Nuclear Nonproliferation: Focusing on the Highest Priority
Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE's Efforts to Secure
Sources in Foreign Countries (13-MAR-07, GAO-07-580T).
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological
sources posed a significant security threat to the United States
and the international community. If certain types of these
sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to
produce a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. In
response, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the
International Radiological Threat Reduction Program to identify,
recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources.
GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE's progress in securing sources in
foreign countries, (2) identify DOE's current and planned program
costs, and (3) determine the extent to which DOE has coordinated
its efforts with other federal agencies and with international
organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). In January 2007, GAO issued a report--Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat
Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the
Highest Priority Radiological Sources, (GAO-07-282)--that
addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed DOE
policies, plans and budgets; observed installed physical security
upgrades; and interviewed senior DOE, Department of State
(State), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-580T
ACCNO: A66767
TITLE: Nuclear Nonproliferation: Focusing on the Highest
Priority Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE's Efforts to
Secure Sources in Foreign Countries
DATE: 03/13/2007
SUBJECT: Cost analysis
Foreign aid programs
Foreign governments
Interagency relations
International organizations
International relations
Nuclear facilities
Nuclear facility security
Nuclear proliferation
Program evaluation
Program management
Radioactive materials
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-07-580T
* [1]In summary
* [2]Background
* [3]DOE Has Installed Physical Security Upgrades at Hundreds of
* [4]DOE Has Spent about $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sour
* [5]Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but Coordinati
* [6]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [7]GAO's Mission
* [8]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [9]Order by Mail or Phone
* [10]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [11]Congressional Relations
* [12]Public Affairs
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE's
Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign Countries
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director
Natural Resources and Environment
GAO-07-580T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the actions the
Department of Energy (DOE) has taken to secure radiological sources in
foreign countries. Specifically, my remarks are based on the report we are
issuing today--Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological
Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the
Highest Priority Radiological Sources, which was prepared at the request
of this subcommittee.^1
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources
were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the
United States and the international community. If certain types of these
sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a
simple and crude but potentially dangerous weapon--known as a radiological
dispersion device, or dirty bomb.
In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to address the threat posed
by dirty bombs. In response, the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA)^2 established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to
identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources.
This effort was focused in countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU)
because DOE determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable
sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE
expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide,
ultimately establishing the International Radiological Threat Reduction
(IRTR) Program. The program's primary objective is to protect U.S.
national security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security
upgrades at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating,
recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive
sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure
necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory
controls, including the development of regional partnerships to leverage
international resources.
^1 [13]GAO-07-282 .
^2NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-65 (2000), with responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons,
nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other countries,
though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State, among other things,
provides the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with funds to
conduct training, workshops, and advisory missions to improve member
states' radiological source security practices and procedures. NRC has
provided guidance on the development of programs in Armenia, Georgia, and
Kazakhstan to improve nuclear regulatory controls over radiological
sources, including establishing radiological source inventories and
promoting the development of laws, rules, and regulations governing
controls over this material.
In this context, you asked us to (1) assess the progress DOE has made in
implementing its program to help other countries secure their sealed
radiological sources, (2) identify DOE's current and planned program
costs, and (3) determine the extent to which DOE has coordinated its
efforts with other federal agencies and with international organizations,
such as IAEA and the European Commission. In conducting our review, we
analyzed DOE's IRTR program documentation, including project work plans
for each country and program activity; strategic plans; and internal
briefings. We supplemented the documentation with interviews with senior
level DOE officials responsible for implementing the IRTR program. We also
visited four countries--Russia, Lithuania, Poland and
Georgia--representing about 35 percent of overall DOE program
expenditures, observed physical security upgrades implemented by DOE's
program, and met with host government officials in each country. We
reviewed budget documents detailing IRTR program expenditures and
determined the program's total carryover of unspent and unobligated funds.
Finally, we met with senior officials at State, NRC, IAEA and the European
Commission. We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other
locations, from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary
DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
radiological sources in more than 40 countries and achieved some
noteworthy accomplishments, including the removal of cobalt-60 and
cesium-137 sources from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in
Chechnya. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources
remain unsecured. For example, hundreds of large devices known as
radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) remain operational or
abandoned in Russia. Each of these devices has activity levels ranging
from 25,000 to 250,000 curies of strontium-90--similar to the amount of
strontium-90 released from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in
1986.^3 In addition, security upgrades at a majority of waste storage
facilities--which can individually store up to 3 million curies of
material--located primarily in Russia and Ukraine, have not been
completed. Moreover, in 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program's
scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites
that required security upgrades to include medical facilities operating
teletherapy machines which are used to provide radiation treatment to
cancer patients. These machines generally contain a single cobalt-60
radiological source ranging from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. As a
result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were
hospitals and oncology clinics. In the view of several DOE national
laboratory and security specialists responsible for implementing the
program, DOE installed security upgrades at so many of these facilities
primarily because the upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost.
In addition, DOE has also experienced a number of challenges, such as,
problems with foreign contractor performance and lack of adequate physical
infrastructure to support security upgrades, which impeded program
implementation; caused project delays; and in some extreme cases,
prevented DOE from initiating projects at all. Finally, DOE has not
developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will
be able to sustain them over the long term. This is particularly
problematic, since we identified numerous problems with the maintenance of
DOE-funded security equipment and storage facilities during our site
visits.
Regarding program costs, as of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent
approximately $108 million to secure radiological sources worldwide. A
majority of this money--$68 million--was spent to (1) physically secure
sites; (2) locate, recover, and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and
(3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and
accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to
support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in
IAEA member states and spent $26.5 million on program planning activities
such as, developing program guidance documents, hiring private
consultants, and conducting studies. DOE officials told us that securing
radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority than securing
more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched
uranium (HEU). As a result, recent budget allotments for radiological
security activities were reduced. Consequently, DOE program officials are
concerned that the agency may be unable to meet outstanding contractual
commitments to maintain the more than $40 million in security upgrades
already installed.
^3A curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear
physics, it is defined as the amount of substance in which 37 billion
atoms per second undergo radiological disintegration. In the international
system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of radioactivity. One
curie equals 3.7 x 10^10 becquerels.
Concerning coordination between DOE, State and NRC, efforts have improved
since we reported on this matter in 2003.^4 Specifically, DOE has involved
State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction
activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the
agencies. However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory
infrastructure development efforts with these agencies efficiently. For
example, DOE and NRC disagreed about whether, as directed by the Senate
Appropriations Committee, DOE should have transferred $5 million from its
fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for the purpose of strengthening
international regulatory controls over radiological sources. Ultimately,
DOE did not transfer the funds, causing friction between the agencies.
Finally, DOE has improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls
over other countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and
multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their
regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in
information-sharing between DOE and IAEA have impeded DOE's ability to
target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements.
To help ensure that DOE's future efforts focus on securing the highest
priority sources, our report recommends that the Secretary of Energy and
the Administrator of the NNSA, among other things, (1) limit the number of
hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive
security upgrades to only those deemed the highest risk; (2) accelerate
efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as practicable; and (3) develop a
long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that includes, among
other things, future resources required to implement such a plan.
Additionally, we asked that the Congress consider providing NRC with the
authority and a direct appropriation to conduct international regulatory
infrastructure development activities. DOE said that our recommendations
were helpful and would further strengthen its program. NRC said it would
work closely with relevant executive branch agencies and IAEA if Congress
acts upon our matter for consideration.
^4GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts
to Control Sealed Radiological Sources Need Strengthening, [14]GAO-03-638
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).
Background
The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological
sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft.
According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in
radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004,
about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of
which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the
development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a
dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could, however,
have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type, amount, and
form, the dispersed radiological material could cause radiation sickness
for people nearby and produce serious economic, psychological and social
disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the
contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the
mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in
a Moscow park. While the device was not detonated and no radiological
material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have the
capability and willingness to use radiological sources as weapons of
terror.
A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic
impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is
likely to equal and perhaps exceed that of the September 11, 2001, attacks
on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another study, the
economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs at U.S. ports,
for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in losses to the
U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb attack could also
produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the Federation of
American Scientists concluded that an americium radiological source
combined with one pound of explosives would result in medical supervision
and monitoring required for the entire population of an area 10 times
larger than the initial blast.
DOE Has Installed Physical Security Upgrades at Hundreds of Sites Worldwide, but
Many Dangerous Radiological Sources Have Not Been Secured
As of September 30, 2006, DOE had secured 368 sites that contained
radiological sources in more than 40 countries. The agency's efforts
included the removal of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 sources from a poorly
protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya; construction of storage
facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Georgia in order to
consolidate sources and strengthen their long-term protection; and the
installation of physical security upgrades at 21 sites containing
radiological sources in Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics. However,
despite these achievements, a majority of sites secured do not represent
the highest-risk or the most vulnerable sources, and many of the most
dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in Russia.
In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program beyond the former Soviet
Union, it expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades to
include medical facilities that contained lower priority sources. For
example, of the total sites completed, 256--or about 70 percent--were
hospitals and oncology clinics operating teletherapy machines which
generally contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from about 1,000 to
10,000 curies. In contrast, only 4 of 20 waste storage sites across Russia
and Ukraine have been secured. According to DOE, these waste storage
facilities are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a significant
risk, because of the large quantities of radioactive sources currently
housed at each site.
Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited raised
concerns about DOE's focus on securing so many medical facilities and
Russian officials told us that radiological sources in hospitals did not
pose a risk comparable to that of RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. In
addition, several national laboratory officials and security specialists
responsible for implementing DOE's program told us that although progress
had been made in securing radiological sources, the agency had focused too
much attention on securing medical facilities at the expense of other
higher-priority sites, such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In their
view, DOE installed security upgrades at so many of these facilities
primarily because the upgrades were relatively modest in scope and cost.
For example, a typical suite of security upgrades at a medical facility
costs between $10,000 and $20,000, depending on the size of the site,
whereas the average cost to remove and replace an RTG in the Far East
region of Russia is about $72,000 in 2006 dollars.
To track program progress, DOE has relied upon an indicator that uses as
its primary metric, the number of sites that have been upgraded, or "sites
secured." Although DOE has compiled and tracked accomplishments such as
the amount of curies secured, the number of countries to receive
regulatory assistance, and the number of orphan sources recovered,
multiple national laboratory officials and security specialists told us
that completing upgrades at medical facilities served to demonstrate rapid
program progress because the upgrades are completed relatively quickly.
DOE's program director said that the number of sites completed
demonstrated conclusively that work has been done and represented the best
available measurement. However, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and
Sandia National Laboratory officials told us that this particular
measurement did not demonstrate how the program is reducing threats posed
to U.S. national security interests. In their view, this measurement is
one-dimensional and does not adequately distinguish lower-priority sites
from higher-priority sites.
Furthermore, although numerous medical facilities have been secured, more
than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia, representing
several million curies of unsecured radioactive material. Almost 100 of
these are located along the Baltic coastal line and, according to Russian
officials, should be removed as soon as possible because of their
accessibility and proximity to large population centers. As of September
30, 2006, DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of all RTGs
located in Russia's inventory.
According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and DOE has
faced a number of challenges. First, no comprehensive inventory of RTGs
exists, and, as a result, the actual number of these devices is unknown.
Second, RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, and their
removal requires specialized containers for their transport and facilities
with adequate storage capacity. Finally, future RTG removal efforts will
depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace power
supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has equipped a
select number of RTGs with alarm systems that are remotely monitored as an
interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs that have not yet
been removed.
Additionally, although IAEA officials told us that transportation of
high-risk radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear
and radiological supply chain, DOE determined that source transport is
generally outside the scope of the program and did not pursue
transportation security-related projects with the majority of countries
participating in the IRTR program. However, in every country we visited,
host country officials identified the transportation of sources as a
critical vulnerability and a priority for security upgrades.
DOE also experienced numerous challenges that impeded program
implementation, specifically problems with foreign contractor performance
and inadequate physical infrastructure. Some examples we found of poor
contactor performance included
o steel security doors to a room containing radiological sources
installed with the hinges on the outside,
o security manuals and procedures for newly installed equipment
provided in English instead of the native language, and
o hospital staff that had not been trained by the contractor on
operation of the alarm systems.
In terms of physical infrastructure, some countries lacked
reliable electricity, a backup power source, or telecommunications
at sites containing radiological sources. As a result, frequent
power outages diminished the detection capability of security
alarms installed, and backup sources of power were unavailable to
operate the security alarms and security lighting. DOE officials
said that various combinations of these and other impediments
resulted in delays implementing security upgrades in about 75
percent of all countries participating in the program.
Finally, we were especially concerned to find that DOE had not
developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving security
upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long term,
particularly in light of the number of problems with the
maintenance of DOE-funded security equipment and storage
facilities we identified during our site visits. For example, we
visited an oncology clinic and observed that the security cable
used to secure a teletherapy machine's cobalt-60 source had been
broken for almost a month. This cable, according to a DOE physical
protection specialist, was the most important security feature
because it triggered an alarm directly connected to the
teletherapy machine's "head," which contains the radiological
source. We also observed a storage facility containing RTGs and a
seed irradiator-- which has thousands of curies of a cesium-137
source--with several large openings in the roof and a broken
motion detection device at a research facility containing a 22,000
curie irradiator. According to the foreign contractor, because of
the high level of radioactivity present, the device had been
disabled at least three times since the equipment was installed
about a year earlier.
DOE's current sustainability plan consists of a 3-year warranty on
newly installed security equipment and preventative maintenance
contracts, as well as providing training on newly installed
equipment for operational staff at the sites. However, DOE has not
formulated a long-term plan that identifies, among other things,
how host countries will financially continue maintenance of
upgrades following DOE warranty expiration. DOE officials
responsible for program implementation said that they were
uncertain that security upgrades installed would be sustained by
countries once DOE assistance was no longer available. In fact,
our analysis showed that these officials had confidence that the
security upgrades would be sustained in only 25 percent of the
countries.
DOE Has Spent about $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources
Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain
As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to
implement the IRTR program. The majority of program
expenditures--$68 million--was spent to (1) physically secure
sites containing radiological sources; (2) locate, recover, and
dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help countries draft
laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of
sources. DOE also provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support
activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in
IAEA member states. However, one-fourth of the total budget--about
$26.5 million--was spent on program planning activities not
directly attributed to a specific country. DOE also carried over
almost $23 million in unspent or unobligated funds for the IRTR
program from previous years. Moreover, the program consistently
carried over a substantial uncosted balance each fiscal year
throughout the life of the program. Specifically, for fiscal years
2003 through 2005, the program carried over uncosted funds
totaling $27.4 million, $34.1 million, and $22.4 million,
respectively.
Physical security upgrades accounted for DOE's largest program
expenditure--almost $43 million. The majority of these upgrades
were installed at hospitals and oncology clinics. DOE also funded
upgrades at other types of facilities that utilize or store
radiological sources and materials, including waste storage
facilities, commercial and industrial facilities, and other
research institutes. The types of upgrades installed varied, but
standard equipment packages consisted mostly of hardened windows
and doors; motion sensors and alarms; access control systems, such
as coded keypads or swipe card entry; security cameras; and video
monitoring. Costs of physical security upgrades also included
3-year warranty contracts that covered maintenance costs, such as
the cost of remote monitoring and spare parts.
DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation
detection equipment and training to locate and recover lost or
abandoned radiological sources and secure them in interim or
permanent storage facilities. More than 80 percent of these
expenditures were spent in Russia--about $19 million. These funds
were spent primarily to provide countries with (1) standard
packages of equipment, such as hand-held radiation detection
monitors and characterization instruments to properly identify
recovered sources; (2) training workshops on the appropriate use
of the equipment; and (3) physical security upgrades at some
facilities storing recovered or disposed sources.
While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia
received the largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of
total program expenditures. The 13 other former Soviet Union
countries received a total of about $11 million. By comparison,
DOE spent significantly less outside the former Soviet Union, and
expenditures in these countries were both modest by comparison and
disproportionately spent in the United States by DOE's national
laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead costs.^5
For example, the 35 non-FSU countries participating in DOE's
program received a total of about $17 million, or just 28 percent
of total country-specific expenditures.^6 Furthermore, two-thirds
of funds allocated for activities in these countries were spent in
the United States.
Since 2003, DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding
and according to a senior DOE official, future funding will be
redirected to, among other things, securing special nuclear
material, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Future
anticipated reductions in funding for the IRTR program will have
significant implications for the amount of sources that can be
secured in other countries and may jeopardize DOE's ability to
meet outstanding contractual commitments for the more than $40
million in security upgrades already installed. Additionally,
according to DOE officials, the agency plans to seek international
contributions to secure radiological sources in other countries to
offset anticipated shortfalls in funding.
Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but Coordination
Problems Worldwide Have Impacted DOE�s Ability to Target the Most
Vulnerable Sites for Security Improvements
In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC
to secure radiological sources worldwide, involved State and NRC
in its international radiological threat reduction activities more
often, and increased information-sharing with the agencies. For
example, these agencies worked together successfully to implement
a State-led effort to create the Iraq Radiological Source
Regulatory Authority. This effort included providing equipment,
training, technical assistance, and funding to help the new agency
assume increased responsibility for establishing radiological
source regulations and procedures consistent with international
standards.^7
However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently,
and coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent.
In particular, DOE, State, and NRC have differed on funding and
implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities
in other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC's Office of
International Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to
assist its regulatory counterparts in countries of the Former
Soviet Union and central and eastern Europe to, among other
things, enhance existing laws, rules, and regulations governing
the use of radiological sources. NRC officials noted they made the
request in part because the biggest challenge the agency has faced
has been identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding
to support international assistance activities. In July 2003, the
Senate Appropriations Committee directed DOE to make $5 million
out of certain amounts appropriated to NNSA available to NRC for
bilateral and international efforts to strengthen regulatory
controls over radioactive sources that are at the greatest risk of
being used in a dirty bomb attack. However, DOE did not do so
because, according to DOE officials, the provision directing them
to transfer the funds did not appear in the final conference
report and was not included in the appropriation legislation.
In addition, within the agency, DOE has not adequately coordinated
the activities of multiple programs responsible for securing
radiological and nuclear materials in other countries, which, at
times, has resulted in conflicting or overlapping efforts.
Specifically, we found
o a lack of effective integration between different programs
addressing multiple threat reduction activities at the same sites,
o confusion among host country officials because of multiple
visits to the same country by different components of the same
program, and
o limited information-sharing between international source
security and recovery of U.S.-origin sources in order to better
leverage DOE resources.
With respect to international organizations, DOE has improved
coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other
countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and
multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their
regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in
information-sharing between DOE and IAEA have impacted DOE's
ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security
improvements. For example, IAEA has not shared with DOE the
countries that IAEA considers the most in need of security
assistance. In addition, although DOE funds IAEA appraisal
missions to assess the weaknesses in radioactive source security
in IAEA member states, IAEA does not provide DOE with the findings
of these missions because member state information is considered
country-sensitive and confidential.
Finally, we found that little coordination exists between DOE and
the European Commission. Although, the Commission has coordinated
with IAEA to provide assistance to selected European countries to
improve control over radiological sources, Commission officials
told us that no formal communication exists with the United States
on matters related to radioactive source security assistance. As a
result, each the United States and the Commission are largely
unaware of the specific sites and locations the other is securing,
and whether recipient countries are receiving too little or too
much assistance.
^5DOE noted that some of the FSU countries that received DOE assistance
had comparatively larger infrastructure problems than that of several
non-FSU countries and, in some cases, higher labor rates; and therefore,
project implementation costs in the FSU countries were proportionally
higher.
^6Of the $107.7 million in total program expenditures, $61.7 million could
be traced to specific country-related expenditures.
^7For more information on U.S. efforts to secure radiological sources in
Iraq, see Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source
Recovery Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions,
[22]GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or at [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this statement. Erika D. Carter, Nancy
Crothers, Glen Levis, Mehrunisa Qayyum, and Jim Shafer also made
key contributions to this statement.
GAO�s Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
the performance and accountability of the federal government for
the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of
newly posted products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and
select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
(202) 512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
[email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
(202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
Room 7125 Washington, D.C. 20548
Public Affairs
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-580T .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, [email protected]
.
Highlights of [24]GAO-07-580T , a testimony to the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate
March 13, 2007
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE's
Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign Countries
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources
posed a significant security threat to the United States and the
international community. If certain types of these sources were obtained
by terrorists, they could be used to produce a radiological dispersion
device, or dirty bomb. In response, the Department of Energy (DOE)
established the International Radiological Threat Reduction Program to
identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources.
GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE's progress in securing sources in foreign
countries, (2) identify DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3)
determine the extent to which DOE has coordinated its efforts with other
federal agencies and with international organizations, such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In January 2007, GAO issued a
report-- Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat
Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest
Priority Radiological Sources, (GAO-07-282)--that addressed these matters.
To carry out its work, GAO reviewed DOE policies, plans and budgets;
observed installed physical security upgrades; and interviewed senior DOE,
Department of State (State), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
officials.
While DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
radiological sources in more than 40 countries, many of the highest-risk
sources remain unsecured. For example, more than 700 radioisotope
thermoelectric generators (RTG) remain operational or abandoned across
Russia, representing the largest unsecured quantity of radioactivity in
the world. Each of these devices has activity levels ranging from 25,000
to 250,000 curies of strontium-90--similar to the amount of such material
released from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident. In addition, only 4
of 20 waste storage facilities in Russia and Ukraine have been secured.
In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the scope of the program beyond the
former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required
security upgrades to include hospitals and oncology clinics. In contrast
to higher priority sources, such as RTGs, these facilities operate
teletherapy machines that generally contain a single cobalt-60 source
ranging from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. As of September 30, 2006,
almost 70 percent of all sites secured by DOE's program were hospitals and
oncology clinics. Moreover, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that
countries receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over
the long-term.
Since 2002, DOE has spent about $108 million to implement its program.
Funding for the program has steadily declined as DOE has placed a higher
priority on securing special nuclear material, such as plutonium and
highly enriched uranium.
Finally, although DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC, these
efforts have been inconsistent. For example, DOE chose not to transfer $5
million of its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for international
regulatory activities, causing friction between the agencies. In addition,
GAO found that critical gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA
have impeded DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites in IAEA
member states for security improvements.
In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy
and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to
(1) limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological
sources that receive security upgrades to only those deemed the highest
risk; (2) accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as
practicable; and (3) develop a long-term sustainability plan for security
upgrades. In addition, GAO asked Congress to consider providing NRC with
authority and a direct appropriation to conduct regulatory development
activities to help improve other countries' security over sources. DOE
said that our recommendations were helpful and would further strengthen
its program. NRC said it would work closely with relevant executive branch
agencies and IAEA if Congress acts upon GAO's matter for consideration.
References
Visible links
13. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282
14. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-580T
*** End of document. ***