Federal Oversight of Food Safety: High-Risk Designation Can Bring
Needed Attention to Fragmented System (08-FEB-07, GAO-07-449T).
Each year, about 76 million people contract a foodborne illness
in the United States; about 325,000 require hospitalization; and
about 5,000 die. While the recent E. coli outbreaks highlighted
the risks posed by accidental contamination, the attacks of
September 11, 2001, heightened awareness that the food supply
could also be vulnerable to deliberate contamination. This
testimony focuses on the (1) role that GAO's high-risk series can
play in raising the priority and visibility of the need to
transform federal oversight of food safety, (2) fragmented nature
of federal oversight of food safety, and (3) need to address
federal oversight of food safety as a 21st century challenge.
This work is based on previously issued reports.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-449T
ACCNO: A65714
TITLE: Federal Oversight of Food Safety: High-Risk Designation
Can Bring Needed Attention to Fragmented System
DATE: 02/08/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Agency missions
Bioterrorism
Contaminated foods
Food and drug law
Food contamination
Food industry
Food inspection
Food supply
Homeland security
Interagency relations
Risk assessment
Food safety
Government agency oversight
GAO High Risk Series
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GAO-07-449T
* [1]GAO's High-Risk Series Raises the Priority and Visibility of
* [2]Fragmented Federal Oversight of Food Safety Led to High-Risk
* [3]Federal Oversight of Food Safety Should Be Addressed as a 21
* [4]Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [5]GAO's Mission
* [6]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [7]Order by Mail or Phone
* [8]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [9]Congressional Relations
* [10]Public Affairs
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA, and
Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST
Thursday, February 8, 2007
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OFFOOD SAFETY
High-Risk Designation Can Bring Needed Attention to Fragmented System
Statement of David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
GAO-07-449T
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the designation of federal
oversight of food safety as a high-risk area in the January 2007 update to
our High-Risk Series. Let me state at the outset that this nation enjoys a
plentiful and varied food supply that is generally considered to be safe.
However, each year, about 76 million people contract a foodborne illness
in the United States; about 325,000 require hospitalization; and about
5,000 die, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In
addition, as we have repeatedly reported, our fragmented food safety
system has resulted in inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination,
and inefficient use of resources. With 15 agencies collectively
administering at least 30 laws related to food safety, the patchwork
nature of the federal food safety oversight system calls into question
whether the government can more efficiently and effectively protect our
nation's food supply. As a result, we added the federal oversight of food
safety to our list of programs needing urgent attention and transformation
in order to ensure that our national government functions in the most
economical, efficient, and effective manner possible.^1
Our high-risk status reports are provided at the start of each new
Congress to help in setting congressional oversight agendas and to help in
raising the priority and visibility of government programs needing
transformation. These reports also help Congress and the executive branch
carry out their responsibilities while improving the government's
performance and enhancing its accountability for the benefit of the
American people. In this regard, I recently provided congressional
leadership with a set of recommendations based on GAO's work, including
work on some areas we have designated as high risk, for its consideration
in developing the oversight agenda of the 110th Congress.^2 Together, the
high-risk update and the recommendations for oversight can help
congressional decision makers focus on the programmatic challenges facing
the nation.
Because of your continuing interest in the effective use of food safety
resources, I will focus on three key points: (1) the role of GAO's
High-Risk Series in raising the priority and visibility of the need to
transform federal oversight of food safety, (2) the fragmented nature of
federal oversight of food safety, and (3) the need to address federal
oversight of food safety as a 21st century challenge. My testimony is
based on published GAO products that were developed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I includes
highlights of selected reports.
^1GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [11]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
^2GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress,
[12]GAO-07-235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
GAO's High-Risk Series Raises the Priority and Visibility of the Need to
Transform Federal Oversight of Food Safety
Overall, our High-Risk Series has served to identify and help resolve
serious government weaknesses in areas that involve substantial resources
and provide critical services to the public. Since we began reporting on
high-risk areas, the government has taken high-risk problems seriously and
has made long-needed progress toward correcting them. With that in mind,
we designated the federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area to
raise the priority and visibility of the need to transform the federal
government's oversight system.
Since 1990, GAO has reported on government operations that we identified
as high risk and has periodically reported on the status of progress to
address high-risk areas and updated our high-risk list. Historically,
high-risk areas have been so designated because of traditional
vulnerabilities related to their greater susceptibility to fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement. As our high-risk program has evolved, we have
increasingly used the high-risk designation to draw attention to areas
needing broad-based transformations to achieve greater economy,
efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability of selected
key government programs and operations.
In determining whether a government program or operation is high risk, we
consider whether it has national significance or a management function
that is key to performance and accountability. Further, we consider
qualitative factors, such as whether the risk
o involves public health or safety, service delivery, national
security, national defense, economic growth, or privacy or
citizens' rights; or
o could result in significantly impaired service, program failure,
injury or loss of life, or significantly reduced economy,
efficiency, or effectiveness.
Clearly, these factors weighed heavily into our deliberations to place the
federal oversight of food safety on our high-risk list.
We remove a high-risk designation when legislative and agency actions,
including those in response to our recommendations, result in significant
and sustainable progress toward resolving a high-risk problem. Key
determinants include a demonstrated strong commitment to and top
leadership support for addressing problems, the capacity to do so, a
corrective action plan, and demonstrated progress in implementing
corrective measures. The sustained attention and commitment by Congress
and agencies to resolve serious, long-standing high-risk problems have
paid off; because of sufficient progress, we were able to remove the
high-risk designation from 18 areas--more than half of our original list.
As we have with areas previously removed from the high-risk list, we will
continue to monitor these programs, as appropriate, to ensure that the
improvements we have noted are sustained.
For areas that remain on our high-risk list for 2007, there has been
important--but varying levels of--progress. Top administration officials
have expressed their commitment to ensuring that high-risk areas receive
adequate attention and oversight. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has led an initiative to prompt agencies to develop detailed action
plans for each area on our high-risk list. These plans are intended to
identify specific goals and milestones that address and reduce the risks
we identified within each high-risk area. Further, OMB has encouraged
agencies to consult with us regarding the problems our past work has
identified and the many recommendations for corrective actions we have
made. While progress on developing and implementing plans has been mixed,
concerted efforts by agencies and ongoing attention by OMB are critical.
In addition to the programs that remain on the list, we recently
designated three new areas as high risk, including the need to transform
federal oversight of food safety. For these recently added areas, along
with those remaining on the list, we expect that continued perseverance
will ultimately yield significant benefits. To begin to address the
weaknesses in federal oversight of food safety, executive agencies can
start by implementing our recommendations intended to improve the problems
we previously identified. Further, continued congressional oversight,
including today's hearing, and additional legislative action will also be
key to achieving progress, particularly in addressing challenges in the
broad-based transformation needed to promote the safety and integrity of
the nation's food supply.
Fragmented Federal Oversight of Food Safety Led to High-Risk Designation
For several years, we have reported on issues that suggest that food
safety could be designated as a high-risk area because of the need to
transform the federal oversight framework to reduce risks to public health
as well as the economy. Specifically, the patchwork nature of the federal
food oversight system calls into question whether the government can plan
more strategically to inspect food production processes, identify and
react more quickly to outbreaks of contaminated food, and focus on
promoting the safety and the integrity of the nation's food supply. This
challenge is even more urgent since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, heightened awareness of agriculture's vulnerabilities to terrorism,
such as the deliberate contamination of food or the introduction of
disease to livestock, poultry, and crops.
An accidental or deliberate contamination of food or the introduction of
disease to livestock, poultry, and crops could undermine consumer
confidence in the government's ability to ensure the safety of the U.S.
food supply and have severe economic consequences. Agriculture, as the
largest industry and employer in the United States, generates more than $1
trillion in economic activity annually, or about 13 percent of the gross
domestic product. The value of U.S. agricultural exports exceeded $68
billion in fiscal year 2006. An introduction of a highly infectious
foreign animal disease, such as avian influenza or foot-and-mouth disease,
would cause severe economic disruption, including substantial losses from
halted exports. Similarly, food contamination, such as the recent E. coli
outbreaks, can harm local economies. For example, industry representatives
estimate losses from the recent California spinach E. coli outbreak to
range from $37 million to $74 million.
While 15 agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food
safety, the two primary agencies are the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), which is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and
processed egg products, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which
is responsible for virtually all other foods. Among other agencies with
responsibilities related to food safety, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) in the Department of Commerce conducts voluntary,
fee-for-service inspections of seafood safety and quality; the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the use of pesticides and
maximum allowable residue levels on food commodities and animal feed; and
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating
agencies' food security activities.
The food safety system is further complicated by the subtle differences in
food products that dictate which agency regulates a product as well as the
frequency with which inspections occur. For example, how a packaged ham
and cheese sandwich is regulated depends on how the sandwich is presented.
USDA inspects manufacturers of packaged open-face meat or poultry
sandwiches (e.g., those with one slice of bread), but FDA inspects
manufacturers of packaged closed-face meat or poultry sandwiches (e.g.,
those with two slices of bread). Although there are no differences in the
risks posed by these products, USDA inspects wholesale manufacturers of
open-face sandwiches sold in interstate commerce daily, while FDA inspects
manufacturers of closed-face sandwiches an average of once every 5 years.
This federal regulatory system for food safety, like many other federal
programs and policies, evolved piecemeal, typically in response to
particular health threats or economic crises. During the past 30 years, we
have detailed problems with the current fragmented federal food safety
system and reported that the system has caused inconsistent oversight,
ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. Our most
recent work demonstrates that these challenges persist. Specifically:
o Existing statutes give agencies different regulatory and
enforcement authorities. For example, food products under FDA's
jurisdiction may be marketed without the agency's prior approval.
On the other hand, food products under USDA's jurisdiction must
generally be inspected and approved as meeting federal standards
before being sold to the public. Under current law, thousands of
USDA inspectors maintain continuous inspection at slaughter
facilities and examine all slaughtered meat and poultry carcasses.
They also visit each processing facility at least once during each
operating day. For foods under FDA's jurisdiction, however,
federal law does not mandate the frequency of inspections.^3
o Federal agencies are spending resources on overlapping food
safety activities.^4 USDA and FDA both inspect shipments of
imported food at 18 U.S. ports of entry. However, these two
agencies do not share inspection resources at these ports. For
example, USDA officials told us that all USDA-import inspectors
are assigned to, and located at, USDA-approved import inspection
facilities and some of these facilities handle and store
FDA-regulated products. USDA has no jurisdiction over these
FDA-regulated products. Although USDA maintains a daily presence
at these facilities, the FDA-regulated products may remain at the
facilities for some time awaiting FDA inspection. In fiscal year
2003, USDA spent almost $16 million on imported food inspections,
and FDA spent more than $115 million.
o Food recalls are voluntary, and federal agencies responsible for
food safety have no authority to compel companies to carry out
recalls--with the exception of FDA's authority to require a recall
for infant formula. USDA and FDA provide guidance to companies for
carrying out voluntary recalls. We reported that USDA and FDA can
do a better job in carrying out their food recall programs so they
can quickly remove potentially unsafe food from the marketplace.^5
These agencies do not know how promptly and completely companies
are carrying out recalls, do not promptly verify that recalls have
reached all segments of the distribution chain, and use procedures
that may not be effective to alert consumers to a recall.
o The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have heightened
concerns about agriculture's vulnerability to terrorism. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned DHS the lead coordination
responsibility for protecting the nation against terrorist
attacks, including agroterrorism. Subsequent presidential
directives further define agencies' specific roles in protecting
agriculture and the food system against terrorist attacks. We
reported that in carrying out these new responsibilities, agencies
have taken steps to better manage the risks of agroterrorism,
including developing national plans and adopting standard
protocols.^6 However, we also found several management problems
that can reduce the effectiveness of the agencies' routine efforts
to protect against agroterrorism. For example, there are
weaknesses in the flow of critical information among key
stakeholders and shortcomings in DHS's coordination of federal
working groups and research efforts.
o More than 80 percent of the seafood that Americans consume is
imported. We reported in 2001 that FDA's seafood inspection
program did not sufficiently protect consumers.^7 For example, FDA
tested about 1 percent of imported seafood products. We
subsequently found that FDA's program has improved: More foreign
firms are inspected, and inspections show that more U.S. seafood
importers are complying with its requirements.^8 Given FDA
officials' concerns about limited inspection resources, we also
identified options, such as using personnel in the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Seafood Inspection
Program to augment FDA's inspection capacity or state regulatory
laboratories for analyzing imported seafood. FDA agreed with these
options.
o In fiscal year 2003, four agencies--USDA, FDA, EPA, and
NMFS--spent a total of $1.7 billion on food safety-related
activities.^9 USDA and FDA together were responsible for nearly 90
percent of federal expenditures for food safety. However, these
expenditures were not based on the volume of foods regulated by
the agencies or consumed by the public. The majority of federal
expenditures for food safety inspection were directed toward
USDA's programs for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and egg
products; however, USDA is responsible for regulating only about
20 percent of the food supply. In contrast, FDA, which is
responsible for regulating about 80 percent of the food supply,
accounted for only about 24 percent of expenditures.
^3GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should be Taken to Reduce
Overlapping Inspections and Related Activities, [13]GAO-05-549T
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
^4GAO, Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should Pursue
Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage Resources,
[14]GAO-05-213 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2005).
^5GAO, Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food, [15]GAO-05-51 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
6, 2004).
^6GAO, Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a
Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, [16]GAO-05-214
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2005).
Federal Oversight of Food Safety Should Be Addressed as a 21st Century Challenge
We have cited the need to integrate the fragmented federal food safety
system as a significant challenge for the 21st century, to be addressed in
light of the nation's current deficit and growing structural fiscal
imbalance.^10 The traditional incremental approaches to budgeting will
need to give way to more fundamental reexamination of the base of
government. While prompted by fiscal necessity, such a reexamination can
serve the vital function of updating programs to meet present and future
challenges within current and expected resource levels. To help Congress
review and reconsider the base of federal spending, we framed illustrative
questions for decision makers to consider. While these questions can apply
to other areas needing broad-based transformation, we specifically cited
the myriad of food safety programs managed across several federal
agencies. Among these questions are the following:
^7GAO, Food Safety: Federal Oversight of Seafood Does Not Sufficiently
Protect Consumers, [17]GAO-01-204 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2001).
^8GAO, Food Safety: FDA's Imported Seafood Safety Program Shows Some
Progress, but Further Improvements Are Needed, [18]GAO-04-246 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).
^9GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should Be Taken to Reduce
Overlapping Inspections and Related Activities, [19]GAO-05-549T
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005).
^10GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [20]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
o How can agencies partner or integrate their activities in new
ways, especially with each other, on crosscutting issues, share
accountability for crosscutting outcomes, and evaluate their
individual and organizational contributions to these outcomes?
o How can agencies more strategically manage their portfolio of
tools and adopt more innovative methods to contribute to the
achievement of national outcomes?
Integration can create synergy and economies of scale and can provide more
focused and efficient efforts to protect the nation's food supply.
Further, to respond to the nation's pressing fiscal challenges, agencies
may have to explore new ways to achieve their missions. We have identified
such opportunities. For example, as I already mentioned, USDA and FDA
spend resources on overlapping food safety activities, and we have made
recommendations designed to reduce this overlap. Similarly, regarding
FDA's seafood inspection program, we have discussed options for FDA to use
personnel at NOAA to augment FDA's inspection capacity.
Many of our recommendations to agencies to promote the safety and
integrity of the nation's food supply have been acted upon. Nevertheless,
as we discuss in the 2007 High-Risk Series, a fundamental reexamination of
the federal food safety system is warranted. Such a reexamination would
need to address criticisms that have been raised about USDA's dual mission
as both a promoter of agricultural and food products and an overseer of
their safety. Taken as a whole, our work indicates that Congress and the
executive branch can and should create the environment needed to look
across the activities of individual programs within specific agencies and
toward the goals that the federal government is trying to achieve.
To that end, we have recommended, among other things, that Congress enact
comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food safety legislation and
commission the National Academy of Sciences or a blue ribbon panel to
conduct a detailed analysis of alternative organizational food safety
structures.^11 We also recommended that the executive branch reconvene the
President's Council on Food Safety to facilitate interagency coordination
on food safety regulation and programs.
These actions can begin to address the fragmentation in the federal
oversight of food safety. Going forward, to build a sustained focus on the
safety and the integrity of the nation's food supply, Congress and the
executive branch can integrate various expectations for food safety with
congressional oversight and through agencies' strategic planning
processes. The development of a governmentwide performance plan that is
mission-based, is results-oriented, and provides a cross-agency
perspective offers a framework to help ensure agencies' goals are
complementary and mutually reinforcing. Further, this plan can help
decision makers balance trade-offs and compare performance when resource
allocation and restructuring decisions are made.
As I have discussed, GAO designated the federal oversight of food safety
as a high-risk area that is in need of a broad-based transformation to
achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and
sustainability. The high-risk designation raises the priority and
visibility of this necessary transformation and thus can bring needed
attention to address the weaknesses caused by a fragmented system. GAO
stands ready to provide professional, objective, fact-based, and
nonpartisan information and thereby assist Congress as it faces tough
choices on how to fundamentally reexamine and transform the government.
Lasting solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save
billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to the American public,
strengthen public confidence and trust in the performance and
accountability of our national government, and ensure the ability of
government to deliver on its promises.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.
^11GAO, Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure
Safe Food, [21]GAO-02-47T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10, 2001).
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further
information about this testimony, please contact Lisa Shames, Acting
Director, Natural Resources and Environment at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected]. Key contributors to this statement were Erin Lansburgh,
Bart Fischer, Alison O'Neill, and Beverly Peterson.
Appendix I: Highlights of Selected GAO Food Safety Reports
Related GAO Products
Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase the
Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease.
GAO-06-644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should Pursue
Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage Resources. GAO-05-213.
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2005.
Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries in Consolidating Their Food
Safety Systems. GAO-05-212. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2005.
Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51. Washington, D.C.: October
6, 2004.
Antibiotic Resistance: Federal Agencies Need to Better Focus Efforts to
Address Risk to Humans from Antibiotic Use in Animals. GAO-04-490.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
School Meal Program: Few Instances of Foodborne Outbreaks Reported, but
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Outbreak Data and Food Safety Practices.
GAO-03-530. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2003.
Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, but Federal
Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation. GAO-03-342. Washington,
D.C.: February 14, 2003.
Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety Rules
Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses. GAO-02-902. Washington,
D.C.: August 30, 2002.
Genetically Modified Foods: Experts View Regimen of Safety Tests as
Adequate, but FDA's Evaluation Process Could Be Enhanced. GAO-02-566.
Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2002.
Food Safety: Improvements Needed in Overseeing the Safety of Dietary
Supplements and "Functional Foods." GAO/RCED-00-156. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2000.
(360750)
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Highlights of [29]GAO-07-449T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA, and Related Agencies, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives
February 8, 2007
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY
High-Risk Designation Can Bring Needed Attention to Fragmented System
Each year, about 76 million people contract a foodborne illness in the
United States; about 325,000 require hospitalization; and about 5,000 die.
While the recent E. coli outbreaks highlighted the risks posed by
accidental contamination, the attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened
awareness that the food supply could also be vulnerable to deliberate
contamination. This testimony focuses on the (1) role that GAO's high-risk
series can play in raising the priority and visibility of the need to
transform federal oversight of food safety, (2) fragmented nature of
federal oversight of food safety, and (3) need to address federal
oversight of food safety as a 21st century challenge. This work is based
on previously issued reports.
[30]What GAO Recommends
While many of GAO's recommendations to promote the safety of the nation's
food supply have been acted upon, others that are not yet addressed could
help Congress and the executive branch transform the federal oversight of
food safety. For example, GAO recommended that Congress enact
comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food safety legislation, and
analyze alternative organizational food safety structures. GAO also
recommended that the executive branch reconvene the President's Council on
Food Safety to facilitate interagency coordination. Finally, the
development of a governmentwide performance plan could help ensure
agencies' goals are complementary.
GAO'shigh-risk series is intended to raise the priority and visibility of
government programs that are in need of broad-based transformation to
achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and
sustainability. In January 2007, as part of our regular update of this
series for each new Congress, GAO designated the federal oversight of food
safety as a high-risk area for the first time.
While this nation enjoys a plentiful and varied food supply that is
generally considered to be safe, the federal oversight of food safety is
fragmented, with 15 agencies collectively administering at least 30 laws
related to food safety. The two primary agencies are the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), which is responsible for the safety of meat,
poultry, and processed egg products, and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), which is responsible for other food. In many previous reports, GAO
found that this fragmented system has caused inconsistent oversight,
ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. For example:
o Existing statutes give agencies different regulatory and
enforcement authorities. Under current law, thousands of USDA
inspectors must examine all slaughtered carcasses and visit all
processing facilities at least once during each operating day.
However, federal law does not mandate the frequency of inspection
for foods that are under FDA's jurisdiction.
o Food recalls are generally voluntary. While USDA and FDA provide
guidance to companies for carrying out voluntary recalls, they do
not know how promptly and completely companies carry out recalls
and do not promptly verify that recalls have reached the entire
distribution chain. In addition, they use procedures that may not
be effective to alert consumers to a recall.
o Federal agencies are spending resources on overlapping food
safety activities. USDA and FDA both inspect shipments of imported
food at 18 U.S. ports of entry but do not share inspection
resources at these ports.
Integrating the fragmented federal food safety system is a significant
challenge for the 21st century, particularly in light of the nation's
current deficit and growing structural fiscal imbalance. To help Congress
review and reconsider the base of federal spending, GAO framed
illustrative questions for decision makers to consider in 21st Century
Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government. Among these
questions are how agencies can integrate and share accountability for
their activities on crosscutting issues and how they can adopt more
innovative methods to contribute to the achievement of national outcomes.
While framing these questions, GAO specifically cited the myriad of food
safety programs managed across several federal agencies.
References
Visible links
11. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-310
12. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-235R
13. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-549T
14. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-213
15. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51
16. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-214
17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-204
18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-246
19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-549T
20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-325SP
21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-47T
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-GAO-07-449T
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