited Debris Management Role under Federal
                     Law and the National Response Plan, and Its Guidance to
                     States on Making Certain Emergency Debris Disposal Decisions
                     Is Limited
                   * [21]Lack of Clarity on Federal Debris Management Roles
                     Delayed Actions to Ensure That White Goods and Electronic
                     Waste Were Handled in a Timely and Appropriate Manner

              * [22]Conclusions
              * [23]Recommendations for Executive Action
              * [24]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

         * [25]Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
         * [26]Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency

              * [27]GAO Comments

         * [28]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Report to Congressional Committees

    June 2007

    HURRICANE KATRINA

    EPA's Current and Future Environmental Protection Efforts Could Be
    Enhanced by Addressing Issues and Challenges Faced on the Gulf Coast

    Contents

    June 25, 2007

    Letter

    Congressional Committees

    The scope and severity of the destruction that Hurricane Katrina caused on
    the Gulf Coast in 2005 are staggering. More than 1,600 people lost their
    lives and more than a million were driven from their homes, many still
    unable to return. Moreover, tens of thousands of homes in New Orleans were
    flooded, many requiring either demolition or gutting before
    reconstruction. This natural disaster affected an area of over 90,000
    square miles, destroying or severely damaging not only countless buildings
    but also bridges, roads, and the area's power and communications
    infrastructures. Hurricane Katrina severely damaged the environment as
    well: Millions of gallons of oil and unknown quantities of potentially
    hazardous chemicals were released into the environment.^1 Hazardous
    materials--such as industrial drums containing toxic and flammable
    chemicals, asbestos-containing materials, household chemicals, paints,
    pesticides, and propane tanks--were commingled with the storm's
    unprecedented levels of other debris, slowing its collection and disposal.
    The environmental contamination caused by this natural disaster could have
    both short- and long-term effects on the health of residents in affected
    areas, as well as on workers, volunteers, and wildlife.

    The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
    establishes programs and processes for the federal government to provide
    major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments,
    tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit
    organizations. Under the Stafford Act, state governors may request
    assistance from the federal government when an incident overwhelms state
    and local resources. Such assistance has been--and to some extent
    continues to be--provided to the Gulf Coast under the Department of
    Homeland Security's (DHS) National Response Plan. This plan serves as a
    basis for how federal departments and agencies are to work together with
    state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector in managing
    incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, including a major
    disaster such as Hurricane Katrina that was determined to be an "incident
    of national significance." Key federal agencies with responsibilities for
    supporting and implementing state and local recovery efforts in the Gulf
    Coast include DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S.
    Army Corps of Engineers.

    1Unless otherwise noted, this report addresses EPA�s response to Hurricane
    Katrina, the storm that caused the bulk of the hurricane-related damage to
    the Gulf Coast in 2005. Other storms, in particular Hurricane Rita, also
    caused significant damage to the region in 2005, some in the same areas
    hit by Katrina.

    EPA serves as the coordinator of emergency support for the oil and
    hazardous materials response, 1 of 15 emergency support functions
    identified in the National Response Plan. When the National Response Plan
    is activated, EPA and the Coast Guard are the primary agencies that
    provide federal support in response to actual or potential discharges of
    oil or hazardous materials, including assessments and cleanups. The
    National Response Plan incorporates many aspects of the National
    Contingency Plan, a plan for responding to releases of oil or hazardous
    materials.^2 This plan implements provisions of the Clean Water Act and
    the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
    of 1980 (CERCLA, also called the Superfund law).Under the Superfund law,
    EPA conducts short-term cleanups to address immediate threats to
    communities from actual or potential releases of hazardous substances and
    conducts or oversees long-term cleanups of the nation's Superfund sites.

    EPA also has a role in assisting other agencies that are coordinating
    other emergency support functions under the National Response Plan,
    including public works and engineering (assisting with such tasks as
    contaminated debris management) and public health and medical services
    response (providing such support as technical assistance in assessing the
    health aspects of situations involving hazardous materials). Aside from
    the emergency support roles defined in the plan, EPA enforces key
    environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act. To facilitate the removal
    of the extraordinary amounts of debris in Louisiana and Mississippi after
    Hurricane Katrina, EPA is not enforcing certain Clean Air Act emissions
    standards for asbestos in the case of government-ordered demolitions of
    homes. In addition, these emissions standards generally do not apply to
    the demolition or renovation of homes by or for individual homeowners.
    Nevertheless, because asbestos inhaled into the lungs can cause cancer, it
    is important for EPA to ensure that public health risks are minimized
    during the demolition and renovation of buildings containing asbestos,
    activities that can release asbestos fibers into the air.

    2Under the National Contingency Plan, EPA and the Coast Guard also serve
    as primary responders.

    In this context, we (1) reviewed EPA's actions under the National Response
    Plan to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane
    Katrina, (2) determined the extent to which EPA has assurance that public
    health in New Orleans is being protected from asbestos inhalation health
    risks posed by extensive demolition activities, (3) determined the extent
    to which EPA's communications on environmental health risks posed by
    Hurricane Katrina have provided useful information to the public, and (4)
    identified challenges EPA has faced in addressing environmental impacts of
    Hurricane Katrina that, if mitigated, could enable EPA to better protect
    the environment in future disasters. Because of the widespread
    congressional interest in these subjects, we are conducting this work at
    the Comptroller General's initiative.

    In conducting our work, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, DHS's
    National Response Plan, federal and state protocols related to the
    hazardous materials response to Katrina, and evaluations of the federal
    government's Katrina response actions. We also reviewed, for example, EPA
    planning documents, environmental risk assessment summaries and related
    communications, and federal guidance to state and local agencies related
    to the 2005 hurricane response. We interviewed officials from EPA's Office
    of Emergency Management, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
    Office of Water, Office of Air and Radiation, and Office of Solid Waste,
    among other headquarters offices. We met with EPA officials in Regions 4
    and 6 in Mississippi and Louisiana, visited EPA's Incident Command Centers
    in Mississippi and Louisiana, and toured affected areas in both states. We
    also interviewed federal officials from FEMA, the Department of Health and
    Human Services' Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and
    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Army Corps of
    Engineers, and the Department of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife
    Service. In addition, we interviewed state and local officials involved
    with EPA's response efforts from the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments
    of Environmental Quality and from Jefferson, Plaquemines, Orleans, and St.
    Bernard Parishes in Louisiana and from Jackson, Hancock, and Harrison
    Counties in Mississippi. We also spoke with national and regional
    stakeholder groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, the
    Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, the Louisiana Environmental Action
    Network, the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, the
    Mississippi Environmental Recovery Alliance, the Mississippi Power
    Company, and Sierra Club chapters in Louisiana and Mississippi. In
    determining the extent to which EPA's communications on Hurricane
    Katrina's environmental health risks provided useful information to the
    public, we focused on the communications themselves and did not evaluate
    the agency's environmental risk assessment methodology. (See app. I for a
    more detailed description of the scope and methodology of our review.) We
    conducted our work from November 2005 through June 2007 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    Under challenging circumstances, EPA conducted a wide variety of
    activities to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane
    Katrina. As of December 2006, EPA had spent an estimated $416 million on
    its hurricane response and, at its peak, employed about 1,600 staff and
    contractors on response activities. For example, EPA and its contractors,
    along with other federal and state partners, have responded to chemical
    and oil spills at industrial facilities; have collected over 200,000 large
    abandoned containers, such as drums and tanks; and continue to oversee
    cleanup of a million-gallon oil spill at a facility in St. Bernard Parish,
    Louisiana, that affected neighboring homes. EPA has also coordinated
    recycling efforts for damaged refrigerators and other appliances (referred
    to as "white goods") to remove chlorofluorocarbons and other refrigerants
    that are harmful to the environment from 380,000 abandoned refrigerators,
    freezers, and air conditioners. In addition, EPA helped collect and
    recycle over 660,000 units of electronic waste and removed and safely
    disposed of almost 5 million household hazardous waste containers, such as
    paint cans and propane tanks. Because of the extensive number of home
    demolitions and renovations that have yet to be completed in the New
    Orleans area, debris removal from uninhabited residences is far from
    complete. Regarding assessing the environmental contamination caused by
    the hurricane, EPA conducted air, water, and sediment and soil sampling
    for chemicals of potential concern in Louisiana and Mississippi. In
    particular, EPA reports having collected about 1,800 sediment and soil
    samples since September 2005 in and around New Orleans. EPA has analyzed
    most of these samples for over 200 potentially harmful metals and organic
    chemicals. In coordination with state and local partners, including the
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, EPA concluded that, in
    general, the sediments left behind by the flooding are not expected to
    cause adverse health impacts to individuals returning to New Orleans. In
    addition, EPA helped both the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of
    Environmental Quality perform 4,000 drinking water and wastewater
    infrastructure assessments to help bring these facilities back online as
    quickly as possible.

    However, as cleanup continues, EPA's assurance that the public health is
    being protected from the risks associated with the inhalation of asbestos
    fibers is limited because the agency has not deployed air monitors in and
    around neighborhoods in New Orleans where demolition and renovation
    activities are concentrated. EPA took steps to monitor asbestos after
    Hurricane Katrina, initially more than doubling the ambient (outdoor) air
    monitors that were in the area before the storm and then conducting
    emissions monitoring at specific sites, such as landfills, that involve
    waste handling or debris reduction activities--for example, grinding.
    However, EPA has neither conducted emissions monitoring at demolition
    sites nor placed ambient air monitors in neighborhoods with substantial
    demolition and renovation activities. For example, no monitors have been
    located in the Ninth Ward, where flooding was widespread and extensive
    demolition and renovation are occurring. This is problematic because,
    according to officials from EPA's Office of Research and Development,
    monitors are effective in detecting asbestos emissions from demolitions
    only if they are located immediately adjacent to the sites. Further, in
    July 2006, the agency scaled back its ambient monitoring to the prestorm
    level and reduced the frequency of sampling. EPA said it based this
    decision, in part, on not having found measurable amounts of asbestos in
    the air samples. However, EPA's expanded monitoring covered only the first
    few months of demolition activities. For these reasons, the results may
    not be representative of asbestos exposures in some neighborhoods.
    Further, for building demolition and renovation activities, EPA regulates
    asbestos emissions by setting standards for work practices. However, EPA's
    asbestos work practice standards generally do not apply to the demolition
    or renovation of a residential building by or for an individual homeowner.
    In addition, to help expedite cleanup and rebuilding, EPA is not enforcing
    some of the work practice standards for certain residences under
    government demolition orders, although for these demolitions, some work
    practice standards--such as the wetting of materials from before
    demolition through disposal in order to control emissions--are still
    required. The fact that many thousands of demolitions and renovations may
    occur in the same geographic area and in the same general time frame--some
    of which are not subject to the enforcement of certain asbestos work
    practice standards while others are not subject to the standards at
    all--represents a potential health problem that warrants monitoring.

    In addition, while EPA provided a substantial amount of useful information
    to the public on environmental health risks using reports (environmental
    assessment summaries), flyers, public service announcements, and EPA's Web
    page, the usefulness of this information was limited in several ways.
    Specifically, some key communications about the environmental
    contamination in New Orleans stemming from Hurricane Katrina were not
    timely or complete. For example, EPA's communications about the potential
    health risks from environmental contamination--three environmental
    assessment summaries prepared with, among others, the Louisiana Department
    of Environmental Quality--were released about 3, 6, and 11 months after
    the hurricane, limiting their usefulness to residents who would have
    benefited from more timely information about the environmental health
    risks they could face when returning home. Further, EPA did not disclose
    until August 2006 that its December 2005 assessment summary--which said
    that the great majority of the data showed that adverse health effects
    would not be expected from exposure to sediments from previously flooded
    areas--applied to short-term visits, such as to view damage to homes. In
    addition, the summaries do not disclose an important EPA assumption--that
    the results of sediment samples from streets and other outdoor public
    access areas can be extrapolated to private properties, such as yards and
    the inside of homes. This is important because, for example, environmental
    contamination levels inside buildings can be significantly higher than and
    different from the contamination outside, potentially causing more adverse
    health effects. Finally, some of EPA's flyers and other public service
    communications provided unclear and inconsistent information on actions
    residents should take to mitigate exposure to contaminants that were
    likely to be found in many homes. For example, the most widely distributed
    flyer on environmental health risks stated that buildings constructed
    before 1970 are likely to contain asbestos, while a document on debris and
    damaged buildings on EPA's Web page stated that all structures built
    before 1975 may contain significant amounts of asbestos and that
    structures built after 1975 may also contain asbestos. EPA also used
    varying and confusing terms when identifying the respiratory protection
    that residents should wear in many cases when cleaning up their homes.

    EPA faced some challenges in addressing the environmental impacts of
    Hurricane Katrina that, if mitigated, could better enable EPA to protect
    the environment in future disasters.

    oFirst, EPA did not remove clearly visible abandoned chemical drums and
    tanks from several national wildlife refuges in Louisiana in a timely
    manner as part of its Katrina response activities in part because FEMA
    disaster assistance funding generally is not used for debris cleanups on
    federal lands. As a result, more than a year later, debris containing
    hazardous materials continued to pose an environmental threat to natural
    resources at several national wildlife refuges, and at least one major
    refuge remained closed to the public. While the Fish and Wildlife Service
    obtained funding for this activity as part of a June 2006 supplemental
    appropriation and signed interagency agreements with EPA and the Coast
    Guard to obtain these agencies' assistance in the fall of 2006, the delay
    in removing the debris from this and other wildlife refuges complicated
    and increased the cost of its removal--some of which is not yet completed.

    oSecond, EPA's debris management role is limited under federal law and the
    National Response Plan; consequently, its guidance to states and
    localities on planning for disposal of disaster debris could be especially
    important in helping ensure that hazardous storm debris is disposed of in
    landfills with appropriate safeguards, thereby preventing contaminants
    from migrating and causing air, soil, or water pollution. However, while
    EPA's 1995 guide on planning for disposal of disaster debris acknowledges
    that such debris can overwhelm existing landfills or force communities to
    use disposal options that otherwise would not be acceptable, the guide
    does not make specific suggestions for addressing these potential
    problems--such as studying potential sites for future use--or practices
    that state agencies should consider when making special debris disposal
    accommodations following disasters.^3 Along these lines, in its emergency
    orders following Hurricane Katrina, the state of Louisiana made decisions
    about landfill sites and the disposal of debris that some studies indicate
    could have long-term, negative environmental impacts.

    oFinally, because of a lack of clarity in the National Response Plan and
    the absence of interagency protocols about federal roles in debris
    management, EPA, in the immediate aftermath of the storms, could not
    ensure that debris such as white goods and electronic waste was handled in
    a timely and appropriate manner that mitigated the potential for
    environmental contamination. Local officials in both Louisiana and
    Mississippi told us that confusion about responsibility for this work
    resulted in delays in removing and disposing of the debris, creating the
    potential in the weeks following Katrina that it was improperly disposed
    of in landfills.

    3EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Planning for Disaster
    Debris (December 1995).

    We are making recommendations to EPA to implement an asbestos monitoring
    plan that addresses the potential health impacts in New Orleans from
    ongoing extensive demolition and renovation activities, improve its future
    communications to the public on environmental risks resulting from
    disasters, and take several actions to better enable the agency to
    minimize environmental risks following disasters. In commenting on a draft
    of this report, EPA's Associate Administrator for Homeland Security agreed
    with all but one of the recommendations. Specifically, EPA agreed with the
    recommendations to provide additional asbestos air monitoring in New
    Orleans, improve environmental health risk communications following
    disasters, provide more guidance to states on managing debris disposal
    following disasters, and clarify debris management roles with the Army
    Corps of Engineers. However, EPA disagreed with our recommendation that
    the agency convene a working group that includes potentially affected
    federal land management agencies and the Coast Guard to develop protocols
    or memorandums of understanding on the steps the agencies should take to
    obtain disaster funding for environmental cleanups on federal lands in the
    future--and thereby address damage to federal lands and wildlife in a
    timely and efficient manner. Rather, EPA asserted that this recommendation
    would be more appropriately addressed to the Department of the Interior
    and FEMA. We continue to believe that EPA should be involved in helping
    resolve these issues because, under the National Response Plan, EPA is the
    chair of the National Response Team, whose duties include national
    planning and response coordination for oil and hazardous materials
    incidents. We do agree that FEMA, which declined to provide funding to the
    Department of the Interior for cleanup after Hurricane Katrina, and DHS,
    which coordinates the federal response to such incidents as major
    disasters under the National Response Plan, should also take part in
    planning efforts to resolve funding issues concerning the removal of
    hazardous materials from federal lands following a disaster. Accordingly,
    we have modified our recommendation to state that EPA should also work
    with DHS and FEMA, as well as with federal land management agencies and
    the Coast Guard, to determine what actions are needed to ensure that
    environmental contamination on federal lands, such as national wildlife
    refuges, can be expeditiously and efficiently addressed in future
    disasters. EPA also provided comments on aspects of the report it
    considered misleading or inaccurate, as well as technical comments, which
    we incorporated as appropriate. EPA's letter and our detailed response to
    it appear in appendix II.

    Background

    Issued in December 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's National
    Response Plan establishes a comprehensive framework for the management of
    domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary. Hurricane
    Katrina marked the first time the National Response Plan was implemented
    in response to an "incident of national significance"--an actual or
    potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated response by a
    combination of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, or
    private-sector entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and
    provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation
    activities.^4 The National Response Plan describes the structure and
    process of this national approach, sets forth federal roles and
    responsibilities, and includes 15 emergency support function annexes that
    describe the missions and responsibilities of federal agencies for
    coordinating resource and program support in specific disaster response
    areas.

    Under the National Response Plan, EPA serves as the coordinator of the
    federal emergency support function for oil and hazardous materials
    releases. Under this support function, both EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard
    are the primary agencies charged with providing the federal support,
    including assessments and cleanups in response to releases. According to
    the plan, EPA generally leads responses to inland releases, while the
    Coast Guard leads responses to releases in coastal zones. The National
    Response Plan incorporates the structures and response mechanisms of the
    National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the
    federal government's guide to oil and hazardous substances spill response
    under the Clean Water Act and the Superfund law. EPA's role under the
    National Response Plan and the National Contingency Plan is similar:
    providing response and recovery actions to minimize threats to public
    health, welfare, or the environment caused by the actual or potential
    release of oil and hazardous materials. However, in the context of
    providing major disaster assistance to the states under the Stafford Act,
    EPA's response is approved and funded by FEMA, while when it responds
    under the National Contingency Plan, EPA uses its own processes and
    funding, based on its authority under the Clean Water Act or Superfund
    law. Thus, in its Hurricane Katrina response, EPA actions were primarily
    funded by FEMA; however, EPA used Superfund authority and funding to test
    for contamination at Superfund sites in the affected Gulf Coast area.

    4The National Response Plan applies to all incidents requiring a
    coordinated federal response as part of an appropriate combination of
    federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental
    entities. For incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, but
    of lesser severity than an incident of national significance, the plan
    includes a comprehensive network of incident annexes and supplemental
    federal contingency plans that may be implemented by the departments
    and agencies with established authorities in coordination with the
    National Response Plan framework.

    Under the National Response Plan, other agencies, including the Department
    of Defense (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) and the Department of Health and
    Human Services, are given supporting roles in the federal response to oil
    and hazardous materials releases. The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is
    also the primary federal agency tasked with providing technical
    assistance, engineering, and construction management resources and support
    during response activities related to public works and engineering. Among
    other things, the Corps is responsible for providing debris removal and
    disposal and the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged
    public facilities. EPA provides support to the Corps for, among other
    activities, assessing drinking water supplies and wastewater and solid
    waste facilities. The Department of Health and Human Services is the
    primary federal agency tasked with assisting state, local, and tribal
    governments in identifying and meeting public health and medical services
    needs. Health and Human Services' responsibilities include providing
    medical care personnel, equipment, and supplies and coordinating with EPA
    and the Corps on water and wastewater issues, solid waste disposal issues,
    and other environmental health issues. The Department of Health and Human
    Services also determines the appropriateness of requests for public health
    and medical information.^5

    EPA can exercise its existing environmental authorities during disaster
    response activities. For example, under the Clean Air Act, EPA regulates
    emissions of volatile organic compounds in gasoline, which contribute to
    the formation of ground-level ozone. Also under the Clean Air Act, EPA
    regulates emissions of air toxics such as asbestos. Under the Superfund
    law, EPA responds to the actual or threatened release of hazardous
    substances that pose a threat to public health or welfare or the
    environment. In this regard, EPA maintains the National Priorities List,
    its list of seriously contaminated Superfund sites.^6 Under the Resource
    Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), EPA has a role in establishing
    criteria for classifying different types of solid waste disposal
    facilities (generally referred to as landfills) and solid waste disposal
    practices that may result in adverse effects on health or the environment.
    In order to facilitate response and recovery activities following the
    hurricanes, EPA exercised its enforcement discretion by issuing "no action
    assurance" letters stating that EPA would not enforce certain Clean Air
    Act requirements for building demolitions involving asbestos-containing
    material to facilitate debris removal in Louisiana and Mississippi.
    According to EPA, the agency also waived some Clean Air Act fuel
    requirements to prevent fuel supply interruptions in the months following
    Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

    5In addition, the primary Joint Information Center, established in support
    of the National Response Plan, is authorized to release general medical and
    public health response information to the public after consultation with
    the Department of Health and Human Services. The Joint Information Center
    is a physical location where public affairs professionals from
    organizations involved in incident management activities provide
    emergency information, crisis communications, and public affairs support.

    EPA Has Taken Numerous Actions to Mitigate and Assess the Environmental
    Impacts of Katrina

    Under challenging circumstances, EPA conducted a wide variety of
    activities to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane
    Katrina. Specifically, EPA and federal and state partners have responded
    to chemical and oil spills at industrial facilities, collected abandoned
    chemical drums and tanks, and coordinated recycling efforts for damaged
    refrigerators and other appliances. EPA has also taken a number of actions
    to assess the environmental contamination caused by the hurricane,
    including conducting air, water, and sediment and soil sampling for
    chemicals of potential concern in Louisiana and Mississippi.

    6The Hazard Ranking System is the principal mechanism EPA uses to place
    sites on the National Priorities List. The system serves as a screening
    device to evaluate the potential for releases of uncontrolled hazardous
    substances to cause human health or environmental damage.

    EPA Has Conducted a Variety of Activities to Mitigate the Impacts of Oil
    Spills and Hazardous Materials Releases

    As of December 2006, EPA had spent an estimated $416 million on a wide
    variety of activities to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of
    the hurricanes.^7 At its peak, EPA had about 1,600 staff and contractors
    working in the Gulf Coast region to assist with response and cleanup
    activities, as well as thousands of additional employees supporting the
    agency's response from headquarters and regional offices across the
    country.^8 Because EPA's environmental protection responsibilities require
    it to be among the first federal agencies to arrive after a disaster,
    before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, EPA deployed personnel and
    resources to FEMA and state emergency operations centers in Louisiana,
    Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to facilitate a quick response in the
    states threatened by Katrina. In this regard, the agency assumed an
    unanticipated role in New Orleans, joining federal, state, and local
    responders in the massive search and rescue efforts in the days following
    the storm. Using watercraft equipped to address oil and hazardous
    substances releases, EPA staff and contractors helped save nearly 800
    residents from the New Orleans floodwaters.

    As the coordinator for the federal response to actual or potential oil and
    hazardous materials releases under the National Response Plan, EPA led
    efforts to evaluate and clean up such spills on land and in inland waters,
    while the Coast Guard led these efforts for spills into coastal waters.^9
    EPA conducted "reconnaissance" activities at the many industrial
    facilities, such as oil refineries and chemical plants, in the Gulf Coast
    area to identify and plan any cleanup needed as a result of Katrina's
    impact. Specifically, EPA conducted aerial and ground assessments of these
    facilities and used facility self-assessments to determine the magnitude
    of potential hazardous releases and to prioritize facilities needing
    additional assessments. EPA also conducted cleanups at stores selling
    chemicals for swimming pools, home repair and building supply stores, and
    other sites. Working with the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality, EPA also evaluated potentially hazardous chemicals at over 350
    chemistry and biology laboratories in schools in southern Louisiana,
    removing chemicals from more than 130 schools.

    7EPA officials said that, as of December 31, 2006, EPA had received
    funding from FEMA totaling $718.4 million. Of this amount, EPA had
    obligated $563.7 million and had expended $415.5 million, including
    $80.1 million passed directly to the U.S. Coast Guard. In addition,
    EPA had expended approximately $13 million of appropriated resources
    in support of the responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

    8EPA used its existing emergency support contracts during its Katrina
    response: (1) Emergency and Rapid Response Services contracts for
    personnel, equipment, and materials to provide emergency removal and
    remedial response cleanup services, including containing, recovering,
    and disposing of hazardous substances; and (2) Superfund Technical
    Assessment and Response Team contracts for personnel providing
    technical support for gathering and analyzing site assessment
    technical data, preparing reports on oil and hazardous substance
    investigations, and providing technical support for cleanup efforts.

    9The Coast Guard estimated that 8 million gallons of oil were released
    due to Katrina and that the hurricane caused six major spills (at
    least 100,000 gallons each) and numerous minor ones (less than 10,000
    gallons each).

    In addition, EPA worked with the Coast Guard and the Louisiana Department
    of Environmental Quality to oversee sampling and cleanup of a large oil
    spill at the Murphy Oil USA refinery in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. The
    floodwaters from Katrina had damaged a large aboveground storage tank at
    the refinery, releasing about 1 million gallons of mixed crude oil onto
    the facility and an adjacent residential neighborhood, affecting
    approximately 1,800 homes. EPA and the Coast Guard divided responsibility
    for overseeing Murphy Oil's voluntary cleanup of the spill. EPA worked
    with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality to oversee Murphy
    Oil's cleanup in residential areas accessible to the public, such as
    parks, school yards, roads, and sidewalks.^10 In addition, EPA is
    continuing to oversee Murphy Oil's soil sampling at residential and other
    properties--for example, by having 10 percent of the soil samples Murphy
    Oil collects analyzed by both Murphy Oil and a separate laboratory as a
    quality control measure. According to EPA officials, the agency will
    continue to oversee Murphy Oil's cleanup of affected areas until these
    activities are complete.^11

    Other EPA efforts to mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane
    Katrina have centered on managing the disposition of debris that may
    contain hazardous materials. Specifically, EPA established a plan to
    segregate, collect, and properly dispose of debris such as household
    hazardous waste (household cleaning chemicals, paints, and pesticides);
    electronic waste (computers, televisions, printers, DVD players, and other
    electronics); and white goods (large appliances such as air conditioners,
    dishwashers, refrigerators, stoves, and freezers). These items frequently
    contain contaminants, such as lead, mercury, or chlorofluorocarbons, that
    can enter the ground, water, or air if they are not disposed of properly.
    In both Louisiana and Mississippi, EPA organized neighborhood curbside
    pickups of household hazardous waste and circulated information about
    them; EPA also worked with local officials to establish collection and
    drop-off sites for debris that may contain hazardous materials. In
    addition, EPA established debris staging areas for sorting and
    categorizing industrial and household hazardous waste that EPA and its
    contractors had collected, draining and recycling hazardous chemicals, and
    ensuring that hazardous containers were disposed of properly. As of
    September 1, 2006, EPA's efforts to facilitate the appropriate disposal of
    debris that may contain hazardous materials had resulted in the

    ocollection of more than 5.1 million containers of potentially hazardous
    waste consisting of about 4.9 million small household containers and about
    200,000 large abandoned containers, such as drums, tanks, and cylinders;

    oremoval of the chlorofluorocarbons and other refrigerants that are
    harmful to the environment and recycling of 380,000 white goods; and

    ocollection and recycling of over 660,000 units of electronic waste.

    10The Coast Guard oversaw the company�s removal of oil from the canals in
    the area, an oil tank farm containment area, and storm drains.

    11Murphy Oil agreed to settle a class action lawsuit brought against the
    company by individuals and entities that were allegedly injured or damaged
    from the oil spill. In January 2007, a court approved a $330 million
    settlement agreement that pays for the acquisition of property, damage
    remediation, and compensation for losses. Turner v. Murphy Oil U.S.A.,
    Inc., No. 05-4206 (E.D. LA. filed Aug. 9, 2005).

    EPA Has Sampled the Air, Water, and Sediment and Soil in Affected Gulf
    Coast Areas to Identify and Assess Environmental Contamination Caused by
    the Storm

    EPA also conducted numerous activities to identify and assess air, water,
    and sediment and soil contamination in Gulf Coast areas affected by
    Katrina. For example, EPA was concerned about the potential environmental
    impact of Katrina on the 24 Superfund sites in the affected Gulf Coast
    areas. These sites are on EPA's National Priorities List, which identifies
    the agency's highest-priority cleanup sites. Many of the Gulf Coast
    Superfund sites have been cleaned up and have remedies in place to
    maintain the standard of cleanup achieved.^12 To determine whether the
    hurricane had caused additional contamination, from September 29 to
    October 14, 2005, EPA collected sediment, surface water, and groundwater
    samples at or near the 24 Superfund sites in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
    Alabama, comparing the samples obtained after the hurricane with
    pre-Katrina samples collected during remedial investigations or routine
    monitoring activities.^13 EPA found that four sites in Louisiana had
    elevated contaminant levels, one with contaminants that had not been
    previously detected.^14 Given the particular situations at these four
    Superfund sites, EPA determined that continued monitoring according to the
    sites' routine operation and maintenance plans would address these
    problems. On the basis of the sampling results, EPA concluded that the
    other 20 sites reviewed were not impacted by Katrina. Additionally, EPA
    Region 4 conducted soil and sediment samples near several industrial
    facilities in the affected areas of Mississippi to determine if flooding
    from Katrina had released hazardous materials. With one exception, the
    region found that there did not appear to be any indication of any
    potential releases due to the hurricane.^15

    12EPA also assessed the potential impact on an additional 30 Superfund
    National Priorities List sites in southwest Louisiana and southeast
    Texas after Hurricane Rita struck this area.

    13EPA Region 4 also compared the sample results from the Superfund sites
    reviewed in Mississippi and Alabama with the EPA Office of Water 2004
    National Recommended Water Quality Criteria and EPA Region 9 Preliminary
    Remediation Goals to determine if those sites� conditions might also
    represent previously unrecognized risks to human health and the
    environment.

    14EPA concluded from the assessment of the Agriculture Street Landfill
    in New Orleans, 1 of the 24 Superfund sites reviewed, that the flooding
    did not cause any lead (the contaminant of concern) to migrate up through
    the site�s soil cover. However, sediment samples EPA collected on the
    site and in the area contained benzo(a)pyrene levels that exceeded
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality risk standards. EPA
    reported on August 17, 2006, that it had contacted the Housing Authority
    of New Orleans (the property owner and manager) regarding the sampling
    results and planned to work with the authority to ensure plans for the
    site addressed this contamination. Additionally, EPA stated it would
    provide a closeout report when the authority announced its specific plans.

    15The one exception EPA Region 4 identified involved the Naval
    Construction Battalion Center in Gulfport, Mississippi. Although EPA
    detected elevated dioxins at some of the sampling points near this
    facility, the agency concluded that none of the concentrations detected
    caused concern about effects on human health and that the site was not
    adversely impacted by Katrina.

    In addition, potential sources of air pollution that could occur as a
    result of a hurricane include spills of volatile chemicals, releases or
    leaks from industrial plants, dust from building demolition and debris
    transport, contaminated sediments that can be resuspended as dust, and
    smoke from open burning of debris. EPA began screening air quality in
    Louisiana and Mississippi in coordination with state departments of
    environmental quality on August 30, 2005, to provide initial air quality
    assessments. EPA employed such equipment as the agency's (1) Airborne
    Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology flying
    laboratory, equipment mounted in a small aircraft that can obtain detailed
    chemical information from a safe distance; and (2) Trace Atmospheric Gas
    Analyzer mobile laboratories, which are self-contained units capable of
    real-time sampling and analysis, to conduct air monitoring immediately
    following Katrina. In addition, EPA worked with state partners to restore
    damaged or lost air quality monitoring stations. EPA has performed air
    sampling to test for contaminants such as lead, arsenic, asbestos fibers,
    volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, and other pollutants using
    temporary ambient air monitoring stations in Louisiana and Mississippi.

    Another key component of EPA's activities to assess the environmental
    impacts of Katrina focused on helping both Louisiana and Mississippi
    perform drinking water and wastewater infrastructure assessments. Many of
    these facilities along the Gulf Coast were damaged and became inoperable.
    EPA helped perform about 4,000 drinking water and wastewater
    infrastructure assessments to help bring these facilities back online as
    quickly as possible after the hurricane. Among other things, EPA provided
    assistance to help assess the status of both states' public water systems;
    helped collect and analyze drinking water samples, including providing
    mobile labs to help with this effort; and provided information to the
    public, such as flyers about drinking water quality. EPA's Office of
    Emergency Management also noted in its September 2006 annual report that
    EPA was working closely with FEMA and Louisiana and Mississippi state
    officials to establish long-term recovery plans, with an emphasis on water
    and wastewater infrastructure.

    EPA also coordinated with various federal and state agencies to test
    surface water bodies (such as rivers, lakes, and the Gulf of Mexico) and
    floodwaters in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Among other
    efforts, EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
    Food and Drug Administration, and the U.S. Geological Survey coordinated
    an environmental impact assessment of the coastal waters throughout the
    affected region. By integrating response activities aboard two EPA and
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration survey and research
    vessels, small boat teams were able to characterize the magnitude and
    extent of the coastal contamination and ecological effects from these
    hurricanes. These efforts, which were conducted between September 27 and
    October 14, 2005, generally found that the water was safe for recreational
    use, including swimming. EPA also coordinated with the Mississippi
    Department of Environmental Quality to conduct a water quality study in
    the rivers and bays along the Mississippi coast in September 2005. The
    objective of this study was to provide sediment and
    water quality data on the major bay systems along the Mississippi
    Sound.^16 According to this study, few pollutants were identified.

    The severe and sustained flooding of about 80 percent of New Orleans and
    large areas of Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes from Hurricanes
    Katrina and Rita prompted EPA and the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality to test the floodwaters and the resulting sediment
    from the hurricanes. Because the flooded portions of the New Orleans area
    were below sea level and had little natural drainage, there were grave
    concerns about the environmental health risks as the floodwaters
    commingled with contaminants such as oil and gas from ruptured lines and
    storage tanks; sewage; and various chemicals leached from abandoned drums,
    containers, and vehicles. The additional storm surge from Hurricane Rita,
    which occurred about 1 month after Katrina, further exacerbated the
    situation when it reflooded much of New Orleans and the surrounding
    parishes. To determine the potential environmental effects of the
    floodwaters, EPA and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
    collected nearly 400 water samples of the flooded areas and also
    periodically collected samples from Lake Pontchartrain as the floodwaters
    were being pumped from the flooded areas around New Orleans into the lake.
    The samples from the floodwaters were tested for bacteria and about 200
    chemicals. While numerous samples revealed elevated bacteria levels, EPA
    and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality reported that this
    was expected, given the commingling of floodwaters with sewage collection
    system waters. Although a small number of samples contained concentrations
    of chemicals that exceeded short-term (i.e., 90 days) standards for dermal
    contact and incidental ingestion, the agencies concluded that there was
    realistically no circumstance that would lead to continuous exposure to
    the floodwaters beyond a few days.^17 Unlike Louisiana, areas in
    Mississippi and Alabama hit by Katrina did not experience any sustained
    flooding, although they did experience severe damage from the hurricane's
    storm surge, high winds, and rainfall.

    13EPA Region 4 also compared the sample results from the Superfund sites reviewed in
    Mississippi and Alabama with the EPA Office of Water 2004 National Recommended Water
    Quality Criteria and EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals to determine if those
    sites� conditions might also represent previously unrecognized risks to human health and
    the environment.

    14EPA concluded from the assessment of the Agriculture Street Landfill in New Orleans, 1 of
    the 24 Superfund sites reviewed, that the flooding did not cause any lead (the contaminant
    of concern) to migrate up through the site�s soil cover. However, sediment samples EPA
    collected on the site and in the area contained benzo(a)pyrene levels that exceeded
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality risk standards. EPA reported on August 17,
    2006, that it had contacted the Housing Authority of New Orleans (the property owner and
    manager) regarding the sampling results and planned to work with the authority to ensure
    plans for the site addressed this contamination. Additionally, EPA stated it would provide a
    closeout report when the authority announced its specific plans.
    15The one exception EPA Region 4 identified involved the Naval Construction Battalion
    Center in Gulfport, Mississippi. Although EPA detected elevated dioxins at some of the
    sampling points near this facility, the agency concluded that none of the concentrations
    detected caused concern about effects on human health and that the site was not adversely
    impacted by Katrina.

    Once the Army Corps of Engineers completed draining the floodwaters from
    the New Orleans area on October 11, 2005, the environmental health risk to
    area residents and emergency responders from the waters was eliminated.
    However, renewed concerns arose over the potentially contaminated sediment
    the floodwaters left behind. As the floodwaters in New Orleans and the
    surrounding parishes receded, sediments ranging in depth from less than an
    inch to several feet remained in some areas.^18 As would be expected,
    sediment was more prevalent in those areas where the floodwaters flowed
    over or breached levees, while in other areas, little or no sediment was
    left behind.

    EPA, in coordination with the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality and several other federal and state agencies, carried out sediment
    testing in four phases, collecting up to 1,800 sediment and soil samples.
    The samples were collected from streets and other public access areas,
    including golf courses, in sections of New Orleans that had been flooded.
    On the basis of these samples, EPA and the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality generally concluded, in conjunction with other
    federal and state agencies, that the sediments left behind by the flooding
    were not expected to cause adverse health effects to individuals returning
    to New Orleans. Specifics regarding the four phases of the sediment
    testing follow. Unless otherwise noted, the samples were (1) analyzed for
    about 200 metals and organic chemicals, including lead, arsenic, gasoline,
    diesel fuel, and oil, as well as for bacteria; and (2) evaluated using
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Risk Evaluation/Corrective
    Action Program Screening Option Standards and EPA's risk criteria based on
    long-term (30 years) residential exposure assumptions.^19

    18For purposes of its hurricane response sampling effort, EPA defined sediment as �residuals
    deposited by receding floodwaters which may include historical sediment from nearby
    water bodies, soil from yards, road and construction debris, and other materials.�

    19The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality has developed a Risk
    Evaluation/Corrective Action Program to address risks to human health and the
    environment from the release of chemical constituents. The program consists of a screening
    option and three management options. The screening option may be used to manage an area
    of concern expeditiously, or determine if it warrants further investigation, while the threetiered
    management options allow site evaluation and corrective action efforts to be tailored
    to site conditions and risks.

    oPhase 1 of the sediment sampling included about 450 samples as follows:
    (1) 430 individual samples EPA collected from September 10 to October 14,
    2005, in Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes; (2) 23
    samples collected by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality on
    November 10, 2005;  ^20 and (3) 14 samples collected on November 19 and
    20, 2005, by EPA and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality at
    locations tested previously where contaminant concentrations exceeded the
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and EPA risk criteria.^21

    oPhase 2 of the sediment sampling included about 280 individual samples
    collected in the Lower Ninth Ward (part of Orleans Parish) and St. Bernard
    Parish from October 29 to November 27, 2005--areas that were severely
    impacted by the flooding.

    oPhase 3 of the sediment sampling focused primarily on 43 locations in
    flood-impacted areas where elevated concentrations of arsenic, lead, or
    benzo(a)pyrene had been found in phases 1 and 2.^22 To determine whether
    the elevated levels of these contaminants were limited to the specific
    location originally sampled or reflected more widespread contamination, up
    to 10 composite samples were collected within a 500-foot radius of each of
    the 43 locations from February 16 to February 22, 2006. The composite
    samples combined four discrete sediment or soil samples, and most were
    analyzed only for the individual contaminant that was elevated in the
    original sediment sample.

    oPhase 4 sediment sampling included 586 samples collected in Orleans and
    St. Bernard Parishes from February 6 to June 30, 2006.^23 These samples
    were analyzed for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, pesticides,
    herbicides, diesel and oil range organic chemicals, and metals. In this
    phase, potential sampling sites were selected using a grid of the "eastern
    half of the flooded area." EPA identified 1,676 potential sampling sites
    on the grid. EPA did not collect samples from a majority of these sites
    (1,090) because (1) the sampling site was in a commercial area, (2) the
    sediment was less than 0.5 centimeters thick (less than one-quarter of an
    inch), or (3) no sediment was present.

    20These 23 samples were analyzed for arsenic, lead, polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons, and
    total petroleum hydrocarbons.

    21The agencies resampled at 14 of the 145 locations at which the initial sampling exceeded
    the risk criteria based on their resampling criteria: the sediment depth had to exceed 1.5
    centimeters (a little more than one-half inch).

    22To address public concerns, phase 3 also included samples in public access areas of a
    neighborhood near a former pesticide blending facility that had not been included in phases
    1 and 2. These composite samples were analyzed for a complete spectrum of pesticides.
    23Duplicate samples were collected at 126 of the locations, resulting in the analysis of 712
    samples.

    EPA's response activities have included providing a substantial amount of
    information to the public on the environmental health risks from Katrina,
    including three environmental assessment summaries that focused primarily
    on the results of these sediment samples taken in New Orleans. The first
    summary also conveyed the results of air and water sampling in the New
    Orleans area. Beginning shortly after Hurricane Katrina, in September
    2005, EPA started to provide other information to the public on
    environmental health risks and actions to mitigate exposures via flyers,
    health advisories, and public service announcements that were distributed
    at various locations throughout the hurricane-damaged areas, made
    available to the media, and posted on EPA's Web page. For example, EPA
    reported that it distributed over 3.8 million flyers on various topics,
    such as hazardous waste collection, mold problems, and potential
    environmental health hazards.

    Overall, EPA's response activities varied in Louisiana and Mississippi
    based, in part, on the environmental impacts and needs of the affected
    parishes and counties. While EPA's response is complete in Mississippi,
    EPA Region 6 continues to assist the state of Louisiana with its recovery
    efforts and currently plans to continue to do so until at least September
    2007. State and local government decisions continue to affect the length
    of time EPA will need to maintain a presence in Louisiana parishes. For
    example, local government decisions about home condemnation and demolition
    processes will affect the length of time EPA needs to continue its debris
    management and air monitoring activities in the New Orleans area.

    EPA's Air Monitoring for Releases of Asbestos Fibers in New Orleans Does
    Not Adequately Address Neighborhoods with Substantial Building Demolition
    and Renovation Activities

    EPA's Clean Air Act asbestos regulation seeks to minimize the significant
    human health risks--including lung disease and cancer--associated with
    inhalation of asbestos fibers from building demolition and other
    activities. To facilitate and expedite demolition and rebuilding following
    Hurricane Katrina, EPA stated that it would not enforce certain
    requirements under the asbestos regulation, at the request of the
    Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of Environmental Quality. In
    addition, many demolition and renovation activities--those by individual
    homeowners--are generally unregulated under EPA's asbestos regulation. EPA
    took steps to measure asbestos emissions after Hurricane Katrina--for
    example, initially more than doubling from 5 to 12 the ambient (outdoor)
    air monitors in the area prior to the storms.^24 However, air monitors
    generally have not been located in areas in which much of the building
    demolition and renovation is occurring.

    24According to EPA, the monitors can measure ambient concentrations of the following
    potential pollutants and categories of pollutants from local and regional sources: arsenic,
    asbestos, lead, particulate matter, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon chemicals, and volatile
    organic compounds.

    EPA's Clean Air Act Asbestos Regulation Covering Building Demolition
    Activities Seeks to Minimize the Significant Human Health Risks Associated
    with Exposure to Asbestos Fibers in the Air

    The Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended, requires EPA to develop and enforce
    regulations to protect the general public from exposure to hazardous air
    pollutants--also called air toxics--that are known to be hazardous to
    human health. Asbestos is an air toxic consisting of naturally occurring
    fibrous minerals with high tensile strength, the ability to be woven, and
    resistance to heat and most chemicals. Because of these properties,
    asbestos fibers have been used in a wide range of manufactured goods,
    including roofing shingles, ceiling and floor tiles, paper and cement
    products, and textiles. Exposure to asbestos can be harmful to human
    health if asbestos fibers are released into the air, such as when asbestos
    is disturbed or in poor condition and these fibers are inhaled into the
    lungs. Such releases of asbestos fibers can occur during building
    renovations and demolitions. Asbestos was among the first air toxics EPA
    regulated. EPA has promulgated regulations governing the renovation and
    demolition of buildings with asbestos-containing materials to protect the
    public from the risks associated with exposure to asbestos fibers.^25

    25See National Emissions Standard for Asbestos, 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart M.

    Some significant health effects associated with asbestos exposure--such as
    asbestosis and lung cancer--have been recognized for many years.
    Asbestosis is a serious, progressive, long-term disease caused by inhaling
    asbestos fibers that produces scarring and inflammation of the lung
    tissue, thereby making it harder for the lungs to get oxygen into the
    blood. Lung cancer causes the largest number of deaths related to asbestos
    exposure. Individuals working in occupations involving the mining,
    milling, manufacturing, and use of asbestos and its products, including
    construction and demolition workers, are more likely to get lung cancer
    than the general population.

    Diseases linked to asbestos exposure take a long time to develop.
    Specifically, most cases of lung cancer or asbestosis in asbestos workers
    occur 15 years or more after initial exposure to asbestos, and cases of
    mesothelioma (cancer of the lining of the lungs) are commonly diagnosed 30
    years or more after exposure. Cases of mesothelioma have been reported in
    family members of asbestos workers after exposure to these workers at home
    and in individuals without occupational exposure who live close to
    asbestos mines.^26

    According to EPA, scientists have not been able to identify a safe, or
    threshold, level for exposure to airborne asbestos. Rather than regulating
    this air toxic by setting emission standards for emission sources, as is
    typically done to mitigate health risks, EPA's national emissions
    standards for asbestos regulate various potential sources of asbestos
    emissions, including renovation and demolition activities, by setting
    standards for work practices.^27 EPA has granted some states, including
    Louisiana and Mississippi, approval to implement and enforce the asbestos
    standards. However, EPA retains the authority to enforce its requirements;
    to oversee states' implementation of the air toxics program in general;
    and to withdraw the delegation of the program if a state does not, for
    example, adequately enforce the program. Under EPA's regulations of
    demolitions involving asbestos, the owner or operator of the demolition
    activity generally must

    oinspect buildings for asbestos where demolition or substantial renovation
    activity will occur;

    oprovide written notice to EPA or the state of intention to renovate or
    demolish buildings that have asbestos-containing material;

    oremove all regulated asbestos-containing material before any activity
    begins that would break up, dislodge, or disturb the material;^28

    owet all regulated asbestos-containing material exposed during cutting or
    disjoining operations and stripping operations so that no emissions are
    visible during the demolition;

    otake steps to contain asbestos-containing material in preparation for
    disposal, such as wetting the material or encasing it in leak-tight
    wrapping; and

    oundertake the removal of asbestos-containing material in the presence of
    an on-site representative who has been trained to comply with the
    provisions of the asbestos standard.

    26Related information on the adverse health effects due to asbestos can be found via the
    Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
    Registry Web page at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/health_effects.

    27The Clean Air Act provides EPA with the authority to promulgate a work practice standard
    to mitigate health risks if it is not feasible to establish an emission standard. 42 U.S.C. �
    7412(h). In its 1978 rule amending EPA�s asbestos standard, the agency said that it was not
    feasible to prescribe a numerical emission standard for building demolitions or renovations.
    See 40 C.F.R. � 61.145(c), Procedures for asbestos emissions control.

    However, if a building is to be demolished by government order because it
    is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse, it is not
    required to be inspected for asbestos, and the regulated
    asbestos-containing materials are not required to be identified and
    removed first. Nevertheless, specified notification requirements and
    emission control requirements--primarily the wetting of
    asbestos-containing materials to limit releases of asbestos fibers--still
    apply to the demolition operation.^29 Importantly, these standards
    generally do not apply to the demolition or renovation of a residential
    building by or for an individual homeowner.  ^30

    28Regulated asbestos containing material (RACM) means (a) Friable asbestos material, (b)
    Category I nonfriable ACM that has become friable, (c) Category I nonfriable ACM that will
    be or has been subjected to sanding, grinding, cutting, or abrading, or (d) Category II
    nonfriable ACM that has a high probability of becoming or has become crumbled,
    pulverized, or reduced to powder by the forces expected to act on the material in the course
    of demolition or renovation operations regulated by the asbestos work practice standards.
    Category I nonfriable asbestos-containing material (ACM) means asbestos-containing
    packings, gaskets, resilient floor covering, and asphalt roofing products containing more
    than 1 percent asbestos as determined using the method specified in appendix E, subpart E,
    40 C.F.R. part 763, section 1, Polarized Light Microscopy. Category II nonfriable ACM means
    any material, excluding Category I nonfriable ACM, containing more than 1 percent asbestos
    as determined using the methods specified in appendix E, subpart E, 40 C.F.R. part 763,
    section 1, Polarized Light Microscopy that, when dry, cannot be crumbled, pulverized, or
    reduced to powder by hand pressure.

    Many of the flooded homes in New Orleans that will be demolished or
    substantially renovated are likely to contain asbestos-containing
    materials, such as roof shingles, siding, flooring, and ceilings. For
    example, analysis by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
    shows that the majority of land tracts in the New Orleans area contain
    homes built before 1980, when use of asbestos products was prevalent. As
    of January 2007, about 25,000 homes had been identified as awaiting
    demolition--98 percent of which are concentrated in the Orleans and St.
    Bernard Parishes.^31 According to the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality, another 80,000 homes that were flooded in the New
    Orleans area are not yet included in the demolition estimates, but many of
    them will likely be demolished. Those that are not demolished will very
    likely have to be substantially renovated.

    EPA Has Issued "No Action Assurances" for Certain Clean Air Act Asbestos
    Requirements Governing the Demolition of Buildings to Help Expedite the
    Gulf Coast Cleanup

    On rare occasions, EPA issues "no action assurance" letters stating that
    it will not enforce certain legal requirements. EPA recognizes that such
    assurances could erode the credibility of the agency's enforcement program
    by creating real or perceived inequities in the agency's treatment of the
    regulated community. Consequently, under EPA policy guidance, such
    assurances are to be used only in extremely unusual cases when clearly
    necessary to serve the public interest--such as to avoid extreme risks to
    public health or safety or to obtain important information for research
    purposes--when no other mechanism can adequately address the problem
    presented.

    2940 C.F.R. � 61.145(a)(3); see EPA Office of Compliance, Managing Your Environmental
    Responsibilities: A Planning Guide for Construction and Development, at VII-15 (April
    2005).

    30Demolition or renovation by the individual homeowner of a residential building with four
    or fewer dwelling units is not covered by EPA�s asbestos national emissions standards,
    unless the demolition is part of a larger overall project carried out by one owner or operator.

    31Summary of homes remaining for demolition. Information compiled from the January 6,
    2007, weekly status report from the Department of Homeland Security.

    To facilitate and expedite demolition and rebuilding following Hurricane
    Katrina, Louisiana and Mississippi requested that EPA issue no action
    assurance letters concerning some provisions of the national emissions
    standard for asbestos. In light of the extraordinary demolition, cleanup,
    and debris disposal required on the Gulf Coast, EPA issued several no
    action assurance letters to Louisiana and Mississippi. Under letters
    issued in February 2006, residences that are subject to a
    government-issued demolition order based on the residence being (1)
    structurally unsound but not necessarily in danger of imminent collapse,
    (2) moved off of its foundation, or (3) uninhabitable for other
    environmental reasons, such as flooding, are effectively not subject to
    otherwise applicable requirements for inspection and removal of asbestos
    prior to demolition. Such structures must nonetheless be demolished,
    transported, and disposed of in accordance with specified requirements
    aimed at ensuring adequate protection of any asbestos the buildings may
    contain. These requirements include notification, thorough wetting of the
    building both prior to and during the demolition process, and proper
    disposal of all of the debris as if it contained asbestos.^32 EPA's 2006
    no action assurance letters also allowed government-issued demolition
    orders to be expanded to groups of residences instead of only individual
    residences because it may not be practical for state or local officials to
    make an individual determination for every residential structure. The no
    action assurances apply to the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of
    Environmental Quality, to local governments, and to the Army Corps of
    Engineers, as well as to any persons operating at the direction of these
    government entities.

    The Army Corps of Engineers is the prime contractor for many of the
    demolitions covered by the no action assurances, including all of them in
    Orleans Parish. Some parishes--most notably St. Bernard Parish--use other
    contractors or a mix of the Corps and other contractors. According to data
    from FEMA, of the vast majority of the remaining 25,000 demolitions
    estimated as of January 2007, approximately half are in Orleans Parish and
    half in St. Bernard. Regarding demolitions conducted by the Corps and its
    contractors, the Corps said that approximately 85 percent of the 2,600
    demolitions conducted in Orleans Parish, which includes the Ninth Ward,
    were classified as containing regulated asbestos-containing materials,
    primarily because inspections could not be performed inside properties.^33
    The Corps also said that in other parishes, between 10 percent and 40
    percent of the structures it had demolished were classified as containing
    regulated asbestos-containing materials on the basis of inspections.

    32EPA also issued an April 28, 2006, no action assurance letter to the Louisiana Department
    of Environmental Quality allowing a staging process for debris from approximately 70
    residential structures to be used in debris grinding and burning pilot studies in Louisiana
    until July 31, 2006. However, FEMA did not approve funding for these pilot studies for
    several reasons.

    Initially, the no action assurance letters were in effect for 1 year--that
    is, until February 2007. Officials from Louisiana told us that while EPA's
    no action assurances were helpful in allowing demolitions to proceed at a
    faster pace, a number of other issues, such as landfill capacity and the
    building condemnation process, have contributed to demolition delays. As a
    result, on December 21, 2006, the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality requested an extension of the no action assurances until February
    2008 because many demolitions have yet to be conducted. Citing information
    from the Army Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality told EPA that, as of December 2006, 10,000
    residences had been demolished, but more than 25,000 demolitions are
    likely to be needed.^34 In supplemental information supporting the
    extension request, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
    provided EPA with repopulation estimates on the basis of estimates by The
    Brookings Institution's December 2006 report, Katrina Index: Tracking
    Variables of Post-Katrina Recovery. For the Orleans and St. Bernard
    Parishes, 41 percent and 39 percent, respectively, of the residents were
    estimated to have returned as of August 2006, compared with Census 2000
    population estimates.^35 The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
    also cited a plan for the recovery of the Ninth Ward that stated about 20
    percent of the residents of the Ninth Ward had returned.^36 This plan also
    stated that homeowners have gutted 30 percent of the houses in this ward
    and that owners have repaired or are in the process of repairing another
    30 percent of the housing. A March 2007 update to the Katrina Index, which
    did not update the August 2006 repopulation estimates, stated that
    thousands of college students and families on spring break are coming to
    the Gulf Coast to help with rebuilding; it also reported that the New
    Orleans metropolitan area gained more than 50,000 workers from November
    2006 to January 2007.

    33According to the Army Corps of Engineers, residences it had demolished were inspected
    for asbestos prior to demolition except when it was not safe to enter a structure, the
    structure had transite shingles or siding (which the Corps classifies as regulated asbestoscontaining
    materials), or the structure was completely demolished.

    34In February 2007, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality stated that 12,000
    residences had been demolished and estimated 30,000 more home demolitions were needed.

    35The margin of error for the estimates was plus or minus 9.8 percent for Orleans Parish and
    plus or minus 14.4 percent for St. Bernard Parish.

    36A Peoples� Plan for Overcoming the Hurricane Katrina Blues (draft study prepared by
    ACORN Housing/University Partnership, Feb. 1, 2007).

    On February 2, 2007, EPA approved an extension of the no action assurances
    through September 30, 2007, for the 11 parishes covered under Louisiana
    Emergency Declarations and Administrative Orders. EPA also approved an
    extension of the no action assurance it provided the Mississippi
    Department of Environmental Quality through September 30, 2007, for four
    counties in Mississippi. In its no action assurance letters to Louisiana
    and Mississippi, EPA stated that it reserved the right to revoke or modify
    the assurances if it determined that doing so was necessary to protect
    public health or the environment. Moreover, we believe that the potential
    public health effect of demolition and renovation activities by individual
    homeowners--which are generally not regulated under EPA's asbestos work
    practice standards--also warrants evaluation.

    Current Asbestos Monitoring Is Not Sufficient to Assess the Potential
    Public Health and Environmental Impacts of Demolition and Renovation
    Activities

    Many homes in the New Orleans area contain hazardous materials such as
    asbestos that could be released during demolition and renovation
    activities, posing health hazards for individuals exposed to asbestos
    fibers. The bulk of these demolition and renovation activities have yet to
    occur. For example, in December 2006, the Army Corps of Engineers said it
    had completed about 2,000 of the 6,000 to 12,000 residential demolitions
    it expected to perform in the Orleans Parish.^37 In addition to these
    demolitions covered by the no action assurances, the demolition and
    renovation activities by individual homeowners that are outside the scope
    of EPA's asbestos national emissions standards will likely be substantial.
    For example, in December 2006, the Corps stated that the demolition effort
    by individual homeowners was approximately equal to the public demolition
    effort. Further, because of mold problems caused by the extensive
    flooding, many residences that do not require demolition must nonetheless
    be gutted--stripping the walls down to the studs--before they can be
    renovated. Numerous volunteer organizations continue to help individual
    owners by gutting the homes. For example, the Corps reported that, as of
    October 2006, 6,500 homes were on a list for gutting services to be
    provided by volunteers from various nonprofit organizations. According to
    EPA, whether demolitions by volunteer groups would be subject to the
    asbestos work practice standards depends upon the number and location of
    sites and who is supervising the demolition. That thousands of demolitions
    and substantial renovations may occur in the same geographic area and in
    the same general time frame without being subject to the asbestos work
    practice standards represents a potential health problem--especially since
    the protective requirement to wet any asbestos-containing materials does
    not apply to unregulated demolitions and disposal.

    37According to the Corps, the number of residence demolitions continues to be speculative
    and is dependent on the city of New Orleans finalizing condemnation packages.

    To be responsive to potential public questions and concerns, EPA took
    steps to measure asbestos emissions after Hurricane Katrina--initially
    more than doubling from 5 to 12 the number of the ambient (outdoor) air
    monitors in the New Orleans area prior to the storm. EPA officials said
    the agency's monitoring network was designed to include measuring the
    effects from both the regulated asbestos-containing material to which no
    action assurance letters might apply and activities not regulated, which
    would include demolition or renovation activities by or for individual
    homeowners.^38 In July 2006, the agency scaled back ambient air monitoring
    to its prestorm level of five ambient air quality monitors and also
    reduced the frequency of sampling to several times a month.^39 EPA said
    the decision to reduce the monitoring sites was based in part on the fact
    that no measurable amounts of asbestos fibers were found for the period of
    time that a 12-monitor network had been in place.^40 However, because the
    demolition activities in the New Orleans area generally did not start
    until 7 or more months after Hurricane Katrina, EPA's cutback in asbestos
    air monitoring occurred before (1) most of the demolitions that are now
    completed had taken place and (2) the substantial number of remaining
    demolitions had begun.^41

    38EPA is using a 1-year screening level of 0.01 fibers of the length greater than 5 �m found
    per cubic centimeter of air. According to EPA, this screening level was developed with
    consideration of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act regulations and EPA�s
    asbestos risk estimates.

    39One monitor is in St. Tammany Parish, north of Lake Ponchartrain and Orleans Parish; one
    is in Metairie, west of Orleans; one is in St. Bernard Parish (Arabi); and two are in Orleans
    Parish�in the north at the University of New Orleans and in the east at a fire training
    academy near some landfill operations.

    40According to air sampling information on EPA�s Web page, measurements of asbestos were
    below the method detection limit, a value below the minimum detectable by the method
    used. According to EPA, the reduction in air monitors was also a response to the delays in
    the demolition activities.

    41The Army Corps of Engineers demolished the first storm-damaged homes in Orleans
    Parish in March 2006, and demolition activities started in St. Bernard Parish in April 2006.
    According to Corps data reported in the December 2006 Brookings Institution Katrina
    Index cited above, the Corps had completed 195 demolitions in Orleans Parish as of July
    2006 and 2,289 as of December 2006.

    While officials from EPA's Office of Research and Development said the use
    of air monitors would not be effective in detecting asbestos emissions
    from home demolitions and renovations unless monitors were located
    immediately adjacent to demolition and renovation sites, monitors
    generally have not been located in areas in which much of the building
    demolition and renovation is occurring. For example, since Hurricane
    Katrina, EPA has not located ambient or emissions monitors in the Ninth
    Ward, a residential area subjected to widespread flooding in which
    extensive demolition and renovation are occurring. Specifically, the
    closest monitor is in Arabi, a city south of the Ninth Ward. EPA's air
    monitoring focus has not included proximity to demolition sites. EPA
    officials said the locations for the monitors, initially selected in
    October 2005, were chosen based on proximity to public access (e.g., near
    populated areas), wind and geographical factors, and locations of
    waste-moving activities.

    In January 2007, EPA said that its air monitoring currently focuses on
    more limited geographic areas where "grinding and other remediation
    activities are ongoing"--for example, at debris volume reduction sites,
    which are often landfills. This monitoring does not rely solely on the
    five ambient air monitors around New Orleans but instead includes some
    monitoring at sites involving waste handling, burning, or grinding
    activities. According to EPA, conducting air monitoring at debris
    reduction sites is more conservative than at demolition sites since volume
    reduction activities such as grinding or burning have the potential to
    release more asbestos fibers as the material is destroyed. While this
    focus on debris and landfills is important, so, too, is monitoring data
    from areas undergoing concentrated levels of demolition and renovation.

    Along these lines, according to EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers and its
    contractors who are conducting demolitions under government orders have
    monitored the air at demolition sites for asbestos emissions, and the
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality has told EPA that this
    monitoring has found "little or no asbestos emissions." For example, in
    November 2006, one Corps contractor reported on air sampling conducted at
    demolition sites where samples were primarily taken from the site
    perimeters (using personal sampling pumps) and from employees wearing
    personal monitoring equipment required by the Occupational Safety and
    Health Administration (OSHA).^42 Most of the sampling was conducted at
    sites that the Corps classified as containing regulated asbestos
    materials, and the contractor concluded that exposures to asbestos were
    minimal and respiratory protection was needed only as a precautionary
    measure.

    Such air monitoring data from the Corps and its contractors do not,
    however, address potential asbestos emissions from the privately sponsored
    demolitions and renovations by individual homeowners. Since these
    activities are not regulated--and emissions control actions such as
    wetting the material from before the demolition process through disposal
    are not required--the potential for asbestos emissions at these sites is
    greater than at the regulated sites. Because EPA's air monitors have not
    been deployed in and around neighborhoods where demolition and renovation
    activities--both publicly and privately sponsored--are concentrated, the
    agency's finding of no measurable amounts of asbestos at its ambient
    monitoring sites does not necessarily address the asbestos to which
    residents, workers, and volunteers may be exposed in some neighborhoods.

    This monitoring gap exists even though immediately after Hurricane
    Katrina, EPA recognized the potential health and environmental issues that
    could arise in New Orleans from asbestos emissions at both demolition and
    disposal sites. Specifically, EPA's September 2005 Overview Plan for
    Ambient Air Monitoring After Hurricane Katrina--which addresses air
    monitoring in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama--discusses asbestos
    monitoring tentatively planned at a number of fixed sites and states that
    additional monitoring requirements to more specifically address both
    asbestos demolition and disposal operations may be established. The
    October 2005 Regional Air Monitoring Plan for Hurricane Katrina in
    Louisiana, developed by EPA Region 6, mentions air monitoring for
    potential emissions during decontamination, demolition, removal, and
    remedial action in impacted areas, but it does not establish additional
    monitoring requirements for asbestos demolition or disposal operations.
    This plan also notes that a site-specific air sampling plan will be
    established to assess air pollutants resulting from debris burns and
    building demolition. In this regard, EPA Region 6 issued its Air
    Monitoring and Sampling Plan for Construction and Demolition Debris
    Burning or Grinding Sites in February 2006.^43 This plan addresses the
    asbestos sampling methodology to be used around activity areas such as
    debris piles or landfills. While this plan notes that numerous properties
    are expected to contain hazardous materials such as asbestos that could
    result in inhalation exposure, posing health hazards for individuals in
    the vicinity, it does not include any requirements for monitoring asbestos
    emissions at building renovation or demolition sites.

    42While the report includes some samples covering other activities, such as canal cleaning
    and debris removal, 93 percent of the samples identified in the report were collected at
    demolition sites.

    In contrast, EPA's conditions for granting the first Hurricane
    Katrina-related asbestos no action assurance to Louisiana in October
    2005--which Louisiana chose not to use and which expired in April
    2006--included a requirement that the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality ensure that adequate monitoring was conducted prior
    to and during demolition of residences.^44 EPA's conditions, which were
    reviewed by EPA's Science Advisory Board, specifically directed Louisiana
    to develop a plan for monitoring that provides information sufficient to
    ensure adequate protection of public health and the environment and to
    have the plan approved by EPA Region 6. EPA further directed that the plan
    must, at a minimum, include representative asbestos monitoring at
    demolition sites.

    Along these lines, an EPA pilot study conducted in 2006 in Fort Smith,
    Arkansas, demonstrates that air monitoring close to the source of asbestos
    emissions is important to detect releases of asbestos fibers. The pilot
    was designed to test the effectiveness of an alternative asbestos control
    method for building demolitions using monitoring information from the
    demolition
    site and the landfill.^45 Specifically, the quality assurance project plan
    for the pilot--which had been subject to independent peer review--called
    for, among other things, perimeter asbestos monitoring during demolition
    as well as at landfill sites.^46 The quality assurance project plan also
    specified that an air monitoring network consisting of two concentric
    rings of monitors would be placed at intervals around each of the two
    buildings being demolished. According to EPA officials, it is preferable
    to have emissions monitors stationed as close to a potential source of
    asbestos emissions as possible because the risk of exposure decreases by
    orders of magnitude the farther away one is from the emissions source. For
    this reason, EPA's pilot was intentionally located in Arkansas in a
    "remote, secure location to ensure no public exposure," with the nearest
    residence approximately 2 miles from the demolition site. The plan also
    called for asbestos monitoring in the soil at the demolition site, in dust
    that settled on surfaces near the demolition site, and in collected runoff
    water from wetting the building and debris during demolition and debris
    loading. EPA officials said that any monitoring of asbestos emissions at
    demolition sites in New Orleans would not need to be as elaborate as that
    done for the pilot, which was conducted to develop data for potential use
    in a revision to EPA's asbestos regulation. However, they noted that using
    the second concentric ring of monitors in the pilot allowed EPA's Office
    of Research and Development to compare air monitor results between the
    outer perimeter ring and the inner ring and project emissions levels
    outward with increased accuracy.

    43Region 4 officials told us they did not develop additional air monitoring plans for
    Mississippi because they determined that the overview plan developed for both states was
    adequate.

    44The initial no action assurance letter largely focused on disposition of the construction and
    demolition debris using an open burning technology. Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality officials said the state chose to not conduct the test burn required
    under the terms of the letter or exercise the flexibility EPA authorized in the letter because
    of the conditions for the test burn and the time it would take to reach agreement with EPA
    on a test protocol.

    45The methods used in the pilot had more stringent requirements before and during
    demolition than EPA is requiring under the current asbestos no action assurances in
    Louisiana and Mississippi.

    46Environmental Quality Management and EPA, Quality Assurance Project Plan:
    Evaluation of an Alternative Asbestos Control Method for Building Demolition (Mar. 31,
    2006).

    Some Shortcomings in EPA's Communications on Environmental Health Risks
    Have Limited the Communications' Usefulness to the Public

    EPA's key communications about the potential health risks from exposure to
    environmental contamination in New Orleans--three environmental assessment
    summaries prepared with, among others, the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality--did not sufficiently disclose some information that
    would have helped residents better understand the potential health risks
    of returning home and how to mitigate them. In addition, some of EPA's
    other communications, including flyers and public service announcements,
    provided unclear and inconsistent information on mitigating exposure to
    some contaminants many returning residents would likely be exposed to in
    their homes.

    EPA's Insufficient Disclosure about Its Decisions Regarding Sampling of
    Contaminants Limited Residents' Understanding of the Potential Health
    Risks of Returning Home

    Following disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, an immediate and primary
    concern of evacuees is whether and when it is safe to return to their
    homes. Accurate and timely information on many factors is important for
    residents to make this assessment--and to determine what they should bring
    with them when they do return, including items to mitigate potential
    health risks. One important factor residents need information on is the
    environmental contamination to which they may be exposed when they return
    home. Such contamination was a particular concern in New Orleans, a
    densely populated, older urban area in proximity to petroleum and chemical
    industry sites, as well as a number of Superfund sites, from which
    contaminants may have migrated into residential areas.

    EPA worked with other federal and state agencies to support local
    officials evaluating home and neighborhood safety. In addition, as
    discussed earlier, EPA provided a substantial amount of information to the
    public on environmental health risks using reports (environmental
    assessment summaries), flyers, public service announcements made available
    to the media, and EPA's Web page. However, EPA's communications about the
    potential health risks from environmental contamination in New
    Orleans--three environmental assessment summaries prepared with, among
    others, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality^47--were
    released about 3, 6, and 11 months after Hurricane Katrina, limiting their
    usefulness to residents who would have benefited from more timely
    information about the environmental health risks they could face when
    returning home. These environmental assessment summaries convey some
    helpful information about the floodwaters, sediments, and air quality in
    the New Orleans area after the hurricanes--that is, about the potential
    health risks of being outdoors in the New Orleans area.

    47In addition, EPA worked with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Agency
    for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the Louisiana Department of Health and
    Hospitals, and FEMA.

    However, because some sampling decisions that EPA made were not
    sufficiently disclosed, residents could have been given the wrong
    impression about the potential health risks they could face in returning
    to their homes. For example, the first environmental assessment summary,
    released in December 2005, states that "the great majority of the data
    available show that adverse health effects would not be expected from
    exposure to the sediments from previously flooded areas provided people
    used common sense and good personal hygiene and safety practices."
    However, 8 months later in its third and final assessment summary,
    released in August 2006, EPA said that the December 2005 summary indicated
    no immediate health risk to residents returning for a quick assessment of
    damage to their homes. The August 2006 summary said that the focus of the
    analyses of sediments reported on in December 2005 was to assess "(1)
    whether hazardous substances were present in the sediment in residential
    areas and (2) the potential health effects to emergency workers and
    residents from short-term exposure to any hazardous substances found in
    the sediment." Because the December 2005 summary did not include this
    qualification, residents could have misinterpreted it and assumed it was
    generally safe to return to their homes.

    EPA also insufficiently disclosed an important decision it had made about
    sampling in New Orleans. That is, all sediment samples analyzed were taken
    outdoors, from streets and other areas of public access in previously
    flooded residential areas, and samples were not collected from private
    property, such as residents' yards or inside residences. Regarding
    disclosure of this sampling decision, EPA states in its first assessment
    summary that all of its sampling was conducted "outdoors." While the
    subsequent assessment summaries issued in March 2006 and August 2006
    provide overviews of the previous assessment summaries, they do not
    disclose that the assessments did not include sediment samples taken
    inside buildings or on private property. For example, the March 2006
    summary states only that the December 2005 assessment summary was based on
    the results of "samples from floodwaters and sediments analyzed throughout
    the flood-impacted areas."

    However, according to EPA officials, in its assessments, the agency
    assumes that results from sediment samples collected from streets or other
    public access areas in residential neighborhoods can be used to
    characterize the degree and nature of contamination in New Orleans,
    including inside homes and in yards. We believe this assumption is
    important and warrants highlighting in the EPA environmental assessment
    summaries for two main reasons. First, environmental contamination levels
    inside buildings can potentially be significantly higher than and
    different from the contamination levels outside for a variety of reasons,
    potentially causing more adverse health effects. For example, contaminants
    that could have been washed into a building during the flooding--such as
    petroleum-based products and arsenic--are not dispersed into the
    atmosphere over time if confined indoors. Moreover, any toxic chemicals or
    other contaminants already in a building at the time of the flooding--such
    as pesticides, asbestos, and lead-based paint--may be released inside the
    building. Finally, after flooding, mold frequently forms and spreads. For
    example, in the case of the Gulf Coast 2005 hurricanes, the Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) concluded that the duration and
    extent of the flooding and the number of structures flooded made massive
    mold contamination a certainty.^48 Along these lines, the Natural
    Resources Defense Council conducted tests in several mold-contaminated
    homes in New Orleans and found that mold in one home was at concentrations
    that would render the building "dangerously uninhabitable"; in three other
    homes, mold spore concentrations were "dangerously high." In addition to
    causing respiratory discomfort, mold also can cause major allergic
    reactions, asthma attacks, and a pneumonia-like illness (pneumonitis) that
    causes breathing difficulty and fever. Second, to understand the level of
    assurance that EPA can provide about the extent to which localized areas
    of contamination may exist throughout the city, it is important to
    understand that limiting sediment and soil sampling to outdoor, public
    access areas can be problematic in that, for example, sediments in streets
    may be subject to more dispersion than those that settled in more
    protected areas, such as close to residences.

    Further, regarding indoor sampling, in September 2005, EPA's Science
    Advisory Board had suggested that EPA consider some indoor sampling in New
    Orleans, including sampling of surface films on walls and structures,
    because material deposited outdoors may have been different from material
    indoors, where the potential for human exposure is likely to be greater.
    At that time, EPA said that indoor testing of private homes could not be
    conducted in the initial sampling effort because of worker safety issues
    and difficult logistical issues--such as obtaining owners' consent--that
    could not be quickly resolved. EPA stated the agency would revisit this
    recommendation as these issues were addressed. To date, while CDC has
    tested some New Orleans homes for mold contamination, EPA has not tested
    for contamination inside homes that were flooded as a result of the
    hurricanes. EPA officials told us the agency has not tested indoors
    because state and local governments did not request this assistance and
    because EPA determined that indoor testing was not necessary to
    characterize the environmental contamination resulting from the storm.

    48Generally, CDC has said that any structure flooded after hurricanes or major floods should
    be presumed to contain materials contaminated with mold if those materials were not
    thoroughly dried within 48 hours.

    During the time EPA was conducting the sediment sampling program, the
    agency posted test results on its Web page as the results became
    available, identifying the general area of the sampling sites on a map of
    the New Orleans area. Thus, any residents with access to the Internet and
    with experience in searching and reviewing government Web sites could
    obtain some information about the environmental contamination in New
    Orleans prior to the release of the assessment summaries. However, the
    information about the individual samples on EPA's Web page is highly
    technical and would be of limited value to individuals who are not experts
    in health risk assessment. For example, the Web page provides information
    on the micrograms per kilogram (ug/kg) of arsenic and benzo(a)pyrene in
    the sediment at one sampling site. Accompanying text indicates whether the
    detected levels were above or below the "LDEQ RECAP value" and states that
    in cases where they exceeded the RECAP value, "the levels fall within
    EPA's risk range of 1 in 1,000,000 to 1 in 10,000 risk of an individual
    developing cancer over a lifetime from exposure to those concentrations in
    residential soils." Although we believe that posting data on the
    individual samples on EPA's Web site was not a particularly effective tool
    for communicating information to residents about potential health risks
    and mitigation strategies, we agree with EPA's Inspector General that
    EPA's posting of information on sediment contamination on its Web page
    provided timely information to the states and other federal decision
    makers for use in determining associated risk and impact assessment.^49

    49EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA Provided Quality and Timely Information on
    Hurricane Katrina Hazardous Material Releases and Debris Management, Report No.
    2006-P-00023 (Washington, D.C., May 2, 2006).

    Some Information EPA Provided to Residents in Its Public Service
    Communications Was Unclear and Inconsistent

    Although EPA did not perform environmental assessments of any flooded
    homes in New Orleans, it did provide information to residents based on
    general knowledge and assumptions about potential environmental health
    risks inside buildings following disasters. Specifically, EPA relied on
    flyers, public service announcements, and EPA's Web site to provide
    information on the potential health risks in buildings stemming from
    exposure to, for example, asbestos, lead, and mold--three contaminants
    that were of concern to EPA and other officials immediately after the
    hurricanes. While the flyers, public service announcements, and documents
    on EPA's hurricane Web page provide information on mitigating exposure to
    these contaminants, some information lacks clarity and consistency on
    certain key points.^50 For example, EPA's most widely distributed flyer on
    environmental health risks--EPA and Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality Warn of Potential Environmental Health Hazards When Returning to
    Homes and Businesses^51--states that buildings constructed before 1970 are
    likely to contain asbestos, including pipe and other insulation, ceiling
    tiles, exterior siding, and roof shingles. In contrast, another document
    available on EPA's hurricane Web page, Dealing with Debris and Damaged
    Buildings, states that all structures built before 1975 may contain
    significant amounts of asbestos, and structures built after 1975 may also
    contain asbestos. Further, in developing estimates of the number of homes
    that may contain asbestos, the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality included homes built before 1980 as those likely to contain
    asbestos.^52 Accurate and consistent information about the age of
    buildings that are most likely to contain asbestos is important in helping
    residents understand what protections they may need when entering and
    working in their homes.

    In addition, EPA's flyer on potential environmental health hazards
    recommends seeking assistance from public health authorities and specially
    trained contractors, if possible, when a resident knows or suspects that
    asbestos or lead-based paint may be in the home and these materials have
    been damaged or will be disturbed during cleanup. However, the flyer does
    not contain the following more strongly worded guidance from the Frequent
    Questions document on EPA's hurricane Web page: "Before you begin your
    cleanup, seek help from public health authorities and specially trained
    contractors. Although conditions following a hurricane may make it
    difficult to obtain such assistance, EPA strongly advises against
    individuals attempting to handle such materials themselves."

    50EPA�s hurricane Web page, �Response to 2005 Hurricanes,� is still accessible on EPA�s Web
    site using a search function, but it is no longer highlighted on EPA�s home page.

    51In August 2006, EPA reported that more than 1.3 million of these flyers had been
    distributed, as had about 900,000 flyers on mold problems.

    52This date is consistent with other sources we reviewed that indicate that any building
    constructed before 1980 can be presumed to contain asbestos. See �Asbestos: A Legal
    Primer for Air Force Installation Attorneys,� Air Force Law Review (2004); and �Asbestos in
    Construction Hazard Alert,� The Center to Protect Workers� Rights (2004).

    Both the flyer and the Frequent Questions document then list a number of
    steps individuals should take when handling this debris. However, the
    information provided on the hurricane Web page regarding respiratory
    protection that individuals should wear is more clear and useful than the
    information in the widely distributed flyer on potential environmental
    health hazards and in the relevant EPA public service announcement.
    Specifically, the flyer states, "In handling materials that are believed
    to be contaminated with asbestos or lead, EPA recommends that, at a
    minimum, you wear gloves, goggles, and most importantly, OSHA-approved
    respiratory protection, if available." The public service announcement
    recommends wearing "gloves, goggles, and a face mask." The information on
    EPA's hurricane Web page, however, is more specific about what respiratory
    protection is required, where it can be purchased, and the importance of
    wearing it: "Wear gloves, goggles, pants, shirts, socks, and most
    importantly, a tightly-fitted N-95 OSHA-approved respiratory mask. A
    regular `dust mask' is not enough to protect against lead or asbestos.
    N-95 masks are available at minimal cost at the hardware store. Carefully
    follow instructions when using a respiratory mask to make sure it fits
    correctly. A tight fit is important, and despite the heat, it is the best
    way to protect yourself."

    However, a safety step EPA recommended on its hurricane Web page that many
    individuals were not likely to have been able to perform was to determine
    if asbestos-containing products--specifically, asbestos-cement corrugated
    sheet, asbestos-cement flat sheet, asbestos pipeline wrap, roofing felt,
    vinyl-asbestos floor tile, asbestos-cement shingle, millboard,
    asbestos-cement pipe, and vermiculate-attic insulation--were present in
    their damaged homes. How individuals would determine if these
    asbestos-containing products were present is not clear, as another EPA
    document (available on the general EPA Web site but not cited in either
    the flyer for residents or the Frequent Questions document) states that
    unless they are labeled, materials containing asbestos cannot be
    identified by visual inspection. This document further cautions readers to
    treat the material as if it contained asbestos when in doubt or have it
    sampled and analyzed by a qualified professional.

    Some communications about exposures to mold also were not sufficiently
    clear or consistent to be helpful to residents whose homes had been
    flooded. For example, a flyer distributed to many residents specifically
    addressing mold is more focused on urging people to clean up than on
    providing information on how to protect themselves while doing so. The
    flyer, Cleaning Up After a Flood: Addressing Mold Problems, gives this
    general safety advice: "Take precautions to limit your exposure to mold
    and mold spores when attempting to clean up mold. If you have health
    concerns, you may want to have someone else clean up the mold." Yet this
    flyer does not explain what precautions to take. Moreover, the flyer urges
    residents to act quickly to remove materials contaminated with mold and
    bacteria, explaining that these contaminants can trigger allergic
    reactions and induce respiratory infections. For "more specific
    information on mold," the flyer refers readers to EPA's Indoor Air Quality
    Hotline, EPA and CDC Web sites, and two documents available on EPA's Web
    page (one addressing mold in schools and commercial buildings and the
    other addressing mold in homes). The document that addresses mold in homes
    includes the following somewhat tentative guidance: "In order to limit
    your exposure to airborne mold, you may want to wear an N-95 respirator,
    available at many hardware stores and from companies that advertise on the
    Internet...." However, other information on EPA's general Web site that is
    not specifically cited in the flyer less ambiguously recommends wearing an
    N-95 respirator. Specifically, Flood Cleanup and the Air in Your Home says
    to wear an "N-95 respirator" over the mouth and nose to avoid breathing in
    mold. This publication further explains that a dust mask or handkerchief
    does not provide protection from mold because it can pass through them. In
    contrast, EPA's flyer on potential environmental health hazards advises
    readers to wear "an N-95 respirator, if available, or a dust mask" when,
    for example, cleaning significant areas of mold contamination.

    Importantly, as of March 2007, none of EPA's communications, including its
    hurricane Web page, were updated to highlight comprehensive information on
    mold exposure released by CDC on June 9, 2006. Specifically, CDC's report
    Mold Prevention Strategies and Possible Health Effects in the Aftermath of
    Hurricanes and Major Floods includes population-specific recommendations
    for protection from exposure to mold in buildings after
    hurricanes and major floods.^53 For example, CDC states that healthy
    individuals do not need to take special precautions for exposure to mold
    in buildings after hurricanes when they are observing from outside or
    simply inspecting or assessing damage. However, if healthy individuals are
    recovering moldy personal belongings (thereby disturbing some dust or
    mold), CDC recommends that they wear respiratory protection (N-95
    filtering face pieces), gloves, and dermal protection. This report also
    identifies individuals who should avoid specific activities (inspecting,
    recovering belongings, sweeping, etc.) and specifies the protection they
    should have to conduct the activities. For example, pregnant women and
    those over the age of 65 may recover personal belongings wearing
    respiratory protection, dermal protection, and eye protection but are to
    avoid any sweeping or cleaning activities. Individuals with "profound
    immunosuppression"--such as those with HIV infection--are to avoid all
    exposures, while those with "immunosuppression"--such as those in cancer
    treatment--or those with lung disease can conduct some specified
    activities with recommended protective gear.

    53CDC, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 55(RR08); 1-27 (June 9, 2006).

    In addition, some information in EPA's December 2005 environmental
    assessment summary was inconsistent. For example, according to the
    summary, it does not address indoor environmental issues associated with
    re-entry into flooded homes and structures. However, the following excerpt
    from the conclusions section of the summary appears to contradict this
    statement:

    This guidance does not acknowledge that sediments and contaminants may
    have been washed into or spilled inside structures as a result of
    flooding. Thus, the detailed guidance the summary provides for working
    outdoors, which may also be applicable for working inside homes, is not
    recommended for working indoors. Specifically, the December assessment
    summary provides the following "good personal hygiene" guidance for those
    working with or near exposed sediments outdoors:

    o"Wear gloves, boots, and safety glasses.

    oWear a dust mask (an N-95 dust mask is recommended and can be purchased
    at your local pharmacy or building supply stores).

    oKeep arms and legs covered. Wear long sleeves and long pants.

    oWash hands frequently with soap and water.

    oWash work clothes separate from other laundry."

    In general, EPA's communications recommend wearing some sort of
    respiratory protection as a key step in mitigating potential health
    effects of exposure to sediments and three contaminants--asbestos, lead,
    and mold--likely to be present in many homes damaged by the 2005 Gulf
    Coast hurricanes. However, EPA refers to this protection inconsistently
    and with varying levels of specificity:

    o "a face mask";

    o "N-95 masks";

    o"OSHA-approved respiratory protection";

    o "a dust mask (an N-95 dust mask is recommended...)";

    o "an N-95 respirator, if available, or a dust mask"; and

    o"a tightly fitted N-95 OSHA-approved respiratory mask--a regular `dust
    mask' is not enough to protect against lead or asbestos."

    These varying terms are confusing and could result in an insufficiently
    protective choice. For example, "OHSA-approved respiratory protection" is
    not a common term or household item, and people might not understand what
    to look for and where to find it. Moreover, the federal agency that
    approves respirators to protect against a variety of hazards is the
    National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Thus,
    respirators approved by NIOSH that are available for purchase will be
    labeled as in
    compliance with specified NIOSH requirements.^54 Further, it is not clear
    what a "face mask" is, and "dust masks" and "dust respirators" vary widely
    in terms of the respiratory protection they provide. That is, dust masks
    can provide some protection to the lungs from the irritating effects of
    nontoxic dust and airborne particles such as pollen, common household
    dust, and cut grass, but they are not protective against mold spores or
    toxic dusts. Given the number and variety of dust masks and respirators
    that are available and that provide varying levels of protection, EPA's
    communications would be more useful if they clearly and consistently named
    and described the type of respiratory protection the agency is
    recommending for the specific exposures being addressed.

    EPA Faced Challenges in Assessing and Mitigating Some Environmental
    Impacts of the Gulf Coast Hurricanes

    EPA did not remove clearly visible abandoned chemical drums and tanks from
    several national wildlife refuges in Louisiana as part of its Katrina
    response activities, in part because FEMA disaster assistance funding
    generally is not used for debris cleanups on federal land. As a result,
    more than a year later, debris containing hazardous materials continued to
    pose an environmental threat to natural resources at several refuges. In
    addition, EPA's guidance to states on making some emergency debris
    disposal decisions is limited, and the agency has a limited debris
    management role under the National Response Plan and federal law. Finally,
    because of a lack of clarity in the National Response Plan and the absence
    of interagency protocols about federal roles in debris management, EPA, in
    the immediate aftermath of the storms, could not ensure that debris such
    as white goods and electronic waste was handled in a timely and
    appropriate manner that mitigated the potential for environmental
    contamination.

    Funding Issues Delayed Cleanups at National Wildlife Refuges for More Than
    a Year

    In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused debris containing hazardous
    materials to be released into several national wildlife refuges in
    Louisiana, posing an environmental threat to natural resources and
    requiring that some refuges be closed to the public because of safety
    issues. Under the National Response Plan, EPA is to take appropriate
    actions to prevent, minimize, or mitigate a threat to public health,
    welfare, or the environment--including the protection of natural
    resources--caused by actual or potential oil and hazardous materials
    incidents.^55 As EPA and contractor responders worked to clean up releases
    of oil and hazardous materials in areas adjacent to several national
    wildlife refuges using disaster assistance funding authorized by FEMA,
    they identified clearly visible abandoned drums and tanks on the federal
    lands, and they could have efficiently removed them. However, FEMA did not
    approve the Department of the Interior's request for funding to clean up
    this debris in part because it was on federal lands. Consequently, EPA did
    not remove clearly visible abandoned chemical drums and tanks from
    national wildlife refutes in Louisiana as part of its hurricane response
    activities because disaster assistance funding was unavailable for debris
    cleanup actions on these federal lands. According to FEMA officials
    relying on the agency's regulations and debris management guidance,
    federal agencies are responsible for their own property, and FEMA does not
    have authority to provide assistance to federal agencies for debris
    removal following disasters unless the debris constitutes an immediate
    threat to life, public health, and safety.

    54Respirator labels may cite compliance with both NIOSH and OSHA requirements. OSHA
    regulations require certain employers to have respiratory protection programs to protect
    employees against workplace hazards. A requirement of the programs is the selection of
    appropriate respirators approved by NIOSH.

    According to Fish and Wildlife Service officials, in the fall of 2006--a
    year after the hurricanes--chemical drums and tanks remained in the Sabine
    and Cameron Prairie refuges in western Louisiana and may also have
    remained at the Bayou Sauvage and Big Branch Marsh refuges in the New
    Orleans area in eastern Louisiana. For example, a January 2006 study
    conducted for the Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that about 1,400
    containers--potentially holding a total of between 115,000 and 350,000
    gallons of hazardous liquids and gases--were at the Sabine National
    Wildlife refuge, a 125,000-acre refuge that consists almost entirely of
    marshland and open water. The study identified hazardous materials in
    containers ranging in size from 35-gallon drums to 10,000-gallon liquid
    storage tanks.

    According to Fish and Wildlife officials, leaving this debris in place for
    about a year caused containers holding hazardous materials to settle into
    marshlands and begin to corrode and leak. For example, officials said that
    after a chemical sheen was observed on the water during a flight over a
    refuge in August 2006, a hazardous materials team found a leaking
    55-gallon drum containing hydraulic fluid. Also in August 2006, a fire in
    the Big Branch Marsh refuge spread over 120 acres, reaching a debris field
    with propane and other hazardous material containers. When containers
    began exploding, firefighters had to let the fire burn through the field
    because it was too dangerous for them to attempt to put the fire out.

    55The National Response Plan directs the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, which
    are responsible for incidents affecting agriculture and natural resources, to coordinate with
    EPA and other oil and hazardous materials response partners on the removal of debris
    affecting natural and cultural resources.

    In addition to presenting safety concerns to responders cleaning up the
    debris, the delay in removing the debris complicated the required cleanup
    efforts and increased the cost of removal. Fish and Wildlife officials
    said that many containers were 2 or 3 feet under water, requiring
    excavation using heavy equipment. While smaller materials can be removed
    by hand, specialized equipment such as airboats, sleds or skids, and
    amphibious marsh vehicles are required to remove larger containers to
    minimize adverse effects to the marsh. Such excavations are costly and
    could damage sensitive marshy areas, which could have been avoided if
    drums and tanks had been removed expeditiously. In addition, Fish and
    Wildlife officials said that cleanup crews may not be able to locate all
    of the containers that have sunk into marshlands until the containers
    begin leaking, which could take several years.

    According to the Fish and Wildlife Service, Sabine and other national
    wildlife refuges are important to the long-term recovery of Louisiana
    coastal communities because of the tourism they generate. For example,
    prior to being closed in 2005 because of safety concerns related to the
    debris from Hurricane Rita, the Sabine refuge, a principal component of
    the Creole Nature Trail All-American Road, a National Scenic Byway, and an
    All-American Road designated by the Federal Highway Administration, helped
    attract about 300,000 visitors each year. The Sabine refuge's 125,000
    acres are home to concentrations of ducks, geese, alligators, muskrats,
    nutria, raptors, and other wildlife. Visitors to the refuge have
    opportunities to observe wildlife and have access to a wetland walkway and
    a visitors center; recreational options include boating, fishing, and
    hunting.

    According to a Fish and Wildlife official, previous hurricanes in other
    Gulf states have not affected national wildlife refuges as severely as the
    hazardous material debris impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on
    Louisiana's refuges. Consequently, he said that Fish and Wildlife has not
    sought funding for hazardous material debris removal under the Stafford
    Act following other hurricanes in recent years. Because disaster
    assistance funding from FEMA was not available for cleaning up hazardous
    materials on these federal lands following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
    Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service sought appropriations for this
    activity, which the agency received as part of a June 2006 supplemental
    appropriation for disaster response activities.^56 The Fish and Wildlife
    Service allocated $12 million for the cleanup of the Sabine refuge and $8
    million for the other refuges. The agency received this appropriation 8
    months after EPA's cleanup of the adjacent area under the National
    Response Plan. In addition, EPA and the Fish and Wildlife Service do not
    have a protocol for expeditiously handling circumstances such as cleanup
    of national wildlife refuges following disasters, and developing
    interagency agreements with EPA and the Coast Guard for the cleanups
    required time and resulted in further delays.

    In September 2006, Fish and Wildlife signed agreements with EPA and the
    Coast Guard to obtain these agencies' assistance in cleaning up the Sabine
    refuge. Subsequently, EPA provided the incident commander for the team
    that oversaw the hazardous materials recovery and debris cleanup in the
    Sabine and Cameron Prairie refuges in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, while the
    Coast Guard provided the deputy incident commander and other support. The
    project was completed in January 2007. While the Fish and Wildlife Service
    had estimated that about 1,400 containers potentially filled with
    hazardous liquids and gases had been deposited into the refuge, about
    2,200 such containers were found and removed, along with several thousand
    household hazardous waste items, tires, batteries, munitions, and white
    goods. Fish and Wildlife estimated that cleanup at Bayou Sauvage and Big
    Branch Marsh would be completed by May 2007.

    56The Fish and Wildlife Service also considered requesting EPA cleanup assistance under the
    Superfund law, the Clean Water Act, and the Oil Pollution Act. In a draft 2006 letter to EPA,
    the Fish and Wildlife regional director stated that these authorities extended to the cleanup
    needed on the refuges because the debris was deposited on these lands by the hurricanes,
    not because of any action on the part of Fish and Wildlife. While Fish and Wildlife worked
    with EPA to draft a letter requesting EPA assistance under the Superfund law, the request
    was never sent to EPA. Under this law, the Superfund is generally unavailable at federal
    facilities. Funds from the Superfund may be used to pay for removal actions on federal lands
    at EPA�s discretion but must be reimbursed by the relevant federal agency.

    EPA Has a Limited Debris Management Role under Federal Law and the
    National Response Plan, and Its Guidance to States on Making Certain
    Emergency Debris Disposal Decisions Is Limited

    EPA's 1995 guide on planning for disposal of disaster debris acknowledges
    that disaster debris can overwhelm existing landfills--solid waste
    management facilities--or force communities to use disposal options that
    otherwise would not be acceptable.^57 The guide also notes that state
    waste management agencies can make special accommodations for the unusual
    waste management needs resulting from a disaster, such as temporarily
    lifting permit requirements for landfills. However, the guide does not
    provide specific guidance on the selection of emergency landfill sites or
    practices that state agencies should consider when making special debris
    disposal accommodations following disasters.

    In addition, as set forth in the Stafford Act and other executive policy,
    EPA and other federal agencies generally provide disaster assistance at
    the request of state or local governments.^58 Along these lines, when the
    National Response Plan is activated in response to a Stafford Act major
    disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, EPA's role regarding waste disposal is
    to provide assistance requested by a state. For example, EPA may supply
    environmental scientists and engineers to assess landfills, help locate
    disposal sites for debris clearance activities, and assist with
    contaminated debris management activities.^59 EPA's support may also
    include providing technical assistance and consultation to the Department
    of Health and Human Services on solid waste disposal issues related to
    public health effects.^60

    Further, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the federal
    law addressing the management of hazardous and other solid wastes,
    addresses nonhazardous solid wastes under subtitle D. According to
    subtitle D, states have primary responsibility for permitting and
    monitoring solid waste disposal facilities (generally referred to as
    landfills) and developing solid waste management plans in accordance with
    minimum federal requirements.^61 EPA regulations establish criteria for
    classifying different types of landfills and practices that may result in
    adverse effects on health or the environment, among other things. The act
    prohibits "open dumping"--the disposal of solid waste in landfills failing
    to meet the relevant criteria--and requires state plans to prohibit the
    establishment of open dumps. RCRA provides EPA with limited authority to
    address environmental problems at solid waste landfills.

    57EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Planning for Disaster Debris
    (December 1995).

    58See 42 U.S.C. � 5170 et seq.; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (Feb. 28, 2003).

    59EPA provides this support to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the federal coordinator for
    the public works and engineering emergency support function, which addresses debris
    removal and disposal, among other things.

    60EPA provides this support under the public health and medical services emergency
    support function, which is coordinated by the Department of Health and Human Services.
    The department, in coordination with EPA�s oil and hazardous materials response, may
    request this support from agencies such as EPA.

    Solid waste landfills may generally receive household waste (garbage),
    industrial waste (solid waste generated by manufacturing, industrial, or
    mining processes), commercial nonhazardous waste (solid waste generated by
    stores, offices, restaurants, and other nonmanufacturing entities), and
    construction and demolition (C&D) waste (nonhazardous waste that is not
    water soluble, such as metal, concrete, and asphalt). Under Louisiana
    solid waste regulations, landfills that receive household waste,
    industrial waste, or commercial nonhazardous waste must have safeguards
    that include a liner designed to control groundwater contamination.^62 The
    regulations do not require C&D landfills to have liners in place.^63
    Louisiana regulations exclude asbestos-contaminated waste, white goods,
    furniture, trash, and treated lumber from the categories of debris that
    may be disposed of at C&D landfills.

    Because EPA's debris management role is limited under federal law and the
    National Response Plan, its guidance to states and localities on planning
    for disposal of disaster debris could be especially important in helping
    ensure that hazardous materials are disposed of in landfills with
    appropriate safeguards when disposal options that would not otherwise be
    acceptable are used for disaster debris, thereby preventing contaminants
    from migrating and causing air, water, and soil contamination. Such
    guidance could help states and localities consider the potential
    environmental impacts of debris management accommodations that may be made
    in emergency situations if affected areas are to be cleared of debris
    without causing adverse public health effects in the future. One potential
    example of a prior problem with hurricane debris is the Agriculture Street
    Superfund site in New Orleans, which was a municipal landfill from about
    1909 until the late 1950s. During this period, oil was used to burn the
    refuse at the dump, and during the 1940s and 1950s the area was routinely
    sprayed with DDT. The landfill was reopened after Hurricane Betsy occurred
    in 1965 to receive debris from destroyed buildings and ash from municipal
    incinerators. In the 1970s and continuing into the late 1980s, portions of
    the site were developed with private and public housing units, an
    elementary school, and a community center. Following health concerns among
    residents in the area, EPA initiated investigations at the site in 1986,
    ultimately identifying elevated levels of lead, arsenic, and carcinogenic
    polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons--the primary contaminants of concern
    identified in sediment tests following Hurricane Katrina. Analyses of the
    health effects of these contaminants found at the Agriculture Street
    Landfill led EPA to place the site on the Superfund National Priorities
    List in 1994. Cleanup of the site, which primarily entailed soil
    excavation, placement of clean cover and soil, and resodding, was
    completed in 2001.^64 As part of litigation involving EPA efforts to
    recover its cleanup costs at the site, some private parties have argued
    that the debris disposed of at the Agriculture Street Landfill in the wake
    of Hurricane Betsy contained hazardous substances that contributed to the
    contamination at the site.^65 EPA officials told us that after years of
    case development research and discovery the agency has no evidence that
    hazardous substances were disposed of at the Agriculture Street Landfill
    during the Hurricane Betsy response. The case is pending, and settlement
    negotiations are under way.

    61While EPA may review approved state subtitle D permit programs and withdraw approval
    of state programs it determines do not meet the national minimum requirements, EPA
    officials told us the agency has never withdrawn approval of a state subtitle D permit
    program.

    62These landfills are designated as Type I or II facilities under Louisiana solid waste
    regulations. These facilities must have a composite liner that consists of a geomembrane
    liner at least 30-mil thick installed directly above and in uniform contact with a 3-foot
    recompacted clay liner.

    63These landfills are designated as Type III facilities under Louisiana solid waste regulations.

    As the entity with primary responsibility for solid waste disposal under
    RCRA subtitle D, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality has
    made decisions about landfills and the disposal of debris that some
    studies suggest could have long-term, negative environmental impacts. For
    example, under a November 2005 Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality amendment to an emergency order addressing Hurricane Katrina and
    its aftermath, the types of debris that C&D landfills could receive were
    broadened to include some potentially hazardous wastes, including
    furniture, painted or stained lumber from demolished buildings, and
    asbestos-contaminated waste that cannot be extracted from demolition
    debris.^66 The order states that this and other actions were taken because
    Hurricane Katrina created conditions that require immediate action to
    prevent irreparable damage to the environment and serious threats to life
    or safety. A Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality official told
    us that the department elected to include these categories of waste
    because separating this waste from other debris took considerable effort,
    and the department determined the environmental risks resulting from the
    expanded definition were minimal. The official also noted that the
    expanded definition allowed this waste to be cleaned up more quickly,
    enabling residents to return home.

    64Soil samples collected at the Agriculture Street Landfill site following Hurricane Katrina
    revealed elevated levels of benzo(a)pyrene, a polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon. EPA and
    local authorities are developing a plan to address this contamination.

    65United States v. City of New Orleans, et al, Civil Action No. 02-3618, Section E, Magistrate
    3 (E.D. La.).

    However, a draft 1995 study prepared for EPA identifies a number of the
    debris components being allowed at C&D landfills under the emergency
    order--including asbestos insulation and shingles, furniture, and wood
    paints and stains--as "problematic," even though these materials are not
    necessarily classified as hazardous wastes under RCRA.^67 Moreover,
    studies by a Louisiana State University research institute and an
    environmental engineering firm state that these categories of waste can
    introduce hazardous materials into landfills, increasing the likelihood of
    pollution.^68 For example, wood treated with chromated copper arsenate as
    a preservative can leach arsenic, which can cause problems with
    circulatory systems and may increase cancer risk if ingested. Chromated
    copper arsenate is often used to prevent termite infestation in areas
    where termites are prevalent, such as New Orleans. Lumber with lead paint
    also poses health hazards. Lead poisoning in children can cause learning
    disabilities, impaired hearing, and behavioral problems, and in pregnant
    women, it can result in adverse developmental effects to fetuses. Even
    before Hurricane Katrina struck, concentrations of lead as much as 10
    times EPA's screening level were detected in soil samples taken in New
    Orleans. In addition, some household furniture is treated with fire
    retardants containing polybrominated diphenyl ethers, carcinogens that
    have been found as environmental pollutants accumulating in human breast
    milk and wildlife.

    66State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Second Amended Declaration of
    Emergency and Administrative Order regarding Hurricane Katrina and Its Aftermath (Nov.
    2, 2005). The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality extended the emergency
    order several times, most recently extending the broadened definition through May 18, 2007.

    67ICF Inc., Construction and Demolition Waste Landfills (draft document prepared for the
    EPA Office of Solid Waste, 1995).

    68G.F. Lee, Summary of Findings on the Environmental Impacts of the Proposed C&D
    Landfill on Top of the Closed Gentilly Landfill (February 2006); and John H. Pardue,
    Director, Louisiana Water Resources Research Institute, Louisiana State University,
    Anticipating environmental problems facing hurricane debris landfills in New Orleans
    East (undated).

    The inclusion of asbestos-contaminated waste mixed with other debris in
    the state's expanded definition of C&D debris may also present a potential
    health hazard. As we previously noted, asbestos exposure has been
    recognized for many years as causing serious human health problems.
    Moreover, the requirements of the Clean Air Act's asbestos work practice
    standard generally do not apply to residential buildings with four or
    fewer units, and unregulated asbestos-containing material may be disposed
    of in C&D landfills.^69 The extensive renovation and demolition activities
    in New Orleans create the potential for large quantities of
    asbestos-contaminated waste to enter C&D landfills.

    Furthermore, while white goods and household hazardous waste may generally
    not be disposed of at C&D landfills, until recently the emergency order
    stated that such wastes should be segregated from other solid waste prior
    to disposal in C&D landfills except in cases where segregation is not
    practicable. The order did not specifically state what must happen in
    cases where segregation is not practicable. Environmental groups filed a
    lawsuit against Louisiana in August 2006 alleging that the state's order
    authorizes the disposal of white goods and household hazardous waste in
    landfills that do not meet RCRA criteria for these types of debris and,
    therefore, that the state has authorized "open dumping" of potentially
    dangerous solid wastes in violation of RCRA's prohibition on such
    dumping.^70 The state contends that the order does not authorize any
    practices that violate RCRA and, accordingly, that the groups' suit is
    without merit. EPA is currently mediating settlement negotiations between
    the parties. On January 19, 2007, the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality issued an amended emergency order that, among other
    things, deleted the phrase "where segregation is not practicable."

    69Louisiana also authorized some landfills in the New Orleans area to operate as �enhanced�
    C&D landfills that may receive regulated asbestos-containing material as well as
    unregulated material. These facilities are required to have additional controls in place, such
    as air monitoring for asbestos emissions. According to the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality, these landfills meet the landfill requirements under the federal
    asbestos standard (40 C.F.R. � 61.154).
    70The lawsuit further alleges that because the emergency orders conflict with RCRA�s open
    dumping prohibition, the state�s issuance and implementation of the orders violates the
    Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.

    In addition, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality authorized
    the controversial use of two landfills to receive C&D waste in locations
    of concern to nearby communities and environmental organizations.
    Specifically, pursuant to its Katrina emergency authorities, the Louisiana
    Department of Environmental Quality authorized (1) the utilization of an
    existing C&D landfill in proximity to hurricane-devastated areas in New
    Orleans called the Gentilly Landfill and (2) the construction and
    operation of the Chef Menteur landfill, located near a minority
    residential community and a national wildlife refuge.^71 Studies conducted
    by an environmental engineering firm and Louisiana State University raised
    concerns about debris disposal at the Gentilly and Chef Menteur landfills,
    citing possible surface water and groundwater implications from
    potentially hazardous storm debris. These studies suggest that debris
    disposal in landfills without appropriate safeguards could result in the
    migration of contaminants, potentially causing pollution and affecting
    public health and the environment.^72 For example, the studies identified
    concerns about the potential discharge of leachate (water that has come
    into contact with waste) into water--in the case of Gentilly, into
    groundwater and surface water, and in the case of Chef Menteur, into
    surrounding wetlands. In both cases, concerned groups filed lawsuits. The
    Gentilly suit was settled, with the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality agreeing to limit the amount of debris entering the landfill
    daily. In the case of Chef Menteur, an environmental group alleged that
    proper procedures had not been followed in issuing an emergency
    authorization for the landfill under the Clean Water Act--in particular,
    that the public had not been provided notice and the opportunity to
    comment on the action.^73

    71The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality issued a permit to conduct
    construction and demolition waste disposal to the Gentilly Landfill in 2004 and an Order to
    Authorize Commencement of Operations on August 29, 2005. However, according to the
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, following the litigation related to a lawsuit
    against the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, �It became apparent that
    although the decision to use the Gentilly landfill was properly based upon the Louisiana
    Department of Environmental Quality�s emergency authority under the Louisiana
    Environmental Quality Act, this authority and the underlying reasoning for arriving at that
    decision was not clearly reflected in the Order.� Therefore, the order was revoked and an
    administrative order and decision were issued authorizing use of the landfill pursuant to
    state law and the Hurricane Katrina emergency order.

    72See footnote 68.

    73This lawsuit was dismissed by the court 2 days after the landfill was closed on August 14,
    2006, when, as is discussed later in this report, the local order authorizing the zoning of the
    landfill expired and was not renewed.

    In authorizing the use of the Gentilly landfill under the Hurricane
    Katrina emergency order, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
    stated that it had considered alternative sites and determined that the
    Gentilly site met state solid waste requirements and was located in
    proximity to the bulk of the hurricane-generated C&D debris. The
    department further noted that allowing debris disposal at Gentilly would
    decrease waste-hauling time and expense and alleviate traffic problems,
    thereby aiding New Orleans' recovery. In addition, although the Chef
    Menteur site faced opposition, the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality maintained that it was environmentally suitable, citing
    independent sampling of air and water quality in May and June of 2006. The
    air results found no contaminants at or above health risk levels, while
    the water quality results showed that the contaminants tested for fell
    within the daily maximum limits of the site's discharge permit, though
    ammonia was detected above the monthly average discharge limit.
    Furthermore, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality underscored
    the importance of the centrally located landfill to disaster cleanup in
    Orleans Parish.

    EPA's review of the Gentilly site following its authorization to receive
    Hurricane Katrina debris found that current use of the landfill appeared
    to be consistent with the types and volumes of wastes for which it was
    designed and permitted by the state, but noted that there is no way to
    insulate the federal government against future Superfund liability
    absolutely. EPA recommended steps that Gentilly operators should take to
    minimize risks, including posting signs, developing debris inspection and
    segregation procedures, and working with the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality on groundwater monitoring. EPA officials told us the
    agency worked with the Department of Environmental Quality to develop a
    process for reviewing key technical areas of concern at the Gentilly site,
    and EPA officials said that the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality has put effective measures in place to address these areas of
    concern. In May 2007, EPA said that the Gentilly landfill operator
    installed groundwater monitoring wells and inclinometers at the Gentilly
    site and reported that the environmental samples "do not indicate any
    problem." The newly constructed Chef Menteur landfill continued to
    generate considerable controversy, and the Mayor of New Orleans allowed
    the local order authorizing the zoning of the landfill to expire on August
    14, 2006--closing it 4 months after it opened.

    While EPA provided consultations to the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality on some landfill decisions, under the National
    Response Plan and RCRA, the agency does not have a formal role in this
    decision making. Further, EPA did not review or approve state decisions
    regarding the use of the Gentilly or Chef Menteur landfills. However, at
    the request of the state, EPA did provide technical support and conducted
    some oversight activities at New Orleans area landfills to supplement
    existing controls at landfills.^74 Specifically, EPA took steps to promote
    the segregation of debris before it entered landfills, such as organizing
    hazardous waste collection events. At the request of the Louisiana
    Department of Environmental Quality, EPA also began sending landfill
    observers to about 12 landfills in the New Orleans area in February
    2006.^75 EPA's landfill observers usually visited landfills unannounced
    and documented that they were generally operating appropriately--with
    entrance tower monitors and dump-site spotters in place, record keeping on
    violations, and financial and other documentation in order--and prepared
    and transmitted a report to the Louisiana Department of Environmental
    Quality citing any problems.^76 EPA officials told us the problems
    observers identified were minor, such as excessive dust on roads or
    instances of debris segregation not taking place. Moreover, EPA officials
    believe that work practices at the landfills, such as periodic covering,
    mitigate the potential migration of specific materials from the landfills.
    However, the officials also noted that while EPA's limited oversight
    provided assistance to the state, it did not allow the agency to ensure
    that debris containing hazardous materials would not enter landfills.

    74According to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, landfills were subject to
    several controls intended to minimize hazardous waste disposal, including monitoring at
    entrance towers and debris dump sites. In addition, daily inspections by department
    officials at five construction and demolition landfills in the New Orleans area, an increase
    from twice-weekly inspections, were conducted in May and June 2006.

    75According to EPA, as of December 2006, EPA landfill observers were observing at seven
    landfills, the reduced number reflecting the fact that some landfills are no longer receiving
    hurricane-related debris.

    76EPA landfill observers also visited landfill sites in Mississippi from October 2005 to June
    2006.

    Finally, detailed guidance from EPA to the states on advance planning for
    potential emergency landfill sites and practices to consider when making
    special debris disposal accommodations following disasters might have
    helped Louisiana avoid some of the controversies and lawsuits it faced as
    a result of its emergency debris management decisions in New Orleans.
    Along these lines, after reviewing its Hurricane Katrina response actions
    in Mississippi, EPA's Region 4 identified helping states with
    hurricane-prone coastal areas with such advance planning as one of several
    steps EPA could take to improve its emergency responses in the future.
    Specifically, Region 4's September 2006 summary report on its response
    actions in Mississippi stated that advance planning for landfill sites
    would allow geologic and other crucial data to be known before an
    incident, including data for staging areas or temporary landfills for
    vegetative and C&D debris. The report said that EPA Region 4 could provide
    assistance to states so that debris-clearing operations have preapproved
    disposal sites that would not pose long-term environmental issues after
    they were used during an emergency.

    Lack of Clarity on Federal Debris Management Roles Delayed Actions to
    Ensure That White Goods and Electronic Waste Were Handled in a Timely and
    Appropriate Manner

    The recycling and disposal of debris such as white goods and electronic
    waste also presented the agency with a challenge in mitigating the
    potential for environmental contamination following the storms. Because of
    a lack of clarity in the National Response Plan and the absence of
    interagency protocols about federal roles in debris management, EPA could
    not ensure that debris such as white goods and electronic waste was
    handled in a timely and appropriate manner. Specifically, the plan does
    not state whether EPA or the Army Corps of Engineers should manage the
    collection, processing, recycling, and disposal of white goods, such as
    refrigerators and freezers, and electronic waste, such as televisions,
    computers, and printers. Recycling of white goods entails the removal of
    chemicals, such as chlorofluorocarbons and other refrigerants that are
    harmful to the environment. Recycling of electronic waste entails removing
    toxic components, such as lead and mercury. Computers contain toxic
    chemicals such as mercury, while the average television contains more than
    4 pounds of lead.

    The National Response Plan assigns the Corps primary responsibility for
    the public works and engineering emergency support function, which
    includes debris removal and disposal. In addition to EPA's role as the
    coordinator for the federal response to actual or potential discharges of
    oil and hazardous materials, the plan states that EPA can, among other
    things, assist the Corps with contaminated debris management activities by
    coordinating and providing resources, assessments, data, expertise,
    technical assistance, monitoring, and other appropriate support. In this
    regard, EPA's Hurricane Katrina response activities included the
    collection and disposal of household hazardous waste such as paints,
    pesticides, and propane tanks. While debris such as white goods and
    electronic waste contain hazardous materials, neither the plan nor
    interagency protocols address whether EPA or the Corps should manage the
    collection, processing, recycling, and disposal of these types of waste.

    After initial delays in determining whether EPA or the Corps would be
    responsible for white goods and electronic waste disposal, the agencies
    agreed that they would fulfill this role jointly in Louisiana, while the
    Corps or local agencies would handle white goods and electronic waste
    disposal in Mississippi. Local officials in Louisiana and Mississippi told
    us that confusion about EPA's role in white goods and electronics waste
    disposal resulted in delays in removing and disposing of this debris. A
    parish official in Louisiana also said that the delays may have resulted
    in the inappropriate disposal of some electronic waste in landfills
    without proper safeguards.

    In Mississippi, county officials from the three coastal counties hit by
    Katrina expressed frustration that EPA did not assist with either white
    goods or electronic waste disposal. Officials in one county told us that
    the collection of white goods was delayed for 7 weeks because of confusion
    among EPA, the Corps, and the county about responsibility for this task.
    Officials from another county said that while they appreciated EPA's
    assistance with household hazardous waste collection, the county would
    have also appreciated EPA's help with other activities that they believed
    involved environmental issues, such as white goods and electronic waste
    disposal and removing and cleaning up fuel that leached into waterways and
    bayous from abandoned automobiles. Although EPA did help coordinate some
    electronic waste recycling in one Mississippi county, an official from
    this county said that the effort was limited and only came about at the
    county's insistence. According to officials from all three counties, EPA
    generally informed them that white goods and electronic waste disposal
    were beyond the purview of the agency's disaster response activities in
    Mississippi. One of these officials suggested that EPA and the Corps
    should develop a better plan to address the collection of white goods
    following future disasters. According to EPA, the agency has been having a
    series of discussions with the Corps and FEMA to clarify roles and
    responsibilities and enhance coordination, based on Katrina experience
    related to debris, among other things. EPA said it has not yet been
    determined how the discussions will be documented, but possibilities
    include a memorandum of understanding or supporting documents to the
    National Response Plan.

    Conclusions

    Working under extraordinary conditions, EPA undertook a broad range of
    activities to support state and local entities in Louisiana and
    Mississippi in assessing and minimizing the environmental risks resulting
    from Hurricane Katrina, including search and rescue efforts that brought
    800 New Orleans residents to safety. Because of the breadth and scope of
    this disaster, cleanup and recovery efforts are still under way in the New
    Orleans area. For example, many homes have yet to be demolished or
    substantially renovated. A significant number of them will be demolished
    or renovated during the next year, and likely these activities will
    continue for a longer period of time. Given the age of many New Orleans
    residences, environmental hazards such as asbestos are likely to be
    present. For the demolitions covered by the no action assurances, in lieu
    of the requirement for prior identification and removal of regulated
    asbestos-containing materials, homes that are not inspected before
    demolition are required to be wetted during the demolition and disposition
    processes to reduce potential asbestos emissions. However, much of the
    demolition and renovation activities, including house gutting, will be
    undertaken by individual homeowners; these activities are not regulated
    and therefore none of the asbestos control requirements apply. While EPA
    has taken steps to monitor asbestos concentrations in the air in New
    Orleans, it is not clear how its approach can accomplish the agency's
    stated goal of measuring the effects from both the regulated
    asbestos-containing material, to which the no action assurances might
    apply, and the unregulated activities, which would include demolitions and
    renovations by individual homeowners. To date, according to EPA, the
    asbestos air data it has collected have not identified potential problems
    regarding public exposure to asbestos fibers. However, these results may
    not be representative of asbestos releases to which residents, workers,
    and volunteers may be exposed in some neighborhoods because of monitoring
    gaps stemming from monitor locations and the scaling back of monitoring
    sites a few months after demolitions began. Specifically, without
    sufficient and targeted asbestos air monitoring data from neighborhoods
    where demolitions and renovations are concentrated, EPA has limited
    assurance that the public health is protected from risks associated with
    inhalation of asbestos fibers potentially stemming from the substantial
    levels of both regulated and unregulated demolition and renovation
    activities occurring in concentrated geographic areas.

    In addition, EPA could improve the effectiveness of its communications
    about the potential health risks from exposure to environmental
    contamination when responding to future disasters. Following a disaster
    that has involved evacuation, residents are typically anxious to return to
    their homes, and public leaders are eager to take steps to return to
    normalcy, including having residents return as soon as it is safe for them
    to do so. Among the important information residents need in order to
    minimize their environmental health risks when they do return is timely,
    complete, clear, and consistent guidance about the environmental
    contamination they may be exposed to, both indoors and outdoors, and how
    to best protect themselves from it. Without such information, people may
    return too soon or without the proper protective gear and supplies, which
    might expose them to both short-term and long-term negative health
    effects. This could well have been the case in New Orleans since, for
    example, EPA did not state until August 2006 that its December 2005
    assessment summary applied to short-term visits, such as to view the
    external damage to their homes. This situation was exacerbated by some
    confusing information EPA provided in public service communications--for
    example, about the respiratory protection residents should use to mitigate
    potential exposure to asbestos, lead, and mold in their homes.

    Mitigating some challenges EPA faced addressing Hurricane Katrina could
    better protect the environment in the future. For example, while under the
    National Response Plan, EPA's responsibilities include mitigating threats
    to the environment--including the protection of natural resources--funding
    may not always be available to carry out these essential actions. It is
    shortsighted, inefficient, and potentially dangerous to limit the removal
    of debris containing hazardous materials to state lands and waterways,
    halting such cleanups arbitrarily at federal land or water boundaries.
    Thus, while the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service
    ultimately requested and received funding through supplemental
    appropriations that it then provided to EPA to conduct the cleanups, this
    is not an effective or efficient solution in disaster situations. In such
    situations, timely cleanup can lessen the damage to the environment,
    better protect the public from exposure to contaminants, prevent further
    migration of hazardous materials, and likely be more cost-effective.
    Without a framework in place to enable EPA, the Coast Guard, and federal
    land management agencies such as the Department of the Interior and the
    Department of Agriculture to quickly obtain funding to respond to
    environmental impacts of disasters on federal lands and waterways, these
    natural resources--and state areas that can be harmed by the migration of
    chemical releases from federal lands--are at risk.

    In addition, given EPA's limited role in ensuring that states dispose of
    storm debris appropriately, EPA's lack of sufficient guidance to state and
    local entities on selecting additional landfill sites and on practices
    that state agencies should consider when making special accommodations for
    debris disposal following disasters becomes increasingly important. Such
    guidance could help avoid controversies over landfill sites selected under
    emergency conditions, assist state and local agencies in planning for
    accommodations that may be needed to handle large volumes of hazardous
    materials after disasters, and identify strategies needed to mitigate the
    potential environmental impacts of such accommodations. Finally, greater
    clarity in the roles of EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers in recycling
    and disposing of white goods and electronic waste could help minimize the
    inappropriate disposal of these wastes in the immediate aftermath of
    disasters.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To enhance EPA's ability to monitor and assess information on asbestos
    emissions resulting from the extensive demolition and renovation
    activities in New Orleans, we recommend that the EPA Administrator develop
    and implement an asbestos monitoring plan that addresses the potential
    health effects of both (1) the nonenforcement of certain asbestos
    requirements covering government-ordered demolitions of residences and (2)
    the general exemption from EPA's asbestos work practice standards for
    demolition and renovation activities of residential buildings with four or
    fewer dwelling units when done at the initiative of individual homeowners.

    To provide environmental health risk information to the public that is
    timely, complete, clear, and consistent about (1) the environmental
    contamination to which individuals may be exposed subsequent to disasters
    and (2) how individuals can best protect themselves, we recommend that the
    EPA Administrator take the following two actions:

    oDevelop protocols to ensure that the agency's communications following
    disasters are timely and sufficiently disclose all of the information that
    affected residents would need to understand the potential health risks
    they may face upon returning, including information on the scope and
    methodology for EPA's assessments of environmental health risks.

    oDevelop clear and consistent generic information for the public regarding
    mitigating exposure to contaminants--such as asbestos, lead, and
    mold--likely to be present in many disaster situations and ensure that
    this information can be expeditiously communicated via all appropriate
    media, thereby providing the public with basic protective information at
    the same time that EPA is developing any additional event-specific health
    risk information that is needed.

    To better enable EPA and its partner agencies to minimize the
    environmental risks resulting from future disasters, we recommend that the
    EPA Administrator take the following three actions:

    oWork with potentially affected federal land management agencies, the
    Coast Guard, DHS, and FEMA to determine what actions are needed to ensure
    that environmental contamination on federal lands, such as national
    wildlife refuges, can be expeditiously and efficiently addressed in future
    disasters. Potential actions include the development of protocols or
    memorandums of understanding or amendments to the Stafford Act if the
    agencies determine that amendments are needed to achieve the timely
    availability of such funding when responding to disasters involving
    federal lands.

    oProvide more detailed guidance to state and local entities on managing
    debris disposal following disasters to better ensure protection of public
    health and the environment and prevent the creation of future Superfund
    sites. This guidance should address the selection of landfill sites for
    disaster debris, including advance selection of potential landfill sites,
    and practices to consider when making special accommodations for debris
    disposal in emergency situations.

    oWork with the Army Corps of Engineers to clarify each agency's role in
    debris disposal and develop a memorandum of understanding or other agency
    protocol to allow the agencies to quickly manage and recycle white goods
    and electronic waste following future disasters.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA's Associate Administrator for
    Homeland Security agreed with all but one of the recommendations.
    Specifically, EPA agreed with the recommendations to provide additional
    asbestos air monitoring in New Orleans, improve environmental health risk
    communications following disasters, provide more guidance to states on
    managing debris disposal following disasters, and clarify debris
    management roles with the Army Corps of Engineers. However, EPA disagreed
    with our recommendation that the agency convene a working group that
    includes potentially affected federal land management agencies and the
    Coast Guard to develop protocols or memorandums of understanding on the
    steps the agencies should take to obtain disaster funding for
    environmental cleanups on federal lands in the future--and thereby address
    damage to federal lands and wildlife in a timely and efficient manner. EPA
    asserted that this recommendation would be more appropriately addressed to
    the Department of the Interior and FEMA. We continue to believe that EPA
    should be involved in helping to resolve these issues because, under the
    National Response Plan, EPA is the chair of the National Response Team,
    whose duties include national planning and response coordination for oil
    and hazardous materials incidents. We do agree that FEMA, which declined
    to provide funding to the Department of the Interior for cleanup after
    Hurricane Katrina, and DHS, which coordinates the federal response to
    disasters under the National Response Plan, should also take part in
    planning efforts to resolve funding issues concerning the removal of
    hazardous materials from federal lands following a disaster. Accordingly,
    we have modified our recommendation to state that EPA should also work
    with DHS and FEMA, as well as with federal land management agencies and
    the Coast Guard, to determine what actions are needed to ensure that
    environmental contamination on federal lands, such as national wildlife
    refuges, can be expeditiously and efficiently addressed in future
    disasters. This recommendation is aimed at supporting EPA's efforts in
    conducting its environmental protection and coordination missions
    expeditiously in future disasters, thereby avoiding situations in which
    the removal of hazardous materials is halted at federal land or water
    boundaries and individual federal land management agencies waste valuable
    time seeking appropriations to pay EPA to conduct cleanup, as was the case
    during the year following the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Further, as was the
    case following Hurricane Katrina, EPA will often have the necessary
    cleanup infrastructure in place (such as contractors, equipment, and
    personnel with cleanup oversight expertise) to respond rapidly and
    effectively to contamination. EPA also provided comments on aspects of the
    report it considered misleading or inaccurate, as well as technical
    comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. EPA's letter and our
    detailed response to it appear in appendix II.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Adminstrator, EPA; appropriate
    congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also make
    copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be
    available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

    If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov . Contact points for our
    Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
    last page of this report. Other GAO staff who made major contributors to
    this report are listed in appendix III.

    John B. Stephenson
    Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    List of Committees

    The Honorable Barbara Boxer
    Chairman
    The Honorable James M. Inhofe
    Ranking Member
    Committee on Environment and Public Works
    United States Senate

    The Honorable John D. Dingell
    Chairman
    The Honorable Joe Barton
    Ranking Member
    Committee on Energy and Commerce
    House of Representatives

    Appendix I:  Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    The objectives of our work on environmental issues stemming from Hurricane
    Katrina were to (1) review the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
    actions under the Department of Homeland Security's National Response Plan
    to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina; (2)
    determine the extent to which EPA has assurance that public health in New
    Orleans is being protected from asbestos inhalation health risks posed by
    extensive demolition activities; (3) determine the extent to which EPA's
    communications on environmental health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina
    have provided useful information to the public; and (4) identify
    challenges EPA has faced in addressing the environmental impacts of
    Hurricane Katrina that, if mitigated, could enable EPA to better protect
    the environment in future disasters.

    In reviewing EPA's actions under the National Response Plan to assess and
    mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina, we analyzed the
    National Response Plan and its accompanying annexes--particularly the
    Emergency Support Function Annexes, which specify the various
    responsibilities EPA and other agencies have with regard to providing
    emergency assistance. We discussed EPA's hurricane response actions with
    EPA's Offices of Emergency Management, Enforcement and Compliance
    Assurance, Water, Air, and Solid Waste and reviewed documentation related
    to these actions. We visited the EPA Incident Command Centers in both
    Metairie, Louisiana, and Biloxi, Mississippi, and discussed with various
    EPA officials from Region 6 (covering Louisiana) and Region 4 (covering
    Mississippi) their overall Hurricane Katrina response actions. We visited
    affected areas to survey the massive damage and cleanup operations,
    including the Lower Ninth Ward and the Murphy Oil Spill in Louisiana and
    some of the Mississippi's most severely damaged areas, such as Waveland,
    Bay St. Louis, Biloxi, and Gulfport. We interviewed other federal, state,
    and local officials who were either directly or indirectly involved with
    EPA's response efforts, such as officials with the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services' Agency for
    Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of the
    Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. State and local officials
    interviewed included representatives with the Louisiana and Mississippi
    Departments of Environmental Quality and local officials from Jefferson,
    Plaquemines, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisiana and from
    Jackson, Hancock, and Harrison Counties in Mississippi. In addition, we
    spoke with national and regional stakeholder groups, including the Natural
    Resources Defense Council, the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, the
    Louisiana Environmental Action Network, the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil
    and Gas Association, the Mississippi Environmental Recovery Alliance, the
    Mississippi Power Company, and Sierra Club chapters in both Louisiana and
    Mississippi. We also reviewed various Congressional Research Service
    reports that provided an overall context for various environmental issues
    emerging from Hurricane Katrina, as well as reports from the EPA Inspector
    General on the hurricane response.

    To analyze the extent to which EPA has assurance that public health in New
    Orleans is being protected from asbestos inhalation health risks posed by
    extensive demolition activities, we reviewed key documents, such as
    relevant Clean Air Act provisions; EPA's national emissions standards for
    asbestos, which set work practice standards for building demolition and
    renovation activities; and EPA's no action assurance letters to Louisiana
    and Mississippi. Other key documents reviewed include EPA's September 2005
    Overview Plan for Ambient Air Monitoring After Hurricane Katrina, EPA's
    October 2005 Regional Air Monitoring Plan for Hurricane Katrina in
    Louisiana, and EPA's February 2006 Contingency Air Monitoring and Sampling
    Plan for C&D Burning or Grinding Sites, all of which cover areas of
    southern Louisiana impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We also
    reviewed EPA's March 2006 Quality Assurance Project Plan for a building
    demolition project in Fort Smith, Arkansas, testing an alternative
    asbestos control method for building demolition. Additionally, we examined
    the air monitoring data EPA posted on its "Response to 2005 Hurricanes"
    Web page, which identified the location of the various air monitors the
    agency used to measure air quality after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
    Louisiana and Mississippi and the pollutants each monitor measured. We
    spoke with officials from EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance
    Assurance regarding EPA's asbestos no action assurance letters and its
    approach to addressing asbestos issues resulting from the hurricanes. We
    also spoke with EPA officials in the Office of Emergency Management,
    Office of Research and Development, and Regions 4 and 6 regarding asbestos
    and demolition issues, as well as with officials from the Army Corps of
    Engineers and the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of Environmental
    Quality.

    To determine the extent to which EPA's communications on environmental
    health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina have provided useful information
    to the public, we reviewed the agency's key communications about the
    potential health risks from environmental contamination in New
    Orleans--three environmental assessment summaries that were released in
    December 2005, March 2006, and August 2006. We also reviewed EPA's various
    flyers, public service announcements, advisories, and other documents on
    EPA's "Response to 2005 Hurricanes" Web page that provide information to
    the public about environmental health risks and how to mitigate them. We
    spoke with EPA officials from the Office of Emergency Management and
    Regions 4 and 6 about the agency's efforts to communicate information
    regarding the environmental health risks from the hurricanes and reviewed
    comments provided by EPA's Science Advisory Board related to EPA's
    sediment sampling plan. Additionally, we reviewed various reports from the
    Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention, including the agency's June 2006 report Mold Prevention
    Strategies and Possible Health Effects in the Aftermath of Hurricanes and
    Major Floods. We also reviewed EPA Inspector General reports on EPA's
    response activities. The focus of our review of EPA's communications of
    environmental health risks following Hurricane Katrina was on their
    content and the extent to which they provided clear and consistent
    information; we did not evaluate the scientific merits of EPA's
    environmental risk assessment methodology.

    In conducting this work, we identified several challenges EPA faced in
    addressing the environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina, based on our
    interviews with the federal, state, local, and private-sector officials
    identified above; our site visits in Louisiana and Mississippi; and a
    review of federal and private-sector reports and articles about
    environmental cleanup activities in the Gulf Coast after the hurricanes.
    Regarding the landfill issues, we reviewed related laws and guidance such
    as the Stafford act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the
    National Response Plan, Federal Emergency Management Agency debris
    management guidance, state regulations and emergency orders, and
    independent reports that addressed potential debris issues at landfill
    sites in Louisiana that received debris from Katrina. Finally, we visited
    the Chef Menteur and Old Gentilly landfill sites to observe debris
    management activities. Officials of the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency, the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service, and
    the Army Corps of Engineers reviewed sections of the draft report that
    applied directly to their agencies. We conducted our work from November
    2005 through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

    Appendix II:  Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency

    The following are GAO's comments on the Environmental Protection Agency's
    letter dated May 9, 2007.

    GAO Comments

    1.As stated in the draft report, we reviewed the extent to which EPA's
    communications on environmental health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina
    have provided useful information to the public. In this regard, the issue
    with timeliness that we raise focused on EPA's three key environmental
    assessment summaries covering its environmental sampling in New Orleans
    after the floodwaters had receded. The draft report also addressed the
    many other communications on environmental health risks EPA provided to
    the public via flyers and health advisories distributed at various
    locations throughout the hurricane-damaged areas, public service
    announcements made available to the media, and information posted on EPA's
    Web page. We recognize that many of these communications preceded the
    release of the environmental assessment summaries. Therefore, to address
    EPA's concern that the report may be construed as indicating that EPA did
    not release information about environmental conditions following Hurricane
    Katrina until December 2005, when it released the first assessment
    summary, we have added a statement on the Highlights page that "EPA issued
    timely information to the public on a variety of environmental health
    risks." Also, in the body of the report, we now state that EPA started its
    communications efforts shortly after the storm, beginning in September
    2005. In addition, EPA suggested we include some information it provided
    to FEMA, but we did not because it was not relevant to this report, which
    addresses EPA's communications to the public.

    2.We do not agree that the draft report created an impression that it was
    EPA's role to determine if it was safe for residents to return to their
    homes. The draft report stated that "EPA worked with other federal and
    state agencies to support local officials evaluating home and neighborhood
    safety."

    3.We disagree with EPA's statement that the draft report did not recognize
    that EPA worked with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and
    other federal and state agencies in the development of the environmental
    assessment summaries. The draft report explicitly stated in several
    places, starting with the Results in Brief section and again in the body
    of the report, that EPA worked with the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality and others in developing the summaries. All of the
    other federal and state entities are identified in the body of the draft.
    We have, however, added the language used in the Results in Brief section
    of the report to the Highlights page.

    4.We disagree with EPA's assertion that the draft report suggested that
    EPA's sampling program was incomplete. The draft report explicitly stated
    that we (1) determined the extent to which EPA's communications on
    environmental health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina have provided useful
    information to the public and (2) did not evaluate the agency's
    environmental risk assessment methodology. In the context of the
    usefulness of the communications to the public, the draft report stated
    that we believe EPA's assumption (that the results from sediment samples
    from streets or other public access areas can be used to accurately
    characterize the degree and nature of contamination in New Orleans,
    including inside homes and in yards) is important and warrants
    highlighting in the environmental assessment summaries for two main
    reasons. First, as the draft report stated, environmental contamination
    levels inside buildings can potentially be higher than and different from
    the contamination levels outside for a variety of reasons, potentially
    causing more adverse health effects. Further, as the draft report also
    stated, EPA's Science Advisory Board had suggested that EPA conduct some
    indoor sampling in New Orleans for this reason. Second, the draft report
    stated that to understand the level of assurance that EPA can provide
    about the extent to which localized areas of contamination may exist
    throughout the city, it is important to know that limiting sediment and
    soil sampling to outdoor, public access areas can be problematic. For
    example, sediments in streets may be subject to more dispersion than those
    that settled in more protected areas, such as on private property close to
    residences. Our point is that EPA should have disclosed, and provided its
    rationale for, important assumptions such as this in the assessment
    summaries themselves.

    5.EPA said that the data the agency has collected to date do not support
    the statement in the draft report that the environmental contamination
    caused by this natural disaster could have both short- and long-term
    effects on the health of residents in impacted areas, as well as workers,
    volunteers, and wildlife. We believe that it would be premature to
    conclude that the environmental contamination caused by Hurricane Katrina
    has not and will not cause any short- and long-term public health effects.
    Further, EPA has not demonstrated that it has assurance that the
    environmental contamination both has not and will not cause any short- and
    long-term public health effects.

    6.EPA takes issue with the draft's assertion that EPA's August 2006
    summary indicates that the data presented in the December 2005 summary
    applied to only short-term visits. In fact, the statement that EPA is
    questioning is taken directly from its August 2006 summary, which
    describes the results of EPA's analysis of 450 samples (termed phase I by
    EPA) addressed in its December 2005 summary. The complete statement in
    EPA's summary is as follows: "The results of the phase I sampling
    indicated that hazardous substances were not detected in the sediments at
    levels that would pose an immediate health risk to workers involved in
    response activities or to residents returning for a quick assessment of
    damage to their homes." Further, the August 2006 summary also states that
    the data from the phase I analysis were used to assess "(1) whether
    hazardous substances were present in the sediment in residential areas;
    and (2) the potential health effects to emergency workers and residents
    from short-term exposure [emphasis ours] to any hazardous substances found
    in the sediment." EPA's summary of the results of the testing, combined
    with its explanation of the goal of this testing, indicates that the data
    presented in the December 2005 summary apply to short-term visits.

    Moreover, in its comments, EPA appears to question the assessment results
    it reported by stating that "both summaries discuss how samples were
    compared to both short and long term health criteria." While the summaries
    do not "discuss" the health criteria, they do state that the samples were
    compared to both "LDEQ Risk Evaluation/Correction Action Program (RECAP)
    and EPA's risk criteria based on long-term (30 years) residential exposure
    assumptions." EPA appears to be suggesting in its comments that a reader
    of the August 2006 summary should independently infer--on the basis of its
    reference to technical (and to the general public, arcane) risk
    criteria--that the December 2005 analysis also provided assurance that
    longer-term exposures would not pose any health risks. However, EPA's
    assessment of the initial 450 sediment samples addressed only short-term
    visits, according to the agency's August 2006 summary as quoted above. We
    believe this example, and EPA's response to it, illustrates the need for
    EPA to improve its environmental risk communications, as we are
    recommending.

    7.We disagree with EPA's statement that the draft report underestimated
    the extent of asbestos monitoring. We believe the draft report accurately
    presented information about the monitoring conducted by the federal and
    state network--the ambient air monitors; some monitoring conducted at some
    debris reduction sites; and the monitoring conducted by the Army Corps of
    Engineers and its contractors, who are conducting demolitions under
    government orders. Further, although the draft report stated that the
    Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality has told EPA that monitoring
    by the Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors has found "little or no
    asbestos emissions," it also stated that such air monitoring data from the
    Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors do not address potential
    asbestos emissions from the privately sponsored demolitions and
    renovations by individual homeowners. Since these activities are not
    regulated--and emissions control actions such as wetting the material from
    before the demolition process through disposal are not required--the
    potential for asbestos emissions at these sites is greater than at
    regulated sites. Because EPA's air monitors have not been deployed in and
    around neighborhoods both where publicly and privately sponsored
    demolition and renovation activities are concentrated, the agency's
    finding of no measurable amounts of asbestos at its ambient monitoring
    sites does not necessarily address the asbestos to which residents,
    workers, and volunteers may be exposed in some neighborhoods.

    8.EPA said that the draft report was misleading regarding responsibility
    for mitigating environmental impacts on national wildlife refuges
    following disasters, stating that the decision to remove hazardous
    materials from the national wildlife refuges was the responsibility of
    FEMA and the Department of the Interior and did not involve EPA. We have
    revised the language in the report to clarify the discussion of
    responsibilities. In presenting this issue--which we cite as a challenge
    EPA faced in addressing the environmental impacts of Hurricane
    Katrina--the draft report explained that EPA did not remove hazardous
    materials from national wildlife refuges in a timely manner as part of its
    response in part because disaster assistance funding generally is not used
    for debris cleanups on federal lands. The draft report also explained that
    FEMA did not approve the Department of the Interior's request for funding
    to clean up this debris because it was on federal lands. The draft report
    showed the impact on national wildlife refuges from the 2005 Gulf Coast
    hurricanes: Debris that could have been removed in conjunction with EPA
    cleanup activities in areas immediately adjacent to refuges was instead
    left in place for a year or more, allowing containers holding hazardous
    materials to settle into marshlands and begin to corrode and leak. In one
    refuge, a fire spread to a 120-acre debris field with propane and other
    hazardous material containers, causing explosions that endangered
    firefighters. We continue to believe that EPA should be involved in
    helping resolve these issues because, under the National Response Plan,
    EPA is the chair of the National Response Team, whose duties include
    national planning and response coordination for oil and hazardous
    materials incidents. We do agree that FEMA, which declined to provide
    funding to the Department of the Interior for cleanup after Hurricane
    Katrina, and DHS, which coordinates the federal response to disasters
    under the National Response Plan, should also take part in planning
    efforts to resolve funding issues concerning the removal of hazardous
    materials from federal lands following a disaster. Accordingly, we have
    modified our recommendation to state that EPA should also work with DHS
    and FEMA, as well as with federal land management agencies and the Coast
    Guard, to determine what actions are needed to ensure that environmental
    contamination on federal lands, such as national wildlife refuges, can be
    expeditiously and efficiently addressed in future disasters. Timely
    cleanup can lessen the damage to the environment, better protect the
    public from exposure to contaminants, and prevent further migration of
    hazardous materials to state and local waters and land--and would likely
    be more cost-effective.

    9.We disagree with EPA's statement that the draft report asserted that EPA
    had a limited role in ensuring that states dispose of storm debris
    appropriately. Specifically, we stated in the draft that EPA's debris
    management role is limited; however, we did not say that EPA had a limited
    role in helping states dispose of storm debris appropriately. In fact, our
    draft report specifically highlighted EPA's efforts with its partners in
    addressing waste segregation, recycling, and landfill operations--the
    areas EPA's comments cited as not being recognized in the draft report.
    Our finding and recommendation in this area relate to current limitations
    in EPA guidance to states on making certain emergency debris disposal
    decisions--such as where to locate emergency landfills and the
    implications of selecting disposal options that otherwise would not be
    acceptable. We note that EPA has agreed to implement our recommendation as
    it makes revisions to its disaster debris manual in calendar year 2007.

    10.The information EPA provides on its asbestos monitoring activities in
    this paragraph was presented and analyzed in the draft report.
    Specifically, the draft cited the asbestos monitoring conducted by
    demolition contractors using personal sampling pumps and employees wearing
    personal monitoring equipment required by the Occupational Safety and
    Health Administration. In addition, the draft report cited the Louisiana
    Department of Environmental Quality's report to EPA that this monitoring
    has found "little or no asbestos emissions." Further, the draft report
    discussed reasons we believe additional monitoring is warranted: (1)
    Neither ambient nor demolition site monitors have been located in
    neighborhoods with substantial demolition and renovation activities, such
    as the Ninth Ward; (2) EPA scaled back its ambient monitoring to the
    prestorm level and reduced the frequency of sampling--thus EPA's expanded
    monitoring covered only the first few months of demolition activities,
    when few demolitions were conducted; and (3) many thousands of demolitions
    and renovations may occur in the same geographic area and in the same
    general time frame--some of which are not subject to the enforcement of
    certain asbestos work practice standards, while others are not subject to
    the standards at all. The draft report also stated that as of January
    2007, about 25,000 homes concentrated in the Orleans and St. Bernard
    Parishes were awaiting demolition, and another 80,000 homes that were
    flooded in the New Orleans area were not yet included in the demolition
    estimates, but many of these homes will likely be demolished. Those not
    demolished will likely have to be substantially renovated.

    11.This information cited by EPA is background information about asbestos
    and EPA's asbestos regulation, which was provided in the draft report.

    12.Contrary to EPA's assertion, the draft report did identify the emission
    controls required by EPA's no action assurances (in its comments, EPA
    refers to these controls as engineering controls). The draft also
    discussed the monitoring of air at grinding sites and EPA's rationale for
    focusing on these sites rather than demolition sites. We continue to
    believe it is appropriate for EPA or the state to conduct monitoring at
    both demolition and volume reduction sites. Further, while some emission
    controls may be in place at demolitions covered by the no action
    assurances, the many demolitions and substantial renovations by individual
    homeowners generally are not subject to any of these controls; further,
    the debris from these unregulated activities may be transported without
    emission controls to construction and demolition landfills.

    13.We encourage EPA to expeditiously implement the plan the agency
    discusses in its comments to work with state and local officials to
    develop further demolition/renovation advisories that can be used
    throughout the area to advise individuals to take appropriate precautions.
    We note that numerous volunteers of all ages travel to the Gulf Coast to
    help with demolitions and renovations, particularly during the summer
    months and holiday periods, and they should have clear guidance on
    protective measures to take when they are in areas undergoing demolition
    or renovation.

    14.We urge EPA, in developing a plan for additional air monitoring, to
    evaluate the number and location of the air monitors to ensure sufficient
    coverage of areas with substantial demolition and renovation activities,
    both regulated and unregulated. If air monitors are not appropriately
    located in neighborhoods undergoing demolition and renovation, the
    monitoring network will not be adequate to ensure that public health is
    being protected.

    15.Our draft report highlighted EPA's communications activities, which EPA
    reiterates in its comments.

    16.Our draft report illustrated the need for EPA to revise and organize
    existing crisis communication fact sheets and other information to ensure
    that accurate and consistent information can be accessed quickly at the
    time of response. In its comments, EPA states its intention to do so by
    developing and using a resource guide to be completed in early 2008.

    17.EPA's comments describe as misleading a statement in the draft report
    explaining that EPA did not remove hazardous materials from national
    wildlife refuges because disaster assistance funding generally is not used
    for debris cleanups on federal lands. We believe this statement is factual
    as written and does not imply that EPA was involved in the decision to
    remove or not to remove hazardous materials from national wildlife
    refuges. Further, the draft report also explained that FEMA did not
    approve the Department of the Interior's request for funding to clean up
    this debris because it was on federal lands. See comment 8.

    18.EPA's comment that EPA and the Coast Guard completed their cleanup work
    at the national wildlife refuges "under budget and ahead of schedule" does
    not acknowledge the fact that the hazardous materials were left in place
    in national wildlife refuges for a year or more before the cleanup was
    initiated. During that time, containers holding hazardous materials
    settled into marshlands and began to corrode and leak. When the cleanup of
    the Sabine National Wildlife Refuge was completed--16 months after
    Hurricane Rita--about 2,200 containers potentially filled with hazardous
    liquids and gases had been found and removed, along with several thousand
    other hazardous waste items, tires, batteries, munitions, and white goods.
    At another refuge, a fire spread to a 120-acre debris field with propane
    and other hazardous material containers, causing them to explode and
    endanger the firefighters. EPA's comments also do not acknowledge that the
    delays in removing the debris complicated the cleanup efforts and
    increased the cost of removal--or that hurricane response actions to
    collect hazardous materials in adjacent areas were halted at federal
    boundaries.

    19.EPA commented that it consulted with the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality regarding landfills. The draft report so indicated.
    Further, EPA stated that its staff assisting the state at landfills did
    not provide oversight as the draft report indicated but "provided
    assistance in a variety of ways." Some of the assistance EPA provided,
    such as sending observers to landfills to monitor and report on
    activities, constitutes oversight. EPA also said that the operator of the
    Gentilly landfill has conducted monitoring of groundwater at the landfill.
    We have added this information to the report.

    20.EPA said in its comments that it is revising the agency's disaster
    debris manual. If the revisions include detailed guidance to states and
    local entities on selecting additional landfill sites under emergency
    situations, and practices that agencies can adopt to mitigate the
    potential environmental impacts of special accommodations to address storm
    debris, EPA could help states avoid controversies over landfill sites
    selected under emergency conditions and help state and local agencies plan
    for accommodations that may be needed to handle hazardous storm debris
    after disasters.

    21.Our report discusses delays in determining whether EPA or the Army
    Corps of Engineers would be responsible for white goods and electronic
    waste disposal in Louisiana and Mississippi. Local officials in both
    states told us that confusion about EPA's role in disposing of white goods
    and electronics waste caused delays in removing and disposing of this
    debris. We note that EPA has agreed to clarify the roles of EPA and the
    Corps regarding debris disposal activities.

    22.Among other things, our report addresses the extent to which EPA has
    assurance that public health is protected from asbestos inhalation risks
    in New Orleans, and the Highlights page appropriately discusses key
    actions by EPA to monitor asbestos after Hurricane Katrina. The body of
    the draft report provides more contextual information--that the ambient
    air monitors in and around New Orleans used to measure asbestos are also
    used to measure other contaminants. The report states that monitors
    measure ambient concentrations of the following pollutants: arsenic, lead,
    particulate matter, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon chemicals, and
    volatile organic compounds.

    23.The introduction and background sections of the draft report provided
    information on the roles of EPA, the Coast Guard, the Army Corps of
    Engineers, and the Department of Health and Human Services as they relate
    to the topic of our review, EPA's hurricane response activities.

    24.See comment 6. In addition, rather than stating that EPA's December
    2005 risk assessment summary indicated it was generally safe for residents
    to return to New Orleans, we revised the report to cite EPA's exact
    language in that summary: "the great majority of the data showed that
    adverse health effects would not be expected from exposure to sediments
    from previously flooded areas."

    25.Although EPA questions our statement that the asbestos work practice
    standards generally do not apply to individual homeowners, this statement
    is accurate as stands. We added wording to the final report regarding the
    possible applicability of the work practice standards to volunteer groups.

    26.We disagree with EPA's statement that it is inaccurate to say that the
    agency is not enforcing some of the work practice standards for certain
    residences. Under most circumstances, EPA's asbestos work practices
    require the demolition operator to inspect buildings for asbestos and to
    remove the asbestos prior to demolition. In letters to the Louisiana and
    Mississippi Departments of Environmental Quality, EPA explicitly stated
    that its no action assurance letters would "allow [specified] houses to be
    demolished without inspection and removal of asbestos prior to
    demolition." Our draft report stated that EPA's no action assurance
    letters did not extend to some other elements of the asbestos work
    practice standards. Finally, we note the purpose of EPA's no action
    assurance letters is to provide assurance that it will not enforce certain
    legal requirements--as it has done for certain asbestos requirements.

    27.EPA's public service announcements and communications, which we
    highlighted in the draft report, addressed generic environmental health
    risks and guidance. The actions by the public that EPA cites in its
    comments (voluntary curbside sorting of household chemicals) may be
    related to those communications efforts. However, EPA appears to be making
    a link between these communications and actions and the comprehensiveness
    of EPA's sampling program--a connection we do not find supportable.

    28.EPA questioned the "intended meaning" of the draft report's statement
    that "after flooding, mold frequently forms and spreads." This statement
    was provided to identify mold as a likely indoor air contaminant in the
    discussion of contamination inside New Orleans residences that had been
    flooded. The draft then highlighted the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention's conclusion that "the duration and extent of the flooding and
    the number of structures flooded made massive mold contamination a
    certainty."

    29.Key information about EPA's no action assurances was included in our
    draft report.

    30.We edited the sentence on household hazardous wastes as suggested.

    31.In its comments, EPA incorrectly states that we characterized
    chlorofluorocarbons as "hazardous." Actually, the draft report said that
    electronic waste and white goods frequently contain "potentially hazardous
    contaminants, such as lead, mercury, or chlorofluorocarbons...." The final
    report refers to these substances simply as "contaminants."

    32.The draft report reflected that EPA approved an extension of the no
    action assurance through September 30, 2007, for four counties in
    Mississippi.

    33.Rather than stating that monitors measure ambient concentrations of up
    to six contaminants, we have revised the report in response to EPA's
    comment to state that the monitors can measure ambient concentrations of
    the following potential pollutants and categories of pollutants from local
    and regional sources: arsenic, asbestos, lead, particulate matter,
    polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon chemicals, and volatile organic compounds.

    34.EPA disagreed with the statement that EPA "delegated the authority" to
    states to implement and enforce the asbestos standard, asserting instead
    that EPA "authorizes" the programs. According to 40 C.F.R. S 61.04(c), EPA
    "delegates" the relevant authority to states. Nevertheless, the Clean Air
    Act uses the term "approve," and we revised the report as EPA suggested.
    We express no view concerning the apparent conflict between EPA's comments
    and the agency's decision to employ the term "delegate" in its
    regulations.

    35.We revised our footnote defining regulated asbestos-containing
    materials to quote the regulations verbatim as EPA recommended.

    36.We added the regulatory citation to the footnote as EPA suggested.

    37.We state that the demolition owner or operator "generally" must notify
    EPA, which encompasses the contingency EPA notes here.

    38.Our draft report stated that specified wetting and notification
    requirements still apply to demolition operations in which the building is
    structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse.

    39.We made the editorial change EPA suggested for clarity.

    40.We made the recommended revision to the footnote that specifies EPA's
    asbestos screening level.

    41.The draft report stated that Louisiana chose not to use the October
    2005 no action assurance, which authorized, among other things, a test of
    an open burn technology for disposing of construction and demolition
    debris.

    42.EPA said that the agency wanted to clarify the purpose of the Fort
    Smith research project. We believe the draft report clearly stated the
    purpose of this pilot. For example, the second sentence of the short
    paragraph describing the Fort Smith project identified the purpose of this
    research project. Further, the draft report stated that "EPA officials
    said that any monitoring of asbestos emissions at demolition sites in New
    Orleans would not need to be as elaborate as that done for the pilot which
    was conducted to develop data for potential use in a revision to EPA's
    asbestos regulation."

    43.The draft report provided information on EPA's asbestos monitoring
    efforts and on monitoring data from the Army Corps of Engineers.

    44.The draft report referred to EPA's environmental assessment summaries
    as "EPA's primary communications about the health risks from exposure to
    contamination in New Orleans." EPA disagreed that these summaries
    represented its primary communications, referring to the other health risk
    communications--which the draft report also discussed. To address EPA's
    concern, we have revised the draft, describing the assessment summaries as
    key  health risk communications because they are significant in that they
    provide EPA's analyses of its sediment sampling efforts in New Orleans.

    45.As suggested, we replaced the term "sanitary engineers" with
    "environmental scientists and engineers."

    46.The draft report identified the primary subtitle D responsibilities of
    states that EPA cited in its comments. As suggested, we clarified that
    EPA's enforcement authority is limited.

    47.EPA proposed several deletions from the paragraph on the Agriculture
    Street Landfill. In response, we have replaced "concerns about cancer"
    with "health concerns." However, we did not delete "debris from destroyed
    buildings and ash from municipal incinerators" because EPA's comments
    conflict with EPA documentation that we obtained during our review.

    48.We made the suggested deletion.

    49.We made the suggested clarification in the footnote.

    50.We revised the draft to reflect that EPA provided technical support and
    undertook some oversight activities at New Orleans landfills because some
    of the activities involved overseeing and reporting on landfill
    operations.

    51.EPA provided information on guidance the agency issued in Mississippi
    on management practices for white goods. However, the implementation of
    the procedures was problematic, as indicated by the comments of
    Mississippi county officials cited in the draft report.

    52.Our finding and recommendation regarding problems with the disposition
    of electronic waste focused on the issues Louisiana and Mississippi
    officials described to us--these problems occurred in the weeks
    immediately after the storm because of confusion regarding the roles of
    EPA and the Corps. We did not identify problems after EPA and the Corps
    defined their responsibilities. Therefore, we did not report on all
    electronics recycling activities, such as the activities EPA says were
    omitted from the report.

    53.We revised the sentence to more clearly separate the land management
    agencies referred to from the other agencies cited (EPA and the Coast
    Guard).

    Appendix III:  GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    John B. Stephenson, (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov

    Staff Acknowledgments

    In addition to the contact named above, Christine Fishkin, Assistant
    Director; Joanna Owusu; Kirk Menard; Nancy Crothers; Richard Johnson;
    Karen Keegan; and Omari Norman made key contributions to this report.
    Jessica Lemke and Hilary Sloan also made important contributions to this
    report.

    (360648)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-651 .

    To view the full product, including the scope
    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact John Stephenson at (202) 512-3841 or
    stephensonj@gao.gov.

    Highlights of [33]GAO-07-651 , a report to congressional committees

    June 2007

    HURRICANE KATRINA

    EPA's Current and Future Environmental Protection Efforts Could Be
    Enhanced by Addressing Issues and Challenges Faced on the Gulf Coast

    In 2005, Hurricane Katrina's impact on the Gulf Coast included damage to
    the environment from chemical and hazardous materials releases. Also, the
    widespread demolition and renovation activities still under way in New
    Orleans may release asbestos fibers into the air, posing a potential
    additional health risk. This report, conducted at the Comptroller
    General's initiative, addresses (1) the Environmental Protection Agency's
    (EPA) actions to assess and mitigate Katrina's environmental impacts, (2)
    the extent to which EPA has assurance that public health is protected from
    asbestos inhalation risks in New Orleans, (3) the extent to which EPA's
    environmental health risk communications provided useful information to
    the public, and (4) challenges EPA faces in addressing environmental
    impacts.

    [34]What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends that EPA develop an asbestos air monitoring plan for New
    Orleans, improve its communications on environmental risks for future
    disasters, and take steps to address several challenges EPA has faced. EPA
    agreed with all but one recommendation, commenting that other agencies
    should address the challenge of obtaining timely funding for the removal
    of hazardous materials from federal lands after disasters. GAO modified
    its recommendation to include additional relevant agencies with which EPA
    should work to address the problem GAO identified.

    Under challenging circumstances, EPA worked with federal and state
    partners to respond to chemical and oil spills, collect abandoned chemical
    containers, coordinate recycling of damaged appliances, and collect and
    recycle electronic waste. EPA also conducted air, water, sediment, and
    soil sampling; helped assess drinking water and wastewater
    infrastructures; and issued timely information to the public on a variety
    of environmental health risks.

    However, as cleanup continues, EPA's assurance that public health is
    protected from risks associated with inhalation of asbestos fibers is
    limited because the agency has not deployed air monitors in and around New
    Orleans neighborhoods where demolition and renovation activities are
    concentrated. While EPA took steps to monitor asbestos after the hurricane
    --for example, more than doubling the number of ambient (outdoor) air
    monitors and monitoring emissions at debris reduction sites--monitors were
    not placed in areas undergoing substantial demolition and renovation, such
    as the Ninth Ward. This is problematic because monitors effectively detect
    releases of asbestos from demolition activities only if they are located
    immediately adjacent to demolition sites. Further, many thousands of homes
    being demolished and renovated by or for individual homeowners are
    generally not subject to EPA's asbestos emissions standards aimed at
    limiting releases of fibers into the air.

    While EPA provided useful environmental health risk information to the
    public via flyers, public service announcements, and the EPA Web page, the
    communications were at times unclear and inconsistent on how to mitigate
    exposure to some contaminants, particularly asbestos and mold. Further,
    the usefulness of three key reports on EPA's environmental sampling in New
    Orleans--developed with, among others, the Louisiana Department of
    Environmental Quality to address potential health risks from exposure to
    floodwaters, sediments, and air--was limited by a lack of timeliness and
    insufficient disclosures about EPA's sampling program. For example, EPA
    did not state until August 2006 that its December 2005 report--which said
    that the great majority of the data showed that adverse health effects
    would not be expected from exposure to sediments from previously flooded
    areas--applied to short-term visits, such as to view damage to homes.

    Mitigating several challenges EPA faces addressing Hurricane Katrina could
    better protect the environment in the future. First, EPA did not remove
    hazardous materials from national wildlife refuges in a timely manner as
    part of its response in part because disaster assistance funding generally
    is not used for debris cleanups on federal lands. Second, because states
    generally have authority over landfill decisions, EPA does not have an
    effective role in emergency debris disposal decisions that could cause
    pollution. Finally, lack of clarity in federal debris management plans and
    protocols precluded the timely and safe disposal of some appliances and
    electronic waste.

    References

    Visible links
      33. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07651.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-651
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