Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate	 
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely	 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations (16-MAY-07, 
GAO-07-641).							 
                                                                 
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations	 
affected 62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard
(ANG) with 14 units losing their flying mission, and others	 
converting from one type of aircraft to another, or increasing or
decreasing assigned aircraft. To implement the recommendations,  
ANG must relocate hundreds of aircraft and retrain or recruit	 
about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this report, GAO addresses the
status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC actions. GAO's	 
objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide 	 
replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the	 
progress and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3)
changes to the cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared 
under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations 
on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to  
2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO conducted its work at the Air	 
Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states affected by BRAC 2005  
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-641 					        
    ACCNO:   A69699						        
  TITLE:     Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to    
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure	 
Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations	 
     DATE:   05/16/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft						 
	     Base closures					 
	     Base realignments					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Military bases					 
	     Military forces					 
	     National Guard					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     A-10 Aircraft					 
	     Advanced Technology Bomber 			 
	     B-2 Aircraft					 
	     C-130 Aircraft					 
	     C-5 Aircraft					 
	     DOD Base Realignment and Closure Program		 
	     F-15 Aircraft					 
	     F-16 Aircraft					 
	     F-22 Aircraft					 
	     Fighting Falcon Aircraft				 
	     Hercules Aircraft					 
	     KC-135 Aircraft					 
	     Strike Eagle Aircraft				 
	     Thunderbolt Aircraft				 

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GAO-07-641

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identi
     * [4]ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That

          * [5]Some Key Planning Tasks Completed
          * [6]Challenges in Managing Many Sequential Implementation Action

               * [7]Completing Manpower Documents
               * [8]Potential Training Capacity Shortfall
               * [9]Lengthy Security Clearance Process
               * [10]Identifying Bridge Missions
               * [11]Delays in Funding
               * [12]Communication between ANG Headquarters and Units Has
                 Been In

     * [13]No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC Re

          * [14]Current Estimates Indicate Annual Recurring Costs Rather Tha
          * [15]ANG One-Time Implementation Cost Estimates Have Increased
          * [16]Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over All ANG BRA

     * [17]Conclusions
     * [18]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [19]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [20]GAO Contact
     * [21]Acknowledgments
     * [22]GAO's Mission
     * [23]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [24]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [25]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [26]Congressional Relations
     * [27]Public Affairs

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve
Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard
Recommendations

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

May 2007

GAO-07-641

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and Assign
Replacement Missions 9
ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That Are Likely to
Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their Missions 12
No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC Recommendations
and Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over All BRAC-Related ANG
Costs 25
Conclusions 29
Recommendations for Executive Action 30
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
Appendix II Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost Their Flying
Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005 40
Appendix III Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between the
2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for
ANG-Related Recommendations 42
Appendix IV Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC Recommendations
Affecting ANG 44
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 46
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50

Tables

Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation's Impact on ANG Flying Units and
Personnel 7
Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units 10
Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs 27
Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the BRAC
Account 28

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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

May 16, 2007

Congressional Committees

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its
recommendations to realign and close bases, which it projected would yield
nearly $50 billion in net savings over 20 years. Although Air National
Guard (ANG) units were affected by 37 of the 42 Air Force recommendations,
these actions were aimed primarily at transforming ANG to better support
the future force structure rather than producing significant savings. In
July 2005, we reported that DOD's proposed recommendations affected 56 ANG
installations with 22 units potentially losing their flying mission.1 We
also observed that the Air Force had not identified new missions for many
of those units. Air Force officials said at the time that they planned to
use positions in these units for emerging missions to support the future
force structure in such areas such as homeland defense, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV), and intelligence, which they expected to further refine as
part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. After performing its own analysis,
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission2 made
substantial changes to the recommendations published in its September 8,
2005 report. The BRAC recommendations affected 56 (62 percent) of ANG
flying units with 14 units losing their flying mission, 4 units reducing
their flying mission, 5 units converting from one type of aircraft to
another, 4 units associating3 with another unit, and 29 units receiving an
increase in the number of aircraft assigned to them. The BRAC Commission
estimated that the Air Force recommendations would result in an annual
recurring savings of about $1.1 billion and those affecting ANG would be
about $26 million of the Air Force projected annual recurring savings. The
BRAC Commission recommendations were accepted by the President and
Congress and became effective on November 9, 2005.

1GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, [28]GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

2The BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub.
L. No. 107-107, Title XXX) provides for an independent Commission to
review the Secretary of Defense's realignment and closure recommendations
and present its findings and conclusions on the Secretary's
recommendations, along with its own recommendations to the President.

3In an associate unit, a unit from one component (i.e., active, guard, or
reserve) of the Air Force operates and maintains equipment that it shares
with a unit from another component. By sharing equipment, the Air Force
seeks to train more people and make more efficient use of the equipment.

Once the recommendations became effective, the Air Force became
responsible for implementing recommendations affecting ANG. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense required the Air Force to submit a detailed
business plan for each recommendation that included a schedule for any
personnel, equipment, or aircraft movements between installations and
updated costs and savings estimates. All the plans affecting ANG were
approved by the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group between
April and October 2006. In accordance with BRAC statutory authority, DOD
must complete closure and realignment actions by September 15, 2011.4

This report is one in a series of reports that detail progress DOD has
made in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the
2005 BRAC round. We performed our work under the Comptroller General's
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative5 and are reporting
the results to you in order to facilitate your oversight role of DOD's
infrastructure and BRAC initiatives. In this report, we address the Air
Force's efforts to implement the BRAC recommendations affecting ANG. Our
specific objectives were to determine (1) the process the Air Force used
to identify and assign new missions to ANG units who will lose flying
missions as a result of BRAC 2005, (2) the progress the Air Force has made
and the challenges it faces in implementing the BRAC recommendations, and
(3) changes to the estimated cost and savings associated with
implementation of recommendations affecting ANG since the BRAC
recommendations became effective.

To accomplish these objectives, we performed our work at the Air Force
headquarters, including the Total Force Integration office6 and the BRAC
Project Management Office; and ANG Directorate of the National Guard
Bureau,7 in Washington, D.C. We also interviewed ANG officials in 11
states that were affected by the 2005 BRAC recommendations.8 During these
meetings, we interviewed key officials involved in implementing the
recommendations to understand the process used to identify and assign new
missions to ANG units as well as the role that Air Force and ANG
headquarters, the state adjutants general, and affected units played in
the process and to identify the challenges the Air Force faces in
implementing the recommendations. Finally, we analyzed the changes to the
costs and savings estimates between the approved BRAC Commission
recommendations and the business plans developed by the Air Force and
approved by the Secretary of Defense. On the basis of our assessments, we
believe the DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further
details on the scope and methodology are described in appendix I.

4Pub. L. No. 101-510, S 2904, as amended (1990).

531 U.S.C. S717.

6The Air Force Total Force Integration Office (A8F) was previously known
as the Future Total Force Office.

7The ANG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau is hereafter referred to
as ANG headquarters.

Results in Brief

Through an evolutionary and consultative process involving all key
stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG headquarters assigned
replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future
force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize the number of ANG
flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major commands and
the combatant commanders, the Air Force identified potential missions for
ANG, which it then categorized into a prioritized list based on mission
significance. The Air Force then let ANG headquarters, with input from
state leadership, decide which of those missions to assign to specific
units. Our analysis indicated that 23 of the 30 missions assigned were on
the prioritized list. In addition to the prioritized list, ANG leadership
sought to ensure that each state had at least one flying mission and to
assign additional flying missions where possible. Our analysis shows that
the remaining 7 missions assigned were new flying missions based on this
premise. For example, Connecticut was assigned a new flying mission
because it no longer had one, and additional flying missions were assigned
in Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi, and two in Ohio.

ANG is making progress toward implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations,
but some related challenges remain that could delay when some units are
able to be mission capable. The Air Force has developed business plans
that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense, created 59
programming plans, developed a plan for the movement of aircraft, and
assigned missions to all affected units. However, ANG headquarters faces
challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required
to implement the BRAC recommendations. First, ANG headquarters faces
challenges in developing the large number of unit manning documents and
requirements templates that provide the specific skill mixes required for
replacement missions. ANG headquarters also does not know the specific
skill sets needed for all missions because some of these missions are new
and the skill sets are still being defined. Second, ANG headquarters faces
challenges in ensuring that there is sufficient space in Air Force
training schools for all the personnel requiring training. For example,
ANG headquarters projects they need to train about 3,000 personnel for
intelligence-related replacement missions, but the intelligence school
currently cannot fully accommodate this requirement in a timely manner.
The Air Force is working on potential solutions, such as increasing the
number of instructors and shortening the required curriculum for one
intelligence specialty, but these solutions have yet to be fully
implemented and may add to ANG costs. Third, ANG officials are concerned
there could be delays in obtaining security clearances for some of the
personnel assigned new missions due to the time required to process a
clearance application. Fourth, ANG headquarters has not identified bridge
missions for all units that will face a delay between the removal of their
old mission and the startup of their replacement mission. Fifth, ANG faces
possible delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment,
construction, and training due to residual impacts of the continuing
resolutions for fiscal year 2007 and requirements that were not included
in the budget. Finally, according to some state and ANG unit commanders,9
communication with ANG headquarters is limited and insufficient to meet
the needs of the units, and they are not receiving key information--such
as new mission requirements and the new personnel skill mix that each unit
will require--which impacts units' ability to recruit and train personnel.
These challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC
recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. Without a
strategy to deal with these related challenges, some units may face delays
in when they are able to be mission capable.

8We visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
We also held video conferences with state ANG officials in Oklahoma and
Ohio and received written responses to questions from state ANG officials
in Mississippi.

9In conducting our work, we spoke with senior state and ANG unit
commanders, including adjutants general and assistant adjutants general,
as well as the wing commanders and some deputy wing commanders of affected
units.

In comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, our analysis of current
Air Force estimates indicates that no annual recurring savings will be
achieved as a result of the recommendations related to ANG, ANG one-time
implementation costs are projected to increase, and Congress has not been
given full visibility over ANG BRAC-related implementation costs.
Specifically, our analysis indicates that implementing the ANG related
recommendations is expected to result in annual recurring costs of $53
million dollars rather than annual recurring savings of $26 million
estimated by the BRAC Commission. The $79 million per year difference
occurred primarily due to language in the Commission's report that
prevents ANG from reducing its current end strength in some states. Also,
our analysis shows one-time implementation cost estimates are projected to
increase $68 million dollars (13.5 percent; from $504 million to $572
million) primarily due to additional military construction requirements
and inflation.10 Further, the Air Force decided to fund over $300 million
to establish replacement missions for units that lost their flying
missions outside the BRAC account and did not report these costs in their
BRAC budget submission. Therefore, Congress does not have full visibility
over ANG BRAC-related implementation costs.

We are making recommendations to ensure the challenges we identified are
addressed, to improve communication between ANG headquarters and the
affected units, and to increase cost transparency.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations regarding ensuring the challenges we identified are
addressed and improving communication between ANG headquarters and the
affected units and did not concur with our recommendation regarding
increasing cost transparency. DOD does not believe these costs are
BRAC-related because establishment of replacement missions was not part of
the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct specific
replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC Commission
recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain all personnel in
affected units, and where appropriate, retrain personnel in skills
relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we believe the costs to
establish the new missions are BRAC-related and should be reported in the
Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission. DOD's written comments are
reprinted in appendix V. DOD also provided technical comments, which we
have incorporated into this report as appropriate.

10BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 dollars,
whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, which
includes inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation period, the
cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent. The actual
impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are incurred.

Background

ANG is a reserve component of the United States Air Force. It performs
both federal and state missions, consists of about 107,000 members, and
makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force. ANG provides 100 percent
of the air sovereignty missions and plays a key role in the Air Force's
Aerospace Expeditionary Force,11 including 49 percent of theater airlifts
and 45 percent of tanker missions. In their state role, ANG units report
to the governor of their respective state or territory (Puerto Rico, Guam,
Virgin Islands) or the commanding general of the District of Columbia
National Guard and participate in emergency relief support during natural
disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and forest fires; search and rescue
operations; support to civil authorities; maintenance of vital public
services; and counter-drug operations. For example, ANG was involved in
the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.

The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each have
a role in the management of ANG. The Air Force and its major commands play
a key role in determining ANG's force structure, approving new missions,
and equipping ANG to perform its missions. The National Guard Bureau
administers the federal functions of ANG and works with the Air Force Air
Staff to develop and coordinate programs that directly affect ANG. The
Bureau also formulates and administers programs for training, development,
and maintenance of ANG units. The National Guard Bureau also acts as the
channel of communication between the Air Force and the 54 states and
territories where National Guard units are located.12

11The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as the Air
and Space Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve, and Guard
into one component that trains, deploys, and operates together. This force
is comprised of fighters, bombers, tankers, and tactical air lifters.

1210 U.S.C. S 10501.

Prior to this round of BRAC, ANG had 91 units with flying missions. As
part of DOD's BRAC report, the Air Force proposed actions that would have
affected 56 of these units with 22 units losing their flying mission. In
July 2005, we reported that many of the personnel positions associated
with the units losing a flying mission did not have a new mission
identified. Air Force officials stated they planned to use these positions
for emerging missions in such areas as homeland defense, UAVs, and
intelligence, which they expect to further refine as part of the 2004
Quadrennial Defense Review. After examining these proposals, the BRAC
Commission made substantial changes to the recommendations affecting ANG
with 14 units losing their flying mission, other units reducing or
converting aircraft, and others increasing the number of aircraft. Table 1
summarizes the BRAC Commission recommendations affecting ANG flying units.

Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation's Impact on ANG Flying Units and
Personnel

                                      Number of
Type of action                  Units Personnela 
Ceasing flying mission             14      6,000 
Converting aircraft typeb           5      1,000 
Increasing assigned aircraft       29      3,900 
Associating with another unitc      4      1,100 
Reducing assigned aircraft          4        700 
Total                              56     12,700 
ANG (end strength/flying units)    91    106,800 
Percentage affected               62%        12% 

Source: ANG.

aRounded to the nearest 100.

bUnits that lost one aircraft type and gained another due to BRAC
recommendations.

cUnits that lost their aircraft and are directed to share the aircraft of
an active or reserve unit due to BRAC recommendations.

While the BRAC Commission directed the removal of aircraft from 14 units,
it did not identify replacement missions for these units. Instead, the
Commission recommended that the affected units would assume a new mission
that would integrate the unit into the Future Total Force such as air
mobility; engineering; flight training; or UAVs, if the state agreed to
change the organization, composition, and location of the affected unit.
Future Total Force transformational missions, also known as Total Force
Integration missions, are managed through a new directorate established by
the Air Force in March 2005, called the Total Force Integration office.13
In addition, the Commission recommended that the loss of a flying unit not
change the authorized end strength of ANG in each affected state.

The President and Congress approved the BRAC Commission recommendations,
which became effective on November 9, 2005. Once the recommendations
became effective, the Secretary of Defense designated one of the military
services or defense agencies as the executive agent responsible for
implementing each recommendation. The Air Force is the executive agent for
the recommendations involving ANG.14 The Chairman of the Infrastructure
Steering Group required the executive agent to submit detailed business
plans to update estimated costs and savings and identify a schedule for
implementing each recommendation. The Air Force BRAC Project Management
office prepared the business plans for the recommendations affecting ANG.
The business plans to implement ANG recommendations were approved between
April and October 2006 by the Infrastructure Steering Group, an office
chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics that oversees BRAC implementation.

While planning to implement the 2005 BRAC recommendations, ANG
headquarters had to manage several other issues that affected its end
strength. ANG headquarters identified that unit manning documents
guardwide included about 3,500 positions more than permitted by authorized
ANG end strength. ANG headquarters had to identify and remove these excess
positions across various states and units. Furthermore, in December 2005,
the Secretary of Defense directed ANG to eliminate about 14,000 positions
between fiscal years 2007 and 2011.15 After several months of planning for
these reductions, in May 2006, ANG reduced its budget in other areas by
$1.8 billion rather than reduce its end strength. As a result, the new
mission plan for each state had to be altered and was not completed until
October 2006.

13The directorate is staffed with representatives from stakeholder
organizations including the Air Staff, Air National Guard, Air Force
Reserve Command, and several states.

14The Navy is the executive agent for one recommendation affecting ANG.

15Program Budget Decision 720.

Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and Assign
Replacement Missions

The Air Force and ANG headquarters identified and assigned new missions to
units that will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005 through an
evolutionary and consultative process that involved key stakeholders such
as its major commands and individual units. A best practice we have
identified in previous work indicates that during major organizational
transformations it is important to involve stakeholders to obtain their
ideas and to gain their ownership of the transformation. Further,
stakeholder involvement helps to increase stakeholder understanding and
acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and gain ownership for
new policies and procedures. In addition to basing decisions on a
prioritized list of possible missions, ANG headquarters also sought
replacement missions that supported the future force structure of the Air
Force and tried to maximize flying missions wherever possible.

The process to identify new relevant missions for ANG units took place in
phases. In June 2005, the Air Force Total Force Integration office
prioritized mission ideas provided by ANG using working groups that
included staff at different levels as well as key stakeholders from all
components of the Air Force, state adjutants general, and major commands.
The Total Force Integration office developed a prioritized list of
potential missions by grouping them into one of the following four bands:

           o Band 1--the highest priority, missions the Air Force "must do"
           to satisfy congressional mandates and existing laws.

           o Band 2--missions that are considered "mission critical" to the
           Air Force achieving its objectives.

           o Band 3--missions that are "mission significant," meaning that
           failing to perform the tasks could negatively affect overall
           effectiveness.

           o Band 4--missions that are "mission enhancing," meaning that they
           would be nice to do if resources are available.

           The Air Force Total Force Integration office sent the banded
           mission list to ANG headquarters,16 which used the list to assign
           replacement missions to units based on a number of variables.
           These included the existing skill sets in the affected units,
           recruiting trends in the affected unit's state, the states'
           expressed desires, and the mission requirements. According to ANG
           officials, they wanted to assign missions that were consistent
           with the preexisting mission or capitalize on the strengths of the
           states to minimize transition challenges. Subsequent to the
           development of the banded list, the Air Force identified some
           flying missions that could be assigned to ANG. According to ANG
           officials, these flying missions were assigned to units instead of
           other missions on the banded list. Most of the replacement
           missions ANG headquarters assigned were either in the top two
           bands or were flying missions. Our analysis indicated that 23 of
           the 30 missions assigned were on the banded list and the remaining
           7 missions assigned were new flying missions, as shown in table 2.

16ANG headquarters also used the banded list to assign missions to units
affected by other force structure changes that were occurring outside of
BRAC.

           Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units
		   
                                   Missions      Positions affected
Source                     Number Percentage     Number   Percentage
Replacement flying mission      7          23     1,875       29 
Band I                         12          40     3,410       53 
Band II                         6          20       472        7 
Band III                        1           3        65        1 
Band IV                         4          13       616       10 
Total                          30        100a     6,438      100 

           Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.

           aNumbers do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.

           As shown in table 2, about 83 percent of the missions assigned and
           89 percent of their personnel were band I or II missions or a new
           flying mission (see app. II for the unit assignments and their
           respective priority level). Although the missions assigned in
           bands III and IV constitute 5 of the 30 missions assigned (about
           16 percent), they require about 681 positions, which is
           approximately 11 percent of the total affected positions of all
           positions in replacement missions. The one band III replacement
           mission is an intelligence instructor mission assigned to the ANG
           unit at Ellington, Texas. Many new positions in ANG replacement
           missions are in the intelligence career field. Anticipating the
           increased intelligence training requirement, this mission is
           designed to augment the instructor staff at the Air Force
           intelligence training school at Goodfellow Air Force Base in
           Texas. The four band IV missions assigned consist of two
           engineering missions assigned to Mansfield, Ohio, and Willow
           Grove, Pennsylvania, an intelligence production mission assigned
           to Nashville, Tennessee, and a classified mission assigned to
           Nashville. According to Air Force officials, ANG headquarters
           assigned the engineering missions to Ohio and Pennsylvania based
           on the ANG desire to distribute homeland defense assets
           regionally.

           In phases subsequent to the development of the banded list, flying
           missions were assigned with direct involvement of senior
           leadership from the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau, and ANG.
           Throughout the process to replace missions for affected ANG units
           there was an effort to assign replacement flying missions to the
           greatest extent possible. According to ANG officials, if any
           flying missions became available, ANG headquarters would match
           those missions to units instead of other missions on the banded
           list. The replacement flying missions are the joint cargo
           aircraft,17 a B-2 association with an active wing, and an F-16
           foreign military sales training mission. The joint cargo aircraft
           mission was assigned to ANG units at Bradley, Connecticut;
           Kellogg, Michigan; Mansfield, Ohio; Key Field, Mississippi; and
           Nashville, Tennessee. According to ANG officials, Bradley received
           the joint cargo aircraft mission because it was in the only state
           that did not have a flying mission, while units in Michigan, Ohio,
           Mississippi, and Tennessee were selected based on the ANG desire
           to distribute homeland defense assets regionally. Additionally,
           two18 of the five joint cargo aircraft mission assignments were
           made to units that currently fly the C-130, another airlift
           aircraft, and one assignment was made to a unit that currently
           flies the KC-135 tanker, which ANG headquarters officials believe
           will minimize transition costs. According to ANG officials, the
           Air Combat Command identified the potential for the ANG unit in
           St. Louis, Missouri, to associate with the B-2 mission at Whiteman
           Air Force Base, Missouri. The two bases are in the same state and
           it provides an opportunity for an ANG unit to associate with an
           active Air Force mission using an aircraft that is new for ANG and
           relevant for the future of the Air Force. Finally, the unit in
           Springfield, Ohio, was assigned an F-16 foreign military sales
           training mission because this unit currently is an F-16 training
           unit.
		   
17The Joint Cargo Aircraft will be a new, small airlift aircraft the Air
Force plans to acquire.

18Units assigned the joint cargo aircraft as a replacement mission that
previously flew the C-130 are Mansfield, Ohio, and Nashville, Tennessee.
The ANG unit at Key Field, Mississippi, previously flew the KC-135 air
tanker and the ANG unit at Kellogg, Michigan, previously flew the A-10.

           ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That
		   Are Likely to Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their Missions

           ANG headquarters has completed some key planning tasks for the
           implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, but we believe
           that challenges remain that could delay when some units may be
           able to become mission capable.19 To date, ANG headquarters has
           completed programming plans, an aircraft movement schedule, and a
           state-by state new mission plan. However, ANG headquarters faces
           challenges in completing manning documents, potentially
           insufficient training school capacity, obtaining security
           clearances for many personnel in a prompt manner, ensuring that
           personnel at affected units have a mission to perform when their
           old mission is removed, and funding delays. Further, some ANG unit
           commanders state that communication with ANG headquarters is ad
           hoc and inadequate to meet their needs. These challenges generally
           affect both the implementation of the BRAC recommendations and the
           establishment of replacement missions. ANG officials have stated
           these challenges could delay when some units are mission capable.
           A strategy for managing these challenges and improved
           communication between ANG headquarters and affected ANG units will
           be required to help minimize delays.
		   
		   Some Key Planning Tasks Completed

           The Air Force has created a business plan for each recommendation
           that will be used as planning tools for BRAC implementation. These
           plans include a description of the actions required including an
           aircraft movement schedule, financial plans, and construction
           required for each recommendation. These plans have been approved
           by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and will be updated as
           implementation details change.

           ANG headquarters completed 59 BRAC-related programming plans
           between December 2006 and January 2007. According to an ANG
           official, these plans provide guidance from the major commands to
           units on how to implement changes to unit structures and missions.
           Specifically, each plan identifies the key organizations involved,
           lists key milestones and objectives for specific actions, and
           assigns primary responsibility to the offices that will assist
           with the implementation.
		   
19ANG has planned for two phases of mission capability for units
converting to a new mission: Initial Operational Capability, and Full
Operational Capability. According to ANG officials, Initial Operational
Capability is a variable term that can apply to any predetermined level of
partial capability, depending on the unit and mission, while Full
Operational Capability is achieved when unit commanders report that the
unit is ready to perform its mission. ANG officials stated that the
conversion process typically takes approximately 4 years to complete.

           ANG headquarters has also completed a plan to manage the movement
           of hundreds of aircraft that will relocate into or out of 56 ANG
           units. This plan provides a schedule that identifies when aircraft
           will move around the country by fiscal quarter, through 2011.
           According to an ANG official, this movement schedule was in part
           designed to ensure that units losing their aircraft are not left
           without a mission by implementing a replacement mission before the
           aircraft depart, and to ensure that existing homeland defense
           missions are continued.20

           ANG headquarters has also produced a state-by-state new mission
           plan that identifies all the changes to ANG units that are
           occurring within each state. This plan includes BRAC actions, new
           missions assigned through the Total Force Integration process,21
           the ANG headquarters review of each unit manning document (UMD) to
           remove excess personnel, and standardizing squadron size so that
           units conducting the same missions are uniform in size.
           Specifically, the new mission plan identifies the general number
           of people that will be assigned to each mission; unit commanders
           can use this information as a basic guide to plan for required
           internal manpower changes. For example, if the new mission plan
           identifies that one mission is ceasing and losing 150 positions
           and a new mission is starting in the same unit or state that
           requires 150 new positions, unit commanders can begin to approach
           the personnel in the ceasing mission to determine if they are
           willing and able to qualify for the new mission.
		   
		   Challenges in Managing Many Sequential Implementation Actions and
		   Communicating with Units

           ANG headquarters may face challenges in managing the timing and
           sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC
           recommendations and to complete the conversion process for units
           taking on a new mission. First, ANG headquarters faces
           difficulties in completing the UMDs that units require to
           determine retraining or recruitment requirements. Second, ANG may
           also have difficulty in securing training at technical and flight
           schools for all personnel in time to perform their new missions as
           scheduled. Third, there may be delays in getting security
           clearances for individuals who require one for their new mission.
           Fourth, there are some units that will require a temporary bridge
           mission to carry them over until their new mission is available.
           Fifth, delays in funding for equipment and facilities could delay
           when units are able to perform their replacement missions. Sixth,
           according to some ANG units, communication with ANG headquarters
           is limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the units, such
           as new mission requirements. Though ANG headquarters officials are
           aware of these challenges and developing some solutions at the
           working level, they lack an overarching strategy to manage and
           mitigate these implementation challenges and any potential domino
           effects and to communicate solutions to the affected units, which
           increases the risk that ANG headquarters will face delays in
           establishing replacement missions and could result in decreased
           readiness and potentially inefficiently utilized personnel.
		   
20One of the missions that ANG units perform is the homeland defense Air
Sovereignty Alert mission, where fighter aircraft stationed around the
country are always ready and available to intercept potentially hostile
aircraft.

21In addition to the replacement missions assigned to the 14 units losing
their flying mission, ANG also assigned new Total Force Integration
missions to nearly every U.S. state and territory in a simultaneous
process unrelated to BRAC.

             Completing Manpower Documents

           ANG headquarters is behind schedule in completing some UMDs and at
           the time we had completed our audit work an ANG official projected
           that they may not be able to meet current stated internal
           deadlines as a result. ANG headquarters must develop new UMDs for
           all converting ANG units, which includes units receiving a
           replacement mission, converting aircraft type, or forming an
           association with another unit. Additionally, UMD changes are
           required for units gaining or losing some aircraft or personnel. A
           UMD allows unit commanders to recruit and train new personnel or
           identify existing personnel who require training for a new
           mission.

           According to an ANG official, they have to complete many UMDs this
           year, and over 100 in order to implement BRAC and replacement
           missions. Although, according to an ANG official, Air Force
           regulations require UMDs to be issued to units 6 months before the
           units are supposed to begin their assigned mission, ANG officials
           have stated that their goal is to get a UMD to units up to 1 year
           prior. An ANG official stated that they had hoped to complete all
           UMDs for units that are supposed to begin conversion by the first
           quarter of fiscal year 2008 by March 31, 2007, but at the time we
           had completed our audit work another ANG official stated that they
           may be unable to meet this deadline because of delays in major
           commands approving the draft UMDs.

           According to ANG headquarters, all UMDs have to be approved by the
           major commands before they can be completed and issued.22
           According to an ANG official, they have been waiting for approval
           for 2 to 3 months, and the process typically takes 30 days to
           complete. One ANG official stated that these delays may in part
           prevent ANG from meeting its March 31, 2007, UMD issuance
           deadline, which could cause delays at some affected units.

           Though required issuance deadlines have not been missed, ANG
           headquarters faces challenges in completing the UMDs required for
           those units that are transforming in the coming year. For example,
           ANG headquarters has yet to complete the UMD for its Distributed
           Ground System, an intelligence mission assigned to Terre Haute,
           Indiana, though the Initial Operational Capability date for this
           unit is scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. Of
           the 11 state ANG commanders we interviewed, none have a final UMD
           for their new missions. Missing internal deadlines for completing
           UMDs increases the risk that ANG headquarters will miss other
           deadlines or the Air Force requirement to issue UMDs 6 months
           prior to the start of new missions. These delays could affect the
           sequencing of other actions, which could in turn delay the
           establishment of replacement missions.

           ANG officials stated that they are working on a solution that will
           provide unit commanders with information about their new manpower
           requirements through a document called a requirements template.
           According to ANG officials, the templates will inform each unit
           commander of the personnel requirements for their new mission, and
           would permit some initial actions, such as sending existing
           personnel to training. However, ANG officials stated these
           templates cannot be used as a funding authorization for recruiting
           new personnel. According to ANG documentation, all existing flying
           mission templates, including those for F-15, F-22, A-10, and C-5,
           have been completed, but they are still working to complete the
           templates for the joint cargo aircraft, the Component Numbered Air
           Force mission, support staff at all units including wing command
           elements and administrative personnel, and units that are
           associating with an active or reserve unit. According to ANG
           officials, templates for the support staff were to be done after
           those for existing flying missions in part to ensure that
           individuals requiring flight training or other lengthy technical
           training could have time to reserve seats in flight schools, while
           support personnel will likely not require further training. ANG
           unit commanders state that they require the templates for support
           missions so they can determine their new command structures. For
           example, Indiana ANG commanders stated that they will not know if
           the command staff for the fighter wing at Terre Haute will be
           responsible for commanding the new Distributed Ground System and
           Air Support Operations Squadron missions assigned to that unit, or
           if these will be assigned to a new command staff. ANG officials
           stated that they had hoped to have requirements templates issued
           to all units by December 31, 2006. However, as of February, 2007,
           ANG headquarters had not issued templates to some of the units we
           interviewed that were also assigned new missions, including Texas,
           Mississippi, and Ohio.
		   
22Major commands identified by ANG headquarters include Air Force Air
Combat Command and Air Mobility Command.

           According to ANG officials, the challenge in completing the UMDs
           and requirements templates is due to the volume of work required.
           According to ANG officials, nearly every ANG unit will require a
           new or modified UMD as a result of BRAC, the Total Force
           Integration process, and standardizing unit sizes. Completing the
           UMDs for some units may be more difficult than for others. For
           example, completing the UMD for a unit that is increasing or
           decreasing its allotted number of aircraft by two or three is
           easier than completing a UMD for a unit that is taking on an
           entirely new mission or converting from one mission or aircraft to
           another. As a result of BRAC and the Total Force Integration
           process, ANG headquarters has to complete many complicated
           conversion UMDs, which is more time consuming; specifically, the
           ANG manpower office is typically only required to complete five
           unit conversion UMDs per year, but in order to implement the BRAC
           recommendations, it will have to complete hundreds of conversion
           UMDs. The Director, ANG, stated that ANG in general was not
           adequately structured to complete the volume of work required by
           BRAC. Recognizing that it does not have sufficient staff,
           according to state officials, the ANG manpower office requested
           assistance from the units. However, ANG headquarters is still
           expected to miss internal deadlines while receiving this support
           from the field. Without significant augmentation to the manpower
           office or some other change in the UMDs creation process, delays
           in meeting sequential deadlines may continue, which increases the
           risk that ANG headquarters will not be able to complete UMDs in
           the time frames required. An ANG official also indicated that ANG
           switched to a new manpower planning computer program at around the
           same time as BRAC implementation, which delayed initial manpower
           planning actions. Further, some of the replacement missions, such
           as the still to be acquired joint cargo aircraft, are new and thus
           still have undefined requirements.
		   
		     Potential Training Capacity Shortfall

           ANG will have to train many individuals to qualify to fly a new
           aircraft or to perform a new mission. According to ANG officials,
           these requirements will create a surge of personnel needing
           training for the coming years, and there may not be enough space
           in some training schools to accommodate this demand. ANG officials
           have identified shortfalls spanning from 2008 through 2012 for
           A-10 and F-15 pilot training schools.23 For example, ANG officials
           stated that ANG typically requires only 8 seats in the initial
           qualification courses per year, but as a result of BRAC it will
           require 30 or more seats in initial qualification courses per
           year. Without adjustments, it will be difficult for some schools
           to incorporate the additional requirements; for example, the only
           A-10 school is currently operating at 100 percent capacity. An ANG
           official stated that without an increase in available school
           seats, some pilot training delays may stretch through 2014.

           Some ANG pilots who need to qualify to fly a new aircraft as a
           result of the BRAC recommendations may face delays when they are
           qualified for their new mission. The projected shortfall may delay
           when some flying units will achieve mission capability, and impact
           ANG readiness. Specifically, the following units will be
           converting to an F-15 mission or increasing their number of F-15
           aircraft within the BRAC implementation period: Great Falls,
           Montana; Portland, Oregon; New Orleans, Louisiana; Jacksonville,
           Florida; and Barnes, Massachusetts. Additionally, the following
           units will be converting to an A-10 mission or increasing their
           number of A-10 aircraft within this time period: Boise, Idaho;
           Fort Smith, Arkansas; Selfridge, Michigan; and Martin State,
           Maryland. Some solutions to mitigate the shortfall in space at
           flight schools have been discussed by ANG headquarters officials,
           but to date none have been implemented. Some potential solutions
           that ANG officials mentioned include increasing flight simulator
           training, sending pilots to training early to avoid later
           delays,24 and establishing ANG-owned flight schools. According to
           ANG officials, this training shortfall could not only delay
           Initial and Full Operational Capability for some units, but could
           also have an impact on warfighting capabilities. ANG officials
           also identified that converting units will face a period of time
           while their newly-trained personnel are gaining the on-the-job
           experience required before the units can achieve a Full
           Operational Capability. Without this on-the-job experience, newly
           converted units potentially face decreased readiness and
           capability.

23Though these school shortfalls may not be caused by implementation of
the BRAC recommendations, they may be exacerbated by the number of pilots
converting to a new airframe as a result of the BRAC recommendations.

24ANG officials stated that this solution may require pilots to
temporarily relocate to another unit if their home unit does not yet have
the new aircraft on the ground. This process results in increased costs
for ANG.

           An increase in personnel requiring training is projected for some
           nonflight technical schools as well. For example, ANG headquarters
           and Air Force officials have stated that some missions--such as
           the Predator UAV mission--will have a high demand for personnel
           trained in intelligence skills. ANG officials have estimated that
           the ANG is increasing the total number of intelligence-related
           positions by approximately 3,000 positions (200 percent) with an
           increase from 1,500 to 4,500. ANG and the Air Force realized that
           there would be a high demand for the limited number of seats at
           the Air Force intelligence training facility at Goodfellow Air
           Force Base in Texas. The Air Force and ANG headquarters developed
           two solutions to limit the impacts of this shortfall. First, ANG
           headquarters is increasing the number of instructors available to
           teach at the school by assigning a new intelligence training
           mission to the Texas ANG. However, Texas ANG officials stated that
           they did not know if they would be able to staff this mission on
           time since the mission requires trained intelligence instructors,
           and stated that late 2008 would be the earliest practical date
           that this mission could be fully operational. Second, the Air
           Force is decreasing the length of some courses. Specifically, ANG
           headquarters and the Air Force arranged to decrease the training
           course for personnel assigned to the UAV sensor operator specialty
           from 6 to 3 months because they recognized that these personnel
           did not initially require all the skills provided in the
           full-length course. Instead, ANG headquarters and the Air Force
           will allow personnel in these positions to delay part of their
           initial training until later in their careers, thus allowing them
           to report to their units faster while freeing up seats in the
           schools. According to ANG officials, these solutions should
           greatly reduce the strain on the intelligence training school and
           should increase the throughput capability, though the increased
           demand has yet to reach the school to test the efficacy of these
           solutions. If these solutions do not increase the capacity of the
           school to required levels, there could be personnel who are unable
           to attend training as scheduled, resulting in a potentially
           inefficient use of personnel and units that are unable to fully
           perform their mission due to insufficient numbers of trained
           personnel, which subsequently impacts unit readiness.
		   
		     Lengthy Security Clearance Process

           All of the approximately 3,000 individuals who will be converting
           to a new intelligence mission, such as a Predator UAV mission,
           will require a security clearance, as will some personnel in
           communications positions supporting an intelligence unit.
           According to ANG headquarters officials and some unit commanders,
           there is a concern that the length of time required to obtain a
           top secret clearance, estimated by ANG officials as 1-1  1/2
           years, could delay when some personnel are able to perform their
           mission. As we have previously reported, there are long-standing
           delays and other problems with DOD's personnel security clearance
           program, and this area remains on our high-risk list.25 If
           affected units do not receive personnel requirements that state
           the number of personnel requiring a clearance for their new
           missions, some or all personnel may not have a clearance in time.
           As a result, some personnel may be unable to perform their mission
           until they obtain their clearance. For example, the unit commander
           at the Otis, Massachusetts, ANG base does not have a requirements
           template or a UMD for either of the two intelligence missions that
           were assigned to Otis. One mission has an initial operational
           capability date in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008;
           Massachusetts ANG officials estimate that it will take several
           years to establish the new mission, in part due to the time
           required to get personnel top secret security clearances.
		   
		     Identifying Bridge Missions

           ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for some units
           that will require one, which could leave personnel without a
           mission to perform and waste resources. Some units may face a
           period of time when they have no mission to perform because their
           original mission was removed and their new mission lacks required
           resources or is scheduled to begin later. In order to prevent the
           inefficient use of personnel who otherwise may have no mission to
           perform, these units will require ANG headquarters to assign them
           a bridge mission that would temporarily give personnel a mission
           to perform until they can transition to their new mission. ANG
           headquarters has planned for bridge missions for some locations,
           such as assigning C-21 light cargo aircraft to some locations
           awaiting the joint cargo aircraft. An ANG official has also stated
           that in some locations they may keep their currently assigned
           aircraft in place past the planned removal date in order to
           provide a mission for unit personnel. However, delaying the
           movement of aircraft may further delay implementation at other
           locations that are waiting to receive these aircraft.
           Alternatively, if the aircraft that are departing are destined to
           be retired, there will be additional costs to ANG to keep these
           aircraft in service.
		   
25GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [36]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).

           ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for several
           units that will have a mission gap. For example, ANG headquarters
           timelines identify that Massachusetts loses its aircraft at Otis
           in the fourth quarter of 2008, and Massachusetts ANG officials
           stated that they will face a gap between missions and that they
           have not been given a bridge mission. If no bridge mission is
           identified, personnel may have no mission for almost 2 years until
           the new mission is established. According to Massachusetts state
           commanders, ANG headquarters has not given them any information
           about a potential bridge mission nor is one identified in an ANG
           headquarters BRAC implementation tracking database. Similarly,
           Ohio ANG officials expressed concern that the C-130s based at
           Mansfield are leaving in 2010 but that the replacement joint cargo
           aircraft mission has no solid implementation date since the
           aircraft is yet to be acquired. No bridge mission for Ohio has
           been identified by ANG headquarters, nor is one listed in an ANG
           headquarters BRAC implementation tracking database. The Director,
           ANG, estimates the deployment date for the joint cargo aircraft
           between 2012 and 2015. The DOD Budget Justification books state
           that requirements are still being defined and predict initial Air
           Force procurement in fiscal year 2010. Further, the Director, ANG,
           identified that there will be a gap at Syracuse, New York; Tucson,
           Arizona; Fargo, North Dakota; and Ellington, Texas, due to delays
           in procuring new UAVs. Without a bridge mission, personnel at
           these locations and any others that face a gap due to
           implementation delays will be unable to perform a mission,
           resulting in an inefficient use of personnel and a reduction in
           ANG readiness.
		   
		     Delays in Funding

           According to ANG documentation, there may be delays in funding for
           required training, equipment, and construction projects that may
           impact some units converting to a new mission in fiscal year 2008.
           Specifically, ANG has identified $127 million in funding
           shortfalls in 2008 for personnel, equipment, construction, and
           operations and maintenance requirements to establish replacement
           missions. According to an Air Force official, these costs were not
           included in the budget due to internal Air Force prioritization
           and there are unfunded requirements every year. According to ANG,
           these unfunded requirements could result in delays in when some
           missions will be capable of converting and performing their
           missions. For example, according to an ANG official, residual
           impacts of the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions may limit
           the funding available for some construction projects in fiscal
           year 2007.26 For example, significant construction was planned for
           Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and Barnes Air National Guard
           Base, Massachusetts, but funding delays due in part to impacts
           from the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions may postpone this
           construction.27 Construction at Barnes is scheduled to begin in
           July 2007 and be completed by July 2009; construction at Elmendorf
           is scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be completed by August
           2011. The schedule for construction at Elmendorf--which is already
           constrained by the short construction season in Alaska --leaves
           little margin for error if construction delays develop. An ANG
           official has stated that construction may not begin by the
           scheduled dates because of funding delays. If required
           construction activity at Barnes or Elmendorf is not completed as
           scheduled, these units may not receive their new aircraft as
           scheduled, which could delay other implementation actions.

           Shortfalls in training funding may also delay implementation of
           some missions: Indiana ANG officials stated that they need to send
           approximately 100-200 people to training for one of their new
           missions that is scheduled to reach an Initial Operational
           Capability in the 1st quarter 2008, but so far they have only been
           able to send 2 people to training due to an insufficient training
           budget. Similarly, Texas ANG officials stated that they had their
           Initial Operational Capability date for their Predator mission
           postponed for almost 2 years because there was not adequate
           funding to send personnel to training. The Comptroller of ANG
           stated that the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions
           constituted a large reduction in available funds that will be hard
           to manage, and another ANG official stated that residual impacts
           from the continuing resolutions may cause a major slip in
           milestones. ANG officials have stated that they may need to take
           steps, such as obtaining a supplemental appropriation or
           reallocating funds internally, in order to ensure that required
           equipment, construction, and personnel funds are available in
           order to achieve fiscal year 2008 actions on schedule and to avoid
           potentially cascading implementation delays. For example, the Air
           Force has developed workaround solutions for some affected units,
           such as using temporary facilities in lieu of actual construction,
           but these solutions may be less efficient and more costly in the
           long term.

26DOD did not receive a permanent appropriation for military construction
until Congress replaced the continuing resolutions with a permanent
appropriation for fiscal year 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-05, February 15, 2007.

27The ANG base at Kulis, Alaska, is required by BRAC to close; all
personnel and aircraft from the 176th wing will relocate to the Air Force
base at Elmendorf, which will require significant construction in order to
accommodate the equipment. Barnes is directed to take the Air Sovereignty
Alert mission from Otis, Massachusetts, which will require construction of
an alert facility and other additional buildings.

           Communication between ANG Headquarters and Units Has Been
		   Inadequate

           Communications at the headquarters level within ANG offices and
           between ANG headquarters and the Air Force appear to be regular
           and adequate, but it is inadequate between ANG headquarters and
           ANG units, according to units we visited. Specifically, ANG
           headquarters and Air Force officials stated that they work
           together to identify potential implementation challenges and
           create potential solutions. However, according to senior
           leadership at ANG units we spoke with, including adjutants
           general, assistant adjutants general, wing commanders, deputy wing
           commanders, and one chief executive officer, communication between
           the units in the field and ANG headquarters is ad hoc and the
           information they are provided by ANG headquarters is not adequate
           to meet their needs. For example, ANG headquarters developed an
           Internet-accessible database that would provide information and
           milestones to the units, but did not make this system available
           until 10 months after it was created. One state ANG official said
           information received is often due to their contacting or traveling
           to ANG headquarters rather than through headquarters-initiated
           communication. The Director, ANG, acknowledged that there are
           challenges in communicating with the units and that some unit
           commanders may not have the information that they feel they need
           to implement the BRAC recommendations and their new missions. To
           address this challenge, the Director, ANG, has started quarterly
           visits to affected units.

           Unit commanders and state adjutants general want details of the
           skill mix required to perform their new missions as soon as
           possible so they can determine how to best fit individual
           guardsmen in the new missions and avoid retention problems.
           Several ANG units that we interviewed stated that they were able
           to get in contact with ANG headquarters offices, but that the
           information they received in response to questions was not
           sufficient to meet their requirements. One of the ANG units
           attributed the communications deficiencies to the high workload
           that ANG headquarters is undertaking. State- and unit-level ANG
           commanders identified the following examples of challenges in
           communicating with ANG headquarters:

           o Texas ANG officials stated that they do not know how many jobs
           will accompany their Predator UAV mission, or if they will even be
           receiving any Predator aircraft as part of the mission or rather
           flying UAVs belonging to other units instead. This has led to
           retention issues among guardsmen who fear losing their jobs, with
           50 percent of their maintenance personnel planning to leave the
           unit.

           o Virginia ANG officials stated that they find it difficult to
           communicate with ANG headquarters because they do not have a
           single point of contact at headquarters to approach with concerns.

           o Missouri and Ohio ANG officials are concerned that there may not
           be funding available to send their guardsmen to required training
           and they cannot get assurances from ANG headquarters that there
           will be adequate funding or other solutions.

           o South Carolina officials told us that they did not know the date
           of their expected Initial Operational Capability, and consequently
           cannot adequately plan for the transition even though they already
           have some new aircraft on the ground.

           o Massachusetts and Texas ANG officials stated that they cannot
           get any information or assurances from ANG headquarters that there
           will be "bridge missions" for their personnel until the new
           mission arrives. Consequently, unit personnel may be
           underutilized.

           Though ANG headquarters created an information-sharing system for
           the BRAC implementation process, it did not promptly make this
           system available to the units, which resulted in unit commanders
           not having important information about their unit conversions. ANG
           headquarters developed the computer-based information-sharing
           system in June 2006 to facilitate frequent communication and to
           provide updates on the status of implementation and requirements
           for each unit. However, ANG headquarters only provided access to
           this system on March 9, 2007, approximately 10 months after it was
           created.28 The system, informally called "dashboard," lists all
           actions related to BRAC and Total Force Integration by state and
           unit and provides dates for key implementation milestones and
           requirements for each unit. According to the Director, ANG, the
           release was delayed until the President's budget was finalized.
		   
28The Air Force Total Force Integration office has a similar Web-based
database that provides details for all the Total Force Integration
missions that is accessible to the state leadership and unit commanders.
However, one field commander that we spoke with stated that the system is
of limited utility due to frequently changing information. Additionally,
this system does not discuss any of the BRAC changes or how timing of all
actions will occur.

           Our prior work has identified that a best practice for
           organizations undergoing a major transformation includes
           establishing a communication strategy specific to the
           transformational action that communicates progress and
           expectations. Importantly, we have identified that such a strategy
           should include means for providing specific information to meet
           the needs of stakeholders, and that the strategy should identify
           the importance of communicating early and often to build trust
           with stakeholders. Furthermore, we have found that promoting
           two-way communication is important for major transformations to
           ensure the transformation's successful completion.29

           ANG headquarters has recently created a draft Strategic
           Communication Plan, but we found this plan to be general in scope
           and not specific to BRAC implementation. Specifically, this plan
           identifies key stakeholders and general tools for communicating
           information to the public and ANG stakeholders, but it focuses
           more on managing the ANG "brand" through specific talking points
           for use in external communications. Airmen, unit commanders, and
           state adjutants general are identified as being target audiences,
           but there is no specific discussion of how ANG headquarters will
           provide information to them. For example, although the purpose of
           the plan is to improve trust between all stakeholders by
           delivering consistent, frequent, and relevant communications, it
           does not identify exactly what specific tools ANG headquarters
           will use to communicate information to each affected unit.
           Instead, the plan generally discusses the use of news media and
           the ANG Web site to promote the ANG brand, messages, and
           initiatives. ANG headquarters also has a section in the
           instruction document they use to guide the unit conversion process
           that assigns responsibilities for communications during the unit
           conversion process to the communications and information
           directorate, but this section does not discuss communicating any
           information to the affected units.30
		   
29GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, [37]GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July
2, 2003).

30Air National Guard Instruction 10-406, March 10, 2006.

           No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC
		   Recommendations and Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility
		   over All BRAC-Related ANG Costs

           Compared to cost estimates contained in the BRAC Commission's
           report, our analysis of the Air Force's current estimates to
           implement ANG-related BRAC actions indicates that there will be
           net annual recurring costs rather than net annual recurring
           savings, and one-time costs are projected to increase by $68
           million (13.5 percent). Furthermore, Congress has not been given
           full visibility over all BRAC-related implementation costs because
           some BRAC-related implementation costs funded outside of the BRAC
           account are not being reported as BRAC-related costs. Air Force
           budget submissions have not provided complete and transparent
           information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions because
           the Air Force decided to fund some costs required to establish
           replacement missions outside of the BRAC account and did not
           report these costs in its annual BRAC budget.
		   
		   Current Estimates Indicate Annual Recurring Costs Rather Than
		   Annual Recurring Savings for ANG Recommendations

           Although the BRAC Commission projected that the recommendations
           affecting ANG would result in estimated annual recurring savings
           of $26 million, our analysis of current Air Force estimates
           indicates that there will be annual recurring costs of $53 million
           instead (see app. III).31 However, Air Force officials still
           expect to realize annual recurring savings overall as a result of
           other BRAC actions affecting the active and reserve components.

           The change in estimates occurred primarily due to language in the
           Commission's report that prevents the Air Force from reducing its
           current end strength in some states.32 For example, annual
           recurring savings decreased an estimated $33 million from BRAC
           Commission projections in the recommendation to realign ANG units
           at Otis, Massachusetts; St. Louis, Missouri; and Atlantic City,
           New Jersey.33 These projections were based on the elimination of
           about 240 positions. Furthermore, annual recurring savings
           decreased an estimated $55 million in seven recommendations34 from
           BRAC Commission projections. According to Air Force officials,
           these BRAC Commission projections were based on the assumption
           that additional positions would be eliminated in the seven
           recommendations to realign other ANG units. However, since no
           positions could be eliminated from those states as a result of
           BRAC--and, overall, ANG headquarters reassigned affected positions
           elsewhere rather than reducing end strength--those projected
           savings will not materialize. Thus, in preparing the business
           plans the Air Force had to reduce the projected savings for these
           recommendations.
		   
31The estimates of the annual recurring savings associated with 24 of the
30 recommendations affecting ANG decreased by a total of $114 million and
the estimated annual recurring savings for 4 increased by a total of $35
million.

32The language affected Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.

33The projected $33 million decrease in annual recurring savings was
primarily due to the elimination of personnel and facilities maintenance
savings.

           In addition, our analysis revealed that the BRAC Commission's
           projected savings related to facilities maintenance are not likely
           to be realized. DOD facilities' maintenance costs35 are partly
           tied to the number of personnel positions and the mission assigned
           at a particular facility. Since there will be no personnel
           eliminations and limited facility eliminations across ANG, the
           associated facility maintenance savings that would have occurred
           as a result of personnel eliminations will not be realized. Air
           Force BRAC project management officials concurred with our
           analysis. For example, savings estimates included in the BRAC
           Commission report in the recommendation affecting ANG units at
           Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic City would have saved about $11
           million annually. In its updated estimates for this
           recommendation, the Air Force projects an annual cost of about $1
           million in facilities maintenance for these installations.
		   
		   ANG One-Time Implementation Cost Estimates Have Increased

           The estimated one-time costs to implement 2005 BRAC
           recommendations affecting ANG are also projected to increase.
           One-time implementation costs include military construction costs
           and other costs associated with moving personnel and equipment. In
           comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, our analysis of
           current Air Force estimated implementation costs (see app. IV)
           indicates that one-time implementation cost estimates for
           recommendations affecting ANG have increased by a net of $68
           million (13.5 percent) primarily due to updated construction
           requirements and inflation,36 as seen in table 3.
		   
34These seven recommendations affected ANG units at (1) Great Falls,
Montana; (2) Martin State, Maryland; (3) Andrews, Maryland; Will Rogers
and Tinker, Oklahoma; and Randolph, Texas; (4) Mansfield, Ohio; (5) March,
California; (6) co-located miscellaneous Air Force leased locations and
National Guard headquarters leased locations; and (7) Boise, Idaho.

35Facilities maintenance costs include sustainment, recapitalization, and
base operating support costs.

           Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs
		   
Dollars in millions                                                        
                         BRAC Commission         Current Air Force            
Cost                         estimate                  estimate Difference 
Military construction            $247                      $366       $119 
Othera                            257                       206       (51) 
Total                            $504                      $572        $68 
		   

           Source: GAO Analysis of BRAC Commission and Air Force data.

           aOther includes costs associated with moving personnel and
           equipment.

           Although updated site surveys that clarified requirements for
           mission changes resulted in decreased cost estimates for some
           activities, the survey process revealed an estimated $119 million
           in additional military construction requirements, causing the
           overall estimate of one-time costs to increase.37 For example,
           estimated military construction costs to close Kulis, Air Guard
           Station, Alaska, and transfer the mission to Elmendorf, Air Force
           Base, Alaska, increased by $87 million. Air Force officials
           determined that there was inadequate utility capacity within the
           proposed development area to support new missions, and that an
           engineer training complex, an upgraded fuel cell maintenance
           hangar, and an upgraded helicopter maintenance hangar were
           required. Likewise, estimated military construction costs in the
           recommendation to realign ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and
           Atlantic City increased by $46 million after site surveys at those
           locations determined the existing squadron operations facilities
           were too small to support the new mission requirements, and the
           affected ANG units did not have facilities to meet the Air
           Sovereignty Alert mission requirement. In addition, other one-time
           cost estimates decreased by a net of $51 million.38 According to
           Air Force officials, these estimates decreased primarily due to
           the Commission language that retained personnel at the realigning
           bases. The greatest decreases were in training and civilian
           personnel severance and relocation costs that were not required
           because positions were not realigned. For example, estimated other
           one-time costs to realign Springfield Air Guard Station, Ohio,
           decreased by $14 million.
		   
36BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 dollars,
whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, which
include inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation period, the
cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent. The actual
impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are incurred.

37There were 25 recommendations in which there was a change in estimated
military construction costs. In 14 recommendations estimated military
construction costs increased by a total of $168 million and in 11
recommendations estimated military construction costs decreased by a total
of $49 million.

           Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over All ANG
		   BRAC-Related Implementation Costs

           Congress has not been given full visibility over all ANG
           BRAC-related implementation costs because some BRAC-related
           implementation costs funded outside of the BRAC account are not
           being reported as BRAC-related costs. The Air Force is funding
           about $309 million for military construction, equipment, and
           training to establish replacement missions for 14 ANG units who
           lost their flying missions outside the BRAC account, as shown in
           table 4.

           Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the
           BRAC Account
		   
Dollars in millions                    
Category              Estimated cost a 
Military construction             $136 
Equipmentb                         101 
Training                            68 
Other                                4 
Total                             $309 

           Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

           aAir Force officials stated that the process of developing these
           cost estimates is ongoing and may understate the ultimate actual
           costs.

           bWe did not include the equipment costs for three Predator
           replacement missions with a combined estimated equipment cost of
           about $400 million because the equipment is an Air
           Force-controlled asset and not under the direct control of ANG. We
           also did not include military construction or equipment costs for
           five joint cargo aircraft missions because the Air Force cannot
           determine these costs until the aircraft is selected.
		   
38There were 31 recommendations in which there was a change in estimated
one-time costs. In 19 recommendations, estimated other one-time costs
decreased by a total of $121 million and in 12 recommendations estimated
other one-time costs increased by a total of $70 million.

           The Air Force estimates are based on combined costs to replace 30
           missions for the 14 affected units. For example, the estimate of
           $136 million for military construction includes about $23 million
           for major renovations and new facilities for the Predator mission
           at March Air Reserve Base in California. The projected cost of
           $101 million for new equipment includes $64 million for equipment
           associated with the Distributed Ground System missions assigned to
           units in Indiana, Kansas, and Massachusetts. The estimated
           training costs include $27 million to recruit and train
           approximately 440 operations and maintenance personnel in a St.
           Louis ANG unit that will associate with the active B-2 wing at
           Whiteman Air Force Base.

           None of these costs are reported in the section of the Air Force's
           BRAC budget submission that would identify one-time costs funded
           outside of the BRAC account. Air Force officials informed us that
           the BRAC Closure Executive Group decided to fund all costs to
           establish replacement missions for the units losing their flying
           mission outside of the BRAC account. Additionally, Air Force
           officials told us that the Office of the Under Secretary of
           Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics decided not to
           report replacement mission costs as BRAC-related costs because the
           Commission did not direct a specific replacement mission for the
           affected units. Nevertheless, the BRAC Commission report
           recommended that personnel in affected units should remain in
           place, assume a new mission, and where appropriate be retrained in
           skills relevant to the emerging mission. Although the Commission
           did not direct specific replacement missions, the language in the
           report requires DOD to provide replacement missions. Therefore,
           any costs associated with establishing replacement missions are
           BRAC-related.
		   
		   Conclusions

           The successful implementation of the BRAC recommendations and
           establishment of new missions depend on the ability of ANG
           headquarters to execute hundreds of sequential actions in a very
           tight sequence with little room for delays. While ANG headquarters
           has developed various implementation plans, challenges remain that
           could delay when units are fully capable of performing their new
           mission. Furthermore, any delay or change in schedule could have a
           domino effect and impact other planned actions. The absence of a
           strategy that addresses mitigation of these and other challenges
           that may arise and is shared with all stakeholders increases the
           risk that delays will occur. Effective development of such a
           strategy for the BRAC implementation process would enable ANG
           headquarters to measure progress towards their goals; determine
           strategies and resources needed to effectively meet these goals;
           and identify strategies to meet goals that were not met due to
           implementation challenges. Further, improved communication between
           ANG headquarters and the affected units is essential to provide
           unit commanders with timely information to ensure they can train
           and recruit personnel to perform their new missions as planned.
           The lack of a communication strategy, specific to the BRAC
           implementation, period that addresses how ANG headquarters will
           provide frequently changing information as required by the units
           to carry out BRAC implementation increases the risk that
           implementation actions may not occur as scheduled.

           It is important for congressional decision makers to have complete
           information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions as they
           deliberate the budget. The Air Force is providing incomplete cost
           information by not including the costs to establish replacement
           missions for units that lost their flying mission in its annual
           budget submission. Including these costs in the BRAC budget would
           provide Congress with more complete and transparent information to
           implement BRAC and assist it in evaluating BRAC budget
           appropriation requests.
		   
		   Recommendations for Executive Action

           In order to ensure management of BRAC implementation challenges,
           we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief,
           National Guard Bureau, to task the Director, Air National Guard,
           with the following.

           o Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders
           that anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation
           challenges. At a minimum, this strategy should include time frames
           for actions and responsibilities for each challenge, and
           facilitate the ability of ANG headquarters officials to act to
           mitigate potential delays in interim milestones.

           o Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how ANG
           headquarters will provide the affected ANG units with the
           information needed to implement the BRAC-related actions.

           In order to provide more complete and transparent ANG BRAC cost
           information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
           Secretary of the Air Force to report in the Air Force annual BRAC
           budget submission the costs and source of funding required to
           establish replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their
           flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005.
		   
		   Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
           concurred with two recommendations and did not concur with one
           recommendation. DOD's written comments are reprinted in their
           entirety in appendix V. DOD also provided technical comments,
           which we have incorporated into this report as appropriate

           DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the
           Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Air National Guard, to
           develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders
           that anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation
           challenges throughout the BRAC implementation process. DOD
           suggested that we modify the recommendation to reflect that the
           Director, Air National Guard, is normally tasked by the Chief,
           National Guard Bureau. We changed the recommendation to reflect
           DOD's position because it clarifies accountability and respects
           the chain of command while still implementing the substance of our
           recommendation. DOD also stated that mitigation plans cannot be
           released until they have been thoroughly vetted with all of the
           key stakeholders. At the same time, however, it is important to
           note that BRAC recommendations are required by law to be completed
           by September 15, 2011, and the limited time available coupled with
           the complexity of implementation actions led us to make this
           recommendation. Therefore, while we agree that the mitigation
           plans should be vetted with all of the key stakeholders, it will
           be important to do this in a timely manner. Further, we believe
           that affected state adjutants general are key stakeholders and as
           such should be included in the process to vet these plans.

           DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the
           Director, Air National Guard, expand the Strategic Communication
           Plan to include how ANG headquarters will provide the affected ANG
           units with the information needed to implement the BRAC-related
           actions. DOD stated that it is incumbent upon ANG and all affected
           units to maximize established chains of leadership and
           communication to effectively manage and execute BRAC actions. We
           agree. Our report points out that units are using the existing
           established chains of leadership and communication to ANG
           headquarters but the communication from ANG headquarters is
           nonetheless ad hoc and not adequate to meet their needs. Further,
           the Director, ANG, acknowledges that there are challenges in
           communicating with the units and that some unit commanders may not
           have the information that they feel they need to implement the
           BRAC recommendations and their new missions.

           DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Air Force
           provide more complete and transparent cost information by
           including in its annual BRAC budget submission the costs required
           to establish replacement missions for ANG units that will lose
           their flying mission as a result of BRAC 2005. DOD does not
           believe these costs are BRAC-related because establishment of
           replacement missions was not part of the BRAC recommendations.
           Although the Commission did not direct specific replacement
           missions for the affected units, the BRAC Commission recommended
           that DOD provide replacement missions, retain all personnel in
           affected units, and where appropriate retrain personnel in skills
           relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we believe the costs
           to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and should be
           reported in the Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission. DOD
           also stated that BRAC funds cannot be used to establish these
           missions and that the costs in question have been appropriately
           programmed and budgeted in the Air Force's regular military
           construction account. In making our recommendation, it was not our
           intent to prescribe which funds should be used to establish
           replacement missions but rather to recommend that DOD provide more
           complete and transparent cost reporting about these BRAC related
           costs. DOD said it was willing to caveat the BRAC budget
           documentation to annotate these costs. As a result, we modified
           our recommendation to include that DOD identify the source of
           funding for these costs in its BRAC budget documentation. Further,
           we continue to believe that the annual BRAC budget documentation
           would be the most complete and transparent place for DOD to report
           the costs to establish replacement missions because this
           documentation is used in evaluating BRAC implementation costs.

           We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
           committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the
           Director, National Guard; the Director, ANG; and the Director,
           Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
           available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
           available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
           http://wwww.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]. Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this report. Additional contacts and
           staff acknowledgements are provided in appendix VI.

           Brian Lepore, Acting Director
		   Defense Capabilities and Management

           List of Congressional Committees

           The Honorable Carl Levin
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable John McCain
           Ranking Member
		   Committee on Armed Services
		   United States Senate

           The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable Ted Stevens
           Ranking Member
		   Subcommittee on Defense
		   Committee on Appropriations
           United States Senate

           The Honorable Tim Johnson
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
		   Ranking Member
		   Subcommittee on Military Construction, 
		     Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies
		   Committee on Appropriations
           United States Senate

           The Honorable Ike Skelton
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
           Ranking Member
		   Committee on Armed Services
		   House of Representatives

           The Honorable John P. Murtha
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
		   Ranking Member
		   Subcommittee on Defense
		   Committee on Appropriations
		   House of Representatives

           The Honorable Chet Edwards
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable Roger F. Wicker
           Ranking Member
		   Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and
		     Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies
		   Committee on Appropriations
           House of Representatives

           The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable Tom Davis
           Ranking Member
		   Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
		   House of Representatives
		   
		   Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

           We performed our work at the Air Force Base Realignment and
           Closure (BRAC) Office, Air National Guard (ANG) headquarters, and
           in various states which had ANG units affected by the BRAC 2005
           recommendations. We selected states to visit that had BRAC actions
           scheduled early in the 6-year implementation period and also had
           units that were going to lose, reduce, convert, or increase their
           flying mission or associate with another unit as a result of the
           2005 BRAC recommendations. We visited state ANG and unit officials
           in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey,
           South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. We also held video
           conferences with state ANG officials in Oklahoma and Ohio and
           received written responses to questions from state ANG officials
           in Mississippi. At all states except Indiana and Virginia we spoke
           with either the adjutant general, assistant adjutant general, or
           both; at every unit we spoke with the wing commanders or the
           deputy wing commanders of affected units. In Indiana, we spoke
           with the wing commanders and the deputy wing commanders, and in
           Virginia we spoke with the Virginia ANG chief executive officer.

           To assess the process the Air Force used to assign new missions to
           units that lost their flying mission, we interviewed all
           stakeholders to the process. These stakeholders included officials
           in the Total Force Integration Office, Headquarters Air Force; the
           Office of Transformation, ANG, and the aforementioned state ANG
           officials to determine how new flying missions were assigned to
           ANG units. In addition, we compared the banded list of potential
           missions developed by Air Force headquarters to the missions
           assigned by ANG headquarters to the affected units.

           To determine the progress that ANG headquarters has made in
           implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations, we reviewed the BRAC
           business plans, the ANG aircraft movement plan, and the new
           mission plan by state for ANG units affected by BRAC. We
           interviewed officials in ANG headquarters, including the Director,
           ANG, and interviewed or obtained written responses from ANG
           officials in 11 states regarding these plans and to identity any
           challenges the Air Force faces in implementing the BRAC
           recommendations. We reviewed Air Force Instructions and Policy
           documents regarding Unit Manning Documents (UMD) and interviewed
           ANG headquarters manpower officials to obtain information on their
           plan for developing the unit manning documents and requirements
           templates for the affected units. We also reviewed documentation
           pertaining to the training requirements for new missions and for
           pilots converting to a new aircraft, and compared these
           requirements to the allocation of seats in pilot training schools
           for ANG for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to determine the
           likelihood of adequate pilot training seats being available. We
           interviewed officials in the Air Force Office of Total Force
           Integration and ANG training officials on their plans to address
           and mitigate these training shortfalls, and spoke with ANG
           officials in Texas about the training mission assigned to
           Ellington. To determine the impact of funding delays, we spoke
           with ANG officials including the Comptroller of ANG, and reviewed
           ANG documentation pertaining to funding delays. To assess the
           degree to which the states were aware of 2005 BRAC-related changes
           that were required for their units, we conducted interviews or
           field visits with or obtained written responses from senior ANG
           leadership and wing commanders from 11 states that had units that
           were impacted by BRAC. We asked these officials their perspective
           on communications with ANG headquarters, and to describe any
           challenges that they faced in BRAC implementation. We also met
           with ANG headquarters officials that were responsible for
           communicating 2005 BRAC changes with the states, including the A/8
           Office of Transformation and the A/1 Manpower Office. We were
           briefed on the internal interface system called "dashboard" that
           ANG headquarters had developed for an eventual "roll out" to the
           states and units that would provide the affected units with
           transformation updates, and reviewed the information available on
           this system.

           To assess changes to projected costs and savings, we compared
           DOD's current estimates to the estimates in the BRAC 2005
           Commission report. BRAC Commission estimates are based on DOD's
           quantitative model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions
           (COBRA). DOD has used the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC
           rounds and, over time, has improved upon its design to provide
           better estimating capability. In our past and current reviews of
           the COBRA model, we found it to be a generally reasonable
           estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among various
           BRAC options. Air Force estimates did not segregate the ANG-
           related costs and annual recurring savings of the Air Force
           recommendations. Therefore, ANG officials provided us with the
           current estimated implementation costs from a Web-based tool, BRAC
           Management Tool (BMT). On the basis of that information, we were
           able to extract the estimated ANG related costs and savings of the
           BRAC 2005 Commission report, as well as the current estimated
           annual recurring costs. The Air Force BRAC Project Management
           Office identified a number of issues with our results. After
           reviewing their issues, we updated the data accordingly and
           satisfied their concerns. To determine the reasons why DOD's
           current estimates changed compared to the Commission's estimates,
           we interviewed officials at the Air Force BRAC Project Management
           Office, ANG headquarters, and reviewed explanations documented in
           the Air Force business plans and decision memorandums. Finally, to
           identify costs being funded outside of the BRAC account, we
           reviewed Air Force budget submissions for fiscal years 2007 and
           2008, as well as obtained data from the Air Force Total Force
           Integration office on the estimated funding for equipment,
           military construction, and training to establish the cost of
           replacement missions for units that lost their flying mission due
           to the BRAC recommendations. We assessed the reliability of the
           Air Force Total Force Integration and BRAC Management Tool data by
           interviewing knowledgeable officials and determined the data were
           sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

           We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

           (This page is left intentionally blank)
		   
Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost Their Flying
Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005
		   

                               Replacement missions
Affected                                                         Flying      
units        Band 1      Band 2        Band 3       Band 4       mission     
March, CA    Predator    Joint Space                                         
                            Operations                                          
                            Centera                                             
Bradley, CT  Component                                           Joint Cargo 
                Numbered                                            Aircraft c  
                Air Force                                                       
                (CNAF)b                                                         
Capital, IL  CNAF                                                            
Terre Haute, Distributed Air Support                                         
IN           Ground      Operations                                          
                System      Squadron                                            
                (DGS)d      (ASOS)e                                             
McConnell,   DGS         ASOS                                                
KS                                                                           
Otis, MA     DGS, CNAF                                                       
Kellogg, MI  CNAF                                                Joint Cargo 
                                                                    Aircraft    
St Louis, MO CNAF                                                B2          
                                                                    Association 
                                                                    with        
                                                                    Whiteman    
                                                                    AFBf        
Key Field,   CNAF                                                Joint Cargo 
MS                                                               Aircraft    
Mansfield,                                          Rapid        Joint Cargo 
OH                                                  Engineer     Aircraft    
                                                       Deployable               
                                                       Heavy                    
                                                       Operational              
                                                       Repair                   
                                                       Squadron                 
                                                       Engineers                
                                                       (Red Horse)g             
Springfield,             Measurement &                           F-16        
OH                       Signatures                              training    
                            Intelligenceh                           unit i      
Willow       CNAF        ASOS                       Red Horse                
Grove, PA                                                                    
Nashville,                                          Classified,  Joint Cargo 
TN                                                  Intelligence Aircraft    
                                                       Production               
Ellington,   Predator    ASOS          Intelligence                          
TX                                     Trainingj                             
Total        12          6             1            4            7           

           Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.

           aA Joint Space Operations Center integrates various joint-space
           capabilities to provide shared situational awareness to commanders
           and troops on the ground.

           b A Component Numbered Air Force is a combination of up to three
           separate missions, including an Air Operations Center (AOC, which
           includes Operations, Planning, Strategy, Intelligence, and
           Surveillance and Reconnaissance components), an Air Mobility
           Division (AMD), and an Air Force Forces group (AFFOR).

           cThe Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) will be a new, small, tactical
           airlift aircraft that has not yet been procured by the Air Force.
           According to senior ANG leadership, the JCA may not be ready for
           deployment until between 2012 to 2015.

           dA Distributed Ground System processes intelligence information.

           eAn Air Support Operations Squadron provides support to ground
           forces by facilitating Air Force air strikes.

           fANG personnel will operate B-2s at Whiteman in conjunction with
           active-duty Air Force personnel.

           gA Red Horse, Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair
           Squadron Engineers, supports contingency and special operations
           missions with mobile, self-sufficient civil engineers.

           h Measurement & Signatures Intelligence units employ a variety of
           intelligence gathering techniques including advanced radar,
           electro-optical/ infrared, and materials sensing.

           iThe Foreign Military Sales--F-16s unit is a school for foreign
           countries that acquire F-16s and require training. The FMS school
           at Springfield will train Dutch pilots.

           jThis intelligence training unit will provide additional
           intelligence instructors for the school at Goodfellow, Texas.

Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between the
2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for
ANG-Related Recommendations

Dollars in millions                                                        
                                 BRAC Commission savings   Current            
Recommendations affecting ANG    estimates(savings) / estimated            
units                                           costs   savings Difference 
Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and                $(27.875)    $5.399    $33.274 
Atlantic City, NJ                                                          
Great Falls, MT                                 0.050    12.735     12.685 
Martin State, MD                              (8.597)     0.117      8.714 
Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and                  (6.339)     0.505      6.844 
Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX                                               
Mansfield, OH                                 (6.708)     0.107      6.815 
March, CA                                     (4.045)     2.749      6.794 
Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air                    17.008    23.461      6.453 
Force Leased Locations &                                                   
National Guard Headquarters                                                
Leased Locationsa                                                          
Boise, ID                                     (6.291)     0.000      6.291 
Grand Forks, ND                                17.177    20.905      3.728 
Richmond, VA and Des Moines,                  (4.923)   (1.642)      3.281 
IA                                                                         
Springfield, OH                               (2.524)     0.005      2.529 
Nashville, TN                                 (0.880)     1.568      2.448 
Capital, IL and Hulman, IN                    (2.003)     0.070      2.073 
Niagara Falls, NY                             (0.258)     1.504      1.762 
Kulis and Elmendorf, AK                      (10.779)   (9.059)      1.720 
Kellogg, MI                                   (1.480)     0.042      1.522 
Mountain Home, ID, Nellis,                      9.072    10.547      1.475 
NV, and Elmendorf, AK                                                      
Portland, OR                                  (7.004)   (5.658)      1.346 
Hector, ND                                    (1.016)     0.023      1.039 
Key Field, MS                                 (0.939)     0.010      0.949 
Fairchild, WA                                 (0.925)   (0.153)      0.772 
Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA,                      (0.508)     0.237      0.745 
Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and                                               
Martin State, MD                                                           
Ellington, TX                                 (0.327)   (0.090)      0.237 
New Orleans, LA--F100 Engine                    0.140     0.151      0.011 
Centralized Intermediate                                                   
Repair Facilities                                                          
Willow Grove and Cambria, PAa                (14.923)  (14.923)      0.000 
Robins, GA                                      0.000     0.000      0.000 
Lackland, TX                                  (2.902)   (3.640)    (0.738) 
Selfridge, MI and Beale, CA                    12.808     4.536    (8.272) 
Fort Smith, AR and Luke, AZ                    12.674     3.613    (9.061) 
Cannon, NM                                     16.425     0.000   (16.425) 
Total                                       $(25.892)   $53.119    $79.011 

           Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006).
		   
		   aNon-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National
           Guard.
		   
Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC Recommendations
Affecting ANG 

Dollars in millions                                                        
                                                               Total one-time 

                                             Military    Other implementation 
Recommendations affecting ANG units   construction   costsa          costs 
Kulis And Elmendorf, AK                    174.569    7.249        181.818 
Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and Atlantic       66.340   27.718         94.058 
City, NJ                                                                   
Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force           55.320    3.431         58.751 
Leased Locations & National Guard                                          
Headquarters Leased Locationsb                                             
Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA, Selfridge,         11.931   23.456         35.387 
MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, MD                                         
Capital, IL, and Hulman, IN                  6.104    9.750         15.854 
March, CA                                    0.000   15.821         15.821 
Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and Tinker,         5.014   10.542         15.556 
OK, and Randolph, TX                                                       
Mansfield, OH                                3.479   10.885         14.364 
Selfridge, MI, and Beale, CA                 4.360    9.196         13.556 
Grand Forks, ND                              5.232    6.207         11.439 
Fairchild, WA                                6.104    4.091         10.195 
Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA              0.061    9.935          9.996 
Hector, ND                                   0.000    8.950          8.950 
Ellington, TX                                2.884    5.544          8.428 
Lackland, TX                                 7.303    1.056          8.359 
Great Falls, MT                              0.000    7.999          7.999 
Program Management, Various                  0.000    7.730          7.730 
Locationsc                                                                 
New Orleans, LA F100 Engine                  7.185    0.004          7.189 
Centralized Intermediate Repair                                            
Facilities                                                                 
Portland, OR                                 1.299    5.648          6.947 
Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, and           0.000    4.763          4.763 
Elmendorf, AK                                                              
Kellogg, MI                                  2.066    2.682          4.748 
Niagara Falls, NY                            0.000    4.430          4.430 
Cannon, NM                                   0.000    3.918          3.918 
Robins, GA                                   2.812    0.721          3.533 
Martin State, MD                             2.344    0.938          3.282 
Key Field, MS                                1.255    1.968          3.223 
Springfield, OH                              0.000    3.120          3.120 
Willow Grove and Cambria, PAb                0.000    2.495          2.495 
Boise, ID                                    0.000    2.053          2.053 
Nashville, TN                                0.000    1.979          1.979 
Fort Smith, AR And Luke, AZ                  0.000    1.660          1.660 
Total                                     $365.662 $205.939       $571.601 

           a Other costs include costs associated with moving personnel and
           equipment.

           bNon-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National
           Guard.

           cOur analysis indicated that Program Management Costs (if any)
           were included in each recommendation. On the basis of the
           information we received from Air Force officials, Program
           Management Costs were calculated separately for the current
           estimates of one-time costs.
		   
		   Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

           Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
		   
           GAO Contact

           Brian Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]
		   
		   Acknowledgments

           In addition to the contact named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant
           Director; Ronald Bergman; Susan Ditto; James P. Klein; Ron La Due
           Lake; James Madar; Julie Matta; and Charles Perdue made key
           contributions to this report.
		   
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Highlights of [39]GAO-07-641 , a report to congressional committees

May 2007

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve
Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard
Recommendations

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected 62
percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14 units
losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type of
aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft. To
implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of aircraft and
retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this report, GAO
addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC actions. GAO's
objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide replacement
missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress and challenges
in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the cost and savings
estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority
to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of
reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO conducted its work at
the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states affected by BRAC 2005.

[40]What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the Department of Defense develop a strategy to
address challenges, enhance communication, and provide more transparent
cost reporting. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations on
strategy and communication, but did not concur with the recommendation on
cost reporting.

Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air
Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected
units that supported either the future force structure or the National
Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation with
its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force developed a
prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but let ANG, with
input from state leadership, decide which missions to assign to specific
units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from the prioritized list.
ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to affected units on the basis of
its leadership goal to have at least 1 flying mission per state and to
maximize the number of flying missions where possible.

ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC recommendations,
but lacks a strategy to address implementation challenges. Without such a
strategy, several challenges could delay when some units are able to
perform their new missions. ANG has developed programming plans for the
BRAC-related actions affecting the ANG and a plan to move hundreds of
aircraft. However, ANG faces challenges in managing the timing and
sequencing of many actions required to implement BRAC, such as developing
manning documents that provide the specific skill mixes required, and in
ensuring there is sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate
personnel requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000
personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school can
currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has worked
with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these have yet to
be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining security
clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process. Further,
bridge missions have not been identified for some units that will face a
gap between old and new missions. ANG also faces possible delays in
obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, and training.
Finally, some ANG units believe there has been insufficient communication
with ANG headquarters about new mission requirements, which impacts their
ability to recruit and train personnel.

GAO's analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will be
annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than estimated $26 million
annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further, the Air
Force is not using BRAC funds for over $300 million for military
construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement missions
for units losing their flying mission. However, because these costs are
not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission, Congress does not
have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation costs.

References

Visible links
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-310
  37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
  39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641
*** End of document. ***