Railroad Safety--Responses to Posthearing Questions (15-MAR-07,  
GAO-07-610R).							 
                                                                 
This letter responds to a Congressional request that we provide  
responses to questions related to our recent testimony before	 
Congress on reauthorizing federal rail safety programs. Our	 
testimony discussed how the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
(1) focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to 
train accidents in planning its oversight, (2) identifies safety 
problems on railroad systems in carrying out its oversight, and  
(3) assesses the impact of its oversight efforts on safety. This 
testimony was based on our recent report on these topics.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-610R					        
    ACCNO:   A66927						        
  TITLE:     Railroad Safety--Responses to Posthearing Questions      
     DATE:   03/15/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Federal regulations				 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Railroad accidents 				 
	     Railroad industry					 
	     Railroad regulation				 
	     Railroad safety					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Safety standards					 

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GAO-07-610R

March 15, 2007

The Honorable Corrine Brown
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives

Subject: Railroad Safety-Responses to Posthearing Questions

Dear Madam Chairwoman:

This letter responds to your request that we provide responses to
questions related to our recent testimony before your subcommittee on
reauthorizing federal rail safety programs.1 Our testimony discussed how
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (1) focuses its efforts on the
highest priority risks related to train accidents in planning its
oversight, (2) identifies safety problems on railroad systems in carrying
out its oversight, and (3) assesses the impact of its oversight efforts on
safety. This testimony was based on our recent report on these topics.2
Your questions, along with our responses, follow.

           1.  You mention that the success of many of FRA's initiatives
           addressing the most common causes of accidents will depend on
           voluntary actions by the railroads. Why? Is FRA focusing too much
           on voluntary measures and not enough on mandating regulations?

A number of FRA's current safety initiatives do rely to a great extent on
voluntary actions by the railroads. For example, the close call reporting
system3 will depend for its success on extensive participation by
railroads. As we reported in January, one railroad has committed to
participate in this pilot project in one rail yard, and, according to FRA,
two others have expressed strong interest. In addition, FRA's efforts to
develop a model to address the problem of worker fatigue depend on the
extent to which railroads eventually use this model to improve train crew
scheduling practices. Also, the agency emphasizes achieving compliance
from railroads voluntarily and takes enforcement action only in a small
percentage of cases of noncompliance found. We have not directly compared
FRA's emphasis on voluntary actions with that of other modal
administrations. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration has
emphasized partnership with industry through programs that allow
participants, such as airlines or pilots, to self-report violations of
safety regulations and potentially mitigate or avoid civil penalties or
other legal action. In the end, what is important is whether FRA is able
to demonstrate, through the use of performance measures and evaluations of
effectiveness, that its initiatives are effective in improving safety and
are superior in terms of costs and benefits to other safety regulatory
interventions.

1GAO, Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Better Targeting
Its Oversight, but Needs to Assess the Impact of Its Efforts, GAO-07-390T
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007).

2GAO, The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps to Better Target
Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is Needed to Determine Impact,
GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).

3According to FRA, a close call represents a situation in which an ongoing
sequence of events was stopped from developing further, preventing the
occurrence of potentially serious safety-related consequences.

           2.  What percentage of railroad operations is FRA able to inspect
           each year?

FRA estimates that it is able to inspect about 0.2 percent of railroad
operations each year. See also the response to question 6 for a discussion
of this issue and question 3 for an approach that could extend the reach
of safety efforts.

           3.  You state that FRA inspections are not designed to determine
           how well railroads are managing safety risks throughout their
           systems. What should FRA and its inspectors be doing differently?

For the most part, FRA inspections determine whether railroads are
complying with various safety standards, such as those related to track
and equipment condition, and its inspections are targeted at locations
where accidents have occurred or previous inspections have identified
problems. A complementary approach to these compliance inspections is
oversight of risk management, which can help to prevent accidents. Risk
management can be described as a continuous process of managing--through
the systematic identification, analysis, and control of risks associated
with such hazards--the likelihood of their occurrence and their negative
impact.4 Oversight of risk management can provide additional assurance of
safety beyond that provided by inspections of compliance with minimum
safety standards. It can supplement uniform, minimum standards by
encouraging or requiring companies to identify and address their unique
safety risks. Risk management has been used in the private and public
sectors for decades. For example, risk management approaches are being
used for public transit and pipeline safety in the United States and for
railroad safety in Canada, and the American Public Transportation
Association, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
and Transport Canada, respectively, oversee these approaches. While FRA
has taken some steps in a limited number of areas to encourage risk
management in the railroad industry, it does not oversee railroads'
overall approach for managing safety risks on their systems.

While we believe that adopting a comprehensive approach to overseeing
railroads' management of safety risks can lead to improved safety, we did
not recommend that FRA adopt such an approach. FRA is pursuing several
initiatives aimed at reducing accident rates, and these initiatives need
time to mature to demonstrate their effects. At the appropriate time, the
agency may wish to determine whether additional actions are needed.

4A framework for risk management based on industry best practices and
other criteria that we have developed divides risk management into five
major phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining
constraints; (2) assessing risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for
addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and
(5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and the
results achieved. See pages 35-39 of GAO-07-149 for further discussion.

           4.  In follow-up to some questions at the hearing, has GAO
           studied, determined, or in any way looked at whether the number of
           inspectors at the FRA is sufficient?

We did not assess whether the number of FRA inspectors was sufficient, nor
did we assess the degree to which state railroad inspections complement
FRA's inspections. However, we did note that the number of these
inspectors is quite small compared with the size of the industry.
(According to FRA, its inspectors inspect about 0.2 percent of railroad
operations each year.)

As discussed both in our January 2007 report and in our testimony
statement, the agency's implementation of its new inspection planning
approach allows it to better target the greatest safety risks and
therefore make more effective use of its inspector workforce. However, the
agency's approach to conducting inspections focuses on determining
compliance with minimum standards at specific sites visited. Oversight of
railroads' management of safety risks throughout their systems could
provide FRA with a greater "reach" and understanding of safety overall.
However, we did not recommend that FRA adopt such an approach because its
current initiatives to bring down the train accident rate need time to
demonstrate their effects.

           5.  How effective is FRA's safety program compared to the safety
           programs of other modal administrations?

We did not attempt to compare the effectiveness of FRA's safety program to
that of other modal administrations. Like other modal safety
administrations that we have reviewed--the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration, FRA is relatively small
compared to the industry it regulates. However, there are important
differences among industries that would require careful study as part of
any comparison of effectiveness. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration regulates about 677,000 commercial motor carriers,
while FRA regulates fewer than 700 railroads.

           6.  In your testimony, you state that FRA inspections cover only
           two-tenths of one percent all railroad operations. Is this a large
           enough sample to accurately gauge safety in the railroad industry?

This is a difficult question to answer because it would require an
assessment of not only the absolute number of inspections and resulting
problems found, but also the manner in which FRA is deploying its
inspectors and any deterrent effect that FRA's inspections and enforcement
actions might have. We are encouraged that, in 2005, FRA developed an
overall strategy through its National Rail Safety Action Plan for
targeting its oversight to areas of greatest risk. We believe that the
action plan provides a reasonable framework for guiding these efforts.

We also concluded that FRA needs to (1) do more to measure the direct
results of its oversight, such as the extent to which identified safety
problems are corrected, and (2) measure the effectiveness of its
enforcement program. We made recommendations to this effect and are
looking forward to FRA's response. Finally, as discussed earlier (see our
response to question 3), adopting a risk management framework could expand
the reach of FRA's inspection and enforcement programs.

           7.  In your testimony, you state that the FRA does not oversee
           railroads' management of safety risk, while many other agencies
           do. Would such oversight improve the safety of railroad
           operations? Are there any models that the FRA should look at to
           implement its own program?

See the response to question 3 for a discussion of this issue.

           8.  What should the FRA do to improve its safety enforcement
           program?

We found that FRA cannot demonstrate how its inspection and enforcement
efforts are contributing to rail safety and that FRA lacks key
information, such as measures of the direct results of these efforts, that
could help it improve performance. While such measures are not always easy
to develop, at least two other modal administrations within the
department--the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--have done so.
Coupled with better measures of FRA's direct results is the need to assess
the effectiveness of its enforcement approach, especially its use of civil
penalties, to understand the degree to which they contribute to improved
safety outcomes and to determine whether it should adjust its approach to
improve performance. We recommended that FRA (1) develop and implement
direct measures of its inspection and enforcement programs and (2)
evaluate its enforcement program to provide further information on the
program's results and the need for any changes to improve performance.

           9.  Based on the small sample of railroad operations that the FRA
           inspects, and how it inspects them, do you believe that the FRA is
           in a position to say if the railroads are safe or not?

See our response to question 6 for a discussion of this topic.

           10.  In your testimony, you state that the FRA efforts to improve
           safety will depend on voluntary action by railroads. Is voluntary
           action sufficient to improve safety?

See our response to question 1 for a discussion of this issue.

           11.  States can play an important role in assisting FRA with
           ensuring safety along the rail lines. Unfortunately, FRA has been
           reluctant to allow states to regulate the railroads in order to
           provide a safe environment for their residents. What role do you
           feel states should play in assisting with railroad safety and
           regulation?

As we noted in our January 2007 report, 30 state oversight agencies
participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct safety oversight
activities at railroads' operating sites. About 160 state inspectors work
with FRA to conduct inspections and other investigative and surveillance
activities as needed. These inspectors are an important supplement to
FRA's 400 inspectors, since the size of the railroad industry is quite
large. FRA officials have told us that the agency does not provide funding
for state inspection activities (except for training and computer
equipment) and therefore does not have authority to tell states what
inspections to conduct. FRA's regional offices do coordinate inspection
activities with participating states in their region.

Our work focused on FRA's activities. We did not assess potential and
actual states' roles or FRA's efforts to encourage state participation. If
a larger role is envisioned for states, several questions would have to be
addressed, including (1) the goals for state participation (e.g.,
increased safety levels to be achieved), (2) how federal and state efforts
would complement each other, (3) what inspection and enforcement authority
(e.g., to cite violations) would be allowed; and (4) who would pay for any
increase in state inspection presence.

                                   - - - - -

We are making copies of this letter available to others upon request and
it will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about its content, please
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] . Contact points for
our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this letter. Key contributors to this letter were Judy
Guilliams-Tapia and James Ratzenberger.

Sincerely yours,

Katherine A. Siggerud
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

(542113)

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