Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi	 
Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities  
(28-MAR-07, GAO-07-503R).					 
                                                                 
In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have	 
undertaken this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller
General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative to provide  
information on the status and challenges of developing Iraqi	 
Security Forces (ISF) support capabilities. Specifically, our	 
objectives were to determine (1) the current state of the	 
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the current state of the  
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of
the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during the course of our 
work Coalition officials provided us with information on the	 
status of coordination and communication between and within the  
ministries. On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to	 
Congress containing our preliminary observations. This report is 
the unclassified version of that classified report. Certain	 
specific information and data about the current state of ISF's	 
logistical, command and control and intelligence capabilities was
classified as secret. On March 9, 2007, we testified before the  
House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and	 
Investigations, on the development of the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior's logistical capabilities for the Iraqi army
and police. We expect to provide a follow-up report later that	 
will examine in more detail the progress in the development of	 
these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being provided to  
the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the ISF's	 
support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq.	 
This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced 
since June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and	 
Iraqi security forces.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-503R					        
    ACCNO:   A67424						        
  TITLE:     Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on     
Iraqi Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control	 
Capabilities							 
     DATE:   03/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Command control communications systems		 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Equipment maintenance				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military communication				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military training					 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 
	     Iraq						 
	     Iraqi Security Forces				 

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GAO-07-503R

   

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

March 28, 2007

Congressional Committees

Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi
Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities

From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), led by the United States and the United Kingdom, was the United
Nations-recognized authority responsible for the temporary governance of
Iraq and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the reconstruction
effort. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military organizations of the
former regime and began the process of creating or reestablishing new
Iraqi security forces, including the police and a new Iraqi military. Over
time, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for recruiting
and training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their areas of
responsibility.^1 In May 2004, President Bush issued a National Security
Presidential Directive stating that after the transition of power to the
Iraqi government is achieved, the Department of Defense (DOD) would
continue to be responsible for U.S. activities relating to security and
military operations. The Presidential Directive also stated that the U.S.
Central Command would direct all U.S. government efforts to organize,
equip, and train Iraqi security forces.

In the summer of 2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) developed and
began implementing a comprehensive campaign plan, which elaborated on and
refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities
to Iraqi forces. In November 2005, the National Security Council issued
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, which states that the Coalition
will adjust its "posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi
capabilities grow," and that Coalition troop levels in Iraq will decrease
over time as the Iraqis take on more responsibilities for themselves. The
national strategy implies a conditions-based linkage between the
development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of
the U.S. presence in Iraq.

In April 2006, MNF-I revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, issued a Joint Campaign Plan that states as a
goal the transfer of security responsibilities from MNF-I to the ISF and
the Iraqi government. Finally, in August 2006, DOD issued its fifth report
to Congress, Measuring Stability and
Security in Iraq, stating that even though 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25
brigades, 85 battalions, and 2 National Police battalions had assumed lead
responsibility for security in their areas of operation, most of these
units still require support from Coalition forces. This is because
logistics, sustainment, and command and control capabilities of the ISF
are not yet fully developed. The ISF comprises the forces of the Ministry
of Defense (MOD)--that is, the Iraqi Army, Navy, Air Force, and several
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions--and the forces of the Ministry of
Interior (MOI)-- which includes the police, border enforcement, and other
Iraqi civilian security services.

1The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and Jordan
academies with support from the State Department and the Justice
Department. The CPA's Coalition Military Assistance Training Team was
responsible for training a new Iraqi Army.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which operates
under MNF-I, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and organize the
Iraqi Security Forces. Once ISF units are trained and equipped,
operational responsibility for their employment is turned over to
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), a command that is subordinate to MNF-I
and is responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq.^2

According to DOD's August 2006 report to Congress, the seating of the new
government of Iraq, which was not fully complete until the appointment in
June 2006 of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and State for National
Security Affairs, sets the conditions for continuing progress toward Iraqi
security self-reliance. Senior Coalition officials in Iraq echoed this
sentiment, stating that prior to the seating of the Minister of Defense
and Minister of Interior in particular, only limited progress could be
made toward forging a self-reliant ISF.

In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken
this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct
evaluations at his own initiative^3 to provide information on the status
and challenges of developing ISF support capabilities. Specifically, our
objectives were to determine (1) the current state of the logistical,
command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry
of Defense; and (2) the current state of the logistical, command and
control, and intelligence capabilities of the Ministry of Interior.
Additionally, during the course of our work Coalition officials provided
us with information on the status of coordination and communication
between and within the ministries.

On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to you containing our
preliminary observations.^4 This report is the unclassified version of
that classified report. Certain specific information and data about the
current state of ISF's logistical, command and control and intelligence
capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9, 2007, we testified
before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, on the development of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry
of Interior's logistical capabilities for the Iraqi army and police.^5 We
expect to provide a follow-up report later that will examine in more
detail the progress in the
development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being
provided to the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the ISF's
support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. This report
is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004
addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi security forces. A
list of related GAO products appears at the end of this report.

2MNC-I is headquartered by the U.S. Army III Corps forward deployed to Camp
Victory, Baghdad.

331 U.S.C. S 717(b)(1)(2000).

^4 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary
Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Support Capabilities, GAO-07-120C
(Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007).

5GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security
Forces' Logistical Capabilities, GAO-07-582T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9,
2007).

To determine the current state of the logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior,
we reviewed relevant documents, orders, policies, and data that we
obtained from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and
contracting officials. We also met with and interviewed DOD officials and
contractor representatives in the United States and made two trips to
Iraq, in January and August 2006. In Iraq, we met with officials from the
Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq. During our August 2006 trip, we also met
with Iraqi Army officials and made a site visit to an Iraqi Army training
compound and Iraq's National Depot. During our visits, we talked with
knowledgeable officials and determined that the data they provided us was
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our
review from January 2006 through August 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Notwithstanding our repeated
requests for DOD to expedite and complete its reviews, this report was
under security review within the Department of Defense and MNF-I from
October 2006 until February 2007. In our March 9th testimony, we updated
information on the ISF's logistical capabilities and, where appropriate,
we have identified that information in footnotes throughout this report.

                                Results in Brief

Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and control
capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. For example, there is a
logistical concept in place for the MOD, and MNSTC-I is fielding many of
the units required by the concept. Furthermore, the Coalition and MOD have
established a training base at Taji, where Iraqi logistical and
communications specialists are being trained. However, significant
challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve selfsufficiency. For
example, although the ministry has a logistical concept, implementing that
concept is hampered by a lag in the development of national and regional
logistics centers, impediments to training of Iraqi logisticians and
mechanics, and maintenance shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a
command and control capability in the MOD faces training challenges as
well as a shortage of military leadership; the lack of a communications
doctrine; and the lack of clearly defined policies and procedures at the
ministerial level have further undermined efforts to develop this
capability.

Progress has also been made toward developing the logistics and command
and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. For example, a
logistics concept for the MOI is being worked on, the ministry has fielded
communications technology, and a National Command Center is in operation.
However, the MOI also faces challenges, such as supplying its forces and
maintaining its vehicles. Furthermore, the logistics concept may not fully
include the forces that are based in the provinces.

With regard to command and control, maintenance and procedural challenges
limit the capabilities of the MOI's communications technology.

                                   Background

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to an interim sovereign Iraqi
government. The CPA was officially dissolved, and Iraq's transitional
period had begun. Under Iraq's transitional law,^6 the transitional period
included the completion of a draft constitution in October 2005 and two
subsequent elections--a referendum on the Iraqi constitution and an
election for a permanent government.^7 The Iraqi people approved the
constitution on October 15, 2005, and voted for representatives to the
Iraq Council of Representatives (COR) on December 15, 2005. The
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq certified the election results on
February 10, 2006. On April 22, 2006, the COR elected senior members of
the new government, including a president, two vice presidents, a speaker
of the COR, and two deputy speakers. This Presidency Council subsequently
nominated a prime minister-designate and two deputy prime
minister-designates, signaling the start of a constitutionally-mandated
30-day period in which the Prime Minister-designate was required to form
his cabinet. On May 20, 2006, the Prime Minister-designate named his
cabinet, which the COR approved the same day, with the Prime Minister and
deputy prime ministers also serving temporarily as the Ministers of
Defense, Interior, and State for National Security Affairs. On June 8,
2006, the Prime Minister submitted his nominees and the COR approved by a
majority vote the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and Minister
of State for National Security Affairs.

Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, MNF-I has the
authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to security and
stability in Iraq during this process, working in partnership with the
Iraqi government to reach agreement on security and policy issues.

  Ministry of Defense is Developing Support Capabilities, but Faces Training,
                  Procedural, Maintenance, and Staffing Issues

Iraq's Ministry of Defense has established a logistical concept and its
development is ongoing; however, implementation of the concept is hampered
by the failure to develop national and regional logistics centers,
training problems, and maintenance challenges. Similarly, as of August
2006, the standing up of a command and control capability in the MOD is
hampered by a shortage of leadership and a lack of policies and procedures
at the ministerial level, the lack of a communications doctrine, and
training challenges.

Implementation of Logistical Concept is Challenged

In early 2005, the MOD and MNF-I approved a multilayered logistics concept
for the Iraqi military. Inherent to the concept is the generation of a
variety of units from the
ministerial to the unit level. The provision of logistics support at the
lowest levels is expected to be the purview of Headquarters and Services
Companies (HSC), which provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and
transportation support to Iraqi Army battalions, brigades, and divisions,
and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide additional
transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to each of the
Iraqi Army's infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics support is expected
to come from a National Depot, five Regional Support Units (RSU), and
numerous Garrison Support Units (GSU). The National Depot, located at
Taji, provides facilities for the receipt, storage, accounting, and issue
of the Iraqi Armed Forces' national stockholding of most classes of supply
as well as the maintenance capability to overhaul vehicles and other
equipment. The RSUs are to provide regionally focused supply, maintenance,
and contract support for the Iraqi military while GSUs are to provide base
support for each Iraqi military installation. A Support Command is to
provide command and control of the National Depot and RSUs while the Iraqi
Joint Headquarters logistics staff section (M-4) is to provide logistics
input to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the
Office of the Director General of Acquisitions, Logistics, and
Infrastructure (DG AL&I), which is expected to direct the ministry's
overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital equipment, to
develop ministerial policies and procedures, and to manage the budget. The
envisioned end state is a comprehensive logistics system that will provide
maintenance, supply, transportation, and garrison support to all elements
of the Iraqi military.^8

^6Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,
March 2004. ^7 See GAO, Iraq's Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R (Washington,
D.C.: May 25, 2004) for more information on key events during Iraq's
transitional period.

However, several challenges remain in the standing up of this logistics
system. First, the establishment of the National Depot, RSUs, and GSUs has
lagged behind the creation of HSCs and MTRs. Second, the training of Iraqi
logisticians has been affected by a lack of fuel, electricity, personnel,
and materiel support to the training academy. Finally, the maintenance of
the Iraqi military's vehicles is complicated because of the heterogeneity
of the MOD's vehicular fleet and the lack of trained mechanics.

The Establishment of National and Regional Logistics Centers Has Lagged
Behind

Although the MOD's logistics concept does not delineate any priority to
the establishment of one type of logistics unit over another, according to
an August 13, 2006, MNSTC-I briefing, the priority has been on generating
lower echelon logistics formations, specifically HSCs and MTRs. As of
August 2006, most of the authorized HSCs and MTRs had been formed.
Meanwhile, the creation of national and regional logistics centers has
lagged behind; a circumstance that Coalition officials contend makes the
attainment of MOD self-sufficiency problematic. For example, the
establishment of the National Depot has been plagued by manpower
shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor maintenance.
In August 2006, Coalition officials assigned to the National Depot told us
that since April 2006, the amount of fuel delivered to the National Depot
has been below that required to support routine warehouse, maintenance,
and transportation requirements. The maintenance of forklifts, vehicles,
and generators necessary to support day-to-day
operations has suffered as well because of a lack of spare parts, a
situation exacerbated by the variety of makes and models of the equipment
with which the National Depot operates. In the words of one senior
Coalition logistician, what presently exists at Taji is "a depot in name
only."^9

^8The areas of health and garrison support are not addressed in this report.

The establishment of the RSUs and GSUs faces similar challenges. As of
August 2006, all five RSUs were still in the process of being formed and
had significant shortfalls in personnel, leadership, training, and
facilities. Furthermore, as of August 2006 the exact number of GSUs to be
formed had not been determined, and only five were in the process of being
formed.^10

Coalition logisticians have emphasized that development of all echelons of
the logistic concept is crucial in order for MOD to become capable of
independently sustaining its forces.

Challenges Exist in the Training of Iraqi Logisticians

Another challenge that the Coalition and MOD face in developing a
logistics system for the Iraqi military is a shortage of experienced
officers and noncommissioned officers available to staff logistics units.
Providing trained officers and noncommissioned officers to fill support
and combat service support positions throughout the Iraqi Army is the
mission of the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute (Institute).
However, during our visit to the Institute, several problems that
negatively affected its ability to fulfill its mission were evident.

According to a senior Iraqi Army official from the Institute, one problem
hampering the training of logisticians for the Iraqi military is
illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the students who report for each course
are turned away because they are illiterate in Arabic and therefore
incapable of reading the required manuals.^11 This includes students from
Kurdish provinces who, though literate in Kurdish, cannot read, write, or
speak Arabic.

For those who are eventually accepted into one of the Institute's courses,
training has been hampered by quality-of-life problems, an insufficient
number of trained cadre members, and equipment shortages. The
quality-of-life problems stem from insufficient fuel for the generators
which provide the power to run air conditioners,
water pumps, and other life-support equipment. In August 2006, ambient
temperatures during the day ran as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit.

^9In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has
asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance,
warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot. According to
DOD, if these funds are not procured, the National Depot's construction
will be affected and the shortfall will necessitate the continued presence
and support of Coalition forces further into the future.

^10According to updated information we obtained in December 2006, the MOD was
still developing the RSUs and they would not be transitioned to full Iraqi
control until June 2007. Moreover, the same update revealed that full
transition of the GSUs to Iraqi control would not occur until late 2007.
In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has
asked for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities for GSUs
and RSUs. Without this funding, DOD states that those facilities might go
months or years without use while waiting for equipment to be delivered
through Iraqi acquisitions systems. According to DOD, if that were to
occur the Coalition would not be able to diminish its support.

^11As a result of the literacy problem within the country, MNSTC-I has
developed a literacy course.

As of August 2006, the Institute was staffed with just over half of its
authorized Iraqi officer instructors. Although the reasons for this
shortage are unclear, it has resulted in the training of fewer logistics
specialists for the Iraqi Army because without the needed cadre the
Institute has had to operate at less than full capacity.

Maintenance Is Challenged by a Heterogeneous Vehicle Fleet and Undermined
by a Lack of Trained Mechanics and Funds

Vehicle maintenance is another challenge that the MOD faces, a challenge
exacerbated by the heterogeneous mixture of the ministry's vehicular
fleet, a circumstance that has several causes: MOD vehicle purchases,
gifts of vehicles from donor countries, and vehicles left over from
Saddam's army. According to an August 1, 2006, vehicle inventory, the
Iraqi Army has 6 different types of fuel trucks, at least 4 of which come
from different manufacturers: Nissan, Ford, KrAZ (Ukrainian), and MAZ
(Belarusian); 21 different types of light utility vehicles, including
vehicles manufactured by Chevrolet, Gazelle (Russian), Honker (Czech),
Kia, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and UAZ (Russian); and 15 different
types of medium cargo vehicles, including U.S. military 2.5- and 5-ton
cargo trucks, as well as vehicles manufactured by AMC, Ashok Leyland
(Indian), GAZ (Russian), Hyundai, Kamaz (Russian), Nissan, and
Mercedes.^12 According to Coalition officials, obtaining repair parts for
such a heterogeneous vehicle fleet, especially parts for vehicles of
non-U.S. manufacture that are in relatively short supply in the MOD's
vehicle inventory, is so expensive that it results in the cannibalization
of parts from similar vehicles awaiting repair. The result is that some
vehicles never get repaired.^13

As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of this
heterogeneous fleet, MNSTC-I committed to a national maintenance contract.
According to the statement of work, MNSTC-I's intent, by way of a "focus
sustainment" effort, was to contract for the services of a maintenance
contractor to support the sustainment of the vehicles and equipment issued
to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi Armed Forces in becoming
self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of organizational and
intermediate maintenance tasks, the maintenance contractor was to be
organized to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi personnel. However,
Coalition officials stated that this training regimen has not produced
sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi mechanics. As of August 11, 2006, only
26 of the 191 Iraqis that had been enrolled in the on-the-job training
program had completed this training.

The national maintenance contract's statement of work also requires the
contractor to determine and maintain an adequate authorized stockage level
(ASL) for all equipment repaired, with the intent of the ASL being to
reduce the "wait time" for
parts. According to Coalition officials, although an ASL has been
completed, updated, and partially funded by the Coalition, the MOD has not
yet budgeted for maintaining the ASL once the contract expires in March
2007. Coalition officials fear that a failure by the Iraqis to budget for
and maintain the ASL will result in repair part shortfalls that will have
a concomitant negative impact on equipment readiness levels.^14

^12Coalition officials stated that the information they provided us about the
MOD's vehicle inventory was fairly complete as of that point in time, but
acknowledged that there may be some vehicles in the MOD's inventory over
which they do not have visibility.

^13According to DOD's Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, a
portion of the $1,043 million it has requested for equipment and
transportation will be used to purchase common system vehicles for the
MOD, with an eye toward reducing the fleet to just one or two systems.

Coalition officials have remarked that the national maintenance contract
is too expensive for the MOD to continue past its March 2007 end date.
Coalition officials have presented an alternative to the national
maintenance contract based on foreign military sales and direct vendor
contracts to the MOD. As of August 2006, the MOD had taken no action with
regard to this alternative.^15

Command and Control Capability Is Hampered by Lack of Ministerial Policies
and Procedures, a Shortage of Leadership, Lack of a Communications
Doctrine, and Training Challenges

Although the MOD's command and control structure is still under
development, Coalition and Iraqi Army officials identified several
challenges that need to be addressed before full capability is achieved.
These include the development of ministerial policies and procedures, the
growth of Iraq's military leadership, the development of an effective
communications infrastructure, and the training of communications
specialists.

Leadership, Procedures, and Policies Need to be Developed

According to senior Coalition officials, one of their greatest challenges
is getting their Iraqi counterparts on the ministerial and Joint
Headquarters Staff to agree on their respective roles and
responsibilities. This confusion stems in large part from an absence of
accepted procedures and policies. Echoing this claim is an August 1, 2006,
Coalition assessment of the MOD's executive support measures of
effectiveness. This assessment rates all of the following core
competencies as "ineffective": the ministry's development and
implementation of a decision-making process; a process for the overall
professionalization of the ministry; a directive that establishes terms of
reference for ministry officials, civilian and military; a process for
oversight and periodic review of decisions; and development and
establishment of policy and procedures for command and control under
provisions of the Constitution. Coalition officials, working in concert
with their Iraqi counterparts, are addressing each of these shortcomings.
In August 2006, these officials stated that they believe that the June
2006 naming of a Minister of Defense will contribute much to the
development and implementation of appropriate procedures and policies.
They stress, however, that without effective procedures and policies,
command and control of the Iraqi military will suffer from confusion, lack
of coordination, ineffectiveness, and inefficiency.

^14In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has
asked for $499.6 million to procure recommended levels of supplies
initially required to meet Iraqi wholesale and retail authorized stockage
levels for most major classes of supplies. If it does not receive this
funding, DOD states that the Iraqis will require continued support from
Coalition forces.

^15According to a DOD official, MNSTC-I has reprogrammed some of its funds to
extend the national maintenance contract beyond its March 2007 expiration
date.

According to a July 2006 MNSTC-I report, although leadership development
programs for the Iraqi military are under way and a senior officer
selection committee has been established to identify Iraq's future
leaders, these measures will take time to have an effect. However, the
report stresses that it has become increasingly evident that the larger
and more complex the Iraqi Army has become, the harder it is to find
senior leaders at the rank of lieutenant colonel and above able to provide
confident, competent commanders and senior staff.

Communications Doctrine Needs to Be Developed

According to Coalition and Iraqi Army officials, as of August 2006, the
MOD had not yet agreed on an Iraqi Army communications doctrine. According
to these same officials, a communications doctrine is essential to the
establishment of an effective communications system which, in turn, is an
essential part of a command and control system.

Training Challenges Remain

As of August 2006, several challenges exist in training Iraqi signal
officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The 28-day training
program, which is conducted at the Iraqi Signal School at Taji, is the
same for all students regardless of rank and includes basic computer
skills, preventive maintenance checks and services, basic radio
communications procedures, and hands-on training with antennae and the
various radios employed by the Iraqi Army. The officials stated that what
is needed are several more courses specifically designed to train Iraqi
Army officers and noncommissioned officers in more advanced procedures.
Five such courses are envisioned for the future (a signal officer basic
and advanced course, a noncommissioned officer basic and advanced course,
and a signal military occupational specialty course), but a lack of
qualified instructors has undermined efforts to establish these courses.
And finally, according to a senior Iraqi Army signal officer, there is a
tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to improperly employ the Signal
School's enlisted graduates. Despite having been trained in
communications, once the students return to their units they are employed
as infantrymen, while officers, who may not have graduated from the Signal
School, run the radios.

 Ministry of Interior Is Developing Support Capabilities, but Has Not Resolved
                    Logistical and Communications Challenges

Although the Ministry of Interior and its Coalition advisers are
developing a logistics concept and the ministry has demonstrated
accountability for some commodities, the ministry faces challenges in the
supply of its forces and maintenance of its vehicles and the logistics
concept may not fully address MOI forces based in the provinces. In the
area of command and control, the MOI has fielded communications
technologies, but maintenance and procedural challenges limit the
capabilities of these systems.

MOI and Coalition Are Developing a Logistics Concept and MOI Has
Accountability for Some Commodities, but MOI Faces Supply and Maintenance
Challenges

The Coalition and Ministry of Interior are currently developing a
logistics concept for the ministry's forces, but the concept may not be
ready for ministry approval until December 2006.^16 The ministry is
experiencing logistics challenges in several areas, including the repair
of police vehicles and the maintenance of its radios. Also, it is unclear
whether the draft logistics concept for the MOI will fully address forces
located outside the capital.

Logistics Concept May Not Be Ready for MOI Consideration until December
2006

According to a Coalition document, the Coalition's goal is to develop a
Ministry of Interior logistics system in which the central government
procures and distributes commodities; supports both the MOI's federal
forces (National Police and Border Forces) and those forces that are based
in each of Iraq's 18 provinces (Iraqi Police Service, Facility Protection
Service, and Fire/Civil Defense); and provides accountability of items
such as vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. In August 2006, this was
the end state envisioned by the Coalition for the ministry's logistics
system, and although the MOI has not yet approved the draft logistics
concept being developed by the Coalition, Coalition officials stated that
one of the ministry's organizations has implemented accountability of some
commodities.

The draft logistics concept calls for a system of five to seven warehouses
that would perform maintenance on communications equipment and weapons and
would include three distribution centers to dispense supplies. In
addition, the concept is to include contracts that would provide
maintenance of vehicles and communications equipment. Although we did not
examine the proposed contracts, Coalition officials stated that the
proposed contracts will include $130 million in Coalition funding for 12
months of vehicle maintenance and $4.5 million in MOI funding for 12
months of radio maintenance and training of Iraqi mechanics. A Coalition
official also stated that these contracts are intended as temporary
solutions to provide maintenance until the MOI is able to develop its own
capabilities in these areas.^17 An August 2006 Coalition document states
that in February 2007, the MOI would assume operation of six warehouses
that supply ministerial forces and were being run by a Coalitionfunded
contractor.^18

^16As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the draft
logistics concept proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is
unclear.

^17It seems that MOI's dependence on Coalition support of its logistical
facilities will continue into fiscal year 2008. DOD states that the MOI
requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental Fiscal Year 2007
Security Forces Fund for the construction and sustainment of warehouse and
maintenance depots.

^18According to an update we received from DOD in December 2006, only one of
the six warehouses will transition to Iraqi control by February 2007. The
remaining five are to continue under Coalition control until July 2007.

MOI Has Exercised Accountability over Some Commodities, but Still Faces
Maintenance Challenges

The end state envisioned by the Coalition for the MOI's logistics system
calls for the logistics system to provide accountability over items
including vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. While the ministry has
not approved the draft logistics concept, a Coalition official stated that
one of the ministry's organizations, the National Police, has demonstrated
accountability for certain commodities, for example, vehicles, weapons,
and uniforms.

However, the ministry is experiencing significant supply and maintenance
challenges in several other areas. According to a July 2006 Coalition
assessment, the MOI's logistics capabilities are ineffective because the
force being developed by the Coalition for the MOI is overwhelming the
ministry's existing logistics capabilities and a lack of centralized
contracting and budget authorities limit MOI oversight. Because of this
ineffectiveness, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment,
vehicles, and weapons for the MOI, and a Coalition-funded contractor was
running warehouses that supply ministerial forces and providing
transportation of supplies from these warehouses to MOI facilities.^19

Coalition officials also stated that the MOI faces maintenance challenges.
In August 2006, approximately 1,600 police vehicles were inoperable in
Baghdad alone. In addition, MOI personnel are unable to maintain a certain
type of American truck delivered by Coalition forces because these
personnel are unable to work with the vehicles' computerized systems. As
of August 2006, the ministry had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand.^20
Coalition officials also stated that there is little or no sustainment of
certain types of police radio equipment.

It is unclear how the logistics concept in development will address some
of the challenges the MOI faces. For instance, the MOI does not currently
have a program to perform vehicle maintenance, and although we did not
examine it, Coalition officials explained that the vehicle maintenance
contract under consideration will operate only in Baghdad. As of August
2006, the draft logistics concept did not include a means to transport MOI
vehicles from other parts of the country to Baghdad.^21

Logistics Concept May Not Fully Address Provincial Forces' Needs

Another related challenge is that the Coalition and ministry are unclear
on how the concept will incorporate MOI forces in Iraq's 18 provinces. One
goal for the logistics system is to support ministerial forces in the
provinces. However, in August 2006, a Coalition official explained that
the future logistical relationship between the MOI's headquarters and its
forces located in the provinces remained unclear. For instance,
while Iraqi Police Service units located in the provinces are part of the
ministry's forces, funding for these units is controlled by each
provincial governor. In August 2006, a Coalition official stated that the
then-current draft logistics concept incorporated some of the ministry's
provincial forces. However, the extent to which the forces are included is
unclear. Also, because the relationship between the ministry and its
provincial forces is still being defined by Iraqi officials, the MOI's
eventual draft logistics concept may not fully address provincial forces.

^19These challenges have continued and the MOI remains dependent on the
Coalition to operate its warehouse system.

^20According to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics remain unfamiliar
with the computerized systems which are found in most of the MOI's
vehicles. Moreover, a significant component of the MOI's forces, the
National Police, is unable to maintain its vehicles.

^21DOD is requesting $145 million to build 130 maintenance facilities for the
MOI. DOD states that without this infrastructure the ministry will not be
able to maintain its vehicle fleet.

Although the Coalition is currently focused on certain MOI forces that
operate on a federal level (National Police, Border Forces, and the
ministry's national headquarters in Baghdad), as the relationship between
the ministry and its provincial forces becomes clearer and the concept
evolves, Coalition officials explained that the logistical relationship
between the ministry's headquarters and its provincial forces may be
clarified in the concept. According to an August 2006 Coalition document,
the focus of the ministry's future logistics efforts were to shift to
provincial forces. However, the timeline for this shift is unclear.

MOI Has Fielded Command and Control Communications Technologies, but
Maintenance and Procedural Challenges Limit Capability

While we did not examine the contracts ourselves, a Coalition official
stated that Coalition-funded contractors have built two command and
control networks for the Ministry of Interior: the Advanced First
Responder Network, which is intended to provide communication between
police forces, the ministerial headquarters, and Iraqi military forces in
15 Iraqi cities; and the Iraqi Command and Control Network, which is
designed to link the MOI's national and provincial headquarters. The MOI's
forces are also being equipped with short- and long-range radios that
allow these forces to communicate among themselves and with Iraqi military
units.

As of August 2006, the MOI's progress in developing a national command and
control network had been mixed. Installation of the Advanced First
Responder Network was complete; work on the Iraqi Command and Control
Network was ongoing, with 52 percent of funded sites installed; and most
of the of short- and long-range radios have been deployed (about 91
percent and 81 percent of authorized requirements, respectively).

Although these technologies have been fielded, the MOI faces substantial
challenges in the area of national command and control. For example, the
capability of the Advanced First Responder Network is limited by
infrastructure insufficiencies, the fragility of Iraq's electrical grid,
and by the MOI's inability to replace critical components.

Infrastructure, Maintenance, and Procedural Challenges Limit the
Capabilities of Certain Communications Technologies

According to a Coalition document, the $218.5 million Advanced First
Responder Network was installed through a Coalition-funded contract and is
intended to provide a communications system for first responders by
integrating MOI police with local, provincial, and national public safety
headquarters and Iraqi military units through radio, secure voice, data,
and global positioning system services. In its current form, the network
was designed to provide communication for MOI forces operating in 15 Iraqi
cities. Although, according to a Coalition document, 65 percent of the
country's population lives in these cities, the network does not provide
national coverage. Several of Iraq's 18 provinces--including Dahuk, Erbil,
Sulaymaniyah in the northeast, al-Anbar in the west, and Maysan in the
east--do not have a city covered by the network.

According to a Coalition document, other infrastructure insufficiencies
also limit the network's capability. For instance, certain switches
operate in a way that is not compatible with communications systems in
Iraq and a system of microwave relay towers used to transmit signals is
poorly designed.

Another challenge is maintaining consistent power for the network.
According to a Coalition official who worked with the MOI's Directorate of
Communications, the fragility of Iraq's electrical grid means that the
network must be powered with generators. The relatively small number of
backup generators presents an additional challenge because the loss of a
generator can result in a substantial loss in network capability.

Challenges faced by the MOI in replacing parts compound the loss of
capability caused by infrastructure insufficiencies and inconsistent
power. For three reasons, the ministry has difficulty replacing parts.
First, while we did not examine the contract, a Coalition official stated
that the original contract to build the network does not require the
contractor to provide spare parts. For instance, according to a Coalition
document, replacement of faulty switches falls outside the scope of the
operations and maintenance contract. Second, according to another
Coalition document, although the ministry's Directorate of Communications
has agreed to assume responsibility for operations and maintenance in
January 2007, it is unclear whether the Minister of Interior has agreed to
that decision. Third, the ministry's Directorate of Finance has refused a
request for additional funding for the network made by the Directorate of
Communications. In August 2006, a Coalition official stated that without
additional funding to address these challenges, the network would likely
fail within 3 months.^22

In addition, as of August 2006, the MOI had not yet begun to develop the
standard operating procedures^23 that govern how it will run its
communications networks. However, according to Coalition officials, Iraqi
staff in the National Command Center^24 are implementing standard
operating procedures provided by the Coalition
and are making progress in their implementation. For instance, the
outgoing shift now briefs the incoming shift, the center's work space is
arranged for more effective communication, and the Center staff now has
adequate technology.

^22DOD has requested $27 million in U.S. funding for MOI communications
maintenance and has stated that without this money, MOI's radio networks
will be severely jeopardized, its first responder network will degrade and
become inoperable, and the MOI will be unable to assume responsibility for
its national command and control network.

^23Standard operating procedures are a set of instructions covering those
features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized
procedure without loss of effectiveness.

^24According to a document provided by Coalition officials, the National
Command Center maintains nationwide strategic and operational situational
awareness and exercises command and control in order to implement plans
and policy and track the execution of all operations for the Ministry of
Interior.

In a July 2006 assessment, the Coalition judged the MOI's communication
capabilities as partly effective. A Coalition official who works with the
ministry to develop its command and control capabilities explained that
while the MOI has several communications technologies in place or in the
process of being installed, as of August 2006, these had not been
coordinated to form a functioning national command and control network.

                            Concluding Observations

The Coalition has been working to transfer full security responsibilities
for the country to the Iraqi military and police. With regard to the
development of logistics capabilities, Coalition officials stated that the
MOD has progressed further than the MOI. In regard to the development of
command and control capabilities, we were unable to determine if one
ministry had made significantly more progress than the other. This is
because Coalition and Iraqi government efforts in this area are numerous
and in various stages of development, making them difficult to compare. We
plan to address this comparison in subsequent work on ISF support
capabilities. Further, according to senior Coalition officials, the
seating of the Ministers of Defense and Interior in June 2006 sets the
conditions for even greater progress toward attaining ISF self-reliance.
However, significant challenges must be overcome before the ISF achieves
full capability. These include training Iraqi logisticians and
communications specialists, maintaining Iraqi vehicles and equipment, and
developing policies and procedures within the ministries. Without
qualified logisticians and communications specialists, reliable vehicles
and equipment, and accepted policies and procedures, the Iraqi forces
cannot achieve the self-sufficiency upon which the drawdown of Coalition
forces depends. Coalition officials recognize these challenges and state
they work daily to rectify them.

                                Agency Comments

DOD provided official oral comments on a draft of this correspondence and
stated that it had no comments on our findings and observations. DOD also
provided technical comments that were incorporated into the correspondence
where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will also be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected] if you or your staff
have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key ontributors to this report included Marilyn
Wasleski, Assistant Director; Katherine Lenane, Guy LoFaro, Christopher
Turner, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin.

William M. Solis, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

List of Congresssional Committees

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable John F. Tierney
Chairman
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

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