Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions 
Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues (30-APR-07, GAO-07-618).  
                                                                 
Corrosion can have a deleterious effect on military equipment and
infrastructure in terms of cost, readiness, and safety. 	 
Recognizing this concern, the Bob Stump National Defense	 
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003 required the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to designate an official or organization to oversee
and coordinate efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion.	 
Recently, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year  
2006 directed GAO to examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion
prevention and mitigation programs. In addition, GAO evaluated	 
the extent to which DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention	 
planning in acquiring weapon systems. GAO reviewed strategy	 
documents, reviewed corrosion prevention planning for 51 recent  
major weapon system acquisitions, and interviewed DOD and	 
military service officials.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-618 					        
    ACCNO:   A68912						        
  TITLE:     Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and 
Actions Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues			 
     DATE:   04/30/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Corrosion						 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense economic analysis				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Government agency oversight			 
	     Program coordination				 

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GAO-07-618

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Imple

          * [4]DOD's Corrosion Office Does Not Review All of the Military S
          * [5]Progress in Identifying Corrosion Impacts Has Been Minimal
          * [6]DOD Has Not Yet Developed Results-Oriented Corrosion Metrics

     * [7]Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not

          * [8]DOD Guidance Encourages Corrosion Prevention Plans and Advis
          * [9]Few Programs Have Both Corrosion Plans and Teams
          * [10]Service Acquisition Officials Cite Diverse Approaches Taken

     * [11]Conclusions
     * [12]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [13]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [14]GAO Contact
     * [15]Acknowledgments
     * [16]GAO's Mission
     * [17]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [18]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [19]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [20]Congressional Relations
     * [21]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

April 2007

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are Needed to Address
Corrosion Issues

GAO-07-618

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 5
DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Implementing Its
Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategy 7
Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not Incorporated
Key Elements of Corrosion Prevention Planning 11
Conclusions 15
Recommendations for Executive Action 16
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17
Appendix I Defense Science Board Recommendations 22
Appendix II Scope and Methodology 23
Appendix III Organizational Structure of DOD's Corrosion Activities 26
Appendix IV Corrosion Prevention Planning in Selected Major Defense
Acquisition Programs 27
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 29
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34

Tables

Table 1: Corrosion Cost Segments and Estimated Completion Dates 10
Table 2: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Either a Corrosion
Prevention and Control Plan or a Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team 13
Table 3: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Both a Corrosion
Prevention and Control Plan and a Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team and
Programs Having Neither a Plan Nor a Team 13

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

April 30, 2007

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends an estimated $10 billion to $20
billion each year on corrosion-related maintenance on weapon systems and
infrastructure. Corrosion can affect mission readiness by taking critical
systems out of action. It also affects safety. For example, since 1985,
the Army has reported over 50 aircraft accidents, including 12 fatalities,
caused by corrosion. Incorporating corrosion prevention planning early in
the acquisition process is the most effective way to reduce and perhaps
avoid corrosion impacts in terms of costs, readiness and safety.

In recognition of the harm that corrosion can cause, Congress enacted, as
part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2003, legislation that requires DOD to designate a senior official or
organization responsible for preventing and mitigating the corrosion of
military equipment and infrastructure.1 The authorization act requires the
designated official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts
throughout the department, recommend policy guidance, and review the
corrosion prevention and mitigation programs and funding levels proposed
by each military service that will enable them to make recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense. The authorization act also requires the official
to provide oversight and coordination of the efforts within the Department
to prevent or mitigate corrosion throughout the life cycle of military
equipment and infrastructure and to monitor DOD acquisition practices to
ensure that corrosion prevention technologies and treatments are fully
considered during research and development phases of the acquisition
process and are incorporated in each acquisition program to the extent
deemed appropriate. In addition, the authorization act directs the
Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term strategy to
reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on DOD's military equipment
and infrastructure. In response to this act, DOD created the Corrosion
Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office) within the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and
in December 2003 developed a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion of
military equipment and infrastructure.2 As part of the strategy, DOD is
developing a corrosion baseline to identify the effects of corrosion on
cost, readiness, and safety.

1 Pub. L. No. 107-314, S 1067 (2002), which added S 2228 to Title 10 of
the United States Code.

Since the passage of the Defense Authorization Act of 2003, we have issued
several reports on corrosion. Among other things, we have found that DOD
and the services do not have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate
corrosion, DOD's long-term strategy falls short of a comprehensive
strategic plan, and the Army is not adequately storing land-based
pre-positioned equipment to protect it from corrosion.3 In 2003, we
recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and
mitigation that included standardized methodologies for collecting and
analyzing corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data; clearly defined
goals, outcome-oriented objectives, and performance measures;
identification of the level of resources needed to accomplish goals and
objectives; and mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and
mitigation projects across the department. In 2004 we further recommended
that DOD accelerate completion of its corrosion baseline, establish a
funding mechanism to implement the corrosion strategy, and submit to
Congress a report identifying the long-term funding and personnel
resources needed to implement the strategy. DOD concurred with all of
these recommendations.

In response to a request of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Defense Science Board issued a
report in October 2004 on DOD's efforts for corrosion control, referring
to "the importance of leadership commitment and proper incentives for
ensuring corrosion is considered early and often in decisions" and calling
for an increased commitment on the part of DOD to prevent and mitigate
corrosion.4 This report found that corrosion prevention has not been a
priority across DOD, and it made 17 recommendations, most of which DOD
concurred with. Specifically, DOD concurred on 11, partially concurred on
4, and did not concur on 2. Appendix I contains a complete list of Defense
Science Board recommendations and DOD's responses. Of the recommendations
with which DOD concurred, it has taken actions to incorporate some into
its strategy document and to begin implementing some of those. According
to our assessment, only minimal changes have been made to DOD's corrosion
strategy in response to the recommendations contained in the report of the
Defense Science Board.

2 Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Department of Defense,
Long-Term Strategy to Reduce Corrosion and the Effects of Corrosion on the
Military Equipment and Infrastructure of the Department of Defense
(Washington, D.C.: December 2003).

3 GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and
Increase Readiness, [22]GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003);
Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of DOD's
Long-Term Corrosion Strategy, [23]GAO-04-640 (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2004); and Defense Management: Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of
Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings, [24]GAO-06-709
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).

4 Defense Science Board, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report on Corrosion Control
(Washington, D.C.: October 2004).

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006 directed us to
examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion prevention and mitigation
programs.5 Specifically, we examined the extent to which DOD has
implemented its corrosion strategy in its oversight of funding; its
identification of cost, readiness, and safety impacts through its
corrosion baseline study; and its development of results-oriented metrics.
In addition, as agreed with your offices, we evaluated the extent to which
DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of
major weapon systems.

In performing our work, we used the requirements for the DOD corrosion
strategy set forth in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2003, along with our previous recommendations, as a baseline
for evaluating DOD's corrosion prevention efforts. We reviewed DOD and
service guidance relating to corrosion prevention, and we interviewed
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Army, the
Air Force, and the Navy. We also gathered and reviewed information about
corrosion prevention planning from a nonprobability sample of 51 major
defense acquisition programs. The sample was based on the programs
contained in DOD's Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition Program
List.6 We reviewed documents from these programs, including their
acquisition plans and corrosion prevention plans. A detailed description
of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix II. We conducted our
work from April 2006 through January 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

5 Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 356 (2006).

6 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition
Program List (Washington, D.C.: September 2006). The programs on this list
were designated by the Secretary of Defense as major acquisition program
or are estimated to require a total expenditure of more than $365 million
in research, development, test, and evaluation funds or require a total
expenditure of more than $2.19 billion in procurement funds.

Results in Brief

While DOD has taken some steps toward implementing its corrosion
prevention strategy since our 2003 and 2004 reports, its progress in
providing oversight of funding, identifying corrosion impacts, and
developing results-oriented metrics has been limited. For example:

           o With regard to funding, the Corrosion Office does not review all
           of the services' proposed funding requests related to prevention
           and mitigation of corrosion, even though such reviews are required
           by 10 U.S.C. S 2228(b)(3). DOD has not directed the services to
           provide the Corrosion Office with comprehensive data on their
           annual funding requirements for corrosion prevention and
           mitigation. Furthermore, none of the four services has a
           designated official or office to oversee and coordinate
           servicewide corrosion activities, including identifying annual
           funding requirements. Without comprehensive reviews of the
           services' corrosion-related programs and proposed funding
           requests, the Corrosion Office cannot fulfill its oversight and
           coordination role for the department.

           o With regard to developing a corrosion baseline, DOD has made
           some progress in identifying cost impacts but has not identified
           readiness and safety impacts. DOD has acknowledged that
           determining these impacts is critical to implementing its
           corrosion strategy and assessing progress. DOD accelerated the
           time frames for completing the overall cost study and recently
           completed corrosion cost impact studies for two segments of its
           corrosion baseline--Army ground vehicles and Navy ships. Although
           these two cost impact studies provide potentially useful data for
           reducing the estimated $4.5 billion in annual corrosion costs, DOD
           has not developed an action plan to apply these data toward
           developing corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. Without
           an action plan, DOD could miss opportunities for achieving
           long-term corrosion cost savings. DOD officials told us that they
           decided to identify cost impacts before they identify readiness
           and safety impacts because more information is available regarding
           costs and identifying cost impacts is an important step towards
           identifying readiness and safety impacts.

           o DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics that would
           provide the capability to measure progress toward reducing
           corrosion impacts, although we and Defense Science Board have
           previously recommended that it do so. DOD asserts that it cannot
           establish such metrics until it has first identified the corrosion
           impacts--yet, as stated above, DOD has made only minimal progress
           in the identification of these impacts. The lack of
           results-oriented metrics impedes DOD's ability to implement its
           corrosion strategy.

           Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these
           issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive
           goal, and opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and
           avoid safety problems will be lost.

           Most of the weapon system acquisition programs we reviewed had not
           incorporated key elements of corrosion prevention planning. Of the
           51 recent major acquisitions we reviewed, only 14 had both
           corrosion prevention plans and advisory teams. The guidebook
           created by the Corrosion Office encourages weapon system
           acquisition programs to incorporate corrosion prevention and
           control plans and advisory teams in order to achieve viable
           corrosion prevention and control planning. DOD acquisition program
           officials retain broad discretion in developing individual
           approaches to corrosion prevention planning, and many different
           approaches are taken within and among the services. However, 27 of
           the 51 programs we reviewed had not included either of the two key
           elements of corrosion prevention planning. Most programs did not
           have corrosion prevention plans or corrosion prevention advisory
           teams in part because these plans and teams are not mandatory. As
           a result, the Corrosion Office could not effectively monitor DOD
           acquisition practices, as required by 10 U.S.C. S 2228(b)(5), to
           ensure that corrosion prevention technologies and techniques were
           being fully considered and incorporated when deemed appropriate.
           Moreover, these programs may be missing opportunities to prevent
           future corrosion and therefore mitigate the impacts of corrosion
           on the costs, readiness, and safety of military equipment.

           We are making recommendations designed to improve DOD's and the
           services' efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion. In commenting
           on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our
           recommendations. In its response, DOD cited actions it planned to
           take which are generally responsive to our recommendations. In
           addition, the department provided several technical comments which
           we considered and incorporated where appropriate. DOD's comments
           and our evaluation of them appear later in this report.
		   
		   Background

           The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
           Technology, and Logistics has been designated DOD's Corrosion
           Executive. The Corrosion Executive is supported by staff assigned
           to the Corrosion Office. The Corrosion Office was initially
           established in 2003 as an independent activity within the Office
           of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
           Logistics, reporting directly to the Corrosion Executive.7 In
           2004, the Corrosion Office was formally assigned to the Defense
           Systems Directorate. The direct chain of command went through the
           Defense Systems Directorate, which provided management and
           administrative support. Following a reorganization of the
           Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization in 2006, the
           Corrosion Office was moved to the Systems and Software Engineering
           Directorate. The Corrosion Office no longer reports directly to
           the Corrosion Executive. Appendix III depicts DOD's organizational
           structure to address corrosion.

           The Corrosion Office is led by the Special Assistant for Corrosion
           Policy and Oversight and works closely with the Corrosion
           Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team, which has
           representatives from the military services and other DOD
           organizations to accomplish the goals and objectives of the
           Corrosion Office. Several working teams have also been established
           to conduct work in the seven areas making up the corrosion
           strategy: policy and requirements; impact, metrics, and
           sustainment; science and technology; communications and outreach;
           facilities; training and doctrine; and specifications, standards,
           and product qualification.

           The Defense Acquisition Guidebook8 contains guidance regarding the
           defense acquisition system, which exists to manage the nation's
           investments in technologies, programs, and product support
           necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and support
           the United States Armed Forces. This guidebook contains specific
           guidance regarding acquisition strategies, which define the
           approach a program manager will use to achieve program goals.
           Among other things, an effective strategy minimizes the time and
           cost required to satisfy approved capability needs. DOD's
           directive on the defense acquisition process states that program
           managers shall consider corrosion prevention and mitigation when
           making trade-off decisions that involve cost, useful service, and
           effectiveness.9 Moreover, on November 12, 2003, the Under
           Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
           issued a policy memorandum stating that corrosion prevention
           should be specifically addressed at the earliest phases of the
           acquisition process by decision authorities at every level.10
		   
		   DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Implementing
		   Its Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategy

           DOD has had long-standing problems in funding, identification of
           impacts, and development of metrics, and these are continuing.
           DOD's implementation of its long-term corrosion strategy, as
           required under 10 U.S.C. S 2228(c), has been hindered by
           weaknesses in these three critical areas. First, the Corrosion
           Office does not review the services' corrosion programs or annual
           budget requests, even though this is required by 10 U.S.C. S
           2228(b)(3). Second, the Corrosion Office has made only minimal
           progress in identifying corrosion impacts. Third, the Corrosion
           Office has not developed results-oriented metrics, even though we
           have previously recommended that it do so.
		   
		   DODï¿½s Corrosion Office Does Not Review All of the Military Servicesï¿½
		   Funding Requests

           Although 10 U.S.C. S 2228(b)(3) requires the Corrosion Office
           within OSD to review the annual funding requests for the
           prevention and mitigation of corrosion for each military service,
           the Corrosion Office has not done so. The Corrosion Office does
           not review comprehensive corrosion data from the services on their
           programs and funding requests because (1) DOD has not required the
           services to provide budget information to the Corrosion Office and
           (2) the services lack an effective mechanism for coordinating with
           the Corrosion Office with respect to their corrosion funding
           requests. None of the four services has a designated official or
           office to oversee and coordinate corrosion activities, including
           identifying annual servicewide funding requirements. Without a
           requirement or mechanism for reporting service funding
           information, the Corrosion Office officials said they are unable
           to review the services' complete corrosion-related funding
           information, and thus DOD is hampered in its ability to provide
           oversight of the services' funding requests.

           The Corrosion Office currently has oversight over only a small
           portion of departmentwide corrosion spending that is provided
           through a separate appropriations account. The Corrosion Office
           reviews and selects for funding the projects that are proposed by
           the services based on a combination of criteria, including:
           whether a project would benefit more than one service, whether it
           is projected to be completed within 2 years of its initial
           funding, the availability of matching funds; and the return on
           investment that it offers. For fiscal year 2006, DOD and the
           military services funded about $24 million for corrosion strategy
           efforts. Of this amount, $19 million was spent on 29
           corrosion-related projects and about $5 million on contractor
           support, training, outreach, and other administrative activities.
           The DOD Corrosion Office projects a combined average return on
           investment of 42.5 to 1 for the $19 million, or a projected
           savings of $809 million over the life of the projects.

           The services frequently bypass the Corrosion Office to obtain
           their funding for corrosion-related efforts. We reviewed the
           President's budget justification for fiscal year 2006 and
           identified more than $97 million for service-specific corrosion
           mitigation-related projects in addition to those reviewed by the
           Corrosion Office. These projects had not been submitted to the
           Corrosion Office for review, and Corrosion Office officials told
           us that they lacked any information about the $97 million and the
           status of the associated efforts. Because corrosion-related
           projects may be included under other maintenance projects or
           budget accounts, it is likely that there is more funding that we
           have not identified. According to recent corrosion cost studies
           conducted by DOD, the annual corrosion costs for Army ground
           vehicles and Navy ships alone were identified to be $2.019 billion
           and $2.438 billion, respectively. Without comprehensive reviews of
           the services' corrosion-related programs and proposed funding
           requests, the Corrosion Office cannot fulfill its oversight and
           coordination role for the department.

           None of the four services has a designated official or office to
           oversee and coordinate corrosion activities, despite a
           recommendation by the Defense Science Board that they do so.
           Currently, multiple offices in the services are responsible for
           corrosion programs and related budgets. For example, several Air
           Force offices are responsible for corrosion-related matters:
           maintenance issues belong to the Air Force Corrosion Prevention
           and Control Office, corrosion policy for weapon systems is managed
           by an office within the Air Force Maintenance Directorate, and
           corrosion policy for infrastructure is handled by the Air Force
           Civil Engineering Directorate. None of these offices has
           comprehensive knowledge about corrosion activities throughout the
           Air Force. Without a designated official or office for corrosion,
           the services do not have the mechanism or capability to fully
           identify their annual servicewide corrosion funding requirements.
		   
		   Progress in Identifying Corrosion Impacts Has Been Minimal

           DOD has acknowledged since 2002 that the identification of cost,
           readiness, and safety impacts is critical to the implementation of
           its corrosion strategy. We recommended in 2003 that DOD complete a
           study to identify these impacts, and further recommended in 2004
           that DOD accelerate its efforts in order to complete the baseline
           prior to its original estimated date of 2011. According to DOD,
           the purpose of the study is to document where corrosion problems
           exist, identify their causes, and prioritize them for funding
           according to their relative severity in terms of their impact on
           DOD costs, readiness, and safety.

           In August 2004, after developing a cost-estimating methodology, a
           DOD contractor began a study to determine the total cost of
           corrosion for military equipment and facilities across the
           services. DOD currently plans to complete this cost study by 2009,
           2 years earlier than originally planned. The study uses fiscal
           year 2004 costs as a measurement baseline and consists of several
           segments, to be completed sequentially. To date, it has made some
           progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts. For example, in
           April 2006, DOD completed the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship
           corrosion segments of this study.11 Several segments remain to be
           completed, including Army and Marine Corps aviation. Corrosion
           Office officials told us that progress has been slower than
           expected, primarily because of a lack of corrosion data. Table 1
           shows the corrosion cost segments included in the study and their
           planned completion dates.
		   
7 Because the position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is currently vacant, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is acting
as DOD's Corrosion Executive.

8 Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, v. 1.6
(Ft. Belvoir, Va.: July 24, 2006).

9 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1,The Defense Acquisition System
(May 12, 2003).

10 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Corrosion
Prevention and Control, November 12, 2003.

11 LMI Government Consulting, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for Army Ground
Vehicles and Navy Ships (McLean, Va.: April 2006).

           Table 1: Corrosion Cost Segments and Estimated Completion Dates
		   

Corrosion cost segments         Estimated completion date 
Army ground vehicles            2006 (actual)             
Navy ships                      2006 (actual)             
DOD facilities                  2007 (planned)            
Army aviation and missiles      2007 (planned)            
USMC ground vehicles            2007 (planned)            
Navy and USMC aviation          2008                      
Coast Guard aviation and ships  2008                      
Air Force aviation and missiles 2009                      

           Source: LMI Government Consulting.

           The two completed studies generated data that could be potentially
           useful for developing initiatives aimed at reducing long-term
           corrosion costs, but DOD lacks an action plan for using these
           data. For example, the studies estimate the annual corrosion costs
           for Army ground vehicles and Navy ships at $2.019 billion and
           $2.438 billion, respectively. Costs are segregated in multiple
           ways, such as costs incurred at the depot, organizational, and
           intermediate maintenance levels; costs incurred while addressing a
           corrosion problem (corrective); costs incurred while addressing a
           potential problem (preventive); and direct costs incurred on end
           items or removable parts. However, the Corrosion Office has not
           developed an action plan on how it will use these data, or the
           data expected from future cost studies, to develop corrosion
           prevention and mitigation strategies. Without an action plan, DOD
           could miss opportunities for achieving long-term corrosion cost
           savings.

           Finally, although it acknowledges the importance of identifying
           corrosion impacts related to readiness and safety, DOD has made
           virtually no progress in assessing these impacts. DOD officials
           told us that they decided to identify cost impacts before they
           identify readiness and safety impacts because more information is
           available regarding costs, and identifying cost impacts is an
           important step towards identifying readiness and safety impacts.
           They said that some of their efforts will shift to readiness and
           safety as the cost impact study approaches completion.
		   
		   DOD Has Not Yet Developed Results-Oriented Corrosion Metrics

           In June 2004, we reported that DOD lacked results-oriented metrics
           in its corrosion strategy and, as a result, could not effectively
           monitor progress toward achieving the goals of the corrosion
           strategy. In May 2005, DOD updated its November 2004 long-term
           corrosion strategy, but the update still does not contain
           results-oriented metrics for measuring progress toward targeted,
           quantifiable goals. In the strategy update, DOD has catalogued the
           aspects of corrosion prevention cost, readiness, and safety
           impacts that will need to be measured, but it has not quantified
           them or linked them with targets for improvement. For example, on
           a table entitled "Potential Revised Metrics Set", under the column
           of safety impacts, the "facilities incidents" entry is linked with
           the description "events over time related to corrosion." No
           measurable outcomes are associated with either the designated
           impact or the description. In addition, DOD officials told us that
           they cannot establish quantifiable goals regarding corrosion costs
           until they have completed the corrosion cost baseline, which, as
           noted earlier, DOD plans to complete sometime in 2009. These
           officials said that metrics for readiness and safety will likely
           take several additional years to complete because less information
           is available regarding readiness and safety impacts than
           information regarding cost impacts. They told us that the
           accompanying definitions and procedures will also take several
           years to complete.
		   
		   Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not
		   Incorporated Key Elements of Corrosion Prevention Planning

           The Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook encourages
           the establishment of corrosion prevention and control plans and
           corrosion prevention advisory teams as early as possible in the
           acquisition process. However, only 14 of the 51 programs we
           reviewed actually had both plans and advisory teams. DOD
           acquisition program officials have taken diverse approaches to
           corrosion prevention planning. We found that one reason why most
           programs did not have corrosion prevention plans or corrosion
           prevention advisory teams is that while they are strongly
           suggested, these elements are not mandatory.
		   
		   DOD Guidance Encourages Corrosion Prevention Plans and Advisory
		   Teams

           The guidebook developed by the Corrosion Office is intended to
           assist acquisition program managers in developing and implementing
           effective corrosion prevention and control programs for military
           equipment and infrastructure.12 According to the Corrosion
           Prevention and Control Guidebook, the corrosion prevention and
           control plan and the corrosion prevention advisory team should be
           established as early as possible in the acquisition process. DOD
           officials told us that establishing both a plan and a team is
           critical to effective corrosion prevention planning, and they
           strongly recommend that corrosion prevention planning begin at the
           start of the technology development phase of acquisition
           (Milestone A), when the effort is made to determine the
           appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into the weapon
           system. They said it should certainly occur no later than the
           system development and demonstration phase (Milestone B), when the
           first system and long lead procurement for follow-on systems may
           be authorized. According to the guidebook, a corrosion prevention
           and control plan should address a number of things, including
           system design, including materials and processes to be used for
           corrosion prevention and control, and should define the membership
           and organization of the corrosion prevention advisory team. The
           team should be actively involved in the review of design
           considerations, material selections, costs, and any documentation
           that may affect corrosion prevention and control throughout the
           life cycle of the system or facility. Members should include
           representatives from the contractors and DOD. In addition to this
           DOD guidance, the individual services have issued guidance that
           also calls for incorporating corrosion prevention planning during
           acquisition of weapon system programs.13
		   
		   Few Programs Have Both Corrosion Plans and Teams

           Most of the acquisition programs we reviewed did not have either
           plans or advisory teams for corrosion prevention and control. We
           reviewed a nonprobability sample of 51 major defense acquisition
           programs from the Army, Navy, and Air Force and found that only 14
           of them had both corrosion prevention and control plans and
           corrosion prevention advisory teams.14 A total of 20 programs had
           developed corrosion prevention and control plans, and 18 had
           established advisory teams. Of the 51 programs, 27 had neither a
           plan nor an advisory team. Tables 2 and 3 list, by service, the
           number of programs we reviewed that had developed corrosion
           prevention and control plans and established corrosion prevention
           advisory teams. Appendix IV contains information on specific
           programs that we reviewed.
		   
12 Department of Defense, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Corrosion Prevention and Control
Planning Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).

13 For example, The Air Force's Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
requires the creation of a corrosion prevention and control plan and
corrosion prevention advisory board.

14 We reviewed 13 Army programs, 13 Air Force programs, and 25 Navy
programs based on a nonprobability sample from the Fiscal Year 2006 Major
Defense Acquisition Program List.

           Table 2: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Either a
           Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan or a Corrosion Prevention
           Advisory Team
		   
                    Programs that have a      Programs that have a
                corrosion prevention and      corrosion prevention
                            control plan             advisory team
                     Yes              No          Total   Yes      No Total
Army                5       8      13                         5     8   13
Air Force           4       9      13                         5     8   13
Navy               11      14      25                         8    17   25
Total              20      31      51                        18    33   51

                                                    Programs having neither a 
                   Programs having both a corrosion  corrosion prevention and 
                  prevention and control plan and a control plan or corrosion 
                 corrosion prevention advisory team  prevention advisory team 
Army                                           4                         7 
Air Force                                      4                         8 
Navy                                           6                        12 
Total                                         14                        27 

           Source: GAO analysis of service data.

           Table 3: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Both a
           Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan and a Corrosion Prevention
           Advisory Team and Programs Having Neither a Plan Nor a Team

           Source: GAO analysis of service data.
		   
		   Service Acquisition Officials Cite Diverse Approaches Taken
		   to Corrosion Prevention Planning

           Service acquisition officials told us that they retain broad
           discretion in developing individual approaches to corrosion
           prevention planning. We found that planning is inconsistently
           performed, and that so many different approaches are taken within
           and among the services that DOD is unable to maintain the
           oversight needed to ensure that corrosion prevention is being
           effectively conducted. For example, the degree to which corrosion
           prevention planning is performed depends on the initiative of the
           respective acquisition program offices. The Air Force's C-17A
           Globemaster program had a corrosion prevention plan and corrosion
           prevention team in place early in the acquisition process, several
           months before it obtained approval to proceed with full-scale
           development. C-17 officials told us that they took a proactive
           approach to avoid the corrosion problems experienced by the C-5
           and KC-135 programs. In contrast, the Javelin program managed by
           the Army has not established a corrosion prevention plan or
           corrosion prevention team, even though the system development and
           most of its production objectives have been completed. Javelin
           program officials told us that they have extensive corrosion
           prevention requirements in the system development specification
           and have obtained the advice of corrosion prevention experts
           located at the Aviation and Missile Research and Development
           Center.

           Further, some program officials told us that specific corrosion
           prevention plans and corrosion advisory teams were not needed
           because other documents and processes provide the same function.
           The Navy's SSN 774 Class submarine program did not have a specific
           corrosion prevention plan or corrosion prevention advisory team
           because the program relied heavily on detailed specifications and
           technical documents and on the experience of similarly designed
           submarines.15

           Officials from some programs said it was too early in the
           acquisition process for them to have a plan or team, while those
           from other programs claimed it was too late. The Air Force KC-135
           Replacement program officials told us they do not have a corrosion
           prevention plan or team because their system is still in the early
           development phase and they have yet to establish firm dates for
           their program design reviews. In contrast, Army High Mobility
           Artillery Rocket System program officials said that it is not
           sensible to have a corrosion prevention plan or team at this time
           because their program is currently in full rate production.

           Some programs we reviewed did not have a corrosion prevention plan
           or team because program officials told us that upgrades to
           existing weapon systems may be covered by an existing corrosion
           prevention plan or team. On the one hand, the Airborne Warning and
           Control System Block 40/45 upgrade program is a modification to
           the prime mission equipment of the E-3 aircraft. This program does
           not have its own corrosion prevention and control team or
           corrosion prevention advisory team, but rather is covered by the
           existing plan and team for the E-3 aircraft. On the other hand, a
           different Air Force program we reviewed represents an upgrade to
           the avionics system of the existing C-5 aircraft, and its
           officials told us that corrosion prevention issues are more
           appropriately addressed at the C-5 aircraft program level. These
           officials told us that while the C-5 program has an existing
           corrosion prevention advisory team, it does not currently have a
           current corrosion prevention plan, though one is under development
           and expected to be completed at the end of May 2007.

           We found that one reason most programs have not prepared corrosion
           prevention plans or established corrosion prevention advisory
           teams is that these elements are not mandatory. Major acquisition
           programs perform corrosion prevention planning at their
           discretion, and that may or may not include having a corrosion
           prevention plan, a corrosion prevention advisory team, or both.
           Further, these programs are not required to provide the Corrosion
           Office information regarding corrosion prevention planning. As a
           result, the Corrosion Office could not effectively monitor DOD
           acquisition practices to ensure that corrosion prevention
           technologies and techniques are being fully considered and
           incorporated when appropriate. Moreover, these programs may be
           missing opportunities to prevent future corrosion and thereby
           mitigate the impacts of corrosion on the costs, readiness, and
           safety of military equipment.
		   
		   Conclusions

           More than 4 years have passed since Congress enacted legislation
           requiring DOD to establish a corrosion prevention and mitigation
           program, yet DOD has not met Congress's expectations. Since the
           passage of this legislation, we have issued several reports on
           corrosion and made numerous recommendations to strengthen DOD's
           ability to combat corrosion. Further, the Defense Science Board
           has called for an increased commitment on the part of DOD to
           prevent and mitigate corrosion, referring to "the importance of
           leadership commitment and proper incentives for ensuring corrosion
           is considered early and often in decisions."16

           DOD's progress in implementing its corrosion strategy has been
           stymied by critical weaknesses. These include the absence of DOD
           guidance directing the services to provide the Corrosion Office
           with comprehensive data about their annual funding requirements
           for corrosion prevention and mitigation, the absence of a
           designated corrosion official or corrosion office within each of
           the services, and the absence of a DOD action plan to guide use of
           data in the corrosion cost study to achieve long-term cost
           savings. Furthermore, the lack of a DOD requirement for all major
           defense acquisition programs to have both a corrosion prevention
           plan and a corrosion prevention team could lead to inadequate
           corrosion prevention and, consequently, long-term corrosion
           problems throughout the life cycle of weapon systems. These and
           other weaknesses that we have raised in our previous reports
           severely hinder DOD's ability to combat corrosion. Without top DOD
           and service leadership commitment to addressing these issues,
           corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive goal
           and opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid
           safety problems will be lost.
		   
15 Such specifications and documents include a corrosion prevention and
control design manual, submarine class building specifications, and
material selection requirement documents.

16 Defense Science Board, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report on Corrosion Control
(Washington, D.C.: October 2004).
		   
		   Recommendations for Executive Action

           To effectively implement DOD's corrosion strategy and meet
           congressional expectations expeditiously, we recommend that the
           Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
           Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provide the necessary
           leadership and commitment to take the following four actions.

           To ensure that DOD's Corrosion Office provides oversight and
           coordination of the services' proposed funding requests for
           corrosion prevention and mitigation programs, we recommend that
           the Secretary of Defense:

           o Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
           Technology, and Logistics to require the military services to
           provide comprehensive data about their annual funding requirements
           for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts to the DOD
           Corrosion Office, before annual funding requests are sent to
           Congress.

           o Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to
           designate a corrosion official or a corrosion office within each
           service that is responsible for corrosion prevention and
           mitigation, and that the responsibilities of this official or
           office include identifying the annual funding requirements for
           corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts throughout the
           service.

           To ensure that DOD does not miss opportunities for achieving
           long-term corrosion cost savings, we recommend that the Secretary
           of Defense:

           o Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
           Technology, and Logistics to develop an action plan for using the
           information contained in the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship
           segments of DOD's cost impact study. This plan should be completed
           as expeditiously as possible and be updated in time to support the
           fiscal year 2009 budget request. This plan should include
           information on corrosion cost areas having the highest priority
           and a strategy for reducing these costs. DOD should develop
           comparable action plans for the information to be derived from
           cost segments completed in the future.

           To improve DOD's ability to avoid or limit corrosion problems
           experienced by weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of
           Defense:

           o Require major defense acquisition programs to prepare a
           corrosion prevention plan and establish a corrosion prevention
           advisory team as early as possible in the acquisition process.
		   
		   Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
           concurred with each of our four recommendations. In its response,
           DOD cited actions it planned to take which are generally
           responsive to our recommendations. In addition, the department
           provided several technical comments which we considered and
           incorporated where appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in
           appendix V.

           DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the
           military services to provide comprehensive data about their annual
           funding requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation
           efforts to the DOD Corrosion Office before annual funding requests
           are sent to Congress. DOD stated that a draft Corrosion Prevention
           and Control Department of Defense Instruction will require the
           military departments during the annual internal DOD budget process
           to submit information on the proposed corrosion programs and
           funding levels to the DOD Corrosion Executive. We believe this
           action is long overdue and is a step in the right direction if
           implemented. However, it remains uncertain when the instruction
           will be approved and what it will look like when finalized.
           Although the instruction was expected to be approved in November
           2006, according to DOD officials, it is still undergoing revision.
           In addition, the draft instruction, as it is currently written,
           does not provide enough detail regarding the identification and
           submission of comprehensive data for funding associated with all
           corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts throughout DOD. For
           example, the draft instruction does not specify the type of
           funding information that is to be obtained by the services and
           reported to the DOD Corrosion Office. DOD also commented that
           corrosion prevention and mitigation activities are funded through
           many different sources, no program elements exist in the military
           departments that directly tie to corrosion, and many activities
           are funded to complete corrosion-related work but are not
           identified as such in budget documents. However, as we stated in
           our report, we reviewed the President's budget justification for
           fiscal year 2006 and were able to readily identify more than $97
           million for service-specific corrosion mitigation-related projects
           for which the Corrosion Office lacked any information.

           DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the
           Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force designate a corrosion
           official or a corrosion office within each service to be
           responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation, and that the
           responsibilities of this official or office should include
           identifying the annual funding requirements for corrosion
           prevention and mitigation efforts throughout the service. DOD
           stated that the same draft DOD Instruction cited in response to
           the first recommendation also specifies that the heads of DOD
           components shall designate a senior individual or office for
           oversight of corrosion matters, and it directs the Secretaries of
           the military departments to support this individual or office. DOD
           stated that the Air Force has already designated such an official.
           The draft instruction as it pertains to each service having a
           corrosion executive or a corrosion office responsible for
           corrosion prevention and mitigation is responsive to our
           recommendation if implemented.

           DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop an
           action plan for using the information contained in the Army ground
           vehicle and Navy ship segments of DOD's cost impact study. In
           response, DOD stated that it would be impractical to develop an
           action plan in time to be used for the 2008 budget cycle. While
           our recommendation was intended for DOD to develop an action plan
           as soon as possible to support near-term funding decisions for
           corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts, we agree that DOD can
           not do this in time to be used for the 2008 budget cycle.
           Therefore, we have modified our recommendation to say that DOD
           develop an action plan as expeditiously as possible and revise the
           plan in time to support the fiscal year 2009 budget request. DOD
           also stated that the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation
           Strategic Plan already includes a requirement to select and fund
           corrosion research projects and integrated product team activities
           to enhance and improve corrosion prevention and mitigation
           throughout DOD. DOD further stated that the Military Departments
           assess and make priorities regarding corrosion based, in part, on
           funding for the "Top Ten" high cost of corrosion-vulnerable
           systems. While these efforts may have merit, we still believe that
           an action plan would provide additional benefits as we recommend.

           DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require every
           major defense acquisition program to prepare a corrosion
           prevention plan and establish a corrosion prevention advisory team
           as early as possible in the acquisition process. DOD stated that a
           corrosion prevention control plan will be developed for all ACAT I
           programs before preliminary design review and implementation will
           be reviewed at each milestone. DOD noted that the establishment of
           a separate, formal Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team may not be
           necessary for all program levels, though such a team will be
           established for all ACAT I programs. DOD's response is essentially
           responsive to our recommendation if carried out. In subsequent
           discussions DOD officials told us that they partially concurred
           because the response in some respects goes beyond our
           recommendation by requiring that all ACAT I programs have a
           corrosion prevention control plan and corrosion prevention
           advisory team.

           In addition to providing comments to our recommendations, DOD
           commented about our statement that the development of metrics for
           readiness and safety will likely take several additional years to
           complete because DOD officials have placed a higher priority on
           completing the cost impact studies. DOD commented that this is an
           inaccurate and dangerous assertion and implies that the department
           holds safety and readiness, the two linchpins of the operation
           military mind-set, in lower esteem than cost. In subsequent
           discussions, DOD officials told us that they decided to identify
           cost impacts before they identify readiness and safety impacts
           because more information is available regarding costs, and
           identifying cost impacts is an important step towards identifying
           readiness and safety impacts. We have modified our report by
           incorporating this statement.

           We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense
           and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies
           available to others upon request. This report will also be
           available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov
           .

           If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
           please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected] .
           Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
           Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO
           staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in
           appendix VI.

           William M. Solis, Director
		   Defense Capabilities and Management

           List of Committees

           The Honorable Carl Levin
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable John McCain
           Ranking Minority Member
		   Committee on Armed Services
		   United States Senate

           The Honorable Daniel Inouye
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable Ted Stevens
           Ranking Minority Member
		   Subcommittee on Defense
		   Committee on Appropriations
		   United States Senate

           The Honorable Ike Skelton
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable Duncan Hunter
           Ranking Minority Member
		   Committee on Armed Services
		   House of Representatives

           The Honorable John P. Murtha
		   Chairman
		   The Honorable C.W. BillYoung
		   Ranking Minority Member
		   Subcommittee on Defense
		   Committee on Appropriations
		   House of Representatives
		   
		   Appendix I: Defense Science Board Recommendations

Defense Science Board recommendation                      DOD response  
   
Create an independent team of corrosion experts to review Partially concur 
all programs coming to the Defense Acquisition Board and                   
all maintenance plans to provide the expertise necessary                   
to decision makers.                                                        

Develop incentive structures to ensure corrosion and life Concur           
cycle cost considerations in all designs and                               
manufacturing.                                                             

Mandate corrosion testing and reporting at all stages of  Concur           
development.                                                               

Issue directive to require that all major weapon system   Concur           
corrosion prevention advisory team members complete a                      

Defense Acquisition University-developed course on                         
corrosion control.                                                         

Accelerate the introduction of activity based cost        Concur           
accounting to ensure future visibility into actual life                    
cycle cost and cost of corrosion.                                          

Contract for support in developing standard definitions,  Partially concur 
metrics, etc. to be completed and promulgated within a                     
year.                                                                      

Direct the services to conform with these standards and   Concur           
to enable capture of complete and accurate                                 
organizational, intermediate, and depot-level corrosion                    
man-hour, material, and cost data.                                         

Use these data to make fact-based decisions regarding     Concur           
corrosion and corrosion cost and to track progress of                      
platform material improvement efforts.                                     

Provide a separate funding line to support annual         Partially concur 
assessment teams, to provide the means and expertise to                    
manage ongoing maintenance efforts, and to support                         
organizational level training and maintenance.                             

Implement well-defined maintenance programs that included Concur           
continuous corrosion performance improvement and                           

continuing assessment and reporting.                                       
Require each service to contract and execute its part.    Concur           

Have all results reported to a common database for        Concur           
analysis and to support the development of a joint                         
strategy for corrosion maintenance that accommodates the                   
unique factors associated with each service and system.                    

Extend assessment database to capture existing aircraft   Concur           
and ship corrosion data.                                                   

Direct that services establish best practices maintenance Nonconcur        
plans, benchmarking and providing adequate training to                     
all involved personnel at operator, intermediate, and                      
depot levels.                                                              

Establish a corrosion executive for each service with     Concur           
responsibility for oversight and reporting and full                        
authority over corrosion-specific funding and a strong                     
voice in corrosion-related funding.                                        

Refocus and reinvigorate corrosion science and technology Partially concur 
portfolio. Triple the effective funding in this area with                  
particular emphasis on development of a                                    
materials-corrosion tool set that emphasizes                               
science-based modeling and simulation; fundamental                         
mechanistic understandings of corrosion phenomena as well                  
as accelerated testing; substitutes for effective                          
corrosion prevention materials which are being withdrawn                   
because of environmental and safety considerations; newly                  
developed materials; and nondestructive corrosion sensing                  
and measurement in the field as feedback to prognostic                     
and condition-based maintenance tools.                                     

Divide the responsibilities for the Office of the         Nonconcur        
Secretary of Defense's corrosion effort between three                      
separate organizations: Defense Systems; Logistics,                        
Materiel, and Readiness; and Installations and                             
Engineering.                                                               

           Source: DOD.

           Note: Of the 17 total recommendations made by the Defense Science
           Board, DOD concurred on 11, partially concurred on 4, and did not
           concur on 2.
		   
		   Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

           To assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement
           its corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy, including the
           oversight of funding; identification of cost, readiness, and
           safety impacts; and the development of results-oriented metrics,
           we reviewed DOD's funding and progress for corrosion-related
           projects that it initiated during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. We
           reviewed the President's budget justification for fiscal year 2006
           for corrosion-related efforts and met with DOD officials within
           the Comptroller's Office regarding their oversight of the
           Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office's budget. We also met with
           DOD officials within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
           for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to assess their
           oversight of programs and funding levels of the military services
           during the annual budget reviews as well as their monitoring of
           the services' acquisition practices. In particular, we met with
           officials with the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office
           responsible for managing, directing, and reviewing corrosion
           prevention and mitigation initiatives. We met with DOD officials
           involved with developing DOD's long-term strategy to prevent and
           control corrosion. We obtained their assessments and perspectives
           on corrosion prevention and mitigation programs and strategies;
           obtained and reviewed DOD policies, procedures, guidelines, and
           draft instructions for prevention and mitigation of corrosion on
           DOD military equipment and infrastructure; and discussed
           additional actions that could be taken to further prevent and
           mitigate corrosion. We reviewed DOD's funding requirements for
           fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and future year projections.

           To assess the extent to which the military services' have
           incorporated corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of
           major weapon systems, we conducted a review of 51 major defense
           acquisition programs from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These 51
           programs were selected based on a nonprobability sample of
           acquisition programs from the Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense
           Acquisition Program List approved by the Under Secretary of
           Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Navy programs
           were about half of the programs on the list. A program is
           designated a major acquisition program either by the Secretary of
           Defense, or because it is estimated to require a total expenditure
           of more than $365 million in research, development, test, and
           evaluation funds or require a total expenditure of more than $2.19
           billion in procurement funds. Our program selection represented
           the functional capability areas for battle space awareness,
           focused logistics, force application, force protection, and joint
           training and included air, ground, and sea weapon systems. In
           particular, we selected and reviewed 13 Army programs, 25 Navy
           programs, and 13 Air Force programs. We met with officials
           responsible for managing the acquisition programs and with
           officials having primary responsibility for overseeing corrosion
           prevention and mitigation within the respective services. We
           obtained and reviewed military service policies and instructions
           that establish corrosion prevention and control program
           requirements. For the acquisition programs we selected, we
           obtained and reviewed documents, including the acquisition
           strategy, acquisition plan, and corrosion prevention and control
           plans, as well as related information establishing corrosion
           prevention advisory teams and other reports used for tracking and
           monitoring corrosion-related design initiatives and corrections.
           In particular, we discussed the barriers that exist to more
           effectively employing corrosion control at program initiation and
           acquisition.

           We also reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board
           report on corrosion control issued in October 2004, and obtained
           DOD's related responses and actions taken to better address its
           strategy for corrosion prevention and mitigation. We met with
           Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office officials regarding their
           concurrence and the related actions taken to date.

           We conducted our work from April 2006 through January 2007 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
           We did not validate the data provided by DOD. However, we reviewed
           available data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with
           DOD. We determined that the data used for our review were
           sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

           We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the
           following locations:1

           o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Corrosion Policy and
           Oversight Office
           o Army

                        o U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
                        o U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone
                        Arsenal, Alabama
						
1 Unless otherwise noted, the officials listed in this appendix have their
offices in the Pentagon or at locations in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area.

           o Navy

                        o Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland
                        o Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard

           o Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air
           Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
		   
		   Appendix III: Organizational Structure of DODï¿½s Corrosion Activities

           Note: DUSD = Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

           aCurrently filled by the Under Secretary of Defense for
           Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
		   
		   Appendix IV: Corrosion Prevention Planning in Selected Major
		   Defense Acquisition Programs

                                                          Corrosion           
                                     Corrosion prevention prevention advisory 

Service and program               and control plan     team                

Army                                                                       

AB3, Apache Block III             Yes                  No                  
UH-60M Blackhawk Upgrade, Utility Yes                  Yes                 
Helicopter Upgrade Program                                                 
Light Utility Helicopter          No                   No                  
CH-47F Cargo Helicopter           No                   No                  
Joint Cargo Aircraft              No                   No                  
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter   Yes                  Yes                 
Program                                                                    
Family of Medium Tactical         No                   No                  
Vehicles                                                                   
Stryker, Armored Vehicle          Yes                  Yes                 
Bradley Upgrade, Bradley Fighting No                   Yes                 
Vehicle System Upgrade                                                     
High Mobility Artillery Rocket    No                   No                  
System                                                                     
Javelin, Advanced Anti-tank       No                   No                  
Weapon System                                                              
Land Warrior, Integrated Soldier  No                   No                  
Fighting System                                                            
Future Combat Systems             Yes                  Yes                 

Navy                                                                       

CVN 21, Next Generation Nuclear   No                   Yes                 
Aircraft Carrier                                                           
DDG 1000, Zumwalt Class Destroyer No                   Yes                 
LHA Replacement New Amphibious    Yes                  No                  
Assault Ship                                                               
Littoral Combat Ship              Yes                  No                  
Cobra Judy Replacement,           No                   No                  
Ship-based Radar System                                                    
Maritime Prepositioning Force     No                   No                  
(Future)                                                                   
T-AKE, Lewis and Clark Class of   No                   No                  
Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships                                                  
CG(X), Next Generation Cruiser    No                   No                  
CVN 68, Nimitz Class Nuclear      No                   No                  
Powered Aircraft Carrier                                                   
DDG 51, Guided Missile Destroyer  Yes                  Yes                 
LPD 17, Amphibious Transport Dock No                   No                  
SSGN, Ohio Class Conversion       No                   No                  
SSN 774, Virginia Class Submarine No                   No                  
SSDS, Ship Self Defense System    No                   No                  
Program                                                                    
E-2C Reproduction, Hawkeye        No                   No                  
Carrier-Based Early Warning                                                
Aircraft                                                                   
E-2D AHE, Advanced Hawkeye        No                   No                  
Vertical Takeoff and Land         Yes                  No                  
Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle                                              
MH-60S, Utility Helicopter to     Yes                  Yes                 
Replace Existing CH-46D, HH-60H,                                           
SH-3 & UH1N Helicopters                                                    
CH-53K, Heavy Lift Replacement    Yes                  No                  
Program                                                                    
F/A-18E/F, Hornet Naval Strike    Yes                  Yes                 
Fighter                                                                    
H-1 Upgrades, U.S. Marine Corps   No                   No                  
Mid-life Upgrade to AH-1W Attack                                           
Helicopter and UH-1N Utility                                               
Helicopter                                                                 
MH-60R, Multi-Mission Helicopter  Yes                  Yes                 
Upgrade                                                                    
P-8A, Multi-Mssion Maritime       Yes                  No                  
Aircraft Program                                                           
V-22, Osprey Joint Advanced       Yes                  Yes                 
Vertical Lift Aircraft                                                     
VH-71, Presidential Helicopter    Yes                  Yes                 
Fleet Replacement Program                                                  

Air Force                                                                  

AWACS Upgrade, Airborne Warning   No                   No                  
and Control System Block 40/45                                             
Upgrade Program                                                            
Global Hawk, High Altitude        No                   Yes                 
Endurance Unmanned Aircraft                                                
System                                                                     
C-130 Aircraft Avionics           No                   No                  
Modernization Program                                                      
C-130J, Hercules Cargo Aircraft   No                   No                  
Program                                                                    
C-17A, Globemaster III Advanced   Yes                  Yes                 
Cargo Aircraft Program                                                     
C-5 Aircraft Avionics             No                   No                  
Modernization Program                                                      
C-5 RERP, Aircraft Reliability    No                   No                  
Enhancement and Reengineering                                              
Program                                                                    
B-2 RMP, Radar Modernization      No                   No                  
Program                                                                    
F-22A, Advanced Tactical Fighter  Yes                  Yes                 
F-35, Joint Strike Fighter        Yes                  Yes                 
Program                                                                    
Joint Primary Aircraft Training   Yes                  Yes                 
System                                                                     
KC-135 Replacement                No                   No                  
Combat Search and Rescue          No                   No                  
Replacement Vehicle                                                        

                     Source: GAO analysis of service data.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Harold Reich, Assistant
Director; Leslie Bharadwaja; Larry Bridges; Tom Gosling; K. Nicole Harms;
Charles Perdue; Cheryl Weissman; and Allen Westheimer made key
contributions to this report.

(350825)

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Highlights of [35]GAO-07-618 , a report to congressional committees

April 2007

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are Needed to Address
Corrosion Issues

Corrosion can have a deleterious effect on military equipment and
infrastructure in terms of cost, readiness, and safety. Recognizing this
concern, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2003 required the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate an official or
organization to oversee and coordinate efforts to prevent and mitigate
corrosion. Recently, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2006 directed GAO to examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion
prevention and mitigation programs. In addition, GAO evaluated the extent
to which DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in acquiring
weapon systems. GAO reviewed strategy documents, reviewed corrosion
prevention planning for 51 recent major weapon system acquisitions, and
interviewed DOD and military service officials.

[36]What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ensure that actions
designed to effectively implement DOD's corrosion prevention strategy are
taken. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with GAO's four recommendations. DOD's actions are generally responsive to
the intent of GAO's recommendations.

DOD continues to have problems that hinder progress in implementing its
corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy. While it has created a
Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, that office lacks the ability to
oversee and coordinate its efforts throughout DOD, as envisioned by
Congress. For example:

           o DOD's office does not review all of the services' proposed
           funding requests for corrosion programs, even though it is
           required to do so, because DOD has not directed the services to
           provide such information and none of the services has a designated
           official or office to oversee and coordinate servicewide corrosion
           activities. Without comprehensive reviews of the services'
           corrosion-related programs and proposed funding requests, the
           office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role.
           o DOD has made some progress in identifying corrosion cost
           impacts, but it has not identified readiness and safety impacts.
           It recently completed corrosion cost impact studies for Army
           ground vehicles and Navy ships, identifying an estimated $4.5
           billion in annual corrosion costs. Although the studies provided
           potentially useful data for reducing these costs, DOD has not
           developed an action plan to apply these data to developing
           corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. Without an action
           plan, it could miss opportunities to achieve long-term cost
           savings.
           o DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics, although GAO
           has previously recommended that it do so.

Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these issues,
corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain elusive goals and
opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety
problems will be lost.

Most of the weapon system acquisition programs GAO reviewed had not
incorporated key elements of DOD corrosion prevention guidance. GAO found
that only 14 of the 51 programs reviewed had both corrosion prevention
plans and advisory teams, as encouraged in the DOD guidance. The primary
reason most programs did not have these two elements is that they are not
mandatory. As a result, these programs may be missing opportunities to
prevent and mitigate corrosion.

Corrosion Prevention Planning for Major Acquisition Programs

              Programs that have a corrosion   Programs that have a corrosion
                prevention and control plan       prevention advisory team
                Yes       No        Total         Yes       No       Total    
Army          5        8           13           5        8         13      
Air Force     4        9           13           5        8         13      
Navy         11        14          25           8        17        25      
Total        20        31          51          18        33        51      

Source: GAO analysis of service data.

References

Visible links
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-753
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-640
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-709
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-618
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