Information Security: Veterans Affairs Needs to Address
Long-Standing Weaknesses (28-FEB-07, GAO-07-532T).
Security breaches at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and
other public and private organizations have highlighted the
importance of well-designed and implemented information security
programs. GAO was asked to testify on its past work on VA's
information security program, as well as ongoing reviews that it
is conducting at VA. In developing its testimony, GAO drew on
over 15 of its previous reports and testimonies, as well as
reports by the department's inspector general (IG).
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-532T
ACCNO: A66385
TITLE: Information Security: Veterans Affairs Needs to Address
Long-Standing Weaknesses
DATE: 02/28/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Classified defense information
Computer security
Confidential information
Information disclosure
Information security
Information security management
Information systems
Information technology
Internal controls
Risk assessment
Government agency oversight
Program implementation
Standards (information technology)
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-07-532T
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]VA's Information Security Weaknesses Are Long Standing
* [4]VA's Efforts to Address Information Security Weaknesses Have
* [5]GAO Has Ongoing Reviews of Information Technology and Securi
* [6]Contact and Acknowledgments
* [7]Attachment 1: Selected GAO Products
* [8]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* [9]Order by Mail or Phone
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on information
security management at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). For many
years, GAO has identified information security as a governmentwide
high-risk issue1 and emphasized its criticality for protecting the
government's information assets. GAO has issued over 15 reports and
testimonies and made over 150 recommendations from 1998 to 2005 related to
VA's information security program.
Today I will address VA's information security management, including
weaknesses that GAO and others have reported, as well as actions that the
department has taken to resolve these deficiencies. I will also discuss
ongoing audit work that GAO is conducting at VA.
To describe VA's information security management, we reviewed our previous
work in this area, as well as reports by the department and its Office of
Inspector General (IG). To provide additional context, we have included,
as an attachment, a list of key GAO publications related to VA security
issues. All GAO work conducted for this testimony is in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
Significant concerns have been raised over the years about VA's
information security--particularly its lack of a robust information
security program, which is vital to avoiding the compromise of government
information. We have previously reported on wide-ranging deficiencies in
VA's information security controls.2 For example, VA had not consistently
implemented appropriate controls for (1) limiting, preventing, and
detecting electronic access to sensitive computerized information; (2)
restricting physical access to computer and network equipment to
authorized individuals; (3) segregating incompatible duties among separate
groups or individuals; (4) ensuring changes to computer software were
authorized and timely; and (5) providing continuity of computerized
systems and operations. The department's IG has recently identified
similar weaknesses. These long-standing deficiencies existed, in part,
because VA had not implemented key components of a comprehensive,
integrated information security program. Although the department has taken
steps to implement components of its security program, its efforts have
not been sufficient to effectively protect its information and information
systems. As a result, sensitive information remains vulnerable to
inadvertent or deliberate misuse, loss, or improper disclosure.
1 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January
2007); Information Security: Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies
Despite Progress Made in Implementing Related Statutory Requirements,
GAO-05-552 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005).
2 See attachment 1.
We have several ongoing engagements to perform work at VA to review the
department's efforts in improving its information security and information
technology management. Our ongoing work is examining data breach
notification, actions to strengthen information security controls,
controls over information technology equipment, and implementation of an
information technology realignment initiative.
Background
Information security is a critical consideration for any organization that
depends on information systems and networks to carry out its mission or
business. The security of these systems and data is essential to prevent
data tampering, disruptions in critical operations, fraud, and the
inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information. Recognizing the
importance of securing federal systems and data, Congress passed the
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) in 2002, which set
forth a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of
information security controls over information resources that support
federal operations and assets. 3
Under FISMA, agencies are required to provide sufficient safeguards to
cost-effectively protect their information and information systems from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction, including controls necessary to preserve authorized
restrictions on access and disclosure. The act requires each agency to
develop, document, and implement an agencywide information security
program that is to include assessing risk; developing and implementing
policies, procedures, and security plans; providing security awareness and
training; testing and evaluating the effectiveness of controls; planning,
implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address
information security deficiencies; detecting, reporting, and responding to
security incidents; and ensuring continuity of operations.
In providing health care and other benefits to veterans and their
dependents, VA relies on a vast array of computer systems and
telecommunications networks to support its operations and store sensitive
information, including personal information on veterans. Effectively
securing these computer systems and networks is critical to the
department's ability to safeguard its assets and sensitive information.
VA's Information Security Weaknesses Are Long Standing
VA has faced long-standing challenges in achieving effective information
security across the department. Our previous reports and testimonies4 have
identified wide-ranging, often recurring deficiencies in the department's
information security controls. For example, VA had not consistently
implemented appropriate controls for (1) limiting, preventing, and
detecting electronic access to sensitive computerized information; (2)
restricting physical access to computer and network equipment to
authorized individuals; (3) segregating incompatible duties among separate
groups or individuals; (4) ensuring changes to computer software were
authorized and timely; and (5) providing continuity of computerized
systems and operations. Figure 1 details the information security control
weaknesses we identified at VA from 1998 through 2005.
3 FISMA, Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347 (Dec. 17,
2002).
4 Attachment 1 includes a list of our products related to information
technology vulnerabilities at VA.
Figure 1: Chronology of Information Security Weaknesses Identified by GAO
Notes: Hines is a suburb of Chicago.
Full citations are provided in attachment 1.
These weaknesses existed, in part, because VA had not implemented key
components of a comprehensive information security program. Specifically,
VA's information security efforts lacked
o clearly delineated security roles and responsibilities;
o regular, periodic assessments of risk;
o security policies and procedures that addressed all aspects of
VA's interconnected environment;
o an ongoing security monitoring program to identify and
investigate unauthorized, unusual, or suspicious access activity;
and
o a process to measure, test, and report on the continued
effectiveness of computer system, network, and process controls.
We made a number of recommendations in 2002 that were aimed at improving
VA's security management.5 Among the primary elements of these
recommendations were that VA centralize its security management functions
and perform other actions to establish an information security program,
including actions related to risk assessments, security policies and
procedures, security awareness, and monitoring and evaluating computer
controls.6
Since our report in 2002, VA's independent auditors and its IG have
continued to report serious weaknesses with the department's information
security controls. In the auditors' report on internal controls prepared
at the completion of VA's 2006 financial statement audit, information
technology security controls were identified as a material weakness
because of serious weaknesses related to access control, segregation of
duties, change control, and service continuity.7 These areas of weakness
are virtually identical to those that we had identified years earlier.
5 GAO, Veterans Affairs: Sustained Management Attention Is Key to
Achieving Information Technology Results, [10]GAO-02-703 (Washington,
D.C.: June 12, 2002).
6 We based our recommendations on guidance and practices provided in GAO,
Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual, [11]GAO/AIMD-12.19.6
(Washington, D.C.: January 1999); Information Security Management:
Learning from Leading Organizations, [12]GAO/AIMD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.:
May 1998); Information Security Risk Assessment: Practices of Leading
Organizations, [13]GAO/AIMD-00-33 (Washington, D. C.: November 1999); and
Chief Information Officer Council, Federal Information Technology Security
Assessment Framework (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2000). The provisions of
FISMA (passed in late 2002) and associated guidance were generally
consistent with this earlier guidance.
7 The auditor's report is included in VA's FY 2006 Annual Performance and
Accountability Report.
The department's FY 2006 Annual Performance and Accountability Report
states that the IG continues to identify the same vulnerabilities and make
the same recommendations year after year. The IG's September 2006 audit of
VA's information security program noted that 16 previously reported
recommendations remained unimplemented; it also identified a new weakness
and made an additional recommendation. The IG has reported information
technology security as a major management challenge for the department
each year for the past 6 years.
VA's Efforts to Address Information Security Weaknesses Have Been Limited
Despite having taken steps to address the weaknesses described in our
earlier work, VA has not yet resolved these weaknesses on a departmentwide
basis or implemented a comprehensive information security program.8 For
example:
o Central security management function: In October 2006, the
department moved to a centralized management model. The department
has also contracted for project support in helping to frame a
security governance structure and provide tools to assist
management with controls over information technology assets. This
work is scheduled to be completed in March 2007.
o Periodic risk assessments: VA is implementing a commercial tool
to identify the level of risk associated with system changes and
also to conduct information security risk assessments. It also
created a methodology that establishes minimum requirements for
such risk assessments. However, it has not yet completed its risk
assessment policy and guidance. While the policy and guidance were
originally scheduled to be completed by the end of 2006, the
completion date was extended to April 2007.
o Security policies and procedures: VA is in the process of
developing policies and directives to strengthen security controls
as part of its action plan. For example, VA planned to develop
directives by the end of 2006 on access controls and media
protection, standards for restricting use of portable and mobile
devices, and policies regarding physical access to VA computer
rooms. However, the completion date for development of these
policies has been extended to April 2007.
o Security awareness: VA has taken steps to improve security
awareness training. It holds an annual department information
security conference, and it has developed a Web portal for
security training, policy, and procedures, as well as a security
awareness course that VA employees are required to review
annually. However, VA has not demonstrated that it has a process
to ensure compliance.
o Monitoring and evaluating computer controls: VA has taken steps
to improve the monitoring and evaluating of computer controls by
developing policies and procedures. For example, VA planned to
develop by the end of 2006 criteria for system security control
testing at least every 3 years and planned to identify key system
security controls for testing on a routine basis. However, the
completion dates for development of these policies have been
extended to April 2007.
8 This result is also reflected in the department's failing grade in the
annual report card on computer security that was issued by the then House
Committee on Government Reform: Computer Security Report Card (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 16, 2006).
To fulfill our recommendations in these areas, VA must not only complete
and document the policies, procedures, and plans that it is currently
developing, but also implement them effectively. With regard to its IG's
findings and recommendations, the department has established an action
plan to address the material weakness in information security (Data
Security--Assessment and Strengthening of Controls), which is to correct
deficiencies and eliminate vulnerabilities in this area. Despite these
actions, the department has not implemented the key elements of a
comprehensive security management program, and its efforts have not been
sufficient to effectively protect its information systems and information,
including personal information, from unauthorized disclosure, misuse, or
loss.
GAO Has Ongoing Reviews of Information Technology and Security Issues at VA
We have several ongoing engagements to perform work at VA to review the
department's efforts in improving its information security and information
technology management. These engagements address:
o Data breach notification: We are conducting a study to determine
the lessons that can be learned from the VA data breach with
respect to notifying government officials and affected individuals
about data breaches. For this evaluation, we are examining similar
data breach cases at other federal agencies, as well as analyzing
federal guidance on data breach notification procedures.
o Actions to strengthen information security controls: We are
conducting a review to evaluate VA's efforts to implement prior
GAO and IG information security-related recommendations and to
assess actions VA has taken since the data breach of May 3, 2006,
to strengthen information security and protect personal
information. As part of this engagement, we are examining VA's
time line of planned efforts to strengthen controls.
o Controls over information technology equipment: We are
conducting a follow-up audit9 at selected VA locations to
determine the risk of theft, loss, or misappropriation of
information technology equipment. To perform our audit, we are
assessing the effectiveness of physical inventory controls and the
property disposal process at four VA locations.
o VA's information technology realignment initiative: We are
conducting a review to determine whether VA's realignment plan for
its Office of Information and Technology includes critical factors
for successful implementation of a centralized management model.
We are also looking at how the realignment will ensure that under
the centralized management approach, the chief information officer
is accountable for the entire information technology budget
(including those funds that had been administered by the Veterans
Health Administration and Veterans Benefits Administration). In
performing this evaluation, we are analyzing governance and
implementation plans, as well as budgetary and other relevant
documentation.
9 This is a follow-up audit to work reported in GAO, VA Medical Centers:
Internal Control Over Selected Operating Functions Needs Improvement,
GAO-04-755 (Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2004).
In summary, long-standing information security control weaknesses at VA
have placed its information systems and information at increased risk of
misuse and unauthorized disclosure. Although VA has taken steps to
mitigate previously reported weaknesses, the department has not yet
resolved these weaknesses, implemented the recommendations of GAO and the
IG, or implemented a comprehensive information security program, which it
needs in order to effectively manage risks on an ongoing basis. Much work
remains to be done. Only through strong leadership, sustained management
commitment and effort, disciplined processes, and consistent oversight can
VA address its persistent, long-standing control weaknesses.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.
Contact and Acknowledgments
If you have any questions concerning this statement, please contact
Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues, at (202)
512-6244, wilshuseng@gao.gov . Other individuals who made key
contributions include Barbara Collier, Mary Hatcher, Valerie Hopkins,
Leena Mathew, and Charles Vrabel.
Attachment 1: Selected GAO Products
Information Security: Leadership Needed to Address Weaknesses and Privacy
at Veterans Affairs. [15]GAO-06-897T . Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006.
Veterans Affairs: Leadership Needed to Address Security Weaknesses and
Privacy Issues. [16]GAO-06-866T . Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Privacy: Preventing and Responding to Improper Disclosures of Personal
Information. [17]GAO-06-833T . Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Information Security: Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies Despite
Progress Made in Implementing Related Statutory Requirements.
[18]GAO-05-552 . Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005.
Veterans Affairs: Sustained Management Attention is Key to Achieving
Information Technology Results. [19]GAO-02-703 . Washington, D.C.: June
12, 2002.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs. [20]GAO-01-255 . Washington, D.C.: January 2001.
VA Information Systems: Computer Security Weaknesses Persist at the
Veterans Health Administration. [21]GAO/AIMD-00-232 . Washington, D.C.:
September 8, 2000.
Information Systems: The Status of Computer Security at the Department of
Veterans Affairs. [22]GAO/AIMD-00-5 . Washington, D.C.: October 4, 1999.
VA Information Systems: The Austin Automation Center Has Made Progress in
Improving Information System Controls. [23]GAO/AIMD-99-161 . Washington,
D.C.: June 8, 1999.
Information Systems: VA Computer Control Weaknesses Increase Risk of
Fraud, Misuse, and Improper Disclosure. [24]GAO/AIMD-98-175 . Washington,
D.C.: September 23, 1998.
(310591)
United States Government Accountability Office
For Release on Delivery
Expected at time 2:00 p.m. EST
February 28, 2007
GAO
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Veterans' Affairs, House of Representatives
GAO-07-532T
INFORMATION SECURITY
Veterans Affairs Needs to Address Long-Standing Weaknesses
Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen
Director, Information Security Issues
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-532T
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Greg Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or
wilshuseng@gao.gov.
Highlights of GAO-07-532T a testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
February 28, 2007
INFORMATION SECURITY
Veterans Affairs Needs to Address Long-Standing Weaknesses
Security breaches at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and other
public and private organizations have highlighted the importance of
well-designed and implemented information security programs. GAO was asked
to testify on its past work on VA's information security program, as well
as ongoing reviews that it is conducting at VA.
In developing its testimony, GAO drew on over 15 of its previous reports
and testimonies, as well as reports by the department's inspector general
(IG).
[26]What GAO Recommends
To ensure that security issues are adequately addressed, GAO has
previously made over 150 recommendations to VA on implementing effective
controls and developing a robust information security program.
For many years, GAO has raised significant concerns about VA's information
security--particularly its lack of a comprehensive information security
program, which is vital to safeguarding government information. The figure
below details information security weaknesses that GAO identified from
1998 to 2005. As shown, VA had not consistently implemented appropriate
controls for (1) limiting, preventing, and detecting electronic access to
sensitive computerized information; (2) restricting physical access to
computer and network equipment to authorized individuals; (3) segregating
incompatible duties among separate groups or individuals; (4) ensuring
that changes to computer software were authorized and timely; or (5)
providing continuity of computerized systems and operations. The
department's IG has also reported recurring weaknesses throughout VA in
such areas as access controls, physical security, and segregation of
incompatible duties. In response, the department has taken actions to
address these weaknesses, but these have not been sufficient to establish
a comprehensive information security programs. As a result, sensitive
information has remained vulnerable to inadvertent or deliberate misuse,
loss, or improper disclosure. Without an established and implemented
security program, the department will continue to have major challenges in
protecting its systems and information from security breaches.
GAO has several ongoing engagements to review the department's efforts in
improving its information security and information technology management.
These engagements address:
o data breach notification;
o actions to strengthen information security controls;
o controls over information technology equipment; and
o VA's information technology realignment effort.
Figure: Chronology of Information Security Weaknesses Identified by GAO
Note: Hines is a suburb of Chicago.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
fraudnet@gao.gov Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548
Public Affairs
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
References
Visible links
10. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-703
11. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-12.19.6
12. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-98-68
13. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-33
15. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-897T
16. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-866T
17. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-833T
18. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-552
19. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-703
20. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-255
21. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-232
22. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-5
23. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-99-161
24. http.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-98-175
*** End of document. ***