United Nations Organizations: Oversight and Accountability Could
Be Strengthened by Further Instituting International Best
Practices (18-JUN-07, GAO-07-597).
Since 2005, the United Nations (UN) has been attempting to reform
its management processes, in part to help ensure that resources
are used effectively and efficiently. Some of these reforms focus
on improving oversight and accountability at the United Nations.
In this report, GAO examines the extent to which selected UN
organizations' (1) internal audit offices have implemented
professional standards for performing audits and investigations,
(2) evaluation offices have implemented UN evaluation standards,
and (3) governing bodies are provided with information about the
results of UN oversight practices. GAO obtained and analyzed
international standards and relevant documents from six of the
largest UN organizations, and also met with U.S. and UN
officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-597
ACCNO: A70888
TITLE: United Nations Organizations: Oversight and
Accountability Could Be Strengthened by Further Instituting
International Best Practices
DATE: 06/18/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Audit oversight
Auditing standards
Best practices
Evaluation
Internal audits
Internal controls
International organizations
International relations
Quality assurance
Risk management
Standards evaluation
Waste, fraud, and abuse
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GAO-07-597
* [1]Report to Congressional Committees
* [2]June 2007
* [3]UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS
* [4]Oversight and Accountability Could Be Strengthened by Further
Instituting International Best Practices
* [5]Contents
* [6]Results in Brief
* [7]Background
* [8]UN Internal Audit Offices Have Not Fully Implemented Key
Components of International Auditing Standards
* [9]All Audit Offices Are Developing Risk-Based Work Plans
but Lack Completed Organizationwide Risk- Management
Frameworks to Guide Their Work
* [10]Some Audit Offices Lack Sufficient Staff to Cover
High-Risk Areas
* [11]Some Audit Offices Have Not Fully Implemented Quality
Assurance Processes
* [12]All Audit Offices Have Implemented a Recommendations
Tracking System and Follow-up Process, and Some Have
Implemented Mechanisms to Strengthen Their Process
* [13]Some Internal Oversight Units Lack Sufficient
Investigative Staff and Rely on Other Parties to Investigate
Wrongdoing
* [14]UN Agencies Are in Various Stages of Adopting Ethics
Policies
* [15]UN Evaluation Offices Have Not Fully Implemented UN
Evaluation Standards
* [16]Most Evaluation Offices Lack Sufficient Resources and
Expertise
* [17]Most Evaluation Offices Have Not Fully Implemented
Quality Assurance Processes
* [18]All Evaluation Offices Are Working toward Fully
Establishing Mechanisms to Systematically Follow Up and
Report on the Status of Their Recommendations
* [19]Governing Bodies Lack Full Access to Information That Could
Provide Greater Insights into UN Organizations' Operations and
Identify Critical Systemic Weaknesses
* [20]Governing Bodies Lack Full Access to Internal Audit
Reports
* [21]Most Governing Bodies Lack Direct Information from the
Internal Audit Offices on the Adequacy of the Audit Offices'
Resources and Capacity to Conduct Oversight
* [22]Most Audit Committees Are Not Aligned with Best
Practices
* [23]Most Audit Committees Are Not Accountable to Their
Governing Bodies
* [24]Some Audit Committees Are Composed of Senior
Management Officials
* [25]Some Organizations Are Considering the
Establishment of Audit Committees That Are Aligned with
Best Practices
* [26]Conclusions
* [27]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [28]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [29]Scope and Methodology
* [30]Comments from the Department of State
* [31]Comments from the Food and Agriculture Organization
* [32]Comments from the World Food Program
* [33]GAO Comment
* [34]Comments from the World Health Organization
* [35]GAO Comments
* [36]GAO Comments
* [37]Comments from the International Labor Organization
* [38]Comments from the United Nations Development Program
* [39]Comments from the United Nations Children's Fund
* [40]GAO Comments
* [41]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [42]Related GAO Products
* [43]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* [44]Order by Mail or Phone
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
GAO
June 2007
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS
Oversight and Accountability Could Be Strengthened by Further Instituting
International Best Practices
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS
Oversight and Accountability Could Be Strengthened by Further Instituting
International Best Practices
What GAO Found
Although the six UN internal audit offices that GAO reviewed have made
progress in implementing international auditing standards, they have not
fully implemented key components of the standards. The organizations lack
completed organizationwide risk-management frameworks, which are essential
in identifying the areas with the greatest vulnerability to fraud, waste,
and abuse. In addition, three audit offices lack sufficient staff to cover
high-risk areas of the organization. Furthermore, some of the audit
offices have not fully implemented quality assurance processes, which
include activities such as external peer reviews. Some of the
organizations also do not have professional investigators to probe
allegations of wrongdoing.
While the six UN evaluation offices that GAO reviewed are working toward
implementation of UN evaluation standards, they have not fully implemented
them. Most of the evaluation offices lack sufficient resources and
appropriate expertise to manage and conduct evaluations, especially at the
country level. This has impacted their ability to conduct high-quality and
strategically important evaluations. In addition, most of the evaluation
offices have not fully implemented quality assurance processes relating to
areas such as evaluation methodology, scope, evidence, and findings.
Furthermore, all of the evaluation offices are working toward fully
establishing mechanisms that systematically follow up and report on the
status of their recommendations.
The governing bodies responsible for oversight of the six UN organizations
that GAO reviewed lack full access to internal audit reports and most lack
direct information from the audit offices about the sufficiency of their
resources and capacity to conduct their work, which could provide greater
insights into the organizations' operations and identify critical systemic
weaknesses. In addition, with one exception, the organizations' audit
committees that GAO examined are generally not accountable to their
governing bodies, and some are composed of senior management officials.
Differences in UN Organizations' and IIA's Best Practices Accountability
Structures
Source: GAO analysis of UN data
and Institute of Internal Auditors' guidance.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
[45]Letter 1
[46]Results in Brief 4
[47]Background 7
[48]UN Internal Audit Offices Have Not Fully Implemented Key
Components of International Auditing Standards 14
[49]UN Evaluation Offices Have Not Fully Implemented UN Evaluation
Standards
[50] 29 Governing Bodies Lack Full Access to Information That
Could Provide Greater Insights into UN Organizations' Operations and
Identify Critical Systemic Weaknesses 39
[51]Conclusions 50
[52]Recommendations for Executive Action 50
[53]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 51
[54]Appendixes
Appendix I:
Appendix II:
Appendix III:
Appendix IV:
Appendix V:
Appendix VI:
Appendix VII:
Appendix VIII:
Appendix IX:
[55]Scope and Methodology 55
[56]Comments from the Department of State 60
[57]Comments from the Food and Agriculture Organization 64
[58]Comments from the World Food Program 67
[59]GAO Comment 69
[60]Comments from the World Health Organization 70
[61]GAO Comments 72 [62]Comments from the
International Labor Organization 73
[63]GAO Comments 76
[64]Comments from the United Nations Development Program 78
[65]Comments from the United Nations Children's Fund 79
[66]GAO Comments 81
[67]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 83
[68]Related GAO Products
Figures
[69]Figure 1: Governance Structure of Selected UN Funds and
[70]Programs and Specialized Agencies 10
[71]Figure 2: Internal and External Oversight Structure of Selected UN
Funds and Programs and Specialized Agencies 12
Figure 3: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized
Agencies' Progress toward Implementing International
[73]Auditing Standards 15
Figure 4: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized
Agencies' Progress toward Ensuring Sufficient Resources
[75]to Perform Investigations 25
Figure 5: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized
Agencies' Progress toward Implementing Financial
Disclosure and Whistleblower Protection Policies 28
Figure 6: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized
Agencies' Progress toward Implementing UNEG Standards and Norms 30
Figure 7: Audit Committee Purpose, Membership, and
Responsibilities According to Best Practices 44
Figure 8: Differences between Current Practice for Most of the UN
Organizations and IIA's Best Practice Accountability
Structure for Audit Committees 46
Figure 9: Audit Committees at the Six UN Organizations That We
Examined 48
Abbreviations
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and
Performance in Humanitarian Action
BOA Board of Auditors
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
IIA Institute of Internal Auditors
ILO International Labor Organization
IT information technology
JIU Joint Inspection Unit
OECD/DAC Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/
Development Assistance Committee
OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services
PBAC Program, Budget and Administration Committee
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
June 18, 2007
The Honorable Norm Coleman
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Member states contribute billions of dollars annually to the United
Nations (UN) system^1 for programs that meet emergency humanitarian needs,
provide development assistance, and support economic and social
development in over 190 countries. To direct these programs, member states
have created governing bodies in each UN organization to develop
governance practices for maintaining the strategic direction of the
organization, overseeing the effective and efficient use of resources, and
monitoring the actions of management and operations. The UN system
generally has both internal and external accountability and oversight
mechanisms. Internal oversight functions include reviewing the
effectiveness and efficiency of the organizations' operations, evaluating
the organizations' compliance with UN financial rules and regulations,
conducting investigations on allegations of misconduct, and reporting to
the executive heads of the organizations. External oversight functions
generally report to the organizations' governing bodies on the
organizations' finances and also may perform nonfinancial reviews of the
efficiency and effectiveness of the organizations' operations.
^1The UN system is composed of the main Secretariat and separately
administered funds and programs and specialized agencies. For example,
funds and programs include the United Nations Children's Fund and the
United Nations Development Program, which have executive boards and
executive heads but are under the authority of the UN Secretary-General.
In contrast, specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture
Organization, have their own governing bodies and executive heads and are
not under the authority of the Secretary-General. The agencies, which are
legally independent international organizations with their own rules,
membership, organs, and financial resources, were brought into
relationship with the United Nations through negotiated agreements.
As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United
States has advocated comprehensive management reform of the UN system,
including measures to strengthen governance and improve oversight. Also,
over the past 2 years, member states and independent experts have proposed
management reforms that call for sustained action to strengthen
accountability and transparency in the UN system by improving UN oversight
practices. As such, several management reforms and proposals have focused
on improving the effectiveness and increasing the capacity and
independence of the oversight function at the United Nations.
In 2005, representatives of UN member states identified an urgent need to
improve UN management processes and requested that the UN Secretariat's
Secretary-General and General Assembly propose and approve reforms for
strengthening the organization in several areas, including accountability
and oversight. For example, at the 2005 World Summit, the General Assembly
requested a comprehensive independent review of the Secretariat's Office
of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) with a view toward strengthening
that office, as well as a systemwide review of UN governance and
oversight.^2 While these reforms have focused primarily on the
Secretariat, they serve as a model for UN systemwide reforms to help
ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently. However, in
2006, we reported to Congress that progress toward implementation of
reforms, including those relating to strengthening oversight, has been
slow.^3
In this report, we examine the extent to which (1) internal audit offices
have implemented professional standards for performing audits and
investigations, (2) evaluation offices have implemented UN evaluation
standards, and (3) governing bodies are provided with information about
the results of UN oversight practices. The scope of our work includes the
internal audit and evaluation offices at the three largest UN funds and
programs--the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United
^2We reported in 2006 that UN funding arrangements constrain OIOS's
ability to operate independently and recommended that reliable funding
arrangements that do not undermine the independence of the office be made.
See GAO, United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of
Internal Auditors, [86]GAO-06-575 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).
^3GAO, United Nations: Management Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many
Awaiting General Assembly Review, [87]GAO-07-14 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5,
2006).
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP);^4 and
three of the largest UN specialized agencies--the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the
World Health Organization (WHO). In most of the organizations that we
studied, the investigations function was part of the internal audit
office.
To complete this study, we analyzed UN documents and processes and
practices relating to the audit, investigation, and evaluation functions
of the six UN organizations we examined. We reviewed professional
standards, guidelines, and best practices for performing audits,
investigations, and evaluations, including the Institute of Internal
Auditors' (IIA) International Standards for the Professional Practice of
Internal Auditing,^5 the UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations, and the
UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) standards and norms.^6 The six UN organizations
we examined have adopted these standards, norms, and guidelines. For the
purposes of our study, we selected key audit standards to examine the
extent to which these organizations have implemented IIA standards. To
examine the extent to which the organizations have implemented UNEG
standards and norms, we selected those standards and norms to match the
key audit standards to the extent possible. We also compared current
governance structures at the six organizations with IIA guidance on the
use of audit committees. We interviewed UN officials and staff with
governance and oversight responsibilities and members of the internal
audit committees and the external auditors for each organization. Finally,
we interviewed officials from the U.S. Departments of State (State),
Labor, and Health and Human Services; the U.S. Agency for International
Development; and 32 UN member state representatives. Appendix I contains
more details on our scope and methodology. We conducted our work in
Washington, D.C.; New York; Geneva; and Rome. We performed our work
between June 2006 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
^4WFP is a subsidiary of both the United Nations and the Food and
Agriculture Organization.
^5IIA is recognized as the internal audit profession's leader in
certification, education, research, and technological guidance. IIA
provides comprehensive guidance for internal auditing through its
Professional Practice Framework, including the International Standards for
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, which outlines the tenets
of the internal audit profession and the Role of Auditing in Public Sector
Governance that defines key elements needed to maximize public sector
audit activity.
^6UNEG is a group of professional practioners. UNEG adopted standards and
norms in 2005 to professionalize the evaluation function, provide guidance
to evaluation offices in preparing their evaluation policies or other
aspects of their operations, as well as to guide the establishment of the
institutional framework, management of the evaluation function, and the
conduct and use of evaluations.
Results in Brief
Although the six UN internal audit offices that we reviewed have made
progress in implementing international auditing standards, they have not
fully implemented key components of the standards, such as basing annual
work plans on organizationwide risk-management frameworks and obtaining
the necessary resources to conduct their work. All of the audit offices
are at various stages of developing and implementing their own riskbased
work plans, but the offices are doing so without the benefit of completed
organizationwide risk-management frameworks, which are essential in
identifying the areas with the greatest vulnerability to fraud, waste, and
abuse. In addition, three of the six UN audit offices lack sufficient
staff to cover high-risk areas of the organizations. Furthermore, three of
the audit offices have not fully implemented quality assurance processes,
which include activities such as internal and external peer reviews. For
example, ILO has not had an external peer review, but it plans to have one
this year for the first time. All audit offices have a tracking and
follow-up system for recommendations to ensure that senior management is
addressing deficiencies identified by internal and external auditors, and
some offices have undertaken efforts to strengthen their follow-up
processes. In addition, three of the organizations currently do not have
professional investigators and rely heavily on auditors to probe
allegations of wrongdoing, which is a practice that could impact the
organizations' ability to provide adequate audit coverage and ensure that
investigations are properly carried out. While most of the organizations
are in various stages of considering and implementing ethics policies,
none have adopted financial disclosure requirements for their oversight
staff to monitor potential conflicts of interest.
Although the six UN evaluation offices that we reviewed are working toward
implementation of UN evaluation standards and norms, such as resource
adequacy and quality assurance processes, they have not fully implemented
them. Five of the evaluation offices reported that they lack sufficient
resources and staff with expertise to manage and conduct
evaluations--conditions that have impacted their ability to conduct
highquality and strategically important evaluations. For example, UNICEF
reported that about two-thirds of its country offices do not have
sufficient staff with the requisite skills to consistently deliver
high-quality evaluations. In addition, five of the evaluation offices have
not fully implemented quality assurance processes relating to evaluation
staff selection, design, and reporting. Specifically, they have identified
weaknesses in areas such as evaluation methodology, scope, evidence, and
findings. Furthermore, all of the evaluation offices are working toward
fully establishing mechanisms that systematically follow up and report on
the status of their recommendations, to provide assurance to senior
management that steps are being taken to address identified weaknesses in
their programs.
The governing bodies responsible for oversight and accountability of the
resources of the six UN organizations that we reviewed lack full access to
internal audit reports and most lack direct information from the internal
audit offices about the sufficiency of their resources and capacity to
conduct their work, which could provide greater insights into the
organizations' operations and identify critical systemic weaknesses. In
addition, although most of the organizations have audit committees that
review internal audit activities and report to the heads of the
organizations, only WHO has an audit committee that is autonomous of
senior management and is part of the governing body. To carry out some of
their oversight responsibilities, UN governing bodies are provided with
the external auditor's report on the organization's financial statements
as well as the internal audit office's summary of internal audit
activities. However, the governing bodies do not have full access to
internal audit reports-- including those that identify systemic weaknesses
in internal controls and cases of fraud, waste, and mismanagement--and the
management response letter to audit reports, which includes senior
management's plans for taking correction action. Also, most of the
governing bodies lack direct information from the internal audit offices
on the sufficiency of the audit offices' staffing and financial resources
as well as the audit offices' capacity for conducting effective oversight.
International best practices suggest that oversight could be strengthened
by establishing an independent audit committee--composed of members
external to the management of the organization and reporting to the
governing body on the effectiveness of the audit office and on the
adequacy of its resources--as part of the governance structure of each of
the United Nations' governing bodies. However, the audit committees at
four of the six UN organizations that we examined are not in line with
these international best practices, and one entity does not have an audit
committee. Four of the five audit committees are not accountable to their
governing bodies, and three of these committees are composed of senior
management officials. An audit committee that is composed of external
members and accountable to its governing body also could assist it with
its responsibility to monitor the organization's oversight function. In
the absence of such an audit committee, many of the member state
representatives to the governing bodies told us that they find such
monitoring difficult because they lack sufficient resources and expertise.
We make recommendations in this report to the Secretary of State to direct
the U.S. Missions to work with member states to improve oversight and
accountability in UN organizations by (1) making audit reports available
to the governing bodies that will provide further insight into the
operations of the United Nations' organizations and identify critical
systemic weaknesses and (2) establishing independent audit committees that
are accountable to their governing bodies, where this does not now occur.
We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the
Secretary of State and cognizant officials representing the six
UN-affiliated agencies that we reviewed--FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and
WHO. These comments are reprinted in appendixes II through VIII, along
with our responses to specific points. State endorsed the main findings
and conclusions of the draft report and stated that the United States has
established partnerships with several other like-minded member states, and
will continue to work with them to build a constituency for strengthening
oversight and accountability in the UN system. FAO stated that our report
observations are clear, comprehensive, and well-reasoned and that its
governing body has begun taking steps that align with implementing our
recommendations. UNDP stated that it is reviewing the issues related to
the recommendations, and that a number of these issues will be part of the
interaction with the Executive Board during June 2007. WFP noted that the
substance of our recommendations is currently being debated in many forums
throughout the UN system, and that its Executive Board and its bureau have
been engaged in considering issues related to the composition and
reporting lines of the audit committee. WHO commented that it is engaged
with other organizations in the UN system in addressing the issue of
access to internal audit reports and noted that its Program, Budget and
Administration Committee already fulfills most of the requirements that we
advocate, such as independence from senior management and accountability
to the governing body. ILO commented that it has serious reservations
about implementing our recommendation to make internal audit reports
available to governing bodies. We maintain that providing the governing
body access to all internal audit reports will provide the governing body
greater insight into the organization's operations and highlight systemic
weaknesses in internal controls. UNICEF noted that any proposal to reorder
the governance mechanisms so as to align them with a particular
understanding of the IIA standards would be a matter for UNICEF's
Executive Board (among other institutions). We recognize that decisions
regarding changes in UNICEF's lines of reporting to allow UNICEF's
governing body access to all audit reports, as well as the creation of an
independent audit committee to be in line with international best
practices, will require the consideration and approval of UNICEF's
Executive Board. We also maintain that the United States, as a member of
UNICEF's governing body, should work with other member states to consider
implementation of these recommendations.
Background
According to the United Nations, effective oversight services are a high
priority and a crucial component in the Secretary-General's efforts to
strengthen the organization in the 21st century. Effective oversight
practices are integral to establishing good governance and help to provide
assurance to governing bodies and senior management that resources
contributed to the organization are not vulnerable to waste, fraud, and
abuse.
Generally, governance is the system by which organizations are directed,
controlled, and held to account to provide reasonable assurance that
objectives are met and that operations are carried out in an ethical and
accountable manner. Good governance requires a clear division of
responsibilities between the governing body and senior management. In
addition, good governance includes clearly articulated ethical values,
objectives, and strategies; proper tone at the top; and internal controls.
An absence of good governance structures and a lack of adherence to basic
governance principles increases the risk of public corruption. The
governing bodies in each UN organization are responsible for developing
governance practices for maintaining the strategic direction of the
organization, and monitoring the actions of management and operations.
Oversight is a key activity in governance that addresses whether
organizations are carrying out their responsibilities and serves to detect
and deter public corruption. Oversight functions include monitoring,
evaluating, and reporting on the organization's performance and holding
senior management accountable for results. These functions also encompass
the auditing, internal and external, of the organization's financial
results and the effectiveness of its internal controls. In addition,
oversight also includes investigation of allegations of fraud. The UN
system, including its affiliated funds and programs and specialized
agencies, generally has both internal and external accountability and
oversight mechanisms.
The principal bodies responsible for conducting oversight in the UN funds
and programs and specialized agencies in our study include member states
in their capacity as members of the governing bodies; governing body
committees; internal auditors; investigators; evaluation offices; and
external auditors, including the UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU). These
bodies are defined in the following text and illustrated in figure 1.
o Member states refers to those countries that are members of each of
the UN organizations.
o Governing body is composed of member state representatives who are
responsible for steering and directing the organization. Its role is
to set and maintain the organization's strategic direction, effective
and efficient allocation of resources, and effective monitoring of
management and operations. The governing body exercises oversight over
senior management.
o Governing body committee is composed of member state representatives
who are responsible for certain governance functions, such as budget
and finance committees; it makes recommendations to the governing body
or acts on its behalf in the interests of efficiency and
effectiveness.
o Senior management refers to the chief administrative or executive
officer of a UN organization and his or her senior management team.
Senior management is responsible for the organization's day-to-day
operations and the implementation of the policies, strategies, and
budgets established by the governing body. It has the duty to assess
risk and establish effective controls to achieve objectives and avert
risk. Senior management exercises oversight over the organization's
operational activities.
o Internal auditors determine whether there is an adequate and effective
system of internal controls for providing reasonable assurance with
respect to the integrity of financial and operational information;
compliance with regulations, rules, policies, and procedures, and
safeguarding of assets; economic and efficient use of resources, and
identifying opportunities for improvement; and effectiveness of
program management for achieving objectives consistent with policies,
plans, and budgets. Internal auditors are generally accountable to the
organization's senior management.
o The Office of Internal Oversight Services is the internal auditor of
the UN Secretariat and other UN organizations, including several funds
and programs, under the authority of the UN Secretary-General. Certain
funds and programs, such as UNDP and UNICEF, fall within OIOS's
jurisdiction but do not always use OIOS's services because they have
their own oversight units. OIOS's authority does not extend to UN
specialized agencies, such as FAO, ILO, and WHO.^7
o Investigators examine allegations of wrongdoing, including fraud,
corruption, misconduct, and other irregular activity, to propose
corrective management and administrative measures, such as an eventual
prosecution or disciplinary measures as appropriate. Investigators are
accountable to the organization's senior management.
o Evaluators determine the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of an
ongoing or completed program, project, or policy in light of its
objectives and accomplishments to incorporate lessons learned into
decision-making processes. The governance structures of evaluation
offices vary among organizations; either the governing bodies or the
heads of the organizations are responsible for the governance of the
evaluation offices.
o The external auditor reports on the organization's accounts and may
make observations on financial procedures, the accounting system,
internal financial controls, and the administration and management of
the organization in general. Several bodies within the UN system
provide external oversight. The Board of Auditors (BOA) serves as the
external auditor for the UN funds and programs. BOA is mandated to
express an opinion on the financial statements and, in general, on the
administration and management of the organization. Each of the
specialized agencies has its own external auditor, which is generally
the Auditor-General of a member state's supreme audit institution.^8
7 [88]GAO-06-575.
^8BOA examines the UN Secretariat and other UN organizations within the
Secretary-General's authority. BOA is presently composed of the heads of
the national audit offices of France, the Philippines, and South Africa.
Unlike the other funds and programs, WFP does not fall under BOA's
jurisdiction. Instead, WFP's governing body appoints its external auditor
in accordance with WFP's Financial Regulations. The National Audit Office
of the United Kingdom currently serves as the external auditor of WFP and
ILO, while the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India serves as the
external auditor for WHO and FAO.
o In addition, the Joint Inspection Unit, the only independent systemwide
external oversight body, has the authority to perform inspections,
evaluations, and investigations throughout the UN system, including the
funds and programs and specialized agencies.^9
Figure 1: Governance Structure of Selected UN Funds and Programs and Specialized
Agencies
Audit authority
Operational/Reporting relationship
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
ILO International Labor Organization
OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
OIOS has no oversight authority
OIOS has oversight authority
These organizations have their own internal oversight entities
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
^aThe Board of Auditors serves as the external auditors for both UNDP and
UNICEF. Currently, the National Audit Office of the United Kingdom serves
as the external auditor for WFP.
^bCurrently, the National Audit Office of the United Kingdom serves as the
external auditor for ILO, while the Comptroller and Auditor General of
India serves as the external auditor for WHO and FAO.
^cUN funds and programs operate under the authority of the UN Secretariat.
^dWFP is under the authority of the Director General of FAO and the UN
Secretary-General.
^9JIU primarily examines thematic areas, such as the possibility of
outsourcing certain services that cut across UN organizations. Although
the JIU statute provides it with the mandate to conduct investigations, at
the time of our study, it did not have the resources to carry out its
mandate to investigate wrongdoing, according to JIU.
The UN funds and programs and specialized agencies organize their internal
oversight functions^10 in different ways. For example, in most of the UN
organizations we examined, the oversight functions are separated into two
distinct units--one unit for the audit and investigation functions, and
another unit for the evaluation function--while in WHO, these three
functions are combined into a single unit and operate under one office.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the organizational structure of the
oversight functions at the UN organizations we studied, as well as their
total budgets for the biennium 2006-2007. On the basis of UN member
states' assessed rates of contribution, the U.S. government provides 22
percent of the budgets of FAO, ILO, and WHO. The amounts that the United
States provides to UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP are on a voluntary basis. On the
basis of the United States' budget for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the
United States provided total amounts of about $209 million to UNDP and
$249 million to UNICEF. In calendar year 2006, the United States
contributed $1.1 billion to WFP.^11
^10For the purposes of this report, oversight functions include audit,
investigation, and evaluation functions.
^11Contributions to WFP are dependent on an ongoing needs assessment for
emergency food aid. Therefore, State could not provide us with an estimate
for U.S. contributions made in 2007.
Figure 2: Internal and External Oversight Structure of Selected UN Funds and
Programs and Specialized Agencies
Oversight function
Budget
20 dedicated 56 dedicated and
professional professional staff
field field data do
positions positions not
funded by funded by include
separate separate regional
budget budget and
country
offices
External UN Board of UN Board of National National
auditors Auditors Auditors Audit Audit Supreme Supreme
Office Office Audit Audit
of the of the Institution Institution
United United of India of India
Kingdom Kingdom
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
aILO's 2006-2007 biennium budget figure does
not include voluntary contributions.
^bILO's governing body is a tripartite structure, which is composed of 28
member state representatives, 14 employer members, and 14 worker members.
^cWHO's OIOS is composed of the audit, investigation, and evaluation
functions.
^dEvaluations can be conducted or managed or both by headquarters,
regional, and field offices. Some evaluation offices (UNDP, ILO, WHO, and
FAO) are centrally managed and oversee the activities of the regional and
field offices. Other evaluation offices (UNICEF and WFP) activities are
decentrally managed and overseen directly by the regional and field
offices.
The audit, investigation, and evaluation functions within UN organizations
were established to advise senior management. The primary objective of
internal oversight in these organizations is to assist senior management
in fulfilling its responsibilities by providing advice on the adequacy of
internal controls and management practices on the basis of a systematic
and independent review of the organizations' operations. For example, the
mission of WFP's internal audit office is to help the organization
accomplish its objectives with a systematic approach to assess the
organization's risk-management, control, and governance processes and
suggest improvements to them. At the six organizations we studied, the
chief audit executives were appointed by and accountable to the heads of
their respective organizations, and in some organizations--such as ILO and
WHO--the appointments are made following a consultation with its governing
body.
The span of oversight and accountability of the evaluation function varies
among the six organizations we examined. Also, the types of evaluations
vary and may include corporate,^12 thematic, and programmatic evaluations.
Generally, at the six organizations that we examined, evaluation reports
are made publicly available.^13 UNDP, ILO, WHO, and FAO evaluation
functions are centralized, such that the headquarters evaluation offices
manage the evaluation function of the organization. For example, based on
the evaluation policy of UNDP, the evaluation office at headquarters is
the custodian of the evaluation function.^14 As such, the evaluation
office,
among other things, submits its annual plan to the governing body, reports
annually to the governing body on the function, findings and
recommendations of evaluations, assures mandatory decentralized
evaluations and support quality assurance of evaluations, as well as
conduct strategic, thematic, program, and other evaluations as
required.^15 In contrast, the management of UNICEF's and WFP's evaluation
functions is decentralized. For example, WFP's evaluation function
consists of its central evaluation office, which manages evaluations,
complemented by evaluations that are managed by regional bureaus and
country offices. In addition, WFP's evaluation office at headquarters
provides limited informal support to the bureaus and country offices.
UNICEF's evaluation office at headquarters commissions and conducts
evaluations and provides guidance on evaluation standards, but it has no
responsibility for overseeing the quality and independence of evaluations
at the regional or country level. The regional office conducts evaluations
related to regional strategies and provides oversight and support for
evaluations undertaken by country offices, and the country offices are
responsible for strategically selecting and conducting evaluations at the
country level.
^12Corporate evaluations have a scope that is of interest to the whole
organization and have systemic implications.
^13ILO said that its public page contains full text reports of major
evaluations and abstracts of all other independent evaluations. According
to UNICEF, as established by the Evaluation Committee Rules and Procedures
in June 2004, the evaluation office will assume that all reports are
suitable for public dissemination unless informed in writing by the
commissioning office.
^14In June 2006, the governing body of UNDP approved its first evaluation
policy, which is in line with the requirements of UNEG norms and
standards.
UN Internal Audit Offices Have Not Fully Implemented Key Components of
International Auditing Standards
Although the six UN internal audit offices that we examined have made
progress in implementing key components of international auditing
standards, they have not fully implemented key components of the
standards. All of the audit offices are at various stages of developing
and implementing their own risk-based work plans, but they lack a
completed organizationwide risk-management framework, which is essential
in identifying the areas with greatest exposure to fraud, waste, and
abuse. In addition, three audit officials stated that their audit offices
lack sufficient staff to cover high-risk areas. Three audit offices have
not fully implemented quality assurance processes, such as internal and
external peer reviews. All of the audit offices have a recommendations
tracking and follow-up system to ensure that senior management is
addressing deficiencies identified by internal and external auditors, and
some offices have undertaken efforts to strengthen their follow-up
process. In addition, some of the organizations do not have professional
investigators and rely
heavily on auditors to probe allegations of wrongdoing, a practice that
could impact the organizations' ability to ensure that investigations are
properly carried out. In addition, while most of the organizations are in
various stages of considering and implementing ethics policies, none have
adopted financial disclosure requirements for their oversight staff to
monitor potential conflicts of interest. Figure 3 provides information on
the six UN audit offices' progress toward implementing international
auditing standards.
^15UNDP defines strategic evaluations as those evaluations that assess its
performance in areas that are critical to ensuring sustained contribution
to development results in the context of emerging development issues and
changing priorities at the global and regional levels. Strategic
evaluations may cover the organization's policies and programmatic
approaches.
Figure 3: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized Agencies'
Progress toward Implementing International Auditing Standards
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
^aWHO conducted an internal self-assessment that was validated by an
external party. The scope and findings of this review were not provided to
GAO.
All Audit Offices Are Developing Risk-Based Work Plans but Lack Completed
Organizationwide Risk-Management Frameworks to Guide Their Work
IIA Standard: Planning
The internal audit activity plan of engagementsshould be based on a risk
assessment, undertaken at least annually. The input of senior management
and the board should be considered in this process. (2010.A1)
All audit offices are developing and implementing risk-based work plans,
but the organizations' senior management has not completed
organizationwide risk-management frameworks that would assist in guiding
the audit offices' work plans, as shown in figure 3. A riskmanagement
framework is (1) a systematic approach to identifying, assessing, and
acting on the probability that an event or action may occur that could
threaten or adversely affect an organization's activities, assets, and
reputation and (2) the responsibility of the organization's management.
Accordingly, the framework should reflect senior management's perspective
of the organization's risk environment and enable the internal audit
office to direct audit resources to those areas with the greatest exposure
to fraud, waste, and mismanagement. While risk management is the
responsibility of the organization's senior management, IIA standards
state that the internal audit office should assist the organization by
identifying and evaluating significant exposures to risk and by
contributing to the improvement of risk management and control systems.
While the internal audit offices of ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO have
contributed to their respective organizations' development of a
riskmanagement framework, none of the organizations have fully completed
such a framework. For example, IIA reported that WFP's audit office played
a key role in introducing an organizationwide risk-management framework by
helping to draft the risk-management proposal that the executive board
approved in late 2005 and by facilitating a series of organizationwide
risk-management workshops for headquarters and field offices.^16 IIA also
reported that the implementation of this organizationwide risk-management
framework would take about 2 years to complete, and it recommended that
WFP continue to implement the framework. In response to IIA, WFP indicated
that it was in the process of identifying a corporate risk coordinator and
a chief risk officer to work on the project's implementation. However,
these are only initial steps to developing an organizationwide
risk-management framework. WFP audit officials stated that until WFP has a
risk-management model in place, the audit office will have to rely on its
current process for assessing risks, which includes a range of factors,
such as questionnaires to managers; consideration of prior audit results;
emerging risks identified in consultation with management; and the results
of data collection and analysis. In contrast, FAO's audit office has not
been involved in assisting senior management in developing
an organizationwide risk-management framework, according to FAO's senior
audit officials.
^16This information is based on IIA's review of WFP's audit function in
2006.
All audit offices are making progress toward establishing their own
riskassessment processes to plan their work. These processes are unique to
each audit office, and the methodology for conducting the risk-assessments
ranges from an informal process to a more formal risk-assessment model.
For example, ILO's audit office developed a risk-assessment model and
undertook a risk assessment toward the end of 2006. The model is based on
a quantitative approach that defines the audit universe, numerically ranks
audit risks on the basis of a risk index, and uses a formula-based scoring
system. Previously, ILO's external auditor had recommended that the audit
office develop a more comprehensive risk-based work plan for each
biennium, and that the plan be formally accepted or approved by the head
of the organization to confirm his satisfaction on the level of internal
audit assurance being delivered. ILO first used this risk model to
prioritize its 2007 work plan. Another example is WHO's audit office,
which uses an informal risk-assessment process to plan its audit work. WHO
audit officials stated that the organization has engaged a consultant to
assist in developing an organizationwide risk-management framework. Once
this framework is established, audit officials said that they will be
better informed and will use the framework to help refine their risk-based
work plans.
Finally, all audit offices submit their risk-based work plans for review
and approval by senior management. However, only WHO submits its work
plans to the governing body for review as called for by IIA standards. IIA
standards state that the input of senior management and the governing body
(board) should be considered in the work plan. Input from the governing
body is essential to help ensure, among other things, that the work plans
are consistent with the organizations' goals; that management understands
its risk environment; and that the audit office has sufficient resources
(which are determined by the management and the governing body) to execute
the work plan. In addition, most audit offices (FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP,
and WHO) create annual work plans as called for by IIA standards.^17
However, according to audit office officials, their work plans would
benefit from an organizationwide risk assessment that reflects
management's perspectives of the organizations' risk environment.
^17ILO prepares a comprehensive risk-based work plan on a biennium basis
and updates the work plan annually.
Some Audit Offices Lack Sufficient Staff to Cover High-Risk Areas
IIA Standard: Resource Management
The audit chief should ensure that internal audit resourcesare
appropriate, sufficient, and effectively deployed to achieve the approved
plan. (2030)
Three of the six senior audit chiefs (FAO, UNICEF, and WFP) reported that
they do not have sufficient resources to carry out their approved work
plans, while three (ILO, UNDP, and WHO) reported that they have sufficient
resources. IIA standards require that audit chiefs have resources that are
appropriate, sufficient, and effectively deployed to achieve the approved
work plan. While UN audit chiefs can request additional resources from the
head of the organization through the budgeting process, it is the
responsibility of the head of the organization to ensure that the audit
office receives sufficient resources to audit high-risk areas or accept
the risks for not taking action. Generally, UN governing bodies are
unaware of the audit offices' budget requests, but governing bodies would
be aware of external auditors' reports that identify the need for
increased audit resources. Without sufficient financial resources for
audit and investigative positions, audit offices would not be able to
adequately address areas, such as financial management and information
technology systems that are vulnerable to fraud and abuse. We did not
review the sufficiency of the reported resources.
Senior audit officials of FAO, UNICEF, and WFP stated that they do not
have sufficient resources to execute their audit work plans. UNICEF's
audit capacity does not provide adequate coverage of high or significant
audit risk areas in headquarters and the field, according to UNICEF senior
audit officials and UNICEF's external auditor, BOA. BOA reported in June
2006 that the audit office's deployment of most of its staff resources to
the field has limited its coverage of the 18 headquarters offices and
divisions. Specifically, BOA reported that between 1999 and 2005, the
audit office conducted between one and four headquarters audits per year,
and that in a number of cases, the areas audited did not pertain to the
core activity of the division. BOA also reported that except for one
review--the financial logistics system security and authorization--carried
out in 2001, the audit office had not audited information technology areas
such as data centers, applications, networks, security, and data
integrity. At the time of BOA's audit, the audit office lacked information
technology (IT) expertise, but it subsequently hired one senior IT
specialist in 2006. UNICEF audit officials agreed with BOA's findings and
informed us that additional auditors are still needed to expand the
coverage of headquarters, systems, and performance audits. According to
BOA, a possible indicator of understaffing is the relationship between the
number of audit staff and the growth in UNICEF's budget and country
offices. For example, between 2000 and 2004, although UNICEF's budget
increased by about 57 percent and its reserves and fund balances doubled,
the audit office's staff level decreased by one during that period. UNICEF
audit officials informed us that on the basis of BOA's audit, its
executive board requested that the audit office conduct a needs assessment
of its resource requirements, which it is currently performing as part of
a UNICEF-wide review.
FAO's audit chief also informed us that the audit office lacks sufficient
resources to address high-risk areas. The audit chief said that there are
many high-risk areas that the audit office cannot cover within a 2-year
period, and that FAO would like to cover 100 percent of its high-risk
areas every 2 years. According to the audit chief, FAO's audit work plan
is driven by the financial resources provided to the internal audit unit,
and the determination of which high-risk areas to cover depends on the
amount of available financial resources.
WFP's audit chief informed us that the audit office does not have
sufficient resources to conduct its planned work for 2007. The audit chief
stated that the audit office had experienced a budget shortfall based on
its work plan for 2007, and that WFP absorbed this shortfall by decreasing
audit coverage of lower-risk areas. However, WFP senior officials stated
that further budget revisions and curtailment of planned recruitment in
2007 has left WFP's internal audit service short of its requirements, and
that budget uncertainties continue into 2008. Furthermore, according to
the audit office, for 2007, resource constraints have resulted in deferred
audit coverage of a number of field offices, and the planned audit of a
complex special operation also was deferred to a future year.
ILO's, UNDP's, and WHO's audit chiefs stated that their audit offices have
sufficient resources to conduct most of their planned audit work,
especially in high-risk areas. According to ILO's audit chief, the audit
office has sufficient resources to achieve its 2007 audit work plan, and
funds are available in the 2007 budget to outsource an IT audit.^18 ILO's
external auditor had recommended in 2006 that the office consider
increasing its level of IT audit specialists to support the audit of
internal controls, particularly regarding its integrated resource
information system. The audit chief also stated that the proposed
2008-2009 program budget includes provisions for an additional
professional staff, a part-time general service staff, as well as nonstaff
resources, which could be used to provide IT audit services. The
International Labor Conference will consider the proposed
2008-2009 budget in June 2007. In addition, WHO's audit chief stated that
he has obtained the number of positions that his office requires to
complete its planned work and has not had to postpone work or travel due
to lack of resources. WHO's audit chief also reported that the office
successfully hired additional staff in 2006 for the 2007 plan of work.
^18However, according to ILO's audit chief, the 2007 work plan is based on
current staffing levels, and the achievement of the work plan will be
subject to demands placed on the audit office to undertake investigations.
UNDP's senior audit officials stated that the organization currently has
sufficient resources to address most of its audit work plan for 2007. In
2005, the audit office reported to the agency head that the cases of fraud
uncovered in some country offices and at headquarters had occurred over
long periods, which indicated that internal controls and review processes,
including internal audits, had been very weak. In 2006, the audit office
requested a budget of about $13 million on the basis of its risk-based
work plan.^19 However, UNDP's senior management initially provided the
office with a budget allocation of about $7 million, according to UNDP
audit officials. The audit office did not have enough funds to perform its
planned work and requested additional resources, which was increased by
three subsequent allotments totaling $1.4 million. Both the audit chief
and UNDP's external auditor had emphasized to the head of the organization
that the audit function needs to be strengthened. Furthermore, BOA
reported in June 2006 that UNDP's internal audit coverage was insufficient
and that in the past 4 years, the audit office had performed an average of
less than four audits per year at headquarters, all of which were of a
very limited scope. BOA reiterated its recommendations to increase the
audit capacity to cover key areas, such as financial records, procedures,
and controls at headquarters. In April 2007, UNDP officials informed us
that for 2004 to 2006, all very-high-risk-rated countries and 72 percent
of high-risk- rated countries had been audited. In addition, UNDP
officials said they performed a risk assessment at the end of 2006, and
senior management allocated $10 million to carry out its audit work plan
in 2007. Furthermore, the officials said that senior management has
committed to allocate additional resources as deemed necessary. According
to UNDP officials, for the 3-year period of 2005 to 2007, they plan to
audit all very-high-risk areas and 96 percent of high-risk countries.
^19The $13 million would have allowed high-risk countries to be audited
once every 2 years, medium-risk countries once every 3 years, and low-risk
countries once every 4 years.
Some Audit Offices Have Not Fully Implemented Quality Assurance Processes
IIA Standards: Quality Assurance and Improvement Program
Internal assessmentsshould include ongoing reviews of the performance of
the internal audit activity. (1311)
External assessments, such as quality assurance reviews, should be
conducted at least once every 5 yearsby an independent reviewer or review
team from outside the organization. (1312)
Although all six audit offices have a number of quality assurance measures
in place, FAO, ILO, and UNDP fall short of fully meeting the IIA quality
assurance auditing standards. Quality assurance mechanisms are important
tools that can provide a level of assurance to the management of the
organization on the effectiveness and performance of the audit function.
Quality assurance and improvement programs include continuous reviews that
are conducted by internal and external reviewers. Internal reviews include
supervisory reviews of audit documentation and reviews of completed audits
by auditors who were not involved with the engagement to determine whether
they were conducted in accordance with the organization's quality control
policies and procedures. External reviews are generally conducted by
independent firms that examine the audit function and audit documentation
against established auditing quality standards, such as IIA standards.
While all audit offices have some form of internal quality assurance
processes in place, the processes vary widely across organizations and are
not always standardized or documented. All audit officials stated that
their internal quality assurance processes include reviews of audit
documentation by senior audit officials, audit peers, or team coordinators
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support audit
findings. For example, WHO audit team coordinators review work conducted
by auditors from the inception to the end of the audit and examine the
quality of work and the audit evidence gathered. In addition, WHO's
internal oversight director stated that he reviews all aspects of the
auditing work, including planning memorandums, report drafts, and comments
from the auditee, before a report is issued in its final format. While
some audit offices, such as ILO, UNICEF, and WFP, have documented their
internal quality assurance processes or have adopted software that
documents their quality assurance processes, FAO and UNDP have not. UNDP
has not documented its quality assurance process, and the audit office is
currently taking steps to document the process to comply with IIA
standards. FAO audit officials stated that they do not have standardized
procedures to review audit documentation of field auditors but expect to
standardize the process with the introduction of electronic work papers
that auditors from headquarters can review. Standardized procedures,
including documentation of the internal quality assurance process, would
help to provide assurance that the internal audit activity is performed in
accordance with the organization's standards and assist peer reviewers in
evaluating the organization's compliance with the standards.
Although periodic external peer reviews required by IIA can provide
reasonable assurance of the quality of the audit offices' work, we found
that two of the audit lacked a timely external review. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP,
and WHO audit offices have met IIA standards by undergoing external
reviews of their quality assurance processes at least once over the past 5
years. On the basis of an external review of UNDP's 2004-2005 audit
activities, in June 2006, UNDP's external auditor made several
recommendations for improving UNDP's audit activities. For example, BOA
recommended that UNDP enforce the timely receipt of audit reports that are
prepared by contractors who audit UNDP program activities in the field to
facilitate the audit office's review. BOA also reviewed UNICEF's audit
activities and reported that UNICEF had implemented many quality assurance
processes required by IIA standards. BOA recommended that the audit office
institute internal peer file review and ensure that there is evidence of
supervisory review on all audit documentation. UNICEF responded that it
had implemented BOA's recommendations pertaining to quality assurance.
Regarding WFP, IIA conducted an external review in March 2006 and found
that WFP generally conforms to its standards. IIA made a number of
recommendations, including that WFP expand and formalize its internal
quality assessment activities, such as supervisory reviews of selected
audits, and provide training to audit management and staff to ensure
consistent application of audit documentation standards. WFP reported that
it is in the process of implementing these recommendations. In August
2006, WHO's OIOS performed an internal quality assurance self-assessment,
which was validated by external reviewers. However, WHO did not provide us
with information covering the scope and findings of this review. According
to the director of WHO's OIOS, the quality assurance review included the
office's three functions of audit, evaluation, and investigation and
indicated general compliance with IIA standards.
FAO and ILO have not had external peer reviews in the past 5 years,
according to audit officials. For example, FAO audit officials stated that
FAO's audit office was peer reviewed in 2001 against standards established
by the UN Panel of External Auditors. The office was due to be reviewed in
2006, but the review was postponed due to budget constraints. However, IIA
began a review in February 2007, according to FAO audit officials. ILO has
not had an external review, but according to the acting chief of audit,
plans have been placed on hold for such a review due to difficulty in
having audit staff available to support the review. According to ILO's
acting chief of audit, funds have been included in the 2007 budget for an
external
review to be performed on the basis of IIA's standards beginning in fall
2007.
All Audit Offices Have Implemented a Recommendations Tracking System and
Follow-up Process, and Some Have Implemented Mechanisms to Strengthen Their
Process
IIA Standards: Monitoring Progress
The chief audit executive should establish and maintain asystem to monitor
the disposition of results communicated to management. (2500)
The chief audit executive should establish afollow-up process to monitor
and ensure that management actions have been effectively implemented or
that senior management hasaccepted the risk of not taking action.
(2500.A1)
All six audit offices we examined have a system in place to monitor and
follow up on the recommendations that are made to agency management to
help ensure that proper attention is being paid to any deficiencies that
are identified by the internal audit office. Some audit offices have also
undertaken efforts to strengthen their follow-up process to ensure that
recommendations are acknowledged and addressed by their organizations'
management. UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP track the status of their
recommendations in electronic work paper software, such as CARDS, Team
Mate, and AutoAudit.^20 UNICEF reports that establishing the database in
AutoAudit has significantly improved tracking and reporting on the status
of its recommendations. In contrast, FAO, ILO, and WHO track their
recommendations in software such as Excel or Access. FAO audit officials
said that they plan to use Team Mate in the future because Excel is not as
flexible, and that Team Mate will allow for input from the departments
they have audited.
All audit offices have a process in place to follow up on the status of
their recommendations and to determine whether any action has been taken
to address them. However, the frequency of follow-up and the way in which
it is conducted varies from agency to agency. For example, three of the
audit offices follow up with auditees every 6 months (FAO, ILO, and UNDP);
UNICEF follows up quarterly; WFP follows up monthly on the basis of the
recommendation implementation due date; and WHO has no set time frame for
follow up, which instead is determined by the types of outstanding
recommendations. The audit offices rely on implementation reports from the
offices that were audited to determine whether adequate actions have been
taken to close the audit recommendations. However, all senior audit
officials we interviewed stated that these written reports from the
auditees are supplemented by subsequent reviews of the status of
recommendations during the audit office's next field visit to verify
whether the appropriate actions were taken to implement the
recommendations.
Three of the audit offices (FAO, ILO, and WFP) have established mechanisms
to ensure that recommendations are acknowledged and
addressed by organization management. For example, according to an FAO
official, the audit committee has been playing an active role in
monitoring the status of recommendations, and, as a result, there is more
commitment from management to follow up on recommendations. At every audit
committee meeting, the committee members review each recommendation to
determine which ones have not been addressed. As a result of the audit
committee's regular monitoring, FAO has cleared the backlog of
recommendations and improved the timeliness of their implementation.
According to FAO, of the 2,790 recommendations issued during 2000 to 2005,
88.9 percent are closed, 4.9 percent are open, and 6.2 percent are
ongoing. ILO's Accountability Committee is charged with examining cases of
persistent failure on the part of officials to implement the
recommendations of the internal and external auditors. Furthermore,
according to WFP audit officials, WFP's audit committee is very active in
consulting with management in instances of nonresponsiveness by management
and where internal audit has concluded that management's implementation
plans are not satisfactory.
^20AutoAudit is an electronic audit system that is widely used in the
audit industry. The planning, execution, and follow-up actions of all
audits are documented in AutoAudit.
Some Internal Oversight Units Lack Sufficient Investigative Staff and Rely
on Other Parties to Investigate Wrongdoing
Investigation, which is an integral element of oversight, is a legally
based and analytical process designed to gather information to determine
whether wrongdoing has occurred. At the six organizations we examined,
investigations are guided by the UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations.
Three internal oversight units lack a sufficient number of professional
investigators and rely on other parties who may not be qualified to
conduct investigations, such as auditors, to determine whether wrongdoing
has occurred. In addition, some of the oversight units that do have
professional investigators reported that they are limited in their
capacity to conduct investigations with their existing staff. Limited
investigative capacity impacts their ability to conduct planned audits and
close cases, which may cause backlogs. According to the UN Uniform
Guidelines for Investigations, organizations should reasonably ensure that
resources available for investigations are proportionate to the number and
magnitude of allegations and the potential benefits to the outcome of the
case. Figure 4 provides information on selected UN funds' and programs'
and specialized agencies' progress toward ensuring sufficient resources to
perform investigations.
Figure 4: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized Agencies'
Progress toward Ensuring Sufficient Resources to Perform Investigations
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
Currently, ILO, UNICEF, and WHO do not have professional investigators.
UNICEF and WHO each have one full-time position allocated for a
professional investigator. UNICEF's position is currently vacant, while
WHO's position is in the process of being filled. ILO does not have any
investigator positions, although its internal oversight officials have
made several requests to management for additional investigative
resources. In March 2007, ILO's governing body approved ILO's 2008-2009
budget, which requested an increase for oversight resources. According to
ILO's chief internal auditor, the additional resources will be allocated
to employ a qualified and experienced investigator. In addition, while
UNDP has professional investigators, in late 2006, UNDP senior officials
reported they needed additional investigative staff because of increases
in the number of cases due to the adoption of a whistleblower protection
policy and the establishment of a fraud hotline in 2005. Accordingly,
UNDP's internal oversight unit stated in its annual report to its
governing body that additional investigative resources are needed to
address the increased caseload. Subsequently, in 2007, UNDP's
investigative unit received a 43 percent increase in resources, for a
total of $2 million, and UNDP officials told us that they are sufficiently
staffed to meet their needs. Moreover, FAO's investigative capacity is
limited because the head of investigations is the only staff member with a
background in investigations. The rest of the staff consists of auditors
who have some investigative training but lack investigative experience,
according to FAO officials. Currently, WFP's investigative function is
staffed with seven positions, including five professional staff. However,
there are new organizationwide initiatives that may increase WFP's
caseload, and WFP's senior officials told us they will
monitor the impact of these initiatives to ensure that investigative
resources continue to be sufficient.
Because the UN internal oversight units we examined lack professional
investigators, these units rely on auditors or consultants to conduct
investigations. As a result of their limited capacity, many internal
oversight units have backlogs of investigative cases and are unable to
complete planned audits. The internal oversight units of ILO and WHO,
which do not have professional investigators, rely on auditors to conduct
investigations on an as-needed basis. Currently, all of ILO's auditors are
engaged in conducting investigative work, according to ILO senior
officials. Also, in a 2006 report of the internal oversight activities,
WHO noted that it makes resources available for investigations as
situations develop, and that regularly scheduled audit work is interrupted
or deferred to provide resources for investigative purposes. FAO and ILO
internal oversight officials reported that they have been unable to
conduct their planned audits because auditor resources were diverted at
times to conduct investigations that occurred throughout the year. In
addition, some organizations hire consultants to conduct investigations as
an interim measure. FAO, UNDP, WFP, and WHO officials reported hiring
consultants to conduct investigative work. These shortfalls, in part, have
led to a backlog of cases that have not been resolved at four of the six
organizations we studied (FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP). For example, in
2006, UNDP reported a backlog of 57 outstanding cases--55 unresolved cases
were carried forward from 2005, and 2 unresolved cases were from 2004.
With the additional resources for two investigator positions UNDP received
in 2007, UNDP officials told us that their capacity to handle cases should
improve.
UN Agencies Are in Various Stages of Adopting Ethics Policies
Most organizations are in various stages of adopting ethics policies, such
as requiring conflict-of-interest and financial disclosure statements and
adopting whistleblower policies to protect those who reveal wrongdoing.
Ethics policies could strengthen oversight by helping to ensure more
accountability and transparency within the organizations. All UN employees
are subject to standards for ethical conduct that have been established by
the International Civil Service Advisory Board.^21 Ethical standards
developed by IIA and the UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations apply
specifically to auditors and investigators, respectively. UNEG is
currently drafting its own set of ethical guidelines for UN evaluation
staff.^22
UN organizations have created various ethics policies across the six
organizations to help to ensure that all staff, including internal
oversight staff, are free from conflicts of interest. Some internal
oversight units rely on their staff to comply with a general declaration
that all UN employees sign when they are employed by the organization. For
example, all FAO employees, including oversight staff, are required to
sign a Declaration for Code of Conduct, which states that one must
exercise loyalty and discretion as an international civil servant and
maintain independence from any government or other external party.
Similarly, in 2006, ILO began requiring all of its employees, including
oversight staff, to complete a disclosure of interest statement on a
periodic basis. WHO employees also complete a Declaration of Interest
statement; however, the requirement applies to its senior managers and
staff members who perform selected functions, such as procurement, and
does not apply to its entire oversight staff. Other organizations, such as
UNDP and WFP, rely on their oversight staff to self-report any conflict of
interests, although WFP's investigative unit was developing a
conflict-of-interest policy to cover investigations staff in fall 2006.
None of the six organizations we examined require their internal oversight
staff to disclose their financial interests, which could help to ensure
that employees are free from conflicts of interest. In late 2006, UNICEF
established a financial disclosure policy for senior management and
officials who are responsible for selected functions, such as procurement,
but did not apply the policy to auditors, investigators, and evaluators
below the senior management level. Although FAO does not currently require
its oversight staff to disclose their financial interests, it is currently
seeking governing body approval to amend its staff regulations to require
financial disclosure statements. Once FAO has amended its staff
regulations, WFP will also be able to require its staff to disclose their
financial interests. However, FAO and WFP have not determined whether this
policy will apply to all of their internal oversight staff. Furthermore,
all six of the organizations we studied have made efforts to increase
accountability by implementing whistleblower protection policies in line
with UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations to protect those who reveal
wrongdoing within their respective organizations. FAO, ILO, UNICEF, WFP,
and WHO have established whistleblower protection policies, and UNDP is
developing such a policy. Figure 5 provides information on selected UN
funds' and programs' and specialized agencies' progress toward
implementing financial disclosure and whistleblower protection policies.
^21The Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service were
prepared by the International Civil Service Advisory Board and were
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 56/244 in
2001. Regarding ethics, the Standards of Conduct state that international
civil servants may be required to disclose certain personal assets if this
is necessary to enable their organizations to make sure there is no
conflict.
^22Although the IIA standards do not call for organizations to establish
an ethics office or to provide compulsory ethics training, some UN
organizations have made efforts to implement such policies. Among the six
organizations we studied, only ILO and UNDP have established an ethics
office or officer, while WHO is discussing whether to create such an
office or position. The other organizations--FAO, UNICEF, WFP, and
WHO--had not taken steps to establish such an office or position. UNDP is
the only organization that we examined that has instituted compulsory
ethics training, a best practice, for its employees. UNICEF offers
voluntary ethics training to its staff, while other organizations have not
developed or implemented such training.
Figure 5: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized Agencies' Progress
toward Implementing Financial Disclosure and Whistleblower Protection Policies
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
UN Evaluation Offices Have Not Fully Implemented UN Evaluation Standards
Although the six UN evaluation offices that we examined are working toward
implementing components of UN evaluation standards and norms, they have
not fully implemented them.^23 These components include ensuring that
adequate resources are allocated to enable the evaluation function to
operate effectively, implementing quality assurance processes, and
following up systematically on recommendations that were made to
management. Most of the evaluation offices reported that they lack
sufficient resources and staff with expertise to manage and conduct
evaluations--conditions that have impacted their ability to conduct
highquality and strategically important evaluations.^24 Most of the
evaluation offices have not fully implemented quality assurance processes;
as a result, there are reported weaknesses in areas such as evaluation
staff selection, design, and reporting processes. In addition, all of the
evaluation offices are working toward fully establishing mechanisms that
systematically follow up and report on the status of their recommendations
to provide assurance to senior management that steps are being taken to
address identified weaknesses in their programs. Figure 6 provides
information on the six UN evaluation offices' progress toward implementing
UNEG's standards and norms.
^23"Evaluation office" as used in this report refers to evaluations
conducted or managed, or both, by headquarters, regional, and country
offices.
^24Strategic evaluations are those that assess performance in areas that
are critical to ensuring sustained contribution to development results in
the context of emerging development issues and changing priorities at the
global and regional levels. These strategic evaluations may cover policies
and programmatic approaches.
Figure 6: Selected UN Funds' and Programs' and Specialized Agencies'
Progress toward Implementing UNEG Standards and Norms
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
Most Evaluation Offices Lack Sufficient Resources and Expertise
UNEG Standard/Norm
Ensure adequate financial and human resources for evaluation in order to
allow efficient and effective delivery of servicesby a competent
evaluation function and enable evaluation capacity strengthening.
(standard 1.1:2)
Evaluators must have the basic skill set for conducting evaluation
studiesand managing externally hired evaluators. (norm 9.3 and standards
2.1:2 and 2.1:3)
The evaluation offices of FAO, ILO, UNICEF, UNDP, and WFP reported that
they do not have enough staff or staff with the appropriate expertise,
especially in the field, to manage or conduct high-quality and
strategically important evaluations as required by UNEG. WHO's officials
stated that their evaluation office has sufficient staff and staff with
appropriate expertise to conduct and manage evaluations. Due to the lack
of evaluations staff and expertise at most organizations, member states
may not be provided with accurate and comprehensive information regarding
whether the program or project is achieving its intended objectives, to
make informed decisions as to whether the program or project should be
modified or eliminated. Specifically, UNEG standards call for governing
bodies or heads of the organizations, or both, to ensure adequate
financial and human resources to allow the efficient and effective
delivery of evaluation services by competent staff. In addition, although
all evaluation offices engage consultants to supplement the work conducted
by their evaluators, according to a panel of evaluation experts, the
availability of qualified evaluation consultants in many countries is
limited. Some regional officers have developed rosters of prescreened
consultants to support country offices in managing the evaluation process.
However, UN officials reported that budget constraints and limited supply
of wellqualified people hamper regional directors' and monitoring and
evaluation officers' efforts to hire local consultants. We did not review
the sufficiency of the reported evaluation staff.
Officials in UNICEF's evaluation office and its peer review panel reported
that they do not have sufficient numbers of staff or staff with
appropriate expertise to conduct evaluations and to strengthen evaluation
capacity.^25 Although the number of professional monitoring and evaluation
staff has increased by 42 percent since 2002, UNICEF's evaluation
officials reported that their staffing needs are still unmet at
headquarters and in the field.^26 UNICEF also reported that funding for
evaluations at the country level is not allocated separately from other
functions so that the 156 professional staff in the field perform other
duties as well as devote a portion of their time to conducting
evaluations. In addition, the evaluation office reported
that about two-thirds of UNICEF's offices do not have a monitoring and
evaluation officer at the appropriate level of expertise and therefore are
less able to consistently deliver high-quality evaluations.^27 In May
2006, an external peer review panel recommended that the resources for the
evaluation office be increased to sufficiently cover strategic evaluations
based on the organization's priorities. The review panel also stated that
critical gaps in quality and resources at the regional and country levels
weaken the usefulness of the evaluation function as a management tool.
According to evaluation officials, UNICEF's executive board requested that
they assess the adequacy of the evaluation budget, which they are
currently performing as part of a UNICEF-wide review.
^25UNICEF reported that evaluation resources are scarcer for the more
expensive evaluations, including corporate-level and country-program
evaluations. Donor-funded efforts usually do not face implementation
constraints, but quality may be less than desired if the country office
does not have a fully skilled evaluation staff.
^26UNICEF reported that it had 48 evaluation professionals in 2002, and 68
in 2006.
UNDP officials reported that they do not have sufficient staff or staff
with the right skills to manage the evaluations that are performed by
consultants at the country and regional levels.^28 According to UNDP
officials, existing budget practices for evaluation vary among country
offices. Evaluation resource requirements are often determined on an
informal basis for field offices, and the amounts allocated are generally
insufficient for quality evaluations. In addition, most of the country and
regional offices are not staffed with evaluation specialists, but rather
with focal points. With few exceptions, focal points are not evaluation
specialists but managers with multiple responsibilities who may perform
some evaluation-related work. Specifically, only 20 of the 142 country
offices have full-time monitoring and evaluation professionals,
specialists or advisors, while 22 country offices have only focal points.
In addition, all 5 regional bureaus have focal points that support
evaluation planning and liaise with country offices and with the
evaluation office at headquarters. Only 1 regional center has a monitoring
and evaluation specialist position.^29 A senior evaluation official
informed us in April 2007 that a number of country offices are in the
process of recruiting monitoring and evaluation professionals. In
contrast, according to UNDP officials, the centrally managed evaluation
function, which resides in the evaluation office at headquarters,
independently produces evaluations of a strategic and policy nature and
presents them
directly to the Executive Board. These evaluations are funded adequately,
and the expertise of the evaluation staff at headquarters and the
consultants it recruits are considered highly professional.
^27UNICEF has 126 country offices and 7 regional offices.
^28The evaluations conducted by UNDP fall into two categories: (1)
independent evaluations conducted by the evaluation office at headquarters
and (2) decentralized evaluations managed by country offices, regional
bureaus, and practice and policy bureaus that are conducted by
consultants.
^29Annual Report of the Administrator on Evaluation in 2005 (May 2006).
FAO's evaluation officials informed us that FAO does not have sufficient
resources to manage and conduct evaluations to address a reasonable level
of senior management's concerns. The evaluation office relies heavily on
the use of outside consultants for its expertise; however, it is difficult
to maintain quality evaluations while only using consultants, according to
the officials. Resources are needed to hire staff to manage the
consultants' work.^30 In addition, ILO officials said that all four of its
evaluation professionals at headquarters are experienced, and that they
provide guidance to their regional and technical offices.^31 However, all
major evaluations are conducted by consultants in the field, and there is
not enough staff at the field level with the expertise to manage the
evaluation process and to ensure that the evaluations produced by the
consultants are of good quality. ILO officials informed us in April 2007
that the 2008-2009 budget will include funding for two additional staff.
Furthermore, according to WFP officials, their current plan of work for
evaluations has been designed to fit resources allocated for evaluations
rather than to ensure adequate resources for the evaluation function. WFP
officials said that they lack resources to conduct evaluations especially
in the regional and country offices. According to the officials, only 50
percent of WFP's planned decentralized evaluations managed by regional
bureaus and country offices were actually conducted in 2006. Similar to
other UN evaluation offices, such as UNDP and UNICEF, WFP officials said
that there are few dedicated monitoring and evaluation staff in regional
offices, and that most of them handle a large number of other duties with
only limited experience in evaluation. According to the officials, this
situation hampers the quality of decentralized evaluations.
^30The officials said that resources are inadequate for regular program
activities and significantly inadequate for extrabudgetary programs.
^31ILO's evaluation office at headquarters has three professional staff.
The fourth evaluation professional staff joined the evaluation office in
2007 on a temporary basis for 1 year.
Most Evaluation Offices Have Not Fully Implemented Quality Assurance
Processes
UNEG Norm
Each evaluation should employ design, planning, and implementation
processes that are inherently quality oriented, covering appropriate
methodologies for data collection, analysis, and interpretation. (norm
8.1)
Evaluation reports must present in acomplete and balanced way the
evidence, findings, conclusions, and recommendations, etc. (norm 8.2)
The evaluation offices of FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP have not fully
implemented quality assurance processes to help ensure that evaluation
reports adequately address criteria such as evaluation methodology, scope,
evidence, and findings.^32 WHO's director of OIOS states that the office
has in place a stringent internal and external quality assurance review
system for the evaluation function and that an internal quality assurance
selfassessment, which was validated by external reviewers, indicates that
the evaluation office was in general compliance with IIA standards.^33 A
number of the reported deficiencies point to weaknesses in the design
process (purpose and objectives, scope, and methodology); in the reporting
process (evidence-based findings, conclusions, and limitations); and the
staff selection process (the quality of the evaluators and management of
the process). However, while not required by UNEG's standards and norms,
some of the entities have taken steps to implement quality-review
mechanisms, such as external peer reviews of draft reports, external
review of their quality assurance processes, and evaluation committees, to
provide an added level of quality assurance. UNDP and UNICEF have had
external peer reviews of their evaluation offices at headquarters, and
FAO, ILO, and WFP have performed quality appraisal exercises or
selfassessments that have identified several areas where their quality
assurance processes could be improved.
ILO's evaluation office reported in November 2006 that while it has
addressed shortcomings in its evaluation practices, it needs to fully
implement quality assurance processes to improve the quality of its
evaluations. The evaluation office reported that some areas of the
evaluations show strength, but the office does not consistently have
welldeveloped monitoring and review plans, as well as indicators and
targets, for which evaluators can conduct evaluations. To improve the
quality of its
evaluation reports, ILO performed a quality appraisal exercise and
reviewed 16 of the 65 independent project evaluations that were finalized
in 2005. In November 2006, ILO reported, among other things, the following
results on the basis of its review:
^32In addition, in 2005, UNEG performed a baseline review of its UN
evaluation members and, among other things, reported that management
follow-up and quality assurance processes were found to be consistently
weak, according to UNICEF. UNEG Task Force on `Quality Stamp' for
Evaluation - Baseline Synopsis of UNEG Members (December 2005).
^33WHO's OIOS is composed of audit, evaluation, and investigation
functions. According to the director, the office has chosen the IIA
standards as the overarching professional guidance because they are more
independent and authoritative than UNEG standards and are responsive to
the evaluation function. However, OIOS also has adopted the UNEG standards
for its evaluation function and applies them accordingly in the
performance of evaluation projects. In addition, WHO conducted an internal
self-assessment that was validated by an external party. The scope and
findings of this review were not provided to GAO.
o About one-half of the evaluation reports did not state the purpose,
scope, or objectives of the evaluation.
o Many reports did not include a methodology section or did not explain
the methodology in a satisfactory manner.
o Only 1 of 6 evaluation reports that used sampling or case studies
explained the selection method.
o All but 1 of the reports included recommendations and identified
lessons learned, but it was difficult to extract the lessons learned
from the evaluations.
o The findings and conclusions were generally of adequate to good
quality, but the quality of the analysis varied.
On the basis of this appraisal, ILO officials stated that the two key
factors for improving the quality of evaluations are the quality of
evaluators and the effective management of the evaluation process. As a
result, (1) the evaluation office has designed 1-day training courses on
managing independent evaluations, guidelines to provide to all external
evaluators on expected content and quality of their evaluation reports,
and (2) steps are being taken to include oversight and control of the
selection of evaluators, among other things.
A UNDP senior official reported in May 2006 that the quality and utility
of the evaluations commissioned by country offices are uneven. Some
evaluations present rigorous and credible assessments of UNDP performance,
while others are lacking in their assessment of the program's performance
and evaluative evidence, according to the UNDP senior official.^34 The
UNDP senior official also said that part of the problem comes from a lack
of clarity in program objectives and poorly defined
performance indicators. In contrast, UNDP officials said that the
evaluation office at headquarters follows a strict regime of quality
assurance, including quality validation by external advisory panels. In
December 2005, an external advisory panel completed a peer assessment of
UNDP's evaluation office at headquarters and reported that it produces
evaluations that are credible, valid, and useful for learning and strategy
formation in the organization.^35 UNDP reports that it is taking a number
of actions to help ensure the quality of centrally managed and
decentralized evaluations. In June 2006, the Executive Board approved an
evaluation policy for UNDP, which is based on the requirements of UNEG
standards and norms. Quality standards are being developed for each stage
of the evaluation process, including the planning, conduct, and use of
evaluations. UNDP officials said that these standards will provide
objective, transparent benchmarks against which quality can be checked,
scored, and ensured at each stage of the process.^36 According to UNDP
officials, the implementation of the evaluation policy for field
evaluations has just begun, and the evaluation office at headquarters
intends to carry out an assessment of the policy's implementation in
2008-2009. Furthermore, the evaluation office hopes to update its handbook
on evaluation and monitoring in 2007.
^34According to UNDP, the evaluations produced by country offices, besides
being used for programmatic improvement, are building blocks for
strategic, global, regional, and country program evaluations.
While UNICEF's evaluation office at headquarters reports that it has
provided guidance and quality standards for conducting evaluations and
reporting on them, it states that while there has been progress over the
past 2 years, considerable improvement is required, particularly at its
country offices, to ensure the quality of its evaluations.^37 In addition,
UNICEF's peer review panel reported in May 2006 that at the country level,
in particular, there were inconsistencies in applying guidance provided by
the evaluation office at headquarters to ensure that all evaluations and
evaluation reports meet the required quality standards. The panel reported
that consideration should be given to strengthening guidance through
training on evaluation reporting standards, such as evidence, conclusion,
and recommendations, and that the accountability for quality assurance
across UNICEF's
evaluation function should be more clearly defined, particularly at the
country and regional levels.
^35This peer assessment was designed under the auspices of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee Network on Development Evaluation.
^36Annual Report of the Administrator on Evaluation in 2005 (May 2006).
^37UNICEF Evaluation Office, The Quality of Evaluations Supported by
UNICEF Country Offices 2000-2001 (September 2004). In this 2004 report,
UNICEF stated that nearly onethird of its evaluations are poor, and that
major improvements and value for money can be gained by enhancing quality.
FAO evaluation officials said that they have a quality assurance process
in place that differs on the basis of the types of evaluation reports it
produces. According to the evaluation officials, internal quality
assurance was strengthened with a set of quality standards introduced in
the last 3 months and the addition of review conducted by external
evaluation specialists to the reviews carried out by independent peer
review panels and staff. FAO officials informed us that there was further
room for improvement regarding whether the evaluation office was meeting
UNEG's quality standards, including for corporate evaluations. WFP
performed a selfassessment of its evaluation function in August 2005 as
part of the UNEG checklist on evaluation quality and identified areas for
improvement, such as ensuring that the quality of evaluation reports is
systematically controlled by quality rules, which it is currently
addressing.
While not required to do so by UNEG's standards and norms, some of the
organizations have taken steps to implement quality review mechanisms,
such as external peer reviews of draft reports, peer reviews of the
evaluation function, and evaluation committees, to provide an added level
of quality assurance. For example, WFP's evaluation office said that it
uses the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) for the review of its humanitarian
evaluations.^38 In addition, three of the evaluation offices (UNDP,
UNICEF, and WHO) have had external peer reviews that cover their quality
assurance processes within the past year or 2, while two are currently
undergoing reviews (FAO and WFP). Furthermore, four of the evaluation
offices (FAO, ILO, UNICEF, and WFP) have established evaluation
committees.
^38ALNAP reviews UN organization evaluations on humanitarian assistance
programs and comments on their quality.
All Evaluation Offices Are Working toward Fully Establishing Mechanisms to
Systematically Follow Up and Report on the Status of Their Recommendations
UNEG Standard
There should be asystematic follow-up on the implementation of the
evaluation recommendations that have been accepted by management and/or
the governing bodies. (norm 12.2 and standard 3.17:41)
There should be a periodic report on the status of the implementation of
the evaluation recommendations. This report should be presented to the
governing bodiesand/or the head of the organization. (norm 12.3 and
standard 3.17:42)
All evaluation offices are working toward fully establishing mechanisms to
systematically follow up and report on the implementation status of their
recommendations. UNEG requires its evaluation offices to perform a
systematic follow-up and prepare a periodic report on the status of the
implementation of the evaluation recommendations that have been accepted
by the head of the organization or the governing body, or both.
FAO's, ILO's, UNDP's, and WHO's evaluation offices have systems in place
to follow up on management's response to their evaluation recommendations.
Officials of ILO's evaluation office said that its monitoring of
management's implementation of recommendations is overseen by ILO's
Evaluation Advisory Committee, which requires ILO management to formally
respond every 6 months to the evaluation office's findings and
recommendations. UNDP's evaluation office developed its recommendation
monitoring system in 2006 and has a systematic follow-up process in place.
FAO's program committee^39 requires that management respond to the
evaluation office's recommendations by indicating which recommendations it
will accept or reject, or both, and report on the progress made in
implementing the recommendations. The program committee requires FAO's
evaluation office to determine whether the report is produced and complies
with the standards, according to the chief evaluation officer. WHO has a
follow-up process in place, and the frequency of recommendation follow-up
depends on the type of the evaluation.
UNICEF's and WFP's evaluation offices have begun to develop evaluation
recommendation tracking systems to allow better follow-up on the status of
their recommendations. UNICEF's evaluation officials stated that they are
in the process of developing such a system because the prior
recommendation monitoring processes did not use a consistent structure or
guidance. Specifically, the evaluation office had been addressing the
status of recommendations through memorandums that are exchanged among
divisions or offices involved in action plans.^40 Like UNICEF, WFP is in
the process of developing a follow-up system, which will take into account
international good practice, as discussed during UNEG's meetings, to
further improve its system.
^39This program committee is a committee of the member countries
(governing bodies).
^40In addition, UNICEF's peer review panel reported in May 2006 that
management responses have not been systematically required until recently,
and that there has been no system for tracking follow-up of
recommendations.
All of the evaluation offices provide periodic reporting on the status of
their recommendations to agency heads or their governing bodies, or both.
The reporting of the status of recommendations would indicate to
management and the governing bodies the extent to which actions are being
taken to address identified weaknesses in the evaluation programs or
projects. ILO's and WFP's evaluation offices report to their governing
bodies annually on the implementation status of their recommendations, and
WHO reports twice a year to its senior management and governing body.
FAO's evaluation office is required to provide a status report on its
recommendations to its governing body after 1 to 2 years, depending on the
type of evaluation performed. Every 4 months, the head of UNDP's
evaluation office provides a report to senior management on the status of
the implementation of its recommendations, which includes highlighting
recommendations and systemic issues that are not being addressed. UNDP's
evaluation office plans to provide a periodic report on the status of its
recommendations to its governing body as part of its annual reporting,
beginning in 2007. In addition, UNICEF's evaluation office provides a
report on the status of its evaluation recommendations to its evaluation
committee, which is chaired by its executive director. While UNICEF
officials said that UNICEF does not provide periodic reporting covering
the specific status of each recommendation to its governing body, it
provides information to give the governing body a general understanding of
whether the systemic issues the evaluation office raised are being
addressed.
Governing Bodies Lack Full Access to Information That Could Provide Greater
Insights into UN Organizations' Operations and Identify Critical Systemic
Weaknesses
The governing bodies responsible for oversight and accountability of the
resources of the six UN organizations that we reviewed lack full access to
internal audit reports and most lack direct information from the internal
audit offices about the sufficiency of their resources and capacity to
conduct their work, which could provide greater insights into the
organizations' operations and identify critical systemic weaknesses. In
addition, although most of the organizations have audit committees that
review internal audit activities and report to the heads of the
organizations, only WHO has a committee that is autonomous of senior
management and is part of its governing body. To carry out some of their
oversight responsibilities, UN governing bodies are provided with the
external auditor's report on the organization's financial statements as
well as the internal audit office's summary of internal audit activities.
However, where the governing bodies do not have full access to internal
audit reports, they may lack full information on systemic weaknesses in
internal controls; cases of fraud, waste, and mismanagement; senior
management's response to audit recommendations; and senior management's
plans for taking
correction action. Also, most of the governing bodies lack direct
information from the internal audit offices on the sufficiency of the
audit offices' staffing and financial resources as well as the audit
offices' capacity for conducting effective oversight. In addition,
international best practices suggest that oversight could be strengthened
by establishing an independent audit committee--composed of members
external to the management of the organization and reporting to the
governing body on the effectiveness of the audit office and on the
adequacy of its resources--as part of the governance structure of each of
the United Nations' governing bodies. However, the audit committees at
four of the six UN organizations we examined are not in line with these
international best practices, and one of the entities does not have an
audit committee. Four of the five audit committees are not accountable to
their governing bodies, and three of these committees are composed of
senior management officials. An audit committee that is composed of
external members and accountable to the governing body could also assist
it with its responsibility to monitor the organization's oversight
function. In the absence of such an audit committee, many of the member
state representatives to the governing bodies told us they find such
monitoring difficult because they lack sufficient resources and expertise.
Governing Bodies Lack Full Access to Internal Audit Reports
While the governing bodies of the six organizations we examined receive
information from various sources about the effectiveness of the
organizations' financial and programmatic operations, they do not have
full access to internal audit reports, which could increase transparency
and provide further insight into the organizations' operations. Currently,
the governing bodies receive information on the organizations' operations
from various sources, including the external auditor's report on the
organization's financial statements, the internal audit office's report
summarizing its main findings and activities, and the audit committee's
report on the internal audit office's activities. For example, UNICEF's
audit office provides an independent annual report to the governing body
covering its summary of audit activities, findings, analysis of systemic
weaknesses, and issues of internal controls. In September 2006, UNICEF's
Executive Board requested that UNICEF's audit office further enhance the
level of analysis in its annual report to include management responses to
key and recurring issues identified by the audit office, as well as assess
and report on the adequacy of resources for the internal audit function,
which the audit office will provide in future reporting.
While these existing information sources help the governing body exercise
its oversight responsibilities, some member states want access to internal
audit reports, which would increase transparency and their awareness of
the adequacy and effectiveness of the organization's system of internal
controls. For example, a representative stated on behalf of the European
Community that the international organizations should work in the spirit
of transparency regarding member states' access to internal audit reports.
Similarly, in a governing body committee meeting to discuss member states'
access to internal audit reports, a U.S. representative stated that
although the internal audit office's annual report to the governing body
contains useful information, it does not provide enough information to
determine whether implemented recommendations significantly improve FAO's
operations. Over the past year, another U.S. representative requested
specific internal audit reports that would provide more information on the
oversight of UNDP's operations in a specific country. The U.S.
representatives stated that full access to UNDP audit reports would help
them to exercise their oversight responsibilities as members of the
governing body.
The UN Secretariat's internal audit office provides member states with
access to internal audit reports upon request, and some of the UN
organizations we studied are considering making these reports available to
member states. In December 2004, the UN General Assembly granted member
states access to internal audit reports of the UN Secretariat's internal
audit office to increase transparency and accountability at the
Secretariat.^41 Previously, the internal audit offices' reports were
issued only to the Secretary-General and the heads of the UN organizations
under examination. According to a U.S. representative, the practice of
providing member states with access to audit reports at the UN Secretariat
has helped to provide insight into the operations of the United Nations
and identify critical systemic weaknesses. Currently, although WHO's
internal audit office does not provide member states with copies of its
internal audit reports, the office's policy is to provide a detailed
briefing, which may include reading the internal audit report, to member
states upon request. Under ILO's financial regulations, the chief internal
auditor has the authority to submit any internal audit report to the
governing body, if the chief internal auditor deems it necessary to do so.
In addition, some of the organizations we studied are considering making
internal audit reports available to member states. For example, since May
2006, FAO's governing
body has been discussing the criteria by which member states may access
FAO's internal audit reports. Although WFP's governing body has not
formally considered requesting access to audit reports, WFP's chief
internal auditor said he would not oppose such a measure if the governing
body makes such a decision after considering all of the advantages and
disadvantages, including issues of confidentiality and due process,
because he believes that member states' access would enhance the
organization's transparency. However, some internal audit officials
indicated that it may be difficult and time-consuming to modify the
current structure of audit reports to delete sensitive material, and that
making the reports available to member states would raise issues
concerning confidentiality, administrative workloads, and the potential
for micromanagement by member states.
^41See G.A. Res. 59/272, U.N. GAOR, 59^th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/59/272
(2005).
Most Governing Bodies Lack Direct Information from the Internal Audit
Offices on the Adequacy of the Audit Offices' Resources and Capacity to
Conduct Oversight
Most governing bodies of the six UN organizations we examined are not
provided with information directly from the internal audit offices on the
adequacy of the audit offices' staffing and financial resources; as a
result, the governing bodies may be unaware of the audit offices' capacity
to conduct effective oversight. WHO's governing body does receive this
information through its Program, Budget and Administration Committee.
According to international auditing standards, an internal audit office
should have sufficient resources to effectively achieve its mandate.
However, the internal audit officials must rely on senior management to
ensure that they have sufficient resources to conduct their planned
audits.
Several UN audit officials stated that they had expressed the need for
additional resources to senior management officials who can grant or deny
their funding request, depending on the budgetary situation of the
organization and senior management's commitment to oversight issues. For
example, ILO audit officials stated that over the past several years, they
had requested resources to hire an investigator, but until this year, no
action had been taken. In March 2007, the governing body approved ILO's
2008-2009 budget request, which sought additional funds for its internal
audit office; according to ILO's chief internal auditor, ILO will use the
additional oversight resources to employ a qualified and experienced
investigator. While the governing bodies approve the organizations'
overall budgets, in general they do not see the internal audit office's
budget, staff size, and results of resource needs assessments. Therefore,
the governing bodies may be unaware of the internal audit offices'
requests for additional resources. For example, although UNICEF officials
told us that the audit office lacks adequate resources to address
high-risk areas and that
UNICEF's audit chief submits an annual report directly to its governing
body, the audit chief did not communicate this deficiency to its governing
body when it had the opportunity to do so in its June 2006 annual report
on its internal audit activities. As a result, the governing body may not
be aware of the audit chief's concerns.
Most Audit Committees Are Not Aligned with Best Practices
Although five of the six UN organizations that we examined have
established audit committees, the accountability structure and composition
of four of these audit committees are not aligned with IIA's best
practices.^42 According to IIA, an independent audit committee is
considered critical to help ensure that the organization has strong and
effective processes related to independence, internal control, risk
management, compliance, ethics, and financial disclosure. Figure 7 depicts
the purpose, membership, and responsibilities of an audit committee,
according to best practices. Best practices also suggest that the
governing body approve the functions and responsibilities of the audit
committee. In addition, members of the audit committee should understand
accounting principles, financial statements, and internal controls.
According to IIA, an audit committee's responsibilities are to review the
proposed budgets of the internal oversight offices, make recommendations
to the governing body on the level of resources needed for internal
oversight, and provide a level of independence from the organization's
senior management. Moreover, an independent audit committee provides the
governing body with an independent and objective assessment of audits of
the organization's financial statements and the internal auditors'
performance. Of the six UN organizations, only WHO's PBAC has an audit
committee structure that includes many of IIA's best practices.
^42All six UN organizations that we studied have adopted IIA's
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing.
Figure 7: Audit Committee Purpose, Membership, and Responsibilities According to
Best Practices
Source: GAO analysis of IIA guidance.
Although five of the six UN organizations that we examined have
established audit committees, the accountability structure and composition
of four of these audit committees are not aligned with the IIA best
practices. Specifically, most audit committees, except for WHO's, are
neither independent of senior management nor accountable to the governing
body, and most include senior management officials rather than exclusively
external financial experts. WHO's PBAC functions as an audit committee and
is generally aligned with IIA's best practices.^43 The PBAC is composed of
14 of WHO's governing body members and is accountable to WHO's entire
governing body.^44 In addition, WHO's PBAC independently provides
information on the effectiveness and capacity of WHO's internal audit
office directly to the full governing body. In contrast, according to the
audit committee charters of FAO's, UNDP's, UNICEF's, and WFP's, their
audit committees are accountable to the heads of their respective
organizations and not to their respective governing bodies. In addition,
these committees do not independently report on the effectiveness and
capacity of the organization's internal audit office directly to their
respective governing bodies, as IIA suggests. Although all four audit
committees provide reports summarizing their work to the governing bodies,
FAO's, UNICEF's, and WFP's audit committees issue their reports to their
respective organization heads who provide a copy to the governing body. In
contrast, UNDP's audit committee charter allows the committee to
independently submit its annual report to its governing body. Without an
independent and knowledgeable audit committee, senior management's opinion
could override that of the audit committee. As a result, a governing body
would not have the benefit of an audit committee's assistance in ensuring
that an organization has implemented effective oversight practices. Figure
8 illustrates the differences between the current practice of the four UN
organizations without independent audit committees and IIA's best practice
accountability structure for the audit committee, governing body, senior
management, external auditor, and internal audit office.
^43In May 2004, WHO's governing body merged the Administration, Budget and
Finance Committee, the Audit Committee, and the Programme Development
Committee into a single committee, composed of its members, called the
Program, Budget and Administration Committee.
^44WHO's governing body is composed of 32 members.
Figure8: Differences between Current Practice for Most of the UN
Organizations and IIA's Best Practice Accountability Structure for Audit
Committees
Source: GAO analysis of UN dataand IIA guidance.
Most Audit Committees Are Not Accountable to Their Governing Bodies
The audit committees at four of the five organizations that have audit
committees are not accountable to their governing bodies, despite IIA's
recommendation that the audit committee report regularly to the governing
body. As previously stated, WHO's PBAC (audit committee) is composed of
members of its governing body, and it is accountable to the governing
body. According to their charters, UNDP's and WFP's audit committee
chairpersons may present their annual reports to their respective
governing bodies. However, UNDP's audit committee was newly reconstituted
in 2006 and has not issued its first annual report, so UNDP's governing
body has not had the opportunity to request that the audit committee
chairperson present it. Although WFP's governing body received the audit
committee's first annual report in 2005, the contents of the report were
not discussed at WFP's governing body meetings. WFP's audit committee did
not release its annual report in 2006, so the chairman has not had the
opportunity to present it. Although WFP's audit committee charter
specifies that the
chairman shall present an audit committee report annually^45 to the
governing body, the chairman believes there is insufficient interaction
between the committee and the governing body. In 2006, WFP's external
auditor recommended that the governing body formally acknowledge the role
and mandate of the audit committee to reinforce the independence of such a
committee and to ensure a closer alignment of WFP's arrangements with best
practices in governance. A member of WFP's governing body stated that the
governing body has begun discussing what role, if any, the audit committee
should have in the organization and what type of relationship it should
have with the governing body. The governing body members have not reached
consensus on this matter. At FAO and UNICEF, the extent to which the audit
committee interacts with the governing body is unclear. The relationship
of FAO's audit committee to its governing body is not mentioned in its
charter. One FAO governing body representative stated that he was unaware
of the activities and composition of FAO's audit committee, and that there
was no formal interaction between the audit committee and the governing
body. UNICEF's audit committee charter specifies that its audit committee
is expected to maintain free and open communication with BOA, the internal
audit office, and UNICEF senior management, and that it may consult the
head of the governing body only in exceptional circumstances.
Some Audit Committees Are Composed of Senior Management Officials
At three of the UN organizations that we examined, the organizations'
senior management officials are members of the audit committees, and the
audit committees are not always composed of financial experts. IIA
recommends that the audit committee be composed of external members who
have expertise in accounting and financial matters. Figure 9 provides
information on the current composition and accountability structure of the
UN audit committees that we studied. UNDP has an audit committee that is
composed entirely of external members who have oversight or financial
backgrounds, but it is not accountable to the governing body. WHO's audit
committee is composed of 14 of its governing body members, 2 from each of
its 6 geographical regions, plus a chairman and a vice-chairman who are ex
officio members. UNICEF's, WFP's, and FAO's audit committee charters allow
for the inclusion of senior management officials on the committee. Whereas
UNDP's, UNICEF's, and WFP's audit committee charters specify that the
chairperson shall be a member external to the organization, FAO's
audit committee charter specifies that the audit chairperson shall be the
Deputy Director General.
^45WFP's audit committee charter does not specify whether the report that
the governing body receives is the same report submitted to the head of
the organization.
Figure 9: Audit Committees at the Six UN Organizations That We Examined
UNDP UNICEF WFP ILO WHO FAO
Audit Composed of 5 Composed of 3 Composed of 3 Currently, Created by member Composed of 2
committee external external and 3 external and 2 there is no statesand composed of external and 5
composition membersappointed internal internal audit 14 membersselected internal
and by whom by the head of membersappointed membersappointed committee. from among the membersappointed
itsmembers the by the head of by the head of In March governing body.a by the head of
are organization. the the 2007, ILO the
appointed organization. organization. submitted a organization.
proposal to
its
governing
body to
consider
establishing
an
independent
oversight
committee.
External member External member External member Not Chairman and Deputy Director
Committee of of of applicable.
chairperson committee committee committee, Vice-Chairman ex General.
designated by elected by appointed by the officio selected from
the head of the committee head of the among the
organization. members.
organization. governing body
members.
To whom the Head of the Head of the Head of the Not Governing body. Head of the
audit applicable.
committee is organization. organization. organization. organization.
accountable
Reports Committee Committee Committee Not Committee
issued to issuesannual issuesannual issuesannual applicable. Committee issuesannual
itsgoverning report to the report to the report to the issues/presentsreports report to the
body governing body. head of the head of the twice per head of the
Upon request, organization, organization. year to the governing organization,
chairman shall who providesa Committee also body. who providesa
copy to copy to
present the the governing preparesa report the governing
report to body. body's
the governing that is Finance
body. transmitted Committee.
through the head
of
the organization
to
the governing
body.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
^aIn 2004, WHO's Administration, Budget and Finance Committee, the Audit
Committee, and the Programme Development Committee merged into a single
committee.
Some Organizations Are Considering the Establishment of Audit Committees
That Are Aligned with Best Practices
An independent audit committee could assist the governing body in
monitoring the organization's oversight functions. In the absence of such
an audit committee, many member state representatives said that they find
such monitoring to be difficult because they lack sufficient resources and
expertise. The majority of the member state representatives are
responsible for programmatic and policy issues within several UN
organizations, and many said that they consider oversight issues secondary
to programmatic issues. In addition, some representatives told us that the
highly technical aspects of auditing make it difficult for them to
question or challenge audit practices. As a result, some member states are
not actively engaged in monitoring UN oversight organizations due to
impediments in the existing governance structure and the lack of resources
and expertise. However, an independent audit committee could provide the
governing body with an independent assessment of the organizations'
financial statements and the internal auditors' performance.
Some organizations have begun discussing whether to establish audit
committees that are aligned with IIA best practices. According to WHO, its
PBAC, which acts as its audit committee, fulfills most of the requirements
of an audit committee. Its audit committee was created by the member
states, and it is independent from senior management and is accountable to
the governing body. In addition, among other things, PBAC reviews the work
plan of the internal audit office and the external auditor; reviews the
internal audit staffing and ensures that the function has adequate
resources; reviews periodic reports of internal audit, including annual
reports summarizing audit findings and progress on implementation of
internal and external audit recommendations. However, WHO's chief internal
auditor does not have a direct organizational reporting line to the PBAC,
but rather reports directly to WHO's Director-General. IIA's guidance
provides that the internal auditor should have the organizational
independence to allow the audit activity to conduct work without
interference by the entity under audit. By reporting organizationally to
WHO's Director-General, rather than to the PBAC, the chief internal
auditor does not have a level of organizational independence that is
consistent with IIA's guidance. The member states of ILO's governing body
and its external auditor recommended that ILO establish an audit
committee. In response, ILO is currently making progress toward
establishing an independent oversight advisory committee that could be in
line with best practices and accountable to the governing body and
entirely composed of external members, if implemented as proposed. For
example, in March 2007, ILO submitted a proposal to its governing body to
consider establishing an independent oversight committee, but the
governing body has not yet reached consensus on this matter. In addition,
FAO's senior management is taking steps to reconstitute its audit
committee by 2008 so that the committee is composed entirely of external
members; however, the audit committee will still be accountable to the
head of the organization, rather than to the governing body, according to
a senior FAO official. Moreover, WFP's senior management indicated that it
would be open to adopting an external audit committee that conforms to
IIA's best practices, and WFP's current audit committee chairman concurred
with this view.
Conclusions
The governing bodies of the UN funds and programs and specialized agencies
are responsible for providing effective oversight and accountability for
the billions of dollars provided annually by member states, including the
United States, to support a wide range of activities globally. Since UN
organizations are funded with government resources, it is essential that
member states have measures in place that provide timely, independent, and
comprehensive information on the operational effectiveness and efficiency
of their programs. Independent and adequately resourced oversight
mechanisms that employ international accountability standards and best
practices are an integral part of organizations and can provide the
governing bodies with reasonable assurance that the UN organizations'
funds are being used as intended. For various reasons, existing internal
oversight mechanisms within the six UN organizations that we reviewed had
not fully implemented some key components of internationally accepted
standards and best practices. This condition hinders them from carrying
out some of their oversight responsibilities as defined by the governing
bodies of their respective organizations. In addition, because key
internal oversight structures, such as audit committees, do not report
directly to the governing bodies, the organizations' good governance
practices are hampered. Without the insights provided by access to
internal audit reports, an independent audit committee, and an internal
audit activity with a high level of independence, the governing bodies
could face challenges in fully executing their responsibilities of
monitoring the effective and efficient use of resources, senior
management's actions, and the organization's operations.
Recommendations for
To improve oversight in UN organizations, we are making
recommendations to the Secretary of State to direct the U.S. Missions to
work with member states by taking the following two actions:
o Make internal audit reports available to the governing bodies to
provide further insight into the operations of the United Nations'
organizations and identify critical systemic weaknesses.
o Establish independent audit committees that are accountable to their
governing bodies, where this currently does not occur. Audit committee
oversight responsibilities could include the following:
o ensuring communication and reporting lines between the head of internal
audit and the audit committee,
o reviewing internal audit staffing and ensuring that the function has
the necessary resources,
o reviewing and assessing the annual internal audit plan,
o reviewing management's responsiveness to internal audit findings, and
o monitoring and assessing internal audit effectiveness.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the
Secretary of State and cognizant officials representing the six
UN-affiliated agencies that we reviewed--FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and
WHO. These comments are reprinted in appendixes II through VIII, along
with our responses to specific points. State, FAO, UNDP, WFP, and WHO
generally agreed with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. ILO
commented that it has serious reservations about implementing our
recommendation to make internal audit reports available to governing
bodies. UNICEF expressed concerns about our recommendation to establish
independent audit committees that are accountable to their governing
bodies. State and the six UN-affiliated agencies submitted technical
comments that we have incorporated into this report, as appropriate.
State endorsed the main findings and conclusions of our report.
Specifically, State fully agreed that members of the governing bodies
should have access to reports and that the establishment of independent
audit committees that meet international best practices would strengthen
governance. State also noted that our report accurately recognizes that
this goal will require the United States to work with other member states
to build support. According to State, the United States has established
partnerships with several other like-minded member states, and will
continue to work with them to build a constituency for strengthening
oversight and accountability in the UN system.
FAO stated that our report observations are clear, comprehensive, and
well-reasoned. The organization also said that the report's thrust toward
instituting further best practices is considered timely and consistent
with the approach that FAO has been observing in recent years. In
addition, regarding the recommendation on the sharing of internal audit
reports, FAO said that this matter is currently under consideration by
both the FAO governing bodies and by the Chief Executives' Board for
Coordination of the UN system. Furthermore, regarding our recommendation
on establishing an independent audit committee that is accountable to
these entities' governing bodies, FAO stated that from 2008 onwards, the
FAO audit committee will be composed solely of external members who will
act in an advisory capacity to the FAO Director-General.
UNDP stated that it has taken note of the recommendations put forth in the
report. Also, UNDP stated that it is reviewing these recommendations, and
that these will be part of the interaction with the Executive Board during
June 2007.
WFP stated that the report is a useful contribution to the ongoing debate
on enhancing oversight and accountability in the UN system. Specifically,
WFP noted that the substance of our recommendations is currently being
debated in many forums throughout the UN system. In addition, WFP noted
that its Executive Board and its bureau have been engaged in considering
issues related to the composition and reporting lines of the audit
committee.
WHO commented that it is engaged with other organizations in the UN system
in addressing the issue of access to internal audit reports. The
organization noted that while it supports the concept of transparency,
there is a need to balance the sharing of information against the need to
protect privileged information and the rights of staff members. In
addition, WHO noted that its PBAC already fulfills most of the
requirements that we advocate, such as independence from senior management
and accountability to the governing body. Upon receipt of WHO's technical
comments, our report was updated to reflect that WHO has a PBAC that
operates similarly to an audit committee. Furthermore, WHO stated that
IIA's best practice accountability structure illustrated in our report
would effectively create a second external auditor, which would not be a
workable solution. We disagree that the IIA guidance would create an
external auditor and leave the Director-General without an internal audit
function. Specifically, IIA guidance on the key elements of an effective
public sector audit activity, which would apply to the internal audit
activity at WHO, provides that at a minimum, the audit activity needs to
have organizational independence that allows audit work that is without
interference by the entity under audit and is seen to be independent as
well. The IIA guidance states that this organizational independence
contributes to the accuracy of the auditors' work and the ability to rely
on the audit results. By having the WHO internal audit activity report
organizationally to the PBAC, which serves as the audit committee for
WHO's governing body, the independence of internal audits of the
Director-General's programs and responsibilities would be enhanced
significantly. In addition, the Director-General would continue to have an
internal audit function, but it would be reporting organizationally to the
PBAC of the governing body.
ILO noted that our report did not sufficiently reflect actions taken by
ILO to address issues highlighted regarding inadequacy of audit staffing
levels; lack of an organizationwide risk-management framework; and lack of
access to internal audit reports and other information by the governing
body, audit staff financial disclosure, and an audit committee. Our report
was updated after receipt of ILO's technical comments to reflect
information provided by the organization regarding several of these
issues, including adequacy of resources, financial disclosure, and the
proposal submitted by the Director-General to ILO's governing body calling
for the creation of an independent audit committee. In addition, ILO
stated that the report does not reflect the process that ILO has in place
concerning the provision of access to information. We updated our report
to reflect information provided in ILO's technical comments about this
process. Furthermore, ILO commented that it has serious reservations about
implementing the recommendation regarding making internal audit reports
available to governing bodies. We maintain that providing the governing
body with access to all internal audit reports will provide the governing
body greater insight into the organization's operations and highlight
systemic weaknesses in internal controls.
UNICEF noted that many of the issues raised in our report are for
consideration by the UNICEF Executive Board, and UNICEF recognizes the
importance of ensuring that any discussion of such issues takes place
within the jurisdiction of the UNICEF Executive Board. Regarding the
recommendation of making internal audit reports available to the governing
body and audit committee, UNICEF stated that its Executive Board has
requested that UNICEF further enhance the level of analysis in the
publicly available annual report of UNICEF's Office of Internal Audit;
include management responses to the key and recurring issues identified by
the Office of Internal Audit; and assess and report on the resources
required for the internal audit function. In addition, UNICEF noted that
any proposal to reorder the governance mechanisms so as to align them with
a particular understanding of the IIA standards would be a matter for the
UNICEF Executive Board (among other institutions). We recognize that
decisions regarding changes in UNICEF's lines of reporting to allow
UNICEF's governing body access to all audit reports, as well as the
creation of an independent audit committee to be in line with
international best practices, will require the consideration and approval
of UNICEF's Executive Board. We also maintain that the United States, as a
member of UNICEF's governing body, should work with other member states to
consider and implement these recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix IX.
Thomas Melito
Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) internal audit
offices have implemented professional standards for performing audits and
investigation, (2) evaluation offices have implemented United Nations (UN)
evaluation standards and norms, and (3) governing bodies are provided with
information about the results of UN oversight practices. For our review,
we selected 6 UN organizations from among the 10 funds and programs and 15
specialized agencies that comprise the universe of all UN funds and
programs and specialized agencies. On the basis of their budgets for
biennium 2004-2005, we selected the 3 largest funds and programs and 3 of
the largest specialized agencies.^1 Therefore, our results cannot be
generalized to the full universe of all funds and programs and specialized
agencies and may not represent the practices of the smaller UN
organizations. The funds and programs we selected include the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP). The specialized agencies we
selected include the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
International Labor Organization (ILO), and the World Health Organization
(WHO).
To examine the extent to which the six organizations' internal audit
offices have implemented professional standards for performing audits, we
reviewed relevant standards issued by the Institute for Internal Auditors
(IIA), which is recognized as the internal audit profession's leader in
certification, education, research, and technological guidance. IIA
provides comprehensive guidance for the profession through its
Professional Practice Framework, including the International Standards for
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, which outlines the tenets
of the internal audit profession and The Role of Auditing in Public Sector
Governance, which provides guidance to all levels of government. The six
UN organizations that we examined have adopted the IIA standards. To
conduct our review, we selected key audit standards that were based on
previous GAO work.^2 Specifically, we (1) selected standards relating to
risk-management framework, risk-based audit work plans, resource
management, quality assurance, recommendation monitoring, and ethics
practices and (2) assessed the extent to which these six organizations'
practices were consistent with these standards. We examined documents from
the six organizations, including reports prepared by the organizations'
external auditors, external peer reviewers, and audit committees, as well
as reports prepared by the chief audit executives for senior management
and governing bodies. In addition, we conducted interviews with various
officials, including officials of the internal audit offices, finance
division, audit committees, legal offices, and external auditors. We did
not perform independent assessments of the organizations' audit functions.
Our reviews were limited to reviews of documents and interviews with the
various officials. For example, to assess whether the internal audit
offices had sufficient resources to conduct their risk-based work plan, we
based our findings on interviews with the organizations' audit officials
and their external auditors' assessment of the adequacy of the
organizations' audit coverage.
^1Total 2004-2005 biennium budgets (in billions of US dollars) for the
following UN organizations include regular and extrabudgetary resources:
UNDP, $7.13; WFP, $5.99; UNICEF, $4.87; WHO, $3.98; FAO, $1.34; and ILO,
$0.90.
^2GAO, United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of
Internal Auditors, [91]GAO-06-575 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).
Regarding investigations, the six UN organizations we examined have
adopted the UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations, which are intended
to be used as guidance in the conduct of investigations in conjunction
with each organization's rules and regulations. In particular, we focused
on the guideline that states that the planning and conduct of the
investigation should reasonably ensure that resources devoted to
investigations are proportionate to the allegation because having
resources for investigations is fundamental to probe allegations of
wrongdoing. To assess the extent to which investigative resources were
sufficient, we examined documents from the six organizations, including
reports prepared by the organizations' external auditors, annual reports
of the oversight unit chiefs to the head of the organization, and the
audit committees' reports, where applicable. In addition, we conducted
interviews with various officials, including external auditors, internal
auditors, and investigators, where applicable. We did not perform
independent assessments of the organizations' investigative functions. To
assess the organizations' efforts to adopt financial disclosure and
whistleblower policies, we examined their policies and procedures and
spoke with relevant officials, including officials from the organizations'
human resources, legal, and oversight units. All UN employees are subject
to standards for ethical conduct established by the International Civil
Service Board. In addition, each oversight function--audit,
investigations, and evaluations--is guided by its respective professional
standards. IIA has developed standards to guide the ethical conduct of
auditors. The UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations applies
specifically to investigators. The UN Evaluation Group is currently
drafting its own set of ethical guidelines for UN evaluation staff. The
International Civil Service Board, IIA, and the UN Uniform Guidelines for
Investigations all address the need
for staff to avoid conflicts of interest and disclose any such
impairments. The UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations recommends the
practice of protecting the identities of those who make complaints to the
investigative office.
To examine the extent to which the six organizations' evaluation offices
have implemented UN evaluation norms and standards, we reviewed the
relevant standards and norms issued by the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG).
UNEG adopted these norms and standards in 2005 in an attempt to
professionalize the evaluation function and provide guidance to evaluation
offices in preparing their evaluation policies or other aspects of their
operations. Norms are the guiding principles for evaluating the results
achieved by the UN system, the performance of the organizations, the
governance of the evaluation function within each organization of the UN
system, and the value-added use of the evaluation function. A set of
standards complementing these norms has been drawn from the best practices
of UNEG members, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)/Development Assistance Committee evaluation principles, national
standards of OECD countries, evaluation policies of the international
financial institutions, evaluation policies of the European Union,
standards of evaluation associations, and evaluation guidance developed by
the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
Humanitarian Action. These standards are intended to guide the
establishment of the institutional framework, management of the evaluation
function, and conduct and use of evaluations. UNEG conducted a baseline
assessment of its evaluation office members in 2005; however, we could not
obtain access to this information. Only UNDP's and UNICEF's evaluation
offices have had external assessments performed on the basis of these
standards and norms.^3 To conduct our review, we selected standards and
norms relating to ensuring the adequacy of financial and human resources,
competency of staff, quality assurances processes, and recommendations
follow-up. To the extent possible, we based our review on those standards
and norms that matched key audit standards. Although we did not assess the
quality of evaluations conducted, we did examine whether processes to help
ensure quality were in place. Time and resource constraints limited our
ability to evaluate organizations' implementation of the other UNEG
standards and norms. We examined documents from the
six organizations, including reports prepared by the organizations'
evaluation offices and external peer reviewers, and annual reports of the
evaluation offices. In addition, we conducted interviews with various
officials of the evaluation offices. We did not perform independent
assessments of the organizations' evaluation function.
^3For the UNDP peer review, the reviewers assessed the evaluation
functions on the basis of the norms, and for UNICEF, the peer reviewers
used primarily the norms. UNDP's peer review was completed in December
2005, and UNICEF's was completed in May 2006.
To assess the organizations' efforts to implement professional standards,
guidelines, and norms for audit, ethics, and evaluations, and to assess
the sufficiency of the organizations' investigative resources, we
developed the following scale:
1. Generally implemented: Evidence of a series of actions that indicate
the standards, norms, or guidelines are generally or mostly
implemented.
2. Partially implemented: Evidence of some actions taken toward
implementation.
3. Not implemented: Evidence that no steps have been taken to implement
the standards, norms, or guidelines.
4. Not clear: Insufficient or conflicting information regarding status in
implementing the standards, norms, or guidelines.
Three GAO staff used this scale to assess the organizations' performance
and sufficiency of their resources independently of each other. These
staff then met to reconcile any differences in their initial assessments.
To examine the extent to which governing bodies are provided information
about the results of UN oversight practices, we reviewed documents from
the six organizations, including reports prepared by the organizations'
external auditors, the oversight unit chiefs, the governing bodies, and
the audit committees, where applicable. We also examined the charters of
the audit offices and the audit committees, where applicable. In addition,
we reviewed relevant guidance regarding audit committees issued by IIA.
Furthermore, we conducted interviews with various officials, including
internal audit officials, external auditors, and members of the audit
committees, where applicable. We also interviewed selected representatives
from UN member states, including representatives from the U.S. UN missions
in Geneva, Rome, and New York and U.S. representatives to the governing
bodies of the UN organizations we
examined. In Geneva, we spoke with members of the Geneva Group,^4
including representatives from the United Kingdom, Canada, the
Netherlands, Australia, and Germany. In Rome, we spoke with additional
members of the Geneva Group, including representatives from the United
Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Sweden, South Korea, Germany, Switzerland,
Finland, Italy, France, Russia, New Zealand, Japan, and the Netherlands.
In addition, we met with representatives of the Group of 77^5 from
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Iraq, Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Brazil,
Cameroon, China, Egypt, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, and Thailand. In New York, we spoke with mission representatives to
the UN from Belgium, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and
Pakistan.
Furthermore, to address our objectives, we spoke with senior officials
from the Departments of State (State) and Labor in Washington, D.C., and
senior officials from State, Labor, Health and Human Services, and the
U.S. Agency for International Development at the U.S. Missions to the
United Nations in Geneva, Rome, and New York. At these locations, we met
with management and staff responsible for governance and oversight at FAO,
ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. In addition, for information on the
budget and staff resources of these six organizations, we used fiscal
biennium 2006-2007 data provided by these organizations. We determined
that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
We conducted our work from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
^4The Geneva Group consists of the 14 largest donor countries on the basis
of their contributions.
^5The Group of 77 is a coalition of developing countries that promotes its
members' collective interests. Currently, 131 developing countries are
members of the G-77.
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State
Appendix III
Comments from the Food and Agriculture Organization
Appendix IV
Comments from the World Food Program
Note: GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appear at the end
of this appendix.
See comment 1.
The following is GAO's comment on the World Food Program's letter dated
May 7, 2007.
1. WFP noted that a request was made for an appropriate change in staff
GAO Comment
rules and regulations to oblige key staff to undertake periodic conflict
of interest and final disclosure. While we agree that this is a critical
step toward fully implementing a sound ethics policy, we noted in this
report that all staff conducting audits, investigations, and evaluations
should be included as those defined as "key staff."
Appendix V
Comments from the World Health Organization
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Appendix V Comments from the World Health Organization
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 3.
The following are GAO's comments on the World Health Organization's letter
dated May 8, 2007.
1. WHO commented that our report lacks recognition of its key efforts to
GAO Comments
increase transparency during the past several years. We updated the text
of our report to include additional information on what is and can be
provided by the internal auditor to the Health Assembly and member states.
1. WHO commented that its Program, Budget and Administration Committee
(PBAC) operates similarly to an independent audit committee and
already fulfills most of the requirements that we advocate, such as
independence from senior management and accountability to the
governing body. We updated the text of this report to include this
information.
2. WHO stated that the IIA's best practice accountability structure
illustrated in our report would effectively create a second external
auditor, which would not be a workable solution. We disagree that the
IIA guidance would create an external auditor and leave the
Director-General without an internal audit function. The guidance
focuses on the reporting relationship needed to achieve organizational
independence for the internal audit function. Specifically, IIA
guidance on the key elements of an effective public sector audit
activity, which would apply to the internal audit activity at WHO,
provides that at a minimum, the audit activity needs to have
organizational independence that allows audit work that is without
interference by the entity under audit and is seen to be independent
as well. The IIA guidance states that this organizational independence
contributes to the accuracy of the auditors' work and the ability to
rely on the audit results. By having the WHO internal audit activity
report organizationally to the PBAC, which serves as the audit
committee for WHO's governing body, the independence of internal
audits of the Director-General's programs and responsibilities would
be enhanced significantly. In addition, the Director-General would
continue to have an internal audit function, but it would be reporting
organizationally to the PBAC of the governing body.
Appendix VI
Comments from the International Labor Organization
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
See comment 5.
See comment 6.
The following are GAO's comments on the International Labor Organization's
letter dated May 11, 2007.
GAO Comments 1. ILO commented that our report did not sufficiently reflect
actions
taken by ILO to address issues highlighted regarding
inadequacy of
audit staffing levels, lack of an organizationwide
risk-management
framework, lack of access to internal audit reports and
other
information by the governing body, audit staff financial
disclosure, and
an audit committee. Our report was updated after receipt
of ILO's
technical comments to reflect information provided by the
organization
regarding several of these issues, including adequacy of
resources,
financial disclosure, and its proposal submitted by the
Director-General
to ILO's governing body in March 2007 calling for the
creation of an
independent audit committee.
ILO commented that the report refers to an overall lack of
2. a
requirement for financial disclosure. According to ILO, in
February
2006, it introduced a declaration that required that all
procurement
officials submit an annual declaration. In addition, in
April 2007, ILO
introduced a register of financial interests for all
senior staff (graded at
D1 level and above) and other designated officials
(procurement)
requiring them to make an annual financial disclosure
identifying
potential conflicts of interest and any supplements or
gifts received. We
updated our report to reflect these actions, but maintain
that requiring
financial disclosures from all staff conducting audits,
investigations,
and evaluations is a sound practice that could help to
ensure that
employees are free from conflict of interest.
ILO disagreed with our use of the findings from the
3. quality assessment
exercise that was published in its Annual Evaluation
Report submitted
to ILO's Governing Body in November 2006. Consistent with
our
generally accepted government auditing standards, we cite
the findings
of external assessments, if publicly available and where
applicable, that
specifically relate to our reporting objectives. We do not
independently
endorse the findings of these assessments, but are
transparent about
the use of them in the scope and methodology sections of
our report.
ILO stated that it has serious reservations about
4. implementing the
recommendation regarding making internal audit reports
available to
governing bodies. We maintain that providing the governing
body with
access to all internal audit reports will provide the
governing body with greater insight into the organization's
operations and highlight systemic weakness in internal controls.
1. ILO stated that the report should note that the proposed Terms of
Reference for an Independent Oversight Advisory Committe submitted by
the Director-General to ILO's governing body in March 2007, is in line
with the recommendation for establishing an independent audit
committee. We updated our report after receipt of ILO's technical
comments to reflect this action.
2. ILO commented that the report makes no reference to the tripartite
governance structure of ILO. We updated our report to include a
sentence explaining ILO's tripartite structure.
Appendix VII
Comments from the United Nations Development Program
Appendix VIII
Comments from the United Nations Children's Fund
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
See comment 5.
The following are GAO's comments on the United Nations Children's Fund
letter dated May 18, 2007.
1. UNICEF commented that our draft report did not reflect a full
GAO Comments
appreciation of the specific governance structures of the United Nations.
We provide information in the introduction, background, and body of our
report to help our readers understand the context of our three reporting
objectives. Our review was not of the overall UN governance structures,
but rather of the governance structures of the six UN affiliated
organizations noted in our report. Figure 1 in our report shows the
overall UN governance structure of the six UNaffiliated organizations
reviewed.
1. UNICEF noted that any proposal to reorder the governance mechanisms so
as to align them with a particular understanding of the IIA standards
would be a matter for the UNICEF Executive Board (among other
institutions). We recognize that decisions regarding changes in
UNICEF's lines of reporting to allow UNICEF's governing body access to
all audit reports, as well as the creation of an independent audit
committee to be in line with international best practices, will
require consideration and approval by UNICEF's Executive Board. In
addition, State and several of the other UN organizations reviewed
noted that discussions relating to our recommendations are currently
being considered in many forums throughout the UN system.
2. UNICEF stated that the draft offered a view of "best practice" that is
inconsistent with certain legislated oversight arrangements. Current
best practice calls for the external auditor to report to an audit
committee, which is part of the governing body, which in this case is
the General Assembly. Therefore, the current reporting by UNICEF's
external auditor is consistent with IIA's guidance, and we do not
suggest that it be changed.
3. UNICEF commented that in 2002, the President of IIA opined that "as
long as your reporting relationship permits you to accomplish your
responsibilities, as stated in [IIA] standard 1110, you are reporting
to the correct level." UNICEF stated that administrative reporting to
the executive head of an organization is in accordance with IIA
standards. We do not imply that reporting to the executive head is not
in accordance with IIA standards. IIA guidance does provide that, at a
minimum, the organizational independence of the internal audit activity
needs to allow audit work that is without interference by the entity under
audit and is seen as independent as well. IIA guidance describes the audit
committee's responsibility for overseeing internal audit as well as the
reporting relationship between internal audit and senior management. By
having the UNICEF internal audit activity report organizationally to an
independent audit committee of the governing body, the independence and
appearance of independence would be significantly improved.
5. UNICEF noted that its internal audit service provides a detailed
summary of audit activities, findings, and analysis of systemic weaknesses
to the governing body. In addition, UNICEF stated that its Executive Board
has requested that UNICEF further enhance the level of analysis in the
annual report of UNICEF's Office of Internal Audit, include management
responses to the key and recurring issues identified by the Office of
Internal Audit, and assess and report on the resources required for the
internal audit function. We updated our report to reflect these actions.
Appendix IX
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the person named above, Phyllis Anderson, Assistant
Director; Zina Merritt, Assistant Director; Debbie Chung; Jane Kim; Andrea
Miller; and Barbara Shields made key contributions to this report. In
addition, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Valerie Caracelli, Martin De Alteriis,
Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Jackson Hufnagle, Charlotte Moore, and Jena
Sinkfield provided technical support.
Related GAO Products
United Nations: Management Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many Awaiting
General Assembly Review. [93]GAO-07-14 . Washington, D.C.: October 5,
2006.
United Nations: Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and Procurement Could
Affect the Effective Implementation of the Planned Renovation.
[94]GAO-06-877T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006.
United Nations: Oil for Food Program Provides Lessons for Future Sanctions
and Ongoing Reform. [95]GAO-06-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2006.
United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and Processes
Need Strengthening. [96]GAO-06-710T. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2006.
United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of Internal
Auditors. [97]GAO-06-575 . Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
United Nations: Lessons from Oil for Food Program Indicate Need to
Strengthen Internal Controls and Oversight. [98]GAO-06-330 . Washington,
D.C.: April 25, 2006.
United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak. [99]GAO-06-577 .
Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S.
Operations in Haiti. [100]GAO-06-331 . Washington, D.C.: February 21,
2006.
United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and
Procurement Practices. [101]GAO-06-226T. Washington, D.C.: October 31,
2005.
United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve
Lasting Results. [102]GAO-05-392T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.
United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits. [103]GAO-05-346T. Washington,
D.C.: February 15, 2005.
United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Areas for
Further Investigation. [104]GAO-04-953T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2004.
Related GAO Products
United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq's Food
Security. [105]GAO-04-880T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004.
United Nations: Observations on the Management and Oversight of the Oil
for Food Program. [106]GAO-04-730T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2004.
United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program.
[107]GAO-04-651T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Recovering Iraq's Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and
Challenges. [108]GAO-04-579T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2004.
United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments Needed
to Measure Impact. [109]GAO-04-339 . Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.N. Confronts Significant Challenges in
Implementing Sanctions against Iraq. [110]GAO-02-625 . Washington, D.C.:
May 23, 2002.
United Nations: Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened Operations, but
Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Achieved. [111]GAO/NSIAD-00-150 .
Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2000.
United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms. [112]GAO/NSIAD-99-71 .
Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1999.
United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services. [113]GAO/NSIAD-98-9
. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 1997.
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