Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide 
Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains (13-FEB-07,	 
GAO-07-448T).							 
                                                                 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in 
November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of	 
programs to secure the commercial aviation system. To implement  
these efforts, TSA funding related to aviation security has	 
totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. Other 	 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as the	 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and	 
Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing	 
commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts	 
TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the
challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger	 
prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening,	 
and air cargo screening. GAO's comments are based on issued GAO  
reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations from	 
ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures  
and technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation	 
Security Officers (TSO).					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-448T					        
    ACCNO:   A65869						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning  
to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains	 
     DATE:   02/13/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Air transportation 				 
	     Airport security					 
	     Aviation security					 
	     Cargo security					 
	     Carry-on baggage screening 			 
	     Checked baggage screening				 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Passenger screening				 
	     Passengers 					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Standards						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Policies and procedures				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-07-448T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Airline Passenger Prescreening
          * [4]Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
          * [5]Air Cargo Security
          * [6]Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2007 Aviation Security Funding and

     * [7]TSA and CBP Are Working to Strengthen Domestic and Internati

          * [8]TSA Has Reported Addressing Challenges That Have Hindered Se
          * [9]DHS Intends to Align Domestic and International Prescreening

     * [10]TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screeni

          * [11]TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Management and P
          * [12]TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger and Checked Bagg
          * [13]TSA is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of Ex

               * [14]Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies
               * [15]Checked Baggage Screening Technologies

     * [16]Federal Action Is Needed to Strengthen Air Cargo Security

          * [17]TSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Risk Management Principle
          * [18]TSA Has Implemented Measures Intended to Strengthen Domestic

     * [19]Concluding Observations
     * [20]Contact Information
     * [21]Airline Passenger Prescreening
     * [22]Airline Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening
     * [23]Air Cargo
     * [24]In-Flight Security
     * [25]Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation
     * [26]Other Aviation Security
     * [27]GAO's Mission
     * [28]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [29]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [30]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [31]Congressional Relations
     * [32]Public Affairs

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Tuesday, February 13, 2007

AVIATION SECURITY

Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions,
but More Work Remains

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director Homeland Security and Justice
Issues

GAO-07-448T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
the security of our nation's aviation system. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 with the mission to protect
the transportation network while also ensuring the free movement of people
and commerce. Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its efforts on
aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs
and procedures to secure commercial aviation. To implement these efforts,
TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since
fiscal year 2004. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also plays
a role in securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has
responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening--or the matching of
passenger information against terrorist watch lists--for international
flights operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting
inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.^1 In addition,
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) is responsible for the research and development of
aviation security technologies. In carrying out its broader homeland
security responsibilities, DHS faces the daunting challenge of determining
how to allocate its finite resources within the aviation system and across
all sectors to address threats and strengthen security.

My testimony today focuses on three key areas of the aviation security
system: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked
baggage screening, and air cargo security. In particular, I will address
the numerous efforts TSA has taken or has planned to strengthen aviation
security in these three key areas, and the challenges that remain.

My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the
security of the U.S. commercial aviation system; and our preliminary
observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening
procedures and technologies, air carriers' domestic passenger prescreening
systems, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers
(TSO). We plan to report on the results of this work later this year. We
conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. A list of our related reports on aviation security is
included at the end of this testimony.

^1TSA also requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize the No
Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers prior to conducting
operations to, from, or within the United States, in accordance with TSA
security directives.

Summary

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation's aviation system. Meeting the congressional
mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage
alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA hired and deployed a
federal workforce of over 40,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners,
and installed equipment at most of the nation's more than 400 commercial
airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using
explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. TSA has since turned
its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger
prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the
TSO--formerly known as screener--workforce; strengthening screening
procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient
screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. More
specifically, based on our past work and preliminary observations from our
ongoing work, DHS and TSA have:

           o Taken numerous steps to strengthen the management and
           performance of the TSO workforce by, for example, developing and
           implementing a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing
           levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions;
           implementing a variety of human capital initiatives to help
           recruit, hire, and retain TSOs (both full-time and part-time); and
           providing TSOs with additional training intended to enhance the
           detection of threat objects, particularly improvised explosive
           devices.

           o Proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint
           screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability)
           information, and pursued several mitigating actions to reduce the
           need to use alternative screening procedures for screening checked
           baggage that have involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.

           o Explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to
           enhance the detection of explosives and other threats; and
           developed a strategic planning framework and identified several
           funding and financing strategies, in collaboration with key
           stakeholders, for installing optimal checked baggage screening
           systems.

           o Implemented measures to strengthen air cargo security, such as
           conducting threat assessments that identified general and specific
           threats related to domestic air cargo; enhancing requirements for
           air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo; conducting compliance
           inspections of air carriers to ensure that they are complying with
           existing air cargo security requirements; and working with DHS's
           Science and Technology Directorate to enhance air cargo screening
           technologies.

While these efforts should be commended, we also found that DHS and TSA
could strengthen their risk-based decision making efforts, including
planning and program evaluations, and collaboration with stakeholders. For
example, for over 4 years, TSA has been unable to develop Secure Flight--a
government-operated domestic passenger prescreening system--to the point
of implementation on the schedule it had established for the program due,
in part, to not employing a range of management disciplines to effectively
manage program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. While TSA
officials stated that they will be able to manage these risks--based on
putting in place a new management team; rebaselining the program's goals,
capabilities, costs, and schedule; and establishing more structured and
controlled processes to guide future development--it is too early to know
how these changes will affect the program's development. Further, TSA and
CBP, although now coordinating efforts, have not yet aligned their
respective domestic and international passenger prescreening programs to
minimize duplication and provide a single, integrated interface to the
aviation industry, and key decisions about how the international and
domestic prescreening programs will be integrated have not yet been
finalized.

In addition, our ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying passenger
checkpoint screening procedures identified that TSA's efforts to evaluate
the effectiveness of proposed changes to passenger screening procedures
could be improved. For example, while in some cases TSA has tested
proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures at
selected airports to help determine whether the changes would achieve
their intended purposes, our preliminary observations indicate that TSA's
data collection and analyses could be strengthened. In addition, with
respect to air cargo, while TSA conducted a variety of compliance
inspections to determine whether air carriers or indirect air carriers^2
were complying with TSA security requirements, and had begun to analyze
the results of these inspections, it had not developed measures to assess
the adequacy of air carrier compliance with air cargo security
requirements, or systematically assessed the results of its compliance
inspections to target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air carriers
for future reviews.

^2Indirect air carriers are entities that consolidate air cargo from
multiple shippers and deliver it to air carriers to be transported.

We also found that limited progress has been made in developing and
deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For
example, our preliminary work has identified that limited progress has
been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger
screening checkpoints in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in
coordinating research and development efforts, and TSA does not yet have a
strategic plan in place to assist in guiding its efforts to acquire and
deploy screening technologies. The lack of such a plan could limit TSA's
ability to deploy emerging technologies at those airport locations deemed
at higher risk. In addition, while TSA has begun to systematically plan
for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems--as we
recommended in March 2005--and to identify funding and financing
strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems, TSA
has identified that under current investment levels, installation of
optimal checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until
approximately 2024. Moreover, although TSA is working to enhance air cargo
screening technologies, the federal government and the air cargo industry
face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement
technologies to inspect air cargo. These challenges include ensuring that
air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery time
frames of air carriers, and that individuals who inspect cargo are
properly trained to operate the inspection technology. Another challenge
is the funding of inspection technologies, which can range in the millions
of dollars. We also reported that additional work is needed to fully
implement a risk-based management approach to securing air cargo. We
recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule for finalizing
assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets that need to
be protected. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a
vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, and
plans to complete this assessment in 2007.

Background

With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in
November 2001, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation security from
the Federal Aviation Administration and for passenger and checked baggage
screening from air carriers.^3 As part of this responsibility, TSA
oversees security operations at the nation's more than 400 commercial
airports, including establishing requirements for passenger and checked
baggage screening, and ensuring the security of air cargo transported to,
from, and within the United States.^4 While TSA has operational
responsibility for conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, TSA
has regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for air carriers who conduct
air cargo screening. While TSA took over responsibility for passenger
checkpoint and baggage screening, as directed by ATSA, air carriers have
continued to conduct passenger prescreening, which includes the process of
checking passenger information against federal watch list data before
flights depart. In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, TSA is developing a program to take over this
responsibility from air carriers for passengers on domestic flights, and
CBP has issued a proposed rule that would enable it to perform its
identity-matching function for passengers on international flights
traveling to or from the United States prior to flight departure.^5

Airline Passenger Prescreening

The prescreening of airline passengers--the process of identifying
passengers who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft--is
one of many important layers of security that is intended to help
officials focus security efforts on those passengers representing the
greatest potential threat to civil aviation. Within DHS, TSA is
responsible for ensuring that passenger prescreening is conducted before
domestic flights--flights operating entirely within the United
States--take off, while CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger
prescreening for international flights operating to or from the United
States.^6

3See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

^4Other federal entities involved in securing or safeguarding air cargo
include the Department of Homeland Security-U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the United States Postal Service, the Department of Commerce,
the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Treasury.

^5See Pub. L. No. 108-458, S 4012(a)(1)-(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19
(codified at 49 U.S.C. SS 44903(j)(2)(C), 44909(a)(6)).

^6Currently, TSA requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize
the No Fly and Selectee lists to prescreen passengers prior to conducting
operations to, from, or within the United States, in accordance with TSA
security directives.

TSA is developing a program, in accordance with ATSA and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, through which TSA would
assume the watch list matching function currently conducted by air
carriers prior to domestic flight departures.^7 TSA has named this
prospective prescreening program Secure Flight.^8 In accordance with
security directives issued by TSA, air carriers--and not the U.S.
government--currently match passenger-supplied reservation information
(referred to as passenger name record (PNR) data), against the No Fly and
Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers before domestic flights depart.
According to TSA, the No Fly List includes the names of individuals
considered to be known or suspected threats to civil aviation and are
therefore precluded from boarding an aircraft traveling to, from, or
within the United States, while the Selectee List includes the names of
individuals who require additional security screening--which includes
physical inspection of the person and a hand search of their
luggage--prior to being permitted to board an aircraft. These lists are
extracted from the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) consolidated
terrorist screening database (TSDB) and are exported to the air carriers
through TSA. The current domestic prescreening process also requires that
air carriers operate the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS), which identifies passengers for additional screening based on
certain behavioral characteristics.^9

The existing identity-matching component of DHS's international aviation
passenger prescreening process involves separate matching activities
conducted by air carriers (prior to a flight's departure and pursuant to
TSA requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight's departure).^10 As
with domestic passenger prescreening, air carriers conduct an initial
match of self-reported PNR data against the No Fly and Selectee Lists
before international flight departures. CBP's process, in effect,
supplements the air carrier identity matching for international flights by
comparing additional passenger information collected from passports (this
information becomes part of Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS)
data), against the No Fly and Selectee Lists and other government
databases.^11 Under current federal regulations for CBP's prescreening of
passengers on international flights, air carriers are required to provide
the U.S. government with PNR data as well as APIS data to allow the
government to conduct, among other things, identity matching procedures
against the No Fly and Selectee Lists--which typically occur just after or
at times just before the departure of international flights traveling to
or from the United States, respectively.^12 To address a concern that the
federal government's identity matching may not be conducted in a timely
manner, in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue a proposed rule
requiring that the U.S. government's identity-matching process occur
before the departure of international flights. CBP published this proposed
rule in July 2006,^13 and, if implemented, it will allow the U.S.
government to conduct passenger prescreening in advance of flight
departure, and will eliminate the need for air carriers to continue
performing an identity-matching function for international flights.

^7GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's
Secure Flight Program, [33]GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006).
GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,
but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, [34]GAO-05-356
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005).

^8Following the events of September 11, and in accordance with ATSA, TSA
began an effort in March 2003 to develop a new computer-assisted passenger
prescreening system known as CAPPS II. See 49 U.S.C. S 44903(j)(2)(A).
Because of a variety of delays and challenges, in August 2004, DHS
cancelled the development of CAPPS II. In its place, TSA announced that it
would develop a new prescreening program called Secure Flight.

^9Although the air carriers currently conduct the watch list matching and
CAPPS prescreening functions, these processes are required and overseen by
TSA.

^10In addition to name matching prescreening activities, CBP also
prescreens travelers by evaluating the authenticity and completeness of
passengers' passports and other travel documents as part of its travel
document review procedures. CBP also attempts to identify high-risk
travelers on international flights through its Automated Targeting
System--Passenger (ATS-P). Under this risk assessment program, CBP
conducts a risk-targeting process by evaluating passenger information (for
both passengers departing from and for the United States) against risk
assessment rules and algorithms within the ATS-P. The ATS-P compares
passenger information against data from numerous national intelligence and
law enforcement databases to identify those travelers who are likely to
present a higher risk, so that CBP can interdict and further screen these
travelers.

^11As passengers are not required to present a passport to board domestic
flights, the name matching process for domestic flights primarily uses
only PNR data, not APIS data.

^12See 19 C.F.R. SS 122.49a, 122.75a (establishing the electronic manifest
transmission requirements for passengers onboard commercial aircraft
arriving in or departing from the United States).

^1371 Fed. Reg. 40,035 (July 14, 2006). A notice of proposed rulemaking
provides notice to interested or affected parties of an agency's
anticipated regulatory action and an opportunity for such parties to
comment on this action before implementation.

Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening

One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from
the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening
operations to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs).
Prior to ATSA, passenger and checked baggage screening had been performed
by private screening companies under contract to airlines. ATSA required
TSA to create a federal workforce to assume the job of conducting
passenger and checked baggage screening at commercial airports. The
federal screener workforce was put into place, as required, by November
2002.^14

Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item
onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.^15 Passenger screening
personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated
screening locations.^16 As shown in figure 1, the four passenger screening
functions are:

           o X-ray screening of property,
           o walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,
           o hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and
           o physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.

Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their
carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector.
Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm the
walk-through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees--that is,
passengers selected by the CAPPS or other TSA-approved processes to
designate passengers for additional screening--are screened by hand-wand
or pat-down and have their carry-on items screened for explosives traces
or physically searched.^17

14TSA also allows airports to apply to opt-out of federal screening and to
use private screeners under contract with TSA. See 49 U.S.C. S 44920. Six
airports currently have screening operations conducted by private
screening contractors under TSA's Screening Partnership Program.

^15Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are
provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is controlled
by TSOs (or by non-federal screeners at airports participating in the
Screener Partnership Program) at checkpoints where they conduct physical
screening of individuals and their carry-on baggage for weapons and
explosives.

^16TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any individual
or property that has not been screened or inspected in accordance with
passenger screening standard operating procedures. If an individual
refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must not be allowed
into the sterile area or onboard an aircraft.

Figure 1: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation

Note: Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and
residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing swabs
along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs determine to be
suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then chemically
analyzes the swabs to identify any traces of explosive materials.

aBDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior in
individuals approaching the checkpoint. Should the BDO observe such
behavior, he or she may refer the individual for additional screening or
to a law enforcement officer.

^17At some airports, some passengers may also be screened by walking
through an explosives trace portal--a machine that detects trace amounts
of explosives on persons.

bThe hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified or
randomly selected for additional screening because he or she met certain
criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal detector.

cManual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the passenger is
identified or randomly selected for additional screening or if the TSO
identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray.

Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent
the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon onboard
an aircraft. As shown in figure 2, checked baggage screening is
accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems^18 or
explosive trace detection systems,^19 and through the use of alternative
means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag
match,^20 when the explosive detection or explosive trace detection
systems are unavailable.

^18Explosive detection systems use computer-aided tomography X-rays to
examine objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures
of threat explosives. This equipment operates in an automated mode.

^19Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
materials.

^20Positive passenger bag match requires that passengers be on the same
aircraft as their checked baggage. According to TSA officials, this
procedure is rarely used.

Figure 2: Checked Baggage Screening Operation

The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of three
elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the screening of
airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked baggage, the
technology used during the screening process, and the procedures TSOs are
to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these elements help to
determine the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger and checked
baggage screening.

Air Cargo Security

TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other things,
establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic and foreign
passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign
all-cargo carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect air
carriers. TSA is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of air
cargo security requirements by air carriers and indirect air carriers
through compliance inspections, while air carriers are required to inspect
air cargo for weapons, explosives, or stowaways.

Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing
TSA security requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved security
program that describes the security policies, procedures, and systems air
carriers are required to implement.^21 These requirements include measures
related to the acceptance, handling, and inspection of cargo; training of
employees in security and cargo inspection procedures; testing employee
proficiency in cargo inspection; and access to cargo areas and aircraft.
If threat information or events indicate that additional security measures
are needed to secure the aviation sector, TSA may issue revised or new
security requirements in the form of security directives or emergency
amendments applicable to domestic or foreign air carriers. The air
carriers must implement the requirements set forth in the security
directives or emergency amendments in addition to those requirements
already imposed and enforced by TSA.

Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type from
perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic
equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry goods,
fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish, and human
remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including large containers
known as unit loading devices that allow many packages to be consolidated
into one container that can be loaded on an aircraft, wooden crates,
assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as break
bulk cargo.

Participants in the international air cargo shipping process include
shippers, such as individuals and manufacturers; freight forwarders or
regulated agents, who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
carriers; air cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto
aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and passenger and all-cargo carriers
that store, load, and transport air cargo.^22 International air cargo may
have been transported via ship, train, or truck prior to its loading
onboard an aircraft. Figure 3 identifies cargo being loaded onto an
aircraft for transport.

^21As of January 2007, TSA security programs include (1) Aircraft
Operators Standard Security Program, which applies to domestic passenger
air carriers; (2) Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program, which
applies to domestic indirect air carriers; (3) Domestic Security
Integration Program, a voluntary program that applies to domestic
all-cargo carriers; (4) the Twelve-Five Program, which applies to certain
operators of aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds in scheduled or
charter service that carry passengers, cargo, or both; (5) Model Security
Program, which applies to foreign passenger air carriers; and (6)
All-Cargo International Security Procedures, which applies to each foreign
air carrier engaged in the transportation of cargo to, from, within, or
overflying the United States in all-cargo aircraft with a maximum
certified takeoff weight of more than 12,500 pounds. TSA drafted new
security programs for foreign and domestic all-cargo carriers with
operations to, from, and within the United States. TSA expects to finalize
these programs in early 2007.

Figure 3: Air Cargo Being Loaded Onto an Aircraft

^22The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a regulated agent
as an agent, freight forwarder, or any other entity that conducts business
with an aircraft operator and provides security controls that are accepted
or required by the appropriate government authority with respect to cargo
or mail.

Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2007 Aviation Security Funding and Fiscal Year 2008
Budget Request for Aviation Security

According to DHS's budget execution reports,^23 TSA's appropriations for
aviation security have totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004.
^24 In fiscal year 2004--the first year for which data was available--TSA
received about $3.9 billion for aviation security programs. In fiscal year
2007, TSA received about $5.7 billion. The President's budget request for
fiscal year 2008 includes about $5.7 billion to continue TSA's aviation
security efforts. This total includes about $5.0 billion specifically
designated for aviation security and about $0.79 billion for
aviation-security related programs. Figure 4 identifies reported aviation
security funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2007.

^23DHS's budget execution reports are monthly statements that reflect the
Department's financial activity.

^24In our analysis of DHS's budget execution reports and the President's
fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA, we included funding specifically
designated for aviation security and funding for other programs, projects,
and activities related to aviation security, to the extent they were
identifiable. In addition, these aviation security totals do not reflect
funding for activities that may support TSA's aviation security programs
and projects, such as intelligence and administration, because TSA's
documentation does not identify the proportion of funding dedicated to
support aviation security. Also, during this time period, a number of
aviation security related activities were transferred in or out of TSA's
jurisdiction, which impact TSA funding levels for the affected fiscal
years.

Figure 4: DHS's Reported Aviation Security Funding For TSA For Fiscal
Years 2004 through 2007

Note:  Figures for fiscal years 2004 to 2007 are those reported by DHS in
monthly budget execution reports for TSA. We used the September 30th
budget execution reports for our analysis of TSA funding for fiscal years
2004 through 2006. For fiscal year 2007, we used the October 31^st report.
According to the reports, figures presented include all rescissions and
supplemental funding for the fiscal years.

aFiscal years 2004 and 2005 include approximately $330 million in research
and development funding for aviation security. For fiscal years 2006 and
2007, research and development funding was consolidated within the DHS
S&T therefore, this funding, as reflected in TSA's budget documentation,
is not included as part of TSA's appropriations for these two fiscal
years.

bFiscal years 2006 and 2007 include approximately $680 million and $710
million, respectively, in funding for Federal Air Marshals, which was
transferred back to TSA from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in
October 2005. Federal Air Marshals funding is included within totals for
related aviation security PPAs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.

cFunding for aviation security-related programs, projects, and activities,
as reported by TSA, which were not included in budget documentation
subtotals for aviation security funding.

Of the approximately $5.7 billion requested for aviation security in the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, almost $4.4 billion, or about
77 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage screening. This includes
approximately $4 billion to support passenger and checked baggage
screening operations, such as TSO salaries and training, and $176 million
for the procurement and $259 million for the installation of checked
baggage explosive detection systems. Additional information on the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to airline
passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening,
and air cargo security is provided later in this statement.

TSA and CBP Are Working to Strengthen Domestic and International Passenger
Prescreening, but Management and Technical Challenges Remain

TSA and CBP have separate efforts under way to strengthen domestic and
international passenger prescreening, respectively. However, these
programs are in development and face management and technical challenges.
Further, while TSA and CBP have been developing their respective
identity-matching programs separately, the two agencies are now taking
steps to align their prescreening programs to minimize duplication and
provide a single set of requirements for air carrier participation.
However, key policy and technical decisions have not yet been made to
clarify how these two programs will be aligned.

TSA Has Reported Addressing Challenges That Have Hindered Secure Flight's
Implementation, but It Is Not Yet Known Whether These Efforts Will Address Past
Problems

For over 4 years, TSA has faced significant challenges in developing and
implementing its advanced passenger prescreening program, now known as
Secure Flight, and has not yet taken the identity-matching function over
from air carriers as mandated by Congress. According to TSA, the Secure
Flight program--which is to perform the functions associated with
determining whether passengers on domestic flights are on the No Fly and
Selectee Lists--is intended to (1) decrease the chance of compromising
watch list data by centralizing its use within the federal government; (2)
provide earlier identification of potential threats, allowing for the
expedited notification of law enforcement and other organizations
responsible for threat management; (3) provide a fair, equitable, and
consistent matching process across all air carriers; and (4) offer
consistent application of an expedited and integrated redress process for
passengers misidentified as a threat. However, during the past 3 years, we
reported on multiple occasions that the Secure Flight program (and its
predecessor, CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or finalized its goals,
objectives, and requirements. Further, in February 2006, we reported that,
taken as a whole, the development of Secure Flight had not been
effectively managed and the program was at risk of failure. We found that
TSA had not conducted critical activities in accordance with best
practices for large-scale information technology programs, and had not
followed its own systems development life cycle guidance in managing the
program's development. Former program officials stated that TSA had
instead used a rapid development method that was intended to enable it to
develop the program more quickly. However, as a result of this approach,
the development process had been ad hoc, with project activities conducted
out of sequence. For example, program officials declared the design phase
complete before requirements needed to guide the design of Secure Flight
had been detailed. In addition, TSA had not maintained up-to-date program
schedules or developed cost estimates for the program. In March 2005, we
recommended that TSA take numerous steps to strengthen the program's
development, such as finalizing system requirements and developing
detailed test plans to help ensure that all Secure Flight system
functionality is properly tested and evaluated. We also recommended that
TSA develop a plan for establishing connectivity among the air carriers
and other stakeholders to help ensure the secure, effective, and timely
transmission of data for use in Secure Flight operations.^25

In early 2006, acknowledging the challenges it faced with the program, TSA
suspended the development of Secure Flight and initiated a reassessment,
or rebaselining, of the program, to be completed before moving forward. In
January 2007, TSA announced that it had completed its rebaselining
efforts, which included reassessing program goals and capabilities, and
developing a new schedule and cost estimates--actions that we recommended
in March 2005.^26 The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA
stated that TSA had made significant progress in upgrading the design and
development of the Secure Flight program, and that program documentation
had been revised to reflect TSA's plans for reliably delivering Secure
Flight capabilities. In December 2006, the DHS Investment Review Board--a
group of DHS senior executives charged with reviewing certain programs at
key phases of development to help ensure they meet mission needs at
expected levels of costs and risks--completed its review of Secure Flight
and approved the program to proceed into capability development and
demonstration phases. According to the Investment Review Board, this
approval was based on rescoping Secure Flight using a new business model
better focused on mission; putting a new team in place with appropriate
technical and management skills; and improving its management approach to
privacy, security, and quality assurance. However, the board also noted
that this important screening capability was needed sooner than its
planned mid-2009 implementation time frame, and requested that TSA
determine the feasibility of accelerating the program schedule to deliver
initial capability by mid-2008. As we have reported, earlier attempts to
accelerate the Secure Flight program have led to developmental problems
and program delays. Accordingly, as TSA moves forward, it will need to
employ a range of program management disciplines, which we previously
found missing, to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy
risks. As part of our ongoing work assessing the Secure Flight program, we
will be reviewing DHS's and TSA's efforts to develop and implement the
program, including progress made during its rebaselining efforts.^27

25 [35]GAO-05-356 .

^26 [36]GAO-05-356 .

Regarding TSA's communications with air carriers about Secure Flight
system requirements, we reported in March 2005 that air carriers had
expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty of Secure Flight system and
data requirements, and the impact that these requirements may have on the
airline industry and traveling public. Further, based on preliminary
results for our ongoing work, officials from 9 of the 15 air carriers we
interviewed from February 2006 to January 2007, ^28 reported that they
were enhancing their respective identity-matching systems or planned to do
so. While these efforts may improve the accuracy of each air carrier's
individual identity-matching system, the improvements will only apply to
their respective systems and could further exacerbate differences that
currently exist among the air carriers' various identity-matching systems.
These differences may result in varying levels of effectiveness in the
matching of passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee Lists,
which was a key factor that led to the government's effort to take over
the identity-matching function through Secure Flight. Also, officials from
7 of 15 air carriers stated that TSA had not communicated with them about
Secure Flight requirements within the past 6 months while the program was
being rebaselined. TSA officials stated that in October 2006 they had
resumed discussions with air carriers regarding Secure Flight
requirements, and as of January 2007, had discussed plans for Secure
Flight with officials from 8 air carriers and the Air Transport
Association. TSA officials stated that they also plan to take into account
current air carrier capabilities and programs as they proceed with Secure
Flight development, and to update guidance previously provided to air
carriers to reflect the current concept of operations for the rebaselined
Secure Flight program.

^27The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, mandates
that GAO review and confirm, upon the department's certification, that the
Secure Flight Program meets the 10 conditions listed in section 522(a) of
Public Law 108-334. See Pub. L. No. 109-295, S 514, 120 Stat 1355, 1379
(2006). See also Pub. L. No. 108-334, S 522, 118 Stat. 1298, 1319-20
(2004). We are also conducting our ongoing review in response to requests
from the United States Senate: the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and its Subcommittee on Aviation; Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security; Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs; Committee on Judiciary; also the House
of Representatives: Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Committee on Homeland Security; and the Chairman of the Committee on
Government Reform.

^28We have ongoing work that includes collecting information about the
identity-matching systems currently used by air carriers to match
information for passengers on domestic flights against information on the
No Fly and Selectee Lists derived from the TSDB. Air carriers will
continue to conduct this name matching until Secure Flight becomes fully
operational. Our interviews with officials from the 15 air carriers is
part of this ongoing review of the air carriers' domestic identity
matching efforts. In that we did not use probability sampling methods to
select these 15 air carriers, information provided by officials from these
air carriers cannot be generalized to other air carriers.

In February 2006, we also reported that TSA was in the early stages of
coordinating with TSC and CBP on broader issues of integration and
interoperability related to other people-screening programs used by the
government to combat terrorism. However, TSA needed to provide these
stakeholders with detailed information about its concept of operations for
Secure Flight to enable them to plan for and provide the support necessary
for the program. For example, a TSC official stated that without specific
information on Secure Flight requirements, TSC could not make decisions
about needed resources, such as personnel needed to operate its call
center that would be used to help resolve potential matches against the No
Fly and Selectee Lists. In January 2007, TSC officials stated that while
they had been participating in meetings with Secure Flight officials, they
had not yet received the specific operational and technical information
needed to plan for supporting Secure Flight operations. During Secure
Flight rebaselining efforts, TSA officials also stated that they were
coordinating with CBP to more closely align their respective
identity-matching programs. However, this collaboration is ongoing and key
policy and technical decisions regarding how the programs will be
coordinated have not been announced. We discuss TSA and CBP's coordination
of their domestic and international prescreening programs later in this
statement.

We have also previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements
development process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of the
envisioned system or the full actions it planned to take to mitigate them.
Specifically, because TSA had not made final determinations about its
requirements for passenger data, and Secure Flight's system development
documentation did not fully address how passenger privacy protections were
to be met, it was not possible to assess potential system impacts on
individual privacy protections at that time. We have also previously
reported that TSA violated provisions of the Privacy Act^29 by not fully
disclosing its use of personal information during systems testing.^30 In
March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will protect
personal privacy.^31 TSA officials stated that they are aware of, and plan
to address, the potential for Secure Flight to adversely affect passenger
privacy protections, and the need to provide a redress process whereby
aviation passengers adversely affected by the identity matching process
may express their concerns, seek correction of any inaccurate data, and
request other actions to reduce or eliminate future inconveniences.
Concurrent with its rebaselining efforts, TSA reported that it has
developed a Secure Flight privacy program that is rooted in the Fair
Information Practices--a set of internationally recognized privacy
principles that underlie the Privacy Act. TSA officials further stated
that the rebaselined Secure Flight program will result in a more
transparent and privacy-enhanced program by addressing concerns identified
by us and others in the following areas: program oversight, program scope,
data collection activities, redress requirements, relationships with other
TSA credentialing programs, and technical requirements. TSA officials also
stated that they have embedded privacy contractor experts in the program
teams to address privacy issues as they arise. In addition, in January
2007, officials from Secure Flight and TSA's Office of Transportation
Security Redress stated that Secure Flight will use the TSA redress
process that is currently available for individuals affected by the air
carrier identity-matching processes, but the details of how this process
will be integrated with other Secure Flight requirements have not yet been
completed. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts to manage system
privacy protections and establish a redress process for resolving
misidentified passengers as part of our ongoing review of the program.

We believe that TSA's efforts to reassess Secure Flight's development and
progress was an appropriate step given the problems that faced the program
in early 2006. However, since TSA only recently announced that it has
completed its rebaselining efforts, and just recently provided more
details of its rebaselined program, it is too early to determine the
extent to which TSA has addressed the long-standing issues that have
affected the program. According to DHS's budget execution reports, TSA
received about $126 million for fiscal years 2004 through 2006--including
funds spent on the CAPPS II predecessor program--and $15 million for
fiscal year 2007 for Secure Flight. For fiscal year 2008, the President's
budget request includes $53 million for TSA to continue this program.
According to the TSA's budget justification, the increase of $38 million
is requested to provide for the development and the authority to operate
the Secure Flight system. Additionally, the funding request would provide
for procuring hardware, starting operations and training, and developing a
network interface between Secure Flight and CBP. We will continue to
monitor Secure Flight's development as part of our ongoing review of the
program.

^29Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. S 552a).

^30GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program
Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More
Fully Inform the Public, [37]GAO-05-864R (Washington, D.C.: July 22,
2005).

^31 [38]GAO-05-356 .

DHS Intends to Align Domestic and International Prescreening Programs, but Key
Policy and Technical Decisions Have Not Yet Been Made

As originally envisioned, once Secure Flight became operational, TSA would
be operating a domestic passenger prescreening system, while CBP would be
operating an international passenger prescreening system. However, air
carriers raised concerns regarding having to support different data
requirements for two separate government prescreening programs. Further,
we reported that both programs could result in potentially different
results for passengers flying on domestic and international flights,
results that could cause additional costs to air carriers, and confusion
and inconvenience to passengers. For example, if the programs are not
aligned, air carriers might have to implement different information
connections, communications, and programming for each prescreening
program, resulting in added costs and inefficiencies. Also, if the two
separate programs use different passenger data elements or
identity-matching technologies, air carriers may receive conflicting
notifications to handle a passenger differently for an international than
for a domestic flight. Passengers may also be inconvenienced since a
passenger may be delayed on one leg of a multileg trip, which includes
both a domestic and an international flight segment, and possibly miss a
flight.

The air carrier community has asked CBP and TSA to coordinate their
efforts to ensure that the programs are compatible and are developed as a
single approach to avoid the need for air carriers to implement two
separate screening systems to meet CBP and TSA requirements. In a joint
letter to the Secretary of DHS dated October 27, 2005, the Air Transport
Association of America and the Association of European Airlines urged DHS
to coordinate international and domestic airline passenger prescreening
programs so that air carriers are not unduly burdened by the costs and
inefficiencies posed by working with two different prescreening programs.
The letter also stated that the Air Transport Association of America and
the Association of European Airlines believed that there had been a lack
of coordination between CBP and TSA in aligning their respective passenger
prescreening programs. Air carrier industry groups reiterated this concern
in comments they provided in response to CBP's proposed rule for
conducting passenger prescreening on international flights. We have also
previously reported that since both agencies are developing and
implementing passenger prescreening programs, CBP and TSA could mutually
benefit from the sharing of technical testing results and the coordination
of other developmental efforts.^32 Coordination and planning in the
development of these two programs would also enhance program integration
and interoperability, potentially limit redundancies, and increase program
effectiveness. We have recently recommended that DHS take additional steps
and make key policy and technical decisions that are necessary to more
fully coordinate these programs.^33

Recognizing these concerns, DHS has directed TSA and CBP to coordinate
their prescreening activities so that they provide "One DHS Solution" to
the commercial aviation industry consistent with applicable authorities
and statutes. CBP and TSA officials stated that they are taking steps to
coordinate their prescreening efforts, including meeting routinely with
DHS's Office of Screening Coordination and with aviation and travel
industry stakeholders to develop joint data requirements, processes, and
methods for disseminating information to other government and law
enforcement organizations in the event of a positive identity match
against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. DHS officials told us that they
envision a joint approach that will allow for standardization between the
two programs to the extent possible, reduce unnecessary programming by
aircraft operators, and provide consistent treatment for passengers across
all aircraft operators. However, despite this coordination, key policy and
technical decisions have not yet been made regarding how these programs
will be aligned, including determining how differences in the data used to
conduct identity matching and the identity matching techniques used will
be resolved. Further, it is unclear how the different implementation
schedules for the two programs--CBP has already issued a proposed rule to
implement a new passenger prescreening program for passengers on
international flights, while TSA's schedule shows that Secure Flight will
not begin operations until 2009--will affect coordination efforts. Given
DHS's commitment to align the two prescreening programs, and the security
and efficiency benefits of doing so, it will be important for CBP and TSA
to take the steps necessary to successfully coordinate these programs.
Until international and domestic prescreening efforts are more fully
aligned, the extent to which potential problems of duplication and
conflicting results in international and domestic passenger prescreening
will be addressed remains unclear.

^32 [39]GAO-06-374T and [40]GAO-05-356 .

^33GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger
Prescreening are Under Way, But Planning and Implementation Issues Remain,
GAO-07-55SU (Washington, D.C.: November 2006). This report contains
information considered to be Security Sensitive Information.

TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screening Checkpoints and
Checked Baggage Screening Stations, but Continues to Face Challenges

TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the passenger
and checked baggage screening systems--people (TSOs), screening
procedures, and technology--but continues to face management, planning,
and funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing Allocation
Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current
operating conditions, and provided TSOs with additional training intended
to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly improvised
explosives. TSA also proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint
screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability information),
among other factors, but could do more evaluation of proposed procedures
before they are implemented to ensure they achieve their intended results.
Additionally, TSA is exploring new technologies to enhance the detection
of explosives and other threats, but continues to face management and
funding challenges. For example, in May 2006, TSA reported that under
current investment levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage
screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. TSA, in
collaboration with key stakeholders, has identified several funding and
financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening
systems, such as continued appropriations for the procurement and
installation of EDS machines.

TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Management and Performance of Its
TSO Workforce

TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the management
and performance of its TSO workforce, which TSA has identified as its most
important asset in accomplishing its mission. We reported in February 2004
that staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had hindered the ability
of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)--the ranking authority
responsible for leading and coordinating security activities at
airports--to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints
and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints without using
additional measures such as overtime.^34 Since that time, TSA has
developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at
airports. In determining staffing allocations, the model takes into
account the workload demands unique to each airport based on an estimate
of each airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then processed
against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers and checked
baggage--including expected processing rates, required staffing for
passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard operating
procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates. In August 2005, TSA
determined that the staffing model contained complete and accurate
information on each airport from which to estimate staffing needs, and the
agency used the model to identify TSO allocations for each airport. At
that time, the staffing model identified a total TSO full-time equivalent
allocation need of 42,303--a level within the congressionally mandated
limit of 45,000 full-time equivalent TSOs. According to TSA, when TSA runs
the model, it does so without imposing a limitation on the maximum number
of full-time equivalent TSOs, either the 45,000 congressional limit or any
budgetary limits that affect the number of TSOs that can be hired.

In addition to the levels identified by the staffing model, TSA sets aside
TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those considered by the
staffing model in the annual allocation run for airports. For example, in
order to handle short-term extraordinary needs at airports, TSA
established a National Screening Force of 615 TSOs who can be sent to
airports to augment local TSO staff during periods of unusually high
passenger volume, such as the Super Bowl. Additionally, certain airports
may, during the course of the year, experience significant changes to
their screening operations, such as the arrival of a new airline or
opening of a new terminal. TSA established a reserve of 329 TSO full-time
equivalents during fiscal year 2006 that can be used to augment the
existing force. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request includes
$35 million for operational expenses for a National Deployment Office--an
office that would be responsible for deploying the National Screening
Force and other TSOs to those airports experiencing significant staffing
shortfalls.

^34GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, [41]GAO-04-440T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).

According to TSA, TSA's approach to allocating TSOs has allowed the agency
to stay within the 43,000 full-time equivalent TSO budgetary limit for
fiscal year 2006--a staffing level that TSA's Assistant Secretary stated
is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage screening
services.^35 According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request,
the $2.6 billion requested for the federal TSO workforce represents an
increase of about $131 million over fiscal year 2007 for cost of living
adjustments and a travel document checker initiative. Under this
initiative, about 1,330 full-time equivalent TSOs would be placed at the
40 highest risk category X and I airports to conduct document checking for
passengers approaching the passenger screening checkpoint.^36 According to
the budget request, the $2.6 billion is to fund the personnel,
compensation, and benefits of approximately 43,688 full-time equivalent
TSOs and about 1,045 full-time equivalent Screening Managers. Table 1
shows the total TSO and Screening Manager full-time equivalents and the
funding levels for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, as reported by TSA.

^35As part of TSA's Screening Partnership Program, six airports used
private contract screeners in lieu of federal TSOs during fiscal year
2006. Despite the fact that these airports do not use federal screeners,
TSA still used the Staffing Allocation Model to determine the full-time
equivalent screening staff at each of these airports for fiscal year 2006.
These staffing levels, as determined by the model, were to serve as a
limit on the number of private screeners that the private screening
contractors could employ. According to TSA, the 1,702 total full-time
equivalent staffing allocation at these airports does not count against
TSA's nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalents for TSO staff. In
addition, according to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for
TSA, TSA is accepting two additional airports--Key West and Marathon
Florida--with a combined total of 30 full-time equivalent TSOs, into the
Screening Partnership Program.

^36According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, under
previous passenger checkpoint screening procedures (prior to August 10,
2006), airport contract employees conducted all document checking for
passengers approaching the checkpoint. TSA has determined that a security
gap exists in verifying the documentation of the traveling public, and is
seeking to close this gap to better meet its security responsibilities
through more rigorous document checking procedures than those being done
by private industry.

Table 1: Passenger and Checked Baggage TSO and Screening Manager Full-time
Equivalents and Actual Spending for TSO Personnel, Compensation, &
Benefits, by Fiscal Year

Fiscal year                          FY 2004   FY 2005   FY 2006 FY 2007^a 
Total TSOs and Screening Managers     45,252    45,690    42,187    43,779 
at airports nationwide                                                     
Actual spending (dollars in       $2,191,551 2,291,572 2,251,503 2,418,329 
thousands)                                                                 

Source: TSA

^aFiscal year 2007 figures are projected.

FSDs we interviewed in 2006^37 as part of our ongoing review of TSA's
staffing model generally reported that the model is a more accurate
predictor of staffing needs than TSA's prior staffing model, which took
into account fewer factors that affect screening operations.^38 However,
FSDs identified that some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006
staffing model did not reflect actual operating conditions. For example,
FSDs noted that the staffing model's assumption of a 20 percent part-time
workforce--measured in terms of full-time equivalents--had been difficult
to achieve, particularly at larger (category X and I) airports, because
of, among other things, economic conditions leading to competition for
part-time workers, remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass
transit, TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002, and
part-time workers' desire to convert to full-time status. TSA data show
that for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the nation's category X airports had
a TSO workforce composed of about 8 percent part-time equivalents, and the
part-time TSO attrition rate nationwide remains considerably higher than
the rate for full-time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 16
percent for full-time TSOs for fiscal year 2006). FSDs also expressed
concern that the model did not specifically account for the recurrent
training requirement for TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged over a fiscal
year quarter. Further, FSDs identified that the model for fiscal year 2006
did not account for time away from screening to perform operational
support duties. FSDs we interviewed stated that because they are not
authorized to hire a sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are
being routinely used to perform certain operational support functions,
such as payroll processing, scheduling, distribution and maintenance of
uniforms, data entry, and workman's compensation processing. Similarly, in
September 2006, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector
General reported that TSA had not determined the precise number of FSD
administrative positions it needed and was using TSOs to perform
administrative work.

^37We visited 14 airports as part of this ongoing review. We did not use
probability sampling methods to select the airports at which the FSDs were
located; therefore, information provided by these FSDs cannot be
generalized to other airports.

^38The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted
in December 2004, required TSA to, among other things, develop and submit
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the
House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all airports
at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 2005. These
standards are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and
ensure that the average aviation security related delay experienced by
passengers is minimized. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act also mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards.
Pub. L. No. 108-458, S 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004).

In response to FSDs' input and the various mechanisms TSA has implemented
to monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation outputs, TSA made
changes to some assumptions in the model for fiscal year 2007. Our
preliminary observations indicate that these revisions should help address
the concerns identified by FSDs. For example, TSA recognized that some
airports cannot likely achieve a 20 percent part-time full-time equivalent
level and others (most likely smaller airports) may operate more
effectively with other levels of part-time TSO staff. As a result, for
fiscal year 2007, TSA modified this assumption to include a variable
part-time goal based on each airport's historic part-time to full-time TSO
ratio. TSA also included an allowance in the fiscal 2007 Staffing
Allocation Model for training to provide additional assurance that TSOs
complete the required training on detecting improvised explosive
devices--which TSA has identified as the most significant threat to
commercial aviation. Additionally, TSA included an allowance for
operational support duties in the 2007 Staffing Allocation Model to
account for the current need for TSOs to perform these duties.

Factors outside of the staffing model's determination of overall TSO
staffing levels also affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their TSO
workforce. Specifically, FSDs we interviewed as part of our ongoing review
of TSA's staffing model cited difficulties in recruiting and retaining
sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full
allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints appropriately
given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism and injuries; and
managing around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, such
as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage check areas despite demand
levels that would justify such added capacity. TSA has made progress in
addressing these challenges through a variety of human capital
initiatives. For example, to allow FSDs to more efficiently address
staffing needs, TSA has shifted responsibility for hiring TSOs from TSA
headquarters to FSDs at individual airports and, according to TSA
officials, provided contractor support to assist in this effort. TSA data
show that since local hiring began in March 2006, TSA has increased the
number of new hire TSOs from approximately 180 per pay period in February
2006 to nearly 450 each pay period under the local hiring initiative.

In addition to having an adequate number of TSOs, effective screening
involves TSOs being properly trained to do their job. Since we first
reported on TSO training in September 2003,^39 TSA has taken a number of
actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO workforce
beyond the basic training requirement. For example, TSA has expanded
training available to the TSO workforce, such as introducing an Online
Learning Center that makes self-guided courses available over TSA's
intranet and the Internet, and enhanced training on explosives detection.
This training included both classroom and hands-on experience, and focused
particularly on identifying X-ray images of improvised explosives device
component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb. According to TSA,
as of February 6, 2007, about 98 percent of the 48,236 TSOs on board had
received classroom, checkpoint, or computer-based improvised explosive
device recognition training. TSA has also developed new training
curriculums to support new screening approaches. For example, TSA recently
developed a training curriculum for TSOs in behavior observation and
analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers exhibiting behaviors
indicative of stress, fear, or deception. The President's fiscal year 2008
budget request includes $89.7 million to fully implement TSO training
programs and related TSO workforce development programs.

TSA has also made progress in addressing challenges that made it difficult
for TSOs to access training. We reported in May 2005 that insufficient TSO
staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access
the Online Learning Center made it difficult for all TSOs at many airports
to receive required training, and had limited TSO access to TSA training
tools.^40 We stated that without addressing the challenges to delivering
ongoing training, including installing high-speed connectivity at airport
training facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a screening
workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to perform at a
desired level. As previously discussed, our preliminary observations from
our ongoing review of TSA's staffing model indicate that TSA has taken
steps to address the TSO staffing challenges, including providing an
allowance for TSO training in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal
year 2007. However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA's efforts will
address TSA's ability to provide required training while maintaining
adequate coverage for screening operations. TSA established its Online
Learning Center to provide passenger and baggage TSOs with online,
high-speed access to training courses. However, effective use of the
Online Learning Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which
TSA has not been able to provide to all airports. We reported that as of
October 2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have
high-speed Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. Given
the importance of the Online Learning Center in both delivering training
and serving as the means by which the completion of TSO training is
documented, we recommended that TSA develop a plan that prioritizes and
schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to
all TSA's airport training facilities to help facilitate the delivery of
TSO training and the documentation of training completion. Since that
time, TSA has made progress in deploying high-speed connectivity to
airports. According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, 95
percent of the nation's airports now have high-speed connectivity.
According to the budget request, TSA expects to meet the goal of all
airports having high-speed connectivity during fiscal year 2007.

39GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
Made and Challenges Remaining, [42]GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
24, 2003).

40GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened but More Work Remains, [43]GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May
2, 2005).

TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Monitoring of the Procedures

In addition to TSA's efforts to train and deploy a federal TSO workforce,
steps have also been taken to strengthen passenger and checked baggage
screening procedures to enhance detection capabilities. However, TSA could
improve its evaluation and oversight of these procedures. With regard to
passenger checkpoint screening procedures, between April and December
2005, proposed modifications were made in various ways and for a variety
of reasons, and a majority of the proposed modifications-- 48 of 92--were
ultimately implemented at airports. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's
process for determining whether and how screening procedures should be
modified, we found that TSA officials proposed standard operating
procedure (SOP) modifications based on risk information (threat and
vulnerability information), daily experiences of staff working at
airports, and complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public.^41
In addition to these factors, our preliminary observations indicate that
consistent with its mission, TSA senior leadership made efforts to balance
the impact that proposed SOP modifications would have on security,
efficiency, and customer service when deciding whether proposed SOP
modifications should be implemented. For example, in August 2006, TSA
sought to increase security by banning liquids and gels from being carried
onboard aircraft in response to the alleged terrorist plot to detonate
liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft en route from the United
Kingdom to the United States. In September 2006, after obtaining more
information about the alleged terrorist plot--to include information from
the United Kingdom and U.S. intelligence communities, discussions with
explosives experts, and testing of explosives--TSA officials decided to
lift the total ban on liquids and gels to allow passengers to carry small
amounts of liquids and gels onboard aircraft. TSA officials also lifted
the total ban because banning liquids and gels as carry-on items was shown
to affect both efficiency and customer service. Specifically, following
the implementation of the total ban in August 2006, the number of bags
checked per passenger increased by approximately 27 percent--thus placing
a strain on the efficiency of the checked-baggage screening system. In
addition, TSA recognized that passengers have legitimate needs that may
require them to carry some liquids and gels onboard aircraft. Moreover, in
an effort to harmonize its liquid screening procedures with other
countries, in November 2006, TSA revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid
ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols onboard aircraft, which is
equivalent to 100 milliliters--the amount permitted by the 27 countries in
the European Union, as well as Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and
Iceland. According to TSA, this means that approximately half of the
world's travelers will be governed by similar measures with regard to this
area of security.

In some cases, TSA first tested proposed modifications to screening
procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the changes
would achieve their intended purpose, such as to enhance detection of
prohibited items or free up TSO resources to perform screening activities
focused on threats considered to pose a high risk, such as explosives.
TSA's efforts to collect quantitative data through testing proposed
procedures prior to deciding whether to implement or reject them is
consistent with our past work that has shown the importance of data
collection and analyses to support agency decision making. However, as
part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA's data collection and
analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed
procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended
purpose. Specifically, we found that for the tests of proposed screening
procedures TSA conducted during the period April 2005 through December
2005, including the removal of small scissors and small tools from the
prohibited items list,^42 although TSA collected some data on the
efficiency of and customer response to the procedures at selected
airports, the agency generally did not collect the type of data or conduct
the necessary analysis that would yield information on whether proposed
procedures would achieve their intended purpose.^43 We will report on the
results of our analysis of TSA's efforts to test proposed modifications to
screening procedures later this year.

41We will report on the results of this work later this year.

Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that TSA
have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with
established procedures. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's process for
revising passenger screening procedures, we identified that TSA monitors
TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs through its
performance accountability and standards system and through local and
national covert testing.^44 According to TSA officials, the performance
accountability and standards system was developed in response to a 2003
report by us that recommended that TSA establish a performance management
system that makes meaningful distinctions in employee performance,^45 and
in response to input from TSA airport staff on how to improve passenger
and checked baggage screening measures. This system will be used by TSA to
assess agency personnel at all levels on various competencies, including,
among other things, technical proficiency. The technical proficiency
component of the performance accountability and standards system will be
used to measure TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening
procedures. In addition to implementing the performance accountability and
standards system, TSA conducts local and national covert tests to
evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with the SOPs
affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in
accessible property or concealed on a person. Our preliminary observations
indicate that TSA airport officials have experienced resource challenges
in implementing these compliance monitoring methods. TSA headquarters
officials stated that they are taking steps to address these challenges.
For example, officials said that they have automated many of the data
entry functions of the performance accountability and standards system to
relieve the field of the burden of manually entering this information into
the online system.

42In December 2005, TSA revised the prohibited and permitted items list by
removing (1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4 inches or less
in length as measured from the fulcrum and (2) tools--such as pliers,
screwdrivers, and wrenches--7 inches or less in length (excluding
crowbars, drills, hammers, and saws) from the list. Pursuant to the
change, passengers are able to bring these items onboard commercial
aircraft on domestic flights and international flights departing the
United States. See 70 Fed. Reg. 79,930 (Dec. 8, 2005). In addition to
assessing the December 2005 prohibited items list change as part of our
ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying passenger checkpoint
screening procedures, we recently initiated a mandated review of the
public safety impacts and risks, if any, of TSA's decision to allow small
and tools onboard aircraft, and will report on the results of this work
later this year.

43TSA conducted tests of several proposed procedures that officials
believed would have a significant impact on how TSOs perform daily
screening functions, TSO training, and customer acceptance.

44Covert testing involves TSA headquarters officials (national testing) or
TSA field staff and other federal employees (local testing) attempting to
carry simulated threat objects through the checkpoint without the objects
being detected by TSOs. The results of the local covert tests are
sensitive security information and the results of national covert tests
are classified, and therefore are not included in this testimony.

TSA has also taken steps to strengthen checked baggage screening through
reducing the need to use alternative screening procedures. In addition to
screening with standard procedures using EDS and ETD, which TSA had
determined to provide the most effective detection of explosives, TSA also
allows alternative screening procedures to be used when volumes of baggage
awaiting screening pose security vulnerabilities or when TSA officials
determine that there is a security risk associated with large
concentrations of passengers in an area. These alternative screening
procedures include the use of EDS and ETD machines in nonstandard ways,^46
and also include three procedures that do not use EDS or ETD--screening
with explosives detection canines, physical bag searches, and matching
baggage to passenger manifests to confirm that the passenger and his or
her baggage are on the same plane. TSA's use of alternative screening
procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.^47 However,
the extent of the security trade-offs is not fully known because TSA has
not tested the effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an
operational environment. In our July 2006 report on TSA's use of
alternative screening procedures, we recommended that TSA conduct local
testing of alternative screening procedures to determine whether checked
baggage TSOs can detect simulated improvised explosives when using these
procedures.^48 Since then, TSA has conducted covert testing of alternative
screening procedures at some airports.

45GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build
a Results Oriented Culture, [44]GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January
2003).

46The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive security
information.

TSA is pursuing several mitigating actions to reduce the need to use
alternative screening procedures. These actions include deploying more
efficient checked baggage screening systems, strengthening its
coordination with groups such as tour operators to better plan for
increases in baggage screening needs, deploying "optimization teams" to
airports that were frequently using alternative screening procedures to
determine why the procedures were being used so often and to suggest
remedies, and deploying additional EDS machines. However, although TSA has
taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening procedures at
airports, TSA's oversight of FSDs' use of alternative screening procedures
could be strengthened. For example, in July 2006, we reported that FSDs
and their staff did not always accurately report the occurrences when a
particular alternative baggage screening procedure was used, impeding
TSA's ability to reliably determine how often and for how long the
alternative screening procedures were used. In addition, FSDs and their
staff did not always report the use of alternative screening procedures as
required. TSA officials stated that they were working with FSDs to correct
these reporting problems and had issued guidance clarifying requirements
for reporting alternative screening procedures.

Additionally, while TSA is working to minimize the need to use alternative
screening procedures at airports, TSA has not created performance measures
or targets related to the use of these procedures. By creating a
performance measure for the use of alternative screening procedures as
part of the checked baggage screening index or as a stand-alone measure,
TSA could gauge whether it is making progress towards minimizing the need
to use these procedures at airports and have more complete information on
how well the overall checked baggage screening system is performing.
Furthermore, performance targets for the use of alternative screening
procedures would provide an indicator of how much risk TSA is willing to
accept in using these procedures, and TSA's monitoring of this indicator
would identify when it has exceeded the level of risk that it has
determined acceptable. We recommended that TSA develop performance
measures and performance targets for the use of alternative screening
procedures. Additionally, in September 2006, Congress directed TSA to take
a variety of actions--most of which we recommended in our July 2006
report--to monitor and assess the use of alternative screening procedures,
including (1) develop performance measures and performance targets for the
use of alternative screening procedures; (2) track the use of alternative
screening procedures at airports; (3) assess the effectiveness of these
measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports that use alternative
screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop alternative screening
procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and (6) report to the
Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Homeland
Security by January 23, 2007, on implementation of these requirements.^49
According to TSA officials, the agency is continuing to monitor and track
the use of alternative screening procedures, which has allowed it to
identify areas for improvement nationwide and address local issues to
minimize the need for alternative screening procedures.

47Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosives
detection technologies and their effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage
screening operations is classified or is considered by TSA to be sensitive
security information. Accordingly, the results of our review of this
information have been removed from this testimony.

48GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, [45]GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: Jul.
28, 2006).

49See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 113 (2006) (accompanying H.R. 5441,
enacted into law as the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2007, Pub. L. No.109-295, 120 Stat. 1362 (2006)).

TSA is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of Explosives and Other
Threats, but Faces Management and Funding Challenges in Fielding Technologies to
Airports

TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to
strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and funding
challenges. For example, TSA and DHS's S&T are exploring new passenger
checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of explosives
and other threats. However, limited progress has been made in fielding
explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, in
part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in coordinating research and
development efforts. In addition, TSA has begun to systematically plan for
the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, but resources
have not been made available to fund the installation of in-line EDS
machines on a large-scale basis.

  Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies

To enhance passenger checkpoint screening, TSA is currently working with
DHS S&T's Transportation Security Laboratory to develop new passenger
checkpoint screening technologies.^50 TSA designated about $80.5 million
in fiscal year 2007 to acquire and deploy emerging screening technologies,
and has requested $81.6 million for similar purposes in fiscal year 2008.
Our preliminary work has found that of the various research and
development projects funded by TSA and DHS S&T, six checkpoint screening
projects are currently in the applied research or advanced development
phases.^51 Projects in the applied research phase include liquid bottle
screening devices, explosives trace portals that will reduce the size of
the current explosives trace portals at checkpoints, and shoe scanners.
Three other projects in the advanced development phase include whole body
imagers, cast and prosthesis scanners, and checkpoint explosives detection
systems. TSA plans to place whole body imagers and checkpoint explosives
detection systems at certain airport locations to collect initial
operational data, and plans to continue to conduct similar tests of the
cast and prosthesis scanners during fiscal year 2007. Table 2 provides a
description and status of the passenger checkpoint screening technologies
TSA and DHS S&T are currently researching and developing.

50DHS's S&T is responsible for research and development of checkpoint
technologies related to aviation security, managing the activities
conducted at the Transportation Security Laboratory, and coordinating
these efforts with TSA. TSA's Passenger Screening Program is responsible
for evaluating and deploying systems to detect explosives and weapons
concealed on persons or in carry-on items, while strengthening access
control, improving screener performance, and reducing staffing
requirements.

51Research and development projects generally fall within the following
phases: (1) basic research includes all scientific efforts and
experimentation directed to increase knowledge and understanding in the
fields of science related to long-term national needs; (2) applied
research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems with a
focus on developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed solutions;
(3) advanced development includes efforts directed toward the development
of hardware for field experiments; and (4) operational testing includes
evaluation of technologies in a realistic operating environment to assess
the performance or cost reduction potential of advanced technology.

Table 2: Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies in the
Research and Development Phase, as of January 2007

Technology       Description                  Status                       
Liquid bottle    Screens for liquid           In the applied research      
screening        explosives                   phase. DHS S&T is currently  
devices                                       testing various devices.     
Explosives trace Detects trace amounts of     In the applied research      
portals II       explosives on persons (will  phase.                       
                    reduce the size of the                                    
                    current explosives trace                                  
                    portals at checkpoints)                                   
Shoe scanners    Scans passengers shoes with  In the applied research      
                    explosives detection         phase. Private industry      
                    capability                   developed this device to be  
                                                 used in combination with     
                                                 other technologies to screen 
                                                 registered travelers.        
                                                 Vendors requested that TSA   
                                                 assess this technology for   
                                                 effectiveness.               
Whole body       Provides two-dimensional,    In the advanced development  
imagers          full-body images of all      phase. TSA plans to place    
                    items on a passenger's body, some units at collect        
                    including plastic explosives initial operational data     
                    and concealed metallic,      during operational tests     
                    non-metallic, and ceramic or using the whole body imager  
                    plastic objects              at one U.S. airport in early 
                                                 2007.                        
Cast and         Provides a 2-dimensional     In the advanced development  
prosthesis       image of the area beneath a  phase. TSA placed this       
scanners         cast or inside a prosthetic  equipment at an airport in   
                    device                       September 2006 and collected 
                                                 operational data. TSA is     
                                                 considering deploying this   
                                                 technology in 2007.          
Checkpoint       Creates a three dimensional  In the advanced development  
explosives       image of bags to detect      phase. TSA plans to place    
detection        explosives and other         this equipment at airports   
systems          nonmetallic items            and collect operational data 
                                                 in fiscal year 2007.         

Source: TSA

Despite TSA's efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening
technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that
limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology
at checkpoints. For example, TSA's fiscal year 2007 budget justification
requested $80.5 million in budget authority to acquire and deploy
screening technologies emerging from research and development programs,
including the acquisition of 92 additional explosives trace portal
machines and funds to operate and service approximately 434 portals. TSA
had anticipated that the portals would be in operation throughout the
country during fiscal year 2007. However, due to performance and
maintenance issues, TSA halted the acquisition and deployment of the
portals in June 2006, and the acquisition of additional portals is
contingent on resolution of these issues. As a result, TSA has fielded
less than 25 percent of the 434 portals it projected it would deploy by
fiscal year 2007. In addition to the portals, TSA has fallen behind in its
projected acquisition of other emerging screening technologies. For
example, the acquisition of 91 Whole Body Imagers has been delayed in part
because TSA needed to develop a means to protect the privacy of passengers
screened by this technology. For fiscal year 2008, TSA has requested an
additional $81.6 million to evaluate, acquire, and install emerging
technologies. We will continue to assess DHS S&T and TSA's deployment of
checkpoint screening technologies during our on-going review.

While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research,
development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, our ongoing work
has identified that challenges remain. For example, TSA and DHS S&T
officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating
research and development efforts due to reorganizations of TSA and S&T. A
senior TSA official also stated that while TSA and the DHS S&T have
executed a memorandum of understanding to establish the services that the
Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA, coordination with
S&T remains a challenge because the organizations have not fully
implemented the terms of the memorandum of understanding. In addition to
challenges in coordinating with each other, our preliminary observations
suggest that TSA and DHS S&T also face challenges in coordinating with
external stakeholders. Specifically, while TSA and DHS S&T have taken
steps to coordinate efforts with external stakeholders, some airport
managers we interviewed in October 2006 stated that TSA did not adequately
communicate with them about when new technologies were to be deployed in
their airports. TSA officials stated that they do not have a master
schedule that establishes milestones for conducting operational tests and
evaluations of emerging technologies or for deploying these technologies.
Lack of such a schedule could limit TSA's ability to coordinate
operational tests and deployments with stakeholders.

Additionally, TSA does not yet have a strategic plan to guide its efforts
to acquire and deploy screening technologies. As part of our ongoing work,
we will assess further TSA's efforts to develop an overall strategic
approach to guide the deployment of checkpoint technologies. A lack of a
strategic plan or approach could limit TSA's ability to deploy emerging
technologies at those airport locations deemed at highest risk. TSA
officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing a
strategic plan for the checkpoint that is scheduled to be completed in
early 2007. TSA officials stated that the completion of the plan was
delayed due to competing priorities, including ensuring the screening of
checked baggage using explosives detection systems and responding to new
and emerging threats, such as homemade explosives. TSA officials also said
that reorganizations at TSA and DHS S&T have contributed to the delay.

It is important that TSA continue to invest in and develop technologies
for detecting explosives, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006
terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board multiple commercial
aircraft bound for the United States from the United Kingdom. The
President's fiscal year 2007 budget request notes that emerging checkpoint
technology will enhance the detection of prohibited items, especially
firearms and explosives, on passengers. We are currently evaluating DHS's
and TSA's progress in planning for, managing, and deploying research and
development programs in support of airport checkpoint screening operations
and will report on the results of our work later this year.

  Checked Baggage Screening Technologies

At checked baggage screening stations, TSA has been effective in deploying
EDS machines and ETD machines. However, initial deployment of EDS machines
in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--and ETD machines
resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as compared with
using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor
systems. As we reported in March 2005,^52 to initially deploy EDS and ETD
equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA
implemented interim airport lobby solutions rather than in-line EDS
baggage screening systems.^53 TSA officials stated that they used EDS
machines in stand-alone mode and ETD machines as an interim solution in
order to meet the congressional deadline for screening all checked baggage
for explosives. Officials stated that they employed these interim
solutions because of the significant costs required to install in-line
systems and the need to reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor
systems to accommodate the equipment. TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD
machines has required a greater number of TSOs and resulted in screening
fewer bags for explosives each hour. Additionally, because in-line EDS
checked baggage screening systems can significantly reduce the need for
TSOs to handle baggage, installing them may also reduce the number of TSO
on-the-job injuries. Moreover, screening with in-line EDS systems could
also result in security benefits by reducing congestion in airport lobbies
and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures.^54

52 [46]GAO-05-365 .

53TSA was required to provide for the screening of all checked baggage for
explosives using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2003. See 49
U.S.C. S 44901(d).

In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed to
help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that
screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government
about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that a
savings of approximately $4.7 billion could be realized over a period of
20 years by installing optimal checked baggage screening systems,
including in-line EDS machines, at the airports with the highest checked
baggage volumes. However, TSA also reported in February 2006 that many of
the initial in-line EDS systems had not achieved the degree of anticipated
savings initially estimated. TSA has since determined that recent
improvements to the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS screening
technology now offer the opportunity for higher-performance and lower-cost
screening systems. In June 2006, TSA issued guidance to airports to
provide options, ideas, and suggestions for airports to choose from when
considering security requirements in the planning and design of new or
renovated airport facilities.^55 This guidance also provides
recommendations for airports in constructing in-line systems.

TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked
baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available to
fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale basis. In
March 2005, we reported that while TSA had made progress in deploying EDS
and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis
of the optimal deployment of these machines to achieve long-term savings
and enhanced efficiencies and security. We recommended that TSA
systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports. In February
2006, TSA released its strategic planning framework for checked baggage
screening aimed at increasing security through deploying more EDS
machines, lowering program life-cycle costs, minimizing impacts to TSA and
airport and airline operations, and providing a flexible security
infrastructure. According to TSA, the framework will be used to establish
a comprehensive strategic plan for TSA's checked baggage screening
program. As part of this planning effort, TSA identified, among other
things, the top 25 airports that should first receive federal funding for
projects related to the installation of in-line EDS systems, and the
optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the 250 airports with the
highest checked baggage volumes.^56 DHS's budget execution reports for TSA
for fiscal year 2007 show that TSA received $524.4 million for the
purchase, installation, maintenance, and operations integration of EDS and
ETD machines. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request includes
$692 million for these activities--an increase of $167.6 million over the
previous year's appropriations. Most (about 72 percent) of this increase
is for installation of EDS and ETD machines.^57

54TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and
international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over
current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an average of 0.76
checked bags per passenger were to remain constant through 2010, TSA would
be screening about 96 million more bags than it now screens. This could
increase airports' need to rely on alternative screening procedures in the
future in the absence of additional or more efficient checked baggage
screening systems.

55TSA, Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and
Construction, Revised June 15, 2006.

In February 2006, TSA officials reported that if some of the top 25
airports do not receive in-line checked baggage screening systems, they
will require additional screening equipment to be placed in airport
lobbies and additional TSO staffing in order to remain in compliance with
the mandate for screening all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems. Additionally, in May 2006, TSA reported that under current
investment levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage screening
systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. According to TSA,
as of September 30, 2006, 36 airports had operational in-line systems-- 18
airports had airport-wide systems, while the remaining 18 airports had
systems at a particular terminal or terminals. Over the next 2 years, TSA
expects full and partial in-line systems to become operational at 25
additional airports. This level of effort, according to TSA, balances
resources with other risks to transportation security.

In March 2005, we reported that TSA and airport operators were relying on
several sources of funding to construct in-line checked baggage screening
systems. One source of funding airport operators initially used was the
Federal Aviation Administration's Airport Improvement Program, which
traditionally funds grants to maintain safe and efficient airports. With
Airport Improvement Program funds no longer available after fiscal year
2003 for this purpose, airports turned to other sources of federal funding
to construct in-line systems.^58 The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution approved the use of letter of intent agreements
as a vehicle to leverage federal government and industry funding to
support facility modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage
screening systems.^59 TSA also uses other transaction agreements as an
administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments,
airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects.^60
Under these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator
provides a portion of the funding required for the modification. To fund
the procurement and installation of explosive detection systems in-line,
TSA uses annual appropriations and the $250 million mandatory
appropriation of the Aviation Security Capital Fund.^61 For example, in
fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007, TSA received appropriations of $175
million, $180 million, and $141.4 million, respectively, for the
procurement of explosive detection systems. It received appropriations of
$45 million in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and $138 million in fiscal year
2007 for the installation of explosive detection systems, in addition to
the $250 million made available through the capital fund.^62 Congress also
authorized an additional appropriation of $400 million per year through
fiscal year 2007 for airport security improvement projects, including the
installation of in-line EDS systems. However, appropriations have not been
made under this authorization.^63 Figure 5 shows TSA obligated funding
levels for EDS installation and integration.

56According to TSA, these 250 airports process 99 percent of all checked
baggage transported.

57The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request acknowledges that it
does not take into account amounts from the Aviation Security Capital Fund
because the Fund was only authorized through fiscal year 2007. As such,
although the amount requested for installation reflects an increase of
$121 million from the amount specifically appropriated in fiscal year
2007, it also reflects an overall decrease of $129 million in total
funding from fiscal year 2007 absent the $250 million previously available
from the Fund.

58The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, prohibited the use of Airport
Improvement Program funds for activities related to the installation of
in-line explosive detection systems. See Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3,
283. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, and the Department of
Transportation Appropriations Act, 2006, continued this prohibition. See
Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 3203 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119
Stat. 2396, 2400-01 (2005).

59Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, S 367,
117 Stat. 423-24. The letter of intent agreements entered into between TSA
and the airport authorities, though not a binding commitment of federal
funding, represent TSA's intent to reimburse the airport authority for
costs incurred in executing the security improvement project--in future
years and up to the agreed upon amount--contingent upon the receipt and
availability of sufficient appropriations to fulfill the agreement.

60Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by TSA to
directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification projects
without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions take many
forms and are generally not required to comply with federal laws and
regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements;
and enable the federal government and others entering into these
agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually agreeable.

61The Aviation Security Capital Fund provides TSA with a mandatory
appropriation of $250 million for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007
in support of airport improvement projects related to the installation of
explosive detection systems. See 49 U.S.C. S 44923. A provision of the DHS
Appropriations Act, 2004, precluded the use of passenger security fees to
establish the capital fund in fiscal year 2004, but the capital fund has
been made available to TSA in each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007.
Congress must reauthorize the capital fund for it to continue beyond
fiscal year 2007.

62Of the $250 million available through the Aviation Security Capital
Fund, $125 million is designated as priority funding to fulfill letters of
intent, with the remaining $125 million available for allocation in
accordance with a formula based on the size of the airport and risks to
aviation security. See 49 U.S.C. S 44923(h).

63Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization must follow the same
50 percent split as mandated under the Aviation Security Capital Fund. See
49 U.S.C. S 44923(i).

Figure 5: TSA Obligated Funding Levels for EDS Installation and
Integration

aThis is an estimate as of August 2006.

TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and
financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening
systems. In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage
screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a member,
released a study outlining an investment strategy for funding TSA's
checked baggage screening program.^64 According to TSA, this study, which
has been provided to the Office of Management and Budget for review, is
the final component of TSA's strategic plan for checked baggage screening.
The investment study recommended four investment options, including (1)
tax credit bonds,^65 (2) continued appropriations for the procurement and
installation of EDS machines, (3) combined line items for the purchase and
installation of EDS machines in order to provide TSA increased flexibility
in directing the funding where it is most needed, and (4) enhanced
eligibility for the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC).^66 The working group
estimated that under its recommended approach, the present value cost of
the checked baggage screening program is $23.3 billion over the next 20
years. Of these costs, the aviation industry is projected to bear $3.6
billion and the federal government is projected to bear $19.7 billion.
According to the working group, the net effect of investing in optimal
systems would be to reduce overall life-cycle costs by $1.2 billion
relative to the current rate of investment, primarily through TSO staff
cost savings and avoidance of increased TSO staff costs in the future. In
addition, in its August 2006 study, the working group identified that in
order to achieve these cost savings, a formal cost management process is
needed given evolving technology and design practices, the various parties
involved in design and operation, and the amount of capital investment to
be made over the next several years. The working group identified a
variety of actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation
industry, including implementing a structured process for ongoing
government and industry collaboration and increasing program management
resources to provide for more substantial TSA involvement throughout the
planning, design, and construction process. (App. I includes a complete
list of the specific actions the working group identified for Congress,
TSA, and the aviation industry.)

64Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group Report, Baggage
Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, August 9, 2006.

Federal Action Is Needed to Strengthen Air Cargo Security

In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions
intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but, as we reported,
factors existed that may have limited their effectiveness. Since our
report was released, TSA has issued an air cargo security rule that
revised some of the requirements air carriers are required to follow to
ensure air cargo security, and has drafted new and revised security
programs for domestic and foreign passenger and all-cargo carriers that
contain more specific security requirements. However, more work remains to
ensure that TSA has a comprehensive strategy to secure air cargo that
fully incorporates risk management principles.

65Tax credit bonds are bonds where bondholders receive credit against
their federal income tax liabilities instead of cash interest.

66The Passenger Facility Charge Program allows the collection of PFC fees
up to $4.50 for every enplaned passenger at commercial airports controlled
by public agencies. Airports use these fees to fund FAA-approved projects
that enhance safety, security, or capacity; reduce noise; or increase air
carrier competition.

TSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Risk Management Principles into Its Decision
Making to Secure Domestic Air Cargo, but Most Efforts Are in the Early Stages

TSA has taken steps towards applying a risk-based management approach to
addressing domestic air cargo security, including conducting threat
assessments. However, opportunities exist to strengthen these efforts.
Applying a risk management framework to decision making is one tool to
help provide assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are
properly prioritized and focused. TSA has underscored the importance of
implementing a risk-based approach that protects against known threats,
but that is also sufficiently flexible to direct resources to mitigate new
and emerging threats. According to TSA, the ideal risk model would be one
that could be used throughout the transportation sector and applicable to
different threat scenarios. As part of TSA's risk-based approach, TSA
issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that focused on
securing the domestic air cargo supply chain.^67 TSA coordinated with air
cargo industry stakeholders representing passenger and all-cargo carriers
to develop this plan. TSA officials stated that they are revising their
existing domestic air cargo strategic plan, but as of February 5, 2007,
agency officials had not set a timeframe for when TSA will complete this
revision. TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan describes, among other things, an
approach for screening or reviewing information on all domestic air cargo
shipments to determine their level of relative risk, ensuring that 100
percent of cargo identified as posing an elevated risk is physically
inspected, and pursuing technological solutions to physically inspect air
cargo. TSA officials anticipate that the agency's system for targeting
domestic air cargo, referred to as Freight Assessment, will minimize the
reliance on the random physical inspections currently conducted by air
carriers. According to agency plans, air carriers would receive targeting
information from TSA on specific cargo items identified as posing an
elevated risk. Upon notification by TSA's Freight Assessment System, air
carrier personnel would be responsible for conducting the inspection of
cargo identified as elevated risk. In October 2005, we reported that
although TSA had identified data elements that could be used in its
Freight Assessment System, the agency had not yet ensured that these data
are complete, accurate, and current. We recommended that TSA take steps to
do so; however, as of February 2007, TSA has not yet addressed this
recommendation. Further, while TSA planned to phase in implementation and
deployment of the targeting system for cargo transported on passenger
carriers during calendar years 2006 and 2007, as of February 2007, TSA's
system for targeting domestic cargo is still under development.

67U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan,
November 2003.

In addition to developing a strategic plan, a risk management framework in
the homeland security context should include risk assessments, which
typically involve three key elements--threats, vulnerabilities, and
criticality or consequence. Information from these three assessments
provides input for setting priorities, evaluating alternatives, allocating
resources, and monitoring security initiatives. In September 2005, TSA's
Office of Intelligence (formerly known as the Transportation Security
Intelligence Service) completed an overall threat assessment for air
cargo, which identified general and specific threats to domestic air
cargo.^68 However, we reported that TSA had not conducted a vulnerability
assessment to identify the range of security weaknesses that could be
exploited by terrorists.^69 TSA plans to conduct this assessment of
domestic air cargo vulnerabilities--as we recommended--and expects it to
be completed in late 2007.

TSA Has Implemented Measures Intended to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security,
but More Work Remains

In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions
intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but that factors
existed that may limit the effectiveness of these actions. For example, we
reported that TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper database to
streamline the process by which shippers (individuals and businesses) are
made known to carriers with whom they conduct business.^70 However, at
that time, the information in this database on the universe of shippers
was incomplete, because participation in this database was voluntary.
Moreover, we identified problems with the reliability of the information
in the database. TSA estimated that the agency's centralized database
contained information on about 400,000 known shippers, or less than
one-third of the total population of known shippers, which is estimated to
be about 1.5 million. In May 2006, TSA issued an air cargo security rule
that included a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of
air cargo.^71 For example, TSA made participation in the Known Shipper
database mandatory, requiring air carriers and indirect air carriers to
submit information on their known shippers to TSA's Known Shipper
database. However, the May 2006 security rule did not modify TSA's current
process for validating known shippers, which remains the responsibility of
indirect air carriers and air carriers. Accordingly, passenger, all cargo,
and indirect air carriers will continue to be responsible for determining
the integrity of the shipper, which may allow for potential conflicts of
interest because air carriers who conduct business with shippers will also
continue to have the authority to validate these same shipping customers.

68TSA's Office of Intelligence (formerly know as the Transportation
Security Intelligence Service) does not independently gather intelligence
information but rather produces threat assessments using available
intelligence from sources such as DHS's Directorate of Information
Analysis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The details of TSA's threat assessment are
classified.

69At the departmental level, DHS does not have any efforts under way
specifically aimed at assessing the vulnerabilities of inbound air cargo.
However, agency officials stated that the Office of Infrastructure
Protection, an office within DHS charged with coordinating national
critical infrastructure protection efforts, is coordinating with TSA on
conducting risk assessments associated with U.S. airports.

70A known shipper is an individual or business with an established history
of shipping cargo on passenger carriers.

In October 2005, we also reported that TSA had established requirements
for air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo, but had exempted some
cargo from inspection, potentially creating security weaknesses.^72 We
recommended that TSA examine the rationale for existing air cargo
inspection exemptions, determine whether such exemptions leave the air
cargo system unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack, and make any
needed adjustments to the exemptions. TSA established a working group to
examine the rationale for existing air cargo inspection exemptions, and in
October 2006, issued a security directive and emergency amendment to
domestic and foreign passenger air carriers operating within and from the
United States that limited the inspection exemptions. According to TSA
officials, the agency is still considering revisions to the inspection
exemptions for cargo being transported into the United States.

In October 2005, we also reported that TSA conducted compliance
inspections of air carriers to ensure that they were complying with
existing air cargo security requirements. These compliance inspections
ranged from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all air cargo
security requirements by an air carrier or indirect air carrier to a
review of just one or several security requirements.^73 However, TSA had
not developed measures to assess the adequacy of air carrier compliance
with air cargo security requirements, or assessed the results of its
compliance inspections to target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air
carriers for future reviews. More recently, TSA reported that the agency
has increased the number of inspectors dedicated to conducting air cargo
inspections, and has begun analyzing the results of the compliance
inspections to help focus their inspections on those entities that have
the highest rates of noncompliance. For fiscal year 2008, the President's
budget includes a request of about $56 million for TSA's air cargo
security program, which includes funding for, among other things, 300 air
cargo security inspectors, TSA-certified canines for air cargo related
activities, and the development and deployment of a Freight Assessment
System to target elevated-risk cargo.

7171 Fed. Reg. 30,478 (May 26, 2006).

72GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
Cargo Security, [47]GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005).

In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA is
working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically, TSA,
together with DHS's S&T, is currently developing and pilot testing a
number of technologies to assess their applicability to inspecting and
securing air cargo. These efforts include:

           o an air cargo explosives detection pilot program implemented at
           three airports, testing the use of explosive detection systems,
           explosive trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine teams,
           technologies that can locate a stowaway through detection of a
           heartbeat or increased carbon dioxide levels in cargo, and manual
           inspections of air cargo;^74 
           o an EDS pilot program, which is testing the use of computer-aided
           tomography to measure the densities of objects in order to
           identify potential explosives in air cargo;^75 
           o an air cargo security seals pilot, which is exploring the
           viability of potential security countermeasures, such as
           tamper-evident security seals, for use with certain
           classifications of exempt cargo;
           o the use of hardened unit-loading devices, which are containers
           made of blast-resistant materials that could withstand an
           explosion onboard the aircraft; and
           o the use of pulsed fast neutron analysis, which allows for the
           identification of the material signatures of contraband,
           explosives, and other threat objects.

73TSA compliance inspections are fundamentally different from air
carriers' inspections of air cargo. TSA inspections are designed to ensure
air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, while air
carrier inspections focus on ensuring that air cargo does not contain an
improvised explosive device or human stowaway.

74The Conference Report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub L. No. 109-90, directed $30 million to the
Science and Technology Directorate to conduct three cargo screening pilot
programs testing different concepts of operation. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
109-241, at 53 (2005).

75Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three-dimensional
image of the internal structures of an object from a large series of
two-dimensional X-ray images taken around a single axis of rotation.

According to TSA officials, the agency will determine whether it will
require the use of any of these technologies once it has completed its
assessments and analyzed the results. However, TSA has not established a
timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA officials,
the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges
that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies
to inspect or secure air cargo. These challenges include factors such as
the nature, type, and size of the cargo; environmental and climatic
conditions; inspection throughput rates; staffing and training issues for
individuals who inspect air cargo; the location of air cargo facilities
(centralized versus decentralized); cost and availability; and employee
health and safety concerns. To effectively inspect domestic air cargo that
TSA deems to pose an elevated risk, the agency will need to make decisions
regarding which technologies will be used to inspect such cargo. According
to TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently and
effectively inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of
potential terrorist threats, including explosives and weapons of mass
destruction.

We will soon report on the second phase of our review of air cargo
security, which focuses on DHS's efforts to secure air cargo that is
transported into the United States from abroad, referred to as inbound air
cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have taken to
secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts could be
strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and select
foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance TSA's
efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent to which
TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance their air
cargo security efforts.

Concluding Observations

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for
these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline
passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since
that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger
prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs,
strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more
effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic air
cargo security, among other efforts. TSA has made progress in all of these
areas, but opportunities exist to further strengthen their efforts, in
particular in the areas of risk-based decision making, program planning
and monitoring, and stakeholder collaboration. Our work has shown--in
homeland security and in other areas--that a comprehensive risk management
approach can help inform decision makers in the allocation of finite
resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that risk
management has been a cornerstone of DHS and TSA policy, and that TSA has
implemented risk-based decision making into a number of its efforts.
Despite this commitment, however, TSA will continue to face difficult
decisions and trade-offs--particularly as threats to commercial aviation
evolve--regarding acceptable levels of risk and the need to balance
security with efficiency and customer service. We recognize that doing so
will not be easy. In implementing a risk-based approach, DHS and TSA must
also address the challenges we identified in our work related to program
planning, risk assessments, and implementation and monitoring of aviation
security programs. Without rigorous planning and prioritization, and
knowledge of the effectiveness of aviation security programs, DHS and TSA
cannot be sure that they are focusing their finite resources on the areas
of greatest need. Risk-based decision making will be particularly
important as TSA begins to place more focus on the security of
non-aviation modes of transportation, including passenger rail, and
resource decisions and related trade-offs will have to be made not only
within aviation, but across all transportation modes.

TSA must also continue its work to strengthen partnerships with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and
international partners to improve the security of the commercial aviation
system. Securing all aspects of commercial aviation is shared a
responsibility among these parties. Accordingly, it is important that all
stakeholders be involved, as appropriate, in coordinating security-related
priorities and activities, and reviewing and sharing best practices and
developing common security frameworks. Such efforts are particularly
important with international partners due to our interdependence with
foreign nations in securing the aviation system--as evidenced by the
recent alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard
multiple aircraft departing the United Kingdom for the United States. TSA
has strengthened its coordination efforts with domestic and international
partners, which has aided its security efforts and helped to avoid
duplication of effort. Existing risk-based decision making, program
planning and monitoring, and coordination efforts will need to continue
and be strengthened as TSA works to address continuing challenges and
threats facing commercial aviation.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at this
time.

Contact Information

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this statement.

In addition to the contact named above, Mike Bollinger, Kristy Brown,
Carissa Bryant, Tony Cheesebrough, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett,
Samantha Goodman, John Hansen, Mike Harmond, Dawn Hoff, Suzanne Heimbach,
Adam Hoffman, Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi, Steve Morris, Katrina Moss,
Mona Nichols-Blake, Leslie Sarapu, Brian Sklar, Edith Sohna, Maria
Strudwick, Meg Ullengren, and Candice Wright made contributions to this
testimony.

Appendix I: Key Actions for Congress, TSA, and the Aviation Industry, as
Recommended by the Baggage Screening Investment Study Working Group

In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage screening
investment study working group, of which TSA is a member, released a study
outlining an investment strategy for the funding of TSA's checked baggage
screening program.^1 The working group's investment study identified five
key actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation
industry, respectively, with regard to funding these systems. Table 3
provides a summary of the key actions identified by the working group.

Table 3: Summary of key actions for Congress, TSA, and the aviation
industry, as recommended by the baggage screening investment study working
group

Congress                   TSA                       Aviation industry     
Authorize a voluntary tax  Finalize and publish the  Use upcoming industry 
credit bond program of $3  draft baggage screening   conferences to        
billion for fiscal years   investment study          communicate the key   
2008 through 2011, which   guidelines developed by   findings and          
airports could access to   the baggage screening     recommendations of    
fund the infrastructure    investment study          the baggage screening 
necessary for automated    technical team. Include a investment study.     
EDS baggage screening      detailed explanation of                         
systems.                   the upgraded design                             
                              review and approval                             
                              process in the baggage                          
                              screening investment                            
                              study guidelines. Update                        
                              the baggage screening                           
                              investment study                                
                              guidelines at least                             
                              yearly to reflect ongoing                       
                              lessons learned.                                
Permit use of tax credit   Issue detailed funding    For those airports    
bonds for refunding by     guidance to the aviation  and airlines that     
airports or airlines that  industry explaining the   have already          
have or will self-fund     alternatives available    developed designs for 
their in-line screening    for funding baggage       in-line systems but   
systems through the tax    screening systems and     not yet initiated     
credit bond authorization  communicate the process   construction, prepare 
period (with the airport   and business rules to     refined designs       
facilitating conduit       access facility           consistent with the   
financing on behalf of     modification grants for   baggage screening     
airlines as needed, as tax airports and airlines not investment study      
credit bonds require the   wishing or not able to    guidelines.           
issuer to be a public      use the tax credit bond                         
entity).                   program.                                        
Continue or increase the   Provide Congress with     Create integrated     
existing rate of annual    requested information     local design teams    
appropriations for         regarding an estimated    for individual design 
purchase and installation  deployment timeline on an efforts to facilitate 
of EDS equipment ($435     airport-by-airport basis. stakeholder           
million per year,                                    coordination at the   
escalating annually). TSA                            local level.          
would be responsible for                                                   
prioritizing the use of                                                    
these funds, which could                                                   
include provision of (a)                                                   
equipment to airports that                                                 
use the voluntary tax                                                      
credit bond program, (b)                                                   
grants and equipment to                                                    
airports and airlines that                                                 
do not use the voluntary                                                   
tax credit bond program,                                                   
(c) grants to airports and                                                 
airlines requiring                                                         
reimbursement for                                                          
self-funded optimal                                                        
screening systems that do                                                  
not use the tax credit                                                     
bond program, (d) ongoing                                                  
support for expansion of                                                   
optimal screening systems                                                  
to accommodate future                                                      
traffic growth, and (e)                                                    
life-cycle replacement and                                                 
refurbishment of                                                           
previously installed                                                       
equipment.                                                                 
Eliminate any restrictions Work with DHS and         Develop contracts     
associated with combining  equipment manufacturers   with baggage handling 
purchase and installation  to actively manage the    systems designers,    
funds to provide TSA with  timely development and    suppliers, and other  
increased flexibility to   deployment of new         associated            
manage the impact of the   screening technologies    contractors that      
voluntary tax credit bond  critical to the costs and require compliance    
program.                   performance assumptions   with the baggage      
                              in the baggage screening  screening investment  
                              investment study.         study guidelines and  
                                                        the performance       
                                                        standards specified   
                                                        therein.              
Enhance passenger facility Establish an integrated   Actively participate  
charge program flexibility national deployment team  in the integrated     
to include (a) tax credit  composed of               national deployment   
bond sinking fund payments representatives from TSA, team, including       
and (b) modification or    airport, airline, and key providing dedicated   
construction of            industry trade            representatives to    
exclusive-use outbound     associations to actively  work with TSA during  
baggage systems to         and collaboratively       the initial           
accommodate EDS screening  manage the cost and       deployment of optimal 
systems.                   quality of automated EDS  screening systems to  
                              baggage screening systems all categories X, I,  
                              at a national level.      II, and III airports. 

1Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Working Group Report, Baggage
Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, August 9, 2006.

Source: Aviation Security Advisory Committee

Related GAO Products^1

Airline Passenger Prescreening

Transportation Security Administration's Office of Intelligence: Responses
to Post Hearing Questions on Secure Flight. [49]GAO-06-1051R . Washington
D.C.: August 4, 2006.

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. [50]GAO-06-864T .
Washington D.C.: June 14, 2006.

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect
Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's Secure
Flight Program. [51]GAO-06-374T . Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006.

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully
Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program Testing
in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More Fully
Inform the Public. [52]GAO-05-864R . Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. [53]GAO-05-356 .
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial
Data for the Secure Flight Program. [54]GAO-05-324 . Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 23, 2005.

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System. [55]GAO-04-504T . Washington, D.C.: March
17, 2004.

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces
Significant Implementation Challenges. [56]GAO-04-385 . Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 13, 2004.

1Note: GAO products that are not available to the public because they are
considered Security Sensitive Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive, or
National Security Secret are not included in this list of related
products.

Airline Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening

Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures
Could Be Strengthened. [57]GAO-06-869 . Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.

Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding Uncertainties
Remain. [58]GAO-06-875T . Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening, but Challenges Remain. [59]GAO-06-371T . Washington, D.C.:
April 4, 2006.

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made
Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at
U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. [60]GAO-06-597T . Washington, D.C.:
April 4, 2006.

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. [61]GAO-05-896T . Washington, D.C.:
July 13, 2005.

Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. [62]GAO-05-457 . Washington, D.C.:
May 2, 2005.

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. [63]GAO-05-365 . Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2005.

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger
and Baggage Screening Operations. [64]GAO-04-440T . Washington, D.C.: Feb.
12, 2004.

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and
Challenges Remaining. [65]GAO-03-1173 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003.

Air Cargo

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo
Security. [66]GAO-06-76 . Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's
Enforcement Approach. [67]GAO-03-22 . Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003.

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
Cargo System. [68]GAO-03-344 . Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002.

In-Flight Security

Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better
Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. [69]GAO-06-475 . Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006.

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved
Planning and Controls, [70]GAO-06-203 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005.

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.
[71]GAO-05-781 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005.

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of
Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
[72]GAO-04-242 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003.

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots.
[73]GAO-02-822R . Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.

Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation

Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted
Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. [74]GAO-05-928T .
Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
Success. [75]GAO-05-144 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004.

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. [76]GAO-04-728 .
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
[77]GAO-04-785T . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.

Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter
Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. [78]GAO-04-519 .
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.

Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. [79]GAO-04-499R . Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-based
Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. [80]GAO-04-341R .
Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004.

Other Aviation Security

[81]Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to
Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375 [82]. Washington, D.C.: Jan.
24, 2007.

Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on
the Public. [83]GAO-06-1031 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006.

Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of
Federal Security Directors Is Needed. [84]GAO-05-935 . Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 23, 2005.

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation Security
Efforts. [85]GAO-04-592T . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. [86]GAO-04-285T . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003.

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. [87]GAO-04-232T . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003.

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges
Ahead. [88]GAO-03-1150T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports' Planned Capital Development. [89]GAO-03-497T . Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 25, 2003.

Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
Affected Some Development Projects. [90]GAO-03-27 . Washington, D.C.: Oct.
15, 2002.

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect
Competition. [91]GAO-03-171T . Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002.

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
and Long-Term Challenges. [92]GAO-02-971T . Washington, D.C.: July 25,
2002.

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. [93]GAO-01-1171T . Washington, D.C.: Sept.
25, 2001.

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. [94]GAO-01-1165T . Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 21, 2001.

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. [95]GAO-01-1162T . Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001.

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
Security. [96]GAO-01-1166T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.

(440586)

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

GAO's Mission

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
[email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470

Congressional Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548

Public Affairs

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-448T .

To view the full product, including the scope 
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [104]GAO-07-448T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

February 13, 2007

AVIATION SECURITY

Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions,
but More Work Remains

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in November
2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to secure the
commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA funding
related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal
year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing commercial
aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts TSA has taken or
planned to strengthen aviation security, and the challenges that remain,
in three key areas: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and
checked baggage screening, and air cargo screening. My comments are based
on issued GAO reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations
from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures and
technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers
(TSO).

[105]What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
strengthen aviation security, including recommendations related to
passenger prescreening, passenger and checked baggage screening, and air
cargo security. TSA has generally agreed with our recommendations.

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for
these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional
mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a
tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to,
among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently
allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; strengthening
screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and
efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo
security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas were in response
to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with GAO's recommendation
to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has developed a strategic
planning framework and identified several funding and financing strategies
for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems.

While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation security,
GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based
decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For example,
as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight--TSA's prospective domestic
passenger prescreening program--it will need to employ a range of program
management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control
program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA has put in
place a new management team, but it is too early to know how this change
will affect the program's development. In addition, while TSA has tested
some proposed modifications to passenger screening procedures at airports
to help determine whether to implement the changes, GAO identified that
TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved. GAO also found that
limited progress has been made in developing and deploying technologies
due to planning and funding challenges. For example, limited progress has
been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger
screening checkpoints, and while TSA has begun to systematically plan for
the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and to
identify funding and financing strategies for installing these systems,
the agency has identified that under current investment levels,
installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be
completed until approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government
and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome
to effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as
ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the
delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is
needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo,
including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments
of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA stated that the
agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo
operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and plans to complete
this assessment in 2007.

References

Visible links
  33. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-374T
  34. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-356
  35. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-356
  36. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-356
  37. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-864R
  38. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-356
  39. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-374T
  40. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-356
  41. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-440T
  42. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1173
  43. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-457
  44. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-190
  45. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-869
  46. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-365
  47. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-76
  49. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1051R
  50. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-864T
  51. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-374T
  52. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-864R
  53. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-356
  54. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-324
  55. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-504T
  56. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-385
  57. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-869
  58. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-875T
  59. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-371T
  60. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-597T
  61. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-896T
  62. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-457
  63. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-365
  64. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-440T
  65. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1173
  66. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-76
  67. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-22
  68. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-344
  69. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-475
  70. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-203
  71. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-781
  72. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-242
  73. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-822R
  74. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-928T
  75. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-144
  76. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-728
  77. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-785T
  78. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-519
  79. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-499R
  80. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-341R
  81. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1031
  82. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-375
  83. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1031
  84. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-935
  85. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-592T
  86. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-285T
  87. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-232T
  88. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1150T
  89. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-497T
  90. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-27
  91. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-171T
  92. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-971T
  93. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-1171T
  94. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-1165T
  95. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-1162T
  96. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-1166T
 104. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-448T
*** End of document. ***