Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions
Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues (30-APR-07, GAO-07-618).
Corrosion can have a deleterious effect on military equipment and
infrastructure in terms of cost, readiness, and safety.
Recognizing this concern, the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003 required the Department of
Defense (DOD) to designate an official or organization to oversee
and coordinate efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion.
Recently, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2006 directed GAO to examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion
prevention and mitigation programs. In addition, GAO evaluated
the extent to which DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention
planning in acquiring weapon systems. GAO reviewed strategy
documents, reviewed corrosion prevention planning for 51 recent
major weapon system acquisitions, and interviewed DOD and
military service officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-618
ACCNO: A68912
TITLE: Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and
Actions Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues
DATE: 04/30/2007
SUBJECT: Corrosion
Cost analysis
Defense cost control
Defense economic analysis
Defense procurement
Procurement planning
Program evaluation
Strategic planning
Weapons systems
Government agency oversight
Program coordination
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GAO-07-618
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Imple
* [4]DOD's Corrosion Office Does Not Review All of the Military S
* [5]Progress in Identifying Corrosion Impacts Has Been Minimal
* [6]DOD Has Not Yet Developed Results-Oriented Corrosion Metrics
* [7]Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not
* [8]DOD Guidance Encourages Corrosion Prevention Plans and Advis
* [9]Few Programs Have Both Corrosion Plans and Teams
* [10]Service Acquisition Officials Cite Diverse Approaches Taken
* [11]Conclusions
* [12]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [13]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [14]GAO Contact
* [15]Acknowledgments
* [16]GAO's Mission
* [17]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [18]Order by Mail or Phone
* [19]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [20]Congressional Relations
* [21]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
April 2007
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are Needed to Address
Corrosion Issues
GAO-07-618
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 5
DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Implementing Its
Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategy 7
Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not Incorporated
Key Elements of Corrosion Prevention Planning 11
Conclusions 15
Recommendations for Executive Action 16
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17
Appendix I Defense Science Board Recommendations 22
Appendix II Scope and Methodology 23
Appendix III Organizational Structure of DOD's Corrosion Activities 26
Appendix IV Corrosion Prevention Planning in Selected Major Defense
Acquisition Programs 27
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 29
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34
Tables
Table 1: Corrosion Cost Segments and Estimated Completion Dates 10
Table 2: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Either a Corrosion
Prevention and Control Plan or a Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team 13
Table 3: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Both a Corrosion
Prevention and Control Plan and a Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team and
Programs Having Neither a Plan Nor a Team 13
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
April 30, 2007
Congressional Committees
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends an estimated $10 billion to $20
billion each year on corrosion-related maintenance on weapon systems and
infrastructure. Corrosion can affect mission readiness by taking critical
systems out of action. It also affects safety. For example, since 1985,
the Army has reported over 50 aircraft accidents, including 12 fatalities,
caused by corrosion. Incorporating corrosion prevention planning early in
the acquisition process is the most effective way to reduce and perhaps
avoid corrosion impacts in terms of costs, readiness and safety.
In recognition of the harm that corrosion can cause, Congress enacted, as
part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2003, legislation that requires DOD to designate a senior official or
organization responsible for preventing and mitigating the corrosion of
military equipment and infrastructure.1 The authorization act requires the
designated official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts
throughout the department, recommend policy guidance, and review the
corrosion prevention and mitigation programs and funding levels proposed
by each military service that will enable them to make recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense. The authorization act also requires the official
to provide oversight and coordination of the efforts within the Department
to prevent or mitigate corrosion throughout the life cycle of military
equipment and infrastructure and to monitor DOD acquisition practices to
ensure that corrosion prevention technologies and treatments are fully
considered during research and development phases of the acquisition
process and are incorporated in each acquisition program to the extent
deemed appropriate. In addition, the authorization act directs the
Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term strategy to
reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on DOD's military equipment
and infrastructure. In response to this act, DOD created the Corrosion
Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office) within the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and
in December 2003 developed a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion of
military equipment and infrastructure.2 As part of the strategy, DOD is
developing a corrosion baseline to identify the effects of corrosion on
cost, readiness, and safety.
1 Pub. L. No. 107-314, S 1067 (2002), which added S 2228 to Title 10 of
the United States Code.
Since the passage of the Defense Authorization Act of 2003, we have issued
several reports on corrosion. Among other things, we have found that DOD
and the services do not have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate
corrosion, DOD's long-term strategy falls short of a comprehensive
strategic plan, and the Army is not adequately storing land-based
pre-positioned equipment to protect it from corrosion.3 In 2003, we
recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and
mitigation that included standardized methodologies for collecting and
analyzing corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data; clearly defined
goals, outcome-oriented objectives, and performance measures;
identification of the level of resources needed to accomplish goals and
objectives; and mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and
mitigation projects across the department. In 2004 we further recommended
that DOD accelerate completion of its corrosion baseline, establish a
funding mechanism to implement the corrosion strategy, and submit to
Congress a report identifying the long-term funding and personnel
resources needed to implement the strategy. DOD concurred with all of
these recommendations.
In response to a request of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Defense Science Board issued a
report in October 2004 on DOD's efforts for corrosion control, referring
to "the importance of leadership commitment and proper incentives for
ensuring corrosion is considered early and often in decisions" and calling
for an increased commitment on the part of DOD to prevent and mitigate
corrosion.4 This report found that corrosion prevention has not been a
priority across DOD, and it made 17 recommendations, most of which DOD
concurred with. Specifically, DOD concurred on 11, partially concurred on
4, and did not concur on 2. Appendix I contains a complete list of Defense
Science Board recommendations and DOD's responses. Of the recommendations
with which DOD concurred, it has taken actions to incorporate some into
its strategy document and to begin implementing some of those. According
to our assessment, only minimal changes have been made to DOD's corrosion
strategy in response to the recommendations contained in the report of the
Defense Science Board.
2 Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Department of Defense,
Long-Term Strategy to Reduce Corrosion and the Effects of Corrosion on the
Military Equipment and Infrastructure of the Department of Defense
(Washington, D.C.: December 2003).
3 GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and
Increase Readiness, [22]GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003);
Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of DOD's
Long-Term Corrosion Strategy, [23]GAO-04-640 (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2004); and Defense Management: Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of
Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings, [24]GAO-06-709
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).
4 Defense Science Board, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report on Corrosion Control
(Washington, D.C.: October 2004).
The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006 directed us to
examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion prevention and mitigation
programs.5 Specifically, we examined the extent to which DOD has
implemented its corrosion strategy in its oversight of funding; its
identification of cost, readiness, and safety impacts through its
corrosion baseline study; and its development of results-oriented metrics.
In addition, as agreed with your offices, we evaluated the extent to which
DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of
major weapon systems.
In performing our work, we used the requirements for the DOD corrosion
strategy set forth in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2003, along with our previous recommendations, as a baseline
for evaluating DOD's corrosion prevention efforts. We reviewed DOD and
service guidance relating to corrosion prevention, and we interviewed
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Army, the
Air Force, and the Navy. We also gathered and reviewed information about
corrosion prevention planning from a nonprobability sample of 51 major
defense acquisition programs. The sample was based on the programs
contained in DOD's Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition Program
List.6 We reviewed documents from these programs, including their
acquisition plans and corrosion prevention plans. A detailed description
of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix II. We conducted our
work from April 2006 through January 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
5 Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 356 (2006).
6 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition
Program List (Washington, D.C.: September 2006). The programs on this list
were designated by the Secretary of Defense as major acquisition program
or are estimated to require a total expenditure of more than $365 million
in research, development, test, and evaluation funds or require a total
expenditure of more than $2.19 billion in procurement funds.
Results in Brief
While DOD has taken some steps toward implementing its corrosion
prevention strategy since our 2003 and 2004 reports, its progress in
providing oversight of funding, identifying corrosion impacts, and
developing results-oriented metrics has been limited. For example:
o With regard to funding, the Corrosion Office does not review all
of the services' proposed funding requests related to prevention
and mitigation of corrosion, even though such reviews are required
by 10 U.S.C. S 2228(b)(3). DOD has not directed the services to
provide the Corrosion Office with comprehensive data on their
annual funding requirements for corrosion prevention and
mitigation. Furthermore, none of the four services has a
designated official or office to oversee and coordinate
servicewide corrosion activities, including identifying annual
funding requirements. Without comprehensive reviews of the
services' corrosion-related programs and proposed funding
requests, the Corrosion Office cannot fulfill its oversight and
coordination role for the department.
o With regard to developing a corrosion baseline, DOD has made
some progress in identifying cost impacts but has not identified
readiness and safety impacts. DOD has acknowledged that
determining these impacts is critical to implementing its
corrosion strategy and assessing progress. DOD accelerated the
time frames for completing the overall cost study and recently
completed corrosion cost impact studies for two segments of its
corrosion baseline--Army ground vehicles and Navy ships. Although
these two cost impact studies provide potentially useful data for
reducing the estimated $4.5 billion in annual corrosion costs, DOD
has not developed an action plan to apply these data toward
developing corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. Without
an action plan, DOD could miss opportunities for achieving
long-term corrosion cost savings. DOD officials told us that they
decided to identify cost impacts before they identify readiness
and safety impacts because more information is available regarding
costs and identifying cost impacts is an important step towards
identifying readiness and safety impacts.
o DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics that would
provide the capability to measure progress toward reducing
corrosion impacts, although we and Defense Science Board have
previously recommended that it do so. DOD asserts that it cannot
establish such metrics until it has first identified the corrosion
impacts--yet, as stated above, DOD has made only minimal progress
in the identification of these impacts. The lack of
results-oriented metrics impedes DOD's ability to implement its
corrosion strategy.
Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these
issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive
goal, and opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and
avoid safety problems will be lost.
Most of the weapon system acquisition programs we reviewed had not
incorporated key elements of corrosion prevention planning. Of the
51 recent major acquisitions we reviewed, only 14 had both
corrosion prevention plans and advisory teams. The guidebook
created by the Corrosion Office encourages weapon system
acquisition programs to incorporate corrosion prevention and
control plans and advisory teams in order to achieve viable
corrosion prevention and control planning. DOD acquisition program
officials retain broad discretion in developing individual
approaches to corrosion prevention planning, and many different
approaches are taken within and among the services. However, 27 of
the 51 programs we reviewed had not included either of the two key
elements of corrosion prevention planning. Most programs did not
have corrosion prevention plans or corrosion prevention advisory
teams in part because these plans and teams are not mandatory. As
a result, the Corrosion Office could not effectively monitor DOD
acquisition practices, as required by 10 U.S.C. S 2228(b)(5), to
ensure that corrosion prevention technologies and techniques were
being fully considered and incorporated when deemed appropriate.
Moreover, these programs may be missing opportunities to prevent
future corrosion and therefore mitigate the impacts of corrosion
on the costs, readiness, and safety of military equipment.
We are making recommendations designed to improve DOD's and the
services' efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion. In commenting
on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations. In its response, DOD cited actions it planned to
take which are generally responsive to our recommendations. In
addition, the department provided several technical comments which
we considered and incorporated where appropriate. DOD's comments
and our evaluation of them appear later in this report.
Background
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has been designated DOD's Corrosion
Executive. The Corrosion Executive is supported by staff assigned
to the Corrosion Office. The Corrosion Office was initially
established in 2003 as an independent activity within the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, reporting directly to the Corrosion Executive.7 In
2004, the Corrosion Office was formally assigned to the Defense
Systems Directorate. The direct chain of command went through the
Defense Systems Directorate, which provided management and
administrative support. Following a reorganization of the
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization in 2006, the
Corrosion Office was moved to the Systems and Software Engineering
Directorate. The Corrosion Office no longer reports directly to
the Corrosion Executive. Appendix III depicts DOD's organizational
structure to address corrosion.
The Corrosion Office is led by the Special Assistant for Corrosion
Policy and Oversight and works closely with the Corrosion
Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team, which has
representatives from the military services and other DOD
organizations to accomplish the goals and objectives of the
Corrosion Office. Several working teams have also been established
to conduct work in the seven areas making up the corrosion
strategy: policy and requirements; impact, metrics, and
sustainment; science and technology; communications and outreach;
facilities; training and doctrine; and specifications, standards,
and product qualification.
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook8 contains guidance regarding the
defense acquisition system, which exists to manage the nation's
investments in technologies, programs, and product support
necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and support
the United States Armed Forces. This guidebook contains specific
guidance regarding acquisition strategies, which define the
approach a program manager will use to achieve program goals.
Among other things, an effective strategy minimizes the time and
cost required to satisfy approved capability needs. DOD's
directive on the defense acquisition process states that program
managers shall consider corrosion prevention and mitigation when
making trade-off decisions that involve cost, useful service, and
effectiveness.9 Moreover, on November 12, 2003, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
issued a policy memorandum stating that corrosion prevention
should be specifically addressed at the earliest phases of the
acquisition process by decision authorities at every level.10
DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Implementing
Its Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategy
DOD has had long-standing problems in funding, identification of
impacts, and development of metrics, and these are continuing.
DOD's implementation of its long-term corrosion strategy, as
required under 10 U.S.C. S 2228(c), has been hindered by
weaknesses in these three critical areas. First, the Corrosion
Office does not review the services' corrosion programs or annual
budget requests, even though this is required by 10 U.S.C. S
2228(b)(3). Second, the Corrosion Office has made only minimal
progress in identifying corrosion impacts. Third, the Corrosion
Office has not developed results-oriented metrics, even though we
have previously recommended that it do so.
DOD�s Corrosion Office Does Not Review All of the Military Services�
Funding Requests
Although 10 U.S.C. S 2228(b)(3) requires the Corrosion Office
within OSD to review the annual funding requests for the
prevention and mitigation of corrosion for each military service,
the Corrosion Office has not done so. The Corrosion Office does
not review comprehensive corrosion data from the services on their
programs and funding requests because (1) DOD has not required the
services to provide budget information to the Corrosion Office and
(2) the services lack an effective mechanism for coordinating with
the Corrosion Office with respect to their corrosion funding
requests. None of the four services has a designated official or
office to oversee and coordinate corrosion activities, including
identifying annual servicewide funding requirements. Without a
requirement or mechanism for reporting service funding
information, the Corrosion Office officials said they are unable
to review the services' complete corrosion-related funding
information, and thus DOD is hampered in its ability to provide
oversight of the services' funding requests.
The Corrosion Office currently has oversight over only a small
portion of departmentwide corrosion spending that is provided
through a separate appropriations account. The Corrosion Office
reviews and selects for funding the projects that are proposed by
the services based on a combination of criteria, including:
whether a project would benefit more than one service, whether it
is projected to be completed within 2 years of its initial
funding, the availability of matching funds; and the return on
investment that it offers. For fiscal year 2006, DOD and the
military services funded about $24 million for corrosion strategy
efforts. Of this amount, $19 million was spent on 29
corrosion-related projects and about $5 million on contractor
support, training, outreach, and other administrative activities.
The DOD Corrosion Office projects a combined average return on
investment of 42.5 to 1 for the $19 million, or a projected
savings of $809 million over the life of the projects.
The services frequently bypass the Corrosion Office to obtain
their funding for corrosion-related efforts. We reviewed the
President's budget justification for fiscal year 2006 and
identified more than $97 million for service-specific corrosion
mitigation-related projects in addition to those reviewed by the
Corrosion Office. These projects had not been submitted to the
Corrosion Office for review, and Corrosion Office officials told
us that they lacked any information about the $97 million and the
status of the associated efforts. Because corrosion-related
projects may be included under other maintenance projects or
budget accounts, it is likely that there is more funding that we
have not identified. According to recent corrosion cost studies
conducted by DOD, the annual corrosion costs for Army ground
vehicles and Navy ships alone were identified to be $2.019 billion
and $2.438 billion, respectively. Without comprehensive reviews of
the services' corrosion-related programs and proposed funding
requests, the Corrosion Office cannot fulfill its oversight and
coordination role for the department.
None of the four services has a designated official or office to
oversee and coordinate corrosion activities, despite a
recommendation by the Defense Science Board that they do so.
Currently, multiple offices in the services are responsible for
corrosion programs and related budgets. For example, several Air
Force offices are responsible for corrosion-related matters:
maintenance issues belong to the Air Force Corrosion Prevention
and Control Office, corrosion policy for weapon systems is managed
by an office within the Air Force Maintenance Directorate, and
corrosion policy for infrastructure is handled by the Air Force
Civil Engineering Directorate. None of these offices has
comprehensive knowledge about corrosion activities throughout the
Air Force. Without a designated official or office for corrosion,
the services do not have the mechanism or capability to fully
identify their annual servicewide corrosion funding requirements.
Progress in Identifying Corrosion Impacts Has Been Minimal
DOD has acknowledged since 2002 that the identification of cost,
readiness, and safety impacts is critical to the implementation of
its corrosion strategy. We recommended in 2003 that DOD complete a
study to identify these impacts, and further recommended in 2004
that DOD accelerate its efforts in order to complete the baseline
prior to its original estimated date of 2011. According to DOD,
the purpose of the study is to document where corrosion problems
exist, identify their causes, and prioritize them for funding
according to their relative severity in terms of their impact on
DOD costs, readiness, and safety.
In August 2004, after developing a cost-estimating methodology, a
DOD contractor began a study to determine the total cost of
corrosion for military equipment and facilities across the
services. DOD currently plans to complete this cost study by 2009,
2 years earlier than originally planned. The study uses fiscal
year 2004 costs as a measurement baseline and consists of several
segments, to be completed sequentially. To date, it has made some
progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts. For example, in
April 2006, DOD completed the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship
corrosion segments of this study.11 Several segments remain to be
completed, including Army and Marine Corps aviation. Corrosion
Office officials told us that progress has been slower than
expected, primarily because of a lack of corrosion data. Table 1
shows the corrosion cost segments included in the study and their
planned completion dates.
7 Because the position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is currently vacant, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is acting
as DOD's Corrosion Executive.
8 Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, v. 1.6
(Ft. Belvoir, Va.: July 24, 2006).
9 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1,The Defense Acquisition System
(May 12, 2003).
10 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Corrosion
Prevention and Control, November 12, 2003.
11 LMI Government Consulting, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for Army Ground
Vehicles and Navy Ships (McLean, Va.: April 2006).
Table 1: Corrosion Cost Segments and Estimated Completion Dates
Corrosion cost segments Estimated completion date
Army ground vehicles 2006 (actual)
Navy ships 2006 (actual)
DOD facilities 2007 (planned)
Army aviation and missiles 2007 (planned)
USMC ground vehicles 2007 (planned)
Navy and USMC aviation 2008
Coast Guard aviation and ships 2008
Air Force aviation and missiles 2009
Source: LMI Government Consulting.
The two completed studies generated data that could be potentially
useful for developing initiatives aimed at reducing long-term
corrosion costs, but DOD lacks an action plan for using these
data. For example, the studies estimate the annual corrosion costs
for Army ground vehicles and Navy ships at $2.019 billion and
$2.438 billion, respectively. Costs are segregated in multiple
ways, such as costs incurred at the depot, organizational, and
intermediate maintenance levels; costs incurred while addressing a
corrosion problem (corrective); costs incurred while addressing a
potential problem (preventive); and direct costs incurred on end
items or removable parts. However, the Corrosion Office has not
developed an action plan on how it will use these data, or the
data expected from future cost studies, to develop corrosion
prevention and mitigation strategies. Without an action plan, DOD
could miss opportunities for achieving long-term corrosion cost
savings.
Finally, although it acknowledges the importance of identifying
corrosion impacts related to readiness and safety, DOD has made
virtually no progress in assessing these impacts. DOD officials
told us that they decided to identify cost impacts before they
identify readiness and safety impacts because more information is
available regarding costs, and identifying cost impacts is an
important step towards identifying readiness and safety impacts.
They said that some of their efforts will shift to readiness and
safety as the cost impact study approaches completion.
DOD Has Not Yet Developed Results-Oriented Corrosion Metrics
In June 2004, we reported that DOD lacked results-oriented metrics
in its corrosion strategy and, as a result, could not effectively
monitor progress toward achieving the goals of the corrosion
strategy. In May 2005, DOD updated its November 2004 long-term
corrosion strategy, but the update still does not contain
results-oriented metrics for measuring progress toward targeted,
quantifiable goals. In the strategy update, DOD has catalogued the
aspects of corrosion prevention cost, readiness, and safety
impacts that will need to be measured, but it has not quantified
them or linked them with targets for improvement. For example, on
a table entitled "Potential Revised Metrics Set", under the column
of safety impacts, the "facilities incidents" entry is linked with
the description "events over time related to corrosion." No
measurable outcomes are associated with either the designated
impact or the description. In addition, DOD officials told us that
they cannot establish quantifiable goals regarding corrosion costs
until they have completed the corrosion cost baseline, which, as
noted earlier, DOD plans to complete sometime in 2009. These
officials said that metrics for readiness and safety will likely
take several additional years to complete because less information
is available regarding readiness and safety impacts than
information regarding cost impacts. They told us that the
accompanying definitions and procedures will also take several
years to complete.
Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not
Incorporated Key Elements of Corrosion Prevention Planning
The Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook encourages
the establishment of corrosion prevention and control plans and
corrosion prevention advisory teams as early as possible in the
acquisition process. However, only 14 of the 51 programs we
reviewed actually had both plans and advisory teams. DOD
acquisition program officials have taken diverse approaches to
corrosion prevention planning. We found that one reason why most
programs did not have corrosion prevention plans or corrosion
prevention advisory teams is that while they are strongly
suggested, these elements are not mandatory.
DOD Guidance Encourages Corrosion Prevention Plans and Advisory
Teams
The guidebook developed by the Corrosion Office is intended to
assist acquisition program managers in developing and implementing
effective corrosion prevention and control programs for military
equipment and infrastructure.12 According to the Corrosion
Prevention and Control Guidebook, the corrosion prevention and
control plan and the corrosion prevention advisory team should be
established as early as possible in the acquisition process. DOD
officials told us that establishing both a plan and a team is
critical to effective corrosion prevention planning, and they
strongly recommend that corrosion prevention planning begin at the
start of the technology development phase of acquisition
(Milestone A), when the effort is made to determine the
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into the weapon
system. They said it should certainly occur no later than the
system development and demonstration phase (Milestone B), when the
first system and long lead procurement for follow-on systems may
be authorized. According to the guidebook, a corrosion prevention
and control plan should address a number of things, including
system design, including materials and processes to be used for
corrosion prevention and control, and should define the membership
and organization of the corrosion prevention advisory team. The
team should be actively involved in the review of design
considerations, material selections, costs, and any documentation
that may affect corrosion prevention and control throughout the
life cycle of the system or facility. Members should include
representatives from the contractors and DOD. In addition to this
DOD guidance, the individual services have issued guidance that
also calls for incorporating corrosion prevention planning during
acquisition of weapon system programs.13
Few Programs Have Both Corrosion Plans and Teams
Most of the acquisition programs we reviewed did not have either
plans or advisory teams for corrosion prevention and control. We
reviewed a nonprobability sample of 51 major defense acquisition
programs from the Army, Navy, and Air Force and found that only 14
of them had both corrosion prevention and control plans and
corrosion prevention advisory teams.14 A total of 20 programs had
developed corrosion prevention and control plans, and 18 had
established advisory teams. Of the 51 programs, 27 had neither a
plan nor an advisory team. Tables 2 and 3 list, by service, the
number of programs we reviewed that had developed corrosion
prevention and control plans and established corrosion prevention
advisory teams. Appendix IV contains information on specific
programs that we reviewed.
12 Department of Defense, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Corrosion Prevention and Control
Planning Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
13 For example, The Air Force's Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
requires the creation of a corrosion prevention and control plan and
corrosion prevention advisory board.
14 We reviewed 13 Army programs, 13 Air Force programs, and 25 Navy
programs based on a nonprobability sample from the Fiscal Year 2006 Major
Defense Acquisition Program List.
Table 2: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Either a
Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan or a Corrosion Prevention
Advisory Team
Programs that have a Programs that have a
corrosion prevention and corrosion prevention
control plan advisory team
Yes No Total Yes No Total
Army 5 8 13 5 8 13
Air Force 4 9 13 5 8 13
Navy 11 14 25 8 17 25
Total 20 31 51 18 33 51
Programs having neither a
Programs having both a corrosion corrosion prevention and
prevention and control plan and a control plan or corrosion
corrosion prevention advisory team prevention advisory team
Army 4 7
Air Force 4 8
Navy 6 12
Total 14 27
Source: GAO analysis of service data.
Table 3: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Both a
Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan and a Corrosion Prevention
Advisory Team and Programs Having Neither a Plan Nor a Team
Source: GAO analysis of service data.
Service Acquisition Officials Cite Diverse Approaches Taken
to Corrosion Prevention Planning
Service acquisition officials told us that they retain broad
discretion in developing individual approaches to corrosion
prevention planning. We found that planning is inconsistently
performed, and that so many different approaches are taken within
and among the services that DOD is unable to maintain the
oversight needed to ensure that corrosion prevention is being
effectively conducted. For example, the degree to which corrosion
prevention planning is performed depends on the initiative of the
respective acquisition program offices. The Air Force's C-17A
Globemaster program had a corrosion prevention plan and corrosion
prevention team in place early in the acquisition process, several
months before it obtained approval to proceed with full-scale
development. C-17 officials told us that they took a proactive
approach to avoid the corrosion problems experienced by the C-5
and KC-135 programs. In contrast, the Javelin program managed by
the Army has not established a corrosion prevention plan or
corrosion prevention team, even though the system development and
most of its production objectives have been completed. Javelin
program officials told us that they have extensive corrosion
prevention requirements in the system development specification
and have obtained the advice of corrosion prevention experts
located at the Aviation and Missile Research and Development
Center.
Further, some program officials told us that specific corrosion
prevention plans and corrosion advisory teams were not needed
because other documents and processes provide the same function.
The Navy's SSN 774 Class submarine program did not have a specific
corrosion prevention plan or corrosion prevention advisory team
because the program relied heavily on detailed specifications and
technical documents and on the experience of similarly designed
submarines.15
Officials from some programs said it was too early in the
acquisition process for them to have a plan or team, while those
from other programs claimed it was too late. The Air Force KC-135
Replacement program officials told us they do not have a corrosion
prevention plan or team because their system is still in the early
development phase and they have yet to establish firm dates for
their program design reviews. In contrast, Army High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System program officials said that it is not
sensible to have a corrosion prevention plan or team at this time
because their program is currently in full rate production.
Some programs we reviewed did not have a corrosion prevention plan
or team because program officials told us that upgrades to
existing weapon systems may be covered by an existing corrosion
prevention plan or team. On the one hand, the Airborne Warning and
Control System Block 40/45 upgrade program is a modification to
the prime mission equipment of the E-3 aircraft. This program does
not have its own corrosion prevention and control team or
corrosion prevention advisory team, but rather is covered by the
existing plan and team for the E-3 aircraft. On the other hand, a
different Air Force program we reviewed represents an upgrade to
the avionics system of the existing C-5 aircraft, and its
officials told us that corrosion prevention issues are more
appropriately addressed at the C-5 aircraft program level. These
officials told us that while the C-5 program has an existing
corrosion prevention advisory team, it does not currently have a
current corrosion prevention plan, though one is under development
and expected to be completed at the end of May 2007.
We found that one reason most programs have not prepared corrosion
prevention plans or established corrosion prevention advisory
teams is that these elements are not mandatory. Major acquisition
programs perform corrosion prevention planning at their
discretion, and that may or may not include having a corrosion
prevention plan, a corrosion prevention advisory team, or both.
Further, these programs are not required to provide the Corrosion
Office information regarding corrosion prevention planning. As a
result, the Corrosion Office could not effectively monitor DOD
acquisition practices to ensure that corrosion prevention
technologies and techniques are being fully considered and
incorporated when appropriate. Moreover, these programs may be
missing opportunities to prevent future corrosion and thereby
mitigate the impacts of corrosion on the costs, readiness, and
safety of military equipment.
Conclusions
More than 4 years have passed since Congress enacted legislation
requiring DOD to establish a corrosion prevention and mitigation
program, yet DOD has not met Congress's expectations. Since the
passage of this legislation, we have issued several reports on
corrosion and made numerous recommendations to strengthen DOD's
ability to combat corrosion. Further, the Defense Science Board
has called for an increased commitment on the part of DOD to
prevent and mitigate corrosion, referring to "the importance of
leadership commitment and proper incentives for ensuring corrosion
is considered early and often in decisions."16
DOD's progress in implementing its corrosion strategy has been
stymied by critical weaknesses. These include the absence of DOD
guidance directing the services to provide the Corrosion Office
with comprehensive data about their annual funding requirements
for corrosion prevention and mitigation, the absence of a
designated corrosion official or corrosion office within each of
the services, and the absence of a DOD action plan to guide use of
data in the corrosion cost study to achieve long-term cost
savings. Furthermore, the lack of a DOD requirement for all major
defense acquisition programs to have both a corrosion prevention
plan and a corrosion prevention team could lead to inadequate
corrosion prevention and, consequently, long-term corrosion
problems throughout the life cycle of weapon systems. These and
other weaknesses that we have raised in our previous reports
severely hinder DOD's ability to combat corrosion. Without top DOD
and service leadership commitment to addressing these issues,
corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive goal
and opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid
safety problems will be lost.
15 Such specifications and documents include a corrosion prevention and
control design manual, submarine class building specifications, and
material selection requirement documents.
16 Defense Science Board, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report on Corrosion Control
(Washington, D.C.: October 2004).
Recommendations for Executive Action
To effectively implement DOD's corrosion strategy and meet
congressional expectations expeditiously, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provide the necessary
leadership and commitment to take the following four actions.
To ensure that DOD's Corrosion Office provides oversight and
coordination of the services' proposed funding requests for
corrosion prevention and mitigation programs, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense:
o Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to require the military services to
provide comprehensive data about their annual funding requirements
for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts to the DOD
Corrosion Office, before annual funding requests are sent to
Congress.
o Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to
designate a corrosion official or a corrosion office within each
service that is responsible for corrosion prevention and
mitigation, and that the responsibilities of this official or
office include identifying the annual funding requirements for
corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts throughout the
service.
To ensure that DOD does not miss opportunities for achieving
long-term corrosion cost savings, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense:
o Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to develop an action plan for using the
information contained in the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship
segments of DOD's cost impact study. This plan should be completed
as expeditiously as possible and be updated in time to support the
fiscal year 2009 budget request. This plan should include
information on corrosion cost areas having the highest priority
and a strategy for reducing these costs. DOD should develop
comparable action plans for the information to be derived from
cost segments completed in the future.
To improve DOD's ability to avoid or limit corrosion problems
experienced by weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense:
o Require major defense acquisition programs to prepare a
corrosion prevention plan and establish a corrosion prevention
advisory team as early as possible in the acquisition process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
concurred with each of our four recommendations. In its response,
DOD cited actions it planned to take which are generally
responsive to our recommendations. In addition, the department
provided several technical comments which we considered and
incorporated where appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in
appendix V.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the
military services to provide comprehensive data about their annual
funding requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation
efforts to the DOD Corrosion Office before annual funding requests
are sent to Congress. DOD stated that a draft Corrosion Prevention
and Control Department of Defense Instruction will require the
military departments during the annual internal DOD budget process
to submit information on the proposed corrosion programs and
funding levels to the DOD Corrosion Executive. We believe this
action is long overdue and is a step in the right direction if
implemented. However, it remains uncertain when the instruction
will be approved and what it will look like when finalized.
Although the instruction was expected to be approved in November
2006, according to DOD officials, it is still undergoing revision.
In addition, the draft instruction, as it is currently written,
does not provide enough detail regarding the identification and
submission of comprehensive data for funding associated with all
corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts throughout DOD. For
example, the draft instruction does not specify the type of
funding information that is to be obtained by the services and
reported to the DOD Corrosion Office. DOD also commented that
corrosion prevention and mitigation activities are funded through
many different sources, no program elements exist in the military
departments that directly tie to corrosion, and many activities
are funded to complete corrosion-related work but are not
identified as such in budget documents. However, as we stated in
our report, we reviewed the President's budget justification for
fiscal year 2006 and were able to readily identify more than $97
million for service-specific corrosion mitigation-related projects
for which the Corrosion Office lacked any information.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force designate a corrosion
official or a corrosion office within each service to be
responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation, and that the
responsibilities of this official or office should include
identifying the annual funding requirements for corrosion
prevention and mitigation efforts throughout the service. DOD
stated that the same draft DOD Instruction cited in response to
the first recommendation also specifies that the heads of DOD
components shall designate a senior individual or office for
oversight of corrosion matters, and it directs the Secretaries of
the military departments to support this individual or office. DOD
stated that the Air Force has already designated such an official.
The draft instruction as it pertains to each service having a
corrosion executive or a corrosion office responsible for
corrosion prevention and mitigation is responsive to our
recommendation if implemented.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop an
action plan for using the information contained in the Army ground
vehicle and Navy ship segments of DOD's cost impact study. In
response, DOD stated that it would be impractical to develop an
action plan in time to be used for the 2008 budget cycle. While
our recommendation was intended for DOD to develop an action plan
as soon as possible to support near-term funding decisions for
corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts, we agree that DOD can
not do this in time to be used for the 2008 budget cycle.
Therefore, we have modified our recommendation to say that DOD
develop an action plan as expeditiously as possible and revise the
plan in time to support the fiscal year 2009 budget request. DOD
also stated that the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation
Strategic Plan already includes a requirement to select and fund
corrosion research projects and integrated product team activities
to enhance and improve corrosion prevention and mitigation
throughout DOD. DOD further stated that the Military Departments
assess and make priorities regarding corrosion based, in part, on
funding for the "Top Ten" high cost of corrosion-vulnerable
systems. While these efforts may have merit, we still believe that
an action plan would provide additional benefits as we recommend.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require every
major defense acquisition program to prepare a corrosion
prevention plan and establish a corrosion prevention advisory team
as early as possible in the acquisition process. DOD stated that a
corrosion prevention control plan will be developed for all ACAT I
programs before preliminary design review and implementation will
be reviewed at each milestone. DOD noted that the establishment of
a separate, formal Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team may not be
necessary for all program levels, though such a team will be
established for all ACAT I programs. DOD's response is essentially
responsive to our recommendation if carried out. In subsequent
discussions DOD officials told us that they partially concurred
because the response in some respects goes beyond our
recommendation by requiring that all ACAT I programs have a
corrosion prevention control plan and corrosion prevention
advisory team.
In addition to providing comments to our recommendations, DOD
commented about our statement that the development of metrics for
readiness and safety will likely take several additional years to
complete because DOD officials have placed a higher priority on
completing the cost impact studies. DOD commented that this is an
inaccurate and dangerous assertion and implies that the department
holds safety and readiness, the two linchpins of the operation
military mind-set, in lower esteem than cost. In subsequent
discussions, DOD officials told us that they decided to identify
cost impacts before they identify readiness and safety impacts
because more information is available regarding costs, and
identifying cost impacts is an important step towards identifying
readiness and safety impacts. We have modified our report by
incorporating this statement.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense
and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. This report will also be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov
.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO
staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in
appendix VI.
William M. Solis, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
List of Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. BillYoung
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Defense Science Board Recommendations
Defense Science Board recommendation DOD response
Create an independent team of corrosion experts to review Partially concur
all programs coming to the Defense Acquisition Board and
all maintenance plans to provide the expertise necessary
to decision makers.
Develop incentive structures to ensure corrosion and life Concur
cycle cost considerations in all designs and
manufacturing.
Mandate corrosion testing and reporting at all stages of Concur
development.
Issue directive to require that all major weapon system Concur
corrosion prevention advisory team members complete a
Defense Acquisition University-developed course on
corrosion control.
Accelerate the introduction of activity based cost Concur
accounting to ensure future visibility into actual life
cycle cost and cost of corrosion.
Contract for support in developing standard definitions, Partially concur
metrics, etc. to be completed and promulgated within a
year.
Direct the services to conform with these standards and Concur
to enable capture of complete and accurate
organizational, intermediate, and depot-level corrosion
man-hour, material, and cost data.
Use these data to make fact-based decisions regarding Concur
corrosion and corrosion cost and to track progress of
platform material improvement efforts.
Provide a separate funding line to support annual Partially concur
assessment teams, to provide the means and expertise to
manage ongoing maintenance efforts, and to support
organizational level training and maintenance.
Implement well-defined maintenance programs that included Concur
continuous corrosion performance improvement and
continuing assessment and reporting.
Require each service to contract and execute its part. Concur
Have all results reported to a common database for Concur
analysis and to support the development of a joint
strategy for corrosion maintenance that accommodates the
unique factors associated with each service and system.
Extend assessment database to capture existing aircraft Concur
and ship corrosion data.
Direct that services establish best practices maintenance Nonconcur
plans, benchmarking and providing adequate training to
all involved personnel at operator, intermediate, and
depot levels.
Establish a corrosion executive for each service with Concur
responsibility for oversight and reporting and full
authority over corrosion-specific funding and a strong
voice in corrosion-related funding.
Refocus and reinvigorate corrosion science and technology Partially concur
portfolio. Triple the effective funding in this area with
particular emphasis on development of a
materials-corrosion tool set that emphasizes
science-based modeling and simulation; fundamental
mechanistic understandings of corrosion phenomena as well
as accelerated testing; substitutes for effective
corrosion prevention materials which are being withdrawn
because of environmental and safety considerations; newly
developed materials; and nondestructive corrosion sensing
and measurement in the field as feedback to prognostic
and condition-based maintenance tools.
Divide the responsibilities for the Office of the Nonconcur
Secretary of Defense's corrosion effort between three
separate organizations: Defense Systems; Logistics,
Materiel, and Readiness; and Installations and
Engineering.
Source: DOD.
Note: Of the 17 total recommendations made by the Defense Science
Board, DOD concurred on 11, partially concurred on 4, and did not
concur on 2.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement
its corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy, including the
oversight of funding; identification of cost, readiness, and
safety impacts; and the development of results-oriented metrics,
we reviewed DOD's funding and progress for corrosion-related
projects that it initiated during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. We
reviewed the President's budget justification for fiscal year 2006
for corrosion-related efforts and met with DOD officials within
the Comptroller's Office regarding their oversight of the
Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office's budget. We also met with
DOD officials within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to assess their
oversight of programs and funding levels of the military services
during the annual budget reviews as well as their monitoring of
the services' acquisition practices. In particular, we met with
officials with the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office
responsible for managing, directing, and reviewing corrosion
prevention and mitigation initiatives. We met with DOD officials
involved with developing DOD's long-term strategy to prevent and
control corrosion. We obtained their assessments and perspectives
on corrosion prevention and mitigation programs and strategies;
obtained and reviewed DOD policies, procedures, guidelines, and
draft instructions for prevention and mitigation of corrosion on
DOD military equipment and infrastructure; and discussed
additional actions that could be taken to further prevent and
mitigate corrosion. We reviewed DOD's funding requirements for
fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and future year projections.
To assess the extent to which the military services' have
incorporated corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of
major weapon systems, we conducted a review of 51 major defense
acquisition programs from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These 51
programs were selected based on a nonprobability sample of
acquisition programs from the Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense
Acquisition Program List approved by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Navy programs
were about half of the programs on the list. A program is
designated a major acquisition program either by the Secretary of
Defense, or because it is estimated to require a total expenditure
of more than $365 million in research, development, test, and
evaluation funds or require a total expenditure of more than $2.19
billion in procurement funds. Our program selection represented
the functional capability areas for battle space awareness,
focused logistics, force application, force protection, and joint
training and included air, ground, and sea weapon systems. In
particular, we selected and reviewed 13 Army programs, 25 Navy
programs, and 13 Air Force programs. We met with officials
responsible for managing the acquisition programs and with
officials having primary responsibility for overseeing corrosion
prevention and mitigation within the respective services. We
obtained and reviewed military service policies and instructions
that establish corrosion prevention and control program
requirements. For the acquisition programs we selected, we
obtained and reviewed documents, including the acquisition
strategy, acquisition plan, and corrosion prevention and control
plans, as well as related information establishing corrosion
prevention advisory teams and other reports used for tracking and
monitoring corrosion-related design initiatives and corrections.
In particular, we discussed the barriers that exist to more
effectively employing corrosion control at program initiation and
acquisition.
We also reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board
report on corrosion control issued in October 2004, and obtained
DOD's related responses and actions taken to better address its
strategy for corrosion prevention and mitigation. We met with
Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office officials regarding their
concurrence and the related actions taken to date.
We conducted our work from April 2006 through January 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We did not validate the data provided by DOD. However, we reviewed
available data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with
DOD. We determined that the data used for our review were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the
following locations:1
o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Corrosion Policy and
Oversight Office
o Army
o U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
o U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama
1 Unless otherwise noted, the officials listed in this appendix have their
offices in the Pentagon or at locations in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area.
o Navy
o Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland
o Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard
o Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
Appendix III: Organizational Structure of DOD�s Corrosion Activities
Note: DUSD = Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.
aCurrently filled by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Appendix IV: Corrosion Prevention Planning in Selected Major
Defense Acquisition Programs
Corrosion
Corrosion prevention prevention advisory
Service and program and control plan team
Army
AB3, Apache Block III Yes No
UH-60M Blackhawk Upgrade, Utility Yes Yes
Helicopter Upgrade Program
Light Utility Helicopter No No
CH-47F Cargo Helicopter No No
Joint Cargo Aircraft No No
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Yes Yes
Program
Family of Medium Tactical No No
Vehicles
Stryker, Armored Vehicle Yes Yes
Bradley Upgrade, Bradley Fighting No Yes
Vehicle System Upgrade
High Mobility Artillery Rocket No No
System
Javelin, Advanced Anti-tank No No
Weapon System
Land Warrior, Integrated Soldier No No
Fighting System
Future Combat Systems Yes Yes
Navy
CVN 21, Next Generation Nuclear No Yes
Aircraft Carrier
DDG 1000, Zumwalt Class Destroyer No Yes
LHA Replacement New Amphibious Yes No
Assault Ship
Littoral Combat Ship Yes No
Cobra Judy Replacement, No No
Ship-based Radar System
Maritime Prepositioning Force No No
(Future)
T-AKE, Lewis and Clark Class of No No
Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships
CG(X), Next Generation Cruiser No No
CVN 68, Nimitz Class Nuclear No No
Powered Aircraft Carrier
DDG 51, Guided Missile Destroyer Yes Yes
LPD 17, Amphibious Transport Dock No No
SSGN, Ohio Class Conversion No No
SSN 774, Virginia Class Submarine No No
SSDS, Ship Self Defense System No No
Program
E-2C Reproduction, Hawkeye No No
Carrier-Based Early Warning
Aircraft
E-2D AHE, Advanced Hawkeye No No
Vertical Takeoff and Land Yes No
Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle
MH-60S, Utility Helicopter to Yes Yes
Replace Existing CH-46D, HH-60H,
SH-3 & UH1N Helicopters
CH-53K, Heavy Lift Replacement Yes No
Program
F/A-18E/F, Hornet Naval Strike Yes Yes
Fighter
H-1 Upgrades, U.S. Marine Corps No No
Mid-life Upgrade to AH-1W Attack
Helicopter and UH-1N Utility
Helicopter
MH-60R, Multi-Mission Helicopter Yes Yes
Upgrade
P-8A, Multi-Mssion Maritime Yes No
Aircraft Program
V-22, Osprey Joint Advanced Yes Yes
Vertical Lift Aircraft
VH-71, Presidential Helicopter Yes Yes
Fleet Replacement Program
Air Force
AWACS Upgrade, Airborne Warning No No
and Control System Block 40/45
Upgrade Program
Global Hawk, High Altitude No Yes
Endurance Unmanned Aircraft
System
C-130 Aircraft Avionics No No
Modernization Program
C-130J, Hercules Cargo Aircraft No No
Program
C-17A, Globemaster III Advanced Yes Yes
Cargo Aircraft Program
C-5 Aircraft Avionics No No
Modernization Program
C-5 RERP, Aircraft Reliability No No
Enhancement and Reengineering
Program
B-2 RMP, Radar Modernization No No
Program
F-22A, Advanced Tactical Fighter Yes Yes
F-35, Joint Strike Fighter Yes Yes
Program
Joint Primary Aircraft Training Yes Yes
System
KC-135 Replacement No No
Combat Search and Rescue No No
Replacement Vehicle
Source: GAO analysis of service data.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, Harold Reich, Assistant
Director; Leslie Bharadwaja; Larry Bridges; Tom Gosling; K. Nicole Harms;
Charles Perdue; Cheryl Weissman; and Allen Westheimer made key
contributions to this report.
(350825)
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Highlights of [35]GAO-07-618 , a report to congressional committees
April 2007
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are Needed to Address
Corrosion Issues
Corrosion can have a deleterious effect on military equipment and
infrastructure in terms of cost, readiness, and safety. Recognizing this
concern, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2003 required the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate an official or
organization to oversee and coordinate efforts to prevent and mitigate
corrosion. Recently, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2006 directed GAO to examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion
prevention and mitigation programs. In addition, GAO evaluated the extent
to which DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in acquiring
weapon systems. GAO reviewed strategy documents, reviewed corrosion
prevention planning for 51 recent major weapon system acquisitions, and
interviewed DOD and military service officials.
[36]What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ensure that actions
designed to effectively implement DOD's corrosion prevention strategy are
taken. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with GAO's four recommendations. DOD's actions are generally responsive to
the intent of GAO's recommendations.
DOD continues to have problems that hinder progress in implementing its
corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy. While it has created a
Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, that office lacks the ability to
oversee and coordinate its efforts throughout DOD, as envisioned by
Congress. For example:
o DOD's office does not review all of the services' proposed
funding requests for corrosion programs, even though it is
required to do so, because DOD has not directed the services to
provide such information and none of the services has a designated
official or office to oversee and coordinate servicewide corrosion
activities. Without comprehensive reviews of the services'
corrosion-related programs and proposed funding requests, the
office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role.
o DOD has made some progress in identifying corrosion cost
impacts, but it has not identified readiness and safety impacts.
It recently completed corrosion cost impact studies for Army
ground vehicles and Navy ships, identifying an estimated $4.5
billion in annual corrosion costs. Although the studies provided
potentially useful data for reducing these costs, DOD has not
developed an action plan to apply these data to developing
corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. Without an action
plan, it could miss opportunities to achieve long-term cost
savings.
o DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics, although GAO
has previously recommended that it do so.
Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these issues,
corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain elusive goals and
opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety
problems will be lost.
Most of the weapon system acquisition programs GAO reviewed had not
incorporated key elements of DOD corrosion prevention guidance. GAO found
that only 14 of the 51 programs reviewed had both corrosion prevention
plans and advisory teams, as encouraged in the DOD guidance. The primary
reason most programs did not have these two elements is that they are not
mandatory. As a result, these programs may be missing opportunities to
prevent and mitigate corrosion.
Corrosion Prevention Planning for Major Acquisition Programs
Programs that have a corrosion Programs that have a corrosion
prevention and control plan prevention advisory team
Yes No Total Yes No Total
Army 5 8 13 5 8 13
Air Force 4 9 13 5 8 13
Navy 11 14 25 8 17 25
Total 20 31 51 18 33 51
Source: GAO analysis of service data.
References
Visible links
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-753
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-640
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-709
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-618
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