Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special Operations
Command's Management of Weapon System Programs (28-JUN-07,
GAO-07-620).
Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) duties have greatly
increased since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Special
Operations Forces are at work in Afghanistan and Iraq, and SOCOM
has been assigned to lead U.S. efforts in the Global War on
Terrorism. SOCOM's acquisitions budget has also greatly increased
in this period--more than doubling from $788 million in 2001 to
approximately $1.91 billion in 2006. In light of SOCOM's expanded
duties, Congress requested that GAO review SOCOM's management of
its acquisition programs. GAO's evaluation includes an assessment
of: the types of acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since
2001 and whether the programs are consistent with its mission;
the extent to which SOCOM's programs have progressed as planned;
and the challenges SOCOM faces in managing its acquisition
programs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-620
ACCNO: A71615
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special
Operations Command's Management of Weapon System Programs
DATE: 06/28/2007
SUBJECT: Agency missions
Counterterrorism
Defense capabilities
Defense procurement
Military forces
Military operations
Military procurement
Procurement planning
Procurement policy
Program evaluation
Special operations
Terrorism
Weapons systems
C-130 Aircraft
C-141 Aircraft
C-17 Aircraft
CH-47 Helicopter
Chinook Helicopter
Combat Talon II Helicopter
CV-22A Helicopter
MC-130H Helicopter
MH-47 Helicopter
Starlifter Aircraft
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GAO-07-620
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Consistent with the Command
* [4]Most of SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Small
* [5]Leaflet Delivery System
* [6]Commercially Designed Sniper Weapons
* [7]Modification to the Army's Service-Common CH-47
Helicopter
* [8]Some SOCOM Programs Are Targeted to Urgent Needs
* [9]SOCOM'S Acquisition Program Performance Has Been Mixed
* [10]SOCOM Faces Management and Workforce Challenges in Its Acqui
* [11]SOCOM Management Challenges
* [12]SOCOM Workforce Challenges
* [13]Conclusions
* [14]Recommendations for Executive Actions
* [15]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [16]SOCOM Plans, Resources, Acquires, and Sustains Weapon System
* [17]SOCOM Has Unique Program Management Structure Options
* [18]GAO Contact
* [19]Staff Acknowledgments
* [20]GAO's Mission
* [21]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [22]Order by Mail or Phone
* [23]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [24]Congressional Relations
* [25]Public Affairs
Report to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee
on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
June 2007
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
An Analysis of the Special Operations Command's Management of Weapon
System Programs
GAO-07-620
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 5
SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Consistent with the Command's Mission 8
SOCOM'S Acquisition Program Performance Has Been Mixed 18
SOCOM Faces Management and Workforce Challenges in Its Acquisition
Programs 21
Conclusions 26
Recommendations for Executive Actions 27
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29
Appendix II SOCOM's Policies, Procedures, and Organizational Structure for
Managing Acquisitions 30
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 36
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38
Related GAO Products 39
Tables
Table 1: SOCOM Component Commands End Strength 6
Table 2. SOCOM Acquisition Programs from 2001 to 2006 by Type and Funding
9
Table 3: Summary of SOCOM Programs by Acquisition Categories 10
Table 4: Estimated Ranges of Acquisition Program Costs 10
Table 5: Summary of Programs That Have and Have Not Been Progressing as
Planned 19
Table 6: Summary of Acquisition Programs by Management Structure 20
Table 7: SOCOM's Civilian and Military Acquisition Workforce Composition
and Training Levels 24
Table 8: SOCOM's Military Critical Acquisition Position (CAP) and DOD
Certification Levels 25
Table 9: Summary of SOCOM Acquisition Programs' MDAs and Program Managers
34
Figures
Figure 1: Leaflet Delivery System 11
Figure 2: SOCOM's Family of Sniper Rifles 12
Figure 3: MH-47G 14
Figure 4: Example of a SOCOM-Modified Commercial Vehicle 15
Figure 5: MANPACK Advanced Concept Technology Development 17
Figure 6: SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Management Structure 34
Abbreviations
ACAT Acquisition Category
AMP Avionics Modernization Program
ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict
CAAP Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration
CAP Critical Acquisition Position
DAWIA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
DOD Department of Defense
GWOT global war on terrorism
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
MDA Milestone Decision Authority
MILDEP military department
SEAL Sea Air and Land
SOALIS Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System
SOCOM Special Operations Command
SOF Special Operations Forces
UDA Urgent Deployment Acquisitions
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
June 28, 2007
The Honorable Jack Reed
Chairman
The Honorable Elizabeth Dole
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in 1987 to oversee
the training, doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. Special Operations
Forces (SOF). A key objective in establishing a unified command was to
ensure that the Special Operations Forces of the military services would
be equipped with the right weapon systems to carry out their unique
missions. The SOCOM commander was granted the authority to independently
develop, acquire, and field specialized equipment. This "special
operations forces-peculiar" equipment may be newly created or standard
equipment modified to meet SOF needs, but may not duplicate equipment
provided from the other military services.^1
In the past several years, SOCOM's acquisition program budget has
increased significantly--from $788 million in 2001 to approximately $1.91
billion in 2006--as the role of the special operations forces in U.S.
military operations has grown. For example, in 2003, the Secretary of
Defense expanded SOCOM's duties to include leading the Department of
Defense's (DOD) global war on terrorism (GWOT) operations. In keeping with
this expanded role, DOD has begun to re-tool SOCOM from primarily a
supporting command into a command responsible for planning and executing
missions in GWOT. The change became more prominent with the fiscal year
2004 budget request, in which the President proposed a 47 percent increase
in SOCOM's funding.
^1Pursuant to Title 10 United States Code, Section 167, the Commander, U.
S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is vested with the responsibilities
and the authority for the development and acquisition of special
operations forces (SOF)-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the
functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute its own
budget. SOF-peculiar equipment is defined as equipment, materials,
supplies, and services required for SOF activities for which there is no
service-common requirement.
In light of SOCOM's expanded acquisition duties, Congress requested that
GAO review SOCOM's management of its acquisition programs. To do so we
addressed the following questions:
o What types of acquisition programs has SOCOM undertaken since
2001 and are they consistent with SOCOM's mission?
o To what extent have SOCOM's acquisition programs progressed as
planned, meeting their initial cost and schedule estimates?
o What challenges if any does SOCOM face in managing its
acquisition programs?
SOCOM has encountered difficulties over the past several years with two of
its flagship acquisition programs--the Advanced SEAL Delivery System
(ASDS) and the CV-22 Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft.^2 The ASDS program
is funded by SOCOM and managed by the Navy. The basic CV-22 platform is
funded by the Air Force and produced under a Navy contract. SOCOM funds
SOF-peculiar modifications to the CV-22. Both the ASDS and CV-22 programs
have experienced significant cost, schedule, and performance problems
because of requirements, technology, and design issues. Since both
programs began before 2001, we did not include them in our analysis.
However, we have reported separately on the programs, and those reports
are listed at the end of this report.
To assess SOCOM's management of its acquisition programs, we collected and
reviewed information on all programs undertaken by the command between
2001 and 2006. We analyzed the information to determine what types of
systems were being acquired and whether programs were meeting planned
cost, schedule, and quantity objectives. To identify the challenges they
face, we examined and analyzed pertinent documentation to include DOD,
military departments, and SOCOM directives, instructions, policies, and
operating procedures related to the Defense Acquisition System, and we
interviewed key officials from SOCOM's Special Operations Acquisition and
Logistics and Resources and Requirements organizations. We relied on
previous GAO work as a framework for knowledge-based acquisition.
^2The Advanced SEAL Delivery System is a long-range submersible capability
to deliver special operations forces for clandestine missions. The
submersible "hybrid combatant" provides improved range, speed, and
payload, and habitability for the operators. CV-22 Osprey is a tiltrotor
aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff, hover, and vertical landing
qualities of a helicopter with the long-range, fuel efficiency, and speed
of a turboprop aircraft. Its mission is to conduct long-range
infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions for SOF.
We performed our review from July 2006 through May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
Since January 2001, SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition
programs that are consistent with the command's mission to provide
equipment that addresses the unique needs of the special operations forces
and for which there is no service-common requirement. SOCOM has committed
about $6 billion to date on these programs. About 88 percent of the
programs are Acquisition Category (ACAT) III level in size,^3 have short
acquisition cycles, and use commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental
items or modify existing service equipment and assets. For example, SOCOM
has modified commercially available trucks, information technology
equipment, and weapon systems, as well as undertaken extensive
modifications to service systems such as the Army's CH-47 helicopter. In
the latter case, the Army funded the basic aircraft and Army-common
improvements, and SOCOM funds the special operations modifications, which
include extended range and enhanced defensive capabilities. Since 2001,
SOCOM has undertaken only one ACAT I level program. It was to develop a
common avionics package for its fleet of transport, tanker, and gunship
aircraft. SOCOM's acquisition plans--as reflected in its current Future
Year Defense Program^4--continue to focus on starting new programs that
will be relatively small-scale, short-cycle, and involve modifications of
existing systems.
^3DOD categorizes acquisition programs into several categories--ACAT I,
II, and III. These categories are determined by the cost threshold in
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars, special interest, and the level of
decision authority. ACAT I programs have an estimated eventual total
expenditure for research, development, technology, and evaluation of more
than $365 million or for procurement of more than $2.190 billion, and
milestone decision authority resides with DOD's Under Secretary of
Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L), head of the
DOD component, or if delegated the DOD component acquisition executive.
ACAT II programs have an estimated eventual total expenditure for
research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $140 million or
for procurement in excess of $660 million, and milestone decision
authority resides with the DOD component acquisition executive or its
designee. ACAT III programs are all other acquisition programs that do not
meet the criteria of an ACAT II or above program and milestone decision
authority is designated by the component acquisition executive at the
lowest appropriate level.
^4DOD's Future Year Defense Programs reflect decisions made in the
planning, programming, and budgeting system, which is intended to produce
the best possible mixture of forces, equipment, and support to accomplish
the mission.
Overall, SOCOM's acquisition program performance has been mixed. About 60
percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001
progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and schedule
estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost increases
from buying additional quantities of equipment for ongoing combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other 40 percent of SOCOM's
acquisition programs have not progressed as planned and experienced modest
to, in a number of cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays
because of a range of technical, programmatic, or funding issues. Although
fewer in number, the programs that experienced problems make up about 50
percent of acquisition funding because these acquisitions tend to be the
larger and costlier platform-based programs SOCOM is developing and
programs where SOCOM is dependent on one of the military departments for
the basic platform or equipment and/or for program management support. We
could not compare SOCOM's acquisition performance with DOD's overall
performance, mainly because aggregate data on DOD's smaller programs are
not kept.
SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges in ensuring its
acquisition programs are more consistently completed on time and within
budget. Urgent requirements to support SOCOM's role in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and its new role as the lead in the global war on terrorism have and
will continue to challenge SOCOM's ability to balance near- and long-term
needs against available funding resources. For example, according to
SOCOM, in order to fund urgent deployment acquisitions in the past
5-years, the command reallocated about $259 million from existing and
planned programs. Additionally, SOCOM has difficulty tracking progress of
programs for which it has delegated management authority to the military
departments and addressing problems early on when they occur in these
delegated programs. Also, while SOCOM employs elements of a
knowledge-based acquisition approach, it is not consistently applied. For
example, SOCOM has started some programs without ensuring that there was a
solid match between requirements and the necessary resources, such as key
technologies, to complete the development. In addition, a key database
SOCOM uses for managing all of its acquisition programs has not been kept
up to date, impeding program oversight. Furthermore, SOCOM plans to expand
the size of its acquisition workforce by about 75 percent; however, in
recent years SOCOM has encountered difficulties in being able to hire
personnel in reasonable time frames and ensuring that its program managers
are fully certified in accordance with DOD standards.
To better position SOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program
outcomes, we are making recommendations that the Secretary of Defense take
steps to ensure that SOCOM: (1) establishes sound business cases when
starting programs, particularly its more complex and military
department-managed acquisition programs, and applies the elements of a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy; (2) has the workforce size and
composition to match its acquisition workload; and (3) improves the
accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of its acquisition management
information system. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation
and fully concurred with the other two recommendations. With respect to
the first recommendation, DOD concurred with applying elements of a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy, but only after it is defined by DOD
within the 5000 Series of documents. This should not result in a delay in
action on DOD's part as DOD's acquisition policy already includes the key
elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach particularly regarding
technology, design, and production. It is important that SOCOM follow this
policy because we have found that programs experience cost, schedule, and
performance problems when they proceed into system development and initial
manufacturing with lower levels of knowledge than specified in DOD's
acquisition policy.
Background
SOCOM is one of ten combatant commands^5 directly responsible to the
Secretary of Defense. The command was established by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,^6 and codified in 10 USC Section
167. As a functional command, SOCOM's primary responsibility is to prepare
the special operations forces (SOF) to carry out assigned missions. When
appropriate, SOCOM may be called upon to conduct special operations
activities unilaterally or provide support to other U.S. military forces.
In 2003, the Secretary of Defense expanded SOCOM's role to include leading
the DOD's GWOT operations. In this central role, SOCOM plans, directs, and
executes special operations in the conduct of the GWOT in order to disrupt
and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States, its
citizens, and its interests worldwide. SOCOM also organizes, trains, and
equips SOF warriors provided to the geographic combatant commanders and to
the American ambassadors and their country teams. In keeping with this
expanded role, DOD has begun to re-tool SOCOM from primarily a supporting
command into a command responsible for planning, synchronizing, and
executing missions in the GWOT. SOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air
Force Base in Tampa, Florida, and has four component commands, and one
sub-unified command located at different military bases. The Marine Corps
Special Operations Command joined SOCOM on February 24, 2006. Table 1
shows the end strength of each of the component commands.
^5A Unified Combatant Command is a U.S. joint military command composed of
forces from two or more services and has broad and continuing mission.
^6Pub. L. No. 99-661 Div A, S1311 (Nov.14, 1986), codified at 10 U.S.C
S167.
Table 1: SOCOM Component Commands End Strength
Component command Location End strength
Joint Special Operations Command Pope Air Force Base and 1,250
(Sub-unified Command) Ft. Bragg, N.C.
Army Special Forces Command Ft. Bragg, N.C. 22,386
Naval Special Warfare Command Coronado, Calif. 7,507
Air Force Special Operations Command Hurlburt Field, Fla. 12,801
Marine Corps Special Operations Camp Lejeune, N.C. 1,414
Command
Total 45,358
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
Congress created SOCOM to improve the ability of the United States to
conduct special operations. Congress vested the command with the
responsibility and the authority for the development and acquisition of
SOF-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the
head of agency, and the authority to execute its own budget. SOF-peculiar
equipment is defined as equipment, materials, supplies, and services
required for SOF activities for which there is no service-common
requirement. According to SOCOM, these are limited to items and services
initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for service-common
use by other DOD forces; modifications approved for application to
standard items and services used by other DOD forces; and items and
services critical for the immediate accomplishment of a SOF activity.
To fund the acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment, SOCOM was also given
responsibility for supervising a separate Major Force Program-11 budget
account.^7 Congress determined that a dedicated funding mechanism was
necessary because, in the past, the military departments had tended to
give lower priority to SOF's equipment needs than to their own needs. For
fiscal year 2006, SOCOM's total budget was $7.2 billion, of which $1.9
billion was for development-and-acquisition-related purposes.
^7Congress directed DOD to include a new special operations budget
category, major force program-11. This provides the command with funding
authority for the development and acquisition of equipment, materials,
supplies, and services peculiar to special operations.
In acquiring SOF equipment, SOCOM falls under the same DOD acquisition
policies and guidelines and workforce requirements that apply to the
military departments and other defense agencies. The military departments
and SOCOM are governed by DOD's 5000 Series for the Defense Acquisition
System.^8 Similarly, each military department, along with SOCOM, has its
own policies and procedures to implement higher level directives and guide
the management of acquisition activities within the military departments
or command.
SOCOM's acquisition workforce training and tenure is governed by the
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), enacted in 1990.^9
The Act specifically created a formal acquisition corps and defined
educational, experience, and tenure criteria needed for key positions,
including program managers, contracting officers, and other personnel
involved in the acquisition process. According to DOD, members of the
acquisition corps may earn three progressive certification levels--basic
(Level I), intermediate (Level II), and advanced (Level III).^10 Each
certification level is comprised of a combination of education,
experience, and training elements. Certification recognizes the level to
which a member of the acquisition workforce has achieved functional and
core acquisition competencies required by a specific career field. Members
of SOCOM's acquisition workforce are required to meet the same training
and certification requirements as those in the military departments.
SOCOM's approach to acquisition management also has some distinctive
features. The command is unique in DOD in that it plans, funds, acquires,
and sustains weapon systems all under one roof. Specifically, all the key
entities involved in the acquisition life-cycle process--requirements
developers, comptroller, contracting personnel, logistics planners, and
program offices--are colocated. SOCOM also uses a centralized approach to
assess and prioritize requirements and select programs based on competing
needs and available resources. SOCOM's customers--the SOF warriors--are
directly involved in determining what weapon systems are pursued. In
addition, SOCOM can arrange to transfer program management and milestone
decision authority^11 responsibilities to one of the military departments
to execute the program on behalf of SOCOM. SOCOM has done this with many
of its programs that involve some modification of military
department-provided equipment or in cases where the military departments
may have greater technical and program management expertise. Further
description of how SOCOM is structured to manage its acquisitions is
provided in appendix II.
^8DOD Directive 5000.1, Subject: The Defense Acquisition System (May 12,
2003) and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Subject: Operation of
the Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003).
^910 U.S.C. Sections 1701-1764.
^10DOD Instructions 5000.66, Subject: Operations of the Defense
Acquisition, Technology, Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and
Career Development Program (Dec. 21, 2005).
SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Consistent with the Command's Mission
SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs since January
2001 that are consistent with the command's mission to address unique SOF
needs and those needs for which there are no service-common requirement.
SOCOM has committed about $6 billion to date on these programs. The vast
majority of SOCOM's acquisition programs are ACAT III level in size, have
short acquisition cycles, and use modified commercial off-the-shelf and
nondevelopmental items or modify existing service equipment and assets. In
acquiring systems, SOCOM has emphasized the need for "80 percent"
solutions that provide improved capabilities incrementally to the
warfighter in reasonable time frames, rather than major development
efforts that require advanced technologies and years of research and
development. Both the ASDS and CV-22 programs were started in the 1990s.
Since 2001, SOCOM has undertaken only one ACAT I level program. It was to
develop a common avionics package for its fleet of transport, tanker, and
gunship aircraft. SOCOM's acquisition plans for the future--as reflected
in its current Future Year Defense Program--continue to maintain its
SOF-peculiar focus.
^11The milestone decision authority is the designated individual with
overall responsibility for a program. The MDA has the authority to approve
entry of an acquisition program into the next phase of the acquisition
process and is accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting
to higher authority, including congressional reporting. For ACAT I level
programs, USD (AT&L), head of a DOD component, or if delegated the DOD
component acquisition executive is the initial milestone decision
authority.
Most of SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Small
SOCOM initiated 86 acquisition programs from 2001 to 2006 to meet
SOF-peculiar requirements, which can be grouped into five major areas:
rotary wing, fixed wing, maritime systems, information and intelligence
systems, and special operations forces warrior equipment (e.g., vehicles
and weapons).^12 Table 2 shows the number and funding for these programs
by each major grouping.
Table 2. SOCOM Acquisition Programs from 2001 to 2006 by Type and Funding
Program types Number of programs Funding ($M)
Rotary wing 10 $2,019
Fixed wing 29 1,670
Maritime systems 5 30
Information and intelligence systems 15 393
Special Operations Warrior 27 885
Total 86 $4997^a
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
aThis amount excludes about $254 million in supplemental funding.
As table 3 shows, 76 of SOCOM's 86 acquisition programs are ACAT III level
in size, and the majority of these programs use nondevelopmental and
commercial off-the- shelf items to meet SOF-peculiar needs. A further
breakdown of these programs, depicted in table 4, indicates that most cost
less than $25 million. The small number of larger, ACAT I and II level
programs are fixed and rotary wing systems, costing $200 million or more.
These larger programs involve modifications to existing platform systems
and more substantial technology development efforts. The one ACAT I level
program SOCOM initiated since 2001--the Common Avionics Architecture for
Penetration (CAAP) program--is intended to provide specialized
capabilities for MC-130H and AC-130H/U transport, tanker, and gunship
aircraft, including low probability of detection and improved terrain
following and avoidance radar.
^12SOCOM also has mission planning and training systems, which are
included in the fixed wing programs.
Table 3: Summary of SOCOM Programs by Acquisition Categories
Acquisition Number of
categories programs Program types
I 1 Fixed wing
II 6 Fixed wing and Rotary wing
III 76 Fixed wing, Rotary wing, Information & Intelligence
systems, Maritime systems, and Special Operations
Forces Warrior
N/A^a 3 Information & Intelligence systems
Total 86
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
aAccording to SOCOM, these programs do not meet the criteria to be
designated as a regular acquisition category.
Table 4: Estimated Ranges of Acquisition Program Costs
Number acquisition programs Cost ranges ($M)
6 Greater than $200
7 $101 to $200
11 $51 to $100
14 $25 to $50
48 Less than $25
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
Several key examples of the types of programs SOCOM has undertaken are
described below.
Leaflet Delivery System
The leaflet delivery system is an ACAT III program that was fielded by
SOCOM at a cost of about $20 million. The system uses a fully reusable,
commercial-off-the-shelf, unmanned aerial vehicle as a component of the
autonomously guided parafoil system it has developed. The delivery system
is capable of delivering leaflets or psychological operations materials to
target audiences in peacetime and in war. It took SOCOM about 8 months to
field this capability to the SOF warrior. It can be ground launched from
the back of a high-mobility multiwheeled vehicle and air launched from a
C-130, C-141, or C-17 cargo aircraft. Figure 1 below shows the leaflet
delivery system.
Figure 1: Leaflet Delivery System
Commercially Designed Sniper Weapons
SOCOM's current family of sniper rifles was acquired as nondevelopmental
and commercial off-the-shelf items, which according to the program office,
enables rapid acquisition of an initial capability as well as efficient
spiral development of enhanced capabilities as mission requirements
direct. SOCOM currently has four rifles in its family of sniper rifles,
the MK 11--7.62mm Sniper Support Rifle, the MK 12--5.56mm Special Purpose
Rifle, the MK 13--.300 Winchester Magnum, and the MK 15--.50 caliber. Each
will only fire one type of ammunition and with varying effective ranges.
Two of the sniper rifles, MK 11 and MK 12, will be replaced by the Sniper
Support Rifle variant of the SOF Combat Assault Rifle, which is an ACAT
III program consisting of a modified commercial off-the-shelf system, and
is estimated to cost about $50 million. The new sniper rifle is a modular
design, and the caliber of the rifle can be changed by replacing the
barrel, bolt, and trigger modules. The life expectancy of the SOCOM rifles
shown in figure 2 is about 5 years. Therefore, according to the SOF
Warrior program office, SOF plans a phased replacement of like or enhanced
capability every 5 years.
Figure 2: SOCOM's Family of Sniper Rifles
Modification to the Army's Service-Common CH-47 Helicopter
SOCOM has an ACAT II program underway, estimated to cost about $200
million, which modifies the Army's service-common CH-47 helicopter to meet
its SOF-peculiar requirements. Several features on the aircraft are
SOCOM-peculiar such as the long aerial refueling probe on the front of the
aircraft, the standardized extended range fuel tank, and the common
aviation architecture systems cockpit. The CH-47 helicopter, when modified
by SOCOM, becomes a MH-47G helicopter that provides SOCOM with a heavy
assault helicopter with the latest avionics, sensors, aircraft
survivability features, and weapons systems. All MH-47 helicopters in
SOCOM's inventory--which includes the MH-47D and the MH-47E aircraft--will
be converted to the MH-47G configuration over time. According to SOCOM, at
least two of the SOF-peculiar features on the MH-47G helicopter were
adopted by the Army and are now service-common features. SOCOM developed
standardized engines and an enhanced air transportation kit that were
designed to meet a SOF-peculiar requirement. However, once they
operational, the Army decided it could use the capability as well and
adopted it. Figure 3 shows some of the basic modifications to the CH-47
that were provided by the Army and those that were provided by SOCOM.
Figure 3: MH-47G
Some SOCOM Programs Are Targeted to Urgent Needs
In addition to regular acquisition programs, SOCOM has acquired various
equipment and material to meet urgent needs related to planned and ongoing
military operations. According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs qualify
for consideration if they meet one of two criteria: a potential mission
failure or loss of life. Because of the urgency of these needs, SOCOM's
focus is on acquiring readily available equipment in short time frames.
Since 2001, SOCOM has addressed about 50 urgent mission needs and fielded
equipment to its deployed SOF warriors at cost of about $339 million. For
example, to address an urgent operational need to move personnel and
materiel more effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq without attracting local
attention or projecting an overt military presence, SOCOM acquired and
modified about 150 commercial off-the-shelf 4x4 trucks, sedans, and sport
utility vehicles and fielded them in about 4 weeks. Figure 4 below shows
an example of a modified commercial truck used by SOCOM.
Figure 4: Example of a SOCOM-Modified Commercial Vehicle
Source: SOCOM
According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs are not to be used as a means
of circumventing or accelerating the normal program approval or funding
processes. To that end, equipment acquired via the urgent needs process is
fielded and sustained only for the duration of the military operation. The
sponsoring Component Commander is responsible for determining
post-operation disposition of any equipment acquired as a result of an
urgent needs request.
SOCOM has also fielded critical combat-related technologies through DOD's
Advanced Concept Technology Development program. DOD initiated the program
in 1994 to help get new technologies that meet critical military needs
into the hands of users faster and at less cost than the traditional
acquisition process.^13 Over the past 5 years, SOCOM has fielded seven
Advanced Concept Technology Development programs at a cost of about $385
million. For example, as shown in the figure 5, SOCOM fielded the MANPACK
radio threat detector which was an Advanced Concept program. The MANPACK
is designed to provide the basic capability to identify and locate threat
and friendly emitters, locate unknown emitters, and provide situational
awareness to the SOF operator with little or no interaction from the user.
^13DOD guidelines for selecting Advanced Concept Technology Developments
include the following: (1) the time frame for evaluating their military
utility is typically 2 to 4 years; (2) the technology should be
sufficiently mature; (3) they should provide an effective response to a
priority military need; (4) a lead service or agency has been designated;
(5) risks have been identified and accepted; (6) demonstrations or
exercises have been identified that will provide a basis for assessing the
military utility; and (7) funding is sufficient to complete them.
Figure 5: MANPACK Advanced Concept Technology Development
SOCOM's acquisition plan for the future--as reflected in its current
Future Year Defense Program--continues to maintain a focus on providing
SOF-peculiar equipment. The acquisition programs SOCOM plans to start over
the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 time frame are similar to the programs that
SOCOM is currently acquiring. There are 13 acquisition programs remaining
in SOCOM's fiscal year 2007 to 2011 plan, and all are at the ACAT III
level. These programs continue to be small scale, low cost, and will
employ modified commercial-off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items. For
example, the SOF Combat Assault sniper rifle was among the remaining 2007
to 2011 programs and is SOF-peculiar and a nondevelopmental item.
SOCOM'S Acquisition Program Performance Has Been Mixed
Fifty-one (about 60 percent) of the 86 acquisition programs SOCOM has
undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, either staying within
original cost and schedule estimates or experiencing cost increases
unrelated to progress, such as for adding quantities to support ongoing
combat operations . The other 35 (40 percent) of SOCOM's 86 programs have
experienced or are likely to experience modest to, in a number of cases,
significant cost increases and schedule delays due to a range of
technical, programmatic, or funding issues. Although fewer in number,
these programs make up about 50 percent of SOCOM's total funding for its
acquisition programs. Ten of the programs have an estimated schedule slip
of at least one year, and several programs were canceled because of a need
to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered in
developing the weapon system. The programs that have not progressed as
planned tend to be the larger, more complex platform-based programs SOCOM
is developing and programs where SOCOM is dependent on the military
departments for the basic platform or for equipment and/or other
resources, such as program management support. Programs that are smaller,
with less development risk, have better results.
As shown in table 5, there are some differences in the type of programs
that are and are not progressing as planned, but the overall picture is
mixed.
Table 5: Summary of Programs That Have and Have Not Been Progressing as
Planned
Not progressing as
Progressing as planned planned
Dollar value Number of Dollar value
Type programs Number of programs (millions) programs (millions)
Fixed wing 15 $352.2 14 $1,317.5
Information and 10 65.6 5 327.8
intelligence
Maritime systems 4 22.8 1 7.0
Rotary wing 6 1,492.5 4 526.6
SOF Warrior 16 543.3 11 341.9
Total 51 $2,476.5 35 $2,520.7
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
In terms of the number of programs, fixed wing and SOF warrior systems
comprise a large proportion (25 out of 35) of those that are not meeting
original cost and schedule estimates. However, when viewed by the amount
of funding allocated to these programs, fixed and rotary wing systems make
up the majority ($1,844 million out of $2,521 million) that are not
progressing as planned. We were not able to put these results in context,
that is, to compare them with DOD as a whole to determine whether SOCOM's
performance was typical or atypical. This is primarily because of the fact
that DOD does not keep aggregate performance data on ACAT III
programs--which comprise most of SOCOM's acquisition portfolio.
Many of the fixed and rotary wing programs are the larger programs in
SOCOM's portfolio, involving modifications to existing military-service or
special-operations platform systems. As such, these programs require more
systems engineering and design/integration efforts than other smaller
programs being acquired by SOCOM. For example, the estimated costs for
SOCOM's fixed-wing AC-130U 30-millimeter gun-modification program has
increased 92 percent because of technical and design issues, and the
program has been deferred until fiscal year 2008 when additional funding
may be available. Likewise, the AC-130U+4 program, which is intended to
modify the C-130 aircraft into a side-firing gunship, has been delayed by
7 months because of technical issues with the aircraft `s configuration
and design.
Many of SOCOM programs that are not progressing as planned are also
programs in which the military departments are involved in a management
capacity. As shown in table 6, 22 of the 35 programs that have not stayed
within original cost and schedule estimates have one of the military
departments in a management role--either as the milestone decision
authority or program manager or both. All of the fixed and rotary wing
programs that are not progressing as planned are in this category. In
contrast, however, SOCOM does manage its five largest information and
intelligence system programs, but they are not progressing as planned.
Table 6: Summary of Acquisition Programs by Management Structure
Not progressing as
Progressing as planned planned
Management No. of Cost (in No. of Cost (in
structure programs millions) programs millions)
SOCOM managed 26 $632.3 13 $626.0
programs
MILDEP role in 25 1844.2 22 1895.0
managing programs
Total 51 $2476.5 35 $2521.0
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
In assessing how programs have progressed, we identified a small number of
programs (8 out of 86) that SOCOM canceled or deferred because of a need
to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered
during development. Most of these programs were canceled early before
significant funding and time were committed. In the other few programs,
however, we found significant time and effort was invested before they
were cancelled. For example, SOCOM's High Power Fiber Optic Towed Decoy
program, which was being developed to provide a fiber optic towed decoy
capability to SOCOM's fleet of AC and MC-130 aircraft, was canceled after
spending about $85 million because of higher funding priorities. SOCOM's
one ACAT 1 program, the Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration
(CAAP) program was also subsequently terminated. The CAAP program, which
was managed by the U.S. Air Force, was being designed to provide
SOF-peculiar avionics capability to the U.S. Air Force's Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) on the MC-130 H and AC-130H/U aircraft. It was
designed to give SOF-peculiar capabilities to the aircraft, including
enhanced abilities to follow terrain and avoid detection while using Air
Force-provided radar. However, SOCOM terminated all funding for the CAAP
program in its fiscal years 2008 to 2013 program objective memorandum.
SOCOM determined that it was cost prohibitive to continue the program
after the Air Force ran into problems with the AMP program and determined
that the cost to complete development of both AMP and CAAP would more than
double the original estimates.
SOCOM Faces Management and Workforce Challenges in Its Acquisition Programs
SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges in ensuring its
acquisition programs are completed on time and within budget. Urgent
requirements arising from SOCOM's role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its
new role in the GWOT have and will continue to challenge SOCOM's ability
to balance near- and long-term needs against available funding resources.
For example, in order to fund almost 50 urgent deployment acquisitions in
the past 5 years, SOCOM has had to reallocate $259 million from existing
and planned acquisition programs. Additionally, even though SOCOM employs
elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, it is not consistently
applied, and some programs have started without a good match between
requirements and resources. SOCOM also has difficulty tracking progress on
programs for which it has delegated management authority to the military
departments and addressing problems earlier in these programs. Moreover, a
key SOCOM tool for managing its acquisition programs has not been
consistently maintained with up-to-date information. In addition, SOCOM
has encountered workforce challenges such as being able to hire civilian
personnel in reasonable time frames and ensuring that its military
personnel are fully compliant with DOD standards.
SOCOM Management Challenges
Addressing high-priority urgent needs from the field will continue to
challenge SOCOM's ability to complete existing programs on time and within
budget. In its roles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and GWOT, SOCOM will continue
to fulfill urgent needs with acquisition programs. But because of the
short time frames involved, funding for these programs is not built into
the budget. In the past 5 years, SOCOM reallocated about $259 million from
budgeted programs to fund almost 50 urgent deployment acquisitions. In
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, SOCOM did begin to receive money from Congress
in its budget--about $80 million and $22 million respectively--to help
defray some of the costs of its urgent deployment acquisition programs.
According to SOCOM's Acquisition Executive, urgent deployment acquisitions
are expected to continue over the next several years, and the command
anticipates requesting about $20 to $25 million each year from 2008 to
2013 to help pay for these needs. Although funding shifts are disruptive
in SOCOM, as they are in the military departments, SOCOM's strategic
planning structure for assessing and selecting programs is well-suited for
making the trade-offs among priorities needed to address urgent needs.
SOCOM also has difficulty tracking progress and addressing problems early
in programs where it has delegated management authority to the military
departments. Having access to all the military departments provides SOCOM
the means to leverage resources and expertise that may not reside at
SOCOM, such as program management, engineering and technical services,
testing and evaluation support, and logistical support. However, in some
cases when SOCOM has relied on the military departments for technical or
basic capabilities, its programs have been adversely affected when the
department-provided capabilities are delayed. When delays occur, there
tends to be a cascading effect on SOCOM programs. For example, initial
schedule delays in the U.S. Air Force's AMP for C-130 aircraft resulted in
delays in SOCOM's ability to acquire the CAAP program on the C-130
aircraft. The AMP program was to provide a basic cockpit configuration and
avionics capability for different C-130 aircraft, and SOCOM's CAAP
capability would provide additional avionics capabilities for SOF
missions. The AMP program encountered technical and integration problems
during installation trials and is now being restructured. Because of
delays and cost growth with AMP, cost to complete the CAAP program
increased significantly leading to SOCOM's decision to cancel the CAAP
program and defer this capability.
According to SOCOM's acquisition executive, although SOCOM has
over-arching memorandums of agreement establishing program management
arrangements with each of the military departments, not all of the
agreements are signed at the appropriate levels of authority within the
military departments. While the agreement with the Army is signed by the
Secretary of the Army, the Air Force and Navy agreements are signed by the
chiefs of staff. This is a challenge to SOCOM because acquisition and
budget authority resides with the military department secretary and not
with the chief of staff. When problems occur in programs managed by the
Air Force or Navy, SOCOM may have less standing to make a case that they
are not living up to the memorandums of agreement, than the command would
with the Army. SOCOM also acknowledges that memorandums of agreement for
specific programs--particularly the larger, more complex programs SOCOM
delegates to the military departments--have not been detailed enough in
terms of laying out the roles, responsibilities, and expectations for
executing programs, nor detailed enough in laying out how SOCOM will be
able to track progress and participate in regular program reviews with the
military departments. While written agreements by themselves may not
result in better SOCOM-military department programs, they are important in
that they provide a foundation for effective program management. SOCOM is
currently taking steps to update the written agreements with the military
departments and also examining whether some of its programs would be
better under SOCOM management.
SOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, but it
is not consistently applied. We have frequently reported on the need to
develop a solid, executable business case before committing resources to a
new product development effort. A business case should be based on DOD's
acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial firms and
other successful DOD programs. Our work has shown that the business case
in its simplest form demonstrates evidence that (1) the warfighter's needs
are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2)
the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing
resources--that is: proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate
funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when it is needed. We
found that although SOCOM has a systematic strategic planning process to
prioritize and select programs, it has started some programs, particularly
the larger and more complex programs, without ensuring that there was a
solid match between the requirements and resources to complete the
development. For example, SOCOM terminated the Common Avionics
Architecture for Penetration Program because of excessive cost growth
resulting from technical problems and schedule delays with the Air Force's
Avionics Modernization Program. While SOCOM attributes the cause of
program problems in part to poor contractor performance, it also
acknowledges that technology challenges and development costs were
significantly underestimated when the program started. In addition, the
Navy-managed Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), which has been one of
SOCOM's largest investments since ASDS started in the mid-90s, encountered
significant problems because the capabilities required for the delivery
system outstripped the developer's resources in terms of technical
knowledge, time, and money. Although the first boat was accepted for
operational use in 2003, it did not meet technical or performance
requirements. Currently, reliability issues with the boat are being
examined, and an assessment of alternate material solutions are underway
to determine how best to address the remaining operational requirements.
SOCOM's tool for managing its acquisition programs--called the Special
Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System (SOALIS)--lacks
sufficient oversight and maintenance. At the time of our review, we found
that information for most programs was out of date and that some programs
had not been updated in years, even though the program executive officers
and program directors are required to keep SOALIS accurate and up to date
on at least a monthly basis. Further, we found no enforcement mechanism to
ensure oversight of this important management tool. According to SOCOM's
Standard Operating Procedures Directive, SOALIS is intended to give SOCOM
decision makers and stakeholders essential information on the status and
progress of ongoing acquisition efforts. Although regular progress reviews
take place on individual programs, the lack of up-to-date information on
all programs can impede SOCOM's ability to conduct effective oversight.
SOCOM Workforce Challenges
SOCOM's acquisition workforce has remained relatively small for many
years, but plans are underway to increase the size of the acquisition
workforce about 75 percent by the end of 2008. This is being done to
address the growth in acquisitions work that has taken place over the past
several years as well as expected future growth in acquisitions with
SOCOM's expanded role in the GWOT. Since 2001, SOCOM's workforce has
remained fairly stable, growing by only 10 positions to a total of 185
government--civilian and military--acquisition employees. SOCOM plans to
expand its governmental acquisition workforce to about 300 employees.
Currently, the governmental workforce is heavily supplemented by
contractors. Specifically, contractors comprise about two-thirds of the
overall workforce supporting SOCOM's acquisition activities. The
contractor support includes logistics, training, education, and testing
support, and engineering and technical services. In order to prepare for
the upcoming workforce expansion, SOCOM is conducting a manpower study.
The study, which is scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2008, is
designed to assess the composition of the workforce and determine
workloads associated with each SOCOM position--including all acquisition
positions--to aid SOCOM officials in their placement of newly hired
government employees. Also, to lower costs, SOCOM's acquisition executive
anticipates a reduced reliance on contractors in conjunction with the
expansion of the governmental acquisition workforce. How much of a
reduction will be based on the outcome of the ongoing manpower study and
resource considerations.
As can be seen in table 7, the majority of SOCOM's current civilian
acquisition workforce has attained DOD's level III certification.
Table 7: SOCOM's Civilian and Military Acquisition Workforce Composition
and Training Levels
Certification Level Total
levels Level I Level II III None Vacancies positions
Civilian workforce 2 14 76 0 10 102
Military workforce 1 11 19 6 6 43
Total 3 25 95 6 16 145
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
Additionally, SOCOM's senior level civilian acquisition workforce at the
GS-14, GS-15, and senior executive service levels, along with those
assigned to Critical Acquisition Positions^14 that require level III
certification, have all earned level III certification. We found that the
vacancy rate for civilian acquisition positions is about 10 percent and
that the bulk of the unfilled positions are at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels,
leaving vacancies in some key management positions. The command has
encountered challenges in filling vacancies in the upper-level,
civilian-acquisition-workforce positions. According to SOCOM's acquisition
executive, the difficulty in hiring qualified personnel to fill these
critical vacancies is due, in part, to the lengthy process required to
hire qualified acquisition personnel. SOCOM uses the Air Force personnel
system as its executive hiring agency. However, this process has taken as
long as 240 days to hire at the upper levels.
SOCOM's military acquisition workforce certification rated at level III is
not as high as its civilian counterparts. This is particularly true for
critical acquisition positions, which usually involve significant
supervisory or management responsibilities (e.g., program manager). As
table 8 shows, about 40 percent of these positions are held by officers
who do not meet the level III certification standards required by DOD.
Table 8: SOCOM's Military Critical Acquisition Position (CAP) and DOD
Certification Levels
Program manager certification levels Number of officers in CAPs
Level III 13
Level II 6
Level I 1
No certification 2
Source: GAO analysis of SOCOM data.
^14As defined in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA), any acquisition position in DOD that is required to be filled by
(a) military grade of lieutenant colonel (or commander for the Navy) or a
higher grade or (b) an employee in a senior position in the National
Security Personnel System or in the Senior Executive Service, is required
to be designated as a critical acquisition position.
While DOD guidelines^15 allow acquisition officers to attain the
appropriate certification up to 24 months after being assigned to a
critical position, we found that 3 of SOCOM's 22 military officers filling
these positions are still lacking the required certification. Although
waivers are permitted on a case-by-case basis, at the time of our review
SOCOM did not have a process in place to review and grant required waivers
for those officers not in compliance with DOD standards.
One of the challenges SOCOM faces in filling military acquisition
positions is that the command often requires military operational
experience and/or specialized skills. According to SOCOM, Army and Navy
policies require their acquisition officers to have operational
assignments before being assigned to the acquisition career field, but
officers in the Air Force do not have to gain prior operational
experience. In addition, some of the acquisition positions at SOCOM
require unique special operations experience. For instance, some of the
Navy's acquisition positions at SOCOM are designated to be filled by Navy
SEAL personnel, a group in short supply and generally not trained in
acquisition. Since SOCOM is reliant on the services to provide military
acquisition personnel to the command, SOCOM runs the risk of not being
able to fill acquisition positions if it turns down candidates sent
forward by the services who do not meet all the position requirements.
Conclusions
Thus far, SOCOM has done well with small acquisitions that modify readily
available commercial technologies and nondevelopmental items. It has had
more difficulty delivering the more complex systems that involve
significant development and reliance on the military departments. As SOCOM
prepares for more growth in its acquisition function to meet the expanding
needs for special operations forces, it will be important for the command
to leverage its experience into better results in the future. For those
more complex acquisitions that must be undertaken, opportunities exist for
SOCOM to improve its results by ensuring that better business cases exist
before embarking on such acquisitions, especially if they depend on
acquisitions being managed by other military departments. In addition, the
foundation for all acquisitions can be improved by (1) ensuring that the
size and composition of the workforce is a good match for the acquisition
workload undertaken by SOCOM and (2) having a sound management information
system to track programs.
^15DOD Instruction 5000.66, Subject: Operation of the Defense Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career
Development Program (Dec. 21, 2005) and Department of Defense Desk Guide
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Career Management
(Jan. 10, 2006).
Recommendations for Executive Actions
To better position SOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program
outcomes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following
three steps to ensure:
o SOCOM establishes sound business cases for its more complex and
military department-managed acquisition programs. Integral to this
is applying the elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy
(That is: programs match requirements with resources.) and having
effective agreements in place with the military departments that
specify clear roles, responsibilities, and expectations for
executing programs.
o as SOCOM increases its acquisition workforce, it
(1) obtains personnel with the skills and abilities
needed for more complex acquisitions, (2) makes sure
personnel meet DOD acquisition certification level
requirements, and (3) has the ability to make the
hiring process as efficient as possible.
o SOCOM improves the accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of its
acquisition management information system. To accomplish this,
SOCOM should (1) establish enforcement mechanisms to make sure
program managers submit updated information on a regular basis and
(2) conduct quality checks to make sure the information is
reliable.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In DOD's letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD partially
concurred with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the other
two recommendations. In partially concurring with the first
recommendation, DOD agreed with the need to update memorandums of
agreement between SOCOM and the military departments and apply elements of
a knowledge-based acquisition strategy but only after it is defined by DOD
within the 5000 series of documents. This should not result in a delay in
action on DOD's part as DOD's acquisition policy already includes the key
elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach particularly regarding
technology, design, and production. It is important that SOCOM follow this
policy because we have found that programs experience cost, schedule, and
performance problems when they proceed into system development and initial
manufacturing with lower levels of knowledge than specified in DOD's
acquisition policy. We believe that if properly implemented and enforced,
a knowledge-based acquisition approach, as defined in DOD acquisition
policy, can help reduce development risks and lead to better program
outcomes on a more consistent basis.
DOD's written comments appear at appendix III. Additionally, SOCOM
provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to this report to the Secretary of
Defense, Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and other
interested parties. We will also provide copies to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[26]http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Paul L. Francis
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess what type of programs SOCOM has undertaken and whether they have
progressed as planned, we collected and reviewed information on all
programs undertaken by the command between 2001 and 2006. We collected
specific information on each program pertaining to its size, use of
commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental items, and acquisition
strategy. In addition, we collected data on planned versus actual cost,
schedule and quantities to be fielded. We analyzed this information to
determine what types of systems were being acquired and the extent to
which programs were meeting planned cost, schedule, and quantity
objectives. We relied on GAO's Applied Research and Methodology teams to
array and analyze the acquisition programs in our review. Further, we
interviewed SOCOM's senior-level program executive officers to access and
review available data on about 50 urgent acquisition systems programs, and
a small number of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration programs
transitioned by SOCOM to its forces.
To assess and determine the management and workforce challenges facing
SOCOM, we (1) reviewed and analyzed the current impact that unfunded
near-term requirements had on the regular approved acquisition programs;
(2) we reviewed and analyzed the command's key acquisition program
management tool--the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics
Information System--for managing its acquisition programs; and (3) to
assess the workforce challenges that SOCOM faces, we interviewed key SOCOM
acquisition officials from SOCOM's Special Operations Acquisition and
Logistics Center and key civilian and military personnel management
officials at Tampa, Florida. We relied on previous GAO work as a framework
for knowledge-based acquisition.
We performed our review from July 2006 through June 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: SOCOM's Policies, Procedures, and Organizational
Structure for Managing Acquisitions
SOCOM Plans, Resources, Acquires, and Sustains Weapon Systems All under One Roof
Unlike the military departments, which have geographically dispersed
acquisition organizations, SOCOM's acquisition activities are
geographically consolidated. All acquisition support functions integral to
SOCOM's acquisition activities--contracting, budgeting, and requirements
setting--are located at SOCOM headquarters.
The SOCOM Commander has duties analogous to both service Secretaries and
the service Chiefs. For example, like the Secretaries, he has budget,
programming, research, development and acquisition, contracting, and
procurement authority, and he can direct investigations and audits.
Similar to the service Chiefs, the Commander of SOCOM is charged with
organizing, training, and equipping SOF personnel, establishing
requirements, conducting operational testing, and providing operational
logistics. Unlike other combatant commanders, the SOCOM Commander has both
command and acquisition authorities--he is the only combatant commander
with a "checkbook." This arrangement allows SOCOM officials to plan,
resource, and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment.
SOCOM decides what weapon systems and equipment to acquire through a
centralized strategic-planning and resource allocation process where
requirements are assessed and prioritized and programs are selected based
on competing needs and available resources. The process has many of the
characteristics of an integrated portfolio management framework that GAO
recently reported as lacking at DOD in its departmentwide approach to
weapon system investments.^1 That is, SOCOM addresses weapon system
programs collectively from an enterprise level, rather than as independent
and unrelated programs. Proposed programs are assessed through a screening
process that weighs the relative costs, benefits, and risks of each, and
selects those that help SOCOM balance near and future term opportunities,
different SOF component capability needs, and available resources against
the demand for new and ongoing systems and equipment.
^1GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to
Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
[27]GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C., Mar. 30, 2007). In this review, GAO
compared DOD's processes for investing in weapon systems to the best
practices that successful commercial companies use to invest in new
products. GAO found that DOD's organizational structures, processes, and
practices for planning and acquiring weapon systems at a department wide
level are fragmented, making it difficult for the department to prioritize
needs, make informed trade-offs, and achieve a balanced mix of programs
that are affordable, feasible, and provide the best value to the
warfighter. Commercial companies use an integrated portfolio management
approach to product development where the relative pros and cons of market
opportunities and competing product proposals are assessed and a balanced
mix of products is selected that ensures a good return on investment and
moves the company toward achieving its strategic goals and objectives
within available resources.
SOCOM has a close relationship with its customers--the SOF community--and
receives inputs regarding capability needs directly from SOF operators and
component commands on an ongoing basis. SOCOM officials with operational
experience and expertise in different program areas assess and prioritize
the requests from the component commands on a bi-annual basis. These
officials rate each proposal in terms of its potential to fulfill required
military operational tasks. The officials then forward their assessments
to SOCOM's central decision-making body-- the Board of Directors--for a
final determination of what acquisition programs should be undertaken by
the command and where resources should go.
The Board of Directors is composed of the SOCOM commander, all SOF
component commanders, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))--OSD's
principal advisor on special operations activities and the organization
charged with interfacing with SOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC)'s position on the Board
of Directors allows DOD insight and a voice into what acquisition programs
SOCOM undertakes.^2 Although DOD has an oversight role and decision
authority over ACAT I programs, as previously discussed, over 95 percent
of SOCOM's acquisition programs are below the ACAT I level. Therefore,
ASD(SO/LIC) has no direct day-to-day oversight role in the bulk of SOCOM
programs. The Board of Directors is SOCOM's primary and final approval
authority regarding regular planned SOF-peculiar acquisition programs.
Once the need for a SOF capability is verified and approved through
SOCOM's strategic planning process, it is reviewed through DOD's Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to verify that it
is a SOF-unique requirement, and not duplicative of a Service-common
system.^3 However, according to SOCOM officials, JCIDS often fails to
resolve time-sensitive SOF capabilities gaps that may be identified during
active combat. Therefore, to support SOF acquisition priorities, SOCOM
established its own version of the larger joint-requirement-setting
process--the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System--which
interoperates with the command's Acquisition Management System and
Strategic Planning Process.
^2The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) is the principal staff assistant and
civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense on Special Operations (SO) and Low-Intensity Conflict
(LIC) activities. ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for developing, coordinating,
and overseeing the implementation of policy for SO and LIC activities and
for ensuring adherence to approved policy. ASD(SO/LIC) is also required to
provide supervision of the preparation and justification of Special
Operations Forces programs and budget. ASD (SO/LIC) is also charged to be
the proponent for SO and LIC issues in the Defense Acquisition Board and
other appropriate boards and committees, and maintain liaison to monitor
progress in achieving milestones.
SOCOM employs a two-tiered SOF Capabilities Integration and Development
System--standard and fast track--to support SOF priorities. The standard
capabilities process parallels the JCIDS process although it is internal
to SOCOM to specifically address SOF-unique capability gaps. The fast
track process is used when a SOCOM component identifies an urgent and
critical capability gap--derived from a combat-mission need statement.
This process is not intended as a means to circumvent the command's
standard acquisition portfolio management process, rather it is SOCOM's
method to accelerate its response to compelling and time-sensitive
SOF-peculiar needs.
Under the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System, validation
and approval of a combat mission need statement mandates an offset of
resources as it constitutes a "must-pay" bill for SOCOM. Once the mission
need statement is approved through the Fast-Track CIDS process, SOCOM
officials initiate an urgent deployment acquisition to expedite the
acquisition and field the required equipment. At this point, command
officials reallocate resources to fund the urgent deployment acquisition.
SOCOM's goal is to field equipment within 180 days of approval.
SOCOM Has Unique Program Management Structure Options
SOCOM can arrange to transfer program management and milestone decision
authority (MDA) responsibilities to one of the military departments to
execute the program on behalf of the command. SOCOM has delegated
responsibilities to the military departments in many of the acquisition
programs underway that involve some modification of military
department-provided equipment or in cases where the services have greater
technical and specific platform program management expertise, such as
fixed and rotary wing aircraft or submarine programs. SOCOM's Acquisition
Executive is the milestone decision authority for all SOCOM acquisition
programs, unless the executive delegates that authority. However, through
memorandums of agreement with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, SOCOM employs
a range of program management structures. The command has the following
three basic options for managing individual programs:
^3JCIDS is intended to manage military requirements across DOD, and
provide a top down, analytic-based process for affirming capability gaps
and proposed solutions to meet the needs of the warfighter.
o SOCOM can manage a program in-house by designating both a SOCOM
program manager and MDA to execute the program.
o SOCOM, through a program specific memorandum of agreement with a
military department, can agree on appointment of a department
program manager to manage the program under the direction of a
SOCOM MDA.
o SOCOM can transfer both program management and MDA
responsibility to a military department through a program-specific
memorandum of agreement, to execute the program on behalf of
SOCOM.
Applicable policies and procedures vary somewhat for each of the program
management options just described. For example, for SOCOM MDA and SOCOM
managed programs, SOCOM's acquisition and logistics directives and
standard operating procedures apply, and according to SOCOM, any
exceptions are noted in the acquisition program's Acquisition Decision
Memorandum. Secondly, for SOCOM MDA and military department managed
programs, responsibilities and exceptions to SOCOM procedures are intended
to be defined in program specific memorandums of agreement. Finally, for
programs with a military department MDA and program manager, the military
department's policies and procedures normally apply. Table 9 illustrates
how the acquisition executive has delegated or retained decision authority
for programs undertaken from 2001 to 2006.
Table 9: Summary of SOCOM Acquisition Programs' MDAs and Program Managers
Milestone decision authority SOCOM Military department (MILDEP)
Program manager SOCOM MILDEP MILDEP
Percentages 45% 18% 37%^a
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
aTotals do not include one program with a non-MILDEP MDA and one program
with a MILDEP MDA and SOCOM program manager.
SOCOM is the MDA for over 60 percent of its acquisition programs. The
SOCOM MDA could be the Acquisition Executive or a program executive
officer, depending on the size and importance of the program. The
Acquisition Executive has delegated the MDA role to the military
departments for approximately 37 percent of SOCOM's acquisition programs.
For programs managed directly by SOCOM, the command has a hierarchical
management structure, as shown in figure 6, which resembles the military
departments in its internal acquisition organizational make-up.
Figure 6: SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Management Structure
The program executive offices utilize program managers and system
acquisition managers organized by program. System acquisition managers are
charged with assisting the military department in program planning and
execution and also representing SOCOM at military department-led
integrated-product teams, technical conferences, and program reviews.
System acquisition managers are normally used when the MDA and program
manager or both options are assigned to a military department.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Paul L. Francis, Director, (202) 512-4841
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact above, John Oppenheim, Assistant Director, Leon
S. Gill, John Ortiz, Michele Williamson, Julia Kennon, Greg Campbell, and
Marie Ahearn made key contributions to this report.
Related GAO Products
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[28]GAO-07-406SP . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
[29]GAO-06-391 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
[30]GAO-05-301 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. [31]GAO-04-248
. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. [32]GAO-03-476
. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Defense Acquistions: Advanced SEAL Delivery System Program Needs Increased
Oversight. [33]GAO-03-442 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2003.
Defense Acquistions: Readiness of the Marine Corps' V-22 Aircraft for
Full-Rate Production. [34]GAO-01-369R . Washington, D.C.: February 20,
2001.
Navy Aviation: V-22 Cost and Capability to Meet Requirements Are Yet to Be
Determined. NSIAD/ [35]GAO-98-13 . Washington, D.C.: October 22, 1997.
(120563)
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[42]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-620 .
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Highlights of [43]GAO-07-620 , a report to the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
June 2007
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
An Analysis of Special Operations Command's Management of Weapon System
Programs
Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) duties have greatly increased since
the attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Special Operations Forces are at
work in Afghanistan and Iraq, and SOCOM has been assigned to lead U.S.
efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. SOCOM's acquisitions budget has
also greatly increased in this period--more than doubling from $788
million in 2001 to approximately $1.91 billion in 2006. In light of
SOCOM's expanded duties, Congress requested that GAO review SOCOM's
management of its acquisition programs. GAO's evaluation includes an
assessment of: the types of acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken
since 2001 and whether the programs are consistent with its mission; the
extent to which SOCOM's programs have progressed as planned; and the
challenges SOCOM faces in managing its acquisition programs.
[44]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to ensure SOCOM
(1) establishes sound business cases when starting programs, particularly
its more complex and department-managed programs; (2) has the workforce
size and composition to match its acquisition workload; and (3) improves
its acquisition management information system. DOD generally concurred
with these recommendations.
SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs that are
consistent with the command's mission to provide equipment that addresses
the unique needs of the Special Operations Forces. SOCOM has committed to
spend about $6 billion on these programs. About 88 percent of the programs
are relatively small, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified
commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing
service equipment and assets. SOCOM's acquisition plans--as reflected in
its current 5-year plan--continue to focus on relatively small-scale,
short-cycle programs with modest development efforts.
Overall, SOCOM's acquisition program performance has been mixed. About 60
percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 have
progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and schedule
estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost increases
because of the need to buy additional quantities of equipment for ongoing
combat operations. The other 40 percent of SOCOM's acquisition programs
have not progressed as planned and experienced modest to, in a small
number of cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays because of
a range of technical and programmatic issues. Although fewer in number,
the programs that experienced problems comprise about 50 percent of
acquisition funding because they tend to be the larger and costlier,
platform-based programs that SOCOM is acquiring and those where SOCOM
depends on one of the military departments for equipment and program
management support.
SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges to ensure its acquisition
programs are consistently completed on time and within budget. Urgent
requirements to support SOCOM's ongoing combat missions have and will
continue to challenge SOCOM's ability to balance near- and long-term needs
against available funding resources. In addition, SOCOM has difficulty
tracking progress on programs where it has delegated management authority
to one of the military departments and has not consistently applied a
knowledge-based acquisition approach in executing programs, particularly
the larger and more complex programs. Furthermore, SOCOM has encountered
challenges ensuring it has the workforce size and composition to carry out
its acquisition work.
References
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26. http://www.gao.gov/
27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-388
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-406SP
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-391
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-301
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-248
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-476
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-442
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-369R
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-98-13
36. http://www.gao.gov/
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42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-620
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