Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned	 
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions	 
Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning (22-MAR-07, 	 
GAO-07-639T).							 
                                                                 
GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the
need for security over conventional munitions storage sites which
provides the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom		 
(OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense  
(DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during  
and after major combat operations. This testimony addresses (1)  
the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional	 
munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks	 
associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage	 
sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. 
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint	 
doctrine and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed	 
senior-level DOD officials.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-639T					        
    ACCNO:   A67128						        
  TITLE:     Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions	 
Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning			 
     DATE:   03/22/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Facility security					 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military policies					 
	     Munitions						 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Warfare						 
	     Weapons						 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 

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GAO-07-639T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure C

          * [4]U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conve
          * [5]U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequat
          * [6]DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy
          * [7]Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites H

     * [8]DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Fo
     * [9]Conclusions and Recommendations
     * [10]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [11]Contacts and Acknowledgements
     * [12]GAO's Mission
     * [13]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [14]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [15]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [16]Congressional Relations
     * [17]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Thursday, March 22, 2007

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning

Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-07-639T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss GAO's report being
released today on the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to plan for
the security of former Iraqi conventional weapons sites and the lessons
learned for planning future operations. In March 2003, citing the failure
of Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors and other concerns, the
United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq in an operation known
as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Commander of the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) was primarily responsible for developing and executing
the war plan for OIF.1 The war plan's military priorities included
overthrowing the Iraqi regime by rapidly capturing Baghdad and disarming
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although WMD stockpiles
were not found, Iraq had hundreds of thousands of tons of conventional
munitions throughout the country at various storage sites.2 The widespread
looting of some Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during OIF has
been the subject of media reports. We previously reported on the looting
and dispersal of radiological sources from a number of sites in Iraq after
the invasion and DOD's efforts to collect and secure those sources.3 My
statement today addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over
conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, and (2) DOD actions to
mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions
storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned.

The observations I will discuss today are based on the unclassified
version of our classified report on this topic.4 To examine the security
over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites provided by U.S. forces,
we reviewed field unit reporting and intelligence products and interviewed
DOD officials. We also collected and analyzed the various iterations of
OIF plans, doctrine, and concepts of operations for coverage of the
security of conventional munitions storage sites. To examine DOD's actions
to learn from its experience with securing conventional munitions storage
sites in Iraq and apply these lessons learned to mitigate risks during
future operations, we interviewed DOD officials about their efforts to
identify and document lessons learned and examined documents on operations
in Iraq. We performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

1CENTCOM is one of five geographic combatant commands. A combatant command
is a unified command established by the President of the United States
with a broad continuing mission under a single commander.

2Conventional munitions are complete devices charged with explosives,
propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition that are not nuclear,
biological, or chemical for use in military operations.

3GAO, Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source
Recovery Effort and Apply Lessons Learned to Further Recovery Missions,
[18]GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).

4 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites
to Future Operations Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2007).

Summary

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites
in Iraq, combined with prewar planning priorities and certain prewar
planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces
not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to
DOD sources. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied
significantly, with the higher estimate being five times greater than the
lower estimate. Although the amount of looted munitions is unknown, field
unit reports, numerous intelligence assessments, and imagery products
showed that many conventional munitions storage sites were looted after
major combat operations and some may remain vulnerable. In October 2006,
we could not verify that all sites had been physically secured. According
to lessons learned reports and knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials,
including field commanders, the widespread looting occurred because DOD
had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage
sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions that proved
to be invalid. For example, the OIF war plan assumed that the regular
Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security" and
resistance was unlikely. Knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials stated
that these Iraqi army units would have been used to secure conventional
munitions storage sites. Our analysis of the various iterations of the war
plan found that the OIF war plan did not examine the consequences of these
and other important planning assumptions being proven wrong. Furthermore,
DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy
munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already
occurred. While DOD had destroyed, disposed of or secured 417,000 tons of
munitions, Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials told us unsecured
munitions continued to pose a threat. Not securing these conventional
munitions storage sites has been costly. For example, looted munitions are
being used to construct improvised explosive devices (IED) that have
killed or maimed many people and maintain the level of violence against
U.S. and coalition forces and their Iraqi partners, which has hampered the
achievement of the strategic goal of stability in Iraq. Moreover,
estimates indicate that the looted munitions will likely continue to
support terrorist attacks throughout the region.

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned,
because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, DOD has given
little focus to mitigating the risk to U.S. forces posed by an adversary's
conventional munitions storage sites in future operations planning.
Instead, the department's actions in response to OIF lessons learned
generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or
terrorists during post-hostility operations. Although these actions are
good first steps, our review of DOD publications--such as doctrine,
policy, guidance, and procedures issued by the joint staff--used to guide
operational planning and execution found little evidence of guidance
concerning the security of conventional munitions storage sites. Without
appropriate joint doctrine, policy, guidance, and procedures, DOD cannot
ensure that OIF lessons learned regarding the security of an adversary's
conventional munitions storage sites will be a strategic planning and
priority-setting consideration that is integrated into future operations
planning and execution, so that these munitions do not become the source
of materials for making IEDs.

Our report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of
the Joint Chief of Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide survey and risk
assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq; (2) report
ensuing risk mitigation strategies and results to Congress; and (3)
incorporate consideration of conventional munitions storage sites security
into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine,
instructions, manuals, and other directives. DOD partially concurred with
our recommendations.

Background

When the United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq on March 17,
2003, and the Iraqi government no longer functioned, many areas
experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public services, such
as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and coalition forces were
then confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and
infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Given the extensive
looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not assume that facilities and
items within the facilities would remain intact or in place for later
collection without being secured.5 Many facilities, such as abandoned
government research facilities and industrial complexes, were no longer
under the control of the former regime and had been looted. For example,
hundreds of tons of explosive materials that had been documented by the
International Atomic Energy Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa
explosives and munitions facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003,
through the theft and looting of the unsecured installations. We also
reported that regarding radiological sources in Iraq, DOD was not ready to
collect and secure radiological sources when the war began in March 2003
and for about 6 months thereafter.6

5 [19]GAO-05-672 .

U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional
Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting

According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons
learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition forces
were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage sites in
Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These sources
indicated that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by the number
and size of conventional munitions storage sites, and DOD had insufficient
troop levels to secure these sites because of prewar planning priorities
and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. Despite war plan and
intelligence estimates of large quantities of munitions in Iraq,
knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did not plan for or set up a
program to centrally manage and destroy enemy munitions until August 2003,
well after the completion of major combat operations in May 2003. The
costs of not securing these conventional munitions storage sites have been
high, as looted explosives and ammunition from these sites have been used
to construct IEDs that have killed and maimed people. Furthermore,
estimates indicate such munitions are likely to continue to support
terrorist attacks in the region.

U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional Munitions
Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting

U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional
munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure these
sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat
operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit
reports, lessons learned reports, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF
estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly with the
higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. The
commander of CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations on September 24, 2003, that "there is more ammunition in
Iraq than any place I've ever been in my life, and it is all not
securable."7

6 [20]GAO-05-672 .

Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the
time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April 2003
through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons associated with
Iraq's former republican guard had been extensively looted and vandalized
after the military campaign phase of OIF ended. It concluded that the most
prized areas for looting were the depots or storage areas. The assessment
further concluded that the thorough nature of the looting and the
seemingly targeted concentration on storage areas suggested that much of
the looting in the areas assessed was conducted by organized elements that
were likely aided or spearheaded by Iraqi military personnel.

Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites--including fixed garrisons, field
sites, and ammunition production facilities--were reviewed to assess their
vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces were obtaining
munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small number of sites were
considered highly vulnerable because of the large quantity of munitions,
inadequate security, and a high level of looting. The majority of the
sites were assessed as having low vulnerability--not because they had been
secured, but because they had been abandoned or totally looted. The review
considered virtually all the sites to be partially secured at best and
concluded that U.S. and coalition troops were able to guard only a very
small percentage of the sites.

U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security Because
of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions

DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S.
forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate security
for conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of OIF planning
priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. According to
DOD officials, ground commanders had two top priorities during major
combat operations that were set forth in the February 2003 OIF war plan.
First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned for and successfully executed
a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on surprise and speed rather than
massive troop buildup, such as was used in 1991 during the first Gulf War.
This rapid march to Baghdad successfully resulted in the removal of the
regime. Another critical planning priority was finding and securing the
regime's stockpiles of WMD, which the administration believed were a
threat to coalition forces and other countries in the region. The OIF war
plan assumed that there was a high probability that the regime would use
WMD against U.S. and coalition forces in a final effort to survive when
those forces reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM planner for OIF
stated that ground commanders had to prioritize limited available
resources against the volume of tasks, both stated and implied, contained
in the war plan.

7Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan: Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, United
States Senate, 108th Cong. 133 (2003).

Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF war
plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being
insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage
sites, including the following:

           o The Iraqi regular army would "capitulate and provide security."
           The OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and
           security forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual
           surrender or desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S.
           Commander, CENTCOM, intended to preserve, as much as possible, the
           Iraqi military to maintain internal security and protect Iraq's
           borders during and after major combat operations. According to a
           study prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, this
           assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of
           combat power deployed to Iraq.8 On May 23, 2003, the Coalition
           Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi Army, which the CENTCOM
           commander assumed would provide internal security.

           o Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid
           out the probability of several courses of action that the regime
           might take in response to an invasion, the plan did not consider
           the possibility of protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S.
           and coalition forces after the conclusion of major combat
           operations. As a result, DOD officials stated that the regime's
           conventional munitions storage sites were not considered a
           significant risk.

           o Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The
           OIF war planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons
           learned report, was based on the assumption that the bulk of the
           Iraqi government would remain in place after major combat
           operations and therefore civil functions, including rebuilding and
           humanitarian assistance, could be shifted from military forces to
           U.S. and international organizations and, ultimately, the Iraqis,
           within about 18 months after the end of major combat operations.9
           Therefore, DOD initially did not plan for an extended occupation
           of the country or the level of troops that would be needed to
           secure conventional munitions storage sites in particular or the
           country in general.

8Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, On Point: U.S. Army in Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Washington, D.C.: 2004).

Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions contributed
to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report by the Joint
Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not examine the
consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further contributing to
insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of civil order in
Iraq.10 The Joint Staff strategic-level lessons learned report also
discussed the effect inaccurate planning assumptions had on force levels.
According to this report, overemphasis on planning assumptions that could
not be validated prior to critical decision points resulted in a force
structure plan that did not consider several missions requiring troops,
such as providing security for enemy conventional munitions storage sites.

DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy Iraqi Munitions
until after the Completion of Major Combat Operations

Despite prewar intelligence assessments of large amounts of conventional
munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did not set up a
central office until July 2003 or set up a program to centrally manage and
destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003. These steps were taken
well after major combat operations were completed in May 2003, because the
department did not perceive conventional munitions storage sites as a
threat. The central office was initially set up to address operational
problems found during an assessment of nine Iraqi sites. This assessment
found that DOD lacked priorities for securing the sites and uniform
procedures and practices for securing and disposing of munitions. It also
uncovered serious safety problems in the handling, transportation,
storage, and disposal of munitions.

9U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One) (Norfolk,
Va.: January 2006).

10U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two).

In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center awarded contracts for
the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first demolition of
munitions under the program was conducted in September 2003. The program's
initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six depots and to have all
enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or transported to the
depots. The program also was tasked with assisting in the establishment,
management, and transfer of depots to the new Iraqi army. According to the
Engineering and Support Center, the program has received more than $1
billion and has destroyed or secured more than 324,000 tons of munitions.
This number, combined with military disposal operations, has accounted for
more than 417,000 tons of munitions, leaving an unknown amount of
conventional munitions in the hands of resistance groups or unsecured.
This unknown amount could range significantly, from thousands to millions
of tons of unaccounted conventional munitions.

According to Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials, unsecured
conventional munitions from the former regime continue to pose a risk to
U.S. forces and others. For example, some conventional munitions storage
sites in remote locations have not been assessed recently to verify
whether they pose any residual risk. These officials also stated that
smaller caches of weapons, munitions, and equipment as well as remaining
unexploded ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent a more pressing and
continuing risk. These officials said that the coalition is working to
reduce this risk by searching for and finding a growing number of caches,
but it will be some time before it can clean up all the munitions in Iraq.
The extent of the threat from smaller caches, however, is difficult to
quantify because the location or amount of munitions hidden or scattered
around the country is unknown.

Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites Have Been High

As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic, and
financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage sites have
been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and explosives looted from
unsecured conventional munitions storage sites will likely continue to
support terrorist attacks throughout the region. Government agencies also
have assessed that looted munitions are being used in the construction of
IEDs. IEDs have proven to be an effective tactic because they are
inexpensive, relatively simple to employ, deadly, anonymous, and have
great strategic value.11 To illustrate, the Congressional Research Service
reported in 2005 that IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat fatalities
and casualties in Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis. Moreover,
Multinational Forces in Iraq reported that the attacks against the
coalition and its Iraqi partners continued to increase through July 2006,
representing at least 40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces.

DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on Securing
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we
found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security of
an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic
planning and priority-setting consideration during planning for future
operations. A critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured conventional
munitions storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces, as
illustrated by intelligence assessments that show one potential adversary,
for example, also has considerable munitions stockpiles that would require
a sizable occupying force to secure or destroy. Despite the strategic
implications regarding unsecured conventional munitions storage sites, our
analysis shows that securing those sites generally is not explicitly
addressed in military policy and guidance, particularly at the joint
level. We reviewed 17 DOD publications--which Joint Staff officials told
us were relevant to our review--to determine the extent to which each of
those publications contained guidance on the security of conventional
munitions storage sites. A list of these publications can be found in our
March 2007 report.12 In reviewing these documents, we found little
evidence of guidance regarding conventional munitions storage site
security. Although several publications addressed defeating IEDs during an
insurgency after major combat operations have ended or provided
tactical-level guidance on how to dispose of explosive hazards, including
munitions, or make those hazards safe, none explicitly addressed the
security of conventional munitions storage sites during or after major
combat operations as a tactical, operational, or strategic risk.

Because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, the
department's actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have
emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists
during posthostility operations. The specific actions DOD has taken are
discussed in our report. These actions are good first steps toward
broadening DOD's focus beyond the ongoing tactical and operational
counter-IED efforts used against Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or
external terrorist groups in Iraq to planning and executing strategic
counter-IED campaigns for future operations. However, the actions do not
directly address the strategic importance of securing conventional
munitions storage sites during major combat operations so that they do not
become the source of materials for making IEDs during an occupation or
become used for other forms of armed resistance.

11Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq:
Effects and Countermeasures, RS22330 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 2005).

12 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites
to Future Operations Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2007).

Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured
conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat to
U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential
adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States' experiences
in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S. invading
forces. We believe these potential adversaries will likely develop
military doctrine to avoid direct military confrontation with the United
States if possible and try to undermine the United States' political
commitment with unconventional warfare. Therefore, the number, size, and
geographic separation of an adversary's munitions storage sites could pose
a significant security challenge during an occupying force's follow-on
operations. A large amount of munitions in such an adversary's country
could require an occupying force to dedicate significant manpower to
secure or destroy the contents of the major munitions storage sites.
Furthermore, the remnants of an adversary's forces, insurgents, or
terrorists could draw from any large conventional munitions storage
network left unsecured by an occupying force.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In our report, we concluded that a fundamental gap existed between the OIF
war plan assumptions and the experiences of U.S. and coalition forces in
Iraq, contributing to insufficient troops being on the ground to prevent
widespread looting of conventional munitions storage sites and resulting
in looted munitions being a continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and
coalition forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs of this
failure to provide sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs made with
looted munitions causing about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and
casualties in Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis and contributing to
increasing instability, challenging U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Further,
DOD does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessed
the risk associated with unsecured conventional munitions storage sites to
U.S. forces and others. Such a survey and assessment combined with
associated risk mitigation strategies--such as providing more troops or
other security measures--could assist DOD in conserving lives and in
meeting its strategic goal to leave a stable nation behind when U.S.
forces ultimately leave Iraq. We recommended that the Joint Chief of Staff
conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured
conventional munitions in Iraq and report ensuing risk mitigation
strategies and the results of those strategies to Congress.

We also concluded that in preparing for future operations DOD's actions in
response to OIF lessons learned primarily have focused on countering IEDs
and not on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a
strategic planning and priority-setting consideration for future
operations. Although good first steps, these actions do not address what
we believe is a critical OIF lesson learned, the strategic importance of
securing conventional munitions storage sites during and after major
combat operations. Unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can
represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would require
significant manpower or other resources during and after major combat
operations to secure. Therefore, since joint doctrine is to present
fundamental principles as well as contemporary lessons that guide the
employment of forces, we believe that it is important that DOD clearly and
explicitly address the security of conventional munitions storage sites in
revisions to joint doctrine. Therefore we recommended that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff incorporate conventional munitions storage site security
as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and
guidance, including joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other
directives.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the department
conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured
conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is imperative
that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional munitions storage
sites be conducted, military commanders in theater are aware of the
significant risk posed by the sites, and similar studies and assessments
have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD also stated that from a
manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide survey is not feasible
without significantly degrading ongoing efforts in Iraq and the region. As
the evidence in our report clearly supports, we made this recommendation
because we did not see any evidence of a strategic-level survey or an
effective, theaterwide risk mitigation strategy to address the commanders'
awareness of this significant risk or the findings of the studies and
assessments regarding security of conventional munitions storage sites.
Accordingly, the intent behind our recommendation is to have DOD assess
the risks associated with unsecured conventional munitions sites on a
strategic, theaterwide basis to develop an effective risk mitigation
strategy.

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the department
report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of those
strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation, DOD stated
that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the department and
Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress remain at the
strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was not our intention
to detract tactical units from the current warfighting mission or to
suggest congressional oversight is needed for each tactical unit. Instead,
we are recommending that DOD alert Congress of its assessment and the
actions being taken to mitigate the strategic risk associated with
unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq.

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the department
incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a
strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance
and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the appropriate language
in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD stated that (1) Iraq is
a separate case and should not be considered the standard for all future
operations and (2) war plans must reflect proper prioritization based on
desired operational effects and resources available as it may not always
be possible or desirable in a resource- and time-constrained environment
to secure all sites or destroy all munitions. We agree with these
statements. The purpose of this report was not to suggest that Iraq be the
standard for all future conflicts or to restrict commanders' planning
prerogatives. Instead, the report suggests that as DOD incorporates OIF
lessons learned into joint doctrine, it includes what is a key OIF lesson
learned--an adversary's stockpile of conventional munitions can be an
asymmetric threat to U.S. forces.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgements

For questions about this statement, please contact Davi D'Agostino at
(202) 512-5431. Other individuals making key contributions to this
statement include: Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director, Renee Brown, Donna
Byers, John Van Schiak, and Nicole Volchko.

(351011)

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Highlights of [28]GAO-07-639T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform

March 22, 2007

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning

GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need for
security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides the
basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March
2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about
how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions
storage sites during and after major combat operations. This testimony
addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional
munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated
with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future
operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these
objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy,
intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials.

[29]What GAO Recommends

The report GAO is releasing today recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) conduct a
theaterwide survey and risk assessment on unsecured conventional munitions
in Iraq, (2) report related risk mitigation strategies and results to
Congress, and (3) incorporate conventional munitions storage site security
as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and
guidance. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations.

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites
in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to
be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites
and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and
intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions
varied significantly, with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than
the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after
major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006.
According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the
widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to
secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning
priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly
taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming
force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would
"capitulate and provide internal security." According to an Army lessons
learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the
amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war
plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were
proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program
for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread
looting had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National
Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat
to U.S. forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions
storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted
munitions are being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that
have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support
terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National
Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to
verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically
secured.

DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however,
DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed by
an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations
planning. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of
IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes
that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric
threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S.
military strengths. For example, potential adversaries are estimated to
have a significant amount of munitions that would require significant
manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that this situation shows
both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that
information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can
represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations.
However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons
learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions
storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and
execution.

References

Visible links
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
  19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
  20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-639T
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