Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts to 
Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Its Critical Infrastructure	 
(24-MAY-07, GAO-07-461).					 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a network of DOD and	 
non-DOD infrastructure assets in the United States and abroad so 
critical that its unavailability could hinder DOD's ability to	 
project, support, and sustain its forces and operations 	 
worldwide. DOD established the Defense Critical Infrastructure	 
Program (DCIP) to identify and assure the availability of	 
mission-critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to evaluate the	 
extent to which DOD has (1) developed a comprehensive management 
plan to implement DCIP and (2) identified, prioritized, and	 
assessed its critical infrastructure. GAO analyzed relevant DCIP 
documents and guidance and met with officials from more than 30  
DOD organizations that have DCIP responsibilities, and with	 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials involved in	 
protecting critical infrastructure.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-461 					        
    ACCNO:   A69909						        
  TITLE:     Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Guide DOD's    
Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Its Critical	 
Infrastructure							 
     DATE:   05/24/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Assets						 
	     Budget outlays					 
	     Critical infrastructure				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense industry					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Planning programming budgeting			 
	     Private sector					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Supplemental appropriations			 
	     Assessments					 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Defense Critical Infrastructure Program		 

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GAO-07-461

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]DOD Has Taken Important Steps to Implement DCIP but Needs a

          * [4]Most DCIP Guidance and Policies Are Newly Issued or Still in
          * [5]Although DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Information Shari
          * [6]DOD Components and Sector Lead Agents Have Relied on Supplem

     * [7]DOD Estimates That It Has Identified about 25 Percent of the

          * [8]DOD Has Identified Some of Its Mission-Critical Infrastructu
          * [9]Vulnerability Assessments of DOD-Owned Infrastructure Have L
          * [10]DCIP Funding Requirements Do Not Include Remediation

     * [11]Conclusions
     * [12]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [13]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [14]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * [15]Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
     * [16]Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [17]GAO Contact
          * [18]Acknowledgments

               * [19]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

May 2007

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess
Its Critical Infrastructure

GAO-07-461

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 8
DOD Has Taken Important Steps to Implement DCIP but Needs a Comprehensive
Management Plan to Guide Its Efforts 13
DOD Estimates That It Has Identified about 25 Percent of the Critical
Infrastructure It Owns, and Most of the Non-DOD-Owned Critical
Infrastructure Remains Unidentified 25
Conclusions 30
Recommendations for Executive Action 31
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 39
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Tables

Table 1: Status of DCIP Guidance and Policies as of May 2007 14
Table 2: Defense and Federal-Level Critical Infrastructure Sector
Counterparts 17
Table 3: DOD-Owned Infrastructure Provisionally Identified as Critical 27

Figures

Figure 1: Notional Depiction of Infrastructure Available to DOD 2
Figure 2: Representative Types of Critical Infrastructure 10
Figure 3: Key DOD DCIP Organizations 12
Figure 4: Total DCIP Funding by Military Service and COCOM, Fiscal Years
2004 to 2007 21
Figure 5: Total DCIP Funding by Defense Sector, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2007
22
Figure 6: DCIP Funding for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2013 24
Figure 7: Allocation of Critical Infrastructure DOD Owns and Does Not Own
26

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Abbreviations

ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs COCOM Combatant Command
DCIP Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

May 24, 2007

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Chairman
The Honorable Jo Ann Davis
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable W. Todd Akin
House of Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a network of physical and cyber
infrastructure so critical that its incapacitation, exploitation, or
destruction could have a debilitating effect on DOD's ability to project,
support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. This defense
critical infrastructure consists of DOD and non-DOD assets located within
and outside the United States (see fig. 1). According to DOD, about 85
percent of the infrastructure it relies on is owned by non-DOD entities.1
Because of its importance to DOD operations, defense infrastructure
represents an attractive target to adversaries; but it is also vulnerable
to natural disasters and accidents. DOD has recognized and emphasized the
importance of ensuring the availability of critical infrastructure in the
most
recent versions of the National Military Strategy2 and the Quadrennial
Defense Review Report.3

1We did not independently verify the accuracy of this estimate. However,
the estimate that non-DOD entities (i.e., private industry; state, local,
and tribal governments; and foreign governments) own and operate
approximately 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is
consistent with national-level estimates and is cited in several national
strategies. See, for example, The White House, The National Strategy for
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003) and Office of Homeland Security,
National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002).

Figure 1: Notional Depiction of Infrastructure Available to DOD

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,4 issued in December 2003,
designates the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as
the principal federal official responsible for leading, integrating, and
coordinating the overall national effort to protect the nation's critical
infrastructure and key resources. The Homeland Security Act of 20025 and
the Presidential Directive also direct DHS to produce a national plan for
critical infrastructure and key resources protection, and on June 30,
2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. This plan
provides an overarching approach for protecting critical infrastructure
and key resources against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. The cornerstone of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan is its risk-management framework to establish priorities based on
risk, and determine protection and business continuity initiatives that
provide the greatest mitigation of risk. The National Infrastructure
Protection Plan identifies 17 infrastructure and key resources sectors,
and designates one or more lead federal agencies--referred to as a
sector-specific agency--for each sector. For example, the Departments of
Defense and Energy are the sector-specific agencies for the Defense
Industrial Base and the Energy sectors, respectively. DHS is the
sector-specific agency for 10 of the 17 sectors. Sector-specific agencies
are responsible for, among other things, coordinating with all relevant
federal, state, and local governments and the private sector; encouraging
risk management strategies; and conducting or facilitating vulnerability
assessments of their sector.

2Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military
Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision
for Tomorrow (Washington, D.C.: 2004). The National Military Strategy is
the Joint Chiefs of Staff's document on the strategic direction of the
armed forces, which establishes three military objectives: (1) protect the
United States against external attacks and aggression, (2) prevent
conflict and surprise attack, and (3) prevail against adversaries.

3Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006). The Quadrennial Defense Review  is a comprehensive
internal review of DOD's forces, resources, and programs.

4Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (Washington D.C.: Dec. 17,
2003).

5Pub. L. No. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 also requires all federal
departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure and key resources from terrorist
attacks. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]), within the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, serves as the principal
civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the identification,
prioritization, and protection of DOD's critical infrastructure.6 DOD
established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to identify
and assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure. DCIP
encompasses the full spectrum of threats--ranging from terrorist attacks
to natural disasters and catastrophic accidents--that can adversely affect
critical infrastructure. Earlier programs analogous to DCIP can be traced
back to 1998. ASD(HD&ASA) has been responsible for developing and ensuring
implementation of critical infrastructure protection policy and program
guidance activities since September 2003. Within DOD, several
organizations play a role in DCIP, including the combatant commands
(COCOM) and the military services. DOD also identified 10 virtual,
functionally-based defense sectors to consider critical infrastructure
that cross traditional organizational boundaries. The 10 defense sectors
are financial services; global information grid; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; space; health affairs; logistics;
personnel; public works; transportation; and the defense industrial base.
Over the last 4 fiscal years (2004 to 2007), DOD has spent about $160
million on DCIP.

6The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy was reorganized
in December 2006. This reorganization included, among other things, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense being
renamed the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs. Hereafter, this office is referred
to by its current name.

In our recent report on DOD's collective protection for military forces,7
we discussed DOD's collective protection management problems, including
fragmented policies and operating concepts among the varied programs and
organizations involved. DOD has been unable to reach consensus on what
criteria to use to identify its most critical facilities. As we reported,
these management problems make it difficult for DOD to balance competing
needs and prudently allocate funding resources for collective protection
improvements. We recommended, among other things, that DOD provide
clearer, more consistent policies to guide the funding of collective
protection and other installation preparedness activities.

As you requested, we have begun a body of work reviewing actions DOD has
taken to identify, protect, and otherwise assure the availability of
infrastructure necessary to sustain its operations. This initial report
focuses on key organizational, structural, and programmatic aspects of
DCIP. Specifically, this report evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1)
developed a comprehensive management plan to implement DCIP and (2)
identified, prioritized, and assessed its critical infrastructure. We plan
to issue additional products of interest to you, including a report later
this year that examines the defense industrial base. Accordingly, this
report does not address the Defense Industrial Base defense sector, unless
indicated otherwise.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD has developed a comprehensive
management plan to implement DCIP, we reviewed and analyzed relevant DCIP
guidance, met with key officials responsible for DCIP from the military
services, the COCOMs (hereafter referred to in this report as "DOD
components"), and the defense sector lead agents; several offices within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the Joint Staff's Directorate
for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense. In addition, we reviewed and
analyzed pertinent funding data from the past 4 fiscal years, met with the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial
Officer to discuss the budgeting process, and interviewed officials
responsible for determining funding requirements for the program. To
evaluate the extent to which DOD has identified, prioritized, and assessed
its critical infrastructure, we reviewed and analyzed relevant DCIP
guidance including the DCIP Assessment Standards and Benchmarks8 and DCIP
Criticality Process Guidance Document.9 We interviewed DOD officials
responsible for critical infrastructure and reviewed DOD's critical
infrastructure vulnerability assessment process. We also met with Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) officials involved in implementing
infrastructure vulnerability assessments.

7See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Updated Intelligence, Clear
Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to Guide Investments in
Collective Protection, [20]GAO-07-113 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).

We conducted our work between June 2006 and May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. A more thorough
description of our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.

Results in Brief

While DOD has taken some important steps to implement DCIP, it has not
developed a comprehensive management plan to guide its efforts. Our prior
work,10 as well as the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government,11 emphasizes the importance of such a plan and management
controls, respectively, to guide program implementation. Accordingly, this
plan should include key elements, such as developing and issuing guidance,
coordinating stakeholders' efforts, and identifying resource requirements
and sources. DOD's most recent effort to protect critical infrastructure
began in September 2003 and, as of May 2007, most of DOD's DCIP guidance
was either newly issued or still in draft form. In the absence of
finalized guidance, DOD components have been pursuing varying approaches
to DCIP. For example, some components have relied on established programs,
such as the antiterrorism program, to implement DCIP, even though
antiterrorism has not been formally linked to DCIP. Although DOD issued a
DCIP directive in August 2005, the lead office--ASD(HD&ASA)--lacks a
chartering directive that defines important roles, responsibilities, and
relationships with other DOD organizations and missions. In March 2003,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense required the Director of Administration
and Management within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to, among
other things, define the relationship between the Directorates for HD&ASA
and Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent
Capabilities regarding several matters, including antiterrorism missions,
in a chartering directive. However, as of May 2007, more than 4 years
later, this task has not been accomplished. Similarly, because DOD's
strategy on tracking and monitoring critical infrastructure was not issued
until 2006, components have been collecting different information on their
infrastructure, which, over the long term, could complicate information
sharing and analysis across the DOD components and sector lead agents. To
facilitate communication among stakeholders, DOD has established several
information sharing and coordination mechanisms to promote a common
approach to common issues, such as sponsoring the Homeland Infrastructure
Foundation Level Database Working Group. The Working Group is a coalition
of federal, state, and local government organizations, and private
companies that are involved in collecting and mapping geographic
information related to homeland defense. Existing DCIP guidance emphasizes
information sharing and collaboration with relevant government and
private-sector entities. However, we found that three of the five defense
sector lead agents that have a federal-level counterpart do not routinely
share information with their corresponding federal-level critical
infrastructure sector counterparts due to the immaturity of the program.12
DCIP has received about $160 million in funding from fiscal years 2004 to
2007.13 However, the DOD components and sector lead agents have received
only $68.5 million during the same 4-year period, of which $14.3 million
(about 21 percent of the component and sector lead agents' combined
funding) has come from supplemental appropriations. Our prior work has
shown that relying on supplemental appropriations is not an effective
means for decision makers to plan for future years resource needs, weigh
priorities, and assess budget trade-offs. Until DOD completes a
comprehensive management plan to implement DCIP, which includes issuing
remaining guidance and fully identifying funding requirements, its ability
to implement DCIP will be challenged. We are making recommendations that
DOD develop and implement a comprehensive management plan to guide DCIP
implementation. This plan would establish timelines for finalizing and
issuing DCIP guidance; assist the defense sector lead agents in
identifying and including DCIP funding through the regular budgeting
process; and determine funding levels and sources to avoid reliance on
supplemental appropriations. We also are recommending that DOD issue a
chartering directive that would, among other things, clarify the
relationship between the department's DCIP and antiterrorism missions.

8This guidance allows DOD components to determine vulnerabilities of their
critical infrastructure.

9This guidance provides a framework for identifying and prioritizing
defense critical infrastructure.

10See, for example, GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan
Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous
Testing, [21]GAO-06-84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005).

11GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[22]GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

12The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Logistics;
Personnel; and Space defense sectors do not have a federal-level
counterpart.

13The $160 million total does not include the $6.8 million provided to the
Defense Contract Management Agency, the lead agent for the Defense
Industrial Base defense sector during fiscal years 2004 to 2007. Further,
the Marine Corps and the U.S. Pacific Command were unable to provide
funding data for fiscal year 2004 because these data were unavailable.

DOD estimates that it has identified about 25 percent of the critical
infrastructure it owns, and DOD officials expect to finish identifying the
remaining infrastructure assets that it controls (estimated to be about 15
percent of the total) by the fiscal year 2008-2009 time frame. The
remainder of its mission-critical infrastructure (estimated to be about 85
percent of the total) is owned by non-DOD entities and considerably less
of this infrastructure has been identified. DOD has not set a target date
for identifying all of its non-DOD-owned critical infrastructure. DOD has
determined that a small portion of the non-DOD-owned infrastructure--about
200 assets--that belongs to the defense industrial base defense sector is
mission critical. Existing guidance requires various DOD components and
sector lead agents to carry out the coordinated identification and
assessment of critical infrastructure. Moreover, DOD components are
pursuing varying approaches in identifying infrastructure critical to
successfully carrying out its mission, which could make it difficult for
DOD to make informed prioritization decisions and assess the effect of
potential vulnerabilities across components and sector lead agents.
Officials from several DOD components stated that a principal reason why
the majority of critical infrastructure remains to be identified is
because of the lack of timely guidance on identifying, prioritizing, and
assessing critical infrastructure. DOD has recently begun to finalize this
guidance. As DOD continues to identify its critical infrastructure, it
also has been conducting a limited number of vulnerability assessments on
DOD-owned assets. While these assessments can provide useful information
about specific assets, until DOD identifies and prioritizes all of the
critical infrastructure it owns, results have questionable value for
deciding where to target funding investments. In 2005, DOD incorporated an
infrastructure assessment module into its existing antiterrorism
vulnerability assessments, but has not made this approach a DOD-wide
practice. DOD plans to implement a self-assessment program that would
enable infrastructure owners to conduct additional vulnerability
assessments, but guidance has not yet been issued. With the exception of
critical infrastructure in the defense industrial base and transportation
infrastructure supporting seaports and airports, DOD is not in a position
to assess assets that it does not own; however, DOD does not have a
mechanism to flag domestic mission-critical infrastructure for DHS to
consider including among its assessments of the nation's critical
infrastructure. DOD has delayed coordinating the assessment of non-DOD
critical infrastructure located abroad while it focuses on identifying the
infrastructure that it owns. Regarding current and future DCIP funding
levels, including supplemental appropriations, the funding levels do not
include the resources needed to remediate vulnerabilities that are
identified through the assessments. As stated previously, our prior work
has shown the importance of identifying all program costs to enable
decision makers to weigh competing priorities. When DOD components and
sector lead agents consistently identify, prioritize, and assess their
critical infrastructure, as well as include the remediation of
vulnerabilities in their funding requirements, DOD's ability to perform
risk-based decision making and target funding to priority needs will be
improved. We are recommending that DOD complete the identification and
prioritization of critical infrastructure before increasing the number of
infrastructure vulnerability assessments beyond current levels; adopt the
practice of combining the infrastructure vulnerability assessment module
with an existing assessment as the DOD-wide practice; expedite the
issuance of guidance and criteria for performing infrastructure
vulnerability self-assessments; flag domestic non-DOD-owned
mission-critical infrastructure for DHS to consider including among its
assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure; and identify funding
for DCIP remediation.

GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD and DHS in April 2007 for their
review and comment. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with all of our recommendations. DHS had no comments. DOD also
provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated in the report,
as appropriate. DOD's response is reprinted in appendix II.

Background

DOD recognizes that it is neither practical nor feasible to protect its
entire infrastructure against every possible threat and, similar to DHS,
it is pursuing a risk-management approach to prioritize resource and
operational requirements. Risk management is a systematic, analytical
process to determine the likelihood that a threat will harm assets, and
then to identify actions to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of
the threat. While risk generally cannot be eliminated, enhancing
protection from threats or taking actions--such as establishing backup
systems or hardening infrastructure--to reduce the effect of an incident
can serve to significantly reduce risk.

DOD's risk-management approach is based on assessing threats,
vulnerabilities, criticalities, and the ability to respond to incidents.
Threat assessments identify and evaluate potential threats on the basis of
capabilities, intentions, and past activities before they materialize.
Vulnerability assessments identify weaknesses that may be exploited by
identified threats and suggest options that address those weaknesses. For
example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in unprotected
infrastructure, such as satellites, bridges, and personnel records.
Criticality assessments evaluate and prioritize assets on the basis of
their importance to mission success. For example, certain power plants,
computer networks, or population centers might be identified as important
to the operation of a mission-critical seaport. These assessments help
prioritize limited resources while reducing the potential for expending
resources on lower-priority assets. DOD's risk-management approach also
includes an assessment of the ability to respond to, and recover from, an
incident.

The amount of non-DOD infrastructure that DOD relies on to carry out
missions has not been identified; however, it is immense. To date, DHS has
identified about 80,000 items of non-DOD infrastructure, some of which is
also critical to DOD. Additionally, according to the Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, DOD owns
more than 3,700 sites with more than half a million real property assets
worldwide that could also qualify as critical infrastructure. The
methodology DOD uses to identify critical infrastructure involves linking
DOD missions to supporting critical infrastructure. Figure 2 shows three
representative types of DOD-owned and non-DOD-owned critical
infrastructure.

Figure 2: Representative Types of Critical Infrastructure

In 1998, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence was responsible for DOD's
critical infrastructure protection efforts; however, in September 2003,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense moved this program to the newly
established Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense. DOD's critical infrastructure efforts were formalized in August
2005 with the issuance of DOD Directive 3020.40, which established DCIP.
On December 13, 2006, this office was renamed the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.

Shortly after the office became responsible for DOD's critical
infrastructure protection efforts in October 2003, ASD(HD&ASA) established
the Defense Program Office for Mission Assurance in Dahlgren, Virginia, to
manage the day-to-day activities of DCIP. The Program Office--now a
Mission Assurance Division--was responsible for coordinating DCIP efforts
across DOD components and sector lead agents, developing training and
exercise programs, overseeing the development of analytical tools and
standards to permit DOD-wide analyses, and developing a comprehensive
system to track and evaluate critical infrastructure.

DOD organizations that have significant DCIP roles and responsibilities
are shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: Key DOD DCIP Organizations

The COCOMs, in collaboration with the Joint Staff, identify and prioritize
DOD missions that are the basis for determining infrastructure
criticality. The military services, as the principal owners of DOD
infrastructure, identify and link infrastructure to specific COCOM mission
requirements. Defense sector lead agents address the interdependencies
among infrastructure that cross organizational boundaries, and evaluate
the cascading effects of degraded or lost infrastructure on other
infrastructure assets. Further, DOD officials told us that DTRA performs
infrastructure vulnerability assessments for the Joint Staff in support of
DCIP to determine single points of failure from all hazards.

DOD Has Taken Important Steps to Implement DCIP but Needs a Comprehensive
Management Plan to Guide Its Efforts

DOD has taken some important steps to implement DCIP; however, it has not
developed a comprehensive management plan to guide its efforts. Although
an ASD(HD&ASA) official told us they are preparing an outline for a plan
to implement DCIP, it is unclear the extent to which such a plan will
address key elements associated with sound management practices, including
issuing guidance, coordinating program stakeholders' efforts, and
identifying resource requirements. DOD has been slow finalizing DCIP
guidance and policies. As of May 2007, most of DOD's DCIP guidance and
policies were either newly issued or still in draft, which has resulted in
DOD's components pursuing varying approaches to implement DCIP. DOD has
taken steps to improve information sharing and coordination within and
outside of DOD. Finally, through DOD's budget process, DCIP has received
over $160 million from fiscal years 2004 to 2007. Of this amount, the
components and sector lead agents have received $68.6 million, of which
about 21 percent is from supplemental appropriations. Our prior work has
shown that supplemental funding is not an effective means for decision
makers to effectively and efficiently plan for future years resource
needs, weigh priorities, and assess budget trade-offs.14 Until DOD
completes a comprehensive management plan to implement DCIP, which
includes issuing remaining DCIP guidance and fully identifying funding
requirements, its ability to implement DCIP will be challenged.

Most DCIP Guidance and Policies Are Newly Issued or Still in Draft

While our prior work has shown that issuing timely guidance is a key
element of sound management, as of May 2007, the majority of DCIP guidance
and policies were either newly issued or still in draft form, more than 3
1/2 years after the Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned DCIP to
ASD(HD&ASA) in September 2003 (see table 1).

14GAO has previously reported on DOD's overreliance on supplemental
appropriations. See GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key
Issues for Congressional Oversight, [23]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 9, 2006); GAO, Global War on Terrorism: Observations on Funding,
Costs, and Future Commitments, [24]GAO-06-885T (Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2006); and GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and
Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force,
[25]GAO-05-926 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005).

Table 1: Status of DCIP Guidance and Policies as of May 2007

Guidance document        Description                       Status          
Critical Infrastructure  Establishes uniform criteria for  Final, dated    
Protection Security      classifying DCIP-related          January 2003    
Classification Guide     information to prevent its                        
                            unauthorized disclosure.                          
DOD Directive 3020.40,   Assigns responsibility for DCIP   Final, dated    
Defense Critical         and incorporates guidance from    August 19, 2005 
Infrastructure Program   Homeland Security Presidential                    
(DCIP)                   Directive 7.                                      
DCIP Assessment          Helps DOD components and sector   Final, dated    
Standards and Benchmarks lead agents determine             June 9, 2006    
                            vulnerabilities of their critical                 
                            infrastructure and supporting                     
                            foundational infrastructure.                      
DCIP Geospatial Data     Provides a common and             Final, dated    
Strategy                 comprehensive foundation for      September 13,   
                            representing critical             2006            
                            infrastructure geospatially.                      
DCIP Criticality Process Provides a framework for          Final, dated    
Guidance Document        identifying and prioritizing      December 21,    
                            defense critical infrastructure.  2006            
DCIP Data Collection     Identifies required data elements Draft, dated    
Essential Elements of    DOD components and sector lead    May 18, 2006    
Information Data Sets    agents are to obtain on their                     
                            critical infrastructure.                          
DCIP Interim             Assigns responsibilities and      Final, dated    
Implementation Guidance  prescribes DCIP procedures, and   July 13, 2006   
                            provides guidance to DOD                          
                            components and sector lead agents                 
                            on establishing their own                         
                            critical infrastructure programs.                 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

In the absence of finalized guidance and policies, DOD components have
been pursuing varying approaches to implement their critical
infrastructure programs, a condition that has not changed markedly with
the issuance of several guidance documents in the past year. According to
officials responsible for the critical infrastructure programs from
several of the DOD components, they were either unaware that the guidance
had been finalized or had decided to continue the approach they had
previously adopted.

Although DOD issued a DCIP directive in August 2005, ASD(HD&ASA) lacks a
chartering directive that, among other things, clearly defines important
roles, responsibilities, and relationships with other DOD organizations
and missions--including the relationship between ASD(HD&ASA) and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. At present, responsibility for
antiterrorism guidance resides with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent
Capabilities. A memorandum entitled Implementation Guidance Regarding the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense issued
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in March 2003 required the Director of
Administration and Management within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to develop and coordinate within 45 days a chartering DOD
Directive that would define, among other things, the relationship between
ASD(HD&ASA) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. However, more
than 4 years later, this chartering DOD directive still has not been
accomplished.

Currently, DCIP implementation is diffused among program stakeholders,
such as the COCOMs and the military services. As a consequence, some
components, such as the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Special Operations
Command, leveraged DOD's antiterrorism guidance to develop critical
infrastructure programs, while other components, such as the U.S.
Strategic Command and U.S. European Command, have kept the two programs
separate. Until DOD addresses the need for a chartering directive to
properly identify the relationship between DCIP and the antiterrorism
program, and sets timelines for finalizing its remaining guidance, it
cannot be assured that components and sector lead agents identify,
prioritize, and assess their critical infrastructure in a consistent
manner. This lack of consistency could impair DOD's ability to perform
risk-based decision making across component lines over the long term.

Although DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Information Sharing and Coordination,
Additional Measures Could Be Taken

Existing DCIP guidance emphasizes information sharing and collaboration
with relevant government and private-sector entities. While DOD has taken
steps to facilitate information sharing and coordination within the
department, as well as with other federal agencies and private sector
companies, we believe additional measures could be taken, such as greater
cooperation with federal-level counterparts on the identification,
prioritization, and assessment of critical infrastructure. Since 2003,
ASD(HD&ASA) has established and sponsored several information sharing and
coordination forums, such as the Defense Infrastructure Sector Council and
Critical Infrastructure Program Integration Staff. The Defense
Infrastructure Sector Council provides a recurring forum for DCIP sector
lead agents to share information, identify common areas of interest, and
leverage the individual activities of each sector to eliminate
duplication. The Critical Infrastructure Program Integration Staff is
comprised of representatives from more than 30 DOD organizations.
Additionally, ASD(HD&ASA) maintains an Internet site that is used to post
relevant information, such as policies, available training, and
announcement of meetings and conferences. ASD(HD&ASA) also is a member of
several critical infrastructure forums whose membership extends beyond
DOD, such as the Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Database Working
Group, and several Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
Committees, including those pertaining to communications, electricity, and
dams. In another effort to coordinate DOD components' and sector lead
agents' critical infrastructure protection practices, DOD released, in
September 2006, its DCIP Geospatial Data Strategy, which lays out a
standardized approach to depict geographically critical infrastructure
data.

Both DHS and DOD officials acknowledged the potential benefits of
increasing collaborative efforts, particularly with respect to critical
infrastructure identification, tracking, and assessing. To promote clear
and streamlined communication, ASD(HD&ASA) has directed DOD components and
sector lead agents to channel their interactions with DHS through them.
However, with the exception of the Health Affairs and Financial Services
defense sectors, there has been little to no coordination between the
defense sectors and their corresponding federal-level critical
infrastructure sector counterparts due to the immaturity of the program.
Table 2 shows the defense-level sectors that are comparable to those at
the federal level.

Table 2: Defense and Federal-Level Critical Infrastructure Sector
Counterparts

Defense sector                  Federal-level sector                       
Financial Services              Banking and Finance                        
Global Information Grid         Information Technology                     
                                                                              
                                   Telecommunications                         
Health Affairs                  Public Health and Healthcare               
                                                                              
                                   Agriculture and Food                       
Public Works                    Dams                                       
                                                                              
                                   Drinking Water and Water Treatment         
Transportation                  Transportation Systems                     
Defense Industrial Base         Defense Industrial Base                    
Intelligence, Surveillance, and No identified federal-level sector         
Reconnaissance                  counterparts                               
                                                                              
Logistics                                                                  
                                                                              
Personnel                                                                  
                                                                              
Space                                                                      
No identified defense-sector    Chemical                                   
counterparts                                                               
                                   Commercial Facilities                      
                                                                              
                                   Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials,    
                                   and Waste                                  
                                                                              
                                   Emergency Services                         
                                                                              
                                   Energy                                     
                                                                              
                                   Government Facilities                      
                                                                              
                                   National Monuments and Icons               
                                                                              
                                   Postal and Shipping                        

Source: DOD and DHS data.

DOD components are collecting different data to track and monitor their
critical infrastructure to meet the needs of DCIP as well as their own,
which could impede information sharing and analysis over time, and hinder
DOD's ability to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure across
DOD components and sector lead agents. ASD(HD&ASA) guidance on how DOD
components and sector lead agents should track and monitor their critical
infrastructure is in various stages of development and review. For
example, in May 2006, ASD(HD&ASA) issued a draft version of the DCIP Data
Collection Essential Elements of Information Data Sets requiring DOD
components and sector lead agents to collect a common set of data on their
critical infrastructure. However, officials from several of the COCOMs and
defense sectors told us that they have not incorporated the DCIP Data
Collection Essential Elements of Information Data Sets into their data
collection efforts because the guidance has not been finalized. These
officials further stated that they are following departmental guidance15
not specific to DCIP that pertains to database interoperability and data
sharing. During fiscal year 2006, ASD(HD&ASA) tasked the Mission Assurance
Division to develop the capability to geospatially display DOD components'
and sector lead agents' critical infrastructure and interdependencies. The
Mission Assurance Division has received and modeled critical
infrastructure data from several defense sector lead agents, but according
to division officials, the combination of funding constraints and the
components and sector lead agents independently acquiring technical
support for their individual critical infrastructure programs, has limited
its utility.

In an effort to maximize the potential information DOD could receive about
critical infrastructure it does not own, DOD officials told us that they
plan to obtain Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
accreditation from DHS. The PCII program was established by DHS pursuant
to the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002.16 The act provides
that critical infrastructure information17 that is voluntarily submitted
to DHS18 for use by DHS regarding the security of critical infrastructure
and protected systems, analysis, warning, interdependency study, recovery,
reconstitution, or other informational purpose, when accompanied with an
express statement, shall receive various protections, including exemption
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.19 If such
information is validated by DHS as PCII, then the information can only be
shared with authorized users.20 Before accessing and storing PCII,
organizations or entities must be accredited and have a PCII officer.21
Authorized users can request access to PCII on a need-to-know basis, but
users outside of DHS do not have the authority to store PCII until their
agency is accredited. However, the lack of accreditation does not
otherwise prevent entities from sharing information directly with DOD. For
example, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Association of
American Railroads began prioritizing railroad assets and
vulnerabilities--information that it shares with DOD--on the more than
30,000 miles of commercial rail line used to transport defense critical
assets.

15See, for example, DOD Directive 8100.1, Global Information Grid (GIG)
Overarching Policy (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2002) and DOD Directive
8320.2, Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 2, 2004).

16The Critical Infrastructure Information Act was enacted as Title II,
Subtitle B of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296
(2002).

17"Critical infrastructure information" is defined at Section 212 of Pub.
L. No. 107-296 (2002).

18DHS's final rule implementing the Critical Infrastructure Information
Act identifies procedures for indirect submissions to DHS through DHS
field representatives and other federal agencies.

195 U.S.C. S 552.

20For more information on the procedures by which PCII may be shared, see
DHS's Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 6
C.F.R. 29.

DOD officials told us that DOD has not yet fully evaluated the costs and
benefits of accreditation for its purposes. We noted in our April 2006
report that nonfederal entities continued to be reluctant to provide their
sensitive information to DHS because they were not certain that their
information will be fully protected, used for future legal or regulatory
action, or inadvertently released. Since our April report,22 DHS published
on September 1, 2006, its final rule implementing the act, but we have not
examined whether nonfederal entities are more willing to provide sensitive
information to DHS under the act at this time, or DOD's cost to apply for,
receive, and maintain accreditation. It is unclear to us, at this time,
the extent to which obtaining accreditation would be beneficial to DOD
when weighed against potential costs.

21For more information on the accreditation process, see app. II of GAO,
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread
Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure
Information, [26]GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2006).

22 [27]GAO-06-383 .

DOD Components and Sector Lead Agents Have Relied on Supplemental Appropriations
to Fund Their Critical Infrastructure Programs

DCIP has received about $160 million from fiscal years 2004 to 2007,
through DOD's budget process. Of this amount, ASD(HD&ASA) received
approximately $86.8 million, while the Joint Staff received approximately
$5.3 million. The DOD components and sector lead agents, which are
responsible for identifying critical infrastructure, received $68.5
million during the same 4-year period, of which $14.3 million (about 21
percent of the component and sector lead agents' combined funding) has
come from supplemental appropriations. Figures 4 and 5 show how much DCIP
funding was received by the components and sector lead agents during
fiscal years 2004 to 2007.

Figure 4: Total DCIP Funding by Military Service and COCOM, Fiscal Years
2004 to 2007

aThe Marine Corps and U.S. Pacific Command totals do not include funding
for fiscal year 2004 because these data were unavailable.

Figure 5: Total DCIP Funding by Defense Sector, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2007

Note: The $6.8 million provided to the Defense Contract Management Agency,
the Defense Sector Lead Agent for the Defense Industrial Base, is not
included.

The extent to which individual components and sector lead agents relied on
supplemental funding for their critical infrastructure programs varied by
fiscal year. In fiscal year 2005, for example, both the U.S. Special
Operations Command and the Health Affairs defense sector did not receive
any programmed funding and relied exclusively on supplemental
appropriations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the lead agent for the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance defense sector, received 78
percent of its fiscal year 2005 critical infrastructure funding from
supplemental appropriations. Likewise, the U.S. Northern Command received
almost three-quarters (72 percent) of its critical infrastructure funding
from supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2006. Management control
standards contained in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government and sound management practices emphasize the importance of
effective and efficient resource use. Relying on supplemental funding to
varying degrees for their DCIP budget prevents the components and sector
lead agents from effectively planning future years' resource needs,
weighing priorities, and assessing budget trade-offs.

DCIP funding has been centralized in ASD(HD&ASA) since fiscal year 2004;
however, beginning in fiscal year 2008, the military departments will be
required to fund service critical infrastructure programs as well as the
nine COCOM critical infrastructure programs. According to DOD Directive
3020.40,23 the military departments and COCOMs are required to provide
resources for programs supporting DCIP. This responsibility is reiterated
and amplified in a memorandum24 from the Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense that instructs the military
departments and the COCOMs to include DCIP funding in their fiscal year
2008 to 2013 budget submissions. ASD(HD&ASA) will continue to fund defense
sector critical infrastructure programs for fiscal years 2008 and 2009,
and ASD(HD&ASA) officials stated that they will work with the defense
sector lead agents to obtain funding through the lead agents' regular
budget process, beginning in fiscal year 2010. Including DCIP in the lead
agents' baseline budgets should reduce reliance on supplemental
appropriations to implement critical infrastructure responsibilities.

Overall DCIP funding received (fiscal years 2004 to 2007), and requested
(fiscal years 2008 to 2013) is shown in figure 6.

23DOD Directive 3020.40 states that the COCOMs are to identify an office
of primary responsibility to establish, resource, and execute a command
program for matters pertaining to the identification, prioritization, and
protection of command mission essential tasks and required capabilities,
and the military services are to establish, resource, and execute an
organizational program supporting DCIP.

24See Memorandum on Defense Critical Infrastructure Program Funding
Responsibilities from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense dated February 15, 2006.

Figure 6: DCIP Funding for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2013

Note: Funding for the Defense Industrial Base defense sector is not
included.

aDCIP funding for fiscal year 2004 does not include funding for the Marine
Corps or the U.S. Pacific Command because these data were unavailable.

bDCIP funding includes supplemental funding received in fiscal years 2005
and 2006.

If DCIP is funded at requested levels in future years, then it will
represent a substantial increase over current actual funding levels.
However, in previous years, DCIP consistently has been funded at less than
the requested amounts. For example, in fiscal year 2005, the military
services collectively requested approximately $8 million in DCIP funding
from ASD(HD&ASA) and received $2.1 million. That year, the military
services also received an additional $2.3 million in supplemental
appropriations, raising their total funding in fiscal year 2005 to $4.4
million, which is approximately 55 percent of what was requested. Even if
DCIP funding is substantially increased, without a comprehensive
management plan in place, it is not clear that the funds would be
allocated to priority needs.

DOD Estimates That It Has Identified about 25 Percent of the Critical
Infrastructure It Owns, and Most of the Non-DOD-Owned Critical Infrastructure
Remains Unidentified

DOD estimates that it has identified about 25 percent of the critical
infrastructure it owns, and expects to finish identifying the remaining 75
percent by the end of fiscal year 2009. DOD has identified considerably
less of its critical infrastructure owned by non-DOD entities, and has not
set a target date for its completion. A principal reason why DOD has not
identified a greater amount of its critical infrastructure is the lack of
timely DCIP guidance and policies, which has resulted in DOD's components
pursuing varying approaches in identifying their critical infrastructure.
DOD has been performing a limited number of vulnerability assessments on
DOD-owned infrastructure; however, until DOD identifies and prioritizes
all of the critical infrastructure it owns, results have questionable
value for deciding where to target funding investments. Currently, DOD
includes the vulnerability assessment of DOD-owned infrastructure as a
module to an existing assessment. However, it has not formally adopted
this practice DOD-wide, which would reduce the burden on installation
personnel and asset owners. Moreover, DOD does not have a mechanism to
flag domestic mission-critical infrastructure for DHS to consider
including among its assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure,
and has delayed coordinating the assessments of non-DOD critical
infrastructure located abroad. DOD has not identified funding to remediate
vulnerabilities identified through the assessment process.

DOD Has Identified Some of Its Mission-Critical Infrastructure

DOD estimates that it has identified about 25 percent of the critical
infrastructure it owns, and ASD(HD&ASA) officials anticipate identifying
all DOD-owned critical infrastructure (estimated to be about 15 percent of
the total) by the fiscal year 2008-2009 time frame. DOD has identified
considerably less critical infrastructure that it does not own (estimated
to be about 85 percent of the total), but that it relies upon to perform
its missions (see fig. 7).

Figure 7: Allocation of Critical Infrastructure DOD Owns and Does Not Own

Without knowing how much non-DOD-owned infrastructure is mission critical,
ASD(HD&ASA) officials were unable to estimate how much of the non-DOD
infrastructure has already been identified or a completion date. DOD has
determined that a small portion of the non-DOD infrastructure--about 200
assets--that belongs to the defense industrial base sector are mission
critical.

The Mission Assurance Division developed a database to track and
geospatially display defense critical infrastructure both within the
United States and overseas, and its associated interdependencies.
According to Mission Assurance Division officials, the willingness of DOD
components to share their critical infrastructure information has varied.
For example, division officials told us that the defense sectors have been
more forthcoming than either the military services or the COCOMs.
Consequently, the database provides an incomplete view of defense critical
infrastructure, which significantly reduces DOD's ability to analyze the
importance of infrastructure across the components and sector lead agents.
ASD(HD&ASA) officials are aware that several of the DOD components and
sector lead agents have developed databases to track their specific
infrastructure. For example, the Air Force, Marine Corps, Health Affairs
sector, Space sector and Personnel sector have each developed their own
databases. According to ASD(HD&ASA) officials, they are focusing on
ensuring compatibility among the databases rather than prescribing a
central database. Until DOD identifies the remaining portion of its
critical infrastructure, including the portion owned by non-DOD entities,
it cannot accurately prioritize and assess the risks associated with that
infrastructure.

Table 3 shows the amount of infrastructure assets--rounded to the nearest
hundred--that the DOD components have provisionally identified as critical
as of December 2006. DOD officials cautioned that not all of this
information has been validated and is subject to change. For example, some
infrastructure may be counted more than once due to components performing
multiple missions or being assigned dual roles. The numbers in table 3 are
presented to provide an order of magnitude.

Table 3: DOD-Owned Infrastructure Provisionally Identified as Critical

DOD component              Critical infrastructure assets identified 
Military services                                              3,400 
COCOMsa                                                          900 
Defense sector lead agents                                     1,600 
Total                                                          5,900 

Source: GAO's analysis of DOD data.

aThe U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. Transportation Command have dual
roles as combatant commands and defense sector lead agents. Their
identified critical infrastructure is included in the COCOM total.

According to the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
appropriate policies and procedures should exist with respect to an
agency's planning and implementation activities. The length of time DOD
has taken to issue DCIP guidance and policies has resulted in components
pursuing varying approaches in identifying and prioritizing critical
infrastructure, approaches that may not be complementary. For example,
Navy officials told us that, prior to 2004, they were basing
infrastructure criticality on its importance to Operation Enduring
Freedom, whereas Army officials indicated that they are using wartime
planning scenarios based on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review to
determine criticality. The COCOMs and the Joint Staff are basing
infrastructure criticality on its importance in accomplishing individual
COCOM mission requirements--an idea proposed by the Mission Assurance
Division. In 2003, the Mission Assurance Division proposed linking
infrastructure criticality with COCOM mission requirements, and Joint
Staff officials stated that a preliminary list has been formulated and
will undergo further review in 2007. Furthermore, defense sector lead
agents, such as Financial Services and Personnel, are identifying all of
their infrastructure regardless of COCOM mission requirements. These
variations in approaches used to determine criticality exist because DOD's
published policy, the DCIP Criticality Process Guidance Document, which
directs the components and sector lead agents to use one set of
criteria--COCOM mission requirements--was not finalized until December
2006.

Vulnerability Assessments of DOD-Owned Infrastructure Have Limited Value without
Knowing Infrastructure Criticality, and DOD Would Benefit from Formally Adopting
a Departmentwide Practice, and Flagging Non-DOD-Owned Infrastructure for DHS's
Consideration

DOD has begun conducting a limited number of infrastructure vulnerability
assessments on the infrastructure it owns. Between calendar years 2004 and
2007, DTRA will have conducted approximately 361 antiterrorism
vulnerability assessments, 45 (about 12 percent) of which will include an
assessment of critical infrastructure. Which installations receive
antiterrorism vulnerability assessments with a module that focuses on
critical infrastructure is based on perceived infrastructure criticality,
as determined by the Joint Staff in coordination with the COCOMs, and to a
lesser extent the military services. However, we believe DOD cannot
effectively target infrastructure vulnerability assessments without first
identifying and prioritizing its mission-critical infrastructure.
Depending on the amount of infrastructure that DOD deems critical, it may
not be able to perform an on-site assessment of every DOD asset. To
address this limitation, ASD(HD&ASA) officials told us that they plan to
implement a self-assessment program that the military services--the
infrastructure owners--can conduct in lieu of or in between the scheduled
vulnerability assessments. DOD is in the process of developing a
vulnerability self-assessment handbook that would provide guidance on how
to conduct these assessments but, as of May 2007, a release date had not
been set.

To reduce the burden of multiple assessments on installation personnel and
asset owners, in 2005, DOD incorporated an all-hazards infrastructure
assessment module into its existing antiterrorism vulnerability
assessments. Including the vulnerability assessment of DOD infrastructure
in an established assessment program, such as the one that exists for
antiterrorism, has not been formally adopted as a departmentwide practice.
Unless this practice is adopted, it is possible that infrastructure
assessments could be conducted independently, thereby increasing the
burden on installation personnel and asset owners that the modular
approach alleviates. Beginning in calendar year 2006, the Air Force
piloted its own critical infrastructure assessments at those Air Force
installations not receiving DTRA-led vulnerability assessments. The Air
Force completed two of these pilot critical infrastructure assessments in
2006, and has nine additional assessments planned in 2007. Unlike the
DTRA-led assessments, the Air Force pilot assessments are based on risk
rather than vulnerabilities. We did not examine the quality or the sources
of the threat, asset criticality, and vulnerability data that the Air
Force is using to perform its risk assessments. We did not evaluate the
effectiveness of either the DTRA-led or Air Force assessments as part of
our review.

DOD is not in a position to address domestic, non-DOD, mission-critical
infrastructure, with the exception of defense industrial base assets and
transportation infrastructure supporting seaports and airports, much less
perform vulnerability assessments on them. DHS conducts on-site
vulnerability assessments of domestic non-DOD-owned critical
infrastructure and has developed a model that enables owners of
private-sector critical infrastructure to perform vulnerability
self-assessments. DOD currently does not have a mechanism to flag
mission-critical infrastructure for DHS to consider including among its
assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure. For example, if DOD
knew that DHS was planning to conduct a vulnerability assessment of
critical infrastructure in the Atlanta, Georgia, area, it could flag for
DHS's consideration privately-owned infrastructure that DOD deemed
critical--such as an electrical substation or a railroad junction.
Officials from both agencies expressed an interest in coordinating
vulnerability assessments of non-DOD-owned critical infrastructure. DOD
has delayed coordinating the assessments of non-DOD-owned infrastructure
located abroad because it has decided to focus on identifying
infrastructure that it owns. For example, U.S. European Command and U.S.
Central Command officials stated that they are concentrating on
identifying critical infrastructure located on their installations. In
addition, DTRA officials pointed out that gaining access to relevant
information about foreign-owned infrastructure is more challenging than
for infrastructure owned domestically.

DCIP Funding Requirements Do Not Include Remediation

Future DCIP funding requests may be understated because current funding
levels, including supplemental appropriations, do not include the
resources that may be needed to remediate vulnerabilities. Our prior work
has shown the importance of identifying all program costs to enable
decision makers to weigh competing priorities. According to critical
infrastructure officials from several DOD components and sector lead
agents, there is insufficient funding to remediate vulnerabilities
identified through the assessment process. Remediation in the form of
added protective measures, backup systems, hardening infrastructure
against perceived threats, and building redundancy could be costly. As a
point of reference, the Joint Staff spent $233.7 million from fiscal years
2004 through 2007 to correct high-priority antiterrorism
vulnerabilities--more than the $160 million spent on all DCIP activities
over this same period.

Additionally, these antiterrorism remediation expenditures were for
DOD-owned assets only and do not reflect costs to remediate
vulnerabilities to infrastructure not owned by DOD. In 2000, the Congress
directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a loan guarantee program25
that makes a maximum of $10 million loan principal guarantee available
each fiscal year for qualified commercial firms to improve the protection
of their critical infrastructure at their facilities or refinance
improvements previously made. Once DOD identifies the critical
infrastructure it relies on but does not own and its associated
vulnerabilities, this program could potentially be utilized to help
qualified commercial firms obtain funding for remediation.

Conclusions

DOD depends on critical infrastructure to project, support, and sustain
its forces and operations worldwide, but its lack of a comprehensive
management plan to guide its efforts that addresses guidance, coordination
of program stakeholders' efforts, and resource requirements, has prevented
the department from effectively implementing an efficient critical
infrastructure program. ASD(HD&ASA) has overseen DCIP since September
2003; however, because key DCIP guidance has either recently been issued
or remains in draft more than 3 1/2 years later, DOD components have been
pursuing different approaches to fulfill their DCIP missions--approaches
that are not optimally coordinated and may conflict with each other or
their federal-level counterparts. Moreover, because the relationship
between the Directorates for HD&ASA and Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities regarding the DCIP
and antiterrorism missions remains undefined, some components are relying
on antiterrorism guidance to implement their critical infrastructure
programs while others take different approaches. Furthermore, some DCIP
funding for the components and sector lead agents has come from
supplemental appropriations, which, as we have reported previously, is not
a reliable means for decision makers to effectively and efficiently assess
resource needs. Until DOD develops a comprehensive management plan for
DCIP--that includes timelines for finalizing remaining guidance and
actions to improve information sharing, its ability to implement DCIP will
be challenged.

25Pub. L. No. 106-398 S 1033 (2000), codified at 10 U.S.C. S 2541.

In addition, until DOD identifies and prioritizes what infrastructure is
critical, the utility of vulnerability assessments is limited in targeting
funding and investments and could lead to an inefficient use of DOD
resources. Combining the infrastructure vulnerability assessment with an
existing assessment, as DOD is currently doing on infrastructure that it
owns, has the added advantage of reducing the burden of multiple
assessments on installation personnel and asset owners. However, because
DOD has not formally adopted this modular approach as a DOD-wide practice,
the possibility exists that infrastructure vulnerability could be assessed
separately. Still, to date, no DCIP funds have been spent on reducing
vulnerabilities to infrastructure. Remediation of risk identified in the
assessment process could be costly--possibly more than doubling current
identified funding requirements. Finally, by not coordinating with DHS on
vulnerability assessments of non-DOD domestic infrastructure, DOD is
missing an opportunity to increase awareness of matters affecting the
availability of assets that it relies on but does not control. When DOD
components and sector lead agents consistently identify, prioritize, and
assess their critical infrastructure, as well as including the remediation
of vulnerabilities in their funding requirements, DOD's ability to perform
risk-based decision making and target funding to priority needs will be
improved.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To guide DCIP implementation, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct ASD(HD&ASA) to develop and implement a comprehensive management
plan that addresses guidance, coordination of stakeholders' efforts, and
resources needed to implement DCIP. Such a plan should include
establishing timelines for finalizing the DCIP Data Collection Essential
Elements of Information Data Sets to enhance the likelihood that DOD
components and sector lead agents will take a consistent approach in
implementing DCIP.

To implement the intent of the Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum
Implementation Guidance Regarding the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense dated March 25, 2003, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Director of Administration and Management
to issue a chartering directive to, among other things, define the
relationship between the Directorates for HD&ASA and Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.

As part of this comprehensive management plan, to increase the likelihood
that the defense sector lead agents are able to make effective budgetary
decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct ASD(HD&ASA)
to assist the defense sector lead agents in identifying, prioritizing, and
including DCIP funding requirements through the regular budgeting process
beginning in fiscal year 2010.

In addition, as part of developing a comprehensive management plan for
DCIP, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct ASD(HD&ASA), in
coordination with the DOD components and sector lead agents, to determine
funding levels and sources needed to avoid reliance on supplemental
appropriations and identify funding for DCIP remediation.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct ASD(HD&ASA) to
take the following actions to increase the utility of vulnerability
assessments:

           o Complete the identification and prioritization of critical
           infrastructure before increasing the number of infrastructure
           vulnerability assessments performed.
           o Adopt the practice of combining the defense critical
           infrastructure vulnerability assessment module with an existing
           assessment as the DOD-wide practice.
           o Issue guidance and criteria for performing infrastructure
           vulnerability self-assessments.
           o Identify and prioritize domestic non-DOD-owned critical
           infrastructure for DHS to consider including among its assessments
           of the nation's critical infrastructure.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of
our recommendations. DOD also provided us with technical comments, which
we incorporated in the report, as appropriate. DOD's comments are
reprinted in appendix II. DHS also was provided with an opportunity to
comment on a draft of this report, but informed us that it had no
comments.

In its written comments, DOD stated that it expects to issue its DCIP
management plan by September 2007 and a chartering directive for
ASD(HD&ASA) by July 2007--guidance that we believe will contribute to a
more efficient and effective critical infrastructure program. Although DOD
did not describe the contents of the management plan, we encourage the
department to address points raised in our report--guidance, coordination
of stakeholders' efforts, and resource requirements. DOD concurred with
our recommendations pertaining to infrastructure vulnerability
assessments. Specifically, it agreed to identify and prioritize all
DOD-owned critical infrastructure before increasing the number of
assessments; to codify the practice of combining the infrastructure
assessment with an existing vulnerability assessment, thereby reducing the
burden of multiple assessments on installation personnel and asset owners;
and to issue self-assessment guidance and criteria. In its comments, DOD
stated that vulnerability assessments are a valid tool to address risk and
support risk management decisions, and that delaying these assessments
until all assets are identified--projected in fiscal year 2009--is
unadvisable. While we agree that infrastructure vulnerability assessments
can reveal exploitable weaknesses, without evaluating the capabilities,
intentions, or probability of occurrence of human and natural threats, as
well as the importance of a particular asset to accomplishing the mission,
reducing vulnerabilities may result in little, if any, risk reduction. We
agree with the department that it should continue to perform
infrastructure vulnerability assessments, but believe that increasing the
number of assessments performed above current levels will have limited
value without considering threat and asset criticality. With respect to
our recommendation on vulnerability self-assessments, DOD's expectation
that installation personnel and asset owners have the expertise and
resources to apply standards and criteria that mirror what DTRA is using
to perform its DCIP vulnerability assessments may be unrealistic. We
believe that DOD's earlier approach of preparing a self-assessment
handbook tailored to meet a range of installation and asset requirements
and capabilities will likely result in more and higher-quality
self-assessments. DOD also agreed with our recommendation to identify and
prioritize non-DOD-owned domestic infrastructure for DHS to consider
including among its assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure.
We expect that this action will increase DOD's awareness of
vulnerabilities associated with infrastructure that it relies on but does
not control.

As agreed with your offices, we are sending copies of this report to the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services, and other
interested congressional parties. We also are sending copies of this
report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Homeland Security;
the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or by e-mail at [email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made
major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Davi M. D'Agostino
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To conduct our review of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense
Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), we obtained relevant documentation
and interviewed officials from the following DOD organizations:1

           o Office of the Secretary of Defense

                        o Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
                        Readiness, Information Technology Division;
                        o Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
                        Technology, and Logistics, Office of the Deputy Under
                        Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy;
                        o Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
                        Counterintelligence & Security, Physical Security
                        Programs;

                                     o DOD Counterintelligence Field
                                     Activity, Critical Infrastructure
                                     Protection Program Management
                                     Directorate;

                        o Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief
                        Financial Officer;
                        o Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
                        and Environment, Business Enterprise Integration
                        Directorate;
                        o Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
                        and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]),
                        Critical Infrastructure Protection Office;
                        o Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
                        Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and
                        Interdependent Capabilities, Antiterrorism Policy;
                        o Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
                        Security Policy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
                        Defense for Forces Policy, Office of Space Policy;
                        o Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs,
                        Force Health Protection & Readiness; and
                        o Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
                        Information Integration, Information Management &
                        Technology Directorate;

           o Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, Antiterrorism and
           Homeland Defense
           o Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Combat Support
           Assessments Division
           o Military Services

                        o Department of the Army, Asymmetric Warfare Office,
                        Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Branch;
                        o Department of the Navy

                                     o Office of the Chief Information
                                     Officer;
                                     o Mission Assurance Division, Naval
                                     Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren
                                     Division, Dahlgren, Virginia;

                                     o Department of the Air Force, Air,
                                     Space and Information Operations, Plans,
                                     and Requirements, Homeland Defense
                                     Division; and
                                     o Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
                                     Security Division, Critical
                                     Infrastructure Protection Office;

           o Combatant Commands

                        o Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, Defense
                        Critical Infrastructure Program Office, MacDill Air
                        Force Base, Florida;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Critical
                        Infrastructure Protection Program Office, Patch
                        Barracks, Germany;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Critical
                        Infrastructure Protection Office, Norfolk, Virginia;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Northern Command, Force
                        Protection/Mission Assurance Division, Peterson Air
                        Force Base, Colorado;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, Critical
                        Infrastructure Protection Plans & Policy Office, Camp
                        H.M. Smith, Hawaii;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command, Joint
                        Operations Support Division, Miami, Florida;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command,
                        Mission Assurance Division, MacDill Air Force Base,
                        Florida;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Mission
                        Assurance Division, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska;
                        and
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command, Critical
                        Infrastructure Program, Scott Air Force Base,
                        Illinois;

           o Defense Sector Lead Agents

                        o Headquarters, Defense Intelligence Agency, Office
                        for Critical Infrastructure Protection & Homeland
                        Security/Defense;
                        o Headquarters, Defense Information Systems Agency,
                        Critical Infrastructure Protection Team;
                        o Headquarters, Defense Finance and Accounting
                        Service, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program
                        Office, Indianapolis, Indiana;
                        o Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency, Logistics
                        Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection Office;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
                        Directorate of Military Programs;
                        o Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
                        Readiness, Information Technology Division;
                        o Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs,
                        Directorate of Force Health Protection & Readiness;
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command, Critical
                        Infrastructure Program, Operations Directorate, Scott
                        Air Force Base, Illinois; and
                        o Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Mission
                        Assurance Division, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

1DOD organizations are located in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area
unless indicated otherwise.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD has developed a comprehensive
management plan to implement DCIP, we reviewed and analyzed policies,
assurance plans, strategies, handbooks, directives, and instructions, and
met with officials from each of the military services, combatant commands
(COCOM) (hereafter referred to as "DOD components"), and the defense
sector lead agents, as well as the Joint Staff. We compared DOD's current
approach to issuing guidance, stakeholder coordination, and resource
requirements to management control standards contained in the Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We also attended the
August 2006 DCIP tabletop exercise sponsored by the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the October 2006 Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level
Database Working Group meeting. We met with representatives from
ASD(HD&ASA), the Joint Staff, and several offices within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense assigned DCIP responsibilities in DOD Directive
3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection (DCIP), as well as the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. Further, we met
with officials from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of
Infrastructure Protection to discuss mechanisms to coordinate and share
critical infrastructure information with DOD.

To determine DCIP funding levels for fiscal years 2004 through 2013, we
met with officials from ASD(HD&ASA) and each of the DOD components and
sector lead agents, and analyzed actual and projected funding data. We
also met with an official from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer familiar with DCIP.
Additionally, we obtained information from the Joint Staff on funds
expended to remediate high-priority antiterrorism vulnerabilities to
illustrate the potential cost of critical infrastructure remediation. We
found the data provided by DOD to be sufficiently reliable for
representing the nature and extent of DCIP funding.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD has identified, prioritized, and
assessed its critical infrastructure, we met with officials and obtained
relevant documentation from each of the DOD components, sector lead
agents, ASD(HD&ASA), the Joint Staff, and the Mission Assurance Division.
We examined various data collection instruments and databases DOD
components and sector lead agents are using to catalog, track, and map
infrastructure, including the Mission Assurance Division's database, the
Air Force's Critical Asset Management System, the Health Affairs defense
sector's Primary Health Assets Staging Tool, the Personnel defense
sector's Characterization and Dependency Analysis Tool, and the Space
defense sector's Strategic Mission Assurance Data System. We also received
a demonstration of DHS's National Asset Database, which catalogs the
nation's infrastructure. We did not verify the accuracy of infrastructure
provisionally identified as critical by the DOD components and sector lead
agents because the data is incomplete and, has not been validated by the
department. Further, we did not verify the interoperability of these
databases because it was outside the scope of our review. We met with DTRA
officials to obtain information on the scope, conduct, and results of
infrastructure vulnerability assessments. We also met with Air Force
officials to discuss their infrastructure risk assessments. We did not
evaluate the effectiveness of either the DTRA-led or Air Force assessments
as part of our review.

Finally, to become familiar with prior work relevant to defense critical
infrastructure, we met in Arlington, Virginia, with officials from the
George Mason University School of Law's Critical Infrastructure Protection
Program and in Washington, D.C., with the Congressional Research Service
(Resources, Science, and Industry Division and Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division).

We conducted our review from June 2006 through May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431, or [email protected]

Acknowledgments

Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director; Burns D. Chamberlain; Alissa Czyz;
Michael Gilmore; Cody Goebel; James Krustapentus; Kate Lenane; Thomas C.
Murphy; Maria-Alaina Rambus; Terry Richardson; Jamie A. Roberts; Marc
Schwartz; and Tim Wilson made key contributions to this report.

(350877)

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-461 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [38]GAO-07-461 , a report to congressional requesters

May 2007

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess
Its Critical Infrastructure

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a network of DOD and non-DOD
infrastructure assets in the United States and abroad so critical that its
unavailability could hinder DOD's ability to project, support, and sustain
its forces and operations worldwide. DOD established the Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to identify and assure the availability of
mission-critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to
which DOD has (1) developed a comprehensive management plan to implement
DCIP and (2) identified, prioritized, and assessed its critical
infrastructure. GAO analyzed relevant DCIP documents and guidance and met
with officials from more than 30 DOD organizations that have DCIP
responsibilities, and with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials
involved in protecting critical infrastructure.

[39]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DOD take several actions to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of DCIP operations. Actions include developing a
comprehensive management plan; issuing a chartering directive defining the
relationship between the directorates responsible for DCIP and
antiterrorism missions; and identifying non-DOD-owned critical
infrastructure for DHS to consider in its assessments. DOD concurred with
all of GAO's recommendations.

While DOD has taken important steps to implement DCIP, it has not
developed a comprehensive management plan to guide its efforts. GAO's
prior work has shown the importance of developing a plan that incorporates
sound management practices, such as issuing guidance, coordinating
stakeholders' efforts, and identifying resource requirements and sources.
Most of DOD's DCIP guidance and policies are either newly issued or in
draft form, leading some DOD components to rely on other, better-defined
programs, such as the antiterrorism program, to implement DCIP. Although
DOD issued a DCIP directive in August 2005, the lead office responsible
for DCIP lacks a chartering directive that defines important roles,
responsibilities, and relationships with other DOD organizations and
missions. DOD has created several information sharing and coordination
mechanisms; however, additional measures could be taken. Also, DOD's
reliance on supplemental appropriations to fund DCIP makes it difficult to
effectively plan future resource needs. Until DOD completes a
comprehensive DCIP management plan, its ability to implement DCIP will be
challenged.

DOD estimates that it has identified about 25 percent of the critical
infrastructure it owns, and expects to identify the remaining 75 percent
by the end of fiscal year 2009. In contrast, DOD has identified
significantly less of the critical infrastructure that it does not own,
and does not have a target date for its completion. Among the
non-DOD-owned critical infrastructure that has been identified are some
200 assets belonging to private sector companies that comprise the defense
industrial base--the focus of another report we plan to issue later this
year. DOD estimates that about 85 percent of its mission-critical
infrastructure assets are owned by non-DOD entities, such as the private
sector; state, local, and tribal governments; and foreign governments. DOD
has conducted vulnerability assessments on some DOD-owned infrastructure.
While these assessments can provide useful information about specific
assets, until DOD identifies and prioritizes all of the critical
infrastructure it owns, assessment results have limited value for deciding
where to target funding investments. For the most part, DOD cannot assess
assets it does not own, and DOD has not coordinated with DHS to include
them among DHS's assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure. DOD
has delayed coordinating the assessment of non-DOD-owned infrastructure
located abroad while it focuses on identifying the critical infrastructure
that it does own. Regarding current and future DCIP funding levels, they
do not include the cost to remediate vulnerabilities that are identified
through the assessments. When DOD identifies, prioritizes, and assesses
its critical infrastructure, and includes remediation in its funding
requirements, its ability to perform risk-based decision making and target
funding to priority needs will be improved.

References

Visible links
  20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-113
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-84
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-885T
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-926
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-383
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-383
  38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-461
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