Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning (31-MAY-07,
GAO-07-549).
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently
been involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that
typically last 5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the
cost of human lives and dollars. A 2005 presidential directive
requires DOD and State to integrate stability activities with
military contingency plans. GAO was asked to address (1) DOD's
approach to enhance stability operations capabilities, and
challenges that have emerged in implementing its approach; (2)
DOD planning for stability operations and the extent of
interagency involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is
applying lessons learned in future plans. To address these
issues, GAO assessed DOD policy and planning documents, reviewed
planning efforts at three combatant commands, and evaluated DOD's
use of lessons learned. GAO is also conducting a related study of
the Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate
stability operations.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-549
ACCNO: A70068
TITLE: Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's
Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning
DATE: 05/31/2007
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Economic stabilization
Foreign governments
Interagency relations
International relations
Lessons learned
Military forces
Military operations
National policies
Policy evaluation
Stability operations
Strategic planning
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GAO-07-549
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operation
* [4]DOD's Approach to Stability Operations Includes a New Policy
* [5]DOD Has Encountered Challenges in Identifying and Prioritizi
* [6]DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Measures of Effe
* [7]DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Plan
* [8]Interagency Coordination is Necessary at Strategic, Operatio
* [9]DOD Has Not Achieved Consistent Interagency Participation in
* [10]Limited Guidance, Information Sharing and Training Hinder In
* [11]Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Cont
* [12]Lessons Learned are Being Captured but Not Incorporated into
* [13]Three Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Use of Lessons
* [14]Conclusions
* [15]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [16]Matter for Congressional Consideration
* [17]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [18]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* [19]Inclusive Criteria
* [20]Exclusive/Restrictive Criteria
* [21]Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes and Descriptions
* [22]Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
* [23]Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [24]GAO Contact
* [25]Acknowledgments
* [26]Related GAO Reports
* [27]Order by Mail or Phone
Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
May 2007
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance
Interagency Planning
GAO-07-549
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 7
DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations
Capabilities, but Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps and
Measures of Effectiveness 13
DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Planning for
Stability Operations 24
Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Contribute to
Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability Operations Planning 33
Conclusions 37
Recommendations for Executive Action 38
Matter for Congressional Consideration 39
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 46
Appendix II Major Lessons-Learned Themes and Descriptions 49
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 51
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 54
Related GAO Reports 55
Tables
Table 1: Selected U.S. Government Responsibilities Related to Stability
Operations 9
Table 2: JIACG Membership at the Central, European, and Pacific Commands
28
Figures
Figure 1: Major Mission Elements of Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations 8
Figure 2: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility 12
Figure 3: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations 15
Figure 4: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of Military Planning
26
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group
NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
State Department of State
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 31, 2007
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Shays:
In the ongoing war on terrorism, the United States government is
confronting a host of challenges requiring a capability to conduct what
has been termed stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction
operations in various countries around the world. The Department of
Defense (DOD) has defined "stability operations" as an overarching term
encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted
outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment,
provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.^1 Since the end of the Cold War,
DOD's involvement in stability operations activities has been significant,
as evidenced by reconstruction and transition operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq, humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan, and security operations
in Bosnia and Kosovo. DOD's increased role in these types of activities
has also required it to employ an increasing number of personnel with
specific skills and capabilities, such as those in civil affairs and
psychological operations units. This shift in DOD's role was captured in
The Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from
Hostilities, which highlighted that since the end of the Cold War, the
United States has been involved in either a stability or reconstruction
operation every 18 to 24 months, that these operations typically last 5 to
8 years, and that these activities surpass combat operations in the cost
of human lives and dollars.
^1Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Sep 2006).
This term and definition was also added to the Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, as
amended through September 17, 2006.
In December 2005, President George Bush issued National Security
Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) which directed U.S. government
agencies to increase efforts to better coordinate stability operations.
NSPD 44 also states that, when relevant and appropriate, reconstruction
and stabilization contingency plans and missions will be coordinated with
U.S. military contingency plans to ensure harmonization with any planned
or ongoing U.S. military operations. The Department of State (State) and
DoD have highlighted that success in stabilization and reconstruction
efforts will depend heavily upon the ability to develop an integrated,
interagency approach, and have initiated steps to facilitate this shift in
focus. But this shift will require cultural changes throughout government
that will take years or perhaps decades to achieve, according to DOD and
State officials.
In the near term, DOD's combatant commanders routinely develop a wide
range of military contingency plans, many of which involve consideration
of stability operations capabilities. As discussed in this report, DOD's
military planning efforts are being expanded to include actions intended
to stabilize regions before conflict develops, deliver humanitarian
assistance, or provide postconflict reconstruction support. In many cases,
these actions will require coordination with non-DOD organizations, such
as State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
Department of Justice.
You asked us to examine DOD's capabilities related to stability
operations, and the extent to which DOD integrates its military planning
efforts with other government agencies. In response to your request, this
report addresses (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations
capabilities and challenges that have emerged in implementing this
approach, (2) DOD military planning for stability operations and the
extent to which the department's planning mechanisms facilitate an
interagency approach; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying
stability operations-related lessons learned from past operations as
future plans are developed. As agreed with your office, we have additional
work underway to address your request to examine the Department of State's
efforts to lead and coordinate stabilization operations in conjunction
with DOD, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other
U.S. agencies, and plan to report on those issues separately.
To evaluate DOD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities,
and the challenges that have emerged in implementing this approach, we
obtained and analyzed relevant departmentwide polices and implementing
guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and
selected combatant commands, and we discussed with each organization the
challenges that exist in implementing DOD's approach. We also discussed
DOD's approach with Department of State and USAID officials to obtain
their perspectives on these issues. Within DOD, we analyzed documentation
and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, the services, three combatant
commands (Central Command, European Command, and Pacific Command) and
fourteen of their related component commands. To evaluate DOD's stability
operations planning and the extent to which the department's planning
mechanisms encourage and facilitate an interagency approach, we reviewed
relevant DOD guidance and portions of selected planning documents that
pertain to interagency coordination. Our review did not include the
planning for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also discussed
the planning process and impediments to interagency coordination with
representatives from non-DOD agencies assigned to the combatant commands
to gain their perspectives, understand the extent to which these agencies
are represented, identify their roles and responsibilities, and determine
the extent to which they participate in the DOD planning process. We did
not, however, assess the extent to which these roles and responsibilities,
including those of DOD, are appropriate. To determine the extent to which
DOD planners are applying lessons learned from past operations and
exercises in planning, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance, discussed with
DOD officials the consideration of lessons during planning, and analyzed
information in lessons-learned databases maintained by each service and
Joint Forces Command, and two non-DOD organizations. With the information
from both DOD and non-DOD sources, we developed a database with over 3,500
individual lessons and observations from 38 reports or studies, identified
strategic-level lessons learned related to stability operations using a
process of independent coding and review, and then grouped the selected
lessons into 14 major themes.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Additional
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief
DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its
stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in
identifying and addressing capability gaps and developing measures of
effectiveness, which are critical to successfully executing this approach.
Among the many improvement efforts underway, the department has taken
three key steps that frame this new approach. Specifically, the department
(1) formalized a new stability operations policy, DOD Directive 3000.05,
that elevated stability operations to a core mission on par with combat
operations, (2) expanded DOD's planning construct to more fully address
pre- and postconflict operations, and (3) defined a new joint operating
concept that will serve as a basis for how the military will support
stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in the
next 15 to 20 years. Notwithstanding these positive and important steps,
however, DOD has encountered challenges in identifying stability
operations capabilities and developing measures of effectiveness--both of
which are key tasks required by DOD Directive 3000.05 and important steps
in performance-based management. Specifically, the services are each
pursuing efforts to improve current capabilities, such as those associated
with civil affairs and language skills. However, DOD has yet to
systematically identify and prioritize the full range of needed
capabilities because DOD has not provided clear guidance, including
timeframes for completion, on how and when to accomplish these tasks. As a
result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability
shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that
will be needed to effectively accomplish stability operations in the
future. Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of
effectiveness required by DOD Directive 3000.05 because the current
guidance does not clearly articulate a systematic approach for developing
measures of effectiveness. Without agreed-upon measures of effectiveness,
DOD will not be able to assess the extent to which its efforts are
enhancing stability operations capabilities. We are recommending DOD
provide more comprehensive guidance, including a clear methodology and
time frames for completion, to combatant commanders and the services on
how to identify and prioritize needed capabilities and develop measures of
effectiveness.
DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans to
address stability operations, but it has not established adequate
mechanisms to obtain input from other federal agencies to incorporate into
its planning efforts. Recent changes in national security strategy and
policies and DOD guidance require State and DOD to integrate stabilization
and reconstruction plans with military contingency plans where relevant
and appropriate, and to coordinate those plans with relevant government
and nongovernment organizations.^2 DOD has begun taking steps to better
coordinate with other U.S. government agencies by establishing working
groups with representatives from several key organizations, such as the
Department of State and USAID, but these working groups are comprised of
liaison officers with limited planning experience and training, the
representatives are few in number, and the representatives do not
consistently participate in DOD's planning process. In addition, some DOD
organizations are reaching out to country teams in embassies within their
areas of responsibility on an ad hoc basis, but this approach can be
cumbersome because of the large number of countries that may be affected
by a regional plan. Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency
participation in the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has
not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning
with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate
sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD
and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other's planning
processes and capabilities, and have different planning cultures and
capacities. As a result, the overall foundation for unity of
effort--common understanding of the purpose and concept of the operations,
coordinated policies and plans, and trust and confidence in key
participants--in military operations that involve stabilization and
reconstruction activities is not being established. To increase unity of
effort in these operations, we are recommending the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide implementation
guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and encourage interagency
participation in the development of military plans, develop a process to
share planning information with non-DOD agencies early in the planning
process as appropriate, and orient DOD and non-DOD personnel in each
agency's planning processes and capabilities.
^2Recent changes are included in the National Security Strategy, NSPD-44,
DOD Directive 3000.05, and DOD Joint Publications.
Although DOD has spent considerable time and resources to collect lessons
learned from past and ongoing operations, DOD planners are not
consistently using these lessons learned as they develop future
contingency plans. Department policies and guidance encourage the
consideration of lessons learned during the planning process, and
information from current and past operations is being incorporated into
various databases.^3 For example, our analysis of DOD's databases
identified lessons learned related to the need for (1) the military to
work more closely with other agencies during stability operations, (2) DOD
to develop knowledge of other agencies and the capabilities they can
contribute, and (3) commanders to ensure that military sectors during
operations correspond with civil geopolitical boundaries. However, we
found that DOD planners are not using lessons-learned information on a
consistent basis as plans are developed or revised because (1) Joint Staff
guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not
specifically state that planners are required to include lessons learned
in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned
databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not
evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into
specific plans. DOD has recently initiated an effort to develop an
information system to improve access to lessons learned within the
department and between non-DOD agencies, and although this is a positive
step, this effort is in its early stages. Moreover, it is not clear how
the system will accommodate interagency needs, and when it will be fully
operational. In addition, without a comprehensive and timely approach to
improve guidance, information systems, and the planning review process,
DOD's efforts to improve information systems alone may not enable the
department to fully leverage lessons learned from past operations into its
future plans, and past mistakes could be repeated. We are recommending
that DOD update its planning guidance to: (1) direct planners to include
lessons learned as plans are developed, and (2) require that the plan
review process include a step to verify lessons learned have been
considered and adopted as appropriate. We are also recommending that DOD
include the interagency stakeholders in the development of its new
lessons-learned information system earlier than currently planned.
^3Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.0l, Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and
Procedures) (Sept. 29, 2006); Department of Defense Directive 3000.05,
Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations (Nov. 28, 2005); and Department of Defense, Military
Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
Operations, Joint Operating Concept (Washington, D.C., December 2006).
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with
our eight recommendations but did not discuss what specific steps, if any,
it plans to take to implement our recommendations. (DOD's comments appear
in their entirety in app. III.) State was also afforded an opportunity to
comment on this report, but declined to do so. In its written comments,
DOD highlighted traditional DOD methodologies and approaches to developing
capabilities, measures of effectiveness, coordinating with other agencies,
and incorporating lessons learned that it believes are adequate to address
our recommendations. Although DOD is making progress in achieving a
greater focus on stability operations through its new directive, our
report notes it has made limited progress in certain areas, such as
establishing measures of effectiveness, due to the limited guidance
provided to DOD components. As a result, we continue to believe our
recommendations are warranted and that DOD should take specific steps to
address them. Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD plans
to take to implement our recommendations we have added a matter for
congressional consideration suggesting that the Congress require the
Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually on the
specific steps being taken to address our recommendations and the current
status of its efforts. The report should also identify challenges to
achieving an integrated interagency approach to stability operations, and
potential solutions for mitigating those challenges.
Background
According to DOD's guidance, the immediate goal of stability operations
often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential
services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help
develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable
market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil
society.^4 Stability operations include a continuum of activities that can
occur throughout the spectrum of conflict ranging from preconflict
stabilization to postconflict reconstruction and transition to effective
governance. DOD has identified six major activities, or major mission
elements, that U.S. military forces, civilian government agencies, and in
many cases multinational partners may need to engage in to stabilize an
environment and build sustainable host-nation capabilities. Figure 1
depicts these major mission elements.
^4Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
Figure 1: Major Mission Elements of Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations
As Figure 1 illustrates, the mission elements, or dimensions, of stability
operations range from establishing and maintaining a secure environment to
delivering humanitarian assistance, economic support, and establishing
effective forms of governance. As shown in the figure, DOD envisions one
key element--strategic communications--as encompassing all of the other
five mission elements. DOD guidance recognizes that many stability
operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian
professionals and that DOD's participation may be in a supporting role.
However, this guidance also states U.S. military forces shall be prepared
to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when
civilians cannot do so.
NSPD-44 outlines the major roles and responsibilities throughout the
government for stability operations, including the responsibilities of the
National Security Council, State, non-DOD agencies, and DOD. In November
2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, which established the department's
overall policy and assigned responsibilities within DOD for planning,
training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.^5
Table 1 highlights several key responsibilities established by NSPD-44 and
DOD Directive 3000.05.
Table 1: Selected U.S. Government Responsibilities Related to Stability
Operations
Organization Key Responsibilities
National Security o Co-Chair to Policy Coordination Committee
Council^a established for Reconstruction and
Stabilization^b
o Designate lead and supporting responsibilities
as outlined in National Security Presidential
Directive-1^c for stability operations.
Department of State o Coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government
efforts, involving all U.S. departments and
agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare,
plan for, and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction activities.
o Develop and approve strategies, with respect to
U.S. foreign assistance and economic cooperation,
for reconstruction and stabilization activities
directed toward foreign states and regions at
risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or
civil strife.
o Coordinate interagency process to identify
states at risk of instability, lead interagency
planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and
develop detailed contingency plans for integrated
U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization
efforts for those states and regions and for
widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated
with military contingency plans, where
appropriate.
o Provide U.S. government decision makers with
detailed options for an integrated response in
connection with specific reconstruction and
stabilization operations.
o Coordinate U.S. government responses for
reconstruction and stabilization with the
Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with
any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations,
including peacekeeping missions, at the planning
and implementation phases; develop guiding
precepts and implementation procedures for
reconstruction and stabilization which, where
appropriate, may be integrated with military
contingency plans and doctrine.
o Lead U.S. government development of a strong
civilian response capability including necessary
surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and
recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and
resources needed to ensure that the United States
has the civilian reserve and response
capabilities necessary for stabilization and
reconstruction activities to respond quickly and
effectively.
o Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding
disputes among U.S. government departments and
agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance
and foreign economic cooperation related to
reconstruction and stabilization, consistent with
Office of Management and Budget's budget and
policy coordinating functions.
Other Executive o Support stability operations activities and
Departments and requirements with agency resources.
Agencies o Coordinate with the Department of State's
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
during budget formulation for relevant
reconstruction and stabilization activities prior
to submission to the Office of Management and
Budget and Congress, or as required to coordinate
reconstruction and stabilization activities.
o Identify, develop, and provide Department of
State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization with relevant information on
capabilities and assets.
o Identify and develop internal capabilities for
planning and for resource and program management
that can be mobilized in response to crises.
o Identify within each agency current and former
agency personnel skilled in crisis response,
including contract employees, and establish under
each agency's authorities mechanisms to reassign
or reemploy these personnel and mobilize
associated resources rapidly in response to
crises.
o Assist in identifying situations of concern,
developing action and contingency plans,
responding to crises that occur, assessing
lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts
and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S.
response and effective international
reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
Department of Defense o Institutionalize stability operations within
DOD and prioritize them comparable with combat
operations.
o Integrate stability operations across all DOD
activities including doctrine, organizations,
training, education, exercises, material,
leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.
o With the Secretary of State, integrate
stabilization and reconstruction contingency
plans with military contingency plans when
relevant and appropriate.
o Develop general framework with the Secretary of
State to fully coordinate stabilization and
reconstruction activities and military operations
at all levels where appropriate.
o Provide and seek assistance and advice from the
Department of State and other U.S. departments
and agencies, as appropriate, for developing
stability operations capabilities.
o Develop greater means to help build other
countries' security capacity quickly to ensure
security in their own lands or to contribute
forces to stability operations elsewhere.
o Be prepared to perform all necessary tasks to
establish or maintain order when civilians or
other agencies cannot do so.
o Lead and support the development of military
civilian teams to support stability operations
activities.
o Share information with U.S. departments and
agencies, foreign governments and forces,
international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and members of the private sector
supporting stability operations, consistent with
legal requirements.
^5Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and non-DOD data.
Note: Data are from NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05.
aIn those instances when we refer to the National Security Council as it
relates to NSPD-44, the directive generally refers to the National
Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), Organization of the National
Security Council System (Washington, D.C., Feb. 13, 2001).
bNational Security Council/Policy Coordination Committees manage the
development and implementation of national security policies and serve as
the mechanism for interagency coordination of national security policy.
They provide policy analysis and ensure timely responses to decisions made
by the President.
cNational Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National
Security Council System (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2001). This directive
is issued by the President and establishes policy for the organization and
membership in the National Security Council to advise and assist the
President in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it
affects the United States--domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and
economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council [NEC]). The
National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive
departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation
of those national security policies.
Within DOD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
responsible for developing stability operations policy options for the
Secretary of Defense and, according to DOD officials, provides oversight
for the implementation of DOD's stability operations policy. Under DOD
Directive 3000.05, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the
Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, in coordination with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, shall each develop stability operations capabilities.
Commanders of the geographic combatant commands through the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall identify stability operations requirements
within their areas of responsibility, shown in figure 2. Combatant
commands are also directed to engage other organizations in stability
operations planning, training, and exercises, in coordination with the
Joint Staff and the Office of Policy.
Figure 2: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility
Note: As of October 1, 2006.
aThe state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's Area of
Responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to
multiple commands.
The department has recently announced that it plans to realign these areas
of responsibility to establish a new geographic combatant command for the
continent of Africa. As of February 2007, the details of this realignment
had not been finalized.
DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations Capabilities, but
Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps and Measures of Effectiveness
DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its
stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in
identifying capability gaps and developing measures of effectiveness,
which are critical to successfully executing this approach. Among the many
improvement efforts underway, the department has taken three key steps
that frame this new approach. Specifically, the department has: (1)
formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated stability
operations to a core mission and gave them priority comparable to combat
operations, and assigned numerous responsibilities to DOD organizations,
(2) expanded DOD's planning construct to more fully address stability
operations, and (3) defined a new joint operating concept that will serve
as a basis for how the military will support stabilization, security,
transition, and reconstruction operations in the next 15 to 20 years.
However, DOD has made limited progress in identifying and prioritizing
needed capabilities, and in developing measures of effectiveness, which
are critical steps required by DOD's new directive and important tenets of
performance-based management. Capability gaps are not being assessed
because the department has yet to issue adequate guidance on how to
conduct these assessments or set specific time frames to complete them.
Similarly, the department has made limited progress in developing measures
of effectiveness because current guidance does not clearly articulate a
systematic approach on how to develop measures of effectiveness. Without a
comprehensive assessment of stability operations capability gaps and clear
measures of effectiveness, the department may not be appropriately
prioritizing and developing the needed capabilities, or measuring its
progress toward achieving these goals.
DOD's Approach to Stability Operations Includes a New Policy, Planning Guidance,
and a Joint Operating Concept
In the past 18 months, DOD has taken positive steps to improve stability
operations capabilities by establishing a new and comprehensive policy,
planning guidance, and joint operating concept. First, in November 2005,
DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which established DOD's stability
operations policy and assigned responsibilities within the department for
planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability
operations. This directive reflects a fundamental shift in DOD's policy
because it designates stability operations as a core mission that shall be
given priority comparable to combat operations and emphasizes that
integrated military and civilian efforts are key to successful stability
operations efforts. According to DOD officials, this publication is
intended to serve as a catalyst, pushing DOD to develop methods to enhance
its own capabilities and integrate the capabilities and capacities of the
defense, diplomatic, and development communities for achieving unity of
effort in stability operations. The policy emphasizes that integrating
civilian and military efforts is key to successful stability operations
and recognizes that stability operations will not always be led by the
military, and that DOD needs to be prepared to provide support to both
government and nongovernment organizations when necessary.
The directive assigns responsibility for approximately 115 tasks to 18
organizations in the department, such as the Under Secretaries for Policy
and Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant
Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The directive
states that stability operations skills, such as language capabilities and
regional area expertise, be developed and incorporated into professional
military education at all levels, and that information shall be shared
with U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and forces,
international organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and the
members of the private sector supporting stability operations, consistent
with legal requirements. The policy also states that military plans shall
address stability operations throughout all phases of an operation or plan
as appropriate, and that stability operations dimensions of military plans
be exercised and tested, when appropriate, with other U.S. departments and
agencies. In addition, the directive states that the Under Secretary for
Policy shall submit a semiannual report developed in coordination with
responsible DOD components to the Secretary of Defense evaluating the
department's progress in implementing the directive.
A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to broaden
its military planning guidance for joint operations to include noncombat
activities to stabilize countries or regions and prevent hostilities; and
postcombat activities that emphasize stabilization, reconstruction, and
transition governance to civil authorities. Figure 3 illustrates the
change in DOD planning guidance.
Figure 3: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations
As shown in Figure 3, previous Joint Staff planning guidance considered
four operational phases, including deter and engage the enemy, seize the
initiative, conduct decisive operations, and transition to peaceful
activities. The revised planning guidance now directs consideration of six
phases of an operation, which include shaping efforts to stabilize regions
so that conflicts do not develop, and expanding the dimensions of
stability operations that are needed in more hostile environments after
conflicts occur.^6 This new planning guidance requires planners to
consider the types of activities that can be conducted to help a nation
establish a safe and secure environment, eliminating the need for armed
conflict, and activities to assist a nation in establishing security
forces and governing mechanisms to transition to self-rule. These are also
the phases of an operation that will require significant unity of effort
and close coordination between DOD and other federal agencies.
In December 2006, DOD took a third step in outlining its approach to
stability operations when the Joint Forces Command published the Military
Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
Operations Joint Operating Concept.^7 This operating concept describes how
the future Joint Force Commander will provide military support to
stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations within
a military campaign in pursuit of national strategic objectives in the
2014-2026 time frame. The operating concept focuses on the full range of
military support that the future Joint Force might provide in foreign
countries across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order
to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed
due to either a natural or man-made disaster. This publication provides a
conceptual framework for how future commanders can provide military
support in foreign countries to a full range of stabilization, security,
transition, and reconstruction operations, such as
o assist an existing or new host nation government in providing
security, essential public services, economic development, and
governance following the significant degradation or collapse of
the government's capabilities due to internal failure or as a
consequence of the destruction and dislocation of a war;
o provide support to stabilize and administer occupied territory
and care for refugees in major combat operations fought for
limited objectives that fall short of forcibly changing the
adversary regime;
o support a fragile national government that is faltering due to
serious internal challenges, which include civil unrest,
insurgency, terrorism and factional conflict;
o assist a stable government that has been struck by a devastating
natural disaster;
o provide limited security cooperation assistance to a state that
is facing modest internal challenges; and
o provide military assistance and training to partner nations that
increase their capability and capacity to conduct stabilization,
security, transition, and reconstruction operations at home or
abroad.
^6Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations.
^7DOD defined stability, security, transition, and reconstruction missions
as activities that support U.S. government plans for stabilization,
security, reconstruction, and transition operations, which lead to
sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. In many cases stability
operations and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
terminology is used interchangeably.
This publication is intended to complement both policy and
planning guidance by expanding the understanding of stability
operations and by providing leaders with a conceptual explanation
of the strategic considerations, solutions, risks and mitigations,
and implications to consider when planning a stability operation.
In addition to establishing a new policy, revising planning
guidance, and developing a new joint operating concept, DOD has
taken other complementary actions to address stability operations
capabilities within the department. For example, in order to
follow up on initiatives identified in the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the department has published a series of roadmaps
on specific topics such as Building Partnership Capacity. The
Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap provides an action plan to
meet objectives focused on strengthening interagency planning and
enhancing both DOD and non-DOD capabilities in this area. Another
step taken by DOD was to work with the Department of State to
develop a draft planning guide for other federal agencies that is
intended to assist these organizations in the planning for
reconstruction and stabilization operations.^8
DOD Has Encountered Challenges in Identifying and Prioritizing
Stability Operations Capabilities
DOD Directive 3000.05 tasked several organizations within the
department to take specific actions to identify and prioritize
stability operations capabilities, but the department has made
limited progress in meeting this goal. Specifically, the directive
states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall
identify DOD-wide stability operations capabilities and recommend
priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is tasked to identify stability operations
capabilities and assess their development. The Geographic
Combatant Commanders, responsible for contingency planning and
commanding U.S. forces in their regions, shall identify stability
operations requirements. Finally, the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command are
required to develop the required stability operations capabilities
and capacity in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
^8United States Joint Forces Command, J7 Pamphlet, U.S. Government Draft
Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict
Transformation (December 2005).
Officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's office
stated they intended to meet the requirement to identify
capabilities and recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense
through an iterative process known as capability gap assessments.
Policy officials envisioned that the geographic combatant commands
would conduct theater-specific, scenario-driven assessments of
forces and capabilities required for contingencies through DOD's
planning process. They also expected that the geographic commands
would compare the planned requirements for stability operations
with the current available forces and military capabilities, and
propose remedies for eliminating the gaps. DOD officials described
the Joint Staff's role as to review each of the combatant command
assessments and provide guidance, including common standards and
criteria, to the combatant commands to assist them in identifying
their requirements. The combatant command requirements were then
expected to drive each service's development of stability
operations capabilities and capacity.
As discussed below, as of March 2007, DOD has made limited
progress in identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities
following this iterative capability gap assessment process. At the
three combatant commands that we visited, we found that the
identification of stability operations requirements was occurring
in a fragmented manner. At Central Command, officials from the
command's assessment branch explained that there has been
increased emphasis on stability operations across the command,
especially for nonlethal activities, such as civil military
operations. Officials explained that organizations at the command
level routinely conduct capability assessments and turn in a list
of shortfalls for incorporation into the command's consolidated
integrated priority list that the Combatant Command Commander
submits annually to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.^9 They envision
that in the future these lists will include stability operations
requirement shortfalls. Similarly, in the European Command,
various organizations are independently conducting assessments
within their respective areas. For example, within the combatant
command headquarters, training officials explained that they were
working on a consolidated and prioritized list of stability
operations training requirements, while at the Naval component
command they are evaluating each country within its region to
identify the specific stability operations requirements for that
country. At the Pacific Command, officials stated that they had
not tasked any of their component commands to identify stability
operations requirements. However, component command officials
indicated that capability requirements would be identified through
routine processes, such as DOD's required Joint Quarterly
Readiness Review.^10
^9The Integrated Priority List is a succinct statement, prepared annually,
of key capability gaps that could hinder the performance of a combatant
commander's assigned missions.
^10The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for conducting a Joint
Quarterly Readiness Review, which is a scenario-based readiness assessment
that identifies capabilities and risks associated with missions that
support strategic-level planning guidance. Participants in this review
include the Combatant Commanders, senior representatives from DOD, the
Military Services, and other DOD components.
Notwithstanding the lack of identification of specific
requirements from combatant commanders, each service is taking
some steps to improve stability operations capabilities, but each
service is using a different approach. For example, Marine Corps
officials highlighted the establishment of a program to improve
cultural awareness training, increased civil affairs planning in
its operational headquarters, and the establishment of a Security
Cooperation Training Center as key efforts to improve stability
operations capabilities.^11 Navy officials highlighted the service
efforts to align its strategic plan and operations concept to
support stability operations, the establishment of the Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command, and the dedication of Foreign Area
Officers to specific countries as their key efforts.^12 Army
officials highlighted the establishment of an office dedicated to
stability operations policy and strategy, the development of Army
doctrine related to stability operations, and an ongoing process
to address gaps in Army stability operations capabilities and
capacities. Army officials expect to approve an action plan by the
end of fiscal year 2007 that is intended to provide solutions for
improving its capabilities to conduct stability operations. Air
Force officials emphasized the service's use of an analytical
capabilities-based planning model that has identified and begun to
address specific shortfalls related to stability operations.
^11The Marine Corps's Security Cooperation Training Center coordinates
Marine Corps education and training programs in support of Department of
Defense Security Cooperation efforts to enhance interoperability with
allied and coalition partners in the conduct of traditional and irregular
warfare and in support of the global struggle against violent extremism.
^12Foreign Area Officers are a group of military officers with a broad
range of military skills and experiences; knowledge of political-military
affairs; familiarity with the political, cultural, sociological, economic,
and geographic factors of the countries and regions in which they are
stationed; and professional proficiency in one or more of the dominant
languages in their regions of expertise.
Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant
commands to identify requirements, and the different approaches
taken by the services to develop capabilities, the potential
exists that the department may not be identifying and prioritizing
the most critical capabilities needed by the combatant commanders,
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has not been able to
recommend capability priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The
department recognizes the importance of successfully completing
these capability assessments, and in the first semiannual report
on stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretary stated that the department has not yet defined the
magnitude of DOD's stability operations capability deficiencies,
and that clarifying the scope of these capability gaps continues
to be a priority within the department.^13
^13Interim Progress Report on DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations
(Washington, D.C., August 2006).
We identified two factors that are limiting DOD's ability to carry
out the capability gap assessment process envisioned by the Office
of Policy. First, at the time of our review, DOD had not issued
guidance or set specific timeframes for the combatant commands to
identify stability operations capability requirements. Joint Staff
officials explained that the combatant commanders were expected to
identify capability requirements based on operational plans, and
DOD has not issued its 2007 planning guidance to the combatant
commanders that reflect the new six-phase approach to planning
previously discussed in this report.^14 Joint Staff officials
expressed concerns that if the combatant commands based their
requirements on existing plans that have not been updated to
reflect new planning guidance, the requirements would not reflect
the more comprehensive stability operations capabilities needed.
^14To focus the guidance provided in the national strategy, and to meet
statutory requirements of Title 10 of the United States Code, the
Secretary of Defense provides written policy guidance to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation and review of contingency
plans every 2 years, or more frequently as needed. This written guidance,
called the Contingency Planning Guidance includes the relative priority of
plans and drives DOD's contingency planning efforts. To meet the
requirements of the Contingency Planning Guidance, combatant commanders
develop plans focused on their specific areas of responsibility.
A second factor contributing to the limited progress in completing
capability gap assessments is confusion over how to define
stability operations. For example, Air Force officials stated in
their May 22, 2006, Stability Operations Self Assessment that the
absence of a common lexicon for stability operations functions,
tasks, and actions results in unnecessary confusion and
uncertainty when addressing stability operations. In March 2007
they reiterated that they still consider this lack of a common
lexicon an issue in identifying stability operations capabilities.
Central Command and Pacific Command officials equated stability
operations with activities conducted under the auspices of Theater
Security Cooperation, while European Command officials stated that
stability operations are what they do in every country they have a
presence. This lack of a clear and consistent definition of
stability operations has caused confusion across the department
about how to identify activities that are considered stability
operations, and commanders have difficulty identifying what the
end state is for which they need to plan. Officials with DOD's
Office of Policy have recognized that confusion exists surrounding
the definition of stability operations, and stated they are taking
actions to clarify it. For example, Office of Policy officials
cited a revised definition of stability operations that has been
incorporated into DOD's September 2006 planning guidance discussed
previously in this report, and the office is considering a more
aggressive outreach program that will help DOD officials at all
levels better understand the definition and application of
stability operations concepts in identifying and addressing
capability gaps.^15 However, without clear guidance on how and
when combatant commanders are to develop stability operations
capability requirements, the combatant commanders and the military
services may not be able to effectively identify and prioritize
needed capabilities.
^15Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations.
DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Measures of Effectiveness
Past GAO work on DOD transformation reported the advantages of
using management tools, such as performance measures, to gauge
performance in helping organizations successfully manage major
transformation efforts.^16 Good performance measures are an
important results-oriented management tool that allows DOD to
determine the extent to which individual goals contribute to
progress in achieving the overall goal of increasing stability
operations capability. GAO's previous work highlighted that the
elements of a performance measure should include a baseline and
target; be objective, measurable, quantifiable; and include a time
frame. Clear, well-developed and coordinated performance measures
help ensure that stakeholders are held responsible and accountable
for completing their tasks in a timely manner and to an
agreed-upon standard. Results-oriented measures further ensure
that it is not the task itself being evaluated, but progress in
achieving the intended outcome.
DOD has recognized the need for performance measures to evaluate
its progress in enhancing stability operations goals and
objectives. Specifically, DOD Directive 3000.05 requires each
organization tasked under the directive to develop measures of
effectiveness to evaluate progress in meeting its goals. According
to Office of Policy officials the intent for developing measures
of effectiveness was to let stakeholders take ownership in
identifying the metrics and procedures for evaluating their
assigned tasks. These officials also explained that as each
organization develops a measure of effectiveness, the Office of
Policy will review the proposed measure, provide feedback, and
assist the stakeholders in refining the metrics to ensure that the
measure is adequate. Policy officials expect that some measures
will be quantitative, while others will be qualitative. This
approach is based on the premise that the directive did not intend
to place a fixed methodology on the stakeholders, would allow
development of a process that was flexible enough to evolve with
future stability operations activities and requirements, and would
motivate change at the lowest level.
Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however,
as of March 2007 we found that limited progress has been made in
developing measures of effectiveness because of significant
confusion over how this task should be accomplished, and because
of minimal guidance provided by the Office of Policy.
Specifically, in initial discussions with us, the Army had
indicated that it was working on an Action Plan for Stability
Operations, but had placed the process on hold pending guidance
from DOD. More recently, despite the lack of guidance, the
Director of the Army's Stability Operations Division told us that
it is taking steps to finalize the Action Plan for Stability
Operations and once it is approved will track all of the
responsibilities outlined in DOD 3000.05 through its Strategic
Management System. Army officials have also established May 2007
as an objective for developing and refining its performance-based
metrics. Air Force officials explained that they already conduct a
biennial review of Air Force Concepts of Operations that produces
a stability operations assessment and that the results of its 2005
review were summarized and provided to DOD. Air Force officials
indicated that in their opinion, this satisfied the requirement to
develop performance measures for stability operations. As of March
2007, officials from the Navy's Office of Strategy and Concepts
explained that the Navy has begun efforts to implement a stability
operations action plan that includes developing metrics and
measures of effectiveness, but have put the process on hold
pending metrics guidance from DOD. Similarly, the Marine Corps's
Action Plan for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction dated February 2007 shows that the Marine Corps is
also still waiting for additional guidance from DOD on developing
measures of effectiveness. Within the combatant commands, Pacific
Command officials explained that they were still waiting for
guidance on implementing the directive from the Office of Policy
and had not tasked the component commands with any implementing
tasks, including developing metrics. At Central Command a policy
official told us that there had been no development of measures of
effectiveness relative to the directive. In DOD headquarters,
officials in the Office of Personnel and Readiness stated that
they expected the development of measures of effectiveness to be
problematic, for both themselves and the Office of Policy, and
that they were unsure how the measures would be developed for
their office.
^16GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities, [28]GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2004).
Officials from DOD's office for stability operations stated they
are aware of the confusion surrounding the development of measures
of effectiveness and that in the next few months they plan to
sponsor a workshop to help train individuals on developing
measures of effectiveness. While these workshops can be a positive
step, they will only benefit those who participate. Without clear
departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of
effectiveness and milestones for completing them, confusion may
continue to exist within the department and progress on this
important management tool may be significantly hindered. Moreover,
without central oversight of the process to develop measures of
effectiveness, including those that address identifying and
developing stability operations capabilities, the department will
be limited on its overall ability to gauge progress in achieving
stability operations goals and objectives.
DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Planning
for Stability Operations
DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive plans related to
stability operations, but it has not established adequate
mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation
in the development of military plans developed by the combatant
commanders. Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
along with the overall war on terrorism, have led to changes in
national security and defense strategies and an increased
governmentwide emphasis on stability operations. NSPD-44 states
that lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and
departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in
NSPD-1. In some cases, per NSPD-44, the National Security Council
may direct the Department of State to lead the development of
stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction plans for
specific countries.^17 However, the combatant commanders also
routinely develop a wide range of military plans for potential
contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input from other
agencies or organizations. Within the combatant commands where
contingency plans are developed, the department is either
beginning to establish working groups or is reaching out to U.S.
embassies on an ad hoc basis to obtain interagency perspectives.
But this approach can be cumbersome, does not facilitate
interagency participation in the actual planning process, and does
not include all organizations that may be able to contribute to
the operation being planned for. Combatant Commanders have
achieved limited interagency participation in the development of
military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance
to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD
organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing
of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD
and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other's
planning processes and capabilities, and have different planning
cultures and capacities. As a result, the overall foundation for
unity of effort in stability operations--common understanding of
the purpose and concept of the operation, coordinated policies and
plans, and trust and confidence between key participants--is not
being achieved.
^17NSPD-44 directs this through NSPD-1. Specifically, NSPD-44 states
"Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear
accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or
stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting
responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the
mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will
be redesignated as transitions are required."
Interagency Coordination is Necessary at Strategic, Operational
and Tactical Levels of Planning
As previously discussed, NSPD-44 states that the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State will integrate stabilization
and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency
plans when relevant and appropriate and will develop a general
framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction
activities and military operations at all levels where
appropriate. DOD Directive 3000.05 has placed significant emphasis
on the interagency nature of stability operations and the need for
a coordinated approach to integrate the efforts of government and
nongovernment organizations. Specifically, the Directive requires
the geographic combatant commanders to engage relevant U.S.
departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces,
international organizations, nongovernment organizations, and
members of the private sector in stability operations planning,
training, and exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy.^18 Beyond this directive, combatant commanders also
have the overall responsibility to plan for a wide range of
military operations, such as potential military conflicts, other
operations to stabilize fragile governments or regions, or to
respond to unexpected events such as the Tsunami relief effort in
2005. As a result, combatant commanders now have an expanding
responsibility to coordinate these planning efforts with
representatives from various U.S. agencies, organizations, other
governments, and the private sector.
Combatant commanders develop military plans focused at three
distinct, yet overlapping, levels that help commanders at each
level visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate
resources, and assign tasks. Figure 4 illustrates these levels,
and the type of planning that occurs in each.
^18Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
Figure 4: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of Military
Planning
As illustrated in figure 4, at the strategic level, planners
prepare what is known as the supported plan, which describes how a
combatant commander intends to meet the national or high-level
goals for his geographical area of responsibility. These plans
assign responsibilities for specific strategic goals to other
organizations and subordinate commands, but do not provide the
details for how these goals will be accomplished. Generally,
component commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force forces
assigned to the combatant commander) prepare operational and
tactical level plans, which are intended to provide an increasing
level of detail and fidelity to the plans and are referred to as
supporting plans. It is at this level of planning that planners
develop specific details about actions that will be taken and how
resources will be applied to achieve the objectives outlined in
the strategic level plan. At the operational and tactical levels,
military planners need knowledge of the resources they can rely on
from other agencies for conducting operations and who will be on
the ground that they can coordinate with for information and
integration of activities.
To achieve a fully integrated strategic, operational, or tactical
plan, DOD planners require increased knowledge of the roles,
responsibilities, and capabilities that all agencies and
organizations can contribute to stabilization efforts. DOD policy
officials responsible for developing planning guidance have stated
that interagency planning in military operations can no longer be
an afterthought, but is critical to realizing U.S. interests in
future conflicts. We found almost universal agreement between all
organizations included in our review that there needs to be more
interagency coordination in planning, and that these coordination
requirements differ at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of planning. For example, officials agreed that at the
strategic level, the many organizations that can play a key role
in stability operations should be present to represent their
respective organizations, and that those representatives can help
facilitate a mutual understanding of the overall contributions,
capabilities, and capacity of each organization. These
representatives can also develop a better understanding of DOD and
the process used to develop military plans. At the operational and
tactical level, DOD officials agreed that, ideally, they need
consistent access to interagency personnel from other government
agencies that have been authorized by their organizations to
establish coordinating relationships with the military.
Specifically, European Command officials commented that they would
benefit from subject matter experts from non-DOD organizations at
the operational level who can (1) participate in the planning
process and (2) increase the probability that planned
contributions from non-DOD organizations in stability operations
can actually be provided. Similarly, Pacific Command officials
stated that to facilitate interagency coordination at the
operational and tactical levels, several issues such as liaison
authority, willingness on the part of other agencies to work with
DOD, and coordinating mechanisms must be addressed. The department
has also recognized that nongovernmental organizations should
participate in DOD's planning process, where appropriate.^19
DOD Has Not Achieved Consistent Interagency Participation in the
Military Planning Process
DOD has taken steps to establish interagency coordination
mechanisms and to improve interagency participation in its
planning efforts, but it has not achieved consistent interagency
representation or participation at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels of planning. At the strategic level, DOD's primary
mechanism for interagency coordination within each combatant
command is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). As
shown in Table 2, the size and composition of these groups varied
within each combatant command we visited, but in general, they
have been comprised of a limited number of representatives from
State, USAID, the Department of Treasury, the Drug Enforcement
Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
^19Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
Table 2: JIACG Membership at the Central, European, and Pacific Commands
JIACG membership (proposed staffing)
Department
Federal Bureau Drug of Department
Department of Department of Enforcement Homeland of the Department of
Defense (DOD) of State Investigations Agency Security Treasury USAID Transportation
Military Civilian
U.S.
Central
Command 41 8 1 2 1 1 1 1 0
U.S.
European
Command 13 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 0
U.S.
Pacific
Command 8 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
The organization and functions of the JIACGs are evolving. At the time of
our review, each JIACG we examined had an overall function to improve
general coordination between DOD and the agencies represented in the group
and were not intended to be actively involved in DOD's planning efforts.
At each command we visited, we found JIACG participants served primarily
as advisors and liaisons between DOD and their parent organizations, had
limited planning experience and training, and were not consistently
engaged in DOD's planning process. However, officials commented that the
role of the JIACG was changing. Specifically, Central Command officials
expected that the JIACG within their command would begin to assume a more
active role in the planning process, but they did not have specific
details on how or when this would occur. At the Pacific Command, the JIACG
was being refocused by the commander from coordinating counterterrorism
activities to more of a "full spectrum" approach that would include
stability operations activities. At the European Command, officials also
expected the focus of the JIACG would expand from a counterterrorism focus
to a fuller spectrum of operations, which, in their opinion, could include
participating in the planning process.
Below the strategic level, at the operational and tactical levels, some
service component commands are reaching out to country teams in embassies
within their areas of responsibility on an ad hoc basis to obtain
interagency perspectives during their planning efforts. But this approach
can be cumbersome because of the large number of countries that may be
affected by a regional plan. Generally, component command officials we
contacted agreed that the primary mechanism available to them for
interagency coordination was establishing personal relationships and
direct dealings with country teams and other embassy personnel. For
example, according to Naval Forces Europe, it is developing new
contingency plans, and one of its first steps in this effort is to
identify the key participants and resources available within its area of
operations and to develop individual relationships that will help it
accomplish more. In Central Command, both the Army and Navy component
commands commented that they work directly with the embassies in the area
of operations in order to interface with other agencies.
Limited Guidance, Information Sharing and Training Hinder Interagency
Participation in the Development of Military Plans
Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation in
the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided
specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD
organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of
planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non-DOD
organizations lack an understanding of each other's planning processes and
capabilities, and non-DOD organizations have limited capacity to fully
engage in DOD's planning efforts. At each combatant command we visited,
planners acknowledged the requirement to include interagency
considerations in planning, as required by recent DOD policy. But command
officials stated they did not have any guidance on how to meet the
requirement, or on the specific mechanisms that would facilitate
interagency planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
For example, numerous DOD publications and documents discuss the JIACG
organizations at each combatant command, but there is no published DOD
guidance that establishes policy governing the JIACGs or that outlines the
responsibilities for establishing and managing them. Officials from the
DOD and State also commented that the JIACG organizations were not
intended to be a coordinating body for military planning, and questioned
if this was an appropriate mechanism for integrating the planning efforts
between DOD and other agencies.
The second factor inhibiting interagency participation is that DOD does
not have a process in place to facilitate the sharing of planning
information with non-DOD agencies, when appropriate, early in the planning
process without specific approval from the Secretary of Defense.
Specifically, DOD policy officials, including the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that it is the
department's policy not to share DOD contingency plans with agencies or
offices outside of DOD unless directed to do so by the Secretary of
Defense, who determines if they have a need to know. In addition, DOD's
planning policies and procedures state that a combatant commander, with
Secretary of Defense approval, may present interagency aspects of his plan
to the Joint Staff during the plan approval process for transmittal to the
National Security Council for interagency staffing and plan development.
This hierarchical approach limits interagency participation as plans are
developed by the combatant commands at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. State officials also told us that DOD's current process
for sharing planning information limits non-DOD participation in the
development of military plans, and inviting interagency participation only
after the plans have been formulated is a significant obstacle to
achieving a unified government approach in those plans. In their opinion,
it is critical to include interagency participation in the early stages of
plan development at the combatant commands.
Additionally, according to combatant command officials, non-DOD personnel
do not always have the necessary security clearances required by DOD for
access to the department's planning documents or participation in planning
sessions. In its recent interim report to the Secretary of Defense on DOD
Directive 3000.05, DOD acknowledged the current challenges in information
sharing and predicts that DOD will continue to face serious problems
concerning the release and sharing of information among DOD, other U.S.
government agencies, international partners, and other nongovernmental
organizations. In the report DOD attributed information-sharing issues to
restrictions based on current information-sharing policies and emphasized
that to improve information-sharing capabilities senior leadership
direction is required.
The third factor limiting the effectiveness of interagency coordination
efforts is that DOD and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of
each other's planning processes and capabilities, and have different
planning cultures and capacities. DOD and non-DOD officials repeatedly
emphasized in their discussions with us the cultural and capacity
challenges that the two communities face. Within DOD, officials discussed
a lack of formally trained DOD planners within the combatant commands. For
example, only two of the six planners at U.S. Army Europe were formally
trained, and another official noted that it takes a planner about a year
on the job to become proficient in what is generally a 2-year assignment.
Even if combatant command planners are experienced, they may lack
knowledge of interagency processes and capabilities. For example, a
Pacific Command planner stated that they had to guess about interagency
capabilities during planning. Senior Pacific Command officials cited a
need to educate DOD planners on U.S. government agencies strengths and
weaknesses and where expectations may exceed an agency's capabilities.
Similarly, European command JIACG officials commented that DOD needs to
institutionalize the interagency education piece at its schools for
professional planners, and a European Command planner stated that it is
essential to understand what the various non-DOD agencies do and what they
need to know about DOD capabilities.
Our analysis of DOD's lessons-learned databases from current and past
military operations provided details that specifically addressed the
training differences between DOD and non-DOD agencies and the limited
knowledge of each other's capabilities. For example, the databases can
contain lessons learned such as: (1) DOD needs to develop knowledge of
other agencies and the capabilities they bring to operations, (2)
significant improvements could be made in military education by the
development of interagency programs of instruction, and (3) DOD should
work to aggressively include State in the process of project
development.^20 Furthermore, DOD officials described what they believe is
a significant difference in the planning cultures of DOD and non-DOD
organizations. They stated that DOD has a robust planning culture that
includes extensive training programs, significant resources, dedicated
personnel, and career positions. Conversely, officials from the Joint
Staff, the Office of Policy, Joint Forces Command, and the combatant
commands explained that many agencies outside of DOD do not appear to have
a similar planning culture and do not appear to embrace the detailed
planning approach taken by DOD. In addition, these officials repeatedly
stated that their efforts to include non-DOD organizations in planning and
exercise efforts has been stymied by the limited number of personnel those
agencies have available to participate. DOD has attempted to mitigate some
of these challenges by sharing its planning resources to projects such as
the development of a draft joint planning concept with State, offering DOD
personnel to provide training to non-DOD organizations, and encouraging
non-DOD agencies to participate in exercise planning. We did not examine
the planning capability and capacity of non-DOD organizations in this
review, but we do have ongoing work that is examining this issue in more
detail.
^20Our analysis of DOD's lessons learned data is discussed in more detail
in the next section of this report.
The difference in planning between DOD and other U.S. departments and
agencies was also highlighted in the first semiannual report to the
Secretary of Defense on stability operations. In that report, the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy states, "The difference between DOD
and other U.S. Departments and Agencies is that DOD plans and prepares for
current and future operations and other U.S. Departments and Agencies plan
and prepare for current operations. This is reflected in the different
planning processes across the U.S. Government and the relative spending on
training, education, and exercises."^21
Officials from State offered similar perspectives on the planning
capabilities and capacities of non-DOD organizations. They stated that
State planning is different from military planning, with State more
focused on current operations, and less focused on the wide range of
potential contingency operations that DOD is required to plan for. As a
result, State does not allocate planning resources in the same way as DOD,
and therefore does not have a large pool of planners that can be deployed
to the combatant commands to engage in DOD's planning process. These
officials agreed, however, that participating in DOD's planning efforts as
plans are being formulated is necessary to achieve a unified government
approach in the military plans, and suggested alternative methods to
accomplish this goal. For example, State officials discussed a current
initiative to test methods to "virtually" include State planners in a DOD
contingency planning effort in the European Command using electronic
communication tools, and stated that State personnel could potentially
participate in a large number of planning efforts if this approach were
expanded. State officials also suggested that DOD policies may need to be
revised to authorize combatant commanders to reach back directly to State
and other government agencies as plans are being developed, instead of
through the hierarchical approach through the Joint Staff and the National
Security Council as previously discussed.
Without clear guidance to the combatant commanders on how to establish
adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation
in planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
planning, a process to share planning information as plans are being
developed, and methods to orient and include professional planners from
key organizations in DOD's planning process, the contributions and
capabilities of these organizations may not be fully integrated into DOD's
plans, and a unified government approach may not be achieved.
^21Department of Defense, Interim Progress Report on DOD Directive
3000.05.
Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Contribute to
Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability Operations Planning
DOD planners are not consistently using lessons learned from past
operations as they develop future contingency plans. NSPD-44 and DOD
policies highlight the importance of incorporating lessons learned into
operational planning. Lessons learned from current and past operations are
being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our analysis
indicates that DOD planners are not using this information on a consistent
basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors contribute to this
inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: (1) DOD's guidance for
incorporating lessons learned into plans is outdated and does not
specifically require planners to include lessons learned in the planning
process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned databases is
cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not evaluate the
extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans. As a
result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of the lessons-learned
systems and may repeat past mistakes.
NSPD-44 and DOD guidance stress the importance of incorporating lessons
learned into operations and planning. Furthermore, the recently released
Joint Operating Concept for stability operations envisions that the Joint
Force will implement a continuous learning process that incorporates
lessons learned into ongoing and future operations through constant
observation, assessment, application, and adaptation of tactics,
techniques, and procedures. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System manual, which provides planners with the step by step process for
planning joint operations, states that a regular review of lessons
information can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful and
innovative ideas. Prior GAO work on DOD's lessons learned noted that
effective guidance and sharing of lessons-learned are key tools to
institutionalize and facilitate efficient operations, and failure to
utilize lessons heightens the risk of repeating past mistakes and being
unable to build on the efficiencies others have developed during past
operations.^22
22GAO, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide
Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing,
[29]GAO-05-10 (Washington, D.C.: Nov 10, 2004); Chemical Weapons: Lessons
Learned Program Generally Effective but Could Be Improved and Expanded,
[30]GAO 02-890 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2002).
Lessons Learned are Being Captured but Not Incorporated into Plans
DOD has established comprehensive joint lessons learned programs at all
levels within the department, and lessons learned from exercises and
operations are being captured. The department's Joint Lessons Learned
Program is a federation of separate lessons-learned organizations embedded
within the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the Services and Combat
Support Agencies that focus upon capturing information, data, and lessons
based upon each command's priorities. Each lessons-learned organization
within this program has developed its own processes, systems, and
information products for capturing, storing, and retrieving lessons and
observations based upon each organization's requirements and resources.
The various organizations in the Joint Lessons Learned Program focus on
capturing lessons learned at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. These lessons tend to be oriented toward a specific customer and
are disseminated through a variety of different products. For example, the
services tend to collect tactical- and operational-level lessons that they
use to address command and service-specific issues for resolution.
Similarly, the combatant commands have each developed their own
theater-specific command-level lessons programs related to joint,
interagency, and multinational matters and other matters involving
interoperability. In addition, each organization tailors its
lessons-learned programs to meet the individual command's requirements and
available resources. For example, the U.S. Pacific Command's program is:
managed by one civilian contractor; focuses it efforts on issues at the
senior command leadership level; and hosts a web-based repository that
contains approximately 145 lessons documents. In contrast, the Center for
Army Lessons Learned has 179 people on staff; focuses on all levels within
the Army from the individual soldier to the most senior leaders; uses a
combination of active collection techniques, such as sending out teams to
interview soldiers and observe operations; and has an electronic
repository consisting of approximately 157,000 documents.
Our lessons-learned analysis provides insights into the types of lessons
available to DOD planners and the volume of information that could be
useful to improve future stability operations planning. We grouped 1,074
lessons into 14 themes that reflect the full spectrum of strategic-level
issues surrounding stability operations, such as cultural sensitivity,
language skills, intelligence, communications systems, and reconstruction
activities. For example, the information in one theme we developed related
to DOD coordination and planning with other U.S. agencies and non-U.S.
government organizations highlights issues such as the need for (1) the
military to work more closely with other agencies during stability
operations, (2) DOD to develop knowledge of other agencies and the
capabilities they can contribute, and (3) commanders to ensure that
military sectors during operations correspond with civil geopolitical
boundaries. The information in another of our themes discussing civil
military operations highlights issues such as steps needed to improve
information operations, and how to address cultural differences during
information operations to reach specific audiences. A comprehensive
listing of our themes and an explanation for each can be found in appendix
II.
Despite the robust lessons-learned gathering process in place, we found
that DOD planners at the combatant and component commands in our review
did not consistently incorporate lessons as plans were developed or
revised. For example, two of the combatant commands that we visited stated
that they did not routinely use lessons as plans were developed.
Similarly, we found a range of how lessons learned were used in the
planning process at the component commands we visited. For example, one
Central Command component stated that lessons learned were part of the
component command's planning process, but a Pacific Command component
commented that it generally did not utilize lessons learned as it
developed plans.
When we discussed the limited use of lessons learned with officials from
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, they stated that
planners are generally aware of the need to check lessons learned as they
develop plans. However, the officials acknowledged that there are barriers
to the use of lessons learned, that the existing lessons learned systems
need updating, and questions do exist on whether the information provided
by the current systems is adequate. One official noted that Office of
Policy is developing a new Center for Complex Operations, which is
envisioned to facilitate the use of lessons by acting as a clearinghouse
for stability operations information. The Center is still in the planning
phase, and we were told that funding has been requested in the fiscal year
2007 supplemental budget request and in the fiscal year 2008 budget to
implement the plan.
Three Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Planning
We identified three factors that contribute to this inconsistent use of
lessons learned in the planning process. First, the guidance regarding
lessons learned in the Joint Staff's manual for planning is outdated-the
relevant section of the manual has not been updated since July 2000 and
does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned in the
planning process. Specifically, this guidance states that the Joint
Universal Lessons Learned System should be contacted early in the planning
process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons
in all areas of planning and execution based on actual operation and
exercise occurrences.^23 However, this system does not exist and has not
been supported since 1997, nor does the update reference an existing
system that planners can access for joint lessons learned.
The second factor contributing to limited use of lessons learned in the
planning process is that accessing and searching lessons-learned databases
is cumbersome. For example, to conduct our analysis of DOD lessons
learned, we used five databases--four managed by each of the services, and
one managed by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis. To obtain
lessons-learned information from these sources, we had to: separately
access each database, become familiar with each system's functionality and
search engines; repeat the same searches in each site for stability
operations-related terms; and review the results to find relevant lessons.
However, knowing how to navigate and search each of the lessons-learned
systems is not enough. We also had to familiarize ourselves with and sort
through the multitude of products generated to find lessons that were
applicable to our analysis. Planners we contacted also told us they
considered the databases difficult and time-consuming to use. One
combatant command official described the magnitude of the challenge by
noting that there is so much information within the program that the
biggest difficulty is turning the information into usable knowledge.
Additionally, the Joint Staff has acknowledged that the current system is
inefficient and of limited effectiveness in sharing lessons-learned data.
In an effort to address these issues, DOD has recently initiated an effort
to develop a Joint Lessons Learned Information System, which is intended
to standardize the collection, management, dissemination and tracking of
observations and lessons. The department is in the early stages of
developing this system, and plans that the system will establish
interoperable lessons databases that can be searched with an easy-to-use
search engine. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System development
strategy includes non-DOD agencies, and eventually non-U.S. partners.
However, while Joint Staff officials recognize the need for stakeholder
input to avoid continued inefficiency and limited effectiveness in sharing
lessons learned, they do not plan to include non-DOD organizations until
the later stages of the program's development.
^23Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, CJCSM 3122.01.
The third factor affecting the use of lessons learned is that the planning
review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are
incorporated into specific plans. During discussions with planners at the
various commands, we found no evidence of a formal mechanism to verify
that lessons were considered in plan development. Furthermore we found
conflicting views as to the need for a formal requirement. For example,
one combatant command planner believed that, despite the lack of a formal
mechanism, the command's vetting process for plans ensured that lessons
would be incorporated, while at another combatant command a planner stated
that mechanisms for ensuring that lessons are used in planning is broken
because there is no formal requirement to utilize lessons in plan
development.
DOD has invested substantial resources to develop systems that capture
lessons from exercises, experiments, and operations, with the intent of
using these lessons to improve efficiency. However, in the case of
planning, the department has not developed mechanisms to ensure that they
are taking advantage of this resource. As a result, DOD heightens its risk
of either repeating past mistakes or being unable to build on the
efficiencies developed during past operations as it plans for future
operations.
Conclusions
The DOD has a critical role in supporting a new national policy to improve
stability operations capabilities and to achieve a more unified
governmentwide approach to this demanding and important mission. Recent
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, along with current operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq provide daily reminders of how complex and difficult
these missions are. The department has developed an approach to improve
its ability to execute stability operations, but it has achieved limited
progress in two key areas--identifying needed capabilities, and developing
measures of effectiveness--that are critical to successfully executing
this approach. Without clear guidance on how and when combatant commanders
are to develop stability operations capability requirements, the
capabilities needed to conduct stability operations may not be fully
developed or current service efforts to enhance capabilities may not be
addressing the most critical needs of the commanders. Similarly, without
clear departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of effectiveness
and milestones for completing them, confusion may continue to exist within
the department, and progress on this important management tool may be
significantly hindered.
DOD has recognized the need to achieve greater interagency participation
in the development of military plans, but it has not established an
effective mechanism to accomplish this goal. A governmentwide approach to
stability operations is dependent upon an integrated planning effort of
all organizations involved in them. Integrated planning can help fully
leverage the capabilities, contributions, and capacity of each
organization, and increase the potential for successful operations. The
challenge now facing the department is how to modify its planning approach
to better integrate non-DOD organizations into all levels--strategic,
operational, and tactical--of planning and to support State as the lead
agency in stability operations planning. Without improved guidance to
military commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate
interagency planning, an approach to appropriately share planning
information with non-DOD organizations as plans are developed, and steps
for overcoming differences in planning culture and training and capacities
among the affected agencies, integrated interagency planning for stability
operations may continue to be stymied.
The consideration of lessons learned from past operations as new plans are
developed is not only a requirement stipulated by new stability operations
guidance, it is a requisite step to reducing the potential that past
mistakes will be repeated in future operations. Without clear and complete
guidance for planners, steps to increase the potential that information
system improvements will facilitate sharing of lessons learned both within
DOD and between all organizations that will participate in planning for
stability operations, and a focus on lessons learned as plans are
reviewed, the potential gains that can be achieved through systematic
consideration of lessons learned as future plans are developed may not be
realized.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To meet the goals of identifying and developing stability operations
capabilities and for developing tools to evaluate progress in achieving
these goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy to take the following two actions:
o Provide comprehensive guidance, including a clear methodology
and time frames for completion, to the combatant commanders and
the services on how to identify and address stability operations
capability gaps.
o Provide comprehensive guidance to DOD organizations on how to
develop measures of effectiveness as directed by DOD Directive
3000.05, including those measures related to identifying and
developing stability operations capabilities.
To achieve greater interagency participation in the development of
military plans that include stability operations, and increase the
potential for unity of effort as those operations are executed, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the
Secretary of State take the following three actions:
o Provide specific implementation guidance to combatant and
component commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to
facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the
development of military plans that include stability
operations-related activities.
o Develop a process to share planning information with the
interagency representatives early in the planning process.
o Develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture,
training, and capacities among the affected agencies.
To more fully incorporate lessons learned in the planning process,
we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the
Joint Chief's of Staff working with Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to take the following actions:
o Update the current planning guidance to
o direct military planners to include lessons learned
as they develop plans, and
o require that the plan review process include a step
to verify that lessons learned have been considered
and adopted as appropriate.
o Include non-DOD stakeholders in the development of the Joint
Lessons Learned Information System at an earlier point than
currently planned.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD plans to
take to implement our recommendations, the Congress should
consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop an action
plan and report annually to the Senate Committee on Armed Services
and the House Committee on Armed Services on the specific steps
being taken and current status of its efforts to (1) identify and
prioritize needed stability operations capabilities, (2) develop
measures of effectiveness to evaluate progress in achieving these
capabilities, (3) achieve greater interagency participation in the
development of military plans, and (4) fully incorporate lessons
learned in the planning process. The Secretary's report should
also identify challenges to achieving an integrated, interagency
approach to stability operations, and potential solutions for
mitigating those challenges.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
agreed with our eight recommendations but did not discuss what
specific steps, if any, it plans to take to implement our
recommendations. (DOD's comments appear in their entirety in app.
III.) State was also afforded an opportunity to comment on this
report, but declined to do so. In its written comments, DOD
highlighted traditional DOD methodologies and approaches to
developing capabilities, measures of effectiveness, coordinating
with other agencies and incorporating lessons learned that it
believes are adequate to address our recommendations. Although DOD
is making progress in achieving a greater focus on stability
operations through its new directive, our report notes it has made
limited progress in certain areas, such as establishing measures
of effectiveness, due to the limited guidance provided to DOD
components. As a result, we continue to believe our
recommendations are warranted and that DOD should take specific
steps to address them. Because it is unclear what specific steps,
if any, DOD plans to take to implement our recommendations, we
have added a matter for congressional consideration suggesting
that the Congress require the Secretary of Defense to develop an
action plan and report annually on the specific steps being taken
to address our recommendations and the current status of its
efforts. The report should also identify challenges to achieving
an integrated interagency approach to stability operations, and
potential solutions for mitigating those challenges.
DOD provided three overall comments to the report. First, DOD
commented that GAO began the field work for this report in October
2005, one month prior to the issuance of DOD Directive 3000.05,
and observed that much of our field work was therefore conducted
prior to activities DOD undertook to implement the directive. The
department is mistaken in this observation. In October, 2005, we
held our entrance conference with DOD officials, but conducted the
majority of our field work from January 2006 through March 2007.
We believe the timing of our field work enabled us to focus on the
approach DOD was taking to implement the directive, observe how
key organizations began implementing this approach over a 1-year
period, and highlight impediments that may impair DOD's ability to
achieve the results intended by the directive--improved stability
operations capabilities. Therefore, we believe our work and
related recommendations are particularly relevant and important
because they address systemic issues associated with DOD's
approach and could assist DOD organizations tasked with
implementing the new directive.
Second, DOD commented that our report is directed exclusively at
DOD; that stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
activities are inherently interagency in nature; and that DOD can
only implement recommendations under its purview. While we agree
that stability operations are inherently interagency in nature, we
disagree that our work is focused exclusively on DOD.
Specifically, our audit work included discussions with State and
USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and at each of the combatant
commands included in our review to gain their views and
perspectives. We have also included recommendations to improve
interagency participation in the development of military plans
that are directed to the Secretary of Defense because the military
planning process is conducted under the purview of the Secretary
of Defense. However, acknowledging that interagency participation
in DOD planning cannot be forced, we are recommending the
Secretary of Defense coordinate with the Secretary of State to
implement these recommendations. Furthermore, as we discussed with
DOD officials during the course of our review and stated in this
report, we have other work underway to evaluate State's efforts to
lead and coordinate stabilization operations in conjunction with
other U.S. agencies, and plan to report on those issues
separately.
Third, DOD commented that the identification and development of
stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations
capabilities are not so different from other DOD capabilities that
they require a new or separate methodology to identify and develop
military capabilities and plans. We disagree. As we discuss in
this report, DOD has made limited progress in identifying and
prioritizing needed capabilities, the identification of stability
operations requirements was occurring in a fragmented manner, and
each service is using a different approach to improve stability
operations capabilities. To date, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy has not identified and prioritized needed stability
operations capabilities and military plans do not fully reflect an
integrated, interagency approach to stability operations.
Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendations in
these areas are still warranted, as discussed below.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive
guidance, including a clear methodology and time frames for
completion, to combatant commanders and the services on how to
identify and address stability operations capability gaps, DOD
stated that existing, mandated capability assessment methodologies
already effectively address stability, security, transition, and
reconstruction operations capability needs at the combatant
commands and the services. It also stated that under this process,
the combatant commands assess and communicate to DOD the
capabilities required to conduct these missions just as they do
for other assigned missions. However, as discussed in this report,
we found that the combatant commands included in our review had
made limited progress in identifying stability operations
requirements because DOD had not issued guidance or set specific
time frames to complete this task, and there was confusion over
how to define stability operations. During the course of our work,
DOD refined the definition of stability operations, which was a
positive step, but has not clarified the guidance or set specific
time frames for identifying stability operations requirements.
Because combatant command officials indicated to us that the
absence of guidance and timeframes was a significant contributor
to the lack of progress in developing requirements, we believe our
recommendation would assist the department in accomplishing this
task.
In response to our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive
guidance to DOD organizations on how to develop measures of
effectiveness, the department stated that it already develops
measures of effectiveness in general, and a special process is not
needed for stability operations. We believe this response is not
consistent with DOD Directive 3000.05, which requires each
organization tasked under the directive to develop measures of
effectiveness that evaluate progress in meeting their respective
goals listed in the directive. In addition, as discussed in this
report, and as acknowledged by officials from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) in a progress report to the
Secretary of Defense, the department has made limited progress in
developing measures of effectiveness related to stability
operations. We found this limited progress was caused by
significant confusion over how this task should be accomplished,
and because minimal guidance was provided by the office of Policy.
The department recognizes this confusion exits, and as discussed
in this report plans to establish workshops to assist
organizations in these efforts. We believe this is a positive step
that should be complemented with improved guidance that would be
available to all organizations tasked with this responsibility,
and therefore continue to believe our recommendation is
appropriate and necessary.
In response to our recommendations that DOD coordinate with State
and provide specific implementation guidance to the combatant and
component commanders on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and
encourage interagency participation in the development of military
plans, and that the two departments develop a process to share
planning information, DOD provided the same response to both
recommendations. The department believes that National Security
Presidential Directive 44 should, by itself, provide sufficient
direction on the structures needed and a process to share planning
information. The department also stated it would continue to
include other agencies in planning and exercising for stability
operations. We believe the department's response is inadequate
because NSPD-44 is a high-level directive that sets forth goals
for improved interagency participation in stability operations,
but does not contain details on mechanisms to achieve those goals.
During the course of our review we received consistent comments
from DOD and State officials that it is clear interagency
participation in DOD planning is needed, but it is very unclear to
as to how to accomplish this goal. Therefore, as detailed in this
report, we found that interagency participation in the development
of military plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels was very limited in every command included in our review in
part because DOD's guidance did not provide details on how to
engage relevant agencies in planning or on the specific mechanisms
that would facilitate interagency planning, and because DOD
practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning information.
Combatant command officials cited significant limitations in
current coordinating groups, and various ad hoc methods were in
place to gain interagency perspectives on DOD planning efforts.
State officials were concerned that DOD practices limit the
appropriate sharing of DOD planning information as plans are
developed, and it therefore had minimal impact as plans are being
constructed. These fundamental and systemic issues will not be
resolved with the guidance provided by NSPD-44. We continue to
believe that systemic solutions are needed and can be achieved
with improved guidance and more effective processes to
appropriately share planning information with interagency
representatives.
In response to our recommendation that DOD, in coordination with
State, develop an approach to overcome differences in planning
culture, training, and capacities among the affected agencies, DOD
stated that it will continue to work to understand and accommodate
differences in these areas, offer non-DOD organizations
opportunities to participate in DOD training courses, and detail
DOD personnel to other agencies. We believe these are positive
steps and agree DOD should continue to pursue them. However, our
work indicates that these measures are not adequate to fully
address the magnitude of differences in the planning culture and
capacity between DOD and other agencies. As discussed in this
report, State officials believe that new and innovative practices
need to be identified and pursued, such as "virtual" collaborative
planning between DOD and State. Therefore, we continue to believe
that our recommendation for DOD and State to work together to
develop more comprehensive and innovative solutions to overcome
these differences is an important and necessary step to take.
In response to our recommendations that DOD update its current
planning guidance to direct military planners to include lessons
learned as they develop plans, and to update current planning
guidance to require that the plan review process include a step to
verify that lessons learned have been considered and adopted as
appropriate, DOD stated that the current planning methodology
takes into account lessons learned when constructing or modifying
a plan. As discussed in our report, this is not always the case.
In the course of our field work, we found sporadic use of lessons
learned in the planning process and a lack of formal guidance
directing consideration of lessons learned in both constructing
and in reviewing plans. According to DOD, taking lessons learned
into account during planning is at the heart of all effective
military (or nonmilitary) planning. However, the Joint Staff's
manual on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
encourages, but does not direct planners to review lessons learned
as they develop plans. We agree that lessons learned are being
used by planners, but inconsistently. As a result we believe that
our recommendations should be implemented in order to increase the
potential that lessons are actually incorporated into plans as
appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that DOD include non-DOD
stakeholders in the development of the Joint Lessons Learned
Information System at an earlier point than currently planned, DOD
agreed to invite stakeholders to participate in the system at an
earlier stage, but expressed concerns that these stakeholders face
shortfalls in capacity and resources and therefore cannot ensure
their interactive participation. We believe this is a positive
step and responsive to our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. We are also
sending a copy to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and officials in the U.S. European Command,
U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. We will also make
copies available to other interested parties upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [31]http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or by e-mail at [email protected].
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO
staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Janet A. St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the Department of Defense's approach to improving
stability operations and DOD's identification of stability
operations capabilities and development of performance measures we
obtained and analyzed DOD Directive 3000.05, National Security
Presidential Directive 44, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, the Military Support to
Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operation
Joint Operating Concept, and the Defense Science Board studies on
Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD. We interviewed
current and former officials at the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff and Services, three
Regional Combatant Commands (European Command, Pacific Command,
and Central Command), and U.S. Joint Forces Command. In these
interviews we reviewed relevant information and discussed
implementing guidance for completing responsibilities outlined in
the Directive, the interviewees' understanding of their roles and
responsibilities in completing assigned tasks, progress in
implementing the Directive, challenges that have been encountered,
and input provided for the first report to the Secretary of
Defense on implementing the Directive. Finally, we reviewed the
first report to the Secretary of Defense and discussed the
report's findings with officials within the Office of the Under
Secretary for Policy.
To identify the extent to which DOD is planning for stability
operations and whether the department's planning mechanisms
encourage and facilitate consideration of non-DOD capabilities, we
reviewed and analyzed NSPD-44, DOD Directive 3000.05, joint
planning guidance and manuals, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, and combatant command
processes. We interviewed officials at the Department of State's
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,
the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, and the United States
Agency for International Development to obtain other agencies'
perspectives regarding DOD's planning process and the inclusion of
non-DOD perspectives in contingency plans. To understand DOD's
planning process, mechanisms for interagency involvement in
planning, and impediments to interagency coordination, we met with
representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy as well as planners from three regional combatant
commands, which included the Pacific, European, and Central
commands, members of each combatant command's Joint Interagency
Coordination Group, and fourteen combatant command component
commands responsible for contingency operation planning. We also
reviewed examples of interagency coordination contingency planning
documents to gain an understanding of the level of detail to which
the commands planned coordination efforts. We did not, however,
assess the extent to which these roles and responsibilities,
including those of DOD, are appropriate. Our review did not
include the planning for ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. DOD's contingency plans are classified documents and
a complete review of the contingency plans was beyond the scope of
this audit, and as a result we did not develop a comprehensive
list of documents to draw a representative sample of contingency
planning documents related to interagency coordination. However,
we worked with combatant command officials to identify examples of
planning documents related to interagency coordination and the
level of detail to which the commands planned coordination with
other agencies. We did not include in our review any current or
planned coordination between DOD and non-U.S.-government
organizations, foreign governments, or international
organizations.
To determine the extent to which DOD planners are applying lessons
learned from past operations and exercises we reviewed relevant
DOD guidance, and discussed with DOD officials their consideration
of lessons learned during planning. In order to understand the
requirements for utilizing lessons learned in the planning process
and the purpose and scope of the Joint Lessons Learned Program, we
analyzed DOD's planning guidance and manuals, lessons learned
instructions for the Joint Lessons Learned Program, and the
services' lessons learned guidance.
To assess the type and extent of strategic stability operations
lessons learned available, we identified organizations that
produced studies or reports that included lessons learned relevant
to stability operations, both within and outside DOD. To identify
strategic level lessons within DOD's Joint Lessons Learned
Program, we obtained access to the four armed services lessons
learned databases (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force), the
Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and obtained stability
operations studies from the Defense Science Board. In order to
identify relevant non-DOD organizations conducting lessons-learned
research, we contacted individuals identified as subject matter
experts in stability operations and asked them to identify non-DOD
agencies that published reports and studies regarding stability
operations that they recognized as being leaders in the field. In
this manner, several non-DOD organizations were identified,
including the Center for Strategic and International Studies and
the United States Institute of Peace. After obtaining search
results from the DOD lessons-learned databases and non-DOD
organizations, we reviewed the materials and selected analytical
products for further examination based upon whether the report or
study included original data collection and analysis related to
the conduct of stability and reconstruction in Operations Enduring
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, or the operations of the Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa. We also excluded reports and analysis
focused primarily on combat operations, including tactics,
techniques, and procedures, after action-reports, and handbooks.
We reviewed over 200 reports or studies, and found 38 documents
that met these criteria. We entered all of the individual lessons
and observations from the 38 reports into a database resulting in
over 3,500 individual lessons and observations. Two GAO analysts
independently reviewed the individual lessons and observations
using the following criteria for inclusion.
Inclusive Criteria
We included lessons related to: U.S. forces performing or
supporting local governance functions in areas such as health
care, utilities, infrastructure, and law enforcement; and U.S.
forces interacting with local civil authorities to enhance the
viability of these authorities and strengthen their capacity to
provide basic services to the local population.
Exclusive/Restrictive Criteria
We excluded lessons related to: tactics, techniques, and
procedures for combat operations (e.g., marksmanship and weapons
maintenance; house takedown; cordon and search); general purpose
logistical support and systems sustainment; combat operations that
are primarily offensive in nature. (Note: This does not include
operations or use of force in direct support of the noncombat
activities described above. For example, we would select lessons
regarding the depth and composition of forces required to provide
security for Provincial Reconstruction Teams.)
Following the independent review, the team compared their
individual results and, when agreement between the independent
reviewers could not be reached, a third independent reviewer
decided upon the inclusion or exclusion of the lesson. This
analysis resulted in 1,074 individual lessons that met GAO's
criteria, which we reviewed for commonalities from which we
developed our 14 major themes. After developing the themes, we
categorized each lesson or observation, by consensus, into one or
more categories based upon the content of the lesson. We used
these themes and our knowledge of the lessons-learned systems and
guidance as a basis for discussions with combatant command and
component command planners regarding the use of lessons learned in
the planning process. We recognize that this analysis is not based
upon an exhaustive review of all reports and studies on the
subject of stability operations.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes and Descriptions
Listed below are the 14 major themes that we developed after
reviewing and categorizing 1,074 lessons learned. We used our
analysis to provide insight into the types of stability operations
lessons available to planners and to facilitate our discussions
with Department of Defense. Our coding methodology often resulted
in a lesson falling into one or more categories based upon the
content of the lesson. Furthermore, several categories, such as
Civil Military Operations and Provisional Reconstruction Teams,
were considered to be functional categories, or topical areas, and
the lessons were often included in another theme. The first column
lists the theme GAO developed. The second column provides a
general description of the types of lessons included within the
theme. The third column lists the total number of lessons coded
into each theme. Our analytical methodology was developed to
support an insight as to the types of lessons available and does
not does imply a ranking of themes in terms of importance or
critical needs. A detailed discussion of our methodology is
included in appendix I.
Total
Number of
GAO Themes Theme Definitions Lessons
Cultural Sensitivity, Cultural sensitivity, awareness as it
Awareness, and pertains to U.S.-to-host nation and host
Engagement nation-to-U.S. engagement before and
during deployments. 177
Language Training of U.S. forces and the use of
interpreters. 55
Civil Military Functional category related to lessons
Operations concerning psychological operations,
civil affairs, public affairs, and
information operations, which were viewed
as included within civil military
operations. (Lessons in this category are
often included with one of the other
themes that talk to a more specific
issue.) 301
Intelligence Processes and products, including:
intelligence preparation of the
battlespace; operational security;
counterintelligence; human intelligence. 133
DOD Coordination with Planning and coordination related to
non-DOD Organizations nonmilitary activities with other U.S.
agencies, non-U.S.-government
organizations, and host nation
governments. 212
Force Composition and While deployed, temporary changes in the
Restructuring of primary role of U.S. forces to meet
Forces immediate or unanticipated operational
needs. For example, transition and
reconstruction activities. 12
Welfare and Force Includes providing for the care, feeding,
Protection. and security of military and U.S.
government or coalition civilian forces. 39
Unity and/or Exercise Addresses the question of who is in
of Command. charge and how is the authority of
command being used. 21
Transition and Examples include Corps of Engineers and
Reconstruction contracted construction. Transfers of
authority/responsibility of activities to
host nation; election support. 138
Automation, Capability, capacity, and compatibility
Communication, and of U.S. military communication and
Systems information systems in the theater of
operation. 64
Military to Military U.S., coalition, and host nation military
Coordination coordination, planning, and capacity.
Instances showing how units are working
together. This category addresses
military-to-military. 167
Human Capital--Skills, Military personnel authorization issues.
Capabilities, and Are units staffed with enough personnel
Capacity in the right grade with the right skills
and military specialties all the time,
temporarily, or not at all? 236
Preparation for What is being done to prepare before a
Operations unit needs to deploy. Includes: issues of
doctrine, training, and logistics; and
lessons learned that will result in
changes to training and logistics to
prepare for future operations. 149
Provisional Functional category related to lessons
Reconstruction Teams concerning Provisional Reconstruction
Teams. (Lessons in this category are
often included with one of the other
themes that talk to a more specific
issue.) 31
Source: GAO.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or [32][email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Robert L. Repasky,
Assistant Director; T. Burke; Stephen Faherty; Susan Ditto; Ron La
Due Lake; Kate Lenane; Jonathan Carver; Maria-Alaina Rambus; and
Christopher Banks made key contributions to this report.
Related GAO Reports
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions
Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning. [33]GAO-07-639T .
Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions
Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning. [34]GAO-07-444 .
Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting,
Security, and Capacity Challenges. [35]GAO-07-426T . Washington,
D.C.: February 15, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. [36]GAO-07-308SP .
Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results,
and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant
and Sustainable Progress. [37]GAO-06-179T . Washington, D.C.:
October 18, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and
Financing Challenges. [38]GAO-06-697T . Washington, D.C.: April
25, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing
Challenges. [39]GAO-06-428T . Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2006.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating
Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of
U.S. Goals. [40]GAO-05-742 . Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities. [41]GAO-05-70 . Washington, D.C.: December
16, 2004.
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential
Services, and Oversight Issues. [42]GAO-04-902R . Washington,
D.C.: June 28, 2004.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy
Needed. [43]GAO-04-403 . Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Rebuilding Iraq. [44]GAO-03-792R . Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
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[51]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549 .
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and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or
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Highlights of [52]GAO-07-549 , a report to the Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
May 2007
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance
Interagency Planning
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently been
involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that typically last
5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and
dollars. A 2005 presidential directive requires DOD and State to integrate
stability activities with military contingency plans. GAO was asked to
address (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities,
and challenges that have emerged in implementing its approach; (2) DOD
planning for stability operations and the extent of interagency
involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying lessons learned
in future plans. To address these issues, GAO assessed DOD policy and
planning documents, reviewed planning efforts at three combatant commands,
and evaluated DOD's use of lessons learned. GAO is also conducting a
related study of the Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate
stability operations.
[53]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD take several actions to improve its approach to
stability operations and interagency planning. DOD partially agreed with
GAO's recommendations, but did not specify actions it would take to
address them. Therefore, GAO recommends Congress require DOD to develop an
action plan and report annually on its efforts to address GAO
recommendations.
DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations,
but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of
effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into
military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future
plans. These challenges may hinder DOD's ability to develop sound plans.
Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its
military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help
guide DOD planning for the next 15-20 years. These steps reflect a
fundamental shift in DOD's policy because they elevate stability
operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize
that military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has
yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for
stability operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how
and when to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing
initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the
comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed by combatant
commanders to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future.
Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of
effectiveness because of weaknesses in DOD's guidance.
DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related
to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to
facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning
efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups
with representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and
other outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three
factors cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in
DOD's planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to
commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2)
DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and
non-DOD organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning
processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to
participate in DOD's full range of planning activities.
Although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are
not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency
plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information
from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into
various databases. However, planners are not consistently using this
information because (1) DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons into its
plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this
step, (2) accessing lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the
review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are
incorporated into specific plans.
References
Visible links
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-10
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-890
31. http://www.gao.gov/
32. mailto:[email protected]
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-639T
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-444
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-426T
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-179T
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-697T
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-428T
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-902R
43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403
44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-792R
45. http://www.gao.gov/
46. http://www.gao.gov/
47. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
48. mailto:[email protected]
49. mailto:[email protected]
50. mailto:[email protected]
51. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549
52. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549
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