Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast	 
Hurricanes Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness	 
(14-FEB-07, GAO-07-484T).					 
                                                                 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) helps individuals and	 
businesses recover from disasters such as hurricanes through its 
Disaster Loan Program. SBA faced an unprecedented demand for	 
disaster loan assistance following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes
(Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), which resulted in extensive property 
damage and loss of life. In the aftermath of these disasters,	 
concerns were expressed regarding the timeliness of SBA's	 
disaster assistance. GAO initiated work and completed two reports
under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations 
and determine how well SBA provided victims of the Gulf Coast	 
hurricanes with timely assistance. This testimony, which is based
on these two reports, discusses (1) challenges SBA experienced in
providing victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely	 
assistance, (2) factors that contributed to these challenges, and
(3) steps SBA has taken since the Gulf Coast hurricanes to	 
enhance its disaster preparedness. GAO visited the Gulf Coast	 
region, reviewed SBA planning documents, and interviewed SBA	 
officials.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-484T					        
    ACCNO:   A65927						        
  TITLE:     Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast
Hurricanes Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness	 
     DATE:   02/14/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster relief aid				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal aid programs				 
	     Federal aid to states				 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricanes 					 
	     Lending institutions				 
	     Loans						 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     Performance appraisal				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Hurricane Rita					 
	     Small business					 
	     Small business assistance				 
	     SBA Disaster Loan Program				 

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GAO-07-484T

   

     * [1]Background
     * [2]DCMS's Limited Capacity and Difficulties in Other Logistical
     * [3]Unprecedented Loan Application Volume and SBA's Limited Disa
     * [4]SBA Has Taken Steps to Better Prepare for Future Disasters,
     * [5]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [6]Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Wednesday, February 14, 2007

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes Highlights Need for Enhanced
Disaster Preparedness

Statement of William B. Shear, Director
Financial Markets and Community Investment

GAO-07-484T

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Small
Business Administration's (SBA) response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes
(Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), which caused more than 1,400 deaths and more
than $80 billion of estimated property damages. While SBA is generally
known for the financial support it provides to small businesses, the
agency also plays a critical, if less publicized role, in assisting the
victims of natural and other disasters. Specifically, SBA provides
financial assistance through its Disaster Loan Program to help homeowners,
renters, and businesses of all sizes recover from disasters such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. Due to the damage
associated with the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA faced unprecedented demand
for its disaster loan services and, 9 months following the hurricanes, had
approved nearly 150,000 such loans totaling nearly $10 billion. However,
concerns have been expressed that SBA's response to the hurricanes was
slow, leaving many disaster victims without the timely assistance that
they needed.

My statement today is based on two reports that we issued under the
Comptroller General's authority to initiate reviews of federal programs.
The first report, which was released in July 2006, discussed SBA's
planning for and implementation of the Disaster Credit Management System
(DCMS), which the agency uses to process disaster loan applications.1 The
second report, which is being released today, discusses SBA's disaster
planning for other logistical areas, such as hiring and training a capable
workforce and acquiring necessary office space.2 I note that these reports
are part of a larger effort by GAO to assist Congress in assessing the
response of federal, state, and local agencies to the Gulf Coast
hurricanes and to identify steps that such organizations could take to
improve the provision of assistance and services to the victims of future
disasters.3

1GAO, Small Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More Timely
Disaster Assistance, [7]GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).

2GAO, Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance
Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters, [8]GAO-07-114 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 14, 2007).

3See, for example, GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership,
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness
of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [9]GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).

In my testimony, I will discuss (1) challenges SBA experienced in
providing victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance, (2)
factors that contributed to these challenges, and (3) steps SBA has taken
since the Gulf Coast hurricanes to enhance its disaster preparedness.

To address these objectives, we visited the Gulf Coast region, reviewed
documents related to SBA's acquisition and implementation of DCMS,
reviewed reports that discuss disaster planning, analyzed relevant SBA
planning documentation, and interviewed disaster planning experts and SBA
officials in headquarters and field offices. We conducted the work on our
reports from November 2005 through January 2007 and in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

In summary:

           o We identified several significant system and logistical
           challenges SBA experienced in responding to victims of the Gulf
           Coast hurricanes that compromised the agency's ability to provide
           timely disaster assistance. First, due to DCMS's limited capacity,
           the number of staff who could concurrently access the system to
           process disaster loans was restricted. Further, SBA staff who were
           able to access DCMS often encountered system outages and slow
           response times. Second, SBA faced challenges in training and
           supervising thousands of mostly temporary employees hired to
           process loan applications and encountered difficulties in
           obtaining suitable office space for the expanded workforce. As a
           result of these and other challenges, SBA averaged about 74 days
           to process disaster loan applications, as of late May 2006,
           compared with the agency's goal of processing applications within
           21 days.
           o While the unprecedented volume of disaster loan applications
           clearly affected SBA's capacity to provide timely assistance to
           Gulf Coast hurricane victims, the absence of a comprehensive and
           sophisticated planning process beforehand likely limited the
           efficiency of the agency's initial response. For example, in
           designing the maximum user capacity of DCMS, SBA primarily relied
           on historical data such as the number of loan applications that it
           received after the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake--the
           most severe disaster that the agency had previously encountered.
           SBA did not consider any disaster scenarios that were more severe
           or use the information available from disaster simulations or
           catastrophe models to help design DCMS's capacity.4 SBA also did
           not adequately monitor a DCMS contractor or completely stress test
           DCMS prior to its implementation. Moreover, SBA did not engage in
           comprehensive disaster planning for other logistical issues, such
           as workforce or space acquisition planning, prior to the Gulf
           Coast hurricanes at either the headquarters or field office
           levels.
           o In the aftermath of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA has planned
           or initiated several measures that officials said would enhance
           the agency's capacity to respond to future disasters. For example,
           SBA officials said that the agency has completed an expansion of
           DCMS's user capacity to support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent
           users as compared with 1,500 concurrent users supported for the
           Gulf Coast hurricanes. Additionally, SBA initiated measures or
           established plans to address the logistical challenges that it
           faced in responding to the disasters, such as taking steps to
           increase the availability of trained and experienced disaster
           staff. However, we have also identified several apparent
           limitations in SBA' disaster planning process, including that the
           agency has not established time lines for completing key elements
           of the plan, assessed whether the supplemental use of simulations
           and models would enhance the planning process, and developed a
           long-term strategy to obtain suitable office space in a disaster
           situation.

           We recommended in our July 2006 report that SBA take several
           actions to enhance DCMS, such as reassessing the system's maximum
           user capacity in light of information available from catastrophe
           risk modeling firms and disaster simulations. As I discussed
           earlier, SBA officials said that DCMS's capacity has been
           enhanced. We also recommended that SBA strengthen its DCMS
           contractor oversight and further stress test the system. In the
           report we are releasing today, we recommended, among other things,
           that SBA develop time frames for completing key elements of its
           disaster management plan. SBA agreed with these recommendations.
           However, it remains to be seen how comprehensive the agency's
           final disaster management plan will be and how it will help SBA
           respond to a future disaster.
			  
			  Background

           SBA was established by the Small Business Act of 1953 to fulfill
           the role of several agencies that previously assisted small
           businesses affected by the Great Depression and, later, by wartime
           competition. SBA's stated purpose is to promote small business
           development and entrepreneurship through business financing,
           government contracting, and technical assistance programs. In
           addition, SBA serves as a small business advocate, working with
           other federal agencies to, among other things, reduce regulatory
           burdens on small businesses.

           SBA also provides low-interest, long-term loans to individuals and
           businesses to assist them with disaster recovery through its
           Disaster Loan Program--the only form of SBA assistance not limited
           to small businesses. Homeowners, renters, businesses of all sizes,
           and nonprofit organizations can apply for physical disaster loans
           for permanent rebuilding and replacement of uninsured or
           underinsured disaster-damaged property. Small businesses can also
           apply for economic injury disaster loans to obtain working capital
           funds until normal operations resume after a disaster declaration.
           SBA's Disaster Loan Program differs from the Federal Emergency
           Management Agency's (FEMA) Individuals and Households Program
           (IHP). For example, a key element of SBA's Disaster Loan Program
           is that the disaster victim must have repayment ability before a
           loan can be approved whereas FEMA makes grants under the IHP that
           do not have to be repaid.5 Further, FEMA grants are generally for
           minimal repairs and, unlike SBA disaster loans, are not designed
           to help restore the home to its predisaster condition.

           In January 2005, SBA began using DCMS to process all new disaster
           loan applications. SBA intended for DCMS to help it move toward a
           paperless processing environment by automating many of the
           functions staff members had performed manually under its previous
           system. These functions include both obtaining referral data from
           FEMA and credit bureau reports, as well as completing and
           submitting loss verification reports from remote locations.
			  
			  DCMSï¿½s Limited Capacity and Difficulties in Other Logistical Areas
			  Impeded SBAï¿½s Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes

           Our July 2006 report identified several significant limitations in
           DCMS's capacity and other system and procurement deficiencies that
           likely contributed to the challenges that SBA faced in providing
           timely assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane victims as follows:

           o First, due to limited capacity, the number of SBA staff who
           could access DCMS at any one time to process disaster loans was
           restricted. Without access to DCMS, the ability of SBA staff to
           process disaster loan applications in an expeditious manner was
           diminished.
           o Second, SBA experienced instability with DCMS during the initial
           months following Hurricane Katrina, as users encountered multiple
           outages and slow response times in completing loan processing
           tasks. According to SBA officials, the longest period of time DCMS
           was unavailable to users due to an unscheduled outage was 1
           business day. These unscheduled outages and other system-related
           issues slowed productivity and affected SBA's ability to provide
           timely disaster assistance.
           o Third, ineffective technical support and contractor oversight
           contributed to the DCMS instability that SBA staff initially
           encountered in using the system. Specifically, a DCMS contractor
           did not monitor the system as required or notify the agency of
           incidents that could increase system instability. Further, the
           contractor delivered computer hardware for DCMS to SBA that did
           not meet contract specifications.

           In the report that we are releasing today, we identified other
           logistical challenges that SBA experienced in providing disaster
           assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane victims. For example, SBA moved
           urgently to hire more than 2,000 mostly temporary employees at its
           Ft. Worth, Texas disaster loan processing center through newspaper
           and other advertisements (the facility increased from about 325
           staff in August 2005 to 2,500 in January 2006). SBA officials said
           that ensuring the appropriate training and supervision of this
           large influx of inexperienced staff proved very difficult. Prior
           to Hurricane Katrina, SBA had not maintained the status of its
           disaster reserve corps, which was a group of potential voluntary
           employees trained in the agency's disaster programs. According to
           SBA, the reserve corps, which had been instrumental in allowing
           the agency to provide timely disaster assistance to victims of the
           September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, shrank from about 600 in
           2001 to less than 100 in August 2005.6

           Moreover, SBA faced challenges in obtaining suitable office space
           to house its expanded workforce. For example, SBA's facility in
           Ft. Worth only had the capacity to house about 500 staff whereas
           the agency hired more than 2,000 mostly temporary staff to process
           disaster loan applications. While SBA was able to identify another
           facility in Ft. Worth to house the remaining staff, it had not
           been configured to serve as a loan processing center. SBA had to
           upgrade the facility to meet its requirements. Fortunately, in
           2005, SBA was also able to quickly reestablish a loan processing
           facility in Sacramento, California, that had been previously
           slated for closure under an agency reorganization plan. The
           facility in Sacramento was available because its lease had not yet
           expired, and its staff was responsible for processing a
           significant number of Gulf Coast hurricane related disaster loan
           applications.

           As a result of these and other challenges, SBA developed a large
           backlog of applications during the initial months following
           Hurricane Katrina. This backlog peaked at more than 204,000
           applications 4 months after Hurricane Katrina. By late May 2006,
           SBA took about 74 days on average to process disaster loan
           applications, compared with the agency's goal of within 21 days.
			  
			  Unprecedented Loan Application Volume and SBAï¿½s Limited Disaster
			  Planning Contributed to Challenges in Providing Timely Assistance
			  to Hurricane Victims

           As we stated in our July 2006 report, the sheer volume of disaster
           loan applications that SBA received was clearly a major factor
           contributing to the agency's challenges in providing timely
           assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane. As of late May 2006, SBA had
           issued 2.1 million loan applications to hurricane victims, which
           was four times the number of applications issued to victims of the
           1994 Northridge, California, earthquake, the previous single
           largest disaster that the agency had faced. Within 3 months of
           Hurricane Katrina making landfall, SBA had received 280,000
           disaster loan applications or about 30,000 more applications than
           the agency received over a period of about 1 year after the
           Northridge earthquake.

           However, our two reports on SBA's response to the Gulf Coast
           hurricanes also found that the absence of a comprehensive and
           sophisticated planning process contributed to the challenges that
           the agency faced.7 For example, in designing DCMS, SBA used the
           volume of applications received during the Northridge, California,
           earthquake and other historical data as the basis for planning the
           maximum number of concurrent agency users that the system could
           accommodate. SBA did not consider the likelihood of more severe
           disaster scenarios and, in contrast to insurance companies and
           some government agencies, use the information available from
           catastrophe models or disaster simulations to enhance its planning
           process. Since the number of disaster loan applications associated
           with the Gulf Coast hurricanes greatly exceeded that of the
           Northridge earthquake, DCMS's user capacity was not sufficient to
           process the surge in disaster loan applications in a timely
           manner.

           Additionally, SBA did not adequately monitor the performance of a
           DCMS contractor or stress test the system prior to its
           implementation. In particular, SBA did not verify that the
           contractor provided the agency with the correct computer hardware
           specified in its contract. SBA also did not completely stress test
           DCMS prior to implementation to ensure that the system could
           operate effectively at maximum capacity. If SBA had verified the
           equipment as required or conducted complete stress testing of DCMS
           prior to implementation, its capacity to process Gulf Coast
           related disaster loan applications may have been enhanced.

           In the report we are releasing today, we found that SBA did not
           engage in comprehensive disaster planning for other logistical
           areas--such as workforce or space acquisition planning--prior to
           the Gulf Coast hurricanes at either the headquarters or field
           office levels. For example, SBA had not taken steps to help ensure
           the availability of additional trained and experienced staff such
           as (1) cross-training agency staff not normally involved in
           disaster assistance to provide backup support or (2) maintaining
           the status of the disaster reserve corps as I previously
           discussed. In addition, SBA had not thoroughly planned for the
           office space requirements that would be necessary in a disaster
           the size of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. While SBA had developed
           some estimates of staffing and other logistical requirements, it
           largely relied on the expertise of agency staff and previous
           disaster experiences--none of which reached the magnitude of the
           Gulf Coast hurricanes--and, as was the case with DCMS planning,
           did not leverage other planning resources, including information
           available from disaster simulations or catastrophe models.
			  
			  SBA Has Taken Steps to Better Prepare for Future Disasters, but
			  Their Effectiveness Remains to Be Seen

           In our July 2006 report, we recommended that SBA take several
           steps to enhance DCMS, such as reassessing the system's capacity
           in light of the Gulf Coast hurricane experience and reviewing
           information from disaster simulations and catastrophe models. We
           also recommended that SBA strengthen its DCMS contractor oversight
           and further stress test the system. SBA agreed with these
           recommendations. I note that SBA has completed an effort to expand
           DCMS's capacity. SBA officials said that DCMS can now support a
           minimum of 8,000 concurrent agency users as compared with only
           1,500 concurrent users for the Gulf Coast hurricanes.
           Additionally, SBA has awarded a new contract for the project
           management and information technology support for DCMS. The
           contractor is responsible for a variety of DCMS tasks on SBA's
           behalf including technical support, software changes and hardware
           upgrades, and supporting all information technology operations
           associated with the system.

           In the report we are releasing today, we identified other measures
           that SBA has planned or implemented to better prepare for and
           respond to future disasters. These steps include appointing a
           single individual to coordinate the agency's disaster preparedness
           planning and coordination efforts, enhancing systems to forecast
           the resource requirements to respond to disasters of varying
           scenarios, and redesigning the process for reviewing applications
           and disbursing loan proceeds.8 Additionally, SBA has planned or
           initiated steps to help ensure the availability of additional
           trained and experienced staff in the event of a future disaster.
           According to SBA officials, these steps include cross-training
           staff not normally involved in disaster assistance to provide back
           up support, reaching agreements with private lenders to help
           process a surge in disaster loan applications, and reestablishing
           the disaster reserve corps with 750 individuals as of January
           2007.

           However, the report also discusses apparent limitations we found
           in SBA's disaster planning processes. For example, SBA has not
           established a time line for completing the key elements of its
           disaster management plan, such as cross-training nondisaster staff
           to provide back up support. In addition, SBA has not assessed
           whether the agency could leverage outside resources to enhance its
           disaster planning and preparation efforts, such as information
           available from disaster simulations and catastrophe models.9
           Finally, SBA had not established a long-term process to help
           ensure that it could acquire suitable office space to house an
           expanded workforce to respond to a future disaster.

           To strengthen SBA capacity to respond to a future disaster, the
           report recommends that SBA

           o develop time frames for completing key elements of the disaster
           management plan (and a long-term strategy for acquiring adequate
           office space); and
           o direct staff involved in developing the disaster plan to
           continue assessing whether the use of disaster simulations or
           catastrophe models would enhance the agency's overall disaster
           planning process.
			  
4Federal agencies and other organizations have developed assessments of
the potential destructive consequences of varying disaster scenarios,
which are intended to help federal, state, and local agencies enhance
their disaster planning. Moreover, many insurance companies and state
entities that provide catastrophe insurance coverage currently use
computer programs offered by several modeling firms to estimate the
financial consequences of various natural catastrophe scenarios.

5FEMA grants are also not available to businesses.

6SBA's disaster reserve corps consists of individuals, including retirees
and students, who have backgrounds in the agency's disaster assistance
programs (e.g., finance and customer support) and who are willing to work
on a temporary basis for the agency in an emergency situation. Such
individuals must agree to relocate within 40 hours of notification of a
disaster situation where their services are required by SBA.

7The report we are issuing today ( [16]GAO-07-114 ) discusses the need for
federal agencies and other organizations to engage in comprehensive
disaster planning based on previous GAO work, reports by other
investigative organizations, and the views of disaster planning experts.

8As described in the report we are issuing today ( [17]GAO-07-114 ), SBA
faced a significant backlog in disbursing the funds associated with
approved disaster loans in July 2006. SBA has redesigned the loan review
and disbursement process in such a way that agency officials believe
disbursement performance has been improved significantly.

9SBA has contacted FEMA for more information about a catastrophe model
that FEMA has developed.

           SBA agreed to implement each of these recommendations. However, it
           remains to be seen how comprehensive SBA's final disaster
           management plan will be and how effectively the agency will
           respond to a future disaster.

           Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
           happy to answer any questions at this time.
			  
			  GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

           For further information on this testimony, please contact William
           B. Shear at (202) 512- 8678 or [email protected]. Contact points for
           our Offices of Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs may be
           found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key
           contributions to this testimony included Wesley Phillips,
           Assistant Director; Marshall Hamlett; Barbara S. Oliver; and Cheri
           Truett.
			  
			  GAOï¿½s Mission

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For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or
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Highlights of [19]GAO-07-484T , a testimony before the Committee on Small
Business, House of Representatives

February 14, 2007

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes Highlights Need for Enhanced
Disaster Preparedness

The Small Business Administration (SBA) helps individuals and businesses
recover from disasters such as hurricanes through its Disaster Loan
Program. SBA faced an unprecedented demand for disaster loan assistance
following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), which
resulted in extensive property damage and loss of life. In the aftermath
of these disasters, concerns were expressed regarding the timeliness of
SBA's disaster assistance.

GAO initiated work and completed two reports under the Comptroller
General's authority to conduct evaluations and determine how well SBA
provided victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance. This
testimony, which is based on these two reports, discusses (1) challenges
SBA experienced in providing victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with
timely assistance, (2) factors that contributed to these challenges, and
(3) steps SBA has taken since the Gulf Coast hurricanes to enhance its
disaster preparedness.

GAO visited the Gulf Coast region, reviewed SBA planning documents, and
interviewed SBA officials.

[20]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that SBA take several steps to improve its disaster
preparedness, and SBA agreed with these recommendations.

GAO identified several significant system and logistical challenges that
SBA experienced in responding to the Gulf Coast hurricanes that undermined
the agency's ability to provide timely disaster assistance to victims. For
example, the limited capacity of SBA's automated loan processing
system--the Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS)--restricted the
number of staff who could access the system at any one time to process
disaster loan applications. In addition, SBA staff who could access DCMS
initially encountered multiple system outages and slow response times in
completing loan processing tasks. SBA also faced challenges training and
supervising the thousands of mostly temporary employees the agency hired
to process loan applications and obtaining suitable office space for its
expanded workforce. As of late May 2006, SBA processed disaster loan
applications, on average, in about 74 days compared with its goal of
within 21 days.

While the large volume of disaster loan applications that SBA received
clearly affected its capacity to provide timely disaster assistance to
Gulf Coast hurricane victims, GAO's two reports found that the absence of
a comprehensive and sophisticated planning process beforehand likely
limited the efficiency of the agency's initial response. For example, in
designing the capacity of DCMS, SBA primarily relied on historical data
such as the number of loan applications that the agency received after the
1994 Northridge, California, earthquake--the most severe disaster that the
agency had previously encountered. SBA did not consider disaster scenarios
that were more severe or use the information available from disaster
simulations (developed by federal agencies) or catastrophe models (used by
insurance companies to estimate disaster losses). SBA also did not
adequately monitor the performance of a DCMS contractor or completely
stress test the system prior to its implementation. Moreover, SBA did not
engage in comprehensive disaster planning prior to the Gulf Coast
hurricanes for other logistical areas, such as workforce planning or space
acquisition, at either the headquarters or field office levels.

In the aftermath of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA has planned or
initiated several measures that officials said would enhance the agency's
capacity to respond to future disasters. For example, SBA has completed an
expansion of DCMS's user capacity to support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent
users as compared with just 1,500 for the Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Additionally, SBA initiated steps to increase the availability of trained
and experienced disaster staff and redesigned its process for reviewing
loan applications and disbursing funds. However, SBA has not established a
time line for completing key elements of its disaster management plan,
such as cross-training agency staff not typically involved in disaster
assistance to provide back up support in an emergency. SBA also has not
(1) assessed whether its disaster planning process could benefit from the
supplemental use of disaster simulations or catastrophe models and (2)
developed a long-term strategy to obtain suitable office space for its
disaster staff. While SBA agreed with GAO's report recommendations to
address these concerns, it remains to be seen how comprehensive the
agency's final disaster plan will be and how the agency will respond to a
future disaster.

References

Visible links
7. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-860
8. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-114
9. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618
  19. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-484T
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