Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable	 
Iraqi Security Forces (13-MAR-07, GAO-07-612T). 		 
                                                                 
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired
end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united,	 
stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international  
community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.	 
Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component 
in U.S. efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the  
United States has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi	 
military and police forces. DOD has also asked for an additional 
$5.8 billion in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and	 
fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request to continue 
U.S. efforts to develop Iraq forces and transition security	 
responsibilities to them. This testimony discusses the (1)	 
results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, and (2)
factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi security  
forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued reports and	 
ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we	 
reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the	 
information in this statement is based only on unclassified	 
documents.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-612T					        
    ACCNO:   A66768						        
  TITLE:     Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of    
Capable Iraqi Security Forces					 
     DATE:   03/13/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Counterinsurgency					 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Information classification 			 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military training					 
	     Police						 
	     Police training					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Global War on Terrorism				 
	     Iraq						 
	     National Strategy for Victory in Iraq		 

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GAO-07-612T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Changing Composition and Growth of Iraqi Security Forces Hav

          * [4]Iraqi Military and Police Force Levels Have Increased Over T
          * [5]Levels of Violence in Iraq Remain High Despite Increased Num

     * [6]Several Factors Complicate the Development of the Iraqi Secu

          * [7]Several Factors Have Complicated the Development of Effectiv
          * [8]More Information Is Needed to Fully Assess Progress in Devel

     * [9]Conclusion
     * [10]GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
     * [11]GAO's Mission
     * [12]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [13]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [14]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [15]Congressional Relations
     * [16]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 3:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, March 13, 2007

STABILIZING IRAQ

Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade

GAO-07-612T

This testimony was amended on March 23, 2007, to reflect a change on page
9. Footnote 5 was removed because the information in Appendix I supercedes
the information in the footnote.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi
security forces. In November 2005, the National Security Council issued
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq to clarify the President's
strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in
Iraq. The strategy articulated the desired end-state for U.S. operations
in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into
the international community, and a full partner in the global war on
terrorism. To achieve this end state, the United States is, among other
things, developing Iraqi military and police forces that will be capable
of leading security operations. Ultimately the U.S. goal is to transfer
security responsibilities from the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to
Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government as their capability and the
security situation improve. From 2003 through 2006, the United States
provided about $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces.
The U.S.-led MNF-I is responsible for developing Iraqi forces. ^1

My testimony discusses (1) the results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi
security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of effective
Iraqi forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued reports^2 and
ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both
classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement
is based only on unclassified documents.

To develop the information presented here, we relied on a number of prior
GAO reports and, where appropriate, we updated data. To update data on the
results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, we reviewed DOD
and MNF-I documents and obtained and assessed MNF-I data on
enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners from
the Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for establishing general trends in the number of
attacks. To assess and update information on factors affecting the
development of Iraqi security forces, we reviewed DOD and State reports,
transcripts of MNF-I and U.S. Embassy conferences, and MNF-I guidance on
Iraqi readiness assessments. This work was conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

^1In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential
Directive, which stated that DOD would be responsible for U.S. activities
relating to security and military operations in Iraq after the transition
of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi government.
The presidential directive established that the U.S. Central Command would
direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi
security forces. The Coalition Provisional Authority, established in May
2003, was the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the United States
and United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance of
Iraq.

^2GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, [17]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007);
and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in
Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police,
[18]GAO-05-431T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2005); and Rebuilding Iraq:
Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,
GAO-04-902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).

Summary

As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped 327,000
Iraqi security forces--a substantial increase from the 142,000 reported in
March 2005. The number of Iraqi security forces is more than double that
of MNF-I's January force level of about 153,000 personnel. While the Iraqi
security forces have grown in size and are increasingly leading
counterinsurgency operations, they and MNF-I have been unable to reduce
the levels of violence in Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day have
increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December 2006.

Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi
security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi forces
has not decreased violence.

           o First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force
           with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. Only
           one major component of the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi army,
           has counterinsurgency as its primary mission. The Iraqi army
           represents about 40 percent of the 327,000 Iraqi security
           personnel. The other major component--the Iraqi police--has
           civilian law enforcement as its primary mission.
           o Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting
           result in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces
           present for duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain
           standardized reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does
           not know how many coalition-trained police the ministry still
           employs or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on
           the payroll are coalition trained and equipped. In addition, DOD
           estimates that one-third of Iraqi soldiers are on leave at any one
           time as they return home to provide money to their families.
           o Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the
           loyalties of Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example,
           the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the
           Ministry of Interior and the police were heavily infiltrated by
           militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According
           to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian
           divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army units.
           o Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent
           upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and
           intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was
           providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military,
           including life support, fuel, uniforms, building supplies,
           ammunition, vehicle maintenance and spare parts, and medical
           supplies.

           The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without
           detailed information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I
           captures such information in its Transition Readiness Assessments
           (TRAs), but DOD does not provide this critical information to
           Congress. The TRA reports provide information on and identify gaps
           in areas such as each Iraqi unit's manpower, equipment, training
           levels and, as of late 2006, operational effectiveness and
           reliability. Congress needs this information to make informed
           appropriations decisions and engage in meaningful oversight.
           Despite repeated attempts over many months, we have yet to be
           provided the TRA information we are seeking.
			  
			  Background

           In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the
           military organizations of the former regime, and the United States
           and Iraq began the process of reestablishing or creating new Iraqi
           military and police forces. Over time, multinational force
           commanders assumed responsibility in their areas for recruiting
           and training some Iraqi military and police forces. In October
           2003, the multinational force outlined a multistep plan for
           transferring security missions to the Iraqi forces. The plan had
           the objective of gradually decreasing the number of U.S. forces in
           conjunction with neutralizing Iraq's insurgency and developing
           Iraqi forces capable of securing the country. From the fall of
           2003 through April 2006, MNF-I revised its security transition
           plan a number of times because the Iraqi government and its
           military and police forces proved incapable of assuming security
           responsibilities within the timeframes envisioned by the plans.
           MNF-I first revised the security transition plan in its August
           2004 campaign plan and later in the April 2006 joint MNF-I/U.S.
           Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan. In our classified briefings to
           members and staff, we have discussed the campaign plan and
           conditions for drawing down U.S. forces. Details of the plans are
           classified and can be discussed separately from this unclassified
           statement. ^3

           The current version of MNF-I's security transition plan includes
           the following four phases. According to State and DOD officials,
           MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy Baghdad are in the process of revising
           their April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, which includes the current
           security transition plan.

           o Partnership: During the first phase, which occurred from 2005
           through 2006, MNF-I expanded the use of military, police, and
           other transition teams to assist in the development of Iraqi
           security forces and ministries. Its major subordinate commands
           established partnerships with Iraqi military units.
           o Iraqi army lead: In the second phase, currently ongoing, MNF-I
           is attempting to organize and develop Iraqi army units so that
           they can assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. Units
           in the lead, however, still require MNF-I support because they
           need to develop additional capabilities, particularly in the
           logistics and combat support areas.
           o Provincial Iraqi control: For the third phase, MNF-I and the
           Iraqi government determine when the Iraqi provinces can assume
           responsibility for security based on the threat level in the
           province, the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and the
           provincial government, and MNF-I's ability to respond to major
           threats, if needed. According to an MNF-I official, as these
           conditions are met, MNF-I forces will then move out of all urban
           areas and assume a supporting role.
           o Iraqi security self-reliance: The government of Iraq is capable
           of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and
           forces through its security ministries.

           DOD has asked for an additional $5.8 billion to develop the Iraqi
           security forces in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and
           the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request (see
           table 1). Of this amount, about $3.25 billion (about 56 percent)
           would purchase equipment and transportation for the Iraqi security
           forces. For example, DOD requests resources to establish vehicle
           maintenance facilities at the National Maintenance Depot located
           in Taji and to procure equipment for the Iraqi military. DOD is
           also requesting about $1.29 billion for sustainment projects, such
           as those to support the Ministry of Interior's seven central
           warehouses that manage the storage and distribution of mission
           essential equipment procured for the Iraqi police.

^3See GAO, DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security
Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-152C (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005); and Plans for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-673C
(Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006).

Table 1: Request for Additional Funds to Develop Iraqi Security Forces
(dollars in millions)

                       2007 Supplemental                   2008                   
                                    Not                                           
Category            MOD   MOI Specified Subtotal      MOD   MOI Subtotal    Total 
Infrastructure    264.8 205.0         0    469.8        0     0        0    469.8 
Equipment and   1,584.3 373.6         0  1,957.9  1,043.0 245.0  1,288.0  3,245.9 
Transportation                                                                    
Training and       51.7  52.9         0    104.6     77.0 500.0    577.0    681.6 
Operations                                                                        
Sustainment     1,079.6  72.9         0  1,152.5    135.0     0    135.0  1,287.5 
Related               0     0     157.5    157.5        0     0        0    157.5 
Activities                                                                        
Total           2,980.4 704.4     157.5  3,842.3  1,255.0 745.0  2,000.0  5,842.3 

Source: Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund, Justification for Iraq
Security and Afghan Security Forces Fund, February 2007.

DOD is also requesting smaller amounts for infrastructure and training
projects, as well as related activities. For example, infrastructure
projects include the construction of logistical sustainment facilities at
the Taji National Depot, while training projects include the training of
Iraqi police officers who will serve as trainers at the 18 Iraqi
provincial police headquarters. Finally, under the related activities
category, DOD has requested about $155 million to support Iraqi security
forces in the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration program for militias.

Changing Composition and Growth of Iraqi Security Forces Have Not Led to a
Decrease in Violence

The Iraqi security forces are comprised of Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior forces that vary in size and training. Overall, the
number of operational Iraqi military and police personnel has increased
from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007.
Ministry of Interior forces are made up of the Iraqi police and other
components such as the national police (formerly known as special police)
that have differing levels of training. The Iraqi police account for over
70 percent of all Ministry of Interior personnel. Even though the number
of Iraqi forces has grown and more have taken the lead for security
operations, violence in Iraq increased significantly through the end of
2006.

Iraqi Military and Police Force Levels Have Increased Over Time

The number of military and police forces in Iraq has increased from about
142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007, making the total
number of personnel over twice that of the 153,000 U.S. and other
coalition forces under MNF-I, as of January 2007. The Iraqi total includes
about 135,000 personnel under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and about
192,000 personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Table 2 provides the
force levels for the major components of the Iraq security forces in March
2005 and in February 2007.

Table 2: Status of Iraqi Security Forces

                                           March 2005           February 2007 
                                 Operational/ Trained    Operational/ Trained 
Ministry Component                  and Equipped^a          and Equipped^a 
Defense  Iraqi Army                         59,880               132,856^b 
            Air Force                             186                     929 
            Navy                                  517                   1,135 
            Sub-total                       60,583 ^c               134,920^c 
Interior Iraqi Police Service             55,015^d                 135,000 
            Other MOI forces                   26,874                  24,400 
                                                                              
               o National Police                                       28,400 
               o Border                                                       
               Enforcement                                              4,400 
               o Other                                                        
                                                                       57,200 
            Subtotal                                                          
            Sub-total                        81,889^e                 192,200 
Total                                      142,472               327,120^f 

Sources: State Department and Multinational Security Transition Command
reports.

^aThe term "operational" refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term
"trained and equipped" refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are
from State Department's 3/9/05 and 2/28/07 Iraq Weekly Status Report and
Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi Security Forces Update,
1/26/07.

^bArmy numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.

^cUnauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense
numbers.

^dThe number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway patrol
forces.

^eUnauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior
numbers.

^fThe total does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities
Protection Service personnel working in 27 ministries.

Ministry of Defense forces are comprised of the Iraqi army's 10 divisions,
as well as a small air force and navy.^4 The Iraqi army generally receives
13 weeks of basic training, up from 8 weeks of basic training in 2005.
Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of Iraqi police--which
represents about 72 percent of police personnel within the interior
ministry--and other units, specifically, the national police (formerly the
special police), Department of Border Enforcement, and Center for
Dignitary Protection. Iraqi police precincts are under the operational
control of their local municipality and the corresponding provincial
government. New Iraqi police recruits generally undergo a 10-week basic
training course. Police with prior experience attend a 3-week course
instead of the basic course. The national police receive 6 weeks of
initial training.

Levels of Violence in Iraq Remain High Despite Increased Numbers of Iraqi
Security Forces and Greater Numbers of Iraqi Battalions Leading Operations

The overall growth in trained and equipped Iraqi security forces and the
increasing number of Iraqi army battalions leading counterinsurgency
operations has not resulted in lower levels of violence in Iraq. As shown
in figure 1, since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have
deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by the increased numbers
of attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the
Sunni-Shi'a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the Golden
Mosque in Samarra.

^4As of January 2007, the Iraqi army consisted of 10 divisions, 36
brigades, and 112 battalions. Nine Iraqi army divisions are light infantry
and one is a mechanized division. The Iraq air force consists of 5
squadrons; the Iraqi navy has 4 squadrons and a marine battalion.

Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
Partners Compared with Progress in Developing Iraqi Security Forces

Notes: DOD recently provided GAO unclassified data through February 2007.
This information is shown in appendix I.

The average total attacks per day has increased from about 70 per day in
January 2006 to about 160 per day in December 2006, near the previous
record high of 180 per day reached in October 2006. These attacks have
increased around major religious and political events, including Ramadan
and elections. Coalition forces are still the primary target of attacks,
but the number of attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians also has
increased since 2003. In October 2006, the State Department reported that
the recent increase in violence had hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi
partners and showed the difficulty in making political and economic
progress in the absence of adequate security conditions. In the
President's revised strategy for Iraq, he stated that while political
progress, economic gains, and security are intertwined, political and
economic progress are unlikely absent a basic level of security.

In an effort to expand the combat power of the Iraqi army, Prime Minister
Maliki announced in the fall of 2006 that the Iraqi government would
expand the Iraqi army from 133,000 to about 164,000 personnel. This would
allow the Iraqi army to grow from 10 to 13 divisions, 36 to 41 brigades,
and 112 to 132 battalions. The initiative would also help compensate for
personnel shortages in some existing Iraqi army units.

In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, DOD stated that the
government of Iraq will fund the equipment for new Iraqi army units as the
government assumes increasing financial responsibility for Iraqi security
forces. However, the request also stated that the United States has
approved assistance to the Iraqi government to train and equip the
additional Iraqi army units that the Prime Minister requested. Iraq's
financial contribution to the continued development of its security forces
was not specified in the supplemental request. We are completing a review
of the Iraqi ministries' abilities to provide for their own security and
reconstruction needs.

Several Factors Complicate the Development of the Iraqi Security Forces; More
Information Is Needed to Assess Their Capabilities

Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi
security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security
forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence. These factors include
(1) the portion of Iraqi security forces dedicated to a counterinsurgency
mission, (2) high-rates of absenteeism and poor Iraqi ministry reporting
of active duty personnel, (3) sectarian and militia influences within
Iraqi forces, and (4) shortfalls in Iraqi logistical, command and control,
and sustainment capabilities. A complete assessment of the capabilities
and limitations of the Iraqi security forces can only be determined
through an analysis of data on their readiness. We have requested
unit-level TRAs from DOD but have not received them as of March 9, 2007.

Several Factors Have Complicated the Development of Effective Iraqi Security
Forces

The following factors help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi
security forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence.

First, Iraqi security forces are not a single, unified force; instead,
they are comprised of a wide range of units with different missions that
have changed over time. Of the security forces' major components, only the
Iraqi army currently has the primary mission of conducting
counterinsurgency operations. The Iraqi army has evolved over the past 3
years from two distinct forces: (1) army units that had the mission of
defending Iraq against external threats, and (2) former national guard
battalions^5 that were established to perform constabulary duties such as
setting up traffic control points and cordoning off streets in their home
areas. In early 2005, the Iraqi government decided to move Iraqi national
guard battalions into the Iraqi army and give the entire army the mission
of conducting counterinsurgency operations countrywide. The Iraqi army is
currently the second largest component of the Iraqi security forces and
represents about 41 percent of all Iraqi security personnel.

The Iraqi national police--a paramilitary force of about 24,000 personnel
under the Ministry of Interior--had conducted counterinsurgency operations
in the past, but the Iraqi government decided in late 2006 to transform it
into a civil security force due to frequent allegations of abuse and other
illegal activities. This transformation includes a 4-week retraining
program for Iraq's national police. While the 135,000 Iraqi police are
often forced to engage insurgents and other anti-Iraqi forces, their
primary mission and training has focused on civilian law enforcement. The
Iraqi police currently comprise about 41 percent of Iraqi security forces.

^5The Iraqi National Guard was first known as the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps.

Second, the number of Iraqi security forces who are present for duty is
significantly lower than the number of trained and equipped Iraqi
personnel reported by DOD and State. For example, data on the number of
trained and equipped Ministry of Interior personnel include police who are
absent without leave, while Ministry of Defense data exclude military
personnel who are absent without leave. In addition, according to DOD's
November 2006 report to Congress, due to a lack of standardized personnel
strength reporting in the Ministry of Interior, it is unclear how many of
the coalition-trained police the ministry still employs, or what
percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the ministry payroll are
coalition trained and equipped. Moreover, according to a DOD report, the
Iraqi army generally has about one-third of its soldiers (about 44,000 of
133,000 personnel) on leave so that they can take their pay home to their
families. In addition, some Iraqi army units directed to deploy for combat
operations outside of their normal operating areas have absent without
leave rates of more than 50 percent. This high-rate of absenteeism
significantly affects the manning levels of Iraqi army units at any given
time.

Third, sectarian and militia influences on the Iraqi security forces have
frustrated U.S. efforts to develop effective Iraqi military and police
forces and have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq.
According to the unclassified January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate
on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi
units and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside the areas
where they were recruited. According to an August 2006 DOD report,
sectarian lines among the Iraqi security forces are drawn geographically,
with Sunni, Shi'a, or Kurdish soldiers serving primarily in units located
in areas familiar to their group. According to the report, commanders at
the battalion level tend to command only soldiers of their own sectarian
or regional background. DOD also reported in November 2006 that political
forces in Iraq may have influenced senior military appointments on the
basis of sectarian affiliation.

Moreover, DOD and State also have reported numerous instances of sectarian
and militia influences on Iraqi police and national police. For example,
according to a DOD report, during operations to secure Baghdad in summer
2006, Shi'a death squads received support from some elements of the Iraqi
police and the national police. DOD reported that the police facilitated
militia movement and warned death squads of operations, serving as the
major reason for the increased levels of murders and executions. Further,
in November 2006, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
stated that the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi police were heavily
infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army.
According to the DIA Director, the Mahdi Army often operates under the
protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain and kill suspected Sunni
insurgents and civilians. In November 2006, the State Department reported
that corruption and infiltration by militias and others loyal to parties
other than the Iraqi government have resulted in the Iraqi security
forces, particularly the police, being part of the problem in many areas
instead of the solution.

Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the
coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities.^6 As of December 2006, the coalition was providing
significant levels of support to the Iraqi military, including life
support, fuel, uniforms, building supplies, ammunition, vehicle
maintenance and spare parts, and medical supplies.

More Information Is Needed to Fully Assess Progress in Developing Effective
Iraqi Security Forces

The extent of the challenges affecting the development of effective Iraqi
security forces cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on
the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I captures such information in its
TRAs, but DOD does not provide this critical information to Congress. The
TRA reports provide ratings of Iraqi capabilities and identify gaps in
areas such as each Iraqi unit's manpower, equipment, training levels and,
as of late 2006, operational effectiveness and reliability. GAO has
requested but DOD has not provided these unit-level TRAs.

MNF-I uses the TRA system to determine when units of the Iraqi security
forces can assume the lead for conducting security operations. The TRA is
a classified joint assessment, prepared monthly by the unit's coalition
commander and Iraqi commander. For the Iraqi army, commanders use the TRA
process to determine when a unit--specifically, a battalion, a brigade
headquarters, or a division headquarters--is prepared to assume the lead
in counterinsurgency operations.^7 The TRA report contains capabilities
ratings and detailed narrative information for each unit in personnel,
command and control, equipment, sustainment/logistics, training, and
leadership.^8 Appendix 2 shows a sample TRA form, as of December 1, 2006.
As of late 2006, the TRA also includes measures for determining how
militia and sectarian influences affect the loyalty and reliability of
Iraqi police and military forces. According to MNF-I guidance, the purpose
of the TRA system is to provide commanders with a method to consistently
evaluate units. It also helps to identify factors hindering unit progress,
determine resource shortfalls, and make resource allocations.

^6 [19]GAO-07-582T , Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on
Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2007); and Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007).

DOD provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall
readiness levels for the Iraqi security forces and information on units in
the lead. In mid-February, DOD allowed us to review TRAs from 2
battalions--1 Iraqi army battalion and 1 national police battalion.
However, DOD has not provided us with all unit-level TRA reports. We are
continuing to work with the department to obtain these reports because
they would help fully inform Congress on the capabilities and needs of
Iraqi security forces. As of March 9, 2007, DOD has not provided GAO with
this important data.

Conclusion

Capable and effective Iraqi security forces are a critical element in the
U.S. strategy to stabilize Iraq, drawdown U.S. forces, and lay the
foundation for political reconciliation and economic development. For the
past 3 years, MNF-I has tried to reduce violence in Iraq so that Iraqi
forces can assume greater responsibility for their country's security. The
additional $5.8 billion that DOD now seeks for the Iraqi security forces
attests to the importance of this mission. But, after 3 years, more than
$15 billion in prior U.S. assistance and a substantial increase in the
number of Iraqi security forces, violence in Iraq's society has not
lessened.

This outcome is partly explained by the differing capabilities among Iraqi
forces, high absenteeism, divided loyalties, and the continued reliance on
U.S. logistical support. Other reasons may be discerned from the readiness
assessments coalition advisors complete on Iraqi units. These classified
assessments show whether Iraqi units have their required manpower,
equipment, and training and how well they perform in battle. We have asked
DOD to provide us the TRAs, but they have not done so. We appreciate the
Committee's continuing support for our request.

^7MNF-I uses similar measures to assess the capabilities of other
components of the Iraqi security forces.

^8See GAO-07-308SP for more information on the TRA process.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. Christoff at
(202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Judith
McCloskey, David Bruno, Lynn Cothern, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, and
Mary Moutsos.

Appendix I: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
Partners

Appendix II: Example of the TRA Form Used to Assess Iraqi Army
Capabilities

Note: MNF-I revised this form effective January 10, 2007. The revised form
is for official use only

(320476)

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References

Visible links
  17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T
  19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-582T
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