Interstate Compacts: An Overview of the Structure and Governance
of Environment and Natural Resource Compacts (03-APR-07,
GAO-07-519).
Interstate compacts are legal agreements between states that are
designed to resolve concerns that transcend state lines, such as
allocating interstate waters. While some compacts assign their
administration to existing state agencies, compacts requiring
greater coordination among states may establish an interstate
agency, typically called a commission, to administer their
provisions. Congress must give its consent to compacts that
affect the balance of power between the states and the federal
government. An example of a congressionally approved environment
and natural resource compact is the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact, which created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA)
to administer its provisions. For such compacts, GAO determined
(1) the organizational structures, powers and authorities, and
dispute resolution and public accountability mechanisms; (2) the
extent to which concerns have been raised about the structure and
governance of compacts that have commissions; and (3) how the
structure and governance of TRPA compares to those of other
similar compact commissions. GAO reviewed 59 congressionally
approved compacts and surveyed those 45 that had commissions.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-519
ACCNO: A67684
TITLE: Interstate Compacts: An Overview of the Structure and
Governance of Environment and Natural Resource Compacts
DATE: 04/03/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Advisory committees
Agency missions
Comparative analysis
Conservation
Cooperative agreements
Independent regulatory commissions
Land use
Regional planning
Regulation
State-administered programs
Surveys
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GAO-07-519
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Most Environment and Natural Resource Compacts Are Administe
* [4]Organizational Structure and Governance Generally Varied amo
* [5]Organizational Structure
* [6]Powers and Authorities
* [7]Dispute Resolution
* [8]Public Accountability
* [9]Compacts without Commissions Varied in Their Powers and Auth
* [10]Powers and Authorities
* [11]Dispute Resolution
* [12]Public Accountability
* [13]Significant Concerns about Compact Commissions' Structure an
* [14]Concerns about Organizational Structure
* [15]Concerns about Public Accountability
* [16]Concerns about Regulatory Authority
* [17]Concerns Have Reflected Disagreement with Commission Actions
* [18]While the Structure and Governance of TRPA Are Generally Sim
* [19]Three Interstate Compact Commissions Perform Similar Functio
* [20]TRPA's Organizational Structure and Governance Are Generally
* [21]Organizational Structure
* [22]Dispute Resolution
* [23]Public Accountability
* [24]TRPA Has More Extensive Land Use Planning Authority than the
* [25]Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
* [26]Columbia River Gorge Commission
* [27]Delaware River Basin Commission
* [28]Susquehanna River Basin Commission
* [29]GAO Contact
* [30]Staff Acknowledgments
* [31]GAO's Mission
* [32]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [33]Order by Mail or Phone
* [34]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [35]Congressional Relations
* [36]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
April 2007
INTERSTATE COMPACTS
An Overview of the Structure and Governance of Environment and Natural
Resource Compacts
GAO-07-519
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 6
Most Environment and Natural Resource Compacts Are Administered by
Commissions 8
Significant Concerns about Compact Commissions' Structure and Governance
Have Not Been Frequently Raised 13
While the Structure and Governance of TRPA Are Generally Similar to Those
of Other Compact Commissions, Its Regulatory Authority Is Broader 18
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28
Appendix II Descriptions of Interstate Compacts Included in Our Review 31
Appendix III Descriptions of TRPA and Three Selected Compact Commissions
35
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43
Tables
Table 1: Environment and Natural Resource Compacts, by Subject Matter 7
Table 2: Comparison of Commission Management Plan Issues 21
Table 3: Summary of the Composition of TRPA and Three Other Compact
Commissions 23
Table 4: Congressionally Approved Environment and Natural Resource
Compacts 31
Figures
Figure 1: Frequency of Concerns regarding Organizational Structure 14
Figure 2: Frequency of Concerns regarding Public Accountability 16
Figure 3: Frequency of Concerns regarding Regulatory Authority 17
Figure 4: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of TRPA and
the CRGC 19
Figure 5: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of the DRBC
and the SRBC 20
Figure 6: Map and Photographs of the Lake Tahoe Region 35
Figure 7: Map and Photographs of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic
Area 37
Figure 8: Map and Photographs of the Delaware River Basin 39
Figure 9: Map and Photographs of the Susquehanna River Basin 41
Abbreviations
CRGC Columbia River Gorge Commission
DRBC Delaware River Basin Commission
FTE full-time equivalent
SRBC Susquehanna River Basin Commission
TRPA Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
April 3, 2007 April 3, 2007
The Honorable Don Young
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Natural Resources
House of Representatives
The Honorable John T. Doolittle
House of Representatives
Interstate compacts are legal agreements between two or more states that
are designed to resolve problems or concerns that transcend state lines.
Such compacts enable states to act jointly and collectively to devise
solutions for matters that are beyond the authority of an individual state
but which are not within the immediate purview of the federal government
or easily resolved through a purely federal response. Prior to the
twentieth century, interstate compacts were used almost exclusively to
settle state boundary disputes. In more recent times, their use has
expanded to include such diverse purposes as allocating interstate waters,
developing regional transportation systems, and enhancing law enforcement.
More than 200 interstate compacts exist today, according to the Council of
State Governments. At least 76 of these compacts are designed to address
environment and natural resource management issues such as conservation
and environment (fisheries, forest fire protection, and water pollution
control), energy (low-level radioactive waste), planning and development
(land use planning for environment and natural resource protection), and
water resource management (water apportionment and flood control).
Interstate compacts are legal agreements between two or more states that
are designed to resolve problems or concerns that transcend state lines.
Such compacts enable states to act jointly and collectively to devise
solutions for matters that are beyond the authority of an individual state
but which are not within the immediate purview of the federal government
or easily resolved through a purely federal response. Prior to the
twentieth century, interstate compacts were used almost exclusively to
settle state boundary disputes. In more recent times, their use has
expanded to include such diverse purposes as allocating interstate waters,
developing regional transportation systems, and enhancing law enforcement.
More than 200 interstate compacts exist today, according to the Council of
State Governments. At least 76 of these compacts are designed to address
environment and natural resource management issues such as conservation
and environment (fisheries, forest fire protection, and water pollution
control), energy (low-level radioactive waste), planning and development
(land use planning for environment and natural resource protection), and
water resource management (water apportionment and flood control).
To form a compact, two or more states typically negotiate an agreement,
and then each state legislature enacts a law that is identical to the
agreement reached. Once all states specified in the compact have enacted
such laws, the compact is formed. In some cases, if a compact affects the
balance of power between the states and the federal government or affects
a power constitutionally delegated to the federal government, it must also
obtain congressional consent. In consenting to a compact, Congress may add
certain conditions, such as specifying that compact disputes be resolved
in federal courts. Otherwise, the compact's subject matter and substance
are largely left to the discretion of the negotiating parties. To form a
compact, two or more states typically negotiate an agreement, and then
each state legislature enacts a law that is identical to the agreement
reached. Once all states specified in the compact have enacted such laws,
the compact is formed. In some cases, if a compact affects the balance of
power between the states and the federal government or affects a power
constitutionally delegated to the federal government, it must also obtain
congressional consent. In consenting to a compact, Congress may add
certain conditions, such as specifying that compact disputes be resolved
in federal courts. Otherwise, the compact's subject matter and substance
are largely left to the discretion of the negotiating parties.
When negotiating a compact, the states typically establish a framework for
administering and implementing the compact's provisions. The framework
varies widely and depends largely on the subject matter, scope, and
complexity of the compact agreement. In some cases, the compact does
little more than prescribe certain conditions with which the member states
must comply or require the states to cooperate in furthering the purposes
of the compact. In such cases, the states often assign the compact's
administration and implementation to existing agencies or officials within
the member states. By doing so, the states can coordinate their resources
to avoid duplicating efforts or costs, take advantage of economies of
scale, and promote more effective management of issues common to the
member states. For example, some interstate water allocation compacts that
distribute fixed quantities of water to each of the member states--such as
the Snake River Compact--assign administrative responsibility to the
official in each state who is in charge of managing the public water
supply.
In contrast, some compacts involve more complex interstate matters that
require greater coordination among states, such as the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste. In such cases, states are more likely to
delegate authority to an interstate agency--typically called a
commission--that is created to administer and implement the compact's
provisions.^1 The nature of each commission's authority varies and can
range from advising states on interstate problems to regulating activities
of mutual concern. In general, compact commissions consist of
representatives of the member states, typically called commissioners. The
commissioners are usually appointed by elected officials or serve by
virtue of their elected position, such as governor, or their role as a
federal, state, or local government official. For example, to administer
the provisions of the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, the states of
California and Nevada created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA),
which includes representatives from the two states and the federal
government. Many compact commissions are funded, in whole or in part, by
the member states. Although the federal government may provide grants or
participate in some compact programs, compact commissions generally
operate independently of the federal government. Since interstate compact
commissions are neither federal in nature nor state in scope, they occupy
what some have referred to as a "third tier" of government.
^1For purposes of this report, the term "commission" includes agencies,
authorities, and boards created to administer interstate compacts.
Because of your interest in congressionally approved interstate compacts^2
that address environment and natural resource issues and, in particular,
the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, this report describes (1) the
approaches used to administer congressionally approved environment and
natural resource compacts, including their organizational structure,
powers and authorities, and mechanisms for resolving disputes and
providing public accountability; (2) the extent to which concerns have
been raised regarding the structure and governance of those compacts, like
the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, that have commissions; and (3)
specifically, how the structure and governance of TRPA compares to those
of other similar compact commissions.
To conduct this review, we identified and reviewed 59 congressionally
approved interstate compacts that address environment and natural resource
management issues, interviewed compact experts and officials, and surveyed
compact commission officials on the approaches used to structure and
govern their compacts and the extent to which concerns have been raised
regarding these approaches. We surveyed officials from only 45 of the 46
compacts that established commissions, because 1 commission was not yet
operational at the time of our review. We received responses from 36 of
the 45 compact commissions we surveyed, for a response rate of 80 percent.
In addition, using the survey results, we identified 3 compact commissions
that have functions similar to those of TRPA: the Columbia River Gorge
Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, and the Susquehanna River
Basin Commission. To compare TRPA to these three commissions, we
interviewed commission staff in Stateline, Nevada; White Salmon,
Washington; West Trenton, New Jersey; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In
addition, we reviewed commission documents and activities, and interviewed
compact stakeholders, including commission members; federal, state, and
local government officials; environmentalists; and members of the business
community, among others. See appendix I for additional details on our
scope and methodology and appendix II for additional details on the 59
congressionally approved environment and natural compacts we reviewed. A
more complete summary of the results of our survey of compact commission
officials can be viewed on our Web site at www.gao.gov in an
electronic supplement that we are issuing concurrent with this report--
[38]GAO-07-524SP . We conducted our review from April 2006 through March
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
^2For purposes of this report, the phrase "congressionally approved
interstate compacts" refers to compacts for which Congress provided
consent through legislation.
Results in Brief
Most congressionally approved interstate compacts that address environment
and natural resource issues have established commissions to administer the
compact's provisions. Of the 59 compacts that we reviewed, 46 established
interstate commissions, while the remaining 13 were administered by
existing agencies or officials in the member states. Among the 46 compacts
with commissions, we found variations in organizational structure, powers
and authorities, and provisions for resolving disputes, but several
similarities in how they provided for public accountability. For example,
the number of commissioners ranged from 2 to 48, and some commissions
included a representative of the federal government, while others did not.
Additionally, some commissions had regulatory authority, while others were
limited to more of an advisory role. For example, the Ohio River Valley
Water Sanitation Commission has regulatory authority to set water
pollution control standards for the Ohio River, while the Gulf States
Marine Fisheries Commission is limited to making recommendations to help
member states promote the conservation, development, and utilization of
fishery resources in the Gulf of Mexico. With regard to dispute
resolution, although only 26 percent of the compacts with commissions
specified ways to resolve disputes other than litigation, 36 percent of
them had used processes such as arbitration, mediation, administrative
appeals, and negotiations to resolve disputes. Compact commissions
generally used similar means of providing public accountability. For
example, almost all of the commissions had procedures in place, such as
giving the public access to commission documents, holding public meetings,
and allowing public input, to ensure public accountability, even when not
required by their compact. For the 13 compacts that do not establish
commissions, we found that their powers and authorities also varied. Eight
of these compacts had authorized member states to develop regulations
jointly to further the compact's objectives, while five required member
states only to coordinate resources to meet the compact's goals. Compacts
without commissions did not typically contain provisions addressing
dispute resolution or public accountability, but their administering
agencies or officials are subject to state requirements and procedures.
Only 3 of the 13 compacts without commissions specified methods for
resolving disputes, and one specified mechanisms for providing public
accountability.
Significant concerns about the structure and governance of interstate
compact commissions have not been frequently raised. Specifically, less
than half of the compact commissions that responded to our survey reported
that concerns had been raised infrequently about the organizational
structure and public accountability of their commissions, and about
two-thirds of the commissions with authority to issue regulations reported
that concerns had been infrequently raised about their regulatory
authority. Concerns regarding organizational structure varied by
commission and ranged from issues such as who should be represented on the
commission to whether commissioners should be elected or appointed.
Concerns regarding public accountability also varied, from issues such as
whether the commission had adequate oversight to whether the commission
was sufficiently independent of its member states. Concerns about the
commissions' regulatory authority have generally focused on the extent of
the commission's power, and were more frequently raised when the issues
being addressed by the compact were highly controversial. Moreover, a
number of compact officials believe that the concerns raised about the
commission's structure and governance often reflected disagreements with
specific commission actions or decisions, rather than general concerns
about the commission's organizational structure, public accountability, or
regulatory authority.
TRPA's organizational structure and governance are generally similar to
those of other interstate compact commissions with similar functions, but
TRPA has greater land use planning authority. Specifically, we identified
three interstate compact commissions that perform similar functions to
TRPA--the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River Basin, and Susquehanna
River Basin Commissions. These commissions are similar to TRPA in that
they have the authority to issue regulations and they have developed
comprehensive management plans that address at least six of the following
issues: land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, public
services and facilities, water pollution, flood control, and waste
disposal. TRPA and the three other commissions have similar organizational
structures, with each having appointed representatives, a staff, and
advisory committees. However, the commissions differ in size, interests
represented, and the role of the federal representative. As for
governance, all four commissions generally use similar means, such as an
administrative appeals process, to resolve disputes that may arise with
those they regulate. In addition, all four commissions also use similar
public accountability mechanisms, such as undergoing an annual financial
audit, regularly reporting their activities to member states, and holding
public meetings where the public can provide input. A major distinction
between TRPA and the three other compact commissions is that TRPA has
broad land use authority that extends to water, air, and other natural
resources, as well as public health and safety, while the Columbia River
Gorge Commission only regulates land use when it affects cultural,
natural, recreational, or scenic resources, and decisions made by the
Delaware River Basin and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions only
indirectly affect land use.
Background
Interstate compacts are legal agreements between states that bind member
states to their provisions in the same manner as contracts entered into by
individuals or corporations. Traditionally, compacts were negotiated by
special joint commissions appointed by the state governors. Increasingly,
however, compacts have been formulated by interested groups of state
officials or other stakeholders and then recommended to the state
legislatures. In either case, each state legislature accepts the compact
by enacting a law that adopts the terms of the agreement. When the
required number of states have enacted such a law, the compact is formed.
In cases where the compact affects the balance of power between the
federal government and the states, the states must obtain the consent of
Congress for the compact to be valid. Congress generally gives its consent
in one of three ways: (1) after the fact, by passing legislation that
specifically recognizes and consents to the compact as enacted by the
states; (2) in advance, by passing legislation encouraging states to enter
into a specified compact or compacts for specified purposes; or (3)
implied after the fact, when actions by the states and the federal
government indicate that Congress has granted its consent even in the
absence of a specific legislative act. In addition, Congress may impose
conditions as part of granting its consent, and it typically reserves the
right to alter, amend, or repeal its consent. Any proposed amendment to a
compact must follow the compact approval process, unless the compact
specifies otherwise.
The use of interstate compacts has changed over time in terms of number,
subject matter, and scope. Of the 32 compacts enacted between 1789 and
1920, most resolved boundary disputes between 2 neighboring states. As the
twentieth century progressed, states increasingly used interstate compacts
to address complex problems that were not confined to their borders, such
as apportioning interstate waters, supervising out-of-state offenders
under community supervision, and constructing and administering bridges
and shared port facilities. According to the Council of State Governments,
more than 200 interstate compacts exist nationwide, with each state
belonging to an average of 25 compacts. Along with the increasing numbers
and subjects covered, interstate compacts have also expanded their range
of coverage from 2 states to as many as 50 and may also include the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. territories, and Canadian
provinces as signatories.
Over one-third of the compacts that exist today deal with environment and
natural resource issues. Although a large number of these compacts deal
with water allocation, they address other subjects as well.
Table 1: Environment and Natural Resource Compacts, by Subject Matter
Number with congressional
Subject matter Number approval
Water apportionment 22 22
Water resources and flood control 12 9
Low-level radioactive waste disposal 12 10
Water pollution control 7 4
Fisheries conservation 6 6
Forest fire protection 6 4
Conservation and environment (other than 5 1
water pollution control, fisheries
conservation, and forest fire protection)
Energy (other than low-level radioactive 4 2
waste disposal)
Planning and development (land use 2 1
planning involving environment and
natural resource protection)
Total 76 59
Source: GAO analysis of Council of State Governments' data.
In addition to addressing a variety of subjects, the scope of these
environment and natural resource compacts ranges from 2 to as many as 30
states, and includes, in some cases, the District of Columbia, Canadian
provinces, or the United States as signatories. As table 1 shows, about
three-fourths of these compacts have received congressional approval.
Prior to the 1920s, existing agencies and officials within compact states
routinely administered interstate compacts. However, as states began to
jointly tackle issues of greater complexity and broader geographic scope,
the use of interstate commissions gained popularity. The majority of the
compacts enacted since 1970 have established interstate commissions. These
commissions consist of appointed representatives of each compacting state,
called commissioners, who are responsible for administering the compact's
provisions. Additionally, commissions may employ technical and other staff
to assist in the compact's administration. In some cases, commissions will
hire an executive director who is responsible for administering the
commission's daily operations in accordance with the commission's
direction and policies. In addition, commissions may have advisory
committees that study issues and make recommendations to the
commissioners. These committees may be permanent or temporary in nature,
depending on need.
Most Environment and Natural Resource Compacts Are Administered by Commissions
Of the 59 interstate compacts we reviewed, 46 established commissions to
administer the compact's provisions, while the remaining 13 were
administered by existing agencies or officials in the member states. Among
the compacts with commissions, we found variations in organizational
structure, powers and authorities, and provisions for resolving disputes,
but similarities in how the compacts provided for public accountability.
The 13 compacts without commissions also varied in powers and authorities.
In addition, they generally did not contain provisions for alternative
dispute resolution or public accountability, but their administering
agencies or officials are subject to state requirements and procedures.
Organizational Structure and Governance Generally Varied among Compacts
Administered by Commissions
The 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed varied in organizational
structure, such as the number of commissioners and staff; powers and
authorities, including whether the compact granted advisory or regulatory
authority; and the dispute resolution mechanisms provided as alternatives
to litigation.^3 However, the compacts shared similarities in their
approaches for providing public accountability.
Organizational Structure
The 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed generally varied in
organizational structure, including the composition and size of the
commission, use of administrative staff, and use of advisory committees.
Commission composition. The commissions established by the 46 compacts we
reviewed varied in size and interests represented. In all cases, the
commissioners were appointed to serve--generally by elected officials or
by virtue of their state office, such as governor or head of a state
natural resources department. However, the number of commissioners ranged
from 2 to 48, with each state generally having an equal number of
commissioners. For example, the Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Compact required that each of its three member states appoint one
representative to the commission, while the New England Interstate Water
Pollution Control Compact required that each of its seven member states
appoint 5 commissioners. Depending on the compact, there were as few as 1
and as many as 7 commissioners from each state. Of the 46 compacts, 15
explicitly required member states to appoint commissioners to represent
additional interests. For example, 11 compacts provided for local
representation, 4 required the appointment of a knowledgeable citizen from
each state, and 1 required the appointment of an industry representative
from each state. In addition, 18 of the 46 compacts, such as the
Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Compact, specified the number of
commissioners from each state, but left it to each state to decide how to
choose its commissioners.
^3One of the 46 commissions was not yet operational at the time of our
review.
Of the 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed, 21 provided for a
federal representative on the commission. For 16 of these compacts, the
President appointed the federal representative; the other 5 compacts named
an official of a specified federal agency, such as the Director of the
U.S. Geological Survey. While nearly half of the compacts with commissions
had federal representation, only 4 of these compacts--the Connecticut
River Atlantic Salmon, the Delaware River Basin, the Susquehanna River
Basin, and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compacts--explicitly gave the
federal representative the power to vote on commission decisions or
actions.
Staff. Compacts also varied in their provisions for staff to conduct
day-to-day operations and provide technical assistance to the commissions.
Only 8 of the 46 compacts explicitly required that their commissions hire
staff, an additional 34 compacts left it to the commissions' discretion to
hire staff, and 4 compacts made no provisions for staff. In practice, we
found that 67 percent of the commissions that responded to our survey
reported having an administrative staff. Among these commissions, the
number of full-time equivalent staff ranged from 1 to 85.
Advisory committees. The way compacts provided for committees to advise
the commission varied. Only 4 of the 46 compacts we reviewed expressly
required their commissions to establish an advisory committee, while
another 13 expressly authorized them. For example, the Pacific States
Marine Fisheries Compact required that its commission establish a
permanent advisory committee to represent the interests of the commercial
fishing industry on an ongoing basis, as well as short-term advisory
committees to draft position papers on a specific commission issue, such
as ecosystem management. In practice, however, about 75 percent of the
commissions responding to our survey reported having at least one advisory
committee, and about 56 percent of these commissions reported that members
of the public served on at least one of their advisory committees.
Powers and Authorities
The powers and authorities granted to the compact commissions also varied.
In some cases, the commission only had advisory authority. For example,
the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission makes recommendations to its
member states on the conservation, development, and utilization of fishery
resources in the Gulf of Mexico, but it does not have the authority to
implement its recommendations. In other cases, the compacts explicitly
granted commissions the authority to issue regulations. For example, the
Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission has the authority to set
water pollution control standards for the Ohio River. We also found cases
where the commissions had both advisory and regulatory authority. For
example, the Delaware River Basin Commission studies and advises states on
approaches to water management, but also regulates water quality and water
supply. In some cases, we had difficulty determining from a compact's
language whether the commission was advisory or regulatory in nature.
However, over 55 percent of the commissions that responded to our survey
reported that they had the authority to issue regulations, with 95 percent
of these commissions reporting that they have sufficient authority to
enforce the regulations they issue.
Dispute Resolution
The 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed also differed in their
provisions for resolving disputes among the compact states or between the
commission and those it regulates. While compact disputes generally can be
brought before a court for review, litigation can be expensive. Possible
alternatives to litigation include the following:
o Arbitration--a process by which the parties refer a dispute to
an agreed-upon, independent third party for resolution.
o Mediation--a process by which a neutral person facilitates
discussion between the disputing parties to help them reach
agreement.
o Administrative appeals--a process by which an action of the
commission can be appealed to the commission itself.
o Negotiation--a process by which the parties attempt to reach
agreement through discussion and compromise.
Only 12 of the 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed (26
percent) specified alternative approaches for resolving disputes.
Of these compacts, 9 made provisions for the use of arbitration, 2
provided for negotiations, and 1 called for mediation. For
example, the Klamath River Basin Compact--which manages water
resources for irrigation, fish and wildlife protection, and
domestic and industrial use, among other things--required that if
the commission's two voting members failed to agree on any matter
before the commission, the commission must refer the matter to an
independent third party for resolution. However, while 12 compacts
expressly mentioned the use of arbitration, mediation,
administrative appeals, or negotiation for resolving disputes, 36
percent of our survey respondents reported that they have used one
or more of these dispute resolution mechanisms. Among these
respondents, 7 had used mediation, 5 had used an administrative
appeals process, 5 had used negotiations, and 1 had used
arbitration.
Public Accountability
While compact commissions varied with respect to organizational
structure, powers and a uthorities, and methods for resolving
disputes, they generally used similar approaches to provide
accountability to the public, even when not required by their
compact. For example, while only 18 of the 46 compacts expressly
required that commission documents be made available to the
public, all of the commissions that responded to our survey
reported that they have given the public access to commission
meeting minutes, and 94 percent reported that they also make
available to the public documents used in preparation for
commission meetings. Further, 94 percent of the survey respondents
reported that they had established procedures--such as holding
public meetings and allowing public input--to ensure public
accountability. In addition, 78 percent of the commissions
reported that they have conducted some form of public outreach.
These commissions used various outreach approaches, such as
meeting with stakeholders to discuss their needs and concerns,
operating a commission Web site, distributing newsletters and
press releases, holding symposiums, producing public service
announcements, and making educational presentations to
schoolchildren.
In addition, 6 of the 46 compacts that established commissions
explicitly required representatives from the public to sit on
advisory committees. However, according to our survey responses,
at least an additional 9 commissions have allowed representatives
from the general public to serve on advisory committees, although
they were not required to do so.^4
Financial reporting by the compact commissions was frequently
practiced as a means of providing accountability to both the
public and member states. Among the 46 compacts administered by
commissions, 25 required that the commission undergo an annual
financial audit. Of the commissions responding to our survey, 86
percent reported undergoing financial audits. Of the commissions
that undergo financial audits, 90 percent told us that they
undergo annual financial audits, with the rest undergoing
financial audits somewhat less frequently. All of the commissions
that undergo financial audits told us that they reported their
audit results to the member states, and 71 percent of these
commissions made their audits available to the public.
Compacts without Commissions Varied in Their Powers and
Authorities
The 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or officials
also had varied powers and authorities. Compacts administered by
state agencies or officials contained few provisions for dispute
resolution and accountability. However, these agencies and
officials are required to follow state requirements.
Powers and Authorities
Eight of the 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or
officials authorized member states to jointly develop regulations
for achieving compact objectives, while 5 required member states
only to coordinate resources to meet compact goals. In general,
the 8 regulatory compacts required that the member states mutually
consent to any regulations issued under the compact. For example,
the Columbia River Compact mandated that laws and regulations for
protecting fish in the Columbia River be created or amended only
with the mutual consent of both states. The 5 compacts that called
for coordination among member states typically called for either
sharing expenses among the member states or joint oversight of the
compact's subject matter. For example, the Middle Atlantic
Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact requires member states
to help each other in combating, controlling, or preventing forest
fires.
Dispute Resolution
Only 3 of the 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or
officials specified methods for resolving disputes. However, the
state agencies and officials that administer these compacts are
already subject to state dispute resolution requirements or
procedures. One of the 3 compacts that specified methods for
resolving disputes is the Colorado River Compact--a highly
controversial water allocation compact--that gives the governors
of the member states the authority to appoint individuals to
consider and resolve certain conflicts that arise between member
states regarding a compact issue. Similarly, the New
Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Sewage and Waste Disposal Facilities
Compact and the New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Public Water
Supply Compact, which authorize municipalities to enter into
agreements to establish joint waste facilities and public water
supplies, respectively, require that these agreements include
provisions for arbitration and dispute resolution.
Public Accountability
Of the 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or officials,
only 1 contained any provision relating to public accountability.
However, as with dispute resolution, the state agencies or
officials that administer these compacts are already subject to
state requirements for providing public accountability. The
Jennings Randolph Lake Project Compact, which provides for
Maryland and West Virginia to jointly manage the natural resources
of Jennings Randolph Lake, is the only compact administered by
existing agencies that includes provisions for accountability. It
called for the states to encourage the dissemination of "joint
publications, press releases, or other public information."
Significant Concerns about Compact Commissions� Structure and
Governance Have Not Been Frequently Raised
Interstate compact commissions reported that significant concerns
about their structure and governance have rarely been raised.
While almost two-thirds of the 36 commissions responding to our
survey reported that significant concerns have been raised at
least once about their commission's organizational structure,
public accountability, or regulatory authority, none of the
commissions reported that these concerns have been raised
frequently. Moreover, a number of officials responding to our
survey believed that these concerns often reflected disagreements
with specific commission actions rather than general concerns
about organizational structure, public accountability, or
regulatory authority.
Concerns about Organizational Structure
Survey respondents reported that concerns about organizational
structure have been raised infrequently. As shown in figure 1,
less than half of the 36 compact commissions responding to our
survey reported that significant concerns have been raised about
their commission's structure or composition--with 13 commissions
reporting such concerns as seldom and 4 reporting such concerns as
occasional. We found no consistent theme among the concerns
identified. Examples of concerns included whether the appropriate
interests were represented on the commission, whether the balance
of state and local interests on the commission was fair, where the
commission should be located, and how many votes each state should
have. Regarding concerns about the method of selecting
commissioners, less than one-third of the 36 commissions reported
that such concerns had been raised at all--with 7 reporting such
concerns as seldom and 3 as occasional (see fig. 1). When concerns
were identified, they also varied by commission and included, for
example, whether commissioners should be directly elected to the
commission and whether commission appointments were too political.
^4While 6 of the 46 compacts that established commissions explicitly
required representatives from the public to sit on their advisory
committees, only 3 of these compacts required that the commission actually
establish an advisory committee. The other 3 compacts gave their
commissions the authority to create one or more advisory committees, but
did not require them to do so.
Figure 1: Frequency of Concerns regarding Organizational Structure
Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent because of rounding.
Concerns about Public Accountability
Survey respondents also reported that concerns about public accountability
have been raised infrequently. As shown in figure 2, less than half of the
36 compact commissions responding to our survey reported that significant
concerns have been raised about their commission's public
accountability--with 14 respondents reporting such concerns as seldom and
2 reporting such concerns as occasional. Again, there was no consistent
theme among the concerns identified. For example, 1 commission reported
that a concern had been raised about whether the commission had adequate
oversight, while another commission reported that concerns had been raised
about whether the commission was sufficiently independent of its member
states. Some concerns about public accountability have resulted in
lawsuits. For example, the Susquehanna River Basin Commission was sued in
2006 for allegedly failing to provide adequate notice of public hearings
on proposed changes to its water regulations.^5
5Complaint at 11, Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. The Susquehanna River Basin
Commission, Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-02454 (C.D. Pa. 2006). This suit,
which was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, was still pending at the time of our review.
Figure 2: Frequency of Concerns regarding Public Accountability
Note: The total does not equal 100 percent because of rounding.
Concerns about Regulatory Authority
Twenty of the 36 compact commissions responding to our survey reported
that they have the authority to issue regulations. As shown in figure 3,
over two-thirds of these commissions reported that significant concerns
about their current regulatory authority have been raised
infrequently--with 9 reporting such concerns as seldom and 5 as
occasional. Although the specific concerns varied from commission to
commission, the concerns often involved the scope of the commission's
authority. For example, 1 commission reported that concerns had been
raised about whether it had the authority to regulate certain types of
water rights, while another commission reported that concerns had been
raised about whether it had too much regulatory authority. Commissions
have also been sued over the scope of their authority. For example, a
group of landowners unsuccessfully sued the Columbia River Gorge
Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture on a number of grounds,
including that the commission's decision to deny the landowners'
applications to develop their properties resulted in an illegal taking of
private property under the U.S. Constitution.^6 Notably, survey responses
indicated that concerns about regulatory authority were more frequently
raised in cases where the compact had addressed highly controversial
issues.
Figure 3: Frequency of Concerns regarding Regulatory Authority
Note: The total number of responses equals 20, because only 20 of the 36
commissions responding to our survey reported that they had the authority
to issue regulations.
Concerns Have Reflected Disagreement with Commission Actions or Decisions
A number of commission officials told us they believed that when concerns
have been raised about a commission's structure and governance, they often
reflected underlying disagreements with specific commission decisions or
actions. Officials repeatedly reported that some of the concerns about
organizational structure, public accountability, and regulatory authority
were raised only when an individual objected to a specific commission
decision or action. For example, an official from one commission believed
that a concern raised about the commission's accountability to the public
actually reflected an individual's anger over a particular commission
decision, while an official from another commission stated that concerns
about the methods used to select commissioners have been raised only when
someone dislikes a particular regulation issued by the commission.
Similarly, an official from a third commission stated that people have
raised concerns about the commission's organizational structure and
authority when they simply disliked the commission's actions and that such
concerns arise as the commission deals with controversial or
high-visibility issues.
^6Columbia Gorge United-Protecting People & Property v. Yeutter, 1990 WL
357613, CV No. 88-1319-PA (D. Or. May 23, 1990), aff'd by 960 F.2d 110
(9th Cir. 1992).
While the Structure and Governance of TRPA Are Generally Similar to Those of
Other Compact Commissions, Its Regulatory Authority Is Broader
TRPA's organizational structure and governance are generally similar to
those of three other interstate compact commissions with similar
functions--the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River Basin, and Susquehanna
River Basin Commissions. However, TRPA has greater regulatory
responsibility and more extensive land use planning authority than these
commissions.
Three Interstate Compact Commissions Perform Similar Functions to TRPA
We identified three interstate compact commissions that perform similar
functions to TRPA, including the Columbia River Gorge Commission (CRGC),
the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), and the Susquehanna River
Basin Commission (SRBC). TRPA is responsible for developing and
implementing an environmental and land use plan to preserve the natural
quality of the Lake Tahoe region (see fig. 4). The CRGC is responsible for
developing and adopting a management plan that regulates, through land use
ordinances, the development and use of various categories of land within
the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area (see fig. 4). Both the DRBC
and the SRBC are responsible for multipurpose planning, development, and
management of the water and water resources in the Delaware and
Susquehanna River Basins, respectively (see fig. 5). (For more information
on these compacts, see app. III.)
Figure 4: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of TRPA and
the CRGC
Figure 5: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of the DRBC
and the SRBC
Like TRPA, these three commissions have the authority to issue
regulations. Also, like TRPA, these three commissions have developed a
comprehensive plan for achieving their compact's objectives. While their
compact objectives differ, at least six of the issues addressed in their
comprehensive plans are similar to those addressed in TRPA's plan,
including land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, public
services and facilities, water pollution, flood control, and waste
disposal. See table 2 for a comparison of issues addressed by the four
management plans.
Table 2: Comparison of Commission Management Plan Issues
Tahoe
Regional Columbia Delaware
Planning River Gorge River Basin Susquehanna River Basin
Issue Agency Commission Commission Commission
Land use x x x x
Transportation x x
Conservation x x x x
Recreation x x x x
Public services
and facilities x x x x
Water pollution x x x x
Flood control x x x
Waste disposal x x
Source: GAO.
TRPA's Organizational Structure and Governance Are Generally Similar to Those of
Three Other Compact Commissions
TRPA and the three other compact commissions have similar organizational
structures, but differ in size, composition, and role of the federal
representative. In terms of governance, the four commissions also use
similar means for resolving disputes and providing accountability.
Organizational Structure
TRPA and the three other commissions have similar organizational
structures that consist of appointed commissioners, a staff, and advisory
committees. However, commission composition differs in terms of size,
interests represented, and role of the federal representative.
Commission composition. TRPA's governing board is similar to those of the
three other commissions in that it consists of appointed members,
including a representative of the federal government. However, TRPA is
more like the CRGC in terms of its size, interests represented, and role
of the federal representative. Specifically, TRPA's governing board has 15
members. California and Nevada each have 7 members, including 4 statewide
and 3 local representatives, and the federal government has a
representative.^7 All 7 California board members are appointed by elected
officials. Four Nevada board members are appointed by elected officials, 2
serve by virtue of their state office, and 1 is appointed at-large by the
other Nevada members. The federal representative is appointed by the
President. All board members, except the federal representative, can vote
on matters before the commission. In comparison, the CRGC has 13 members,
including 3 appointees of each governor, 1 appointee of each of the 6
counties in the Scenic Area, and a federal representative who is a member
of the U.S. Forest Service appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. As
with TRPA, all of the CRGC's commissioners are voting members except the
federal representative.
The remaining two commissions are much smaller than TRPA. The DRBC and the
SRBC have only 5 and 4 members, respectively, including a representative
of the federal government. Unlike TRPA and the CRGC, each state has one
commissioner--the governor or a designee. According to DRBC and SRBC
officials, the designee is typically the head of the state's natural
resources or environmental protection department. The federal
representative is an officer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers appointed
by the President. Unlike the federal representatives on TRPA and the CRGC,
the federal representatives on the DRBC and the SRBC can vote on
commission matters, because the United States is a party to the compacts.
^7Originally, the compact provided for an 11-member governing board, with
each state having 3 local and 2 statewide representatives. However, the
compact was amended in 1980 by adding 2 statewide representatives from
each state, increasing the board's size to 15 members.
Table 3: Summary of the Composition of TRPA and Three Other Compact
Commissions
Delaware Susquehanna
Tahoe Regional Columbia River River Basin River Basin
Item Planning Agency Gorge Commission Commission Commission
Compacting 2 states 2 states 4 states 3 states and
parties and the the United
United States
States
Number of 15 13 5 4
commissioners
State members 7 from each 6 from each 1 from each 1 from each
state, including state, including state state
4 statewide and 3 state and 3
3 local local appointees
representatives
Method of Appointed by Appointed by Appointed Appointed by
selection elected elected by virtue virtue of
officials or by officials of their their state
virtue of their state office
state office; office
at-large member
appointed by the
other Nevada
board members
Special All California 1 state None None
requirements state representative
representatives from each state
and at least 1 must reside in
from Nevada must the Scenic Area;
reside outside local
the region; representatives
local must reside in
representatives their respective
must reside in counties
their appointing
body's
jurisdiction
Federal member Appointed by the An employee of An officer An officer
President the Forest of the U.S. of the U.S.
Service Army Corps Army Corps
appointed by the of of Engineers
Secretary of Engineers appointed by
Agriculture appointed the
by the President
President
Role of federal Nonvoting Nonvoting Voting Voting
member
Source: GAO analysis of interstate compacts.
Staff. Like the three other commissions, TRPA employs an executive
director who is responsible for administering the commission's day-to-day
operations in accordance with the commissioners' direction and policies.
The executive director is assisted by a staff of technical and other
employees. At the time of our review, TRPA had the largest staff, with 85
full-time equivalent (FTE) positions.^8 In comparison, the DRBC had 43
FTEs, the SRBC had 35 FTEs, and the CRGC had 8.75 FTEs.
Advisory committees. All four commissions rely on advisory committees to
study issues and make recommendations to the commissioners. For example,
TRPA has a 19-member advisory planning commission--composed of planning
and natural resource management professionals in the region, as well as
members of the public--that assists the governing board with technical and
scientific issues dealing with land use planning. The advisory planning
commission holds hearings, reviews proposed amendments to TRPA's plans and
ordinances, and makes recommendations to the governing board. In addition,
TRPA's governing board has formed four advisory committees, composed of
board members, to review and make recommendations to the board on legal,
operational, public education and outreach, and local government matters.
Similar to TRPA, both the DRBC and the SRBC have established ongoing
issue-related advisory committees that sometimes include members of the
public. For example, the DRBC has established a flood advisory committee
and the SRBC an agricultural water use committee. Moreover, officials of
the CRGC, the DRBC, and the SRBC reported that their commissions set up
short-term committees, which may include members of the public, to provide
input on specific issues or concerns that arise.
^8An FTE generally consists of one or more employed individuals who
collectively complete 2,080 work hours in a given year. Therefore, either
one full-time employee or two half-time employees equal one FTE.
Dispute Resolution
To avoid litigation, TRPA and the three other commissions generally use
similar mechanisms for resolving disputes between the commission and those
it regulates. These mechanisms include administrative appeals, mediation,
and negotiation. Specifically, TRPA, like the three other compact
commissions, has an administrative appeals process that allows individuals
to appeal a final action of the executive director to the governing board
without proceeding directly to court. In addition, TRPA, like the CRGC and
the DRBC, also uses mediation as an alternative process for resolving
disputes. However, only the CRGC explicitly provides for mediation as part
of its administrative appeals process. Lastly, TRPA, like the CRGC and the
SRBC, uses negotiation to resolve cases involving noncompliance with its
regulations.
Public Accountability
In addition to using similar mechanisms for resolving disputes, the four
commissions use similar mechanisms to help ensure accountability. Some
mechanisms serve to help ensure accountability and transparency of
commission decisions, while others provide financial accountability.
Generally, all four commissions:
o Report their activities to state or federal agencies or
officials. TRPA, like the CRGC and the SRBC, regularly reports to
its member states' budget committees during its budget cycles.
According to TRPA and CRGC officials, TRPA and the CRGC have also
been required to report to state legislative oversight committees.
Both the DRBC and the SRBC are required by their compacts to
prepare an annual report to the legislative bodies of their member
states. In contrast, TRPA and the CRGC are not required by their
compacts to issue an annual report. In addition to their regular
reporting, all four commissions report to state or federal
agencies or officials when requested.
o Conduct periodic progress reviews. As required by their
compacts, all four commissions conduct periodic reviews of their
progress toward meeting compact objectives and make the results
available to the states and the public. Specifically, TRPA
assesses its progress toward achieving the goals of its
comprehensive plan every 5 years and issues a report. The CRGC
conducts a similar assessment every 10 years. The DRBC evaluates
its progress toward its strategic plan every year, and the SRBC
does so from time to time, but not according to a set schedule.
o Undergo state evaluations of their performance. TRPA, like the
CRGC and the DRBC, undergoes state evaluations of its performance.
However, such evaluations do not occur on a regular basis. The
most recent TRPA evaluation occurred in 2004, the CRGC in 2003,
and the DRBC in 2006. While no member state has evaluated the
SRBC's performance, officials reported that state member
representatives have on occasion audited the commission's
financial records.
o Make commission meetings and records available to the public.
All four commissions hold meetings that the public can attend, and
provide opportunities for the public to provide input into
decision making. They also make commission records available to
the public, such as commission meeting minutes and records of
individual members' votes, enabling the states and the public to
hold individual commissioners accountable for their decisions.
o Conduct public outreach. All four commissions use various
approaches to conduct public outreach, such as press releases,
commission Web sites, workshops, presentations, newsletters, and
speakers' bureaus.
o Undergo annual financial audits. All four commissions are
audited annually and the results are presented to each commission
in a public meeting. Such audits are required for the CRGC, the
DRBC, and the SRBC by their compacts. In the case of the DRBC and
the SRBC, the audits must be performed by third parties.
o Submit grant reports. All four commissions submit reports to the
appropriate state and federal agencies, as required by the
agencies, for grant monies received.
TRPA Has More Extensive Land Use Planning Authority than the Three
Other Commissions
While all four commissions have the authority to adopt and enforce
regulations, a major distinction between TRPA and the three other
compact commissions is that TRPA has broad land use planning
authority that requires it to address a wide range of
environmental issues. Specifically, under its compact, TRPA is
required to adopt environmental standards to protect the natural
environment and to maintain public health and safety within the
Tahoe region. The nine standards adopted by TRPA address air
quality, water quality, soil conservation, wildlife habitat, fish
habitat, vegetation preservation, noise, recreation, and scenic
resources. After setting the standards, TRPA was required to adopt
a regional plan and ordinances to achieve and maintain the
standards. The ordinances were required to contain, at minimum,
standards for water purity and clarity; subdivision; zoning; tree
removal; solid waste disposal; sewage disposal; landfills;
excavations; cuts and grading; piers, harbors, breakwaters or
channels, and other shoreline developments; waste disposal in
shoreline areas; waste disposal from boats; mobile home parks;
house relocation; outdoor advertising; flood plain protection;
soil and sedimentation control; air pollution; and watershed
protection. Further, these ordinances preempt the regulations of
local and state agencies in the region, unless such regulations
are stricter, and must be interpreted consistently with federal
laws that may also apply within the Lake Tahoe region. Any project
that may substantially affect the land, water, or any other
natural resources of the Lake Tahoe region must comply with
applicable provisions of the compact, the regional plan,
ordinances, and rules and regulations.
In comparison to TRPA, the CRGC is more limited in its land use
planning authority. Whereas TRPA is broadly responsible for how
and to what extent land--as well as water, air, and other natural
resources--is used within the region, the CRGC only regulates the
use of land when it affects cultural, natural, recreational, or
scenic resources. For example, unlike TRPA, the CRGC cannot
regulate land use for public health and safety, such as natural
hazards, or for noise. Further, the CRGC can set and enforce
standards only when a county fails to enact land use ordinances
consistent with the commission's management plan, and only one of
the six counties in the Scenic Area has failed to do so. In
contrast, neither the DRBC nor the SRBC has regulatory authority
over land use; instead, local jurisdictions have such authority.
However, the decisions of the DRBC and the SRBC, which both
regulate water consumption and withdrawal, indirectly affect land
use because the water withdrawal requirements each commission sets
to manage water resources in its respective basin can influence
how land can be used.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to interested congressional committees. We
will also provide copies to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Anu K. Mittal
Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on congressionally approved interstate compacts
that address environment and natural resource issues.
Specifically, we were asked to determine (1) the approaches used
to administer congressionally approved environment and natural
resource compacts, including their organizational structure,
powers and authorities, and mechanisms for resolving disputes and
providing public accountability; (2) the extent to which concerns
have been raised regarding the structure and governance of those
compacts, like the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, that have
commissions; and (3) specifically, how the structure and
governance of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) compares
to those of other similar compact commissions.
To determine the approaches used to administer congressionally
approved interstate compacts that address environment and natural
resource issues, we used Interstate Compacts & Agencies 2003, a
directory compiled by the Council of State Governments, and
prepared a list of 76 such compacts.^1 From this list, we
identified and reviewed 59 compacts with congressional approval.
We also obtained and reviewed relevant compact documents, such as
bylaws, rules of procedure, and management plans, for information
on the compact's organizational structure, powers and authorities,
and mechanisms for resolving disputes and providing public
accountability. In addition, we developed and distributed a
Web-based survey to officials from the 45 compacts with an
operational commission to obtain additional information on the
structure and governance of their compacts, as well as the extent
to which significant concerns have been raised regarding
commission structure or composition, method of selecting
commissioners, current regulatory authority, and public
accountability.^2
The practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
nonsampling error. For example, differences in how a particular
question is interpreted, the sources of information available to
respondents, or the types of people who do not respond can
introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. Therefore,
we included steps in developing and administering the survey for
the purpose of minimizing such nonsampling errors. For example, we
pretested the survey with three compact commission officials and
used their feedback to refine the survey. Also, to reduce survey
nonresponse, we sent e-mail reminders and conducted follow-up
telephone calls with nonrespondents. Overall, officials from 36 of
the 45 compacts in our sampling frame responded to our survey, for
a response rate of 80 percent. Where necessary, we conducted
follow-up telephone interviews with commission officials to
clarify survey responses and obtain additional information on the
concerns raised regarding their commission's structure and
governance.
^1This directory is the most recent compilation of interstate compacts
available.
^2The Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact established a commission,
but at the time of our review, the commission was not yet operational.
In addition to our survey, we contacted officials of compacts
without commissions to obtain information on the administration of
these compacts.
To determine the extent to which concerns have been raised
regarding the structure and governance of compacts with
commissions, we used the results of our survey of compact
commission officials to identify commissions where significant
concerns about commission composition, method of selecting
commissioners, current regulatory authority, and public
accountability have been raised. We conducted follow-up interviews
with commission officials to obtain additional information on the
nature and frequency of these concerns. We also reviewed relevant
documents, such as studies, news articles, and court cases for
information on concerns. We also interviewed interstate compact
experts to obtain their views on issues related to the
organizational structure, authority, and public accountability of
compact commissions.
To determine how TRPA compares to other interstate compact
commissions, we used the results of our survey of compact
commission officials to identify commissions that are similar to
TRPA. The criteria for selecting similar commissions included (1)
having the authority to issue regulations and (2) having a plan
for achieving the compact's objectives that addresses at least six
of the following issues: land use, transportation, conservation,
recreation, public services and facilities, water pollution, flood
control, and waste disposal. We identified three commissions that
met these criteria--the Columbia River Gorge Commission, the
Delaware River Basin Commission, and the Susquehanna River Basin
Commission. To obtain information on each of these commission's
structure and governance, we obtained and reviewed relevant
documents, such as compact plans, commission meeting minutes,
reports, and news articles. We interviewed commission staff in
Stateline, Nevada; White Salmon, Washington; West Trenton, New
Jersey; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and attended meetings of
TRPA, the Columbia River Gorge Commission, and the Nevada
legislative oversight committee on TRPA. In addition, we
interviewed compact stakeholders, such as commissioners; federal,
state, and local government officials; environmentalists; business
community members; and representatives of groups regulated by the
commissions to obtain their views on the organizational structure
and governance of their commissions.
We conducted our work from April 2006 through March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Descriptions of Interstate Compacts Included in Our
Review
This appendix provides information on the 59 congressionally
approved environment and natural resource compacts that we
included in our review.
Table 4: Congressionally Approved Environment and Natural Resource
Compacts
Compact Members Description
Appalachian States 4 states Establishes a commission to
Low-Level Radioactive manage and dispose of low-level
Waste Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Arkansas River Basin 2 states Apportions the waters of the
Compact of 1970 Arkansas River Basin and creates
a commission to administer the
agreement, encourage pollution
abatement programs, and
facilitate cooperation for total
development and management of
water resources in the river
basin.
Arkansas River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the
of 1949 Arkansas River and establishes an
administration as the supervising
agency.
Arkansas River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the
of 1965 Arkansas River Basin, establishes
a commission to administer the
agreement, and encourages further
pollution-abatement programs.
Atlantic States Marine 15 states Establishes a commission to
Fisheries Compact promote better utilization of
fisheries along the Atlantic
seaboard.
Bear River Compact 3 states Apportions the waters of the Bear
River and establishes a
commission to administer the
agreement. Also allocated new
blocks of water for future
development in the three member
states.
Belle Fourche River 2 states Apportions the waters of the
Compact Belle Fourche River with
particular emphasis on
administering public water
supplies in the two member
states.
Big Blue River Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to
promote interstate comity and
equitably apportion the waters of
the Big Blue River Basin to
promote orderly development of
water resources and to continue
active water pollution abatement
programs.
Canadian River Compact 3 states Establishes a commission to
apportion the waters of the
Canadian River in New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Texas, and to
perform all functions required by
the compact.
Central Interstate 4 states Establishes a commission to
Low-Level Radioactive manage and dispose of low-level
Waste Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Central Midwest 2 states Establishes a commission to
Low-Level Radioactive manage and dispose of low-level
Waste Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Colorado River Compact 7 states Apportions the waters of the
Colorado River Basin.
Columbia River Compact 2 states Provides for the regulation,
preservation, and protection of
fish in the waters of the
Columbia River.
Columbia River Gorge 2 states Establishes a regional agency to
Compact govern the planning and
development of the area
designated by the Columbia River
Gorge National Scenic Area Act.
Powers include disapproving
county land use ordinances that
are inconsistent with the area's
management plan and enacting
ordinances setting standards for
using nonfederal land within the
scenic area.
Connecticut River 3 states Promotes the restoration of
Atlantic Salmon Compact anadromous Atlantic salmon by
developing a joint interstate
program for stocking, protection,
management, research, and
regulation.
Connecticut River Valley 3 states Establishes a commission to
Flood Control Compact provide for financial
reimbursement by downstream
states for economic losses to
political subdivisions in which
flood control reservoirs are
located.
Costilla Creek Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of Costilla
Creek and creates the necessary
administrative structure. Amended
in 1963 to perfect further
utilization of interstate waters.
Delaware River Basin 4 states & U.S. Establishes a commission as a
Compact regional multipurpose water
resources regulatory agency.
Great Lakes Basin 8 states Establishes a commission to
Compact advise and make recommendations
to the member states concerning
regional water resources matters.
Gulf States Marine 5 states Establishes a commission to
Fisheries Compact promote the better utilization of
the fisheries of the seaboard of
the Gulf of Mexico by developing
a joint program for promoting and
protecting such fisheries and
preventing the physical waste of
the fisheries from any cause.
Interstate Compact to 30 states Establishes a commission to study
Conserve Oil and Gas and make recommendations about
energy efficiency that would help
member states' economies and
encourage energy independence.
Jennings Randolph Lake 2 states Provides for concurrent
Project Compact jurisdiction among West Virginia,
Maryland, and the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers to enforce civil and
criminal laws of these states
concerning natural resources,
boating, and other regulations
over the land and waters of the
Jennings Randolph Lake Project.
Klamath River Basin 2 states Establishes a commission to
Compact promote comprehensive
development, conservation, and
control of the resources of the
Klamath River.
La Plata River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the La
Plata River and creates a
commission to administer the
compact.
Merrimack River Flood 2 states Establishes a commission to
Control Compact coordinate flood control planning
and water resource management in
the basin of the Merrimack River
and its tributaries.
Middle Atlantic Forest 7 states Provides mutual assistance in
Fire Protection Compact forest fire protection and
control.
Midwest Interstate 6 states Establishes a commission to
Low-Level Radioactive manage and dispose of low-level
Waste Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
New England Interstate 7 states Establishes a commission to
Water Pollution Compact coordinate the water pollution
control activities of the
signatory states as they pertain
to the waters of the compact
area. Other activities include
assurance of water quality
planning and standards in the
compact area, improving
groundwater program coordination,
and distributing public-oriented
information addressing current
environmental issues.
New Hampshire-Vermont 2 states Authorizes local governments in
Interstate Public Water New Hampshire and Vermont to
Supply Compact enter into agreements for jointly
erecting and maintaining public
water supply facilities.
New Hampshire-Vermont 2 states Authorizes local governments and
Interstate Sewage and sewage districts in New Hampshire
Waste Disposal and Vermont to engage in programs
Facilities Compact for abatement of pollution
through joint facilities for the
disposal of sewage and other
waste products.
Northeast Interstate 3 states Establishes a commission to
Low-Level Radioactive manage and dispose of low-level
Waste Management Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Northeastern Forest Fire 7 states, 1 Establishes a commission to
Protection Compact national promote effective prevention and
forest, &3 control of forest fires in the
provinces New England states, New York, and
adjoining Canadian provinces.
Northwest Compact on 8 states Establishes a commission to
Low-Level Radioactive manage and dispose of low-level
Waste Management radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Ohio River Valley Water 8 states Establishes a commission for the
Sanitation Compact purpose of maintaining waters in
the river basin in a satisfactory
condition, available for use as
public and industrial water
supply after reasonable
treatment, suitable for
recreational use, and capable of
maintaining healthy aquatic
communities.
Pacific Marine Fisheries 5 states Establishes a commission to
Compact promote the conservation,
development, and management of
Pacific coast fishery resources
through coordinated regional
research, monitoring, and
utilization.
Pecos River Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to
administer the compact and
apportion the waters of the Pecos
River.
Potomac River Compact of 2 states Establishes a commission to
1958 conserve and improve fishing
resources in the tidewater
portion of the Potomac River.
Potomac Valley Compact 3 states, D.C., Creates a conservancy district
& U.S. and establishes a commission to
cooperatively preserve water
quality and to conserve water and
related land resources of the
Potomac River Basin.
Red River Compact 4 states Provides for the equitable
apportionment of the waters and
tributaries of the Red River.
Republican River Compact 3 states Establishes an agency to provide
for the most efficient use of
basin waters for multiple
purposes and to provide for the
equitable division of water.
Rio Grande Compact 3 states Establishes a commission to
administer the compact and
apportion water.
Rocky Mountain Low-Level 3 states Establishes a commission to
Radioactive Waste manage and dispose of low-level
Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Sabine River Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to
apportion the waters of the
Sabine River and to plan,
develop, and conserve the water
resources of the river basin.
Snake River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the
Snake River.
South Central Forest 5 states Provides mutual aid in forest
Fire Protection Compact fire protection and control among
the states in the south central
area.
South Platte River 2 states Apportions the waters of the
Compact South Platte River.
Southeast Interstate 7 states Establishes a commission to
Low-Level Radioactive manage and dispose of low-level
Waste Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Southeastern Forest Fire 10 states Provides mutual aid in forest
Protection Compact fire prevention and control among
states in the southeastern area.
Southern Compact 16 states Provides for regional cooperation
in the proper utilization of
energy and environmental
resources in the southern states.
Southwestern Low-Level 4 states Establishes a commission to
Radioactive Waste manage and dispose of low-level
Disposal Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Susquehanna River Basin 3 states & U.S. Establishes a federal-interstate
Compact administrative commission to
engage in comprehensive planning,
development, and management of
water and related resources of
the Susquehanna River Basin.
Tahoe Regional Planning 2 states Establishes a regional planning
Compact agency with power to adopt and
enforce a regional plan of
resource conservation and
development and to exercise
various environmental controls
over the Tahoe Basin. Amended in
1980 to require adoption of
environmental threshold
capacities for the Tahoe Basin.
Texas Low-Level 2 states Establishes a commission to
Radioactive Waste manage and dispose of low-level
Disposal Compact radioactive waste generated
within member states' borders.
Thames River Flood 2 states Establishes a commission to
Control Compact administer the compact and
promote the cooperation in flood
control and in the use of water
resources of the Thames River
Basin.
Tri-State Sanitation 3 states Creates a commission to promote
Compact water pollution abatement and
control within the tidal and
coastal waters in the adjacent
portions of Connecticut, New
Jersey, and New York. Since 1962,
the commission has served as the
coordinating and planning agency
for air quality control within
the tristate boundary area.
Upper Colorado River 5 states Establishes a commission to
Basin Compact administer apportionment of the
waters of the Upper Colorado
River Basin System and to promote
agricultural and industrial
development.
Upper Niobrara River 2 states Apportions the waters of the
Compact Upper Niobrara River Basin and
the ground waters common to
Nebraska and Wyoming.
Wheeling Creek Watershed 2 states Establishes a commission for the
Protection and Flood purpose of administering programs
Prevention District of flood control and preservation
Compact of natural resources and
recreational facilities in the
Wheeling Creek watershed.
Yellowstone River 3 states Establishes a commission to
Compact apportion the waters of the
Yellowstone River.
Sources: The Council of State Governments' Interstate Compacts & Agencies
2003 and GAO analysis.
ppendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three Selected Compact Commissions
This appendix describes the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) and
three compact commissions that perform similar functions to TRPA.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
Lake Tahoe is located in the Sierra Nevada Mountains on the border of
California and Nevada (see fig. 6). Approximately two-thirds of the lake
lies in California and one-third in Nevada. Lake Tahoe is about 22 miles
long and 12 miles wide and has a surface area of 191 square miles. With an
average surface elevation of 6,225 feet above sea level, Lake Tahoe is the
highest lake of its size in the United States. The lake, which is known
for its exceptional purity and clarity, has been called a national
treasure.
Figure 6: Map and Photographs of the Lake Tahoe Region
Reports of Lake Tahoe's beauty did not go unnoticed. By the turn of the
twentieth century, the lake had become a summer resort, primarily for the
wealthy. Following World War II, the Tahoe region experienced rapid growth
with the availability of modern snow removal equipment, which enabled the
states to keep the highways into Lake Tahoe open during the winter months,
coupled with the establishment of year-round casinos in Nevada and the
1960 Winter Olympic Games in nearby Squaw Valley, which further stimulated
development of the winter sports industry. Postwar affluence and increased
leisure time, along with rapid population growth in urban centers in
northern California, resulted in a large increase in the number of
tourists and seasonal residents at Lake Tahoe. In response to growing
concerns about the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and its
environment--particularly a proposal for a four-lane freeway with a bridge
over Lake Tahoe's famed Emerald Bay, the states of California and Nevada
negotiated a bistate compact that created a regional planning agency to
oversee development at Lake Tahoe. Congress gave its consent to the
compact in 1969.^1
The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact established the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (TRPA) to administer the compact. It also created a
governing board that, according to TRPA officials, functioned like a
regional planning board. The majority of the board members were local
residents. Project approval required a majority of votes from each state.
Further, the compact had a provision that if a project was not acted upon
within 60 days, the project would automatically be deemed approved. Under
this provision, development continued unchecked, and the compact was
amended and ratified by Congress in 1980 to give more control to statewide
rather than local representatives and to eliminate the 60-day provision.^2
The compact, as amended, grants TRPA the authority to establish
environmental quality standards, called thresholds, and to adopt and
enforce a regional plan and ordinances for achieving and maintaining the
standards while providing opportunities for orderly growth and development
consistent with the standards.
Columbia River Gorge Commission
The Columbia River Gorge is a canyon up to 4,000 feet deep that stretches
for over 85 miles as the Columbia River cuts through the Cascade
Mountains, forming the boundary of the states of Washington and Oregon
(see fig. 7). Because of its scenic beauty, abundant natural resources,
and multicultural history, the Columbia River Gorge has been called a
national treasure. In addition, the gorge provides many recreational
opportunities--such as fishing, hiking, rock climbing, and world-class
windsurfing--that attract millions of visitors a year.
^1Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969).
^2Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).
Figure 7: Map and Photographs of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic
Area
The completion of a highway along the Columbia River in 1915 opened up the
gorge to recreation and stimulated growth on both sides of the river. By
the 1930s, development impacts on the gorge were becoming a source of
concern and, by the 1950s, both Oregon and Washington had created
individual gorge commissions. However, their effectiveness became limited
by inadequate funding, lack of authority, and opposition from various
sources. In 1980, an attempt to build a subdivision in Skamania County,
Washington, across the Columbia River from Multnomah Falls, one of
Oregon's premier tourist attractions, provided the catalyst to find
permanent protection for the gorge's natural resources, and, in 1986,
Congress passed the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act.^3 The
Scenic Area, which totals about 292,500 acres, stretches for 85 miles on
either side of the Columbia River and includes portions of three counties
in Oregon and three counties in Washington.
The purpose of the Scenic Area Act is to (1) establish a national scenic
area to protect and provide for the enhancement of the gorge's scenic,
cultural, recreational, and natural resources and (2) protect and support
the economy of the Columbia River Gorge area by encouraging growth in
urban areas and allowing economic development that is consistent with the
first purpose. The act authorized Oregon and Washington to enter into a
compact that would create a regional agency known as the Columbia River
Gorge Commission and required that the commission carry out its functions
and responsibilities in accordance with the compact and the act. These
functions and responsibilities included, among others, adopting a
management plan for the Scenic Area, administering the plan, reviewing the
plan periodically, and amending it as necessary.
Delaware River Basin Commission
The Delaware River Basin consists of 13,539 square miles, draining parts
of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Delaware (see fig. 8). Nearly
15 million people rely on the waters of the basin for drinking and
industrial use, including 7 million people in the New York City area and
northern New Jersey who live outside the basin. New York City gets nearly
half of its water from three large reservoirs located on the tributaries
to the Delaware, and Philadelphia gets 100 percent of its water supply
directly from the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers. In addition, the
Delaware River Port Complex (including docking facilities in Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and Delaware) is the largest freshwater port in the world.
^3Pub. L. No. 99-663, 100 Stat. 4274 (1986).
Figure 8: Map and Photographs of the Delaware River Basin
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court resolved years of interstate
conflict over water rights by apportioning the waters of the Delaware
River among the four states and New York City. In doing so, the Court did
not guarantee a final apportionment of water resources, but allowed the
parties to return to court if circumstances changed. Instead of risking
future litigation, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and the
United States created the Delaware River Basin Compact to provide a
unified approach to managing the river system without regard to political
boundaries. Congress granted its consent to the agreement in 1961.^4
The compact created the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) to
administer its provisions. The DRBC was given broad authority to plan,
regulate, and coordinate management of the basin's waters. The commission
regulates water supply allocation and water quality protection and has the
authority to issue pollution control standards. In addition, the
commission, acting on information from its advisory committees, makes
recommendations to its member states on issues such as toxic pollutants,
water quality, flooding, and flow management.
Susquehanna River Basin Commission
The Susquehanna River is the nation's 16th largest river, originating near
Cooperstown, New York, and emptying into the Chesapeake Bay at Havre de
Grace, Maryland (see fig. 9). Along with its tributaries, the river drains
27,510 square miles, an area nearly the size of South Carolina. It is also
the largest river lying entirely in the United States that flows into the
Atlantic Ocean, and it provides 50 percent of the fresh water entering
into the Chesapeake Bay.
^4Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
Figure 9: Map and Photographs of the Susquehanna River Basin
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the United States created the
Susquehanna River Basin Compact to plan and manage the development of the
basin's water resources, among other purposes. The compact was modeled
after the Delaware River Basin Compact. The compact received congressional
consent in 1970.^5 However, unlike the Delaware compact, which was created
after its member states had litigated before the Supreme Court over water
distributions, the Susquehanna compact was created to avoid such a dispute
by providing for interstate coordination of efforts to develop and
administer the water resources of the river basin.
The compact established the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC) to
administer its provisions. The SRBC regulates water withdrawals,
diversions, and releases, and is authorized to issue water quality
standards and enforce those standards. The commission also has established
several permanent advisory committees that develop recommendations for
member states to consider on a variety of issues, including water
resources management, water quality, agricultural water use, and drought
management. In addition, the commission establishes short-term committees
as specific needs dictate.
^5Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] .
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Sherry McDonald, Assistant
Director; Fatema Choudhury; Christopher Ferencik; Katherine Freeman; Susan
Malone; Roderick Moore; and Tama Weinberg made key contributions to this
report. Also contributing to this report were Kevin Bray, Thomas James,
Alison O'Neill, and John Smale, Jr.
(360680)
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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-519 .
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Highlights of [49]GAO-07-519 , a report to congressional requesters
April 2007
INTERSTATE COMPACTS
An Overview of the Structure and Governance of Environment and Natural
Resource Compacts
Interstate compacts are legal agreements between states that are designed
to resolve concerns that transcend state lines, such as allocating
interstate waters. While some compacts assign their administration to
existing state agencies, compacts requiring greater coordination among
states may establish an interstate agency, typically called a commission,
to administer their provisions.
Congress must give its consent to compacts that affect the balance of
power between the states and the federal government. An example of a
congressionally approved environment and natural resource compact is the
Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, which created the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA) to administer its provisions. For such compacts, GAO
determined (1) the organizational structures, powers and authorities, and
dispute resolution and public accountability mechanisms; (2) the extent to
which concerns have been raised about the structure and governance of
compacts that have commissions; and (3) how the structure and governance
of TRPA compares to those of other similar compact commissions.
GAO reviewed 59 congressionally approved compacts and surveyed those 45
that had commissions. To view selected results from GAO's survey of
interstate compact commission officials, go to
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-524SP.
Forty-six of the 59 congressionally approved environment and natural
resource compacts that GAO reviewed had established interstate commissions
to administer the compact, while the remainder relied on existing state
agencies. The 46 compacts with commissions varied in their organizational
structure, powers and authorities, and means of resolving disputes, but
were similar in how they ensured public accountability. For example,
commission size ranged from 2 to 48 members, and some commissions had
regulatory authority, while others had only advisory authority. Twenty-six
percent of the compacts had provisions for resolving disputes. However,
about 36 percent of the commissions responding to GAO's survey reported
that they had used means other than litigation to resolve disputes.
Significantly more, about 94 percent, of the commissions reported having
procedures for ensuring public accountability, such as holding public
meetings and allowing public input. For the 13 compacts that did not have
commissions, GAO found variations in their powers and authorities, and few
of these compacts provided mechanisms for dispute resolution or public
accountability.
Interstate compact commissions reported that significant concerns about
their structure and governance have rarely been raised. When concerns did
arise about organizational structure and public accountability, they
varied from commission to commission. However, concerns about regulatory
authority largely centered on the scope of the commission's authority. In
addition, a number of compact officials believed that concerns about
commission structure and governance often reflected disagreements with
specific commission actions rather than actual concerns about the
organizational structure, public accountability, or regulatory authority
of the commission itself.
The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency is generally similar in organizational
structure and governance to three other interstate compact commissions
with comparable functions--the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River Basin,
and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions. All four commissions consist of
appointed representatives, although their size and composition vary; they
all have an administrative appeals process to resolve disputes, and they
use similar accountability mechanisms. A major difference between the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and the other commissions relates to the
breadth of its authority regarding land use issues. This authority extends
to water, air, and other natural resources, as well as public health and
safety, whereas the Columbia River Gorge Commission has more limited land
use authority, and the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions
have no land use authority.
References
Visible links
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-524SP
49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-519
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