The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage
of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency
Operations (04-MAY-07, GAO-07-515).
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides
direction to the federal executive boards (FEBs), is now
emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment, the boards have a
transformed emergency support role. The report discusses the
boards' emergency preparedness roles and responsibilities and
their potential role in preparing for and responding to pandemic
influenza. GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because they
coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or had recent
emergency management experience.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-515
ACCNO: A69125
TITLE: The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take
Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to
Emergency Operations
DATE: 05/04/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Agency missions
Emergency preparedness
Emergency response
Federal agencies
Financial analysis
Influenza
Interagency relations
Pandemic
Public health
Strategic planning
National Response Plan
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-07-515
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibi
* [4]OPM and the FEBs Continue to Work on a Common Set of Perform
* [5]All of the Selected FEBs Were Performing Some Emergency Acti
* [6]FEB Representatives Reported Working with FEMA on COOP Plann
* [7]FEBs Have Played a Role in Responding to Past Emergencies
* [8]The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support
* [9]A Defined FEB Role in National Emergency Plans Would Better
* [10]The Operational Framework for the Boards Poses Accountabilit
* [11]Varying FEB Capacities Test the Boards' Ability to Provide C
* [12]The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a Particu
* [13]Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Present Differe
* [14]FEBs' Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in
* [15]FEBs Are Acting as Conveners to Deliver Planning and Trainin
* [16]Conclusions
* [17]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [18]Agency Comments
* [19]GAO Contact
* [20]Acknowledgments
* [21]GAO's Mission
* [22]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [23]Order by Mail or Phone
* [24]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [25]Congressional Relations
* [26]Public Affairs
Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
May 2007
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE
Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards'
Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations
GAO-07-515
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 6
FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are
Being Developed as a Core Function of the Boards 8
The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support Services 17
The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a Particularly Valuable
Asset in Pandemic Preparedness and Response 27
Conclusions 35
Recommendations for Executive Action 36
Agency Comments 37
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 39
Appendix II Office of Personnel Management Document Describing the FEB
Role and Responsibilities in Emergency Situations 41
Appendix III FEBs' Host Agencies 42
Appendix IV Comments from the Office of Personnel Management 43
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45
Table
Table 1: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by Each FEB in
Descending Order of Employees Served 23
Figures
Figure 1: Location of the 28 FEBs 7
Figure 2: Jurisdictional Boundaries of the 28 FEBs 22
Figure 3: Participants in Two Minnesota FEB Pandemic Tabletop Exercises 32
Abbreviations
MEM Association of Minnesota Emergency Managers
APC Advanced Pharmaceutical Cache
COOP continuity of operations
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FEB federal executive board
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
GSA General Services Administration
HCLMSA Human Capital Leadership and Merit System Accountability
JFO joint field office
JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
ONSC Office of National Security Coordination
OPM Office of Personnel Management
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 4, 2007 May 4, 2007
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka Chairman The Honorable George V. Voinovich
Ranking Member Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate The Honorable
Daniel K. Akaka Chairman The Honorable George V. Voinovich Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs United States Senate
In an April 2004 report on opportunities to improve federal continuity
planning, we concluded that federal executive boards (FEB) are uniquely
positioned to improve coordination of emergency preparedness efforts in
areas outside of Washington, D.C.^1 Located in 28 cities with a large
federal presence, the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to
strengthen federal management practices, improve intergovernmental
relations, and participate as a unified federal force in local civic
affairs. The membership of each board is made up of the highest ranking
federal agency officials in the FEB service area. The regulations that
guide FEB operations state that the boards shall be responsible for
emergency operations, such as those under hazardous weather conditions;
responding to blood donation needs; and communicating related leave
policies.^212 Much of the FEB emergency operations responsibility in the
past has been providing advisories regarding hazardous weather conditions
to member agency leaders and providing a forum in which agency leaders
could make informed decisions about office closings affecting their
employees. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides
direction to the boards, is now emphasizing that in the post-9/11
environment the FEBs have a transformed role that encompasses elements of
emergency preparedness, employee security, and continuity of operations.
Although the boards are not intended to be first responders, we
recommended in the 2004 report that OPM should determine the desired role
for the FEBs in improving coordination of emergency preparedness efforts
and identify and address FEB capacity issues to meet that role. In an
April 2004 report on opportunities to improve federal continuity planning,
we concluded that federal executive boards (FEB) are uniquely positioned
to improve coordination of emergency preparedness efforts in areas outside
of Washington, D.C. Located in 28 cities with a large federal presence,
the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen
federal management practices, improve intergovernmental relations, and
participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. The
membership of each board is made up of the highest ranking federal agency
officials in the FEB service area. The regulations that guide FEB
operations state that the boards shall be responsible for emergency
operations, such as those under hazardous weather conditions; responding
to blood donation needs; and communicating related leave policies. Much of
the FEB emergency operations responsibility in the past has been providing
advisories regarding hazardous weather conditions to member agency leaders
and providing a forum in which agency leaders could make informed
decisions about office closings affecting their employees. The Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), which provides direction to the boards, is now
emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment the FEBs have a transformed
role that encompasses elements of emergency preparedness, employee
security, and continuity of operations. Although the boards are not
intended to be first responders, we recommended in the 2004 report that
OPM should determine the desired role for the FEBs in improving
coordination of emergency preparedness efforts and identify and address
FEB capacity issues to meet that role.
^1GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity Planning
Guidance, [27]GAO-04-384 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2004).
^25 C.F.R. S 960.107 (c) (6).
Determining the FEB role in emergency operations is particularly
challenging given that the boards operate with no independent authority
and with resources voluntarily provided by member agencies. The boards
depend on a host agency, generally the agency with the greatest number of
employees in the area, to provide staff of usually one or two full-time
personnel, including an executive director. The FEBs also rely on their
hosts and other member agencies for operating expenses. Important to
emergency preparedness, one of the FEB functions includes building
relationships with state and local organizations to promote federal
involvement within their communities.
Emergency preparedness efforts involve dealing with the full range of
emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters. Attention has
focused on pandemic influenza, a real and significant threat facing the
United States and the rest of the world. Influenza pandemics occur when a
novel influenza virus emerges that can be effectively transmitted between
humans who have little immunity to it. The last three pandemics in the
20th century occurred in 1918, 1957, and 1968, and killed approximately 40
million, 2 million, and 1 million people worldwide, respectively. Although
the timing of the next pandemic is unpredictable, there is widespread
agreement that an influenza pandemic will occur at some point. A pandemic
is not a singular event, but is likely to come in waves, each lasting
months, and pass through communities of all sizes across the nation and
the world simultaneously. A pandemic could threaten society and the
economy by removing essential personnel, including federal government
employees, from the workplace for weeks or months.
To obtain a better understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and
capacities of selected FEBs for emergency operations, particularly in the
event of pandemic influenza, you asked us to (1) identify the actions FEBs
have taken to fulfill their emergency preparedness and response roles and
responsibilities, (2) describe the key challenges facing the FEBs in
fulfilling these roles and responsibilities, and (3) evaluate the extent
to which the FEBs can contribute to emergency preparedness and response to
pandemic influenza.
To address our objectives, we selected 14 FEBs for our study. The selected
FEBs are Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Denver,
Los Angeles, Minnesota, New Orleans, New York City, Oklahoma,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. These FEBs were selected because
they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or have recent
experience with specific emergency management events. We obtained and
reviewed FEB documents, such as annual reports, monthly activity reports,
minutes, and correspondence, and interviewed at least two key FEB
representatives from each selected board, including the chair or vice
chair and executive director. We also had discussions with and obtained
pertinent documentation from officials at OPM and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) at their headquarters in Washington, D.C. Because
the FEBs and FEMA collaborate closely on continuity of operations (COOP)
activities in the field, we also interviewed the FEMA regional directors
in regions V and VI based in Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas,
respectively.^3 In addition, we reviewed academic literature and prior GAO
reports about leveraging collaborative networks.
We conducted our review in the 14 case study FEB cities and Washington,
D.C., from March 2006 through February 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Detailed information on our scope
and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief
OPM and the FEBs are developing a strategic plan for the boards that will
establish emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a core
FEB function with a common set of expectations for the boards' emergency
activities. This strategic plan should more fully ensure that the federal
employees located in the FEB service areas receive the needed level of
emergency support. OPM officials recognize that the FEBs can add value to
regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for communication, coordination,
and capacity building but acknowledge that the emergency support
activities provided by the FEBs vary. However, all of the selected boards
were involved in emergency activities such as disseminating emergency
preparedness information, serving as federal liaisons for state and local
emergency management officials, and organizing preparedness training.
Officials from FEMA, which provides guidance and assistance for COOP
planning across the executive branch, and almost all of the executive
directors or chairs from the selected boards cited a positive and
beneficial working relationship. In addition, although not all of the FEB
representatives felt this was a responsibility the boards should assume,
some of the selected boards have played a role in responding to
emergencies in the past. For example, the Oklahoma FEB staff played a role
in helping first responders locate building occupants after the April 19,
1995, bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.
^3COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies to ensure that the
capability exists to continue essential agency functions across a wide
range of potential emergencies.
The FEBs face several key challenges in providing support for the nation's
emergency preparedness and response efforts. First, the FEB role in
supporting the nation's emergency response structure is not developed or
identified in federal emergency guidance and plans. According to several
FEMA officials, including the FEBs in a formal role within federal
emergency structures would help the boards carry out their emergency
support role more effectively by identifying and communicating the value
the boards can add to emergency support. In addition, the framework under
which the boards operate poses accountability challenges. Although OPM is
responsible for providing program direction and oversight to the boards,
many of the FEB representatives said OPM cannot provide sufficient
leadership and feedback to 28 boards with its one-person FEB program
office. Also, aligning performance expectations for the FEB executive
directors consistent with OPM direction was hampered by the fact that the
executive directors report to a host agency and are usually subject to
that agency's rating and performance management system. Finally, the
differing sizes of the FEB service areas and their funding and resource
levels, coupled with the voluntary nature of their funding structure,
affect the capacities of the boards to support emergency preparedness. The
Los Angeles FEB, for example, primarily serves a six-county area in the
immediate vicinity of Los Angeles with approximately 120,000 federal
employees, yet the executive director noted that its staffing is similar
to FEBs covering much smaller areas and numbers of employees and agencies.
With FEB resources dependent on the continued willingness of the host
agency and other member agencies to contribute, several of the executive
directors from the selected boards said it was difficult to plan and
commit to providing emergency support services. Many of the FEB
representatives from the selected boards expressed concern that their
activities will be further affected by reduced agency funding and resource
support as agency budgets grow more constrained.
Despite these FEB challenges, the nature of an influenza pandemic makes
the boards a particularly valuable asset in planning for and responding to
a national disaster of this nature. Unlike a localized disaster, such as a
hurricane or earthquake, for which national resources can be mobilized and
deployed to assist in the disaster response, pandemic influenza will be
largely addressed by the resources available to each community it affects.
In the current pandemic planning stages, many of the selected FEBs were
already using their community relationships to facilitate communication
and coordination with local federal agency leaders and state and local
governments. These FEBs were also building capacity for pandemic influenza
response within their member agencies and community organizations through
hosting pandemic influenza training and exercises. For example, 13 of the
14 selected FEBs were involved in pandemic-related activities that ranged
from sponsoring informational briefings to coordinating pandemic
exercises. The Minnesota FEB hosted a pandemic influenza exercise in
October 2006 that included approximately 180 participants from 100
organizations within federal agencies, state and local government, and the
private sector. Given their knowledge of the federal agencies within their
jurisdictions, during pandemic influenza FEBs have the potential to
provide a forum to inform the decisions of member agency leaders and
emergency coordinators, similar to what the boards provide for other
hazards. Additionally, several of the selected FEBs were considering how
they could support the federal workforce during pandemic influenza and
provide assistance in coordinating resources to federal agencies
responding to the pandemic.
This report contains four recommendations to the Director of OPM to work
with the FEBs and FEMA to improve the capacity of the boards to enhance
their emergency support services. OPM and FEMA should formalize the FEBs'
contribution to FEMA's emergency preparedness efforts, and OPM should
initiate discussion with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
other responsible stakeholders to determine the feasibility of integrating
the FEB emergency support responsibilities into the established emergency
response framework. In addition, OPM should also continue to work on a
common set of performance standards for emergency support responsibilities
across the FEB system, for which the boards will be held accountable. As
part of the FEB strategic planning process, OPM should also develop a
proposal for alternative funding mechanisms to help ensure that the FEBs
can provide the appropriate level of emergency support for the federal
workforce.
We provided a draft of the report to the Director of OPM and to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. We received written comments from OPM,
which are included in appendix IV. While not commenting specifically on
the recommendations, OPM stated that it understands the importance of the
issues raised in the report. By documenting results and creating a
consistent accountability mechanism, and through institutionalized
relationships with strategic partners like FEMA, OPM believes that it is
building a strong business case through which it can address the resources
FEBs need to continue operations. In comments received from FEMA by
e-mail, FEMA concurred with the findings of the report and welcomed the
opportunity to work with OPM to develop a memorandum of understanding that
more formally defines the FEB role in emergency planning and response.
Background
FEBs were established by a Presidential Directive in 1961 to improve
coordination among federal activities and programs outside Washington,
D.C. The boards' overall mission includes supporting and promoting
national initiatives and responding to the local needs of federal agencies
and their communities. They provide a point of coordination for the
development and operation of federal programs having common
characteristics. Approximately 85 percent of all federal employees work
outside the greater Washington, D.C., area, and the number of FEBs has
grown from 10 to 28 over the past 46 years. When President Kennedy
established the FEBs, they were located in the major cities in each of the
10 Civil Service Commission administrative regions. He later added 2 more
boards, while President Johnson authorized 3 more, President Nixon added
10, and President Ford added 1. Two more boards were added by OPM in the
1990s bringing the total number of boards to 28. Figure 1 shows the
metropolitan areas where the 28 boards are located.^4
4Federal executive associations or federal executive councils may be
located in places where FEBs do not exist. They have purposes and
objectives similar to those of the FEBs, although they do not function
within the same formal set of parameters as FEBs (e.g., they are not
officially established by Presidential Memorandum nor do they receive
policy direction and guidance from OPM).
Figure 1: Location of the 28 FEBs
According to the regulations that guide the FEBs, the Director of OPM is
responsible for overseeing and directing the operations of all of the FEBs
consistent with the law and with the directives of the President. The
boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military
commanders in their cities, and the regulations state that each FEB should
have a chair elected by the FEB members to serve a term not to exceed a
year. The regulations also state that the boards should be governed by
bylaws or other rules for their internal governance that are developed for
each board. Although through Presidential Directive FEB membership is
mandatory for the senior agency officials within the FEB's geographic
boundaries, the boards have no independent authority and they rely on the
voluntary cooperation of their members to accomplish their goals.
The FEB funding structure is unusual within the federal government. The
boards have no legislative charter and receive no congressional
appropriation. Rather, each FEB is supported by a host agency, usually the
agency with the greatest number of employees in the region. These host
agencies provide varying levels of staffing, usually one or two full-time
positions--an executive director and an executive assistant. Some agencies
also temporarily detail employees to the FEB staff to assist their local
boards and to provide developmental opportunities for their employees.
Additionally, the FEBs are supported by member agencies through
contribution of funds as well as in-kind support, such as office space,
personal computers, telephone lines, and Internet access.^5 In 2006, OPM
estimated the cost of FEB operations at approximately $6 million.
FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are Being
Developed as a Core Function of the Boards
To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system, OPM
and the FEBs are establishing an emergency preparedness, security, and
employee safety set of activities with performance measures that will be
common to all of the boards. Although this effort is not completed, all of
the selected FEBs were doing some emergency activities, such as hosting
emergency preparedness training and exercises. For example, FEMA officials
and the FEB representatives reported working together, often with the
General Services Administration (GSA), on COOP training and exercises. In
the past, some of the selected FEBs also played a role in responding to
emergencies, although not all of the FEB representatives felt this was an
appropriate activity for the boards.
^5For a time, under a governmentwide restriction against interagency
financing of boards, commissions, or other groups, interagency financing
of FEBs was prohibited, including both cash and in-kind financial support.
See, 67 Comp. Gen. 27 (1987). However, beginning in 1996, Congress
exempted FEBs from this restriction. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, S 613, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-356 (1996).
OPM and the FEBs Continue to Work on a Common Set of Performance Standards for
FEB Emergency Support Activities
OPM and the FEBs are developing a multiyear strategic plan that will
include a core function for the FEBs called emergency preparedness,
security, and employee safety. The plan will include expectations and
measures to assess how well each FEB is performing the activities. OPM has
reported working with the boards on emergency planning issues since 2001,
and in March 2004, a document summarizing the FEB role in emergency
situations was finalized. The boards' emergency support responsibilities
include elements such as serving as a federal liaison between state and
local emergency officials, establishing notification networks and
interagency emergency preparedness councils, and hosting emergency
preparedness exercises for agencies. A complete list of the FEB emergency
support responsibilities detailed in the 2004 document can be found in
appendix II. According to an OPM official, designating emergency support
as a core function of the FEBs will further enhance the FEB role in
emergency situations. OPM officials recognize that the FEBs can add value
to regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for communication,
coordination, and capacity building but acknowledge that the emergency
activities of the FEBs have varied from board to board. The emergency
support function is intended to provide consistent delivery of FEB
emergency preparedness and response programs and activities for the
federal workforce across the system of 28 boards.
Not all of the representatives from the selected FEBs were convinced that
the boards should have an expanded emergency service support role.
Although all of the selected boards had some type of emergency
communication network and emergency preparedness council in place, there
was disagreement among the FEB representatives on the role the FEBs should
play in emergency service support, particularly during an emergency.
Without adequate staff and resources, some of the executive directors
expressed concern that they will not be able to meet expectations. One
executive director, for example, noted that because her local board lacked
24/7 communication and coordination abilities, it could not be held
accountable for emergency service roles and responsibilities. Another
executive director commented that there was a general expectation within
the board's metropolitan federal community that the FEB will assume a
significant leadership role during a possible future emergency. However,
he observed that limited and declining funding does not provide for an
effective communication system. As a consequence, he felt this expectation
was unrealistic and may contribute to major misunderstandings in the event
of a significant emergency.
On the other hand, several of the executive directors felt that the FEBs
would be able to accomplish much more in this area with additional
resources. For example, one executive director, with an emergency
operations background, emphasized that if the boards were given dependable
funding and increased stature within the federal government by formal
recognition of their emergency support role, their return on investment in
terms of emergency support functions would be substantial. In general, the
consensus among those who viewed the FEBs as having an increased role in
emergency operations was that with dependable funding and resources, all
the boards in the FEB system could and should provide a similar level of
emergency operations support. Several FEB representatives also stated that
OPM leadership and direction in clearly outlining emergency operations
expectations and OPM's oversight of these activities would diminish
uncertainty about the boards' role in emergency support, both among the
boards and federal agencies in general. They were encouraged by the
designation of emergency services as a core FEB function.
All of the Selected FEBs Were Performing Some Emergency Activities
The FEBs are charged with providing timely and relevant information to
support emergency preparedness and response coordination, and OPM expects
the boards to establish notification networks and communications plans to
be used in emergency and nonemergency situations. The boards are also
expected to disseminate relevant information received from OPM and other
agencies regarding emergency preparedness information and to relay local
emergency situation information to parties such as OPM, FEB members,
media, and state and local government authorities. FEB representatives
generally viewed the boards as an important communications link between
Washington and the field and among field agencies. For example, the
Atlanta FEB's executive director described the boards as a conduit for
both emergency and nonemergency information to member agencies through
e-mail, telephone, and Web sites. While many of the items needing
dissemination are also passed through normal agency channels, several FEB
representatives noted that it usually takes longer for communication to be
received through their agency headquarters than through the FEB channel.
The Oklahoma FEB chair described the FEBs as central depositories that
receive information from headquarters and quickly disseminate that
information to the field, reducing the information gap between Washington,
D.C., and the rest of the country.
Previously, much of the emergency support responsibility of FEBs was in
providing communication regarding hazardous and inclement weather
conditions. Almost all of the selected FEBs reported this as an emergency
activity for which they continue to have responsibility. For example, the
Atlanta FEB executive director said that during potential weather
emergencies, she and members of the Policy and Steering Committee from GSA
and the National Weather Service gather information about the forecast and
road conditions. The executive director, FEB chair, and members of the
Policy and Steering Committee then conduct a 4:00 a.m. conference call to
make a decision about suggested agency closings or delayed reporting.
Following the conference call, the FEB executive director posts a message
on the board's emergency hazard line that designated agency employees can
check. This message is also posted to the FEB general telephone line and
the FEB Web site. Several of the executive directors emphasized that they
can only make recommendations to the federal agencies in their areas of
service, but they cannot mandate that federal agencies close for weather
or other emergencies.
Although each of the selected boards we reviewed reported conducting
communications activities as a key part of its emergency support service,
they used a number of different types of communication systems. The Boston
FEB, for example, operates two electronic communications mechanisms to be
in contact with senior federal agency officials during local and national
emergencies, both during and after hours. The first is an Internet portal,
developed and maintained by the DHS Federal Protective Service, which is
designed to provide senior agency officials access to up-to-date
information, such as threat assessments and emergency weather. The second
communications system is called EDIAL, housed and maintained by the First
U.S. Coast Guard District's 24-hour command system. EDIAL, funded for the
FEB by GSA New England, enables the board to communicate with agency
officials simultaneously via an electronic telephone message in times of
emergency. Several of the executive directors mentioned the importance of
having access to the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
(GETS) cards, a White House-directed emergency phone service. GETS
provides emergency preparedness personnel a high probability of completion
for their phone calls when the probability of completing a call through
normal channels is significantly decreased. The majority of the selected
boards reported keeping an emergency contact list for officials in their
member agencies.
Several of the executive directors emphasized the importance of
standardizing the communications systems of the boards so that every FEB
is communicating in the same way. The communication abilities among the
selected FEBs did vary, often dependent on the communication system
provided by a supporting agency. For example, the Atlanta FEB reported
previously using an emergency call-down system supplied by the Atlanta
U.S. District Court, but the system was too slow. The executive director
there said she was exploring the possibility of transferring to the
Southwestern Emergency Response Network, which would give her greater
capacity to notify area agencies in emergency situations. A complaint
about many of the FEB communication systems was that they were slow or
needed to be manually updated. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB executive
director noted that with the boards becoming more of a national network
and serving as backups to one another, the importance of a fully supported
national communication network for the FEBs is becoming even more evident.
According to OPM, the FEB role in emergency service support also includes
coordination activities. For example, OPM reported that it expects the
boards to serve as federal liaisons for state and local emergency
officials and to assess local emergency situations in cooperation with
federal, state, and local officials. Although all of the boards reported
some involvement of state and local officials in their emergency
activities, the degree of board connections with state and local officials
varied. The Minnesota FEB and the Oklahoma FEB, for example, reported
strong relationships with state and local government officials, state and
local emergency management leaders, and private sector businesses. The
Dallas-Fort Worth FEB executive director reported that the board partners
with state and local government representatives, the private sector, law
enforcement, and first responders, all of which are key players in
assessing local emergency situations. On the other hand, the Chicago FEB
executive director said that because Chicago is so large, the board has
few established relationships with state and local officials. The chair of
the Boston FEB said its board had 24-hour contact numbers for some state
officials but not city officials.
In terms of coordination, the FEBs are also charged with identifying a
core group of federal leaders in each community to discuss planned courses
of action, such as delayed arrival and shelter in place, in the event of
an emergency. All of the selected boards had some type of emergency
preparedness council. In the case of the Los Angeles FEB, however, the
emergency preparedness committee had to disband because of significant
transportation challenges in the Los Angeles area. The board's executive
director said they now have an emergency preparedness e-mail group. In
addition, OPM expects the boards to provide problem resolution assistance
as appropriate, to include identifying federal resources that may be
available to assist the community in responding to, or recovering from, an
emergency. Examples of some of the selected boards' past responses during
emergencies are detailed in a section below.
OPM expects the FEBs in their capacity-building role to facilitate
training for member agencies regarding their responsibilities related to
occupant emergency plans, COOP planning, and other emergency preparedness
topics. All of the selected FEBs reported hosting at least one emergency
preparedness briefing, training, or exercise during the past year. The
Minnesota FEB, for example, hosted homeland security briefings by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Transportation Security
Administration, the Minnesota Department of Health, the Secret Service,
FEMA, the Federal Protective Service, state and county emergency
management directors, and the Department of Defense. The Denver FEB
conducts a yearly scenario-based COOP exercise usually in conjunction with
FEMA, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and GSA. In
addition to other preparedness exercises, the Chicago FEB hosted an
exercise dealing with emergency preparedness and people with disabilities.
Several FEB representatives made the point that these emergency
preparedness exercises and activities are particularly valuable for the
smaller federal agencies. While military, law enforcement, and public
safety federal agencies may have a solid grasp of emergency preparedness,
some of the smaller administrative agencies need help defining what their
responsibilities are in this area. In addition, an FEB executive director
and a chair said that the interagency exercises help to ensure that
federal workers are receiving consistent treatment across the agencies.
FEB Representatives Reported Working with FEMA on COOP Planning
One of the FEB emergency support responsibilities is facilitating COOP
training for federal agencies, and the FEB representatives reported
working with FEMA and, in many cases, GSA to accomplish this. As mentioned
previously, COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies to ensure
that the capability exists to continue essential agency functions across a
wide range of potential emergencies. FEMA, GSA, and OPM are the three
agencies that have the most direct impact on individual agency efforts to
develop viable COOP capabilities. FEMA, as the lead agency for executive
branch COOP planning, has responsibility for formulating guidance,
facilitating interagency coordination, and assessing the status of
executive branch COOP capabilities. GSA is responsible for working with
FEMA in providing COOP training for federal agencies and assisting
agencies in acquiring alternate facilities in the event of an emergency,
while OPM is responsible for maintaining and revising human capital
management guidance for emergency situations and assisting the heads of
other departments and agencies with personnel management and staffing
during national security emergencies.
FEB representatives said they work with FEMA and GSA to develop and
strengthen agency COOP and other emergency plans. For example, most of the
boards have COOP working groups or emergency committees, often lead by
FEMA and GSA, which help conduct various emergency exercises. The
exercises are designed to provide insight and guidance that can be used to
develop specific action plans that address interruptions in services
provided by their agencies, and FEB representatives said that COOP plans
are tested through these exercises. A FEMA official testified in May 2006
that the COOP working groups established with the FEBs in New Orleans,
Houston, and Miami prior to the hurricanes of 2005 and the many COOP
training and exercise activities conducted by these organizations were
instrumental in facilitating federal agency recovery and reconstitution
efforts following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.^6 During the past
year, FEMA Region III nominated the Philadelphia FEB COOP working group
for a 2006 Excellence in Government Award because the group had improved
the federal image of preparedness among the Philadelphia community through
training, exercises, and interagency coordination projects. The group
received a Silver Medal Award as a result of the nomination. As another
example of joint activities, through a campaign that is a collaboration
between FEMA, the Red Cross, and other emergency response groups, the
Boston FEB hosted a series of seminars aimed at educating employees about
home preparedness.
Almost all of the FEB executive directors or chairs from the selected
boards cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA.
Some of the executive directors also said that a strong relationship
exists between their boards and the FEMA regional directors in their
areas. In addition, the regional FEMA officials we interviewed all said
the FEBs assist FEMA with its mission. Another FEMA official noted that
reaching out to the field can be difficult, but the FEBs provide
communications and access to the majority of federal agencies, which makes
FEMA's job much easier. Although FEMA does not have a formal agreement
with the FEBs, FEMA and the FEBs have common interests in making sure the
federal workforce is protected, and the relationship proves mutually
beneficial. According to a FEMA official, many of the agencies in the
field have COOP policies, procedures, and planning in place in part
because the FEBs have assisted FEMA in getting this program out to them.
He noted that the FEBs carry the COOP activities forward and, although the
boards operate under tenuous conditions, their outreach is invaluable.
Similar to most of the opinions expressed regarding FEMA's work with the
FEBs, the Seattle FEB chair said that FEMA has displayed active leadership
and has proven to be a good connection for sharing information.
^6Statement of Robert Shea, Acting Director of Operations Federal
Emergency Management Agency, House Committee on Government Reform, May 24,
2006.
FEBs Have Played a Role in Responding to Past Emergencies
The Oklahoma FEB response to the bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah
Federal Building on April 19, 1995, illustrates the role of some of the
boards in aiding emergency response. The board staff knew all of the
agencies in the Murrah Building; the home telephone numbers of critical
staff; the city, county, and state principals in Oklahoma City; and which
federal agencies were available to provide immediate relief and support.
According to the Oklahoma executive director, with the information the FEB
was able to provide and a blueprint of the Murrah Building, the first
responders were able to determine where they might find more people after
the bombing. The FEB staff also played a role in providing support to the
victims and families of those who died in the bombing through activities
such as arranging counseling. In addition, shortly after the disaster the
Oklahoma FEB hosted a meeting with the Vice President in which local
agency leaders discussed what worked well and what needed attention in
recovering from the disaster.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita represented huge disasters in the history of
our nation, and according to a FEMA official, through these catastrophes
the New Orleans FEB's executive director established and maintained an
essential communication link between FEMA's Office of National Security
Coordination (ONSC) and OPM. A FEMA official noted that many federal
agencies, specifically smaller agencies or agencies with limited
resources, were better prepared because of the coordination,
collaboration, training, and resource sharing the New Orleans FEB was able
to provide. The New Orleans FEB executive director also became part of the
nation's first federal agency COOP and Reconstitution Team, made up of
representatives from the New Orleans and Dallas-Fort Worth FEBs, GSA,
NARA, OPM, and FEMA. Additionally, following the interruption of
communications and loss of contact with federal leaders, the executive
director was able to work through ONSC to locate and reestablish contact
with all members of the FEB Policy Committee at their alternate sites,
beginning the reconstitution of the New Orleans FEB. The FEB served as a
conduit for information between Washington and the representative local
agencies, and the Policy Committee was able to provide status updates to
identify common needs or problems that agency leaders were facing that
required expedited assistance to resolve. According to a FEMA official,
the lessons learned during the conference calls with the New Orleans FEB
Policy Committee following Hurricane Katrina allowed for better national
response and coordination during Hurricane Rita. The New Orleans FEB
executive director reported that part of her role during Hurricane Katrina
was to raise awareness that many of the essential personnel of the federal
workforce in New Orleans had no housing and, therefore, were not able to
return to work. Eventually, essential federal and local workers and
members of the New Orleans police and fire departments and their families
were housed aboard ships.
As another example of FEB support following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma, FEMA Region V put into place a temporary Chicago call center that
was scheduled to open in early September 2005. The call center was created
in response to the projected volume of calls from victims of the disasters
to enable FEMA to more effectively and rapidly communicate with them.
Because of the requirement that call center staff must be fingerprinted
and have security clearances, federal employees were the only ones who
could immediately meet FEMA's need to staff the center. The Chicago FEB
executive director coordinated with agency officials in soliciting nearly
300 federal employees who were detailed to the center while negotiations
were being conducted with a contractor who would then backfill these
positions. According to FEMA and the Chicago FEB, the effort in sharing
federal personnel was highly successful.
During nonemergency but disruptive events, such as political conventions
or rallies, the FEBs in the affected areas have helped to contain the
potential disturbance for federal agencies' operations. For example, the
FEB representatives from Boston and New York City said their boards played
a role during the national political conventions held there in the summer
of 2004. In preparation for the events, OPM conducted a series of
emergency preparedness seminars for local agency representatives through
the FEBs in both cities. The sessions provided information on emergency
planning and human resource flexibilities available to agencies for use in
emergency situations and during major public events and were designed to
prepare all federal agencies for emergencies, both natural and man-made.
In addition, OPM gave the Boston FEB vice chair and the New York City
chair onetime authority during the event to make decisions regarding the
nonemergency workforce should that become necessary. As another example,
during the immigration rallies in the summer of 2006 in Chicago, the
Chicago FEB reported that it was communicating with the Federal Protective
Service, which shared security information with the board. The Chicago FEB
was able to pass this information on to the local agencies so employees
could prepare and make alternative travel arrangements since some streets
were closed.
The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support Services
The distinctive characteristics of the FEBs within the federal government
help to explain the key challenges the boards face in providing emergency
support services. Factors including the boards' lack of a defined role in
national emergency support structures, their accountability framework, and
the differences in their capacities present challenges in providing a
needed level of emergency support across the FEB service areas.
A Defined FEB Role in National Emergency Plans Would Better Ensure That the
Boards Can Effectively Carry Out Their Emergency Support Role
According to several FEMA officials we interviewed, the FEBs could carry
out their emergency support role more effectively if their role was
included in national emergency management plans. FEMA officials from two
different regions with responsibility for emergency activities in 11
states said they felt the boards could be used more effectively and that
they add value to the nation's emergency operations. They agreed with
several of the FEB executive directors we interviewed who felt the boards
lacked recognition within the federal government's emergency response
structure and that their value in emergency support was often overlooked
by federal agency officials unfamiliar with their capabilities. A FEMA
regional director noted that it is very important that the FEB emergency
support role is understood, and he believed including the boards in
emergency management plans was an opportunity to communicate the role of
the FEBs and how they could contribute in emergencies involving the
federal workforce.
The FEMA officials provided examples of areas where the FEBs could support
the existing emergency response structure and where the boards' role could
be defined in emergency management plans. For example, while FEBs are not
first responders, the National Response Plan's^7 emphasis on local
emergency response suggests using the existing local connections and
relationships established by the FEBs. The National Response Plan is also
intended to provide a framework for how federal departments and agencies
will work together and coordinate with state, local, tribal, private
sector, and nongovernmental organizations during incidents through the
establishment of several multiagency coordination structures. Among other
activities, these coordination structures are responsible for maintaining
situational awareness,^8 information sharing, and communications;
coordinating internal operations; and coordinating among the different
entities. The FEMA officials agreed that the FEBs could provide support to
the existing emergency response structure via these multiagency
coordination centers, given the FEBs' connections and knowledge of their
local communities. The boards could provide real-time information to the
centers and have access to status reports that they could share with
high-level federal officials within their service areas during an
emergency affecting the federal workforce.
^7The National Response Plan is designed to provide the structure for the
coordination of federal support for disaster response with a basic premise
that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level
possible. State and local resources provide the first line of emergency
response and incident management support.
FEMA officials had specific suggestions for where formal inclusion of the
FEBs should be considered in multiagency coordination centers. One
official noted that when a disaster threatens the federal community, it
would be advantageous for the FEB to have a seat in the joint field office
(JFO). A JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to
coordinate operational federal assistance activities to the affected areas
during incidents of national significance. Within the JFO, senior federal
representatives form a multiagency coordination entity and direct their
staff in the JFO to share information, aid in establishing priorities
among incidents and associated resource allocation, and provide strategic
coordination of various federal incident management activities. The
reasoning behind the suggestion to include the FEBs was that the boards
have knowledge of the departments and agencies in their cities, making
them able to assess the status of the local federal community affected by
the disaster. According to the same official, another place for the FEBs
to contribute that merits consideration is the regional response
coordination center, which coordinates regional response efforts,
establishes federal priorities, and implements local federal program
support until a JFO is established.
FEMA officials also suggested that the FEBs could maintain the vital
records related to COOP, such as alternative COOP sites, phone numbers,
and emergency contacts. FEMA officials proposed that FEMA could provide
technical assistance to the FEBs to develop a COOP directory format
containing the specific information for their member agencies, while the
FEBs would be responsible for maintaining, updating, protecting, and
distributing the directory. FEMA officials also suggested that it may be
helpful for the FEBs and FEMA to draft a memorandum of understanding that
formalizes the role and responsibilities of the FEBs in assisting FEMA
with COOP and other emergency activities.
^8See GAO, Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration
at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies, [28]GAO-07-89
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2006). This report described situational
awareness as a continual process of collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating intelligence, information, and knowledge to allow
organizations and individuals to anticipate requirements, react
effectively, and establish a common operational picture. Additionally,
situational assessment includes the evaluation and interpretation of
information gathered from a variety of sources that when communicated to
emergency managers and decision makers, can provide a basis for incident
management decision making.
The need for formal agreements on emergency roles and responsibilities has
been highlighted in our previous work.^9 For example, in assessing the
response to Hurricane Katrina, we recommended that it was important for
FEMA and the Red Cross to clarify their respective roles and
responsibilities. In May 2006, the two organizations entered into a
memorandum of understanding that outlines their areas of mutual support
and cooperation in disaster response and recovery operations and in
performance of their respective roles under the National Response Plan.
The Operational Framework for the Boards Poses Accountability Challenges
According to OPM, leadership and oversight of the FEBs is conducted from
OPM Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Although the FEB regulations state
that the chairs of the FEBs should report to OPM through regional
representatives, who were charged with overseeing the activities of their
FEBs, an OPM official explained that the regional oversight these
regulations refer to is now done from headquarters. Within OPM, the
Associate Director for Human Capital Leadership and Merit System
Accountability (HCLMSA) supervises the Director for FEB Operations. Within
the HCLMSA division, the field services group managers are intended to
serve in a liaison and support role with the FEBs in their geographic
areas. An OPM official said there are five field service managers who
interact with the FEBs in their jurisdictions. While the official said the
managers are not expected to provide oversight of FEB activities, they are
expected to regularly attend FEB executive board meetings and help
coordinate OPM-provided training. Some FEB representatives reported that
their OPM field service managers were active in their FEBs, while others
said their managers were not.
^9See, for example, GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
[29]GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005), and Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be Improved
for the 2006 Hurricane Season, [30]GAO-06-712 (Washington, D.C.: June 8,
2006).
In light of the recent emphasis on systemwide expectations and
accountability measures for the boards, many of the FEB representatives we
interviewed believed OPM needs to provide additional leadership and
feedback to them. The relationship between OPM and the FEBs is
complicated, in part because the boards need a certain level of autonomy
to address regionally identified issues through projects and programs
specific to their localities. More recently, however, particularly with
the emergency support expectations for the boards that cut across the FEB
system, many of the FEB representatives felt more assistance and feedback
from OPM on FEB activities are warranted. Many were frustrated with what
they perceived as a lack of priority given to the boards by OPM. For
example, some noted that the Director of FEB Operations is a one-person
office, which they felt was inadequate to meet the needs of and provide
oversight for the 28 boards. Several of the FEB representatives also
pointed to a recent incident where the FEB system's host Web site server,
contracted out by OPM, was defaced. Service was not restored to some of
the FEB Web sites until several weeks later.
The accountability structure for the FEB executive directors poses
additional challenges. An OPM official reported that the executive
directors are rated by their supervisors of record in their host agencies.
In 2004, OPM worked with the FEB executive directors to develop critical
performance standards to be used by the FEB chairs to provide input to the
host agency supervisors on the performance of the FEB executive directors.
Executive directors were asked by OPM to use the standards to solicit
input from their FEB chairs for their performance evaluations, although
there is no provision to ensure the performance standards are consistently
applied among the individual director ratings. Of the 14 selected boards,
5 boards had an arrangement where the performance appraisal was done by
the host agency supervisor who received performance appraisal input from
the FEB chair. Four executive directors reported they were rated by their
host agencies with no input from the FEB chairs, while for four of the
executive directors, the chair provided the executive director's rating to
the host agency. One executive director did not receive a performance
appraisal because she was still considered an employee of one agency even
though her salary was paid by another agency.
Some of the executive directors we interviewed said that under their
current accountability structure, they answer to OPM, the chair or policy
committee of the FEB, and the board's host agency, which generally pays
their salaries. When asked about accountability, some of the executive
directors said they would follow the host agency's guidance given that
their salaries were paid by them. Others said they would answer primarily
to their chairs or policy committees. One of the FEB representatives noted
that he believes the current performance system does not reward
high-performing FEBs.
Varying FEB Capacities Test the Boards' Ability to Provide Consistent Levels of
Emergency Support Services across the Country
As we reported in 2004, the context in which the FEBs operate, including
varying capacities among the boards for emergency preparedness efforts,
could lead to inconsistent levels of preparedness across the nation.^10
Figure 2 illustrates that the service areas of the FEBs differ
substantially in the size of their formal jurisdictions, and table 1 shows
how the number of federal employees^11 and agencies served by each board
varies. These factors may affect a board's capacity to provide emergency
support. For example, FEB representatives from Chicago and Los Angeles
said their locations in large cities made providing FEB emergency support
services for their service areas more difficult. The Los Angeles executive
director, for example, noted that the Los Angeles FEB primarily serves a
six-county area in the immediate vicinity of Los Angeles with notable
transportation problems. This makes in-person meetings a challenge. The
service area includes approximately 120,000 federal employees from 230
different agencies. Yet the executive director noted that the FEB's
staffing is similar to that of FEBs covering much smaller areas and
numbers of employees and agencies. The Cincinnati FEB, in contrast, covers
approximately 15,000 federal employees from 90 different agencies.
Appendix III lists the 28 FEBs along with their host agencies.
^10 [31]GAO-04-384 .
^11The figures include military employees.
Figure 2: Jurisdictional Boundaries of the 28 FEBs
aIncludes civilian agencies in Guam.
Table 1: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by Each FEB in
Descending Order of Employees Served
FEB Federal employees served Number of federal agencies
Los Angeles 118,250 230
San Antonio 91,130 68
Oklahoma 78,681 252
Honolulu-Pacific 72,155 96
San Francisco 70,000 150
Baltimore 69,488 140
Chicago 64,803 180
St. Louis 62,155 82
New York City 61,578 152
Atlanta 58,020 120
Dallas-Fort Worth 49,855 144
Philadelphia 48,238 154
Seattle 47,233 147
Boston 45,479 150
Denver 39,161 160
Kansas City 38,906 134
Newark 38,270 79
Minnesota 35,806 120
South Florida 35,672 129
Detroit 32,733 85
New Mexico 32,102 94
Oregon 31,000 225
Houston 29,419 115
Cleveland 25,842 91
Pittsburgh 24,898 107
New Orleans 20,141^a 71^a
Buffalo 15,935 100
Cincinnati 14,727 90
Source: OPM.
aNumbers are under review because of Hurricane Katrina.
There is no consistency for funding the FEBs nationwide, and the levels of
support provided to the boards in terms of operating expenses, personnel,
and equipment vary considerably. For example, some of the executive
directors reported they received an operating budget allocation for travel
and supplies, while others said they received nothing or very little in
this regard. Without adequate and consistent levels of funding and
resources across the FEB system, some FEB representatives we interviewed
were skeptical as to whether any standardization of emergency activities
could be implemented.
The FEBs' dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for their
resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and
committing to provide emergency support services. The lack of funding in a
particular year may curtail the amount of emergency support an individual
board could provide. Many of the FEB representatives characterized the
board funding structure as dysfunctional, and some expressed concern that
their activities will be further affected by reduced agency funding and
resource support as agency budgets grow more constrained. When boards'
funding is precarious, the executive directors spend the majority of their
time soliciting resources from member agencies, without adequate time or
resources to focus on mission-related activities. Federal agencies that
have voluntarily funded FEB positions in the past have begun to withdraw
their funding support. Of our 14 case study boards, representatives from 3
of the boards said they had recently had their host agencies withdraw
funding for their boards' executive assistant positions. Several FEB
representatives felt the uncertainty about the funding of the FEBs raises
questions as to the survivability of the system and its ability to fulfill
its emergency support function.
Recognizing that the capacities of FEBs vary across the nation, OPM
established an internal working group in August 2003 to study the
strengths and weaknesses of the boards. According to OPM, the working
group reviewed funding and staffing levels for possible recommendations of
funding enhancements in challenged areas and developed several products to
assist OPM in communicating the value of the FEBs to agencies. In 2006,
OPM proposed a three-part plan, including restructuring the network of 28
boards to try to address the resource issues of some of the boards by
combining them with other boards. Federal population numbers and
geographic proximity of existing FEBs were used to develop the proposed
structure, which reduced the 28 boards into a system of 21 boards. The
majority of the FEBs did not support the restructuring component of the
plan, asserting that the proposal was not well developed and stressing the
importance of maintaining local presence for FEB operations and activities
in the current locations. OPM decided not to pursue the approach. However,
OPM officials said they will revisit restructuring the FEB network if
resource issues remain a problem.
There have been different options considered for FEB funding in the past.
For example, in 1988, OPM developed a budget proposal to include in its
fiscal year 1990 budget submission base dollars and full-time equivalents
to fully fund the FEBs. Ultimately, OPM reported only receiving a fraction
of the money requested, and OPM did not request additional funding for the
next fiscal year. OPM has not requested funding of this type for the FEBs
since that time. The current funding arrangements continue to emphasize
local agency responsibility whereby usually one major department or agency
in each city provides funding for an executive director and an assistant,
although other federal agencies can contribute. OPM officials said they
continue to support local agency commitment to the FEBs. From OPM's
vantage point, the boards that have developed strong relationships with
their partner agencies have more success securing the necessary resources
within existing funding arrangements. Although OPM officials stated they
play an integral role in facilitating discussions to resolve FEB funding
issues, some of the FEB representatives reported that OPM told them that
if any of the FEBs encountered funding difficulties, the boards were on
their own to solve the problems since the FEBs were unwilling to accept
OPM's restructuring proposal.
The problem of unstable resources is one that could affect any networked
organization similar to the FEBs that relies, more or less, on voluntary
contributions from members. Agencies may be reluctant to contribute
resources to an initiative that is not perceived as central to their
responsibilities, especially during periods of budgetary constraints. This
reluctance may, however, limit the long-term investment of the federal
government in working more collaboratively. For example, we recently
reported on the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), a
congressionally created entity designed to plan for and coordinate a
transformation from the current air traffic control system to the next
generation air transportation system by 2025.^12 Housed within the Federal
Aviation Administration, JPDO has seven federal partner agencies. One of
the greatest challenges that JPDO officials cited was creating mechanisms
to leverage partner agency resources. Although leveraging efforts have
worked well so far, we noted that JPDO could face difficulties in securing
needed agency resources if the priorities of the partner agencies change
over time. This has been a long-standing problem for the FEBs as well. In
a 1984 report, we concluded that although the FEBs have contributed to
improved field management, the future of the boards was uncertain because
funding for staff and board participation had declined.^13 Similar to the
boards' current situation, in 1983, five FEBs lost all or part of their
staff support as agency budgets grew more constrained.
^12GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System,
[32]GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
In Canada, the federal government has adopted a mix of both central
funding and departmental contributions for its regional coordinating
entities. Regional federal councils, the Canadian equivalent of the FEBs,
are sustained by a balance between central funding and departmental
contributions at the local level. The role of the councils was the subject
of in-depth consideration by Canadian government officials in 1996, and at
that time, the Treasury Board increased the level of support it provided
to the councils, including central funding to support staff positions and
some operating expenses. A 2000 report on the councils concluded that a
balance between central funding and departmental contributions at the
local level may well be the model best suited to financially sustain the
councils.^14
Although OPM and the FEBs are now involved in a strategic planning effort,
OPM has not to date considered the resource requirements to support an
expanded emergency support role for the FEBs. Yet, as we have pointed out
in our previous reports, a strategic plan should include a description of
the resources--both sources and types--that will be needed for the
strategies intended to achieve the plan's goals and objectives.
^13GAO, Federal Executive Boards Contribute To Improved Field Management
But Future Is Uncertain, [33]GAO/GGD-84-31 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6,
1984).
^14Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Regional Federal Councils,
January 2000.
The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a Particularly Valuable Asset
in Pandemic Preparedness and Response
Despite the challenges the FEBs face in providing emergency support, their
potential to add value to the nation's emergency preparedness and response
is particularly evident given an event like pandemic influenza. The
distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the
nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each
community it affects. Using their established and developing community
relationships to facilitate communication and coordination with local
federal agency leaders and state and local governments, FEBs are well
positioned to assist in pandemic preparedness and response. In the current
pandemic planning stages, many of the selected FEBs were already acting as
conveners, hosting pandemic influenza preparedness events, such as
briefings and training and exercises, and were considering how federal
agencies could share resources during a pandemic.
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Present Different Concerns Than
Localized Natural Disasters
According to the Homeland Security Council, the distributed nature of a
pandemic, as well as the sheer burden of disease across the nation, means
that the physical and material support states, localities, and tribal
entities can expect from the federal government will be limited in
comparison to the aid it mobilizes for geographically and temporarily
bounded disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes. Unlike those incidents
that are discretely bounded in space or time, an influenza pandemic could
spread across the globe over the course of months or over a year, possibly
in waves, and would affect communities of all sizes and compositions.
While a pandemic will not directly damage physical infrastructure, such as
power lines or computer systems, it threatens the operation of critical
systems by potentially removing the essential personnel needed to operate
them from the workplace for weeks or months.
The Homeland Security Council issued two documents to help address the
unique aspects of pandemic influenza. The November 2005 National Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza is intended to guide the overall effort to address
the threat and provide a planning framework consistent with the National
Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This
planning framework is also intended to be linked with the National
Response Plan. In May 2006, the Homeland Security Council also issued the
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. This
plan lays out broad implementation requirements and responsibilities among
the appropriate federal agencies and also describes expectations for
nonfederal stakeholders, including state and local governments, the
private sector, international partners, and individuals. Further, all
federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic plans that
along with other requirements, describe how each agency will provide for
the health and safety of its employees and support the federal
government's efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a
pandemic.
The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
states that the greatest burden of the pandemic response will be in the
local communities. Local communities will have to address the medical and
nonmedical effects of pandemic influenza with available resources. The
implementation plan maintains that it is essential for communities,
tribes, states, and regions to have plans in place to support the full
spectrum of their needs over the course of weeks or months, and for the
federal government to provide clear guidance on the manner in which these
needs may be met. As pandemic influenza presents unique challenges to the
coordination of the federal effort, joint and integrated planning across
all levels of government and the private sector is essential to ensure
that available national capabilities and authorities produce detailed
plans and response actions that are complementary, compatible, and
coordinated.
FEBs' Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response
Research has shown that systems like the FEBs have proven to be valuable
public management tools because they can operate horizontally, across
agencies in this case, and integrate the strengths and resources of a
variety of organizations in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to
effectively address critical public problems, such as pandemic
influenza.^15 Government leaders are increasingly finding that using
traditional hierarchical organizations does not allow them to successfully
address complex problems. As a result, they are beginning to explore the
use of collaborative networks that reach across agencies and programs.
The boards bring together the federal agency leaders in their service
areas and have a long history of establishing and maintaining
communication links, coordinating intergovernmental activities,
identifying common ground, and building cooperative relationships.
Documents supporting the establishment of the FEBs noted that it is
important that field executives have a broader picture of government and a
general understanding of the interrelationships of government activity.
The boards also partner with community organizations and participate as a
unified federal force in local civic affairs. This connection to the local
community could play a role in pandemic influenza preparedness and
response as predisaster relationship building and planning are often the
cornerstones to incident management.
^15See, for example, [34]GAO-06-15 , and Donald P. Moynihan, Leveraging
Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations (Washington,
D.C.: IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 2005).
Many of the selected FEBs cultivated relationships within their federal,
state, and local governments and their metropolitan area community
organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general activities. For
example, FEB activities, such as the Combined Federal Campaign and
scholarship programs, brought the boards into contact with local charities
and school boards. In addition, through activities such as hosting
emergency preparedness training or through participation in certain
committees, some of the selected FEBs reported a connection with emergency
management officials, first responders, and health officials in their
communities. Through their facilitation of COOP exercises and training,
the FEBs bring together government leaders, health officials, and first
responders in a venue where the parties can share ideas, discuss plans,
and coordinate approaches. The San Francisco FEB executive director and
chair said they attend FEMA's Regional Interaction Steering Committee
meetings, which brought them in contact with federal, state, and local
government emergency management partners. The Minnesota FEB plays an
active role in both the Association of Minnesota Emergency Managers (AMEM)
and the Metropolitan (Twin Cities) Emergency Managers Association. The
Minnesota FEB executive director, for example, serves on the AMEM board of
directors as federal agency liaison, a newly created partnership with the
organization. As another example, the Oklahoma FEB partnered with the fire
departments in Oklahoma City and Tulsa to provide site visits to the
federal agencies there to help strengthen emergency preparedness plans and
update evacuation and shelter-in-place plans. The executive director said
the site visits also provided agency leaders with the opportunity to
interact with the most likely first responders in the event of an
emergency and to obtain valuable information to include in emergency
preparedness plans.
As with the boards' emergency support role in general, some of the FEB
representatives envisioned their boards taking a more active role in
pandemic influenza preparedness and response than others did. While some
FEB representatives stressed the unique characteristics of the boards that
position them to help prepare and respond to pandemic influenza, others
noted the boards' limited staffing and resources. One FEB executive
director remarked that although the boards have no real authority, they
are valuable because of the community relationships they have forged and
their unique ability to coordinate resources and communicate. As
previously discussed, several representatives were concerned, however,
about the role the FEBs could play in the event of a large-scale
emergency, such as an influenza pandemic.
FEBs Are Acting as Conveners to Deliver Planning and Training Needed for
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Have a Potential Role in Pandemic Response
In terms of current pandemic planning, many of the selected FEBs were
building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member
agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza
training and exercises. The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza highlights training and exercises as an important
element of pandemic planning. For example, 13 of the 14 selected FEBs were
involved in pandemic influenza-related activities that ranged from
informational briefings to coordinating pandemic exercises, some that
included nonprofit organizations, the private sector, and government. The
one exception was the New Orleans FEB, where the executive director said
the board is still too heavily involved with Hurricane Katrina recovery to
focus on helping agencies to collaborate on pandemic influenza
preparedness.
A number of the selected FEBs have held pandemic influenza tabletop
exercises. A pandemic influenza tabletop exercise would be based on a
fictitious account of a plausible outbreak of pandemic influenza with
scenarios constructed to facilitate problem solving and to provoke
thinking about gaps and vulnerabilities. The Boston FEB, together with the
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and FEMA, held a pandemic
influenza tabletop exercise in November 2006. The exercise objectives
included goals such as helping to increase the awareness of federal,
state, local, and tribal government agencies of the requirement to
incorporate pandemic influenza procedures into COOP planning and
identifying special considerations for protecting the health and safety of
employees and maintaining essential government functions and services
during a pandemic outbreak. In addition, the Baltimore FEB hosted a
pandemic influenza exercise on November 1, 2006, facilitated by FEMA
Region III and the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. The Seattle FEB,
with the assistance of FEMA and the City of Seattle, sponsored an all-day
conference in October 2006 called Pandemic Flu: Get Smart, Get Ready!
Conversation Tools and Tips.
The Minnesota FEB has been a leader among the boards in pandemic influenza
planning. Using a tabletop exercise it created, the board hosted its first
pandemic influenza exercise in February 2006, with a follow-up exercise in
October 2006. The October exercise included approximately 180 participants
from 100 organizations within federal agencies, state and local
government, and the private sector. Figure 3 illustrates the breadth of
participation in the exercises, including key infrastructure businesses
such as power and telecommunications. The Minnesota FEB executive director
noted that Minnesota has excellent state and local government
relationships, which help to facilitate planning of this nature. Examples
of partnerships the board has with state and local entities include those
with the State of Minnesota Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management, the Minnesota Department of Health, the St. Paul Chamber of
Commerce, and the American Red Cross.
Figure 3: Participants in Two Minnesota FEB Pandemic Tabletop Exercises
The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
emphasizes that government and public health officials must communicate
clearly and continuously with the public throughout a pandemic. The plan
recognized that timely, accurate, credible, and coordinated messages will
be necessary. According to many of the FEB representatives we interviewed,
the communications function of the boards is a key part of their
activities and could be an important asset for pandemic response. For
example, when asked about the role they envision the FEBs playing in the
response to a pandemic, the Dallas-Fort Worth FEB representatives said
that because the board is viewed by its member agencies as a credible
source of information, the board's role should be to coordinate
communications among member agencies. They gave the example of the
Department of Health and Human Services working through the board to
disseminate medical information to their local community.
In addition to their communications role, during pandemic influenza the
FEBs have the potential to broaden the situational awareness of member
agency leaders and emergency coordinators and provide a forum to inform
their decisions, similar to what the FEBs provide for other hazards, such
as inclement weather conditions. A FEMA official noted that FEBs have
vital knowledge of the federal agencies in their jurisdictions, which can
provide valuable situational awareness to community emergency responders.
Some of the FEBs were also considering the role they can play in assisting
member agencies by supporting human capital functions, such as supporting
the federal workforce and coordinating the deployment of personnel among
member agencies as may be appropriate. Several FEB representatives said,
for example, that they were considering how they could provide assistance
in coordinating support to federal agencies responding to pandemic
influenza, such as addressing personnel shortages by locating available
resources among member agencies. Other FEB representatives we interviewed
reiterated a theme that even the critical federal employees in the field
can be left to fend for themselves when disasters strike their
communities. Consequently, they are not able to handle the emergency
issues of the federal government. For example, according to the New
Orleans executive director, in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina the oil
and gas workers had their companies as powerful advocates in securing
housing for them so they could resume working. She reported that in sharp
contrast, there was no entity nationally that was an advocate for the
local federal workforce to ensure the speedy reconstitution of essential
services. In the majority of cases, she said that essential federal
employees queued up for temporary housing in long lines. She intervened to
bring attention to the need for expedited temporary housing for federal
employees, who were responsible for providing essential functions, but who
were also victims of the disaster.
To avoid a similar situation during pandemic influenza, the Minnesota and
Oklahoma FEBs are trying to negotiate with their states to create
memorandums of agreement between the states and the federal agencies,
represented by the FEBs. Their objectives are to identify how medical
supplies and vaccines from the Advanced Pharmaceutical Cache (APC) or the
Strategic National Stockpile, which will be distributed by the states,
will be dispersed to essential federal government employees in the event
of a pandemic or bioterrorist attack. To accomplish this, the FEBs are
working with their federal members to apply the states' guidelines for
vaccine priorities to the federal workforce in their areas of service so
that essential federal employees, such as air traffic controllers, federal
law enforcement officers, and correctional facilities staff, are
appropriately integrated in the state vaccine distribution plans. They
also want to identify federal agencies and their resources that can
augment the states' operation of the mass vaccine dispensing sites. The
Minnesota FEB has inventoried all of the federal agencies within its
jurisdiction and feels it has a good idea of the resources that will be
needed. According to the Minnesota FEB executive director, however,
Minnesota currently does not have enough medical supplies,
pharmaceuticals, and vaccines in its APC to cover the emergency personnel
of the federal government in Minnesota nor does it have the resources for
purchasing these supplies.
Conclusions
Achieving results for the nation increasingly requires that federal
agencies work with each other and with the communities in which they
serve. The federal executive boards are uniquely able to bring together
federal agency and community leaders in major metropolitan areas outside
Washington, D.C., to meet and discuss issues of common interest, such as
preparing for and responding to pandemic influenza. As we reported in
2004, such a role is a natural outgrowth of general FEB activities and can
add value in coordinating emergency operations efforts.
Several interrelated issues limit the capacity of FEBs to provide a
consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and
response. These issues may present limitations to other areas of FEB
activities, not solely to emergency preparedness. Among them are the
following:
o The role of the FEBs in emergency support is not defined in
national emergency guidance and plans.
o Performance standards, for which the boards will be held
accountable, with accompanying measures, are not fully developed
for FEB emergency support activities.
o The availability of continuing resource support for the FEBs is
uncertain and the continued willingness of host and member
agencies to commit resources beyond their core missions may
decrease, especially in times of increasing budgetary constraints.
While the FEBs and FEMA have established important working
relationships in a number of locations, these have, to date, been
largely informal. As FEMA officials have noted, including the FEBs
in federal emergency guidance and plans provides an opportunity
for the FEBs to leverage the network of community relationships
they have already established. OPM and FEMA could formalize the
FEBs' contribution to FEMA's emergency preparedness and response
efforts through a memorandum of understanding, or some similar
mechanism, between FEMA and the FEBs, and a formal designation of
the FEB role in FEMA guidance. Likewise, recognition of the FEB
emergency support role in the national emergency structure could
help the boards carry out their emergency support role more
effectively by underscoring the value they add, which may be
overlooked by federal agency officials unfamiliar with their
capabilities.
The ability of FEBs and organizations like them to fulfill
important collaborative national missions is hampered if they are
dependent on the willingness of host agencies to provide support.
OPM has determined that the FEBs should have an important and
prominent role in emergency support and envisions a set of
emergency support activities across the FEB system. The current
structure of host agencies and in-kind contributions puts at risk
the achievement of that goal.
OPM's work on a strategic plan with the FEBs affords the
opportunity to complete the development of clear expectations for
the FEBs in emergency operations and to develop appropriate
performance measures for these expectations. OPM also has an
opportunity, as part of this planning process, to consider
alternative funding arrangements that would better match the roles
envisioned for the FEBs. As noted earlier, a strategic plan should
describe how goals and objectives are to be achieved, including
how different levels of resources lead to different levels of
achievement and the sources of those resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Consistent with OPM's ongoing efforts in this regard, we recommend
that the Director of OPM take the following four actions to help
improve the ability of the FEBs to contribute to the nation's
emergency preparedness efforts, particularly given the threat of
pandemic influenza:
o Once OPM completes defining emergency support expectations for
the FEBs, OPM should work with FEMA to develop a memorandum of
understanding, or some similar mechanism, that formally defines
the FEB role in emergency planning and response.
o OPM should initiate discussion with DHS and other responsible
stakeholders to consider the feasibility of integrating the FEB
emergency support responsibilities into the established emergency
response framework, such as the National Response Plan.
o OPM should continue its efforts to establish performance
measures and accountability for the emergency support
responsibilities of the FEBs before, during, and after an
emergency event that affects the federal workforce outside
Washington, D.C.
o As an outgrowth of the above efforts and to help ensure that the
FEBs can provide protection of the federal workforce in the field,
OPM, as part of its strategic planning process for the FEBs,
should develop a proposal for an alternative to the current
voluntary contribution mechanism that would address the
uncertainty of funding sources for the boards.
Agency Comments
We provided the Director of OPM and the Secretary of Homeland
Security a draft of this report for review and comment. We
received written comments from OPM, which are reprinted in
appendix IV. While not commenting specifically on the
recommendations, OPM stated that it understands the importance of
the issues raised in the report, noting that it is building the
boards' capacity by developing a national FEB strategic and
operational plan that will ensure consistent delivery of services
across the FEB network. By documenting results and creating a
consistent accountability mechanism, OPM said it is building a
strong business case through which it can address the resources
FEBs need to continue operations. OPM also stated that it believed
institutionalized relationships with strategic partners like FEMA
can demonstrate FEBs' business value and help address ongoing
funding issues. In comments received from FEMA by e-mail, FEMA
concurred with the findings of the report and welcomed the
opportunity to work with OPM to develop a memorandum of
understanding that more formally defines the FEB role in emergency
planning and response. FEMA also recognized the current personnel
and budget limitations of the FEBs in supporting emergency
planning and response activities and said that a proposal for an
alternative to the current FEB voluntary contribution mechanism
should assist with providing an improved capability for the
boards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Director of OPM and
the Secretary of Homeland Security and appropriate congressional
committees. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-6806 or [email protected].
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO
staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in
appendix V.
Bernice Steinhardt
Director, Strategic Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to
o identify the actions the federal executive boards (FEB) have
taken to fulfill their emergency preparedness and response roles
and responsibilities,
o describe the key challenges facing the FEBs in fulfilling these
roles and responsibilities, and
o evaluate the extent to which the FEBs can contribute to
emergency preparedness and response to pandemic influenza.
To address these objectives, we reviewed FEB annual reports and
academic literature as well as prior GAO reports about leveraging
collaborative networks. Additionally, we reviewed the National
Response Plan, Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza, and the Joint Field Office Activation and
Operations Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure to
assess the feasibility of FEB involvement in those plans. We
interviewed Office of Personnel Management (OPM) officials, and we
consulted with three GAO field office managers who are members of
their local FEBs to gain a greater understanding of FEB
activities. We selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for more detailed
review. Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth,
Denver, Los Angeles, New York City, Oklahoma, Philadelphia, San
Francisco, and Seattle were selected because they are 12 of the 15
largest FEBs in terms of number of federal employees served.
Minnesota was selected because it is considered a leader in
pandemic influenza planning, and New Orleans was selected because
of its recent emergency management experience with Hurricane
Katrina. GAO headquarters and field office teams interviewed at
least two key FEB representatives, including the chair or vice
chair and the executive director from the 14 selected boards.
Additionally, we obtained and reviewed FEB documents, such as
annual reports, monthly activity reports, minutes, and
correspondence, at the selected sites. Because our selection of
FEBs was nonprobabilistic, the results of our review of these
selected FEBs are not generalizable to all other FEBs. However,
the challenges and issues that were identified in our coverage of
half of all FEBs along with our review of materials concerning the
FEBs as a group suggests that these matters are not limited to
just the selected FEBs.
OPM provided data on the counties of jurisdiction for all of the
boards as well as their host agencies and the number of federal
and military employees and agencies in each service area. We
determined these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this report.
We also interviewed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
officials at their headquarters in Washington, D.C. FEMA serves as
the Department of Homeland Security's designated lead agent for
continuity of operations (COOP) plans for the FEBs' executive
branch members. Because the FEBs and FEMA collaborate on COOP
activities in the field, we interviewed the FEMA regional
directors in regions V and VI based in Chicago, Illinois, and
Denton, Texas, respectively, to obtain an outside perspective of
the boards and their role in emergency operations. Our analysis of
the capacity of FEBs to support emergency preparedness is drawn
from our collective review and assessment of information and
documents provided to us by officials from OPM and FEMA and the
FEB representatives at the selected FEBs as well as our
examination of the relevant literature described above.
Our review was conducted from March 2006 through February 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Office of Personnel Management Document Describing the FEB
Role and Responsibilities in Emergency Situations
ROLE: PROVIDE EMERGENCY LIAISON AND COMMUNICATIONS - FEBs stand ready to
provide timely and relevant information to support emergency preparedness
and response coordination.
Emergency Preparedness
-FEBs will serve as a Federal liaison for State and Local emergency
officials.
-FEBs will establish notification networks and develop a protocol
(Communications Plan) to be used in nonemergency and emergency situations.
-FEBs will disseminate relevant information received from OPM/DC regarding
emergency preparedness information (memorandums from OPM officials,
emergency guides, training opportunities, information from other
departments/agencies, etc.)
-FEBs will identify a core group of Federal leaders in each community who
will meet regularly to discuss planned courses of action (delayed arrival,
early dismissal, shelter in place, emergency personnel only, etc.) in the
event of an emergency.
-FEBs will survey and/or facilitate training for member agencies regarding
their roles and responsibilities related to occupant emergency plans.
-FEBs will facilitate training on Continuity of Operations (COOP), and
other emergency preparedness topics, i.e., shelter in place, triage,
onsite responder, etc. for Federal agencies.
Response Coordination
-FEBs will assess local emergency situations in cooperation with Federal,
State and Local officials.
-FEBs will activate established notification system for transmission of
local emergency information, as prescribed by the FEB's protocol
(Communications Plan).
-FEBs will provide problem resolution assistance as appropriate, to
include identifying Federal resources which may be available to assist the
community in responding to, or recovering from, an emergency.
-FEBs relay local emergency situation information, by way of periodic
reports to the appropriate authorities, to include, but not limited to:
OPM/DC, FEB members, media, State and Local government authorities.
-FEBs will disseminate information received from OPM/DC regarding
emergency information at the national level - decision on employee work
status, information from other departments/agencies, etc.
Communications Plan
-FEBs alert those responsible for implementing the Occupant and Agency
Emergency Plans and serve as a redundant (back-up) communication vehicle
to ensure notification.
Source: OPM.
Appendix III: FEBs' Host Agencies Appendix III: FEBs' Host Agencies
FEB Host agency
Atlanta Social Security Administration-Regional Office
Baltimore Department of Defense-U.S. Army/Fort Meade
Boston Environmental Protection Agency-Regional Office
Buffalo Department of Homeland Security-Immigration and Customs
Enforcement U.S. Coast Guard
Chicago General Services Administration-Regional Office
Cincinnati Department of Veterans Affairs-Regional Medical Center
Cleveland National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Glenn
Research Center
Dallas-Fort Worth Health and Human Services-Regional Office
Denver Department of Defense-Defense Finance and Accounting
Service
Detroit Department of Defense-U.S. Tank Automotive Command
Honolulu-Pacific Department of Defense-Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
Houston Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border
Protection
Kansas City Department of Transportation Federal Highway
Administration/Federal Aviation Administration
Los Angeles Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border
Protection/Los Angeles Field Office
Minnesota Department of the Interior-Headquarters National
Business Center
New Mexico Department of the Interior-Bureau of Land Management
New Orleans Department of Agriculture-National Finance Center
New York City Department of Transportation-Federal Aviation
Administration
Newark Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border
Protection
Oklahoma Department of Defense-Tinker Air Force Base
Oregon Department of Veterans Affairs-Portland Veterans Affairs
Medical Center
Philadelphia Department of Defense-Defense Logistics Agency
Pittsburgh Office of Personnel Management
San Antonio Department of Veterans Affairs-Regional Medical Center
San Francisco Department of Labor-Office of Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Management
Seattle Department of Housing and Urban Development-Regional
Office Social Security Administration-Regional Office of
Personnel Management
South Florida Department of Commerce-Headquarters
St. Louis Department of Defense-National Geospatial-Intelligence
Source: OPM.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Bernice Steinhardt (202) 512-6808 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this
report were William Doherty, Assistant Director; Dominic Barranca;
Scott Behen; Kathleen Boggs; Deirdre Brown; Beverly Burke; Jimmy
Champion; Betty Clark; Derrick Collins; Daniel Concepcion; Amber
Edwards; Richard Guthrie; Bonnie Hall; Charles Hodge; Aaron
Kaminsky; Judith Kordahl; Susan Mak; Signora May; Samuel
Scrutchins; Gabriele Tonsil; George Warnock; and Daniel Zeno. In
addition, William Bates, Thomas Beall, David Dornisch, and Donna
Miller provided key assistance.
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
the performance and accountability of the federal government for
the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of
newly posted products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and
select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
(202) 512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
[email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
(202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
Room 7125 Washington, D.C. 20548
Public Affairs
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548
(450461)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-515 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Bernice Steinhardt at (202) 512-6806 or
[email protected].
Highlights of [44]GAO-07-515 , a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight
of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate
May 2007
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE
Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards'
Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations
OPM, which provides direction to the FEBs, is now emphasizing that in the
post-9/11 environment, the boards have a transformed emergency support
role. The report discusses the boards' emergency preparedness roles and
responsibilities and their potential role in preparing for and responding
to pandemic influenza. GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because
they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or had recent
emergency management experience.
[45]What GAO Recommends
Particularly given the threat of pandemic influenza, GAO recommends that
the Director of OPM discuss with FEMA and other stakeholders the
feasibility of integrating FEBs in national emergency plans. In completing
the FEB strategic plan, OPM should also establish accountability for the
boards' emergency support activities and develop a proposal to address the
uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. While not commenting
specifically on the recommendations, OPM said it is building a business
case through which to address the resources FEBs need to continue
operations and that institutionalized relationships with partners such as
FEMA can help address funding issues. FEMA said that it welcomed the
opportunity to work with OPM to formally define the FEB role in emergency
planning and response.
Located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large federal
presence, the federal executive boards (FEB) are interagency coordinating
groups designed to strengthen federal management practices, improve
intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified federal force in
local civic affairs. Created by a Presidential Directive in 1961, the
boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military
commanders in their cities. Although membership by agency heads on the
boards is required, active participation is voluntary in practice. The
boards generally have staff of one or two full-time personnel, including
an executive director. The FEBs have no congressional charter and receive
no congressional appropriation but rather rely on voluntary contributions
from their member agencies. Although the boards are not intended to be
first responders, the regulations that guide the FEBs state that emergency
operations is one of their functions.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEBs have designated
emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a core function
of the boards and are continuing to work on a strategic plan that will
include a common set of performance standards for their emergency support
activities. All of the selected FEBs were performing emergency activities,
such as organizing preparedness training, and FEB representatives and
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials reported that these
activities mutually advanced their missions.
The FEBs, however, face key challenges in carrying out their emergency
support role. First, their role is not defined in national emergency
plans. According to several FEMA officials, FEBs could carry out their
emergency support role more effectively if it was included in national
emergency management plans. The framework within which the FEBs operate
with member agencies and OPM also poses challenges in holding the boards
accountable for their emergency support function. In addition, the funding
sources for the boards are uncertain, affecting their ability to plan for
and commit to providing emergency support services.
Despite these challenges, the nature of pandemic influenza, which presents
different concerns than localized natural disasters, makes the FEBs a
particularly valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. Many of
the selected boards had already hosted pandemic preparedness events, which
included their member agencies and local community organizations. With the
greatest burden of pandemic response resting on the local communities, the
FEBs' outreach and their ability to coordinate across organizations
suggest that they may be an important resource in preparing for and
responding to a pandemic.
References
Visible links
27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-384
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-89
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-384
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-84-31
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
35. http://www.gao.gov/
44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-515
*** End of document. ***