Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard	 
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness (26-JAN-07,	 
GAO-07-60).							 
                                                                 
The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions 
has reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic	 
missions, at the same time it faces an expanded array of threats 
at home. The massive state-led, federally funded response to	 
Hurricane Katrina illustrates the Guard's important role in	 
responding to the effects of large-scale, multistate events as	 
well as the difficulty of working with multiple state and federal
agencies. To address congressional interest in the Guard's	 
domestic preparedness, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the  
Guard's domestic equipment requirements have been identified, (2)
the Department of Defense (DOD) measures and reports to Congress 
the equipment readiness of non-deployed Guard forces for domestic
missions, and (3) DOD actions address the Guard's domestic	 
equipping challenges. GAO examined the National Guard's plans and
equipment status and included case studies in California,	 
Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-60						        
    ACCNO:   A65189						        
  TITLE:     Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness			 
     DATE:   01/26/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Army supplies					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Equipment inventories				 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Government owned equipment 			 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military training					 
	     National Guard					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Strategic planning 				 

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GAO-07-60

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions

          * [4]DOD and State Planning for the National Guard's Use in Domes
          * [5]National Guard Bureau Charter and Civil Support Regulation D

     * [6]DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedn

          * [7]Current Readiness Assessments and Reports on National Guard
          * [8]Some Efforts Are Under Way to Better Assess National Guard P
          * [9]Data Indicate the Majority of State National Guards Have Cap

               * [10]National Guard Capability to Respond to Typical State
                 Missio
               * [11]Equipment Available for Warfighting and Domestic
                 Missions

     * [12]DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equ

          * [13]DOD Is Procuring Items and Transforming Units to Increase Na
          * [14]Army Plans for Balancing Equipment for Deployed and Nondeplo

     * [15]Conclusions
     * [16]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [17]Matters for Congressional Consideration
     * [18]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [19]GAO Contact
     * [20]Acknowledgments
     * [21]GAO's Mission
     * [22]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [23]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [24]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [25]Congressional Relations
     * [26]Public Affairs

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Relations, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

January 2007

RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements
and Readiness

GAO-07-60

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 8
National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions Not Fully
Identified 12
DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedness for
Domestic Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet Complete 18
DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equipment
Challenges, but Long-term Effect on Domestic Preparedness Is Unclear 29
Conclusions 33
Recommendations for Executive Action 34
Matters for Congressional Consideration 36
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 36
Appendix I National Planning Scenarios 44
Appendix II Scope and Methodology 46
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 48
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52
Appendix IV Related Products 53

Tables

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles 10
Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard Bureau
as Essential to Support Domestic Missions 22
Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards
Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical State
Missions 25
Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where
the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized for
Warfighting Missions, Including Substitutes 28
Table 5: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios and
Summary Descriptions 45

Figures

Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including
Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National Guard Forces as of
November 3, 2006 27
Figure 2: The Army's Proposed Force Generation Model 32

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

January 26, 2007

The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The global security environment has changed significantly since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the nation now faces
adversaries who are committed to attacking American interests both
overseas and at home. The National Guard with its dual federal and state
roles has been in demand to meet both evolving overseas operations and
emerging homeland security1 requirements. Since the launch of the Global
War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest
activation of its forces since World War II. At the same time, the Guard's
domestic missions have expanded from routine duties, such as responding to
hurricanes and forest fires, to include activities such as flying armed
air patrols over U.S. cities, providing radar coverage for the continental
United States, protecting critical infrastructure against terrorist
threats, and securing U.S. borders.

Multiple state and federal agencies have roles in planning the response to
the broad range of domestic events to which the National Guard may be
called with the federal government providing more than 90 percent of the
Guard's funding. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for
planning for the Guard's use and the services for equipping its units for
federal missions performed under the command of the President. In
addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has been
established to supervise DOD's homeland defense activities and the U.S.
Northern Command is responsible for planning, organizing, and executing
DOD's civil support missions within the continental United States. The
Department of Homeland Security is responsible for developing a system to
integrate federal, state, and local domestic emergency response and
provides grants to the states to build their emergency response
capabilities. Also at the federal level, the President's Homeland Security
Council2 provides strategic guidance on terrorism prevention and has
developed 15 national planning scenarios to guide federal, state, and
local planning for catastrophic events (see app. I). States are
responsible for planning for National Guard missions performed under the
command of the governors. National Guard units are generally expected to
perform their state missions using the equipment DOD has provided for
federal missions. However, the National Guard's equipment inventories in
the United States have significantly decreased because of overseas
operations, particularly in the Army National Guard, at a time when the
nation faces an increasing array of threats at home.

1According to the Office of Homeland Security's National Strategy for
Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security is a
broad term that encompasses efforts to reduce America's vulnerability to
terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as respond to an attack
that might occur. DOD refers to its contributions to the overall homeland
security efforts it expects to lead as "homeland defense" and activities
DOD will perform in support of efforts led by other federal, state, or
local agencies as "defense support of civil authorities."

We have previously reported that the high pace of operations has caused a
strain on the Army National Guard's equipment inventories that could be
used for domestic missions and that planning for the military's response
to large-scale, catastrophic events is not complete. In October 2005, we
reported that nondeployed Army National Guard units had only about
one-third of the equipment they needed for their overseas missions.3 We
also reported on the National Guard's response to help manage the
consequences of Hurricane Katrina, a large-scale catastrophic event.4 Over
50,000 National Guard members from all 50 states were activated to assist
in the Katrina response effort, demonstrating the pivotal role National
Guard forces play in responding to large-scale, multistate events.
However, we noted a number of serious deficiencies in planning for such
events on the federal and state levels. Two significant shortfalls of
DOD's pre-Katrina planning were that (1) the capabilities DOD could be
called upon to provide had not been assessed and (2) planning did not
fully address the division of tasks between National Guard resources under
the governors' control and federal resources under presidential control.
DOD is now considering steps to address some of the deficiencies
identified in Hurricane Katrina lessons learned reports. A list of related
GAO products is included at the end of this report.

2The Homeland Security Council is composed of cabinet-level officials and
coordinates homeland security-related activities among executive
departments and agencies.

3GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, [27]GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4,
2005).

4GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, [28]GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).

Because of the National Guard's important role in homeland security, you
asked us to assess whether the National Guard has the equipment it needs
to train and maintain readiness for the full range of its domestic
missions. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) the National
Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions have been identified
using an analytically based process, (2) DOD measures and reports to
Congress the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for
domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the National Guard's
domestic equipment challenges.

To determine the extent to which the National Guard's equipment
requirements for domestic missions have been identified using an
analytically based process, we reviewed the status of requirements
planning for National Guard forces. We also conducted case studies in four
states--California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia--which face a
range of homeland security threats to understand the status of the
National Guard's equipment and state planning efforts for the National
Guard's state missions. We also met with U.S. Northern Command, National
Guard Bureau, and Department of Homeland Security officials to discuss
planning processes for the Guard's missions. To assess the extent to which
DOD measures and reports on the equipment readiness of nondeployed
National Guard forces for domestic missions, we reviewed documentation on
DOD's readiness reporting systems and its annual report to Congress on
National Guard equipping, analyzed the inventory status of equipment items
determined by the Army National Guard as having a high value for domestic
missions, reviewed state assessments of domestic capability shortfalls,
and discussed these issues with state National Guard officials in four
case study states. Further, we reviewed documentation on DOD, Army, Air
Force, and National Guard Bureau actions to address National Guard
equipping challenges to determine the extent to which they were derived
from approved requirements and focused on high-priority needs. We
conducted our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and
determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our
objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are described in
further detail in appendix II.

Results in Brief

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to perform
its domestic missions have not been fully identified using an analytically
based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate natural disasters
and terrorist attacks, because states and federal agencies have not
completed an integrated set of plans identifying the capabilities the
National Guard would be expected to provide in response to events like
those described in the Homeland Security Council's 15 national planning
scenarios. The Department of Homeland Security, through the National
Response Plan, has established a framework for federal, state, and local
agencies to use in planning for domestic emergencies. While DOD is
developing plans for the use of federal military forces in domestic
missions, it assumes that the National Guard will respond to large-scale,
multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina under the command of the
governors and therefore does not prepare plans for the Guard's use in
those types of events. States plan for the National Guard's use in the
missions they will lead within their borders, such as responding to
wildfires and floods. However, neither the states nor DOD have
comprehensively planned and identified requirements for the National
Guard's role in responding to events such as the Homeland Security
Council's national planning scenarios that may involve more than one state
and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed in part
because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating state planning
across borders for the Guard's role in large-scale events. As the response
to Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the National Guard Bureau can play a
significant role in facilitating National Guard support among states. As
the liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states' National
Guard forces, the bureau is well positioned to facilitate interstate
planning for the use of National Guard forces in large-scale, multistate
events. However, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its
regulation on military support to civil authorities specifically defines a
role for it in working with the states to facilitate the kind of
comprehensive, pre-event planning that is needed for a coordinated,
efficient, and effective response to large-scale, multistate events.
Moreover, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation
on military support to civil authorities has been updated to reflect the
post-September 11, 2001, security environment, including the bureau's role
with respect to new organizations such as the Department of Homeland
Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, and the U.S. Northern Command. Unless the National Guard Bureau's
charter and regulation on military support to civil authorities are
revised to address the expanded set of homeland security issues the
National Guard faces, the extent to which the National Guard Bureau will
continue or expand its efforts to assist states with planning for and
responding to these events will likely remain uneven. As a result,
planning that fully identifies the Guard's requirements for domestic
missions and is integrated with plans for using other military and
civilian forces is likely to remain incomplete, and the National Guard may
not be prepared to respond to domestic events, such as those described in
the national planning scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as
possible. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to (1) revise the National Guard
Bureau's charter to clearly define its roles in facilitating interstate
planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events,
such as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and monitoring
the Guard's status to perform those missions, and (2) update the National
Guard's civil support regulation. We are also recommending that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to
direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S.
Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian
authorities, to facilitate and coordinate interstate National Guard
planning to identify the capabilities and equipment the National Guard
would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, consistent with
the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios and state and
federal plans.

DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of nondeployed
National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or report this
information to Congress. The Secretary of Defense is required by law to
establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system with which DOD can
measure in an objective, accurate and timely manner the military's
capability to carry out the National Security Strategy, defense planning
guidance, and the National Military Strategy. Until recently, it has been
assumed that the National Guard could perform its typical state missions
with the equipment it had on hand for its federal missions. However, the
equipment demands for overseas operations have decreased the supply of
equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units, particularly in
the Army National Guard. DOD has recognized the need to have more
visibility over the capability that the National Guard has for its
domestic missions and has begun to collect data on units' preparedness;
however, these efforts are not yet fully mature. DOD is implementing a new
readiness reporting system that will include readiness information on the
Guard's federally funded state-led missions, but this system is not fully
operational and it is not clear how equipment readiness will be assessed
without fully identified domestic mission requirements. The National Guard
Bureau has developed a database to collect domestic capability assessments
from the states, but in the absence of fully identified requirements for
domestic missions the system relies on the subjective assessments of state
National Guard officials and does not provide detailed information on
National Guard equipping for large-scale, multistate events. Our analysis
of these data found that a majority of state National Guard leaders
assessed the capability of resources within their states to respond to
typical state missions as adequate, although the Army National Guard has
shortages of some equipment, such as generators and trucks, which could be
useful for domestic events. In addition, National Guard officials in
states we visited expressed concerns about whether they would have enough
equipment to respond to large-scale natural or manmade disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina or those described in the Homeland Security Council's
national planning scenarios. Until DOD's efforts to improve its readiness
measures and reports are mature, decision makers will lack information on
whether the National Guard has the equipment it needs to respond
effectively to the consequences of a large-scale, multistate event.
Further, Congress will have limited information making it more difficult
to mitigate risks and prioritize investments for the Guard's missions. We
are recommending actions intended to improve congressional visibility over
DOD's efforts to assess the readiness of National Guard forces for their
domestic missions. In addition, we are suggesting for congressional
consideration the revision of the annual National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Report requirements to include an assessment of the Guard's
equipping preparedness to provide support to civil authorities, the risks
to those missions associated with any shortfalls, and mitigation
strategies and investment priorities.

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment challenges;
however, it is not clear how these initiatives will affect the Guard's
preparedness for domestic missions since some of the initiatives are in
the early stages of implementation and specific plans are still being
developed. DOD plans to procure additional Army National Guard and Air
National Guard equipment, such as trucks and communications gear, using
$900 million that Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act. In addition, the National Guard Bureau has begun
implementing several initiatives, such as establishing joint force
headquarters within each state and expanding chemical and biological
response capabilities. However, these initiatives were recently approved
by DOD and have not yet been included in DOD's Future Years Defense
Program. The Army has also budgeted $21 billion for fiscal years 2005
through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its
equipment inventory. However, this equipment may be deployed to meet
overseas demands and the Army has not specified how much equipment will
remain in the United States to be available for domestic missions because
it has not finalized plans for allocating equipment to nondeployed units
under its new cyclical readiness and deployment model. In the absence of a
specific plan that outlines how Army National Guard equipment will be
allocated among nondeployed units, state National Guards may be hampered
in their ability to plan for responding to large-scale domestic events. We
are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed
Army National Guard baseline equipment sets.

In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our
recommendation to report to Congress on its plans for assessing National
Guard domestic readiness, but disagreed with our recommendations to update
the National Guard Bureau's charter and civil support regulation for the
new security environment, to direct the National Guard Bureau to
facilitate and coordinate interstate planning for the use of Guard forces
in large-scale, multistate events, and for the Army to provide a plan and
funding strategy for providing baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army
National Guard units. DOD stated that the National Guard Bureau's existing
charter authorizes a planning role for the bureau for large-scale,
multistate events. However, because we found that planning for multistate
events is currently uneven and the charter does not clearly define the
bureau's role in planning, we believe that clarifying the language in the
charter to highlight the importance of these activities would improve
preparedness for such emergencies. Further, DOD stated that it did not see
a need to update its civil support regulation and that it is not
appropriate for the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with
other federal agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders and would infringe
on the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and the
governors. Our recommendation was not intended to designate the National
Guard Bureau as the DOD entity to coordinate with other federal agencies
or infringe on the governor's role in coordination with federal agencies.
However, the current regulation does not specifically address how
coordination with organizations established since September 11, 2001,
should occur or how new planning tools should be used, and we believe that
updating the regulation is an important step in strengthening pre-event
planning and minimizing confusion about the use of National Guard forces.
DOD further stated in its comments that it does not see a need for a
report to Congress on the Army's plans to equip nondeployed Army National
Guard units, and it did not specify any actions the department would take
to measure and report to Congress on the National Guard's equipment
readiness for domestic missions. We continue to believe that the actions
we recommend are important to improve interstate planning and visibility
of National Guard readiness for domestic missions. Therefore, we are
suggesting that Congress consider amending the statute prescribing the
National Guard Bureau's charter to include coordinating and facilitating
interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale,
multistate events such as those contained in the national planning
scenarios and requiring DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil
support regulation to reflect this change. In addition, to provide
information on what equipment will be available for the National Guard's
domestic missions under the Army's force generation model, we are also
suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to
include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report a plan and
funding strategy for providing baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army
National Guard units. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in
detail in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section of this report.

Background

The National Guard performs a range of domestic and overseas missions in
its dual roles as a federal reserve of the Army and Air Force and as a
state militia. DOD is responsible for planning and equipping the National
Guard for its federal missions conducted under the command and control of
the President. Within DOD, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense5 supervises DOD's homeland activities,
including the execution of domestic military missions and military support
to U.S. civil authorities, and develops policies, conducts analyses,
provides advice, and makes recommendations for these activities to the
Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is also the DOD office
responsible for coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security.
While the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense supervises DOD's homeland activities, U.S. Northern Command is the
unified military command responsible for planning, organizing, and
executing DOD's homeland defense and federal military support to civil
authorities' missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and
territorial waters.6

5The office was established by the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, S 902 (2002).

The services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping
military forces, including the National Guard. The Army and the Air Force
have different strategies for structuring and providing resources for
their Guard components that reflect each service's planned use and
available resources. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard
units are provided varying levels of equipment according to their unit's
priority for resources, which generally increases as a unit nears
availability for overseas deployment. Prior to the beginning of current
overseas operations, the majority of the Army National Guard's combat
forces were supplied with 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment.
Our prior work (see Related GAO Products) has shown that in order to fully
equip units deploying overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army National
Guard had to transfer large quantities of items from nondeployed units,
which depleted the inventories of equipment available for the Guard's
domestic missions. In addition, operational requirements to leave
equipment overseas for follow-on forces and DOD's lack of approved plans
to replace these items have further compounded the Army National Guard's
equipment shortages and threaten its ability to maintain readiness for
future missions. In contrast, the Air National Guard has been integrated
into the Air Force's operational force and is maintained at readiness
levels comparable to its active component counterparts. This approach
enables the Air National Guard units to be ready to deploy on short notice
and its units have not been as negatively affected by recent overseas
operations as Army National Guard units.

As a state militia, the National Guard responds to domestic events under
the command and control of a state governor. When not participating in
DOD's federal missions, National Guard members and equipment are available
to their respective state governors to perform state missions, such as
responding to emergencies, disasters, civil disturbances, and other events
authorized by state laws. National Guard state-unique equipment
requirements are funded by the state. In some circumstances, National
Guard personnel can also perform duty under state control that is
federally funded.7 Since September 11, 2001, the President has authorized
federal funding for several National Guard domestic missions conducted
under the command of the governors, such as providing security at the
nation's airports in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist
attacks, assisting the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
and providing security along the southwest border in 2006. Table 1
compares some differences--including differences in command and control
responsibility, where the National Guard has been deployed, and how the
National Guard was funded--in its different state and federal roles.

6U.S. Pacific Command has homeland defense and civil support
responsibilities for Hawaii and the U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean.

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles

                                State role                 Federal role
                  State     Federally                      
                  funded    funded                        Federally funded
Command and    Governor              Governor           President 
control entity                                                    
Mobilization   In accordance with    Title 32 (32       Various Title 10
authorities    state law             U.S.C 502(f))      authorities
used                                                              
Where deployed In accordance with    United States      Worldwide 
                  state law                                          
Mission types  In accordance with    Training and       Overseas training
                  state law             other federally    and as assigned
                                        authorized         after mobilization
                                        missions                     
Examples of    Forest fires, floods, Post-9/11 airport  Air sovereignty,
domestic       civil disturbances    security,          missile defense,
missions                             Hurricane          guarding DOD
                                        Katrina,           infrastructure
                                        southwest border             
                                        security                     
Support law    Yes                   Yes                As limited by
enforcement                                             Posse Comitatusa
activities                                                        

Source: GAO analysis.

aThe 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. S1385, prohibits the direct use
of federal military troops for domestic civilian law enforcement except
where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. This act
applies to the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, which are
reserve components of the armed forces under 10 U.S.C. S10101.

Although it is equipped by the Army and the Air Force for its federal
role, the National Guard can use its equipment and capabilities, such as
airlift, transportation, engineering, communications, logistics, medical,
maintenance, and security capabilities, to support state and local
officials in its domestic role. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, the National Guard supported response and recovery operations in
a number of ways. Among other activities, National Guard units performed
helicopter search-and-rescue missions, augmented security efforts,
supplied satellite phone communications, and provided humanitarian and
medical treatment for victims of the disaster. The National Guard also can
provide capabilities for responding to domestic weapons of mass
destruction events, such as detection, assessment, and decontamination
capabilities.

7National Guard members train for their federal missions under state
control with federal funding. Federal laws also authorize federal funding
for some other state-controlled missions, such as the National Guard's
counterdrug support operations and weapons of mass destruction civil
support teams.

In its domestic role, the National Guard works with the multiple state and
federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects of
homeland security. The National Guard works with state emergency
management agencies to provide military support to state civilian
authorities. In addition, the states have entered into mutual assistance
agreements to provide cross-border assistance, including National Guard
forces, when an event exceeds a state's capacity to respond. The National
Guard Bureau, established by statute8 as a joint bureau of the Army and
the Air Force, is responsible for the administration of the National
Guard, including participating with Army and Air Force staff in developing
and coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army National
Guard and Air National Guard personnel, and it serves as the channel of
communication between the Army and the Air Force and the National Guard in
the several states. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are directed
by statute to jointly develop and prescribe a charter for the National
Guard Bureau that sets out the bureau's responsibilities.9 The Chief of
the National Guard Bureau has overall responsibility for the National
Guard's military support to civil authorities programs. As was
demonstrated in the response to Hurricane Katrina, during civil support
missions the National Guard Bureau provides policy guidance and
facilitates National Guard assistance to the executing adjutants general
who lead National Guard forces within the states under the command and
control of the governors. National Guard forces also have some federal
domestic missions, such as air and missile defense activities, that are
federally funded and conducted under the command of the President.

810 U.S.C. S10501.

910 U.S.C. S10503.

Also at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Homeland Security Council both have responsibilities that could affect the
National Guard's domestic role. The Department of Homeland Security, which
was established in 200210 to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism
and to prevent terrorist attacks as well as respond to attacks that might
occur, is the lead federal agency responsible for preventing, preparing
for, and responding to a wide range of major domestic disasters and other
emergencies. In December 2004, the department issued the National Response
Plan,11 which provides a framework for federal, state, and local agencies
to use in planning for domestic emergencies. To assist in integrating
state and federal responses to domestic emergencies, the Homeland Security
Council developed 15 national planning scenarios in 2004 whose purpose was
to form the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a
wide range of emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that
federal, state, and local first responders may have to address and are
intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale,
catastrophic emergencies for which the nation needs to be prepared. The 15
scenarios include a wide range of terrorist attacks involving nuclear,
biological, and chemical agents, as well as catastrophic natural
disasters, such as an earthquake or hurricane, and a large-scale cyber
attack. These scenarios are described in further detail in appendix I.

National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions Not Fully Identified

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to perform
domestic missions have not been fully identified using an analytically
based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate natural disasters
and terrorist attacks, because state and federal agencies have not
completed an integrated set of plans identifying the capabilities the
National Guard would be expected to provide in response to events like
those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning
scenarios. DOD is developing plans for the use of federal military forces
in domestic missions, but assumes the National Guard will respond to
large-scale, multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina under the command
of the governors. States plan for the National Guard's use in missions
within their borders, but have only planned to a limited extent for the
Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events such as those described in
the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. While neither
the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its civil support regulation
explicitly defines its role in working to facilitate comprehensive and
integrated planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale,
multistate events, the bureau has taken steps to facilitate limited
interstate planning for potential domestic events like hurricanes,
wildfires, and an influenza pandemic. However, without a formal mechanism
to facilitate the development of comprehensive plans for the National
Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events, such plans are unlikely to
be developed. As a result, the National Guard may not be prepared to
respond to large-scale, multistate events as efficiently and effectively
as possible.

10The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, S101 (2002).

11The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the Department of Homeland
Security to consolidate existing federal government emergency response
plans into a single integrated and coordinated national response plan.

DOD and State Planning for the National Guard's Use in Domestic Missions Is
Incomplete

The multiple state and federal agencies likely to be involved in the
response to a large-scale, multistate event are a factor that complicates
planning for how the National Guard should be used and equipped to respond
to domestic events, particularly for events such as terrorist attacks and
natural disasters described in the Homeland Security Council's national
planning scenarios. DOD, Department of Homeland Security, and National
Guard documents, as well as our prior work on Hurricane Katrina, indicate
that comprehensive pre-event planning that is coordinated and integrated
to take into account the roles of federal and state responders, including
the National Guard, is a key step in facilitating an effective, efficient,
and well-coordinated response to unexpected domestic emergencies. As was
illustrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the response to
large-scale, multistate events may involve a combination of state and
local civilian authorities; National Guard forces from across the nation
operating in state status; federal civilian agencies, such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency; and federal military forces, such as active
duty Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces operating under the
command of the President. However, the number of state and federal
agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects of emergency
response combined with their divided and decentralized planning
responsibilities complicate the task of comprehensive planning and
identification of the equipment the National Guard would need for the full
range of potential domestic missions. National Guard assistance to civil
authorities is normally provided when an event is so severe and widespread
that local and state governments are overwhelmed and civil resources are
exhausted. As a result, in order to identify the capabilities the Guard
will be expected to provide for domestic response efforts, state National
Guard plans must be integrated with other responders' plans and account
for the contributions expected to be made by civil authorities as well as
federal military forces.

DOD plans for the domestic use of federal military forces--which may
include National Guard units in federal status--in the homeland defense
missions it leads, such as air defense of the United States and missile
defense, and the federal military support it provides to civil authorities
as a result of natural or man-made disasters. The department, through the
U.S. Northern Command, is currently developing a group of plans to address
homeland defense missions and the missions federal forces may undertake in
support of civilian authorities. However, DOD assumes that National Guard
forces will respond to most domestic events, including large-scale,
multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina and those described in the
Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios, under the command
of the governors. Therefore, the department does not plan for the types of
Guard units or establish equipment requirements for the National Guard's
use under state control in responding to these types of events. Moreover,
a DOD directive prohibits the procurement of equipment exclusively for
providing support to civilian authorities in civil emergencies unless
specifically directed by the Secretary of Defense.12 Consistent with this
directive, DOD's 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
states that DOD will continue to rely on forces with both warfighting and
domestic mission capabilities for consequence management and other defense
support of civil authorities.13

States are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency plans for
the employment of the National Guard in response to civil disturbances;
natural, man-made, or technological disasters; and other potential
emergencies within their borders, such as wildfires and floods. In
responding to such events, states generally have relied on the equipment
that DOD has provided to their National Guard units for their federal
missions. The degree to which states have developed plans for the use of
National Guard forces and identified equipment requirements for the range
of the National Guard's missions, including large-scale, multistate
events, varies. A recent Department of Homeland Security review of state
emergency operations plans, which are the basis for state National Guard
plans, found that a majority of state plans and planning processes are not
fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events.14
According to the report, many state plans are created in isolation and are
insufficiently detailed, and the states do not conduct adequate
collaborative planning as a part of normal preparedness efforts. Further,
the report asserted that the lack of specificity and poorly defined
resource requirements in state plans would hinder the timely
identification, deployment, and employment of equipment, personnel, and
other resources to support emergency response efforts.

12DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, par.
4.4.8.2 (Jan. 15, 1993). DOD is developing a new directive for defense
support to civil authorities that will supersede several existing
directives, including its current military support to civil authorities
directive.

13Two exceptions to this are the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (a
dedicated command and control element) and the National Guard's weapons of
mass destruction civil support teams.

States have not completed the comprehensive and integrated planning
necessary to identify National Guard requirements for responding to
large-scale events that may involve more than one state and be federally
funded, such as the Homeland Security Council's national planning
scenarios, for a number of reasons, including limited state National Guard
planning resources and the lack of a formal mechanism to facilitate
planning across state borders for the Guard's role in these events. In
some of the states we visited, National Guard officials stated that their
planning resources are limited, and this affects their ability to develop
detailed, integrated plans for the Guard's use in domestic events. For
example, the West Virginia National Guard had a single planning officer
who was tasked with other duties, while California National Guard
officials stated they lacked funding for full-time planners. States must
work with each other to conduct planning for the National Guard's use in
large-scale, multistate events and have done so to a limited extent for
events like hurricanes and wildfires. In some cases, states have used
mutual assistance agreements to supplement their National Guard forces
when such events occur. However, there is no formal mechanism to
facilitate comprehensive interstate planning for the National Guard's role
in large-scale domestic events that is integrated with the plans of the
multiple federal and state agencies expected to be involved in response
efforts. In the absence of such a mechanism, planning is likely to remain
incomplete and the Guard's full equipment requirements for domestic
missions will remain unknown.

14Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report
(Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). The report presents the results of
reviews and assessments of the status of state emergency operations plans
as well as the emergency operations plans of 75 of the nation's largest
urban areas. For the purposes of this report, we have focused on report
findings as they relate to state emergency operations plans.

National Guard Bureau Charter and Civil Support Regulation Do Not Clearly Define
National Guard Bureau's Role in Facilitating Comprehensive Planning for the
Guard's Domestic Roles

While the National Guard Bureau is charged with performing a liaison
function between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, neither its
charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities
specifically defines its role in working with the states to facilitate
comprehensive and integrated planning for the National Guard's use in
large-scale, multistate events, such as those described in the Homeland
Security Council's national planning scenarios.

The National Guard Bureau's charter, signed by the Secretaries of the Army
and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
responsibility for facilitating and supporting the training of members and
units of the National Guard to meet state requirements, as well as
responsibility for facilitating and coordinating with the Departments of
the Army and the Air Force on the use of National Guard personnel and
resources for several functions, including natural disasters and military
support to civil authorities.15 The National Guard Bureau's regulation on
military support to civil authorities, last updated in 1996, describes the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau's overall responsibility for National
Guard civil support programs and for issuing planning guidance on the
National Guard's role in providing military support to civil authorities.
The regulation also provides guidance to the states on preparing emergency
plans for the use of National Guard forces in a civil support role,
including coordination for external assistance beyond state
capabilities.16 In its role as a liaison between the Army, the Air Force,
and the states and territories on National Guard issues, the National
Guard Bureau played a significant role in facilitating Guard support among
states during Hurricane Katrina. For example, the bureau acted as a
conduit for communicating requirements for assistance in Louisiana and
Mississippi to state National Guard leaders in the rest of the country.

In line with these existing roles, the National Guard Bureau is well
positioned to facilitate state planning for the use of National Guard
forces in large-scale, multistate events. However, neither the bureau's
charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities
specifically defines a role for it in working with the states to
facilitate comprehensive and integrated pre-event planning for the use of
National Guard forces in responding to large-scale, multistate events.
Moreover, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation
on military support to civil authorities has been updated to reflect the
post-September 11, 2001, security environment or how the state National
Guards and the National Guard Bureau will work with new organizations such
as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern Command in
facilitating planning for the National Guard's response to domestic
events. In addition, the bureau's regulation on military support to civil
authorities does not provide guidance on how the National Guard state
leadership and the National Guard Bureau should use the new planning tools
that have been developed since 2001, to facilitate national preparedness,
such as the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council's
national planning scenarios.

15Army Regulation 130-5/Air Force Mission Directive 10, Organization and
Functions of National Guard Bureau (Jan. 30, 2002). The National Guard
Bureau Charter, dated September 1, 1995, is contained within this
regulation.

16National Guard Regulation 500-1, Military Support to Civil Authorities
(Feb. 1, 1996).

In the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for facilitating state
planning, the National Guard Bureau has taken some steps to facilitate
limited interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces and
equipment in large-scale, multistate events. For example, according to
state and National Guard Bureau officials, during the past year the
National Guard Bureau has helped facilitate a conference of southeastern
states to discuss how those states can cooperate and share equipment in
response to a hurricane as well as a similar conference of western states
to address response efforts for the wildfire season. The National Guard
Bureau has also facilitated state planning for the Guard's role in an
influenza pandemic, and is coordinating the development of state National
Guard plans to support U.S. Northern Command's new homeland defense plan
and providing general planning guidance. While we believe these are
positive steps, they do not provide the comprehensive and integrated
planning that would help identify the specific equipment the National
Guard would need to respond to the types of events described in the
Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. Unless the
National Guard Bureau's charter and its regulation on military support to
civil authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland
security issues the National Guard faces and the roles the bureau will
play in facilitating state planning for and the Guard's response to
large-scale, multistate events, the extent to which the National Guard
Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist states with planning
for and responding to large-scale, multistate events will likely remain
uneven. As a result, comprehensive planning that fully identifies
equipment requirements for the National Guard's use in domestic missions
and is integrated with plans for using other military and civilian forces
may remain incomplete.

DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedness for Domestic
Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet Complete

DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual report to Congress
on National Guard equipment provide information about the National Guard's
readiness for its warfighting missions, but do not include reporting on
its preparedness for its domestic missions. While DOD is taking steps to
better assess the National Guard's preparedness for its domestic missions,
these efforts are not yet complete and are limited by the lack of fully
identified requirements for the Guard's domestic missions. Although DOD
cannot quantify the degree to which the National Guard has the equipment
it needs to respond to domestic missions, our analyses of the limited data
collected by the department and the National Guard Bureau on the National
Guard's capability for domestic missions found that most state National
Guard leaders assessed their forces' capability as adequate to respond to
typical state missions. National Guard officials in the four states we
visited expressed views that were consistent with our analyses, but some
officials expressed concern about whether they have sufficient equipment
to respond to large-scale, multistate events. Until the National Guard's
equipment requirements for domestic missions are fully identified and DOD
collects and reports information that compares equipment on hand to those
requirements, the department cannot provide Congress with detailed
information on the National Guard's equipment status for its domestic
missions, and decision makers lack information to both assess whether the
National Guard is appropriately equipped to respond to a large-scale
domestic event and to target resources to assist the National Guard in
mitigating any shortfalls.

Current Readiness Assessments and Reports on National Guard Equipment Do Not
Address Domestic Mission Requirements

The Secretary of Defense is required by law to establish a comprehensive
readiness reporting system for DOD to use to measure in an objective,
accurate and timely manner the military's capability to carry out the
National Security Strategy, defense planning guidance, and the National
Military Strategy.17 The Secretary is required to measure the capability
of military units to conduct their assigned warfighting missions, identify
any critical warfighting deficiencies in those units' capabilities, and
measure the risk those shortfalls pose to the units' ability to carry out
their federal warfighting missions. DOD's legacy readiness reporting
system--the Global Status of Resources and Training System--contains data
that enable DOD to assess the capability of National Guard forces to carry
out their warfighting missions. However, the system does not contain data
that would enable DOD to assess the preparedness of National Guard forces
for domestic civil support missions, including the extent to which those
forces have the equipment they need, because DOD's focus is on its units'
readiness to perform their warfighting missions.

1710 U.S.C. S 117.

The Secretary of Defense is also required to submit an annual report to
Congress on the equipment the National Guard and reserve components have
and how DOD plans to meet the wartime equipment requirements of its
reserve components.18 The report, known as the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Report, is required to include

           o recommendations on the type and quantity of major equipment
           items that should be in the National Guard's and the reserves'
           inventory;19

           o a list of each type of major equipment item required by the
           National Guard and reserves, indicating their full requirement for
           warfighting missions and the amount of that equipment in the
           inventory, as well as a separate list of deployable and
           nondeployable substitute equipment for that item; and

           o a narrative explaining the Secretary of Defense's plan to fill
           warfighting requirements for each type of major equipment.

           DOD is not currently required to include in the report information
           on the adequacy of the equipment that nondeployed National Guard
           forces have available to perform the full range of their domestic
           missions. Without this information, the report provides Congress
           with limited information to help it prioritize investments for the
           full range of National Guard missions, warfighting and domestic.
           The readiness of units for these two different types of missions
           might vary widely. For example, a National Guard armor unit might
           not have the tanks it requires to successfully perform its
           warfighting mission and therefore be assessed as not ready in the
           Global Status of Resources and Training System, but still have
           adequate equipment to provide support to civil authorities for a
           domestic event like a hurricane. Conversely, a National Guard unit
           may be assessed as ready for its warfighting missions but not have
           the equipment, such as trucks, generators, communications gear,
           and engineering equipment, needed for its domestic missions. Until
           recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard could
           perform its typical state missions with the equipment it had on
           hand for its federal missions. However, some Guard units,
           particularly in the Army National Guard, may be less ready for
           domestic missions than they were 2 or 3 years ago because, as we
           have previously reported, large quantities of equipment have been
           sent overseas to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
           decreasing the supply of equipment available to nondeployed units.
			  
			  Some Efforts Are Under Way to Better Assess National Guard
			  Preparedness for Domestic Missions

           DOD has recognized the need to have greater visibility over the
           National Guard's capabilities for domestic missions and has begun
           taking steps to assess the Guard's preparedness for those
           missions. In a September 2005 memorandum to the Chairman of the
           Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense called for
           improved visibility over the readiness of National Guard forces
           operating in state status with federal funds. To achieve this
           improved visibility, DOD has decided to include information on the
           National Guard's readiness to perform both its federal warfighting
           missions and its state-led, federally funded missions in the
           department's new Defense Readiness Reporting System.20
           Additionally, the National Guard Bureau has developed the Joint
           Capabilities Database as a mechanism to collect information on
           state capabilities, including those of the National Guard, to
           respond to domestic events. Both efforts are being implemented and
           refined, but the lack of requirements for the full range of the
           National Guard's domestic missions limits their usefulness as a
           basis for identifying shortfalls and targeting future equipment
           investments.

           DOD's new readiness reporting system, which will replace the
           Global Status of Resources and Training System, is expected to be
           fully operational by the end of fiscal year 2007. In contrast to
           the Global Status of Resources and Training System, which focuses
           on resource levels, the new system reports on assessed mission
           capabilities. Commanders will use their military judgment to
           assess readiness based on unit performance as well as the
           availability of resources, such as personnel and equipment. The
           system will also contain measures describing the status of major
           equipment items, including the quantities of those items units
           require for their missions, the equipment units are authorized to
           have, and the equipment they have on hand, as well as its
           condition and location. DOD officials plan to use that information
           to identify equipment deficiencies.

           DOD has directed National Guard units to report in the Defense
           Readiness Reporting System on their capabilities to perform
           state-led but federally funded domestic missions, such as border
           security. As a step toward assessing these capabilities, the
           National Guard Bureau has begun to identify the essential tasks
           that National Guard forces need to be capable of performing for
           their domestic roles and missions. For example, the bureau is
           developing lists of essential tasks for state joint force
           headquarters, state joint task forces, and weapons of mass
           destruction civil support teams. Commanders will use these task
           lists to assess the readiness of their units to perform assigned
           domestic missions, such as counterdrug operations and hurricane
           response. However, in the absence of equipment requirements based
           on events like those described in the Homeland Security Council's
           national planning scenarios to include in the Defense Readiness
           Reporting System, the system may not enable DOD or the states to
           fully assess whether nondeployed National Guard forces have an
           appropriate amount of equipment to respond to those missions.

           In addition to the information that will be available in the
           Defense Readiness Reporting System, the National Guard Bureau has
           developed a database that captures information on state
           capabilities to support domestic missions. This unclassified
           database, introduced in 2005 and called the Joint Capabilities
           Database, is a voluntary reporting by the states' National Guard
           leaders to identify capability gaps in each state and help the
           states and the National Guard Bureau develop appropriate
           mitigation strategies. The database compiles subjective
           assessments from state National Guard leaders on whether their
           states have sufficient capabilities in their Army National Guard
           and Air National Guard units to effectively respond to state
           missions. In reporting on their state's capabilities for domestic
           missions, state National Guard leaders assess whether their Army
           National Guard and Air National Guard units collectively can
           provide adequate amounts of 10 core capabilities the National
           Guard Bureau has identified as being essential to supporting
           domestic missions. Table 2 lists these capabilities and provides
           examples of the type of tasks they represent.

1810 U.S.C. S 10541.

19Specifically, the language in the statute refers to equipment
requirements for the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve of each
component of the armed forces, including the Army National Guard and Air
National Guard. The Selected Reserve includes individual mobilization
augmentees--individuals who train regularly, for pay, with active
component units--as well as members who participate in regular training as
members of National Guard and Reserve units.

20The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is
responsible for overseeing the fielding of the Defense Readiness Reporting
System.

Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard Bureau
as Essential to Support Domestic Missions

                              Examples of tasks associated with core          
Core capability            capability                                      
Aviation/airlift              o Provide aircraft to transport personnel    
                                 and cargo during times of emergency          
                                 o Provide aircraft to facilitate             
                                 reconnaissance, command and control, and     
                                 communications during emergencies            
                                 o Support first responders using air assets  
Engineering                   o Provide engineer units to assist local and 
                                 state agencies in debris removal;            
                                 construction of roads, bridges, and          
                                 emergency housing; search and rescue; water  
                                 purification and distribution; and power     
                                 generation                                   
Chemical, biological,         o Maintain a certified civil support team    
radiological, nuclear, and    o Identify chemical, biological,             
high-yield explosive          radiological, nuclear, and high-yield        
                                 explosive agents and substances              
                                 o Assess consequences, advise responders,    
                                 and assist with requests for more support    
Communications                o Establish and maintain interoperable       
                                 communications with local, state, and        
                                 federal agencies, and volunteer              
                                 organizations as necessary for domestic      
                                 missions                                     
Command and control           o Operate a Joint Operations Center to       
                                 process information and serve as a focal     
                                 point for the National Guard response        
                                 o Provide reception, staging, onward         
                                 movement, and integration for arriving       
                                 forces                                       
                                 o Coordinate and act as a liaison with state 
                                 and federal agencies                         
Logistics                     o Plan for and provide sustainment support   
                                 to civil authorities to ensure continuity of 
                                 operations                                   
                                 o Rapidly deploy and monitor movement and    
                                 placement of forces and equipment during     
                                 support operations                           
                                 o Sustain deployed forces                    
Medical                       o Support civilian emergency medical system  
                                 during mass casualty operations              
                                 o Assist the public health system in         
                                 distributing and administering vaccines and  
                                 antidotes to the public                      
Maintenance                   o Ensure equipment is available for state    
                                 missions                                     
                                 o Sustain equipment during all phases of     
                                 state missions                               
Security                      o Provide a military force capable of        
                                 assisting civil law enforcement agencies in  
                                 maintaining law and order                    
                                 o Provide security to critical               
                                 infrastructure                               
Transportation (surface)      o Deploy the force and support first         
                                 responders using ground transportation       
                                 assets                                       
                                 o Provide transportation assets to remove    
                                 civilian personnel from affected areas and   
                                 move supplies                                

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data.

State National Guard leaders are asked to assess the adequacy of their
state's capabilities for two levels of events: (1) state missions that
have been routinely conducted by the Army National Guard and Air National
Guard in the past 10 years and (2) larger, nonroutine events that are
expected to rapidly overwhelm state assets and require immediate external
National Guard or federal assistance. State National Guard leaders'
subjective assessments are to be based on the state's unique needs for
National Guard capabilities as described in its emergency response plan
and consider factors such as equipment on hand, training, and unit
availability, although the assessments do not provide detailed information
on the status of National Guard equipment. State National Guard leaders
rate a capability as adequate if they think their National Guard units
possess the resources and assets necessary to accomplish their missions;
they rate a capability as inadequate if they do not think their National
Guard units possess the resources and assets required to complete the
mission without external assistance and explain the reasons why the
capability is rated as inadequate. The National Guard Bureau has requested
that state National Guards submit new assessments quarterly or when events
change their capability assessment.

Data Indicate the Majority of State National Guards Have Capability for Typical
Missions, but Shortages Exist and Concerns Remain about Ability to Respond to
Large-Scale, Multistate Events

Without analytically based equipment requirements for the National Guard's
domestic missions to compare against the National Guard's current
inventory of available equipment, we could not determine the extent to
which nondeployed National Guard forces have the equipment they need to
perform their full range of domestic missions. However, we collected and
examined information from two sources--the National Guard Bureau's Joint
Capabilities Database and an Army National Guard equipment inventory--as
rough substitute measures of the adequacy of National Guard equipping for
domestic missions. To supplement this information, we visited four
states--California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia--and discussed
the capabilities, including equipment, that would be available within the
states for their typical missions as well as large-scale, multistate
events.

  National Guard Capability to Respond to Typical State Missions

Our analysis indicated that the majority of states report having the
National Guard capabilities they need to respond to typical state
missions; however, some states and territories report capability
shortfalls in one or more areas.21 As of July 2006, 34 of the 54 states
and territories (63 percent) reported having adequate amounts of all 10
core domestic mission capabilities for responding to typical state
missions.22 Of the 20 states and territories (37 percent) that reported an
inadequate capability, 13 reported being inadequate in only one
capability, and 4 reported being inadequate in two capabilities. Table 3
shows the number and percentage of states and territories reporting either
adequate or inadequate for each of the National Guard Bureau's core
domestic mission capabilities. Aviation; engineering; and chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive capabilities
were most frequently reported by state National Guards as being inadequate
for responding to typical state missions. Most states and territories that
rated their chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive capability as inadequate did so because their weapons of mass
destruction civil support teams had not been certified or were in the
process of being established.23 For all other capabilities, the deployment
of units was the most common reason state National Guard leaders gave for
rating a capability as inadequate.

21We did not analyze state assessments in the Joint Capabilities Database
of their National Guard capabilities for responding to larger, nonroutine
events because National Guard Bureau officials did not consider these data
to be fully mature at the time of our audit.

22The Joint Capabilities Database includes assessments from all 50 states
as well as Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.

23Civil support teams are designed to support civil authorities in the
event of a domestic weapons of mass destruction event by identifying
weapons of mass destruction agents and substances, assessing current and
projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with
appropriate requests for additional support. There are 55 civil support
teams--two in California and one in every other state as well as
Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam.
Thirty-six of these teams had been certified as fully capable as of May
2006; the remaining 19 will be certified by the end of fiscal year 2007.

Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards
Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical State
Missions

                                  Adequate capability, Inadequate capability, 
                                            number and             number and 
                                          (percentage)           (percentage) 
Aviation                                    46 (85)                 8 (15) 
Engineering                                 48 (89)                 6 (11) 
Chemical, biological,                                                      
radiological, nuclear, and                                                 
high-yield explosive                        43 (80)                11 (20) 
Communications                              52 (96)                  2 (4) 
Command and control                        54 (100)                  0 (0) 
Logistics                                  54 (100)                  0 (0) 
Medical                                     52 (96)                  2 (4) 
Maintenance                                 53 (98)                  1 (2) 
Security                                    53 (98)                  1 (2) 
Transportation                              53 (98)                  1 (2) 

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data in the Joint
Capabilities Database as of July 2006.

Note: Typical state missions are those missions that have routinely been
conducted by the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of each
individual state or territory in the past 10 years. State National Guard
leader assessments consider factors such as equipment on hand, training,
and unit availability.

  Equipment Available for Warfighting and Domestic Missions

We also used the Army National Guard's equipment inventory to determine
the extent to which the Army National Guard has particular types of
equipment, referred to as dual-use items, which units are authorized for
their warfighting missions but could be highly useful in responding to
domestic events. In 2005, the Army National Guard, in coordination with
the Army and the National Guard Bureau, used military judgment and
historical experience to identify more than 300 of these dual-use items.
The list of equipment the Army National Guard identified includes types of
trucks, generators, radios, medical gear, and engineering equipment.

Our analysis of the Army National Guard's equipment inventory as of
November 2006 showed that nondeployed Army National Guard forces had less
dual-use equipment overall than they were authorized and small available
quantities of some specific types of dual-use equipment. However, since
requirements have not been fully identified for the amount of equipment
National Guard units need to respond to domestic events like those
described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios,
the extent to which amounts of equipment authorized for warfighting meet
or exceed domestic requirements is unknown. According to Army National
Guard officials, having the full amount of equipment authorized for their
warfighting missions would leave their units well positioned to respond
effectively to domestic events.

As of November 2006, nondeployed Army National Guard forces nationwide had
about 64 percent of the total amount of dual-use equipment they are
authorized to have based on their warfighting missions.24 However,
inventory levels of the different types of dual-use equipment varied
widely, from 0 to 100 percent.25 The average inventory level by type of
equipment was roughly 42 percent nationwide.26 As figure 1 illustrates,
the average inventory level of dual-use equipment items also varied by
state and territory, from under 40 percent in New Mexico, Washington,
D.C., and Virginia to more than 60 percent in Georgia and Colorado. On
average, states and territories had about 50 percent of their authorized
inventory of dual-use equipment available for domestic missions.

24This figure includes substitute equipment authorized by Army regulation.
Army Regulation 700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability (Feb.
26, 2004), defines substitute items as items authorized for issue instead
of authorized standard items when the authorized standard items are not
available for issue to the unit.

25At the time of our analysis, the Army National Guard had identified a
total of 342 types of dual-use equipment. Of these, 319 had available data
and were included in our analysis.

26The Army National Guard has over 90 percent of its authorized amount of
19 types of dual-use equipment. For some of these types of equipment, such
as rifles, the Guard is authorized large numbers of individual items.
These large numbers of individual items make up nearly half of the Guard's
inventory of dual-use equipment. When these large numbers are included in
the Guard's inventory, the overall percentage of equipment available is
greater than the average of many of the other types of equipment.

Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including
Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National Guard Forces as of
November 3, 2006

Percentages of dual-use equipment available to nondeployed Army National
Guard units vary significantly by equipment type. Table 4 provides
examples of some of the dual-use equipment items for which the national
inventory is at 15 percent or less of the authorized amount for
warfighting missions, including substitute items. Items at 15 percent or
less of their authorized amount include types of trucks, generators,
communications equipment, and chemical protective gear.

Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where
the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized for
Warfighting Missions, Including Substitutes

                                      Number of items Percentage available to 
                                           authorized      nondeployed forces 
Chemical biological protective                                             
shelter                                        168                       0 
Radio set (AN/PRC-148 urban                                                
version)                                       468                       0 
Dump truck (MTV W/E)                           733                       0 
Diesel generator set (28 volt)                 267                       2 
Navigation set: GPS receiver                25,382                       5 
Electromagnetic radiation meter                                            
(ME-513/U)                                      33                       9 
Thermal sight (AN/PAS-13A)                   7,647                       9 
High mobility cargo trailer (3/4                                           
ton)                                         5,656                       9 
Satellite communications terminal                                          
(AN/TSC-154)                                    40                      10 
Expanded capacity HMMWV (4x4, W/E,                                         
M1113)a                                      2,591                      15 

Source: GAO analysis of Army National Guard data as of November 2006.

Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.

aA high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle is a type of utility truck.

However, without clearly defined requirements for the National Guard's
domestic missions based on events like those described in the Homeland
Security Council's national planning scenarios, there is no benchmark to
judge how many of these items Army National Guard units need to
effectively respond. Amounts required for domestic missions may differ
significantly from the amounts required for the National Guard's
warfighting missions. For example, a nondeployed National Guard force in a
state may have only a small percentage of the amount of a type of truck
required for its warfighting missions, reflecting a shortfall. However, it
may still have enough of that type of truck to perform its domestic
missions, or may have other types of trucks it could use.

National Guard officials in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West
Virginia generally expressed the opinion that, while stressed by overseas
operations, their forces have the capability and equipment to address
typical state missions. For example, New Jersey National Guard officials
said their units had enough equipment to respond to all state missions
that took place during the peak of the state National Guard's overseas
deployments in 2004. Officials noted that nondeployed Army National Guard
units continue to face equipment shortages caused by the need to transfer
significant quantities of equipment to units deploying overseas.27 While
reduced equipment levels caused by overseas operations complicated its
response, the New Jersey National Guard adapted and used the equipment it
had available to effectively respond to its missions. National Guard
officials in California, Florida, and West Virginia expressed similar
levels of confidence in their forces' ability to respond to typical state
missions using currently available equipment. However, some state National
Guard officials expressed concerns about whether they would have enough
equipment to respond to large-scale events similar to Hurricane Katrina or
those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning
scenarios.

DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equipment Challenges,
but Long-term Effect on Domestic Preparedness Is Unclear

We have previously reported that ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have significantly decreased the amount of equipment available
to nondeployed Guard units to respond to domestic events. Moreover, the
Guard's experience with Hurricane Katrina helped to illustrate the types
of equipment that are valuable in responding to domestic disasters. In
response to these events, DOD is taking some actions to address National
Guard equipment challenges and improve the Guard's preparedness for both
overseas and domestic missions. However, the long-term effect of these
initiatives is unclear because some initiatives are in the early stages of
implementation and specific plans are still being developed. For example,
the Army plans to procure additional equipment for National Guard units
during the next few years but has not clearly defined how much equipment
will be available for nondeployed units.

27 [29]GAO-06-111 .

DOD Is Procuring Items and Transforming Units to Increase National Guard's
Equipment Readiness

To improve the equipment readiness of National Guard units, DOD has
several initiatives under way. For example, DOD plans to use $900 million
Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act28
to procure equipment for the Army National Guard and Air National Guard
that are useful for both warfighting and domestic missions, such as
communications gear, tactical vehicles, trucks, and engineering equipment.
In addition, DOD also plans to use $290 million Congress provided in the
2007 Department of Defense Appropriations Act to procure additional
National Guard and Reserve equipment.29

The National Guard Bureau has also begun implementing four initiatives
intended to improve coordination and training of nondeployed National
Guard units for domestic missions. These four initiatives, which involve
both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, include
establishing (1) a joint force headquarters in each state and territory to
provide military command and control capabilities; (2) 12 National Guard
teams trained and equipped to deploy within 6 hours to respond to domestic
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive
incidents;30 (3) 10 detachments--one for each Federal Emergency Management
region--trained and equipped to conduct mission assessments of defense
industrial-base critical infrastructure; and (4) at least one joint
interagency training capability to provide training to National Guard
personnel on domestic missions. To date, the National Guard Bureau has
funded these initiatives on a yearly basis by reprogramming funds, but it
has submitted formal proposals to DOD to incorporate the initiatives into
DOD's departmentwide programming and budgeting process. At the time of our
report, DOD had formally approved the joint force headquarters and the
establishment of 12 National Guard chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident response teams. Formal approval
from DOD means that these two initiatives were approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, which approves all new DOD requirements,
and may now compete to be included in DOD's Future Years Defense Program.
However, because DOD's priority remains its overseas warfighting mission,
the extent to which these domestically focused initiatives will be funded
remains uncertain.

28Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-148 (2005) provided $1 billion for National Guard and Reserve
equipment. The conference report accompanying that act specified that of
the $1 billion, $700 million should go to the Army National Guard and $200
million should go to the Air National Guard. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-359,
at 483 (2005).

29Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289
(2006). The conference report accompanying the act states that the
conferees intend for $150 million of the $290 million to go toward
equipping the National Guard. In addition, the conferees directed that
$2.94 billion of procurement funds provided in Title IX of the act shall
be available for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, and that
$500 million of these funds should be used specifically to meet the 10
core capabilities identified by the National Guard Bureau as essential to
support domestic missions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-676, at 223, 372
(2006).

30Section 412 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163 (2006), authorized end strengths for reserves on
active duty in support of the reserves. In the accompanying conference
report, the conferees specified that the end strength would include five
additional teams. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at 687 (2005).

Army Plans for Balancing Equipment for Deployed and Nondeployed National Guard
Units Are Not Well Defined

The Army has budgeted approximately $21 billion for fiscal years 2005
through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its
equipment inventory. These funds are intended to facilitate the Army
National Guard's conversion to modular brigades as well as to help fill
long-standing equipment shortages. According to Army officials, items
procured will be standard warfighting equipment and may be deployed to
meet overseas demands and therefore may not always be available for
domestic missions. The Army plans to manage all of its equipment for the
active and reserve units using a new cyclical readiness and deployment
model for its forces, including Army National Guard forces, which has
implications for the National Guard's readiness for its homeland missions.
Under this model, Army National Guard units will have access to three
types of equipment sets over time as they prepare for possible deployment
once every 6 years: (1) a baseline set that would vary by unit type and
assigned mission; (2) a training set that would include more of the
equipment units would need to be ready for deployment; and (3) a
deployment set that would include all equipment needed for deployment,
including theater-specific equipment and equipment from Army prepositioned
stock. Figure 2 illustrates the movement of units through the reset and
train, ready, and available phases of the force generation model.

Figure 2: The Army's Proposed Force Generation Model

Note: The Army's force generation model proposes that Army National Guard
units will be available for deployment 1 year in every 6 years.

Army plans call for the baseline set to provide Army National Guard units
in the reset/train pool, at a minimum, the equipment they would need for
their domestic missions. As of September 2006, the Army was still
developing proposals for what would be included in each of the three
equipment sets. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the risks or the
ability of units in the earlier stages of the cycle to respond to
unforeseen domestic crises, such as large-scale natural disasters or
terrorist attacks. Although the Army has worked with the Army National
Guard to identify warfighting equipment that is highly useful for domestic
missions, it is not clear whether nondeployed Army National Guard units
will have sufficient quantities of such equipment during the early phases
of the Army's force generation model to respond effectively to their
domestic missions. State National Guard officials in California and
Florida expressed concerns that their Army National Guard units will not
have enough equipment for their domestic missions during the first 3 years
of the Army's new force generation model, which is when units' equipment
levels would be at their lowest. The Army has taken some temporary actions
to mitigate this concern. In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season,
the Army directed the temporary transfer of equipment such as trucks,
night vision goggles, and floodlights from active Army units to Army
National Guard units in the coastal states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.
However, these states' Army National Guard units were expected to return
this equipment no later than the end of the 180-day loan period. Moreover,
until the Army makes decisions as to what equipment should be included in
the baseline equipment set for nondeployed Army National Guard units,
National Guard officials in the states may be hampered in their ability to
plan and respond to large-scale, multistate events.

Conclusions

With the challenging nature of the new security environment and potential
for large-scale, multistate events depicted in the national planning
scenarios, the nation expects the National Guard to be prepared to provide
an efficient and effective response to domestic events. Without a
designated agency to serve as a mechanism to facilitate interstate
planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events,
the National Guard may lack plans that are complete and integrated with
other DOD, state, and federal plans so that risks are identified and
mitigated efficiently. Currently, the National Guard Bureau has
facilitated limited multistate planning, but comprehensive planning that
identifies equipment requirements and is integrated with plans for using
civilian and federal military forces may remain incomplete unless the
bureau's charter and civil support regulation are updated to reflect this
facilitation role. As a result, the National Guard may not be prepared to
respond to domestic events, particularly large-scale, multistate events
such as those described in the national planning scenarios, as efficiently
and effectively as possible.

DOD's current readiness measures and reports do not provide a rigorous
assessment of the extent to which the National Guard's nondeployed units
have the equipment they need to respond to the full range of their
domestic missions. While DOD has begun to collect data on the readiness of
nondeployed National Guard units using proxy measures and subjective
assessments of military commanders, this effort is not fully mature and
faces limitations. Without validated requirements for the types and
quantities of equipment the National Guard needs for domestic missions, it
will be difficult to measure units' preparedness for those missions. Until
DOD's efforts to improve its measures and reports are mature and the
Guard's required capabilities are better defined and tracked, decision
makers will lack information on whether the Guard has the equipment it
needs to respond effectively to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover,
Congress and federal and state decision makers will have limited
information with which to mitigate risks and prioritize investments for
the National Guard's missions.

While DOD is taking steps to address the Army National Guard's and the Air
National Guard's equipment challenges, the effectiveness of these
initiatives to improve the National Guard's domestic preparedness is not
clear. Moreover, unless DOD, in coordination with other federal and state
agencies that will be involved in responding to large-scale events such as
the national planning scenarios, defines the requirements for nondeployed
National Guard forces, there is no benchmark with which to assess the
effectiveness of the initiatives. In addition, because the Army has not
yet defined the amount and types of equipment that will be available to
nondeployed Army National Guard units, state and federal agencies lack
information they could use to plan to respond to domestic emergencies.
Specifically, they lack information on whether the Army National Guard
will have sufficient quantities of equipment during the early phases of
the Army's force generation model to respond effectively to domestic
missions. Until the Army makes decisions as to what equipment nondeployed
Army National Guard forces can expect to have on hand, it will remain
unclear whether the National Guard has the equipment it needs to
successfully perform its domestic missions, including responding to
large-scale, multistate events.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:

           o Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to add
           clarifying language to the National Guard Bureau's charter to
           clearly define its roles in coordinating and facilitating
           interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale,
           multistate events, such as those contained in the national
           planning scenarios, and monitoring the Guard's status to perform
           these missions.

           o Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the
           Chief, National Guard Bureau, to update the National Guard
           Bureau's 1996 civil support regulation to reflect the National
           Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating interstate
           planning for large-scale, multistate events. The regulation should
           also be updated to formalize procedures for coordination with
           organizations that have been established since the regulation was
           last updated, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the
           Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,
           and U.S. Northern Command, as well as for the use of new planning
           tools like the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security
           Council's national planning scenarios.

           o Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the
           Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S.
           Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other
           civilian authorities, to take actions to facilitate and coordinate
           interstate National Guard planning to identify the capabilities,
           including equipment, the National Guard would need to respond to
           large-scale, multistate events, consistent with the Homeland
           Security Council's national planning scenarios and state and
           federal plans.

           o Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
           to submit a report to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and
           reporting on the readiness of National Guard units to perform
           domestic missions in response to natural disasters or terrorist
           events. This report should include

                        o DOD's progress to date in incorporating these
                        missions into the Defense Readiness Reporting System;

                        o the specific missions for which National Guard
                        units will report their readiness; and

                        o the standards, including any equipment measures,
                        given to National Guard unit commanders to consider
                        when making their readiness assessments for these
                        missions.

           o Direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to
           Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed
           Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the
           plan should include
			  
			  Matters for Congressional Consideration

           Congress should consider amending the statute prescribing the
           National Guard Bureau's charter to require language clarifying the
           National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating
           interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale,
           multistate events, such as those contained in the national
           planning scenarios, and require DOD to revise the National Guard
           Bureau's civil support regulation to reflect the clarification in
           the charter.

           In addition, to ensure that it is kept informed of the National
           Guard's equipment status for its domestic missions, Congress
           should consider revising the statutory requirement for the annual
           National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report to include an
           assessment of (1) the Guard's equipping preparedness to provide
           support to civil authorities, particularly for large-scale,
           multistate events; (2) the risks to those missions associated with
           any equipment shortfalls; and (3) mitigation strategies and
           investment priorities. Further, to provide information on what
           equipment will be available for the National Guard's domestic
           missions under the Army's force generation model, Congress should
           consider requiring the department to include in the 2009 National
           Guard and Reserve Equipment Report a plan and funding strategy for
           providing baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army National
           Guard units.
			  
			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided
           written comments on a draft of this report. The department
           partially agreed with our recommendation that the department
           report to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and reporting on
           the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions
           in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. The
           department disagreed with our recommendations that (1) the
           National Guard Bureau's charter be revised to include language
           clarifying the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and
           facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in
           large-scale, multistate events, (2) the National Guard Bureau's
           1996 civil support regulation be updated to reflect the change to
           the National Guard Bureau's charter and to establish procedures
           for state National Guards and the National Guard Bureau to use to
           coordinate with new organizations and for using new planning
           tools, (3) the National Guard Bureau take actions to facilitate
           interstate Guard planning to identify capabilities the National
           Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, and
           (4) the Secretary of the Army develop and submit to Congress a
           plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National
           Guard baseline equipment sets. As we discussed in our report,
           state planning for the Guard's role in catastrophic events
           contained in the national planning scenarios has not been
           consistent or thorough. We continue to believe that the actions we
           recommend are important to improve interstate planning and
           visibility of the National Guard's readiness for domestic
           missions. Therefore, we have included these actions as matters for
           congressional consideration. Specifically, Congress should
           consider (1) amending the statute prescribing the National Guard
           Bureau's charter to include coordinating and facilitating
           interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale,
           multistate events, such as those contained in the national
           planning scenarios, (2) requiring DOD to revise the National Guard
           Bureau's civil support regulation to implement this change, and
           (3) in addition to requiring DOD to report on the National Guard's
           equipment readiness for domestic missions, require DOD to submit
           the Army's plans and funding strategy for providing equipment to
           nondeployed Army National Guard forces for domestic missions in
           its 2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report.

           In its written comments on a draft of this report, the department
           stated that our recommendation to change the National Guard
           Bureau's charter is not needed because the current charter already
           authorizes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's role in
           coordinating and facilitating state planning for the National
           Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events. As our report
           discusses in detail, the charter, signed by the Secretaries of the
           Army and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National
           Guard Bureau responsibility for facilitating and supporting the
           training of members and units of the National Guard to meet state
           requirements as well as responsibility for facilitating and
           coordinating with the Departments of the Army and the Air Force
           the use of National Guard personnel and resources for several
           functions, including natural disasters and military support to
           civil authorities. Despite the fact that the department believes
           that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has a key role in
           coordinating and facilitating state planning for the National
           Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, the charter does
           not contain language specifically defining this role. Since the
           charter was last updated, the security environment in which the
           National Guard operates has changed significantly, with the
           National Guard now being used extensively for overseas military
           operations while needing to remain prepared for additional threats
           at home. Furthermore, new planning tools, such as the National
           Response Plan and the national planning scenarios, have been
           developed to guide federal, state, and local planning for
           large-scale domestic emergencies. As the response to Hurricane
           Katrina illustrated, there is a need for detailed planning for the
           Guard's use in large-scale natural or man-made domestic
           emergencies. As we discussed in this report, planning for the
           National Guard's use in responding to events such as the national
           planning scenarios is currently uneven. Although this interstate
           planning role is not clearly defined in its charter, the National
           Guard Bureau has taken some steps to perform this role to a
           limited extent. Our recommendation to add clarifying language to
           the National Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define the bureau's
           role in coordinating and facilitating multistate planning is
           intended to highlight the importance of these activities so that
           the National Guard is prepared to respond to multistate events as
           efficiently and effectively as possible. We continue to believe
           that this role is important and that making this activity an
           explicit responsibility of the National Guard Bureau would further
           the goal of facilitating multistate planning and would increase
           the states' and the nation's capability to respond to large-scale
           incidents. Therefore, we have included as a matter for
           congressional consideration amending the statute prescribing the
           National Guard Bureau's charter to include language clarifying
           this role.

           The department also disagreed with our recommendation that the
           Chief, National Guard Bureau, should update the National Guard
           Bureau's 1996 civil support regulation to include the National
           Guard Bureau's role in facilitating interstate planning and to
           address the creation of new organizations and planning tools. In
           its comments, the department raised two major concerns. First, the
           department asserted that the direction to update the regulation
           should come from the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force.
           Therefore, we have modified our report to direct the
           recommendation to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to
           direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to update the regulation.
           Second, the department also commented that it is not appropriate
           for the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other
           federal agencies because this is the responsibility, if required,
           of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders--in the
           case of homeland missions, U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Pacific
           Command--and would infringe on the authority of the Assistant
           Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense over homeland
           activities. We understand the responsibilities of the Secretary of
           Defense and the Combatant Commanders with regard to coordinating
           with federal agencies, and we understand that the Assistant
           Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has authority over the
           department's homeland defense activities and responsibility for
           representing DOD on homeland defense-related matters in the
           interagency environment and for coordinating federal military
           support to civil authorities. Further, we agree with the comment
           that governors have responsibility for the coordination and use of
           National Guard forces in state status and that the governors could
           coordinate with federal agencies if necessary. Our recommendation
           was not intended to designate the National Guard Bureau as the DOD
           entity to coordinate with other federal agencies or to infringe on
           the governors' role in coordination with federal agencies. Our
           intent was to recommend that the National Guard's civil support
           regulation be updated in order to more accurately reflect the
           National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating
           interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale,
           multistate events, and to formalize procedures for state and
           National Guard Bureau coordination with organizations established
           since September 11, 2001 and for the use of new planning tools. We
           have changed the language of our recommendation in the final
           report accordingly. Since September 11, 2001, many changes have
           occurred in the security environment, including the creation of
           entities such as the Department of Homeland Security as well as
           the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S.
           Northern Command within DOD. Planning tools have also been
           created, including the National Response Plan and the Homeland
           Security Council's national planning scenarios. The National Guard
           Bureau's civil support regulation sets out the Chief of the
           National Guard Bureau's overall responsibility for civil support
           programs and for issuing planning guidance on the National Guard's
           role in providing military support to civil authorities, and
           provides guidance to the states on preparing emergency plans for
           the use of National Guard forces in a civil support role,
           including coordination for assistance beyond state capabilities.
           This regulation, last updated in 1996, pre-dates the changes to
           the security environment and does not specifically address how
           coordination with these organizations should occur or how these
           planning tools should be used. The changed security environment
           since September 11, 2001, has increased the need for federal,
           state, and local authorities to work together to enhance
           preparedness. As the response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated,
           the nation relies on the National Guard to respond to the effects
           of large-scale, multistate emergencies and the National Guard
           Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating Guard support
           among the states when such an event takes place. The Katrina
           response also showed that there is a lack of pre-event planning
           and understanding among federal and state responders about the
           type of assistance and capabilities that the National Guard can
           provide. Updating the regulation is an important step to minimize
           confusion about how the bureau and state Guard forces should work
           with organizations and planning tools established since September
           11, 2001, how coordination of planning efforts for the Guard's use
           among federal, state, and local authorities should take place, and
           where the accountability for coordination lies. The National Guard
           Bureau's position as a channel of communication between the states
           and the Army and Air Force makes it uniquely positioned to
           facilitate interstate planning for events that may require support
           from multiple states or across state boundaries; we agree with the
           department that it does play a key role in this capacity. We
           continue to believe that updating the National Guard Bureau's
           regulation to reflect changes to the security environment and to
           clarify how the state National Guards and the National Guard
           Bureau will work with new organizations and use national planning
           tools to strengthen pre-event planning for large-scale, multistate
           events is needed. Therefore, we have included as a matter for
           congressional consideration a requirement for the department to
           revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation.

           In its comments, the department also disagreed that the National
           Guard Bureau should take actions to facilitate and coordinate
           state National Guard planning to identify capabilities the Guard
           would need to respond to multistate events and asserted that the
           responsibility for overall supervision of homeland defense
           activities within DOD resides with the Assistant Secretary of
           Defense for Homeland Defense. First, while we understand that the
           Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is in charge
           of federal defense support to civilian authorities, the Assistant
           Secretary is not charged with planning for National Guard
           activities that will likely be conducted under the command and
           control of the state governor. We are not recommending that the
           National Guard Bureau undertake the responsibilities of the state
           governors, but rather provide a facilitating and coordinating
           function between states for those events that may involve the use
           of National Guard forces from multiple states. Second, in its
           comments, DOD said that the overall supervision of homeland
           defense activities within DOD is a function that should remain
           with a civilian official rather than a military officer. We agree
           and are not recommending that the National Guard Bureau supervise
           either federal or state-led forces but rather that the bureau
           facilitate and coordinate interstate planning for domestic
           emergencies that involve Guard forces from multiple states and
           which may be federally funded. Third, in its comments, DOD also
           stated that training and equipping the National Guard is the
           responsibility of the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. As we
           stated in this report, DOD is responsible for planning for DOD's
           federal missions and training and equipping the National Guard for
           these missions. As mentioned, training for the Guard's federal
           missions is also federally funded. We did not recommend changes to
           the responsibilities for training and equipping the National
           Guard. Rather, our recommendation is directed to improving
           interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces for
           large-scale domestic events in their state roles that are likely
           to be federally funded. As DOD acknowledges in its comments on our
           first recommendation, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, plays a
           key role in coordinating and facilitating state-level planning for
           the employment of National Guard forces to meet large-scale
           disasters. We agree with this assessment and therefore continue to
           believe that the National Guard Bureau is well-positioned to
           facilitate planning and promote cooperation in identifying
           regional and national assets needed for response efforts so that
           decision makers can prioritize investments to mitigate risks. This
           recommendation is consistent with a recommendation we made in our
           previous report examining the response to Hurricane Katrina with
           which the department agreed. In that report, we recommended that
           the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should work with the state
           governors and state Guards to identify capabilities the National
           Guard will likely provide for homeland security missions and make
           that information available to other organizations with federal
           military support to civil authorities planning responsibilities.31
           We have raised as a matter for congressional consideration
           amending the statute that prescribes the National Guard Bureau's
           charter to include this interstate planning role.

           DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under
           Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness submit a report
           to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and reporting on the
           readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions.
           DOD agreed that readiness reporting and tracking is critical to
           ensuring the execution of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and
           Civil Support, but commented that this includes the readiness to
           perform domestic missions of all 10 military components, not just
           the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. We agree that
           readiness reporting and tracking are critical and recognize that
           all 10 military components may participate in homeland defense and
           civil support missions; however, the scope of our review was
           limited to the Army National Guard and Air National Guard.
           Moreover, in recognition that the National Guard has a unique role
           in domestic response, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
           and Readiness' guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System
           specifically directed the National Guard to include assessments of
           its readiness for state-led, federally-funded missions in the new
           readiness reporting system. This information on the National
           Guard's domestic readiness would be useful to Congress as it
           deliberates improvements to national preparedness. As a result, we
           continue to believe that the department should report to Congress
           on the status of efforts to measure National Guard readiness for
           domestic missions.

           DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that the Army should
           develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for
           resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment
           sets. The department asserted that such a report would be
           unnecessary because Reserve component requirements are evaluated
           and prioritized within the department's budget process and
           presented to Congress as part of the department's overall budget.
           We did not recommend changes to the department's budgeting
           process. Rather, our recommendation that the Army provide Congress
           a separate report on nondeployed forces' equipment is based on the
           fact that Congress does not have visibility over the effects of
           the recent high use of National Guard equipment for overseas
           operations and the risks that depleted domestic equipment
           inventories pose to the National Guard's ability to respond to
           domestic missions. Because nondeployed National Guard forces rely
           on the equipment they have on hand to respond to domestic events,
           the equipment they can expect to have available at all times is of
           primary importance to the state National Guard's ability to plan
           for their domestic missions. Therefore, we continue to believe the
           Congress should be informed of the specifics of the department's
           plans, including timelines and funding strategies, to enable it to
           consider current and future risks against proposed investments. As
           a result, we have included as a matter for congressional
           consideration a requirement for the department to include in the
           2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report the Army's plan
           and funding strategy for providing equipment for nondeployed Army
           National Guard units.

           As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
           of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then
           send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the
           Army and the Air Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the
           Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make
           copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report
           will be available at no charge on the GAO website at
           http://www.gao.gov .

           If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
           (202) 512-4402. Contact points for our offices of Congressional
           Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
           report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
           IV.

           Janet A. St. Laurent 
			  Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
			  
31 [31]GAO-06-643 .			  
			  
			  Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios

           The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 national planning
           scenarios, whose purpose is to form the basis for identifying the
           capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The
           scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local
           first responders will have to address and are intended to
           illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic
           events for which the nation needs to be prepared. Table 5
           summarizes the 15 scenarios that have been developed to assess the
           emergency response and preparedness capabilities of federal,
           state, local, and tribal governments as well as the private sector
           and describes their projected consequences. These scenarios have
           not been developed to identify events that are likely to occur;
           instead, they facilitate efforts by all government agencies to
           assess the full range of needs that might be required if events
           similar to these scenarios take place.

                        o a timeline for defining the requirements of
                        nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment
                        sets,

                        o the analytical basis and domestic mission
                        requirements used to determine the equipment required
                        in the baseline set,

                        o readiness standards and measures that will be used
                        to track the status of the baseline equipment sets,
                        and

                        o the Army's plan for funding and filling baseline
                        equipment sets.

Table 5: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios and
Summary Descriptions

Threat                   Description summary     Projected consequencesa   
Nuclear detonation       Terrorists detonate a   450,000 or more evacuees, 
                            10-kiloton nuclear      3,000 square miles        
                            device in a large city  contaminated, and         
                                                    hundreds of billions of   
                                                    dollars in economic       
                                                    impact                    
Biological attack        Terrorists spray        13,000 fatalities and     
                            anthrax spores in a     injuries, extensive       
                            city using a concealed  contamination, and        
                            spray device            billions of dollars in    
                                                    economic impact           
Biological disease       Natural outbreak of     87,000 fatalities,        
outbreak--pandemic       pandemic influenza that 300,000 hospitalizations, 
influenza                begins in China and     and $70 billion to $160   
                            spreads to other        billion impact            
                            countries                                         
Biological               Terrorists release      2,500 fatalities, 7,000   
attack--plague           pneumonic plague into   injuries, millions of     
                            three areas of a large  dollars in economic       
                            city                    impact, and possible      
                                                    evacuations               
Chemical attack--blister Terrorists spray a      150 fatalities, 70,000    
agent                    combination of blister  hospitalized, more than   
                            agents into a crowded   100,000 persons           
                            football stadium        evacuated, and $500       
                                                    million in economic       
                                                    impact                    
Chemical attack--toxic   Terrorists use grenades 350 fatalities, 1,000     
industrial chemicals     and explosive devices   hospitalizations, 50      
                            at petroleum facilities percent of facility       
                                                    damaged, and up to        
                                                    700,000 persons evacuated 
Chemical attack--nerve   Terrorists spray Sarin  6,000 fatalities in       
agent                    into the ventilation    buildings, 350 injuries   
                            system of three         downwind, evacuation of   
                            commercial buildings in unknown number of people, 
                            a city                  and $300 million in       
                                                    economic impact           
Chemical                 Terrorists use          17,500 fatalities,        
attack--chlorine tank    explosives to release a 100,000 hospitalizations, 
explosion                large quantity of       up to 70,000 persons      
                            chlorine gas            evacuated, and            
                                                    contamination at site and 
                                                    waterways                 
Natural disaster--major  A 7.2 magnitude         1,400 fatalities, 100,000 
earthquake               earthquake occurs in a  hospitalizations, 150,000 
                            major metropolitan area buildings destroyed, and  
                                                    hundreds of billions of   
                                                    dollars in economic       
                                                    impact                    
Natural disaster--major  Category 5 hurricane    1,000 fatalities, 5,000   
hurricane                strikes a major city    hospitalizations, 1       
                                                    million people evacuated, 
                                                    and millions of dollars   
                                                    in economic impact        
Radiological attack--    Terrorists detonate     180 fatalities, 20,000    
radiological dispersal   "dirty bombs" in three  detectible contaminations 
device (RDD)             cities in close         in each city, and         
                            proximity               billions of dollars in    
                                                    economic impact           
Explosives               Terrorists detonate     100 fatalities, 450       
attack--bombing using    IEDs in a sports arena, hospitalizations, local   
improvised explosive     use suicide bombers in  economic impact, and      
devise (IED)             a public transit        minimal evacuations       
                            concourse, and in a                               
                            parking facility                                  
Biological attack--food  Terrorists contaminate  300 fatalities, 400       
contamination            food with anthrax in    hospitalizations, and     
                            processing facilities   millions of dollars in    
                                                    economic impact           
Biological               Terrorists infect       No casualties, huge loss  
attack--Foreign Animal   livestock at specific   of livestock, and hundred 
Disease (Foot and Mouth  locations               of millions of dollars in 
Disease)                                         economic impact           
Cyber attack             Terrorists conduct      No casualties, millions   
                            cyber attacks on U.S.   of dollars in economic    
                            financial               impact                    
                            infrastructure                                    

Source: Congressional Research Service.

aThese hypothetical results are among those presented in the scenarios.
They are intended to be illustrative to use in identifying the types of
situations responding units should be prepared to address.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed
documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern Command,
Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Air Force North (previously
First Air Force), the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, the
Air National Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security. We also
developed case studies of four states: California, Florida, New Jersey,
and West Virginia. These states were selected because they had an average
to high number of disaster declarations in the last 53 years, are
geographically dispersed across the United States, reported varying levels
of National Guard domestic response capability, faced a range of homeland
security risks, and were involved in National Guard Bureau domestic
capability initiatives.

To identify the extent to which the National Guard's equipment
requirements for its full range of domestic missions have been identified,
we reviewed domestic operational planning documents, including the
Department of Defense's (DOD) Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army
Campaign Plan, planning documents provided by case study states, and the
National Response Plan. We supplemented this information by interviewing
officials in DOD, U.S. Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau, the
Department of Homeland Security, and our case study states to review their
planning processes for the full range of the National Guard's domestic
mission. In each case study state, we reviewed plans for the use of
National Guard forces and assessed the extent to which they addressed the
national planning scenarios and the extent to which these plans identified
specific equipment requirements. We also discussed with state National
Guard leaders processes for planning and coordinating with multiple state
and federal agencies and challenges to planning for large-scale,
multistate emergencies. We did not review case study state budget
documents to independently verify the level of planning resources
available to their state National Guards.

To assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for the full range of their
domestic missions, we reviewed documentation on DOD's readiness reporting
system, the Global Status of Resources and Training System, as well as the
new system DOD plans to have fully operational in late 2007, the Defense
Readiness Reporting System. We also analyzed data, reviewed documentation,
and interviewed officials about the National Guard Bureau's state
capability tracking system, the Joint Capabilities Database. Specifically,
using data from the National Guard's Joint Capabilities Database, we
determined the number of states that reported adequate capabilities for
typical state missions, the capabilities most frequently reported as
inadequate, and the reasons why. In addition, using Army National Guard
data on equipment useful for both warfighting and domestic missions, we
compared the amount of equipment available for Army National Guard forces
by state and item against the amount they are authorized for warfighting
missions. Further, we examined DOD's annual report to Congress on National
Guard equipping, the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report.

To determine the extent to which DOD is taking actions to address the
National Guard's domestic equipment challenges, we reviewed and analyzed
information about steps being taken to enhance the National Guard's
capabilities and increase equipment for nondeployed National Guard units.
Information we reviewed included DOD appropriations documents, Army budget
information, and National Guard Bureau change request packages. Further,
we reviewed and analyzed relevant DOD, Army, Air Force, and National Guard
equipping strategies and policies and discussed the impact of the Army
transformation plans on nondeployed forces. We also reviewed Army
documentation on plans for implementing its force generation model to
determine the extent to which the plans define equipment available to
nondeployed Army National Guard units for domestic missions.

We conducted our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our
objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they
ensured their own data reliability and reviewed their data collection
methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control
measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and when
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and
reliability.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Alissa Czyz; Matthew Dove; Paul Gvoth; Nicole Harms; Catherine
Humphries; David Marroni; Kenneth Patton; Jerome Sandau; Jay Smale; and
Suzanne Wren made major contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: Related Products

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st
Century Challenges. [33]GAO-06-1109T . Washington D.C.: September 21,
2006.

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [34]GAO-06-618 . Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans.
[35]GAO-06-745 . Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but
Accountability Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and Focused
Departmentwide. [36]GAO-06-1042 Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006.

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. [37]GAO-06-498 .
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [38]GAO-06-643 .
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated
with Major Emergency Incidents. [39]GAO-06-467T . Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2006.

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. [40]GAO-06-170T . Washington, D.C.: October 20,
2005.

Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation
Initiatives. [41]GAO-06-111 . Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2005.

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. [42]GAO-05-926 .
Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005.

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards
Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [43]GAO-05-652 . Washington, D.C.: July
11, 2005.

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. [44]GAO-05-21 . Washington, D.C.:
November 10, 2004.

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and
Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. [45]GAO-04-670T . Washington,
D.C.: April 29, 2004.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. [46]GAO-03-670 . Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2003.

(350768)

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [54]GAO-07-60 , a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of
Representatives

January 2007

RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements
and Readiness

The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has
reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the
same time it faces an expanded array of threats at home. The massive
state-led, federally funded response to Hurricane Katrina illustrates the
Guard's important role in responding to the effects of large-scale,
multistate events as well as the difficulty of working with multiple state
and federal agencies. To address congressional interest in the Guard's
domestic preparedness, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Guard's
domestic equipment requirements have been identified, (2) the Department
of Defense (DOD) measures and reports to Congress the equipment readiness
of non-deployed Guard forces for domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions
address the Guard's domestic equipping challenges. GAO examined the
National Guard's plans and equipment status and included case studies in
California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia.

[55]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends updating the National Guard Bureau's charter and civil
support regulation and improved reporting of the Guard's domestic
readiness. DOD partially agreed to report on plans to assess domestic
readiness but disagreed with our other recommendations. GAO reiterates the
need for changes in matters for congressional consideration.

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond
to large-scale terrorist events and natural disasters have not been fully
identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would have
roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated their
plans. The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 catastrophic
scenarios to guide federal and state governments in planning their
response activities. While DOD is responsible for equipping the Guard for
its federal missions and states plan for the National Guard's activities
within their borders, neither is comprehensively planning for the Guard's
role in responding to events like the national planning scenarios that may
involve more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has not
been completed primarily because there is no formal mechanism for
facilitating planning for the Guard's role in large-scale events. As a
liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National
Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National
Guard forces. The bureau has facilitated some limited interstate planning
for multistate events, although neither its charter nor its civil support
regulation identifies this activity as its responsibility. Until the
bureau's charter and its civil support regulation are revised to define
its role in facilitating state planning for multistate events, such
planning for the National Guard's role in these events may remain
incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as
efficiently and effectively as possible.

DOD does not routinely measure or report to Congress the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions.
DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard
equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not
address the Guard's domestic missions. While DOD has recognized the need
for greater visibility over the Guard's domestic capabilities, its process
and measures for assessing the Guard's domestic readiness have not yet
been fully defined. Until DOD reaches agreement on a specific approach for
measuring readiness for domestic missions and requirements are defined, it
will remain unclear whether the Guard is equipped to respond effectively
to the consequences of a large-scale terrorist attack or natural disaster.

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment challenges
but the extent to which these actions will improve the Guard's domestic
capabilities is uncertain because DOD has not finalized specific plans to
implement and fund several initiatives. Some officials in case study
states expressed concerns about the adequacy of equipment for nondeployed
units under current Army plans. For example, until the Army defines the
types and amounts of equipment that nondeployed Army National Guard units
can expect to retain on hand within the United States, National Guard
officials in the states may be hampered in their ability to plan and train
for responding to large-scale domestic events.

References

Visible links
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-643
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-643
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1109T
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-745
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1042
  37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-498
  38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-643
  39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T
  40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-170T
  41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111
  42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-926
  43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652
  44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21
  45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-670T
  46. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-670
  54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60
*** End of document. ***