Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges Facing the Agency in
Fiscal Year 2008 and Beyond (14-FEB-07, GAO-07-490T).
FAA operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the
world. It is, however, a system under strain. The skies over
America are becoming more crowded every day. FAA faces the
daunting task of safely integrating a growing influx of
passengers and aircraft into the system and simultaneously
leading the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen)--a complicated effort to modernize the system.
FAA's broad responsibilities to maintain and modernize the
nation's air transportation system must be met in an uncertain
budgetary and long-term fiscal environment. GAO's concerns about
financing the nation's transportation system, including aviation,
led GAO to designate this issue as high-risk.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-490T
ACCNO: A65944
TITLE: Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges Facing the
Agency in Fiscal Year 2008 and Beyond
DATE: 02/14/2007
SUBJECT: Accident prevention
Agency evaluation
Air traffic control systems
Air transportation
Airline regulation
Financial analysis
Human capital management
Safety regulation
Strategic planning
Technology modernization programs
Transportation industry
Transportation safety
Transportation statistics
Airbus 380 Aircraft
Aviation Safety Reporting System
FAA Airport Improvement Program
FAA Aviation Safety Program
Next Generation Air Transportation
System
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GAO-07-490T
* [1]FAA Faces Challenges in Ensuring the Safe and Efficient Oper
* [2]Data Limitations Affect FAA's Ability to Manage Risk
* [3]FAA Faces Workload Challenges for its Safety Inspectors
* [4]Hiring and Training Air Traffic Controllers Remains a Challe
* [5]FAA Faces Challenges in Furthering and Institutionalizing Ma
* [6]Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to Instituti
* [7]Progress Continues to Be Made in Planning for NextGen, but C
* [8]JPDO Has Made Progress toward Finalizing Key Planning
Docume
* [9]Both JPDO and FAA Face Challenges as NextGen Moves from
Plan
* [10]Funding Issues May Affect Airports' Investment and Other FAA
* [11]FAA's Recent Estimate of Planned Capital Development Similar
* [12]FAA Funding Proposals Would Change How Airport Development i
* [13]FAA and the Congress Will Face a Challenge Funding FAA Progr
* [14]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [15]Order by Mail or Phone
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST
Wednesday, February 14, 2006
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Challenges Facing the Agency in Fiscal Year 2008 and Beyond
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
GAO-07-490T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today as you consider
the Administration's budget proposal for the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for fiscal year 2008. FAA operates one of the safest
air transportation systems in the world. It is, however, a system under
strain. The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. Demand
for air travel has increased in recent years, with over 740 million
passengers flying in fiscal year 2006, climbing toward an estimated 1
billion passengers per year in 2015, according to FAA estimates. These
passengers are expected to find more choices of aircraft in the years
ahead, ranging from the jumbo Airbus A380 that can hold more than 500
passengers, to very light jets that might transport 6 or fewer passengers
on any given flight. Already with increasing demand has come an increase
in flight arrival delays; such delays are nearing the levels of 2000, a
year in which 1 in 4 flights reached its destination behind schedule. And
although the system remains extraordinarily safe, if the current accident
rate continues while air traffic potentially triples in the next 20 years,
this country would see nine fatal commercial accidents each year, on
average. FAA thus faces the daunting task of safely integrating this
expected influx of passengers and aircraft into the system and
simultaneously leading the transition to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen)--an enormously complicated endeavor to
transform the air traffic control system.
FAA's broad responsibilities to maintain and modernize the nation's air
transportation system must be met in an uncertain budgetary and long-term
fiscal environment. We recently reported that the federal government's
financial condition and fiscal outlook are worse than many may
understand.1 Additionally, our concerns about financing the nation's
transportation system, including the aviation system, led us to designate
this issue as high-risk.2 These circumstances provide the context for my
testimony today. In particular, I will focus on some of the key challenges
and issues facing FAA and the Congress as the fiscal year 2008 budget for
FAA is considered. These challenges and issues are related to (1) ensuring
the continued safe operation of the nation's airspace system, (2)
continuing to improve FAA's internal management while leading the
transition to NextGen, and (3) funding issues concerning capital
improvements for airports and FAA's reauthorization. My statement is based
on our recent reports and updates that we obtained through interviewing
FAA officials and reviewing their documentation. We conducted this work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1GAO, Fiscal Stewardship: A Critical Challenge Facing Our Nation,
[16]GAO-07-362SP (Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
2GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [17]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
In summary:
o To maintain and expand the margin of safety within the national
airspace system, FAA is using risk-based, data-driven safety
programs to oversee the industry; however, the agency faces data
and human resource challenges that affect its ability to fully
implement these programs. These challenges are especially
important in light of the agency not meeting its performance
target for commercial air carrier safety for fiscal year 2006
because of recent fatal accidents and predictions of greatly
increased air travel. FAA's approaches to safety require that the
agency obtain accurate and complete data to monitor safety trends,
fully implement its safety programs, and assess their
effectiveness to determine if they are focused on the greatest
safety risk. We have previously recommended that FAA improve the
accuracy and completeness of its safety data and its analysis of
that data. FAA has made progress in this area but more work
remains. FAA's ability to oversee the aviation industry and ensure
a safe national air space system will be further affected by its
ability to hire, train, and deploy its primary workforce of safety
inspectors, engineers, and air traffic controllers. The expansion
of its oversight program for air carriers will result in workload
shifts for its inspector workforce that will make it important for
FAA to improve its staffing process and address its lack of a
staffing model. In addition, the agency estimates that it will
lose more than 10,000, or about 70 percent, of the air traffic
controller workforce over the next 10 years, primarily due to
retirements. In recent years, air traffic controllers have been
retiring at a faster rate than FAA anticipated, exacerbating this
hiring challenge.
o FAA has made significant progress in implementing management
processes and systems that use leading practices of private sector
businesses; however, further work remains to institutionalize
these efforts. FAA's progress led us to remove its financial
management from our high-risk list. Similarly, new and improved
acquisition processes and oversight have contributed to FAA
reporting that it has met its acquisition cost and schedule goals
for the last three years. Nonetheless, making and
institutionalizing further improvements in acquisition and
investment management are still needed. For example, while FAA has
established a cost estimating methodology for investments, it has
not implemented it. In addition, during the last two fiscal years,
FAA has reported cost savings and cost avoidance of $99.1 million
and $81.9 million, respectively. Additional work remains,
though--FAA received a qualified opinion on its most recent
financial audit as a result of the agency's inability to support
the accuracy and completeness of about $4.7 billion for equipment
reported in the financial statements. Moreover, as we have
previously recommended, FAA should undertake additional efforts to
consolidate its facilities and outsource some of its services to
further cut costs. FAA's focus on maintaining and improving its
record of internal achievement will be further tested as it joins
with its partners in the Joint Planning and Development Office in
transitioning from planning to implementing NextGen. Some key
challenges for the transition include completing the design and
cost estimates for NextGen and proposing how that cost will be
funded, especially in view of reduced funding for applied
aeronautical research, which is necessary to achieve some critical
NextGen capabilities. FAA will also need to assess if it has the
necessary expertise to handle the technical and contract
management that will be required to oversee the implementation of
NextGen.
o Related to the challenge of modernizing the air traffic control
system, FAA faces the challenge of ensuring that the nation's
3,400 airports develop the capacity to safely and efficiently
handle the projected growth in the demand for air travel. FAA
estimates that the total cost for planned airport development that
is eligible for funding from the Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
will be about $42 billion for 2007 through 2011. FAA administers
the AIP, which provides federal funds for capital development
projects at the entire range of the nation's airports. In its
fiscal year 2008 budget proposal, the Administration has proposed
reducing funding for AIP grants and changing the allocation
formula. Other changes being considered by FAA could increase
available funds for airport development. The net effect of all
these changes on the amount of funding available for planned
airport development is uncertain. Additionally, the excise taxes
that fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, such as those on
ticket purchases by airline passengers and aviation fuel, are
scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007. Avoiding a
lapse in revenue to the trust fund in fiscal year 2008 will
require Congressional action. About 80 percent of the budget
request for FAA would be funded by the trust fund and the
remainder by the general fund. Without a continued flow of funds
to the trust fund, FAA's ability to carry out AIP and other
programs throughout the agency may be in jeopardy, compounding the
safety and management challenges facing the agency.
FAA Faces Challenges in Ensuring the Safe and Efficient Operation
of the Nation�s Airspace System
Aviation safety is a priority goal for FAA. That priority is
reflected in the Administration's budget for fiscal year 2008,
which requests $1.9 billion to promote aviation safety and
efficiency. To the credit of FAA and the aviation industry, U.S.
commercial aviation has had an extraordinary safety record in
recent years. In 1997, FAA established a goal to reduce the
commercial fatal accident rate by 80 percent in 10 years and for
many years the agency has made incremental progress toward that
goal. However, increased air traffic, leading to congestion and
delays, is straining the efficiency and potentially the safety of
the nation's airspace system. Moreover, while commercial aviation
safety trends have been positive over the last several years, FAA
did not meet its performance target for commercial aviation
accidents last year and does not expect to meet its target for
2007. If air traffic triples as expected over the next two decades
and the accident rate of recent years is unchanged, there would be
nine fatal commercial aviation accidents each year, on average.
To maintain a safe and efficient airspace system, especially if
substantial growth in the industry materializes, it will be
important for FAA to have well-established, efficient, and
effective processes in place to provide an early warning of
hazards that can lead to accidents. It will also need a skilled
workforce to implement these processes. FAA is moving to a system
safety approach to oversight and has established risk-based,
data-driven safety programs to oversee the industry and a
workforce that includes approximately 4,500 safety inspectors and
engineers to implement those programs, about 15,420 air traffic
controllers, and nearly 7,200 technicians responsible for
maintaining FAA's air traffic control equipment and facilities. In
addition, FAA leverages its inspector and engineer workforce
through its "designee" programs, in which about 13,400 private
individuals and over 200 organizations have been delegated to act
on the agency's behalf. Our recent work has identified data
limitations and human resource challenges facing the agency that
affect its ability to implement these programs and oversee
aviation safety.
Data Limitations Affect FAA�s Ability to Manage Risk
FAA's ability to identify and respond to trends and early warnings
of safety problems and to manage risk is limited by incomplete and
inaccurate data. While FAA has developed risk-based processes for
monitoring and inspecting the aviation industry, in some cases,
the implementation of those processes is hampered by the lack of
reliable and complete data, which are important for identifying
and mitigating safety risks. In other cases, FAA does not fully
utilize the data it collects by evaluating or analyzing it for
nationwide safety trends.
For example, FAA does not collect actual flight activity data for
general aviation operators and air taxis. Instead, the agency uses
an annual survey to query a sample of registered aircraft owners
about the activity of their aircraft during the previous year. The
National Transportation Safety Board3 (NTSB) noted a number of
problems with these data, such as historically low response rates,
and concluded that FAA's data do not accurately portray changes in
general aviation activity.4 As a result, FAA lacks information to
monitor the rate of general aviation accidents, which decreased
from 1,715 in 2002 to about 1,500 in 2006. (See fig. 1.)
Therefore, the agency cannot meaningfully evaluate changes in the
number of general aviation accidents or determine the effect of
its general aviation safety initiatives. NTSB made a number of
recommendations to FAA to improve the accuracy of the survey data,
such as improving the currency of aircraft owner contact
information.
Figure 1: Number of General Aviation Accidents and Fatalities,
2000 through 2006
As another example, FAA does not collect basic data to measure
changes in the air ambulance industry, such as flight hours or
number of trips flown. From 1998 through 2005, the air ambulance
industry averaged 11 accidents per year, peaking at 18 accidents
in 2003. (See fig. 2.) Without data about the number of flights or
flight hours, FAA and the air ambulance industry are unable to
identify whether the increased number of accidents has resulted in
an increased accident rate, or whether it is a reflection of
growth in the industry. Data describing the safety trends of the
industry are essential to understanding the impact of FAA efforts
to improve air ambulance safety.
Figure 2: Total Air Ambulance Accidents, 1998 to 2005
In addition, while FAA receives important data, including
self-reporting of safety violations, through its partnership
programs with industry, the agency does not evaluate this
information for nationwide trends. According to FAA officials, the
Aviation Safety Action Program, Aviation Safety Reporting Program,
and Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program5 allow the agency to be
aware of many more safety incidents than are discovered during
inspections and surveillance. Although FAA tracks the actions
taken to resolve the individual safety violations that it learns
about through these programs, it does not evaluate such
information in the aggregate to identify trends in violations and
their potential cause in order to improve safety. We recommended
that FAA develop a continuous evaluative process for its industry
partnership programs, and use it to create measurable performance
goals for the programs and track performance towards those goals.6
FAA has not taken these actions, but has begun to address other
data issues.
FAA recognizes the critical nature of the issues associated with
its data. To address its data limitations, FAA is in the early
stages of planning the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing system--a comprehensive new data system that is expected
to provide the agency with access to a vast amount of safety data
that reside with entities such as NTSB and industry partners
including airlines and repair stations. Working with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), FAA began planning
for the new system in 2006. Because this activity is in the early
planning stages, our concerns about FAA's data remain relevant.
The fiscal year 2008 budget for FAA proposes $32 million for
safety databases and computer systems. As FAA prioritizes the
activities that it undertakes with such funds, it will be
important to continue addressing these critical data limitations.
FAA Faces Workload Challenges for its Safety Inspectors
Changes to FAA's oversight programs, such as the planned rapid
expansion of the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), from
16 air carriers in 2005 to approximately 115 air carriers by the
end of 2007, will pose workload challenges for FAA's safety
inspector workforce of about 3,600. As FAA moves air carriers
under the ATOS program, it will also move inspectors to the
program. As of January 2007, the 51 air carriers in ATOS were
overseen by 829 safety inspectors. Unlike other FAA inspection
programs, ATOS inspectors are dedicated to an air carrier and
generally cannot be used to inspect other entities. Inspectors who
are not part of ATOS, on the other hand, have duties in addition
to inspecting air carriers--such as overseeing repair stations,
designees, and aviation schools, and investigating accidents. In
prior work, we found that about 75 percent of the non-ATOS
inspectors had responsibility for more than 3 entities and about
half had responsibility for more than 15. In addition, we found
that ATOS requires more inspectors per airline than the
traditional inspection approach.7 As inspectors are transitioned
to ATOS, the remaining inspectors will have to add those other
entities to their workload. With the expansion of ATOS that will
continue into fiscal year 2008, it will be important to monitor
the magnitude of the shift in resources and the effect it may have
on FAA's overall capability to oversee the industry.
Part of the challenge that FAA faces with regard to safety
inspectors is improving its process for determining staffing
needs. This is especially important as oversight activities and
workload shifts with the expansion of ATOS and other program
changes, yet FAA lacks staffing standards for safety inspectors.
The National Academy of Sciences, under a congressional mandate,
recently completed a study for FAA that analyzed FAA's staffing
processes for safety inspectors.8 The study identified a number of
issues that FAA must address when developing a staffing model for
safety inspectors. For instance, the study included concerns that
the current staffing process does not focus resources in the areas
of greatest need and the match between individual inspectors'
technical knowledge and the facilities and operations they oversee
is not always optimal. The study recommended a process for FAA to
follow to develop a staffing model and identified key
factors--such as changes in aircraft and systems, changes in FAA
oversight practices including a shift to a system safety approach
through programs like ATOS and increasing the use of designees,
and new knowledge and skill demands--that should be considered in
developing the model. In response to the Academy's
recommendations, FAA expects to develop a staffing model, but the
agency does not have a specific timeframe for initiating this
effort. With nearly $1 billion of the fiscal year 2008 budget
request for FAA covering personnel compensation and benefits for
aviation safety and operations, these workload and staffing
challenges are critical to address.
Hiring and Training Air Traffic Controllers Remains a Challenge
During the coming decade, FAA will need to hire and train
thousands of air traffic controllers to replace those who will
retire and leave for other reasons. FAA estimated it will lose
10,291 controllers, or about 70 percent of the controller
workforce, during fiscal years 2006 through 2015, primarily due to
retirements.9 To replace these controllers and accommodate
increases in air traffic while accounting for expected
productivity increases, FAA plans to hire a total of 11,800 new
controllers from fiscal year 2006 through 2015. In fiscal year
2006, FAA hired 1,116 controllers. The Administration's budget for
fiscal year 2008 proposes about $4.4 billion for salaries and
benefits for the air traffic organization account, which includes
FAA's large air traffic controller workforce. The fiscal year 2008
proposal includes FAA's plans to hire 1,420 air traffic
controllers, which would bring the total number of air traffic
controllers to about 15,000. Figure 3 shows the estimated losses
each year as well as the number of planned hires.
Figure 3: Estimated Controller Losses and Planned Hires, Fiscal
Years 2006-2015
Note: FAA established these hiring targets in its 2006 controller
workforce plan.
Recent events may exacerbate the hiring situation. Data indicate
that controllers are retiring at a faster rate than FAA
anticipated. FAA projected 341 retirements for fiscal year 2005;
465 controllers actually retired--36 percent more than FAA's
estimate. Similarly, in fiscal year 2006, 25 percent more
controllers retired than FAA projected.10 To meet its hiring
target of 930 controllers in fiscal year 2006, FAA shifted about
200 of its planned hires from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2006
by speeding up the initial screening and training process.
According to FAA, it is on track to hire between 1,300 and 1,400
controllers in fiscal year 2007.11 To keep on track, FAA has
recently expanded its hiring sources, which had focused on
individuals with prior FAA or Department of Defense (DOD) air
traffic control experience and graduates from FAA's collegiate
training initiative program, to include the general public. This
strategy is needed, according to FAA officials, because DOD has
recently become less of a hiring source for controllers due to
military incentives for retaining controllers and higher salaries
than FAA's entry-level salary.12
It is also important for FAA to ensure that air traffic control
facilities have adequate staffing based on their unique traffic
demands and the accuracy of FAA's retirement forecast.
Historically, FAA has computed staffing standards, which are the
number of controllers needed on a systemwide basis, but
distribution of these totals to the facility level was a
negotiated process. The staffing standards did not take into
account the significant differences in complexity and workload
among FAA's 300 terminal and enroute control facilities, which can
lead to staffing imbalances. FAA has begun developing and
implementing new staffing standards that use an algorithm that
incorporates traffic levels and complexity of traffic at the
facility level to determine the number of air traffic controllers
needed, according to an FAA official. As FAA further refines its
process for determining controller staffing needs, the ultimate
objective is to assess the traffic level and complexity on a
sector-by-sector basis to develop more accurate controller
staffing requirements. This process is in the early stages of
implementation and it is too early to assess the outcome. Such
staffing standards for air traffic controllers as well as safety
inspectors are important to ensure that FAA deploys its resources
for fiscal year 2008 and later years in a cost-effective and
risk-based manner.
FAA Faces Challenges in Furthering and Institutionalizing
Management Improvements While Moving Toward Implementing NextGen
FAA has made significant progress in implementing management
processes that use leading practices of private sector businesses,
but further work remains to fully address past problems.
Historically, those problems included chronic cost and schedule
difficulties associated with operating and modernizing the
nation's air traffic control system as well as weaknesses in FAA's
financial management. In 1995, we declared FAA's air traffic
control modernization program a high-risk initiative because of
its cost, complexity, and systemic management and acquisition
problems. In 1999, we also placed FAA on the high-risk list for
financial management, noting weaknesses that rendered the agency
vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse by undermining its ability
to manage operations and limiting the reliability of financial
information provided to the Congress. FAA has made significant
progress in both areas and we removed FAA's financial management
from our high risk list in 2005. However, additional work is
needed in managing its acquisitions and finances and is crucial to
developing a sustainable capability for delivering priority
systems on budget and on time. In addition, FAA, in partnership
with other federal agencies, is embarking on the development of
NextGen--one of the federal government's most complex and
comprehensive undertakings in recent times. FAA faces challenges
associated with moving forward from planning to implementing
NextGen.
Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to
Institutionalize Recent Management Improvements
FAA has taken actions to operate in a more business-like manner
and enable the agency to more economically and efficiently manage
the $14.1 billion requested for its fiscal year 2008 budget. Since
we designated FAA financial management as high-risk in 1999, FAA
has made significant improvements, including implementing a new
financial management system called Delphi13 and developing a cost
accounting system. Additionally, FAA received unqualified opinions
from auditors on its annual financial statements for fiscal years
2001 through 2005, in spite of material internal control
weaknesses that the auditors identified. This progress led us to
remove FAA financial management from our high risk list in 2005.
Nonetheless, external auditors issued a qualified opinion on FAA's
fiscal year 2006 financial statements for the first time since
2000 and repeated a material internal control weakness that was
reported in 2005. The opinion and internal control report stemmed
from FAA's inability to support the accuracy and completeness of
the construction-in-progress account, reported in the financial
statements as $4.7 billion. Difficulties with this account, which
includes costs for projects such as radars, runway guidance
systems, and aviation safety and security systems, have been a
longstanding concern. FAA has begun work to address this problem.
However, it will be important for FAA to develop a systematic
solution to this problem, so that it does not recur.
FAA's efforts towards improved financial management also include
establishing a cost control and cost reduction program. According
to agency officials, each line of business--such as FAA's Air
Traffic Organization (ATO), which is responsible for managing and
modernizing the air traffic control system--is annually required
to propose at least one cost control initiative, and the
Administrator tracks and reviews progress on these initiatives
monthly. According to FAA, these initiatives have yielded a total
of $99.1 million in cost savings and $81.9 million in cost
avoidance for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Additional cost control
efforts include outsourcing flight service stations, which FAA
estimates will save $2.2 billion over 10 years, and restructuring
its administrative service areas from 9 separate offices to 3,
which FAA estimates will save up to $460 million over 10 years. We
have ongoing work that is assessing FAA's cost control strategy
and identifying additional cost savings opportunities that may
exist. For example, we have previously reported the need for FAA
to pursue further cost control options, such as exploring
additional opportunities for consolidating facilities and
contracting out more of its services.14
FAA has taken steps to improve its software acquisition and
investment management processes and for the last 3 years has
reported meeting its cost and schedule targets for the acquisition
of major systems, including air traffic control systems.15 These
improvements are particularly important since FAA plans to spend
about $9.4 billion from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011
to upgrade and replace air traffic control systems. To better
manage its information technology investments, including its
software intensive air traffic control systems, and address
problems we have identified,16 FAA has changed its acquisition
management guidance to require review of all investments--new
systems as well as systems in service. In addition, FAA has
established a cost estimating methodology for its investments. FAA
has also developed and applied a process improvement model to
assess the maturity of its software and systems capabilities
resulting in, among other things, enhanced productivity and
greater ability to predict schedules and resources. Further, FAA
has made progress in expanding its enterprise architecture--a
comprehensive guide to its plans for acquiring new systems--to
include the initial requirements for NextGen.
However, making further improvements and institutionalizing them
throughout the agency will continue to be a challenge for FAA. For
example, FAA's acquisition management guidance does not clearly
indicate whether the reviews of in-service systems include
reevaluations of projects' alignment with strategic goals and
objectives, as we recommended. In addition, the agency has yet to
implement its cost estimating methodology. Furthermore, FAA has
not established a policy to require use of its process improvement
model on all major acquisitions for the national air space system.
Additionally, as FAA begins to detail the scope and system
requirements of NextGen, it will be important to adapt and expand
the enterprise architecture for the national air space system to
guide these future plans. Until the agency fully addresses these
residual issues, it will continue to risk program management
problems affecting cost, schedule, and performance. With a
multi-billion dollar acquisition budget, addressing these actions
are as critical as ever.
Institutionalizing these financial, acquisition, and information
technology improvements will be a challenge for FAA, especially in
view of the imminent departure of the Chief Operating Officer
later this month and the departure of the Administrator, who will
reach the end of her 5-year term this September. We have reported
that the experiences of successful transformations and change
management initiatives in large public and private organizations
suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or more until such
initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are transformed in
a sustainable manner. Such changes require focused, full-time
attention from senior leadership and a dedicated team.17
Progress Continues to Be Made in Planning for NextGen, but
Challenges to Successful Implementation Remain
Work to determine the capabilities and requirements that will be
needed for NextGen and to produce a comprehensive vision for that
system is nearing completion; however, given the staggering
complexity of this ambitious effort to modernize and transform the
air traffic control system over the next two decades, it will not
be easy to move from planning to implementation. To plan NextGen,
Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and
Development Office (JPDO) in 2003. JDPO is housed within FAA and
the Administration's fiscal year 2008 budget includes $14.3
million to support JPDO. To carry out its planning function, JPDO
is required to operate in conjunction with multiple government
agencies.18 JPDO's approach requires unprecedented collaboration
and consensus among many stakeholders--federal and
nonfederal--about necessary system capabilities, equipment,
procedures, and regulations. Recently, JPDO has made progress in
developing key planning documents, including a cost estimate for
NextGen. However, as efforts move forward to implement NextGen, it
will be important to identify the source and funding for
completion of intermediate technology development and determine
how FAA can best manage the complex implementation and integration
of NextGen technologies. Without a timely transition to NextGen
capabilities, JPDO officials estimate a future gap between the
demand for air transportation and available capacity that could
cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars annually.
JPDO Has Made Progress toward Finalizing Key Planning Documents
and Developing a Cost Estimate
FAA and the other JPDO partners have been working to refine the
vision for NextGen and achieve a general consensus on that vision.
The bulk of JPDO's planning has been to develop three critical
documents--a concept of operations,19 enterprise architecture,20
and operational improvement roadmaps.21 Once these key documents
are completed in the next few months, it will be important to
synchronize them with partner agency planning documents, including
FAA's implementation plan for NextGen--the Operational Evolution
Partnership (OEP)--and to continue to use the documents to drive
agency budget decisions. The OEP is intended as a comprehensive
description of how the agency will implement NextGen, including
the required technologies, procedures, and resources. JPDO is
continuing to work with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
to develop a unified, cross-agency program for NextGen funding
requests.
Given the criticality of NextGen, another important planning
document--possibly the most important for Congress--is a
comprehensive estimate of the costs to JPDO partner agencies,
particularly FAA, for the required research, development, systems
acquisitions, and systems integration. Such an estimate does not
yet exist. As we reported in November 2006,22 a limited,
preliminary cost estimate concluded that FAA's budget under a
NextGen scenario would average about $15 billion per year through
2025, or about $1 billion more annually (in today's dollars) than
FAA's fiscal year 2006 appropriation.23 A JPDO official told us
they have submitted a limited NextGen cost estimate to OMB with
the 2008 budget request. As of February 9, 2007, JPDO had not
publicly released its cost estimate for NextGen. According to the
Department of Transportation, the Administration's budget for
fiscal year 2008 includes $175 million to support key FAA
investments in NextGen.
According to JPDO officials, their current estimate focuses only
on the near-term capital needs for FAA's ATO portfolio. To develop
what they believed would be a more accurate cost estimate, JPDO
also focused on the funding necessary to achieve only the
capabilities of the NextGen system around 2016, rather than the
long-term 2025 capabilities. JPDO then laid out the major systems
and investments required by ATO to achieve the mid-term vision and
the related costs for ATO.
While JPDO's new estimate will be a step toward understanding the
costs of NextGen, this estimate is still incomplete. Much work
remains to develop a comprehensive cost estimate for NextGen that
includes the costs to the rest of FAA (beyond ATO), the other JPDO
partner agencies, and industry. A JPDO official told us the agency
is working to develop a comprehensive estimate and plans to have
one ready to submit with the 2009 budget request. This
comprehensive estimate is intended to describe the business case
for NextGen and detail the investments that will be required by
all the JPDO partner agencies to achieve the NextGen vision by
2025.
Both JPDO and FAA Face Challenges as NextGen Moves from Planning
to Implementation
The successful implementation of NextGen will depend, in part, on
resolving the uncertainty over which entities will fund and
conduct the research and development necessary to achieve some key
NextGen capabilities and to support the operational roadmaps. In
the past, a significant portion of aeronautics research and
development, including intermediate technology development, has
been performed by NASA. However, our analysis of NASA's
aeronautics research budget and proposed funding shows a 30
percent decline, in constant 2005 dollars, from fiscal year 2005
to fiscal year 2011. To its credit, NASA plans to focus its
research on the needs of NextGen. However, NASA is also moving
toward a focus on fundamental research and away from developmental
work and demonstration projects. FAA has determined that research
gaps now exist as a result of both NASA's cuts to aeronautical
research funding and the expanded requirements for NextGen coming
from JPDO. These gaps are in the activities of applied research
and development--activities that will be required to implement new
policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for
certification of new systems, and develop technologies for
transfer to industry.
It will be important for both FAA and JPDO to find ways, in the
near term, to keep the necessary research and development on track
to support implementation of NextGen by 2025. In 2006, officials
from FAA and JPDO initiated an assessment of NextGen research and
development requirements. Their goal was to identify specific
research initiatives that were not currently funded, but which
they said must be initiated no later than fiscal year 2009 to
comply with the operational roadmaps. The preliminary findings
from this assessment led to increased budget requests for FAA to
help lessen the research and development gaps. However, JPDO
officials noted that a research and development gap remains, with
items in the research and development pipeline that need funding
to take them from concept to development. Other options for
addressing the gap are for JPDO and FAA to further explore ways to
leverage the research being conducted in other agencies or to
partner with industry or academia. For example, JPDO and FAA have
already identified research within DOD on alternative fuels that,
with a modest investment, could be leveraged to include civil
aviation. Currently, it is unknown how all of the significant
research and development activities inherent in the transition to
NextGen will be conducted or funded.
Another issue with regard to NextGen implementation will be FAA's
ability to manage the systems acquisitions and integration needed
to implement a system as broad and complex as NextGen. In the
past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA's
management of air traffic control modernization efforts. Industry
experts with whom we have spoken continue to question whether FAA
will have the technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. In
November, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and
weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract
management expertise that will be required to define, implement,
and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the
transition to NextGen.24 In response to our recommendation, FAA is
considering convening a blue ribbon panel to study this issue and
make recommendations to the agency about how to best proceed with
its management and oversight of the implementation of NextGen. We
believe that such a panel could help FAA begin to address this
challenge.
Funding Issues May Affect Airports� Investment and Other FAA
Programs
As it modernizes the national airspace system to meet the nation's
future air transportation needs, FAA must not only transform the
air traffic control system, but also work with airport operators
to provide increased capacity at airports to safely handle the
projected growth in the demand for air travel. This latter
responsibility will include overseeing airports' efforts to adapt
their infrastructure to accommodate the introduction of very light
jets, and in the case of the largest airports, the new large
Airbus A380. Airports are an integral part of the nation's
transportation system and maintaining their safety and efficiency
is an important FAA responsibility. To this end, FAA administers
the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), which provides federal
funds for development projects at the entire range of the nation's
3,400 airports--from small general aviation airports to the very
largest that handle several million passengers per year. The
Administration has proposed cuts in AIP funding and is considering
possible changes to the AIP allocation formula as well as
increasing the cap on passenger facility charges25 for airport
development projects. Any change in the level or allocation of
these funds could have implications for funding airport capital
projects. Not only AIP grants but also portions of other FAA
programs receive funds from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund,
which is largely financed by excise taxes on ticket purchases by
airline passengers and aviation fuel. Since these taxes are
scheduled to expire at the end of September 2007, ensuring that
there is no lapse in revenue to the trust fund will require
Congressional action.26 Without a continued flow of funds to the
trust fund, FAA's ability to carry out AIP and other programs
during fiscal year 2008 may be in jeopardy.
FAA�s Recent Estimate of Planned Capital Development Similar to
Past Estimate
FAA estimates the total cost for planned airport projects that are
eligible for AIP funding, including runways, taxiways, and noise
mitigation and reduction efforts, will be about $42 billion for
fiscal years 2007 through 2011.27 This estimate is little changed
from the agency's last estimate in 2004 for the period 2005 to
2009. FAA's current estimate indicates that over half of the
planned development will occur at large and medium hub airports.28
The Airports Council International--North America (ACI-NA) also
provides estimates of planned airport development. ACI-NA includes
both AIP-eligible projects and ineligible projects and, as a
result, has higher estimates.
Historically, airports have received funding for capital
development from a variety of sources. As we reported in 2003, the
single largest source of financing for airports is tax-exempt
bonds, followed by AIP grants and passenger facility charges. Tax
exempt bonds are currently supported by airport revenue and, in
some cases, by passenger facility charges. Access to these funding
sources varies according to airports' size and funding
capabilities. Large and medium hub airports depend primarily on
tax-exempt bonds, while the smaller airports rely principally on
AIP grants.29 Passenger facility charges are a particularly
important source of capital for large and medium hub airports
because they have the majority of commercial service passengers.
FAA Funding Proposals Would Change How Airport Development is
Financed
The Administration has proposed changing the federal role in
financing airport development in its fiscal year 2008 budget
proposal, which also includes a reauthorization proposal for FAA
that will be submitted later this month. Funding for AIP grants
would be reduced and the allocation formula changed. The
Administration's reauthorization proposal is expected to provide
details on these proposed changes. It is, therefore, currently
unclear how a number of issues will be addressed.
The reauthorization proposal may clarify the impact on smaller
airports,30 which received about two-thirds of AIP grants in
fiscal year 2004. As noted earlier in my statement, smaller
airports rely primarily on AIP grants for capital funding. In
recent years, statutory changes in the distribution of AIP grants
have increased the share to smaller airports.31 However, under the
fiscal year 2008 budget proposal, funding changes would especially
impact smaller airports if the current allocation formulas are
unchanged in the forthcoming reauthorization proposal. First,
primary airport entitlements32 under AIP would be cut in half from
the fiscal year 2006 level. In turn, the small airport fund, which
is funded from AIP entitlement amounts that large and medium hub
airports must turn back if they impose passenger facility
charges,33 would also be reduced by half. Second, state
entitlements for non-primary34 commercial service and general
aviation airports would be reduced from 20 percent to 18.5 percent
of total AIP obligations. Finally, discretionary set aside grants
for reliever airports would be eliminated under the fiscal year
2008 budget proposal. Table 1 shows the effect on the amounts
available for various types of AIP grants at different funding
levels including the $2.75 billion requested in the
Administration's budget and the actual funding level for fiscal
year 2006.
3NTSB, Current Procedures for Collecting and Reporting U.S. General
Aviation Accident and Activity Data (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
4In fiscal year 2007, FAA made changes to its survey, increasing the
sample size from 30,000 to 75,000 and, according to the agency, responses
increased from 15,000 to 32,000. However, the response rate still remains
low.
5Participants in the Aviation Safety Action Program include employees of
air carriers and repair stations; participants in the Aviation Safety
Reporting Program include all users of the national airspace system,
including air traffic controllers; participants in the Voluntary
Disclosure Reporting Program include air carriers, repair stations, and
aviation manufacturers.
6GAO, Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls are Needed to Improve
FAA's Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts, [18]GAO-04-646
(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2004).
7GAO, Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration
into FAA's Oversight of Airlines, [19]GAO-05-726 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
28, 2005).
8National Research Council, Staffing Standards for Aviation Safety
Inspectors (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2006).
9The high percentage of retirements is attributable to the 1981 controller
strike, when President Ronald Reagan fired over 10,000 air traffic
controllers, and the consequent need to quickly rebuild the controller
workforce. From 1982 through 1991, FAA hired an average of 2,655
controllers per year. These controllers will become eligible for
retirement during the next decade.
10FAA estimated 467 retirements in fiscal year 2006 and 583 controllers
actually retired.
11FAA originally planned to hire 1,136 controllers in fiscal year 2007 as
shown in figure 3. In January 2007, FAA revised that hiring target to
1,386.
12Under FAA's recent contract with air traffic controllers, most current
controllers continued to receive their existing base salaries and
benefits, while new controllers are hired at lower wages.
13 [20]Delphi is a commercial off-the-shelf financial management system
that was acquired by the Department of Transportation and fully
implemented in FAA in 2003.
14GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural
Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management
Tools, [21]GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).
15We have on-going work examining FAA's procedures for measuring its
acquisition performance.
16GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program
Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, [22]GAO-05-266 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005); GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management
Capabilities Improved, but More can be Done to Institutionalize
Improvements, [23]GAO-04-901 , (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and GAO,
Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities in
Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed, [24]GAO-04-822
, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
17 [25]GAO-06-154 .
18In addition to FAA, these agencies include the Departments of
Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy.
19The concept of operations describes how the transformational elements of
NextGen will operate in 2025. It is intended to establish general
stakeholder buy-in to the NextGen end state, transition path, and business
case.
20The enterprise architecture follows from the concept of operations and
describes the system in more detail (using federal enterprise architecture
and DOD enterprise architecture frameworks). It will be used to integrate
planning efforts and drive partner agency guidance.
21The operational improvement roadmaps lay out a timeline for deploying
and integrating NextGen systems.
22GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System,
[26]GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
23This preliminary estimate--developed by the Research, Engineering and
Development Advisory Committee, an advisory committee to FAA--indicates
that the cost for a status quo scenario (i.e., no NextGen) would also be
about $15 billion per year through 2025. This is due primarily to the
expectation that, under the NextGen scenario, capital expenditures would
be higher than under the status quo scenario in the near term, but
operations costs would be lower because of productivity improvements in
the longer term.
24 [27]GAO-07-25 .
25Passenger facility charges are fees airports can charge passengers to
fund FAA approved projects.
26Congress also would need to renew FAA's authority to spend from the
trust fund.
27FAA's estimate, in nominal dollars, is based on the agency's National
Plan of Integrated Airport Systems, which FAA published in September 2006.
28Commercial service airports are categorized by the number of
enplanements. Large hubs are those airports that account for at least one
percent of total passenger enplanements. Medium hubs account for between
0.25 and 1 percent of total passenger enplanements.
29Any increase in the issuance of bonds exempt from federal taxation has
an impact on federal revenue.
30Smaller airports include small hub, nonhub, other commercial service,
reliever (high capacity general aviation airports in major metropolitan
areas that provide pilots with an alternative to using congested hub
airports) and general aviation airports.
31For example, FAA's 2000 authorization (Pub. L. No. 106-181) boosted
funding for nonprimary airports and small primary airports by increasing
the portion of AIP passenger entitlement funds that must be turned back by
large and medium hub airports. Under AIP, airports that collect passenger
facility charges must forfeit a certain percentage of their AIP
entitlement funds, which are then distributed to smaller airports. In
fiscal year 2004, smaller airports received a total of about $380 million
as a result of these turn backs.
32Entitlements are AIP funds apportioned to airport sponsors and states
for eligible projects based on formulas.
33Small airport fund grants must be spent at small hub primary airports,
general aviation airports (including reliever airports), and nonhub
commercial airports.
34Non-primary airports are commercial service airports that have from
2,500 to 10,000 annual passenger enplanements. These airports are used
mainly by general aviation.
Table 1: Estimated AIP Distribution Under Alternative Funding Levels (in
millions)
Alternative funding levels
$2,750
(proposed FY $3,550 (actual
2008) $3,000 $3,250 FY 2006)
Primary airports $496.0 $496.0 $857.7 $888.0
entitlements
Entitlements for 487.9 534.1 242.0 299.5
non-primary, general
aviation and reliever
airports
Other entitlementsa 103.0 111.8 516.5 526.6
Carryover entitlementsb 447.8 447.8 447.8 431.7
Small airport fund 214.2 214.2 428.4 428.4
Discretionary set aside 0.0 0.0 4.3 5.6
grants for reliever airports
All other discretionary and 888.3 1,083.3 640.4 844.6
set aside grantsc
TOTAL AIP funds available $2,637.2 $2,887.2 $3,137.1 $3,424.4
for grantsd
Source: FAA.
aIncludes grants for Alaskan airports and cargo service airports.
bFunds that some airports can claim to use in the fiscal year in which the
amount was apportioned and two fiscal years immediately after that year.
cFunds that are available for use on AIP eligible projects at FAA's
discretion. This includes funds set aside for such things as noise
planning and programming, reliever airports and capacity, safety,
security, and noise projects. It also includes discretionary grants that
can be used for any AIP eligible project at any airport.
dThe funding available for grants after the 2006 rescission and deductions
for airport research, other programs, and administrative costs.
To help offset any reductions in AIP grants, FAA is also considering
allowing airports to collect more revenue from passenger facility charges,
which large airports generally prefer. Airlines, however, have been
generally opposed to an increase in these charges because they have little
control in how passenger facility charges are spent and because they
believe these charges reduce passenger demand for air travel. Nonetheless,
if airports were to increase charges, additional airport revenue could be
generated. Increasing the cap on passenger facilities charges would
primarily benefit larger airports because these charges are a function of
passenger traffic. However, as already noted, under AIP, large airports
that collect passenger facility charges must forfeit a certain percentage
of their AIP formula funds. These forfeited funds are subsequently divided
between the small airport fund, which is to receive 87.5 percent, and the
discretionary fund, which is to receive 12.5 percent. Thus, under current
law, smaller airports would benefit indirectly from any increases in
passenger facility charges and help offset reductions in AIP funding.
FAA and the Congress Will Face a Challenge Funding FAA Programs in Fiscal Year
2008 if Reauthorization is Not Timely
With the excise taxes that fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007, Congress will need to
act if there is to be no lapse in revenue to the trust fund to fund FAA.
If the taxes are neither reauthorized by that time nor replaced by other
revenue sources for the trust fund, the only revenues to the trust fund
will be interest earned on the fund's cash balance. FAA estimates that two
previous lapses in 1996-1997 resulted in the trust fund not receiving
about $5 billion in revenue.
As of the end of fiscal year 2006, the trust fund's uncommitted
balance--surplus revenues in the trust fund against which no commitments,
in the form of budget authority, have been made--was less than $2 billion.
The Administration's budget proposal projects that the uncommitted balance
will be about $2 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007. If today's level
of monthly tax revenue continues, a 2- to 3-month lapse in fiscal year
2008 could reduce the revenue to the trust fund enough to cause the
uncommitted balance to fall to zero in fiscal year 2008. Most of FAA's
funding comes from the trust fund--the fiscal year 2008 budget request for
FAA proposes about 80 percent of the agency's funding from the trust fund
with the remainder from the general fund. If the trust fund balance falls
to zero, continuation of FAA's programs--including efforts to address some
of the safety and management challenges that I have discussed--would
depend on providing additional general revenues.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] . Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony include Paul Aussendorf, Jay
Cherlow, Jessica Evans, Colin Fallon, Carol Henn, Ed Laughlin, Ed Menoche,
Faye Morrison, Colleen Phillips, Taylor Reeves, Richard Scott, Teresa
Spisak, and Larry Thomas.
(540144)
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Highlights of [36]GAO-07-490T , a testimony to Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
February 14, 2007
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Challenges Facing the Agency in Fiscal Year 2008 and Beyond
FAA operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the world. It
is, however, a system under strain. The skies over America are becoming
more crowded every day. FAA faces the daunting task of safely integrating
a growing influx of passengers and aircraft into the system and
simultaneously leading the transition to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen)--a complicated effort to modernize the
system. FAA's broad responsibilities to maintain and modernize the
nation's air transportation system must be met in an uncertain budgetary
and long-term fiscal environment. GAO's concerns about financing the
nation's transportation system, including aviation, led GAO to designate
this issue as high-risk.
This statement is based on recent reports and interviews with FAA
officials. It focuses on FAA's challenges relating to (1) ensuring the
continued safe operation of the nation's airspace system, (2) continuing
to improve FAA's management while leading the transition to NextGen, and
(3) funding issues concerning capital improvements for airports and FAA's
reauthorization.
[37]What GAO RecommendsIn prior reports, GAO has made recommendations to
address data and management problems. Although FAA has begun to address
them, many have not been fully implemented.
To ensure continued safety within the national airspace system, FAA is
using risk-based, data-driven safety programs to oversee the industry;
however, the agency faces data and human resource challenges that affect
its ability to fully implement these programs. GAO has previously
recommended that FAA improve the accuracy and completeness of the safety
data and analysis of that data needed to monitor safety trends, fully
implement its safety programs, and assess their effectiveness to determine
if they are focused on the greatest safety risk. FAA has made progress in
this area but more remains to be done. FAA's ability to oversee the
aviation industry will be further affected by its ability to hire, train,
and deploy its primary workforce of safety inspectors, engineers, and air
traffic controllers. The expansion of FAA's oversight program for air
carriers will result in workload shifts for its inspectors that will make
it important for FAA to improve its staffing process. In addition, the
agency estimates that it will lose about 70 percent of the air traffic
controller workforce over the next 10 years, primarily due to retirements.
FAA has made significant progress in implementing management processes and
systems that use leading practices of private sector businesses; however,
further work remains to institutionalize these efforts. For example, new
and improved acquisition processes and oversight have contributed to FAA
meeting its acquisition cost and schedule goals for the last three years.
Additional work remains, though--FAA received a qualified opinion on its
most recent financial audit as a result of lack of support for the
accuracy of about $4.7 billion for equipment. Moreover, GAO has previously
recommended that FAA should undertake additional efforts to consolidate
its facilities and outsource some of its services to further cut costs.
Some key challenges for the transition to NextGen include completing the
design and cost estimates for NextGen and proposing how that cost will be
funded. FAA will also need to assess its capacity to handle the technical
and contract management expertise that will be required to oversee the
implementation of NextGen.
FAA estimates that the total cost for planned airport development that is
eligible for funding from the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) will be
about $42 billion for 2007 through 2011. FAA's budget request for fiscal
year 2008 proposes significant cuts in AIP. These cuts, along with changes
to the way AIP is allocated among airports and possible increases in the
cap on passenger ticket charges for airport projects, could have
implications for the amount of funding available for planned airport
development, especially at small airports. Additionally, the taxes that
fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund are scheduled to expire at the end
of fiscal year 2007. Until Congress reauthorizes those taxes, FAA's
ability to carry out programs related to airport development as well as
some other programs throughout the agency may be in jeopardy, compounding
the safety and management challenges facing FAA.
References
Visible links
16. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-362SP
17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-310
18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-646
19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-726
20. http://delphi.faa.gov/
21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-154
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-266
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-901
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-822
25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-154
26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25
27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-GAO-07-490T
*** End of document. ***