NASA: Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space Shuttle to
the Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems (28-MAR-07,	 
GAO-07-595T).							 
                                                                 
On January 14, 2004, the President announced a new Vision for	 
space exploration that directs the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to focus its efforts on returning humans to
the moon by 2020 in preparation for future, more ambitions	 
missions. Implementing the Vision will require hundreds of	 
billions of dollars and a sustained commitment from multiple	 
administrations and Congresses. Some of the funding for 	 
implementing exploration activities is expected to come from	 
funding freed up after the retirement of the Space Shuttle,	 
scheduled for 2010, and projected termination of U.S.		 
participation in the International Space Station by 2016.	 
Congress, while supportive of the effort has voiced concern over 
the potential gap in human space flight. In the NASA		 
Authorization Act of 2005, Congress stated that it is the policy 
of the United States to have the capability for human access to  
space on a continuous basis. NASA has made it a priority to	 
minimize the gap to the extent possible. GAO provides no	 
recommendations in this statement. However, GAO continues to	 
emphasize that given the Nation's fiscal challenges and NASA's	 
past difficulty developing systems within cost, schedule, and	 
performance parameters, it is imperative that the agency	 
adequately manage this transition in a fiscally competent and	 
prudent manner. 						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-595T					        
    ACCNO:   A67388						        
  TITLE:     NASA: Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space   
Shuttle to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems	 
     DATE:   03/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Aerospace research 				 
	     Environmental policies				 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Human capital management				 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Space exploration					 
	     Staff utilization					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems design					 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Space shuttles					 
	     Crew Exploration Vehicle				 
	     Crew Launch Vehicle				 
	     GAO High Risk Series				 
	     NASA Space Shuttle Program 			 
	     Vision for Space Exploration			 

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GAO-07-595T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]NASA Faces Significant Challenges in Retiring the Space Shut

          * [4]Maintaining a Skilled Workforce
          * [5]Developing New Exploration Systems
          * [6]Managing the Supplier Base Throughout Retirement and Transit
          * [7]Providing Logistical Support to the International Space Stat
          * [8]Disposing of Property and Equipment
          * [9]Completing Environmental Clean Up
          * [10]Positioning the Science, Engineering, and Technical Workforc
          * [11]Transforming the Way Financial Information Is Used

     * [12]Concluding Observations
     * [13]GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
     * [14]GAO's Mission
     * [15]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [16]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [17]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [18]Congressional Relations
     * [19]Public Affairs

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related
Sciences, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, March 28, 2007

NASA

Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space Shuttle to the Next
Generation of Human Space Flight Systems

Statement of Allen Li, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management

GAO-07-595T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the challenges faced by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in transitioning from the
space shuttle to the next generation of human space flight systems. In
2004, the President established a new exploration policy--A Renewed Spirit
of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration
(Vision)--which calls for the retirement of the space shuttle and the
development of a new family of exploration systems. NASA's implementation
of the Vision is expected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. A NASA
effort of this size and scope has not been seen since the end of the
Apollo program and the start of the Space Shuttle Program more than 3
decades ago. The transition includes a massive transfer of people,
hardware, and infrastructure. Although NASA has in place many processes,
policies, procedures, and support systems to carry out this effort,
successful transition will depend on thoughtful execution and effective
oversight.

The need for NASA to implement the Vision in a fiscally prudent and
effective manner cannot be overemphasized given the competing fiscal
demands facing the federal government and an already troubling funding
profile projected for human spaceflight activities. We have issued a
number of reports that touch on various aspects of retiring the space
shuttle and transitioning its assets and people to exploration activities.
These reports have questioned the affordability of the exploration
program, NASA's acquisition strategy for the development of new space
vehicles, agencywide contract management, and workforce planning for
current and future agency needs. We also have an ongoing body of work
being performed at the request of the House Committee on Science and
Technology regarding effective management of the industrial base,
development of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, and the logistical support
needed by the International Space Station (ISS). In addition, at the
request of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, we are reviewing NASA's ability
to attract and retain a skilled workforce. My statement today will focus
on the overarching challenges that NASA faces in transitioning from the
shuttle to the next generation of human space flight systems and will
discuss our prior work on shuttle workforce and development of the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle, one of the agency's complex programs. I will
also discuss areas where we have related ongoing work.

This testimony is based on work conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

NASA faces numerous challenges as it transitions from the Space Shuttle
Program to the next generation of human space flight systems. We have
undertaken a body of work over the past 3 years that has highlighted two
of these challenges--sustaining the shuttle workforce and developing new
systems. Sustaining the shuttle workforce through retirement and ensuring
that the workforce is available to support future exploration activities
presents an enormous challenge for NASA. In 2005, we reported that NASA
has made limited progress toward developing a detailed strategy to retain
a critically skilled workforce for shuttle operations. We recommended that
the agency begin identifying the shuttle program's future workforce needs.
NASA has recognized that shuttle workforce management and critical skills
retention will be a major challenge and has taken action to address this
issue. In 2006, we reported that NASA's acquisition strategy for the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle was risky because it committed the government to
a long-term contract before establishing a sound business case. We
recommended that NASA modify the current Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle
acquisition strategy to ensure that the agency does not commit itself to a
long-term contractual obligation prior to establishing a sound business
case. Although it initially disagreed with our recommendation, NASA
subsequently revised its acquisition strategy to address some of the
concerns we raised.

We are currently conducting a body of work relating to the transition,
including NASA's management of the supplier base, development of the Crew
Launch Vehicle, and logistical support of the space station. Our work to
date has also identified other issues that NASA will face during the
transition, including disposing of property and equipment, completing
environmental clean up, managing the overall workforce, and integrating
financial information into how NASA does business. Each area contains its
own set of unique challenges, but they are all critical to NASA's overall
transition effort and will require significant management attention.

Background

The President's Vision for Space Exploration for NASA announced in 2004
calls for the retirement of the shuttle upon completion of the ISS and the
creation of new vehicles for human space flight that will allow a return
to the moon by 2020 and voyages to Mars and points beyond. The shuttle
manifest currently consists of 16 flights--15 to complete assembly and
integration of the ISS and a servicing mission^1 to the Hubble Space
Telescope. The first new space vehicles currently are targeted to begin
operating no later than 2014--thereby creating a potential gap in U.S.
human space flight. Congress has voiced concern over the United States not
having continuous access to space. NASA has made it a priority to minimize
the gap to the extent possible.

NASA has begun planning for the retirement of the shuttle, scheduled for
2010, by identifying best practices in closing facilities and the
transitioning of capabilities. Specifically, NASA has conducted a number
of benchmarking studies of previous closures and realignment of large
programs, including the Titan IV rocket fly-out, the F/A-18 C/D fighter
production close, and the Navy Base Realignment and Closure activities.
The benchmarking efforts have highlighted to NASA the importance of having
a plan, effective communication, human capital management, and effective
program management tools. NASA's benchmarking effort also showed that
closing and transitioning facilities, equipment, and people is expensive
and time consuming. Among the lessons learned is that, historically, it
has taken 3.5 years to close down an installation and another 3 years to
complete the transition of the property. NASA's Office of the Inspector
General has recently reviewed NASA's plan for the space shuttle transition
and recommended, among other improvements, that the two affected space
directorates finalize and implement the Human Space Flight Transition
Plan.^2

Development of the Orion crew capsule, Ares I launch vehicle, and other
exploration systems needed to implement the Vision is dependent on a "go
as you can afford to pay" approach, wherein lower-priority efforts will be
deferred, descoped, or discontinued to allow NASA to stay within its
available budget profile. In recent testimony, the NASA Administrator said
that the cost associated with returning the shuttle to flight, continued
shuttle operations, and recent budget reductions had the combined effect
of increasing the gap by delaying the first manned Orion test flight by 6
months.

^1 The servicing mission includes installing the Cosmic Origins
Spectrograph and Wide Field Camera 3, installing a refurbished Fine
Guidance Sensor that replaces one degrading unit of the three already
onboard, and an attempt will also be made to repair the Space Telescope
Imaging Spectrograph, which stopped working in 2004.

^2 NASA Office of Inspector General. NASA's Plan for Space Shuttle
Transition Could Be Improved by Following Project Management Guidelines,
IG-07-005, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2007).

In an effort to address the gap in U.S. capability to resupply the space
station following retirement of the shuttle, NASA is investing in
commercial space transportation services. NASA's expectation is that by
acquiring domestic orbital transportation services it will be able to send
cargo and, in the future, transport crews to the ISS in a cost-effective
manner. NASA refers to this as the Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services project. The project is in the early stages of development.
Should these commercial services prove to be unreliable or more costly
than anticipated, NASA will need to purchase space transportation from its
international partners to meet obligations to the ISS until the new Orion
spacecraft become operational.

NASA Faces Significant Challenges in Retiring the Space Shuttle Program and
Transitioning to Exploration Activities

We have undertaken a substantial body of work over the past 3 years that
has highlighted the significant challenges that NASA will face as it
retires the shuttle and transitions to exploration activities. One key
challenge is sustaining the shuttle workforce through the retirement of
the shuttle while ensuring that a viable workforce is available to support
future activities. Another key challenge will be developing the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle within cost, schedule, and performance goals.
Additionally, our ongoing work has identified a number of other areas that
may present challenges during the transition period. Some of these
challenges include managing the supplier base to ensure its continued
viability, developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, and completing and
supporting the space station.

Maintaining a Skilled Workforce

The Space Shuttle Program's workforce is critical to the success of the
Vision. The shuttle workforce currently consists of approximately 2,000
civil service and 15,000 contractor personnel, including a large number of
engineers and scientists. In 2005, we reported that NASA had made limited
progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a critically
skilled shuttle workforce to support space shuttle operations. We reported
that significant delays in implementing a strategy to sustain the shuttle
workforce would likely lead to larger problems, such as funding and
failure to meet NASA program schedules. Accordingly, we concluded that
timely action to address workforce issues is critical given their
potential impact on NASA-wide goals such as closing the gap in human
spaceflight.

When we performed our work several factors hampered the ability of the
Space Shuttle Program to develop a detailed long-term strategy for
sustaining the critically skilled workforce necessary to support safe
space shuttle operations through retirement. For example, at that time,
the program's focus was on returning the shuttle to flight, and other
efforts such as determining workforce requirements were delayed. In our
report, we recommended that NASA begin identifying the Space Shuttle
Program's future workforce needs based upon various future scenarios.
Scenario planning could better enable NASA to develop strategies for
meeting future needs. NASA concurred with our recommendation. It has
acknowledged that shuttle workforce management and critical skills
retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it progresses toward
retirement of the space shuttle and has taken action to address this
issue. For example, since we made our recommendation, NASA has developed
an agencywide strategic human capital plan and developed workforce
analysis tools to assist it in identifying critical skills needs. NASA has
also developed a human capital plan specifically for sustaining the
shuttle workforce through the retirement and, then transitioning the
workforce.

Additionally, in March 2006, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, and NASA asked the
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assist the agency in
planning for the space shuttle's retirement and transition to future
exploration activities. In February 2007, a NAPA panel recommended that
the Space Shuttle Program adopt a RAND model for projecting a core
workforce because of its emphasis on "long-term scheduling projections,
quantification of core competencies and proficiencies, and analysis of
overlapping mission needs."^3 Under the RAND model, an organization
maintains a core capability for any competency that will be needed in the
future. According to NAPA, this model is useful where a given expertise is
not immediately required, but is likely to be needed in the future--in
this case, for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle.

Developing New Exploration Systems

In July 2006, we reported that NASA's acquisition strategy for the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle placed the project at risk of significant cost
overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls because it committed
the government to a long-term contract before establishing a sound
business case.^4 Our past work has shown that developing a sound business
case--one that matches requirements to available and reasonably expected
resources before committing to a new product development effort--reduces
risk and increases the likelihood of successful outcomes.^5 For a program
to increase its chances of success, high levels of knowledge should be
demonstrated before significant commitments are made (i.e., they should be
following a knowledge-based approach to product development).

^3NAPA also recommended that NASA adopt scenario planning into its
agencywide workforce planning processes and use the results to inform
decisionmaking.

At the time of our report, NASA had yet to develop key elements of a sound
business case, including well-defined requirements, mature technology, a
preliminary design, and firm cost estimates that would support its plans
for making a long-term commitment. Without such knowledge, NASA cannot
predict with any confidence how much the program will cost, what
technologies will or will not be available to meet performance
expectations, and when the vehicle will be ready for use. NASA
acknowledged that it would not have these elements in place until the
project's Preliminary Design Review scheduled for fiscal year 2008. As a
result, we recommended that the NASA Administrator modify the agency's
acquisition strategy for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle to ensure that
the agency does not commit itself, and in turn the federal government, to
a long-term contractual obligation prior to establishing a sound business
case at the project's Preliminary Design Review.

Although it initially disagreed with our recommendation, NASA subsequently
took steps to address some of the concerns we raised. Specifically, NASA
modified its acquisition strategy for the Orion project and changed the
production and sustainment portions of the contract into options. The
agency will decide whether to exercise these options after the project's
critical design review in 2009. While these changes are in line with our
recommendation and a step in a positive direction, we continue to believe
NASA's acquisition strategy is risky because it does not fully conform to
a knowledge-based acquisition approach. Attempting to close that gap by
pushing forward development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle without
first obtaining the requisite knowledge at key points could very well
result in the production of a system that not only does not meet
expectations but ends up costing more and actually increases the gap.

^4 GAO, NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space Exploration
Program Requires More Knowledge, [20]GAO-06-817R (Washington, D.C.: July
17, 2006).

^5 Examples of our best practices reports include GAO, Best Practices:
Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve Weapon Acquisition,
[21]GAO-04-386SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2004); Space Acquisitions:
Committing Prematurely to the Transformational Satellite Program Elevates
Risks for Poor Cost, Schedule, and Performance Outcomes, [22]GAO-04-71R
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 2003); Best Practices: Capturing Design and
Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes,
[23]GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002); and Best Practices:
Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System
Outcomes, [24]GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001).

Since we last testified on this subject in September 2006,^6 NASA has
successfully completed its first major milestone for the Orion project. It
has completed the Systems Requirements Review.^7 This was a major step
toward obtaining the information critical for making informed decisions.
According to NASA's Orion contracting officer, NASA is also in the process
of renegotiating the Orion contract to extend the Initial Operational
Capability date of the system to 2014. Further, while this change will
increase contract costs, the increase has already been accounted for in
the Orion budget because the agency has been planning the change for over
a year. In addition, risks associated with schedule, cost, and weight
continue to be identified for the Orion project.

As we have previously testified, sound project management and oversight
will be key to addressing the risks that remain for the Orion project as
it proceeds with its acquisition approach. To help mitigate the risks, we
have recommended in the past that NASA have in place markers (i.e.,
criteria) to assist decision makers in their monitoring of the project at
key junctures in the development process. Such markers are needed to
provide assurance that projects are proceeding with and decisions are
being based upon the appropriate level of knowledge and can help to lessen
project risks. NASA has recently issued its updated program and project
management requirements for flight systems in response to our
recommendation. Changes to the policy,^8 including the incorporation of
key decision points throughout the project development life cycle, should
provide an avenue for decision makers to reassess project decisions at key
points in the development process to ensure that continued investment is
appropriate. However, it should be noted that implementation of the policy
in a disciplined manner will ensure success, not the existence of the
policy itself.

^6 GAO, NASA: Sound Management and Oversight Key to Addressing Crew
Exploration Vehicle Project Risks, [25]GAO-06-1127T (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 28, 2006).

^7 According to NASA's Systems Engineering Procedural Requirements (NASA
Procedural Requirements NPR 7123.1), the SRR examines the functional and
performance requirements defined for the system and the preliminary
program or project plan and ensures that the requirements and the selected
concept will satisfy the mission.

^8 NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5D establishes the requirements
by which NASA will formulate and implement space flight programs and
projects. NPR 7120.5D became effective on March 6, 2007, and supersedes
the previous version of the document, NPR 7120.5C, for space flight
programs and projects.

Currently, we are evaluating the development of NASA's latest human-rated
launch vehicle--the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. When completed, the Ares I
vehicle will be capable of delivering the Orion spacecraft to low earth
orbit for ISS missions and for exploration missions to the moon. As
initially conceived by NASA in the Exploration Systems Architecture Study
completed in 2005, the Ares I design would rely on the existing solid
rocket boosters and main engines from the space shuttle as major
components of its two stages. The current design for the Ares I, however,
diverges from the initial design set forth in the architecture study and
now includes elements from the Apollo-era Saturn V launch vehicle. Current
plans are for Ares I to evolve the solid rocket boosters from the Space
Shuttle Program from four segments to five segments and to build a new
upper-stage engine based on an original Saturn V design. NASA maintains
that these changes are necessary to increase commonality between the Ares
I and the planned Ares V cargo launch vehicle and to reduce overall
development costs for implementing the Vision. As NASA's design for the
Ares I continues to evolve, careful planning and coordination between the
Orion and Ares I development teams will be critical to ensuring that
current developmental efforts result in hardware that satisfies the future
requirements of these systems. Subsequently, any development problems on
either of these systems could result in increasing the gap.

Our ongoing work is aimed at assessing whether NASA's acquisition strategy
for Ares I reflects the effect of changes to the Ares I design
incorporated since the Ares I was first conceived in the Exploration
Systems Architecture Study as a shuttle-derived alternative. Also, we are
evaluating the extent to which NASA's Ares I acquisition strategy
incorporates knowledge-based concepts designed to minimize technical and
programmatic risk.

The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle are
the first in a series of new systems to be developed in support of
exploration activities. NASA's careful management of these projects must
preclude historical instances of cost and schedule growth. Indeed, while
NASA has had many successes in the exploration of space, such as landing
the Pathfinder and Exploration Rovers on Mars, NASA has also experienced
its share of unsuccessful missions, unforeseen cost overruns, and
difficulty bringing a number of projects to completion. For example, NASA
has made several attempts to build a second generation of reusable human
spaceflight vehicle to replace the space shuttle, such as the National
Aero-Space Plane, the X-33 and X-34, and the Space Launch Initiative, that
never accomplished its objective of fielding a new reusable space vehicle.
We estimate that these unsuccessful development efforts have cost
approximately $4.8 billion since the 1980s. The high cost of these
unsuccessful efforts and the potential costs of implementing the Vision
make it important that NASA achieve success in developing new systems for
its new exploration program.

Managing the Supplier Base Throughout Retirement and Transition

NASA's plans to retire the shuttle have the potential to greatly impact
the supplier base that has been supporting that program for the last
several decades, as well as mold the future supplier base needed for its
exploration program. Over the next few years, NASA will be making
decisions about its supplier base needs, including which suppliers will be
required for the remainder of the Space Shuttle Program, which will no
longer be required for the program, and which will be needed to support
exploration efforts. One concern is that NASA will be unable to sustain
suppliers necessary to support the exploration program during the period
between the shuttle's retirement and resumption of human space flight.
Also of concern is that those suppliers determined by NASA as not needed
for the exploration program will prematurely end their services, thus
jeopardizing the safe and efficient completion of shuttle activities. In
addition, issues such as obsolescence--already being experienced by some
shuttle projects--could have an impact on the exploration program given
the planned use of heritage hardware for some components of the
Constellation projects. In an attempt to address these potential issues,
NASA has been developing and implementing plans and processes to manage
the transition of its supplier base.

We are in the process of assessing how well NASA is positioning itself to
effectively manage its supplier base to ensure both sustainment of the
Space Shuttle Program through its scheduled retirement in 2010 and
successful transition to planned exploration activities.

Providing Logistical Support to the International Space Station

The shuttle is uniquely suited for transporting crew and cargo to and from
the ISS. However, with scheduled retirement of the shuttle in 2010, NASA
and its international partners will be challenged to fully support ISS
operations until 2014, when the new crew exploration vehicle is scheduled
to come on line. To fill this gap, NASA plans to rely on its international
partners and commercial services to provide ISS logistics and crew
rotation.

Two recent studies have raised serious concerns about whether future ISS
operations can be continuously supported. A 2006 report by the National
Research Council noted that the capabilities, schedules, and funding
requirements for NASA, international partners, and commercial cargo and
crew vehicles were not yet firm enough to give the panel confidence that
ISS exploration mission objectives have a high likelihood of being
fulfilled.^9 A February 2007 report by the International Space Station
Independent Safety Task Force, which was required by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005^10, noted that the transition from the space
shuttle to post-shuttle systems for logistical support to the ISS will
require careful planning and phasing of new capabilities. Specifically,
care must be taken to ensure adequate logistics and spares are provided to
maintain a viable station.^11 The task force report went on to say that if
a commitment is made to an emerging logistics delivery capability and the
capability does not materialize, then logistical support to the ISS could
be lost for some time, seriously decreasing the utility of the space
station and possibly resulting in its abandonment.

We are reviewing NASA's plans for meeting ISS logistics and maintenance
requirements after the shuttle retires, identifying the main risks to
meeting ISS logistics and maintenance requirements, and assessing NASA's
plans for addressing the risks.

Disposing of Property and Equipment

NASA has not developed a comprehensive cost estimate for transitioning or
disposing of Space Shuttle Program facilities and equipment. This poses a
financial risk to the agency. As NASA executes the remaining missions
needed to complete the assembly of and provide support for the ISS, it
will simultaneously begin the process of disposing of shuttle facilities
and hardware that the Space Shuttle Program will no longer need, or,
transitioning such facilities and hardware to the other NASA programs.^12
As the ninth largest federal government property holder, NASA owns more
than 100,000 acres, as well as over 3,000 buildings and 3,000 other
structures totaling over 44 million square feet. Currently, the Space
Shuttle Program uses 654 facilities valued in excess of $5 billion. The
Space Shuttle Program also manages equipment dispersed across government
and its contractors valued at more than $12 billion. NASA is in the
process of evaluating its Space Shuttle Program facilities and equipment
requirements and identifying existing facilities and equipment that will
no longer be needed to support shuttle operations. Constellation and other
NASA programs will determine whether they need any of the facilities or
equipment released by the Space Shuttle Program. According to NASA
officials, assessments currently project that only 70 to 80 of the
existing facilities are needed to support the development or operation of
future exploration systems. In cases where facilities or equipment are no
longer required by the Space Shuttle Program, no other use is identified,
or it is selected for disposal, it will transition to the resident NASA
field center for disposition.

^9Review of NASA Plans for the International Space Station, National
Research Council, Washington, D.C., 2006.

^10Pub. L. No. 109-155, SS 802, 804 (2005).

^11Final Report of the International Space Station Independent Safety Task
Force, February 2007.

It is worth noting that even before the retirement of the shuttle, over 10
percent of NASA's facilities are underutilized or not utilized at all. One
option NASA has is to lease underutilized facilities in exchange for cash
and/or in-kind consideration, such as improvement of NASA's facilities or
the provision of services to NASA. As directed by the NASA Authorization
Act of 2005, we recently reported on NASA's Enhanced Use-Leasing
Program.^13 Congress authorized NASA to employ enhanced-use leasing at two
demonstration centers. This allowed the agency to retain the proceeds from
leasing out underutilized real property and to accept in-kind
consideration in lieu of cash for rent. The act allows NASA to deposit the
net proceeds (i.e., net of leasing costs) in a no-year capital account to
use later for maintenance, capital revitalization, and improvement of the
facilities, albeit only at the demonstration centers--Ames Research Center
and Kennedy Space Center. However, unlike other agencies with enhanced-use
leasing authority, NASA is not authorized to lease back the property
during the term of the lease. Furthermore, we found that the agency does
not have adequate controls in place to ensure accountability and
transparency and to protect the government. We recommended that the NASA
Administrator develop an agencywide enhanced use leasing policy that
establishes controls and processes to ensure accountability and protect
the government's interests including developing mechanisms to keep the
Congress fully informed of the agency's enhanced use leasing activity.
NASA concurred with our recommendations. After not receiving additional
authority in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, the agency is again
requesting that the Congress extend enhanced use leasing authority to at
least six NASA centers. NASA currently has other leasing authorities, but
they require the agency to return to the U.S. Treasury any amounts
exceeding cost. Further, NASA has indicated that it is preparing a package
of legislative and administrative tools to help in the transition from the
Space Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program. For example, in
addition to requesting authority for increased use of enhanced use
leasing, a NASA official informed us that one tool the agency might
consider pursuing is the ability to keep the funds within NASA from the
sale of facilities and equipment, rather than returning such funds to the
Treasury.

^12Facilities refers to real property such as land, buildings and other
structures that cannot be readily moved, and equipment refers to personal
property that could be transported elsewhere with relative ease.

^13Pub. L. No. 109-155, S 710 (2005) and GAO, NASA: Enhanced Use Leasing
Program Needs Additional Controls, [26]GAO-07-306R (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
1, 2007).

Completing Environmental Clean Up

NASA does not have a comprehensive estimate of the environmental clean up
costs associated with the transition and disposal of Space Shuttle Program
facilities and equipment. The agency must comply with federal and state
environmental laws and regulations, such as the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended,^14 the Resource, Conservation, and
Recovery Act of 1976, as amended,^15 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended,^16 in
identifying and mitigating the environmental concerns. Although NASA has
an approach for identifying environmental risks, in our report on major
challenges facing the nation in the 21st century, we pointed out that
progress in cleaning up sites frequently does not meet expected time
frames and the costs dramatically exceed available funding levels.^17 For
example, it cost the Titan IV program approximately $300 million over six
years on cleaning facilities, equipment, and tools. At this time, the
extent of the Space Shuttle Program's environmental liabilities is not yet
fully known. Paying for this liability may require a significant future
outflow of funds at the same time that NASA will be facing many other
competing demands for its limited dollars, such as development of Orion,
Ares I, and other exploration projects.

^1442 U.S.C. S 4321, et seq.

^1542 U.S.C. S 6901, et seq.

^1642 U.S.C. S 9601 et seq.

^17GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [27]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).

Positioning the Science, Engineering, and Technical Workforce

As it moves away from flying the shuttle, the NASA acknowledges that it
must realign where necessary and plan for a workforce that will not be
quite as large. NASA projects fewer resources will be required for
operating and sustaining hardware, especially during vehicle processing
and launch operations. The reduction in reusability of future space
systems will also result in less refurbishing. In addition, as new space
systems are designed, emphasis will shift to personnel with skills in
systems development and engineering, program management and systems
integration. Unfortunately, these skills will be in high demand at a time
when other federal agencies and the private sector have similar needs.

NASA projects that by fiscal year 2012 the total number of personnel
needed to meet its strategic goals will decrease from 18,100 to 17,000.
The agency is taking advantage of the flexibilities outlined in the NASA
Flexibility Act of 2004^18 to attract highly qualified candidates,
however, continued buy-outs and the threat of a reduction in force have
created a feeling of instability among the science and engineering
workforce. NASA's senior leaders recognize the need for an effective
workforce strategy in achieving mission success. NASA has a strategic
human capital plan, but more work is needed in workforce planning and
deployment. In addition, NASA's transition to full cost accounting in
fiscal year 2004 resulted in a number of its centers experiencing less
than Full Time Equivalent utilization, a situation referred to by NASA as
"uncovered capacity." The Administrator has committed to operating and
maintaining 10 centers and transferred work to those centers with
identified uncovered capacity.

We are examining whether several federal agencies, including NASA, are
taking sufficient steps to address their workforce challenges in a timely
and comprehensive manner, while sustaining focus on its mission and
programmatic goals. Specifically, we are assessing the extent to which
NASA's human capital framework is aligned with its strategic mission and
programmatic goals; whether NASA is effectively recruiting, developing,
and retaining critically skilled staff; and what internal or external
challenges NASA faces in achieving its workforce needs. As noted earlier,
NAPA recently completed a study that made recommendations to NASA on how
to achieve a flexible and scalable workforce by integrating its
acquisition and workforce planning processes.

^18Pub. L. No. 108-201.

Transforming the Way Financial Information Is Used

Since 1990, GAO has designated NASA's contract management as high risk
principally because NASA has lacked a modern financial management system
that can provide accurate and reliable information on contract spending
and has placed little emphasis on product performance, cost controls, and
program outcomes.^19 NASA has made progress toward implementing a
disciplined project management processes, but it has made only limited
progress in certain areas such as reengineering NASA's contractor cost
reporting process. As we reported, the current Integrated Enterprise
Management Program does not provide the cost information that program
managers and cost estimators need to develop credible estimates and
compare budgeted and actual cost with the work performed on the contract.
NASA plans to spend billions of dollars to develop a number of new
capabilities, supporting technologies, and facilities that are critical to
enabling space exploration missions. The development of such capabilities
will be largely dependent on NASA contractors--on which NASA spends about
85 percent of its annual budget. Because of such a large reliance on
contractors to achieve its mission, it is imperative that NASA be able to
track costs and the means to integrate financial decisionmaking with
scientific and technical leadership by providing decisionmakers accurate
information. To its credit, NASA is working to improve business processes
and integrating disparate systems in order to improve efficiencies, reduce
redundant systems, and improve business information available to the
acquisition community and mission support organizations. However, more
effort will be needed to make the cultural transformation a reality.

Concluding Observations

The Vision for Space Exploration puts NASA on a bold new mission.
Implementing the Vision over the coming decades will require hundreds of
billions of dollars and a sustained commitment from multiple
administrations and Congresses over the length of the program. How well
NASA overcomes the transition challenges that we and others have
identified will not only have an effect on NASA's ability to effectively
manage the gap in the U. S. human access to space, but also will affect
the agency's ability to secure a sound foundation of support for the
President's space exploration policy. Consequently, it is incumbent upon
NASA to ensure that these challenges are being addressed in a way that
establishes accountability and transparency to the effort.

^19GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [28]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2007).

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this
time.

GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li
at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this testimony. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony
include Greg Campbell, Richard Eiserman, Yanina Golburt, James L.
Morrison, Jeffrey M. Niblack, Shelby S. Oakley, Jose A. Ramos, Sylvia
Schatz, and John Warren.

(120638)

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-595T .

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For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected].

Highlights of [36]GAO-07-595T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences, Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, U. S. Senate

March 28, 2007

NASA

Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space Shuttle to the Next
Generation of Human Space Flight Systems

On January 14, 2004, the President announced a new Vision for space
exploration that directs the National Aeronautics  and Space
Administration (NASA) to focus its efforts on returning humans to the moon
by 2020 in preparation for future, more ambitions missions.

Implementing the Vision will require hundreds of billions of dollars and a
sustained commitment from multiple administrations and Congresses. Some of
the funding for implementing exploration activities is expected to come
from funding freed up after the retirement of the Space Shuttle, scheduled
for 2010, and projected termination of U.S. participation in the
International Space Station by 2016.

Congress, while supportive of the effort has voiced concern over the
potential gap in human space flight. In the NASA Authorization Act of
2005, Congress stated that it is the policy of the United States to have
the capability for human access to space on a continuous basis. NASA has
made it a priority to minimize the gap to the extent possible.

GAO provides no recommendations in this statement. However, GAO continues
to emphasize that given the Nation's fiscal challenges and NASA's past
difficulty developing systems within cost, schedule, and performance
parameters, it is imperative that the agency adequately manage this
transition in a fiscally competent and prudent manner.

NASA is in the midst of a transition effort of a magnitude not seen since
the end of the Apollo program and the start of the Space Shuttle Program
more than 3 decades ago. This transition will include a massive transfer
of people, hardware, and infrastructure. Based on ongoing and work
completed to-date, we have identified a number of issues that pose unique
challenges to NASA as it transitions from the shuttle to the next
generation of human space flight systems while at the same time seeking to
minimize the time the United States will be without its own means to put
humans in space. These issues include: sustaining a viable workforce;
effectively managing systems development efforts; managing the supplier
base; providing logistical support to the International Space Station;
identifying and disposing of property and equipment; ensuring adequate
environmental remediation; and transforming its business processes and
financial management system.

NASA already has in place many processes, policies, procedures and support
systems to carry out this transition. However, successful implementation
of the transition will depend on thoughtful execution and effective
oversight. How well NASA overcomes some of the challenges we have
identified will not only have an effect on NASA's ability to effectively
manage the gap in the U.S. human access to space, but will also affect the
agency's ability to secure a sound foundation for the President's space
exploration policy.

Moving to the next generation of human space flight vehicles

References

Visible links
  20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-817R
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-386SP
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-71R
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-701
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-288
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1127T
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-306R
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-325SP
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-310
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-595T
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