    Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide
    Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains (13-FEB-07,
    GAO-07-448T).

    The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in
    November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of
    programs to secure the commercial aviation system. To implement
    these efforts, TSA funding related to aviation security has
    totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. Other
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as the
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and
    Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing
    commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts
    TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the
    challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger
    prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening,
    and air cargo screening. GAO's comments are based on issued GAO
    reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations from
    ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures
    and technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation
    Security Officers (TSO).
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-448T
        ACCNO:   A65869
      TITLE:     Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning
    to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains
         DATE:   02/13/2007
      SUBJECT:   Air transportation
    	     Airport security
    	     Aviation security
    	     Cargo security
    	     Carry-on baggage screening
    	     Checked baggage screening
    	     Commercial aviation
    	     Homeland security
    	     Inspection
    	     Passenger screening
    	     Passengers
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Risk assessment
    	     Standards
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Policies and procedures

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    GAO-07-448T

         * [1]Summary
         * [2]Background

              * [3]Airline Passenger Prescreening
              * [4]Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
              * [5]Air Cargo Security
              * [6]Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2007 Aviation Security Funding and

         * [7]TSA and CBP Are Working to Strengthen Domestic and Internati

              * [8]TSA Has Reported Addressing Challenges That Have Hindered Se
              * [9]DHS Intends to Align Domestic and International Prescreening

         * [10]TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screeni

              * [11]TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Management and P
              * [12]TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger and Checked Bagg
              * [13]TSA is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of Ex

                   * [14]Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies
                   * [15]Checked Baggage Screening Technologies

         * [16]Federal Action Is Needed to Strengthen Air Cargo Security

              * [17]TSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Risk Management Principle
              * [18]TSA Has Implemented Measures Intended to Strengthen Domestic

         * [19]Concluding Observations
         * [20]Contact Information
         * [21]Airline Passenger Prescreening
         * [22]Airline Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening
         * [23]Air Cargo
         * [24]In-Flight Security
         * [25]Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation
         * [26]Other Aviation Security
         * [27]GAO's Mission
         * [28]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [29]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [30]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [31]Congressional Relations
         * [32]Public Affairs

    Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
    Appropriations, House of Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

    Tuesday, February 13, 2007

    AVIATION SECURITY

    Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions,
    but More Work Remains

    Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director Homeland Security and Justice
    Issues

    GAO-07-448T

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

    I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
    the security of our nation's aviation system. The Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 with the mission to protect
    the transportation network while also ensuring the free movement of people
    and commerce. Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its efforts on
    aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs
    and procedures to secure commercial aviation. To implement these efforts,
    TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since
    fiscal year 2004. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also plays
    a role in securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has
    responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening--or the matching of
    passenger information against terrorist watch lists--for international
    flights operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting
    inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.^1 In addition,
    the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology
    Directorate (S&T) is responsible for the research and development of
    aviation security technologies. In carrying out its broader homeland
    security responsibilities, DHS faces the daunting challenge of determining
    how to allocate its finite resources within the aviation system and across
    all sectors to address threats and strengthen security.

    My testimony today focuses on three key areas of the aviation security
    system: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked
    baggage screening, and air cargo security. In particular, I will address
    the numerous efforts TSA has taken or has planned to strengthen aviation
    security in these three key areas, and the challenges that remain.

    My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the
    security of the U.S. commercial aviation system; and our preliminary
    observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening
    procedures and technologies, air carriers' domestic passenger prescreening
    systems, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers
    (TSO). We plan to report on the results of this work later this year. We
    conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards. A list of our related reports on aviation security is
    included at the end of this testimony.

    ^1TSA also requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize the No
    Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers prior to conducting
    operations to, from, or within the United States, in accordance with TSA
    security directives.

    Summary

    DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
    security of the nation's aviation system. Meeting the congressional
    mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage
    alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA hired and deployed a
    federal workforce of over 40,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners,
    and installed equipment at most of the nation's more than 400 commercial
    airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using
    explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. TSA has since turned
    its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger
    prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the
    TSO--formerly known as screener--workforce; strengthening screening
    procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient
    screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. More
    specifically, based on our past work and preliminary observations from our
    ongoing work, DHS and TSA have:

               o Taken numerous steps to strengthen the management and
               performance of the TSO workforce by, for example, developing and
               implementing a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing
               levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions;
               implementing a variety of human capital initiatives to help
               recruit, hire, and retain TSOs (both full-time and part-time); and
               providing TSOs with additional training intended to enhance the
               detection of threat objects, particularly improvised explosive
               devices.

               o Proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint
               screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability)
               information, and pursued several mitigating actions to reduce the
               need to use alternative screening procedures for screening checked
               baggage that have involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.

               o Explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to
               enhance the detection of explosives and other threats; and
               developed a strategic planning framework and identified several
               funding and financing strategies, in collaboration with key
               stakeholders, for installing optimal checked baggage screening
               systems.

               o Implemented measures to strengthen air cargo security, such as
               conducting threat assessments that identified general and specific
               threats related to domestic air cargo; enhancing requirements for
               air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo; conducting compliance
               inspections of air carriers to ensure that they are complying with
               existing air cargo security requirements; and working with DHS's
               Science and Technology Directorate to enhance air cargo screening
               technologies.

    While these efforts should be commended, we also found that DHS and TSA
    could strengthen their risk-based decision making efforts, including
    planning and program evaluations, and collaboration with stakeholders. For
    example, for over 4 years, TSA has been unable to develop Secure Flight--a
    government-operated domestic passenger prescreening system--to the point
    of implementation on the schedule it had established for the program due,
    in part, to not employing a range of management disciplines to effectively
    manage program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. While TSA
    officials stated that they will be able to manage these risks--based on
    putting in place a new management team; rebaselining the program's goals,
    capabilities, costs, and schedule; and establishing more structured and
    controlled processes to guide future development--it is too early to know
    how these changes will affect the program's development. Further, TSA and
    CBP, although now coordinating efforts, have not yet aligned their
    respective domestic and international passenger prescreening programs to
    minimize duplication and provide a single, integrated interface to the
    aviation industry, and key decisions about how the international and
    domestic prescreening programs will be integrated have not yet been
    finalized.

    In addition, our ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying passenger
    checkpoint screening procedures identified that TSA's efforts to evaluate
    the effectiveness of proposed changes to passenger screening procedures
    could be improved. For example, while in some cases TSA has tested
    proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures at
    selected airports to help determine whether the changes would achieve
    their intended purposes, our preliminary observations indicate that TSA's
    data collection and analyses could be strengthened. In addition, with
    respect to air cargo, while TSA conducted a variety of compliance
    inspections to determine whether air carriers or indirect air carriers^2
    were complying with TSA security requirements, and had begun to analyze
    the results of these inspections, it had not developed measures to assess
    the adequacy of air carrier compliance with air cargo security
    requirements, or systematically assessed the results of its compliance
    inspections to target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air carriers
    for future reviews.

    ^2Indirect air carriers are entities that consolidate air cargo from
    multiple shippers and deliver it to air carriers to be transported.

    We also found that limited progress has been made in developing and
    deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For
    example, our preliminary work has identified that limited progress has
    been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger
    screening checkpoints in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in
    coordinating research and development efforts, and TSA does not yet have a
    strategic plan in place to assist in guiding its efforts to acquire and
    deploy screening technologies. The lack of such a plan could limit TSA's
    ability to deploy emerging technologies at those airport locations deemed
    at higher risk. In addition, while TSA has begun to systematically plan
    for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems--as we
    recommended in March 2005--and to identify funding and financing
    strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems, TSA
    has identified that under current investment levels, installation of
    optimal checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until
    approximately 2024. Moreover, although TSA is working to enhance air cargo
    screening technologies, the federal government and the air cargo industry
    face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement
    technologies to inspect air cargo. These challenges include ensuring that
    air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery time
    frames of air carriers, and that individuals who inspect cargo are
    properly trained to operate the inspection technology. Another challenge
    is the funding of inspection technologies, which can range in the millions
    of dollars. We also reported that additional work is needed to fully
    implement a risk-based management approach to securing air cargo. We
    recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule for finalizing
    assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets that need to
    be protected. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a
    vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, and
    plans to complete this assessment in 2007.

    Background

    With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in
    November 2001, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation security from
    the Federal Aviation Administration and for passenger and checked baggage
    screening from air carriers.^3 As part of this responsibility, TSA
    oversees security operations at the nation's more than 400 commercial
    airports, including establishing requirements for passenger and checked
    baggage screening, and ensuring the security of air cargo transported to,
    from, and within the United States.^4 While TSA has operational
    responsibility for conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, TSA
    has regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for air carriers who conduct
    air cargo screening. While TSA took over responsibility for passenger
    checkpoint and baggage screening, as directed by ATSA, air carriers have
    continued to conduct passenger prescreening, which includes the process of
    checking passenger information against federal watch list data before
    flights depart. In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
    Prevention Act of 2004, TSA is developing a program to take over this
    responsibility from air carriers for passengers on domestic flights, and
    CBP has issued a proposed rule that would enable it to perform its
    identity-matching function for passengers on international flights
    traveling to or from the United States prior to flight departure.^5

    Airline Passenger Prescreening

    The prescreening of airline passengers--the process of identifying
    passengers who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft--is
    one of many important layers of security that is intended to help
    officials focus security efforts on those passengers representing the
    greatest potential threat to civil aviation. Within DHS, TSA is
    responsible for ensuring that passenger prescreening is conducted before
    domestic flights--flights operating entirely within the United
    States--take off, while CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger
    prescreening for international flights operating to or from the United
    States.^6

    3See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    ^4Other federal entities involved in securing or safeguarding air cargo
    include the Department of Homeland Security-U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection, the United States Postal Service, the Department of Commerce,
    the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Treasury.

    ^5See Pub. L. No. 108-458, S 4012(a)(1)-(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19
    (codified at 49 U.S.C. SS 44903(j)(2)(C), 44909(a)(6)).

    ^6Currently, TSA requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize
    the No Fly and Selectee lists to prescreen passengers prior to conducting
    operations to, from, or within the United States, in accordance with TSA
    security directives.

    TSA is developing a program, in accordance with ATSA and the Intelligence
    Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, through which TSA would
    assume the watch list matching function currently conducted by air
    carriers prior to domestic flight departures.^7 TSA has named this
    prospective prescreening program Secure Flight.^8 In accordance with
    security directives issued by TSA, air carriers--and not the U.S.
    government--currently match passenger-supplied reservation information
    (referred to as passenger name record (PNR) data), against the No Fly and
    Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers before domestic flights depart.
    According to TSA, the No Fly List includes the names of individuals
    considered to be known or suspected threats to civil aviation and are
    therefore precluded from boarding an aircraft traveling to, from, or
    within the United States, while the Selectee List includes the names of
    individuals who require additional security screening--which includes
    physical inspection of the person and a hand search of their
    luggage--prior to being permitted to board an aircraft. These lists are
    extracted from the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) consolidated
    terrorist screening database (TSDB) and are exported to the air carriers
    through TSA. The current domestic prescreening process also requires that
    air carriers operate the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
    (CAPPS), which identifies passengers for additional screening based on
    certain behavioral characteristics.^9

    The existing identity-matching component of DHS's international aviation
    passenger prescreening process involves separate matching activities
    conducted by air carriers (prior to a flight's departure and pursuant to
    TSA requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight's departure).^10 As
    with domestic passenger prescreening, air carriers conduct an initial
    match of self-reported PNR data against the No Fly and Selectee Lists
    before international flight departures. CBP's process, in effect,
    supplements the air carrier identity matching for international flights by
    comparing additional passenger information collected from passports (this
    information becomes part of Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS)
    data), against the No Fly and Selectee Lists and other government
    databases.^11 Under current federal regulations for CBP's prescreening of
    passengers on international flights, air carriers are required to provide
    the U.S. government with PNR data as well as APIS data to allow the
    government to conduct, among other things, identity matching procedures
    against the No Fly and Selectee Lists--which typically occur just after or
    at times just before the departure of international flights traveling to
    or from the United States, respectively.^12 To address a concern that the
    federal government's identity matching may not be conducted in a timely
    manner, in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue a proposed rule
    requiring that the U.S. government's identity-matching process occur
    before the departure of international flights. CBP published this proposed
    rule in July 2006,^13 and, if implemented, it will allow the U.S.
    government to conduct passenger prescreening in advance of flight
    departure, and will eliminate the need for air carriers to continue
    performing an identity-matching function for international flights.

    ^7GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
    Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's
    Secure Flight Program, [33]GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006).
    GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,
    but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, [34]GAO-05-356
    (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005).

    ^8Following the events of September 11, and in accordance with ATSA, TSA
    began an effort in March 2003 to develop a new computer-assisted passenger
    prescreening system known as CAPPS II. See 49 U.S.C. S 44903(j)(2)(A).
    Because of a variety of delays and challenges, in August 2004, DHS
    cancelled the development of CAPPS II. In its place, TSA announced that it
    would develop a new prescreening program called Secure Flight.

    ^9Although the air carriers currently conduct the watch list matching and
    CAPPS prescreening functions, these processes are required and overseen by
    TSA.

    ^10In addition to name matching prescreening activities, CBP also
    prescreens travelers by evaluating the authenticity and completeness of
    passengers' passports and other travel documents as part of its travel
    document review procedures. CBP also attempts to identify high-risk
    travelers on international flights through its Automated Targeting
    System--Passenger (ATS-P). Under this risk assessment program, CBP
    conducts a risk-targeting process by evaluating passenger information (for
    both passengers departing from and for the United States) against risk
    assessment rules and algorithms within the ATS-P. The ATS-P compares
    passenger information against data from numerous national intelligence and
    law enforcement databases to identify those travelers who are likely to
    present a higher risk, so that CBP can interdict and further screen these
    travelers.

    ^11As passengers are not required to present a passport to board domestic
    flights, the name matching process for domestic flights primarily uses
    only PNR data, not APIS data.

    ^12See 19 C.F.R. SS 122.49a, 122.75a (establishing the electronic manifest
    transmission requirements for passengers onboard commercial aircraft
    arriving in or departing from the United States).

    ^1371 Fed. Reg. 40,035 (July 14, 2006). A notice of proposed rulemaking
    provides notice to interested or affected parties of an agency's
    anticipated regulatory action and an opportunity for such parties to
    comment on this action before implementation.

    Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening

    One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from
    the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening
    operations to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs).
    Prior to ATSA, passenger and checked baggage screening had been performed
    by private screening companies under contract to airlines. ATSA required
    TSA to create a federal workforce to assume the job of conducting
    passenger and checked baggage screening at commercial airports. The
    federal screener workforce was put into place, as required, by November
    2002.^14

    Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA
    inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any
    unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item
    onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.^15 Passenger screening
    personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated
    screening locations.^16 As shown in figure 1, the four passenger screening
    functions are:

               o X-ray screening of property,
               o walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,
               o hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and
               o physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.

    Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their
    carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector.
    Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm the
    walk-through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees--that is,
    passengers selected by the CAPPS or other TSA-approved processes to
    designate passengers for additional screening--are screened by hand-wand
    or pat-down and have their carry-on items screened for explosives traces
    or physically searched.^17

    14TSA also allows airports to apply to opt-out of federal screening and to
    use private screeners under contract with TSA. See 49 U.S.C. S 44920. Six
    airports currently have screening operations conducted by private
    screening contractors under TSA's Screening Partnership Program.

    ^15Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are
    provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is controlled
    by TSOs (or by non-federal screeners at airports participating in the
    Screener Partnership Program) at checkpoints where they conduct physical
    screening of individuals and their carry-on baggage for weapons and
    explosives.

    ^16TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any individual
    or property that has not been screened or inspected in accordance with
    passenger screening standard operating procedures. If an individual
    refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must not be allowed
    into the sterile area or onboard an aircraft.

    Figure 1: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation

    Note: Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and
    residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing swabs
    along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs determine to be
    suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then chemically
    analyzes the swabs to identify any traces of explosive materials.

    aBDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior in
    individuals approaching the checkpoint. Should the BDO observe such
    behavior, he or she may refer the individual for additional screening or
    to a law enforcement officer.

    ^17At some airports, some passengers may also be screened by walking
    through an explosives trace portal--a machine that detects trace amounts
    of explosives on persons.

    bThe hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified or
    randomly selected for additional screening because he or she met certain
    criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal detector.

    cManual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the passenger is
    identified or randomly selected for additional screening or if the TSO
    identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray.

    Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security
    screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent
    the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon onboard
    an aircraft. As shown in figure 2, checked baggage screening is
    accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems^18 or
    explosive trace detection systems,^19 and through the use of alternative
    means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag
    match,^20 when the explosive detection or explosive trace detection
    systems are unavailable.

    ^18Explosive detection systems use computer-aided tomography X-rays to
    examine objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures
    of threat explosives. This equipment operates in an automated mode.

    ^19Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
    explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
    which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
    materials.

    ^20Positive passenger bag match requires that passengers be on the same
    aircraft as their checked baggage. According to TSA officials, this
    procedure is rarely used.

    Figure 2: Checked Baggage Screening Operation

    The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of three
    elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the screening of
    airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked baggage, the
    technology used during the screening process, and the procedures TSOs are
    to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these elements help to
    determine the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger and checked
    baggage screening.

    Air Cargo Security

    TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other things,
    establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic and foreign
    passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign
    all-cargo carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect air
    carriers. TSA is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of air
    cargo security requirements by air carriers and indirect air carriers
    through compliance inspections, while air carriers are required to inspect
    air cargo for weapons, explosives, or stowaways.

    Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing
    TSA security requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved security
    program that describes the security policies, procedures, and systems air
    carriers are required to implement.^21 These requirements include measures
    related to the acceptance, handling, and inspection of cargo; training of
    employees in security and cargo inspection procedures; testing employee
    proficiency in cargo inspection; and access to cargo areas and aircraft.
    If threat information or events indicate that additional security measures
    are needed to secure the aviation sector, TSA may issue revised or new
    security requirements in the form of security directives or emergency
    amendments applicable to domestic or foreign air carriers. The air
    carriers must implement the requirements set forth in the security
    directives or emergency amendments in addition to those requirements
    already imposed and enforced by TSA.

    Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type from
    perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic
    equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry goods,
    fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish, and human
    remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including large containers
    known as unit loading devices that allow many packages to be consolidated
    into one container that can be loaded on an aircraft, wooden crates,
    assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as break
    bulk cargo.

    Participants in the international air cargo shipping process include
    shippers, such as individuals and manufacturers; freight forwarders or
    regulated agents, who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
    carriers; air cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto
    aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and passenger and all-cargo carriers
    that store, load, and transport air cargo.^22 International air cargo may
    have been transported via ship, train, or truck prior to its loading
    onboard an aircraft. Figure 3 identifies cargo being loaded onto an
    aircraft for transport.

    ^21As of January 2007, TSA security programs include (1) Aircraft
    Operators Standard Security Program, which applies to domestic passenger
    air carriers; (2) Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program, which
    applies to domestic indirect air carriers; (3) Domestic Security
    Integration Program, a voluntary program that applies to domestic
    all-cargo carriers; (4) the Twelve-Five Program, which applies to certain
    operators of aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds in scheduled or
    charter service that carry passengers, cargo, or both; (5) Model Security
    Program, which applies to foreign passenger air carriers; and (6)
    All-Cargo International Security Procedures, which applies to each foreign
    air carrier engaged in the transportation of cargo to, from, within, or
    overflying the United States in all-cargo aircraft with a maximum
    certified takeoff weight of more than 12,500 pounds. TSA drafted new
    security programs for foreign and domestic all-cargo carriers with
    operations to, from, and within the United States. TSA expects to finalize
    these programs in early 2007.

    Figure 3: Air Cargo Being Loaded Onto an Aircraft

    ^22The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a regulated agent
    as an agent, freight forwarder, or any other entity that conducts business
    with an aircraft operator and provides security controls that are accepted
    or required by the appropriate government authority with respect to cargo
    or mail.

    Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2007 Aviation Security Funding and Fiscal Year 2008
    Budget Request for Aviation Security

    According to DHS's budget execution reports,^23 TSA's appropriations for
    aviation security have totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004.
    ^24 In fiscal year 2004--the first year for which data was available--TSA
    received about $3.9 billion for aviation security programs. In fiscal year
    2007, TSA received about $5.7 billion. The President's budget request for
    fiscal year 2008 includes about $5.7 billion to continue TSA's aviation
    security efforts. This total includes about $5.0 billion specifically
    designated for aviation security and about $0.79 billion for
    aviation-security related programs. Figure 4 identifies reported aviation
    security funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2007.

    ^23DHS's budget execution reports are monthly statements that reflect the
    Department's financial activity.

    ^24In our analysis of DHS's budget execution reports and the President's
    fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA, we included funding specifically
    designated for aviation security and funding for other programs, projects,
    and activities related to aviation security, to the extent they were
    identifiable. In addition, these aviation security totals do not reflect
    funding for activities that may support TSA's aviation security programs
    and projects, such as intelligence and administration, because TSA's
    documentation does not identify the proportion of funding dedicated to
    support aviation security. Also, during this time period, a number of
    aviation security related activities were transferred in or out of TSA's
    jurisdiction, which impact TSA funding levels for the affected fiscal
    years.

    Figure 4: DHS's Reported Aviation Security Funding For TSA For Fiscal
    Years 2004 through 2007

    Note:  Figures for fiscal years 2004 to 2007 are those reported by DHS in
    monthly budget execution reports for TSA. We used the September 30th
    budget execution reports for our analysis of TSA funding for fiscal years
    2004 through 2006. For fiscal year 2007, we used the October 31^st report.
    According to the reports, figures presented include all rescissions and
    supplemental funding for the fiscal years.

    aFiscal years 2004 and 2005 include approximately $330 million in research
    and development funding for aviation security. For fiscal years 2006 and
    2007, research and development funding was consolidated within the DHS
    S&T; therefore, this funding, as reflected in TSA's budget documentation,
    is not included as part of TSA's appropriations for these two fiscal
    years.

    bFiscal years 2006 and 2007 include approximately $680 million and $710
    million, respectively, in funding for Federal Air Marshals, which was
    transferred back to TSA from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in
    October 2005. Federal Air Marshals funding is included within totals for
    related aviation security PPAs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.

    cFunding for aviation security-related programs, projects, and activities,
    as reported by TSA, which were not included in budget documentation
    subtotals for aviation security funding.

    Of the approximately $5.7 billion requested for aviation security in the
    President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, almost $4.4 billion, or about
    77 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage screening. This includes
    approximately $4 billion to support passenger and checked baggage
    screening operations, such as TSO salaries and training, and $176 million
    for the procurement and $259 million for the installation of checked
    baggage explosive detection systems. Additional information on the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to airline
    passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening,
    and air cargo security is provided later in this statement.

    TSA and CBP Are Working to Strengthen Domestic and International Passenger
    Prescreening, but Management and Technical Challenges Remain

    TSA and CBP have separate efforts under way to strengthen domestic and
    international passenger prescreening, respectively. However, these
    programs are in development and face management and technical challenges.
    Further, while TSA and CBP have been developing their respective
    identity-matching programs separately, the two agencies are now taking
    steps to align their prescreening programs to minimize duplication and
    provide a single set of requirements for air carrier participation.
    However, key policy and technical decisions have not yet been made to
    clarify how these two programs will be aligned.

    TSA Has Reported Addressing Challenges That Have Hindered Secure Flight's
    Implementation, but It Is Not Yet Known Whether These Efforts Will Address Past
    Problems

    For over 4 years, TSA has faced significant challenges in developing and
    implementing its advanced passenger prescreening program, now known as
    Secure Flight, and has not yet taken the identity-matching function over
    from air carriers as mandated by Congress. According to TSA, the Secure
    Flight program--which is to perform the functions associated with
    determining whether passengers on domestic flights are on the No Fly and
    Selectee Lists--is intended to (1) decrease the chance of compromising
    watch list data by centralizing its use within the federal government; (2)
    provide earlier identification of potential threats, allowing for the
    expedited notification of law enforcement and other organizations
    responsible for threat management; (3) provide a fair, equitable, and
    consistent matching process across all air carriers; and (4) offer
    consistent application of an expedited and integrated redress process for
    passengers misidentified as a threat. However, during the past 3 years, we
    reported on multiple occasions that the Secure Flight program (and its
    predecessor, CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or finalized its goals,
    objectives, and requirements. Further, in February 2006, we reported that,
    taken as a whole, the development of Secure Flight had not been
    effectively managed and the program was at risk of failure. We found that
    TSA had not conducted critical activities in accordance with best
    practices for large-scale information technology programs, and had not
    followed its own systems development life cycle guidance in managing the
    program's development. Former program officials stated that TSA had
    instead used a rapid development method that was intended to enable it to
    develop the program more quickly. However, as a result of this approach,
    the development process had been ad hoc, with project activities conducted
    out of sequence. For example, program officials declared the design phase
    complete before requirements needed to guide the design of Secure Flight
    had been detailed. In addition, TSA had not maintained up-to-date program
    schedules or developed cost estimates for the program. In March 2005, we
    recommended that TSA take numerous steps to strengthen the program's
    development, such as finalizing system requirements and developing
    detailed test plans to help ensure that all Secure Flight system
    functionality is properly tested and evaluated. We also recommended that
    TSA develop a plan for establishing connectivity among the air carriers
    and other stakeholders to help ensure the secure, effective, and timely
    transmission of data for use in Secure Flight operations.^25

    In early 2006, acknowledging the challenges it faced with the program, TSA
    suspended the development of Secure Flight and initiated a reassessment,
    or rebaselining, of the program, to be completed before moving forward. In
    January 2007, TSA announced that it had completed its rebaselining
    efforts, which included reassessing program goals and capabilities, and
    developing a new schedule and cost estimates--actions that we recommended
    in March 2005.^26 The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA
    stated that TSA had made significant progress in upgrading the design and
    development of the Secure Flight program, and that program documentation
    had been revised to reflect TSA's plans for reliably delivering Secure
    Flight capabilities. In December 2006, the DHS Investment Review Board--a
    group of DHS senior executives charged with reviewing certain programs at
    key phases of development to help ensure they meet mission needs at
    expected levels of costs and risks--completed its review of Secure Flight
    and approved the program to proceed into capability development and
    demonstration phases. According to the Investment Review Board, this
    approval was based on rescoping Secure Flight using a new business model
    better focused on mission; putting a new team in place with appropriate
    technical and management skills; and improving its management approach to
    privacy, security, and quality assurance. However, the board also noted
    that this important screening capability was needed sooner than its
    planned mid-2009 implementation time frame, and requested that TSA
    determine the feasibility of accelerating the program schedule to deliver
    initial capability by mid-2008. As we have reported, earlier attempts to
    accelerate the Secure Flight program have led to developmental problems
    and program delays. Accordingly, as TSA moves forward, it will need to
    employ a range of program management disciplines, which we previously
    found missing, to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy
    risks. As part of our ongoing work assessing the Secure Flight program, we
    will be reviewing DHS's and TSA's efforts to develop and implement the
    program, including progress made during its rebaselining efforts.^27

    25 [35]GAO-05-356 .

    ^26 [36]GAO-05-356 .

    Regarding TSA's communications with air carriers about Secure Flight
    system requirements, we reported in March 2005 that air carriers had
    expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty of Secure Flight system and
    data requirements, and the impact that these requirements may have on the
    airline industry and traveling public. Further, based on preliminary
    results for our ongoing work, officials from 9 of the 15 air carriers we
    interviewed from February 2006 to January 2007, ^28 reported that they
    were enhancing their respective identity-matching systems or planned to do
    so. While these efforts may improve the accuracy of each air carrier's
    individual identity-matching system, the improvements will only apply to
    their respective systems and could further exacerbate differences that
    currently exist among the air carriers' various identity-matching systems.
    These differences may result in varying levels of effectiveness in the
    matching of passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee Lists,
    which was a key factor that led to the government's effort to take over
    the identity-matching function through Secure Flight. Also, officials from
    7 of 15 air carriers stated that TSA had not communicated with them about
    Secure Flight requirements within the past 6 months while the program was
    being rebaselined. TSA officials stated that in October 2006 they had
    resumed discussions with air carriers regarding Secure Flight
    requirements, and as of January 2007, had discussed plans for Secure
    Flight with officials from 8 air carriers and the Air Transport
    Association. TSA officials stated that they also plan to take into account
    current air carrier capabilities and programs as they proceed with Secure
    Flight development, and to update guidance previously provided to air
    carriers to reflect the current concept of operations for the rebaselined
    Secure Flight program.

    ^27The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, mandates
    that GAO review and confirm, upon the department's certification, that the
    Secure Flight Program meets the 10 conditions listed in section 522(a) of
    Public Law 108-334. See Pub. L. No. 109-295, S 514, 120 Stat 1355, 1379
    (2006). See also Pub. L. No. 108-334, S 522, 118 Stat. 1298, 1319-20
    (2004). We are also conducting our ongoing review in response to requests
    from the United States Senate: the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
    Transportation, and its Subcommittee on Aviation; Committee on
    Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security; Committee on Homeland
    Security and Governmental Affairs; Committee on Judiciary; also the House
    of Representatives: Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
    Committee on Homeland Security; and the Chairman of the Committee on
    Government Reform.

    ^28We have ongoing work that includes collecting information about the
    identity-matching systems currently used by air carriers to match
    information for passengers on domestic flights against information on the
    No Fly and Selectee Lists derived from the TSDB. Air carriers will
    continue to conduct this name matching until Secure Flight becomes fully
    operational. Our interviews with officials from the 15 air carriers is
    part of this ongoing review of the air carriers' domestic identity
    matching efforts. In that we did not use probability sampling methods to
    select these 15 air carriers, information provided by officials from these
    air carriers cannot be generalized to other air carriers.

    In February 2006, we also reported that TSA was in the early stages of
    coordinating with TSC and CBP on broader issues of integration and
    interoperability related to other people-screening programs used by the
    government to combat terrorism. However, TSA needed to provide these
    stakeholders with detailed information about its concept of operations for
    Secure Flight to enable them to plan for and provide the support necessary
    for the program. For example, a TSC official stated that without specific
    information on Secure Flight requirements, TSC could not make decisions
    about needed resources, such as personnel needed to operate its call
    center that would be used to help resolve potential matches against the No
    Fly and Selectee Lists. In January 2007, TSC officials stated that while
    they had been participating in meetings with Secure Flight officials, they
    had not yet received the specific operational and technical information
    needed to plan for supporting Secure Flight operations. During Secure
    Flight rebaselining efforts, TSA officials also stated that they were
    coordinating with CBP to more closely align their respective
    identity-matching programs. However, this collaboration is ongoing and key
    policy and technical decisions regarding how the programs will be
    coordinated have not been announced. We discuss TSA and CBP's coordination
    of their domestic and international prescreening programs later in this
    statement.

    We have also previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements
    development process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of the
    envisioned system or the full actions it planned to take to mitigate them.
    Specifically, because TSA had not made final determinations about its
    requirements for passenger data, and Secure Flight's system development
    documentation did not fully address how passenger privacy protections were
    to be met, it was not possible to assess potential system impacts on
    individual privacy protections at that time. We have also previously
    reported that TSA violated provisions of the Privacy Act^29 by not fully
    disclosing its use of personal information during systems testing.^30 In
    March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will protect
    personal privacy.^31 TSA officials stated that they are aware of, and plan
    to address, the potential for Secure Flight to adversely affect passenger
    privacy protections, and the need to provide a redress process whereby
    aviation passengers adversely affected by the identity matching process
    may express their concerns, seek correction of any inaccurate data, and
    request other actions to reduce or eliminate future inconveniences.
    Concurrent with its rebaselining efforts, TSA reported that it has
    developed a Secure Flight privacy program that is rooted in the Fair
    Information Practices--a set of internationally recognized privacy
    principles that underlie the Privacy Act. TSA officials further stated
    that the rebaselined Secure Flight program will result in a more
    transparent and privacy-enhanced program by addressing concerns identified
    by us and others in the following areas: program oversight, program scope,
    data collection activities, redress requirements, relationships with other
    TSA credentialing programs, and technical requirements. TSA officials also
    stated that they have embedded privacy contractor experts in the program
    teams to address privacy issues as they arise. In addition, in January
    2007, officials from Secure Flight and TSA's Office of Transportation
    Security Redress stated that Secure Flight will use the TSA redress
    process that is currently available for individuals affected by the air
    carrier identity-matching processes, but the details of how this process
    will be integrated with other Secure Flight requirements have not yet been
    completed. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts to manage system
    privacy protections and establish a redress process for resolving
    misidentified passengers as part of our ongoing review of the program.

    We believe that TSA's efforts to reassess Secure Flight's development and
    progress was an appropriate step given the problems that faced the program
    in early 2006. However, since TSA only recently announced that it has
    completed its rebaselining efforts, and just recently provided more
    details of its rebaselined program, it is too early to determine the
    extent to which TSA has addressed the long-standing issues that have
    affected the program. According to DHS's budget execution reports, TSA
    received about $126 million for fiscal years 2004 through 2006--including
    funds spent on the CAPPS II predecessor program--and $15 million for
    fiscal year 2007 for Secure Flight. For fiscal year 2008, the President's
    budget request includes $53 million for TSA to continue this program.
    According to the TSA's budget justification, the increase of $38 million
    is requested to provide for the development and the authority to operate
    the Secure Flight system. Additionally, the funding request would provide
    for procuring hardware, starting operations and training, and developing a
    network interface between Secure Flight and CBP. We will continue to
    monitor Secure Flight's development as part of our ongoing review of the
    program.

    ^29Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as
    amended at 5 U.S.C. S 552a).

    ^30GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
    Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program
    Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More
    Fully Inform the Public, [37]GAO-05-864R (Washington, D.C.: July 22,
    2005).

    ^31 [38]GAO-05-356 .

    DHS Intends to Align Domestic and International Prescreening Programs, but Key
    Policy and Technical Decisions Have Not Yet Been Made

    As originally envisioned, once Secure Flight became operational, TSA would
    be operating a domestic passenger prescreening system, while CBP would be
    operating an international passenger prescreening system. However, air
    carriers raised concerns regarding having to support different data
    requirements for two separate government prescreening programs. Further,
    we reported that both programs could result in potentially different
    results for passengers flying on domestic and international flights,
    results that could cause additional costs to air carriers, and confusion
    and inconvenience to passengers. For example, if the programs are not
    aligned, air carriers might have to implement different information
    connections, communications, and programming for each prescreening
    program, resulting in added costs and inefficiencies. Also, if the two
    separate programs use different passenger data elements or
    identity-matching technologies, air carriers may receive conflicting
    notifications to handle a passenger differently for an international than
    for a domestic flight. Passengers may also be inconvenienced since a
    passenger may be delayed on one leg of a multileg trip, which includes
    both a domestic and an international flight segment, and possibly miss a
    flight.

    The air carrier community has asked CBP and TSA to coordinate their
    efforts to ensure that the programs are compatible and are developed as a
    single approach to avoid the need for air carriers to implement two
    separate screening systems to meet CBP and TSA requirements. In a joint
    letter to the Secretary of DHS dated October 27, 2005, the Air Transport
    Association of America and the Association of European Airlines urged DHS
    to coordinate international and domestic airline passenger prescreening
    programs so that air carriers are not unduly burdened by the costs and
    inefficiencies posed by working with two different prescreening programs.
    The letter also stated that the Air Transport Association of America and
    the Association of European Airlines believed that there had been a lack
    of coordination between CBP and TSA in aligning their respective passenger
    prescreening programs. Air carrier industry groups reiterated this concern
    in comments they provided in response to CBP's proposed rule for
    conducting passenger prescreening on international flights. We have also
    previously reported that since both agencies are developing and
    implementing passenger prescreening programs, CBP and TSA could mutually
    benefit from the sharing of technical testing results and the coordination
    of other developmental efforts.^32 Coordination and planning in the
    development of these two programs would also enhance program integration
    and interoperability, potentially limit redundancies, and increase program
    effectiveness. We have recently recommended that DHS take additional steps
    and make key policy and technical decisions that are necessary to more
    fully coordinate these programs.^33

    Recognizing these concerns, DHS has directed TSA and CBP to coordinate
    their prescreening activities so that they provide "One DHS Solution" to
    the commercial aviation industry consistent with applicable authorities
    and statutes. CBP and TSA officials stated that they are taking steps to
    coordinate their prescreening efforts, including meeting routinely with
    DHS's Office of Screening Coordination and with aviation and travel
    industry stakeholders to develop joint data requirements, processes, and
    methods for disseminating information to other government and law
    enforcement organizations in the event of a positive identity match
    against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. DHS officials told us that they
    envision a joint approach that will allow for standardization between the
    two programs to the extent possible, reduce unnecessary programming by
    aircraft operators, and provide consistent treatment for passengers across
    all aircraft operators. However, despite this coordination, key policy and
    technical decisions have not yet been made regarding how these programs
    will be aligned, including determining how differences in the data used to
    conduct identity matching and the identity matching techniques used will
    be resolved. Further, it is unclear how the different implementation
    schedules for the two programs--CBP has already issued a proposed rule to
    implement a new passenger prescreening program for passengers on
    international flights, while TSA's schedule shows that Secure Flight will
    not begin operations until 2009--will affect coordination efforts. Given
    DHS's commitment to align the two prescreening programs, and the security
    and efficiency benefits of doing so, it will be important for CBP and TSA
    to take the steps necessary to successfully coordinate these programs.
    Until international and domestic prescreening efforts are more fully
    aligned, the extent to which potential problems of duplication and
    conflicting results in international and domestic passenger prescreening
    will be addressed remains unclear.

    ^32 [39]GAO-06-374T and [40]GAO-05-356 .

    ^33GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger
    Prescreening are Under Way, But Planning and Implementation Issues Remain,
    GAO-07-55SU (Washington, D.C.: November 2006). This report contains
    information considered to be Security Sensitive Information.

    TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screening Checkpoints and
    Checked Baggage Screening Stations, but Continues to Face Challenges

    TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the passenger
    and checked baggage screening systems--people (TSOs), screening
    procedures, and technology--but continues to face management, planning,
    and funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing Allocation
    Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current
    operating conditions, and provided TSOs with additional training intended
    to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly improvised
    explosives. TSA also proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint
    screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability information),
    among other factors, but could do more evaluation of proposed procedures
    before they are implemented to ensure they achieve their intended results.
    Additionally, TSA is exploring new technologies to enhance the detection
    of explosives and other threats, but continues to face management and
    funding challenges. For example, in May 2006, TSA reported that under
    current investment levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage
    screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. TSA, in
    collaboration with key stakeholders, has identified several funding and
    financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening
    systems, such as continued appropriations for the procurement and
    installation of EDS machines.

    TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Management and Performance of Its
    TSO Workforce

    TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the management
    and performance of its TSO workforce, which TSA has identified as its most
    important asset in accomplishing its mission. We reported in February 2004
    that staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had hindered the ability
    of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)--the ranking authority
    responsible for leading and coordinating security activities at
    airports--to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints
    and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints without using
    additional measures such as overtime.^34 Since that time, TSA has
    developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at
    airports. In determining staffing allocations, the model takes into
    account the workload demands unique to each airport based on an estimate
    of each airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then processed
    against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers and checked
    baggage--including expected processing rates, required staffing for
    passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard operating
    procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates. In August 2005, TSA
    determined that the staffing model contained complete and accurate
    information on each airport from which to estimate staffing needs, and the
    agency used the model to identify TSO allocations for each airport. At
    that time, the staffing model identified a total TSO full-time equivalent
    allocation need of 42,303--a level within the congressionally mandated
    limit of 45,000 full-time equivalent TSOs. According to TSA, when TSA runs
    the model, it does so without imposing a limitation on the maximum number
    of full-time equivalent TSOs, either the 45,000 congressional limit or any
    budgetary limits that affect the number of TSOs that can be hired.

    In addition to the levels identified by the staffing model, TSA sets aside
    TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those considered by the
    staffing model in the annual allocation run for airports. For example, in
    order to handle short-term extraordinary needs at airports, TSA
    established a National Screening Force of 615 TSOs who can be sent to
    airports to augment local TSO staff during periods of unusually high
    passenger volume, such as the Super Bowl. Additionally, certain airports
    may, during the course of the year, experience significant changes to
    their screening operations, such as the arrival of a new airline or
    opening of a new terminal. TSA established a reserve of 329 TSO full-time
    equivalents during fiscal year 2006 that can be used to augment the
    existing force. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request includes
    $35 million for operational expenses for a National Deployment Office--an
    office that would be responsible for deploying the National Screening
    Force and other TSOs to those airports experiencing significant staffing
    shortfalls.

    ^34GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
    Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, [41]GAO-04-440T (Washington,
    D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).

    According to TSA, TSA's approach to allocating TSOs has allowed the agency
    to stay within the 43,000 full-time equivalent TSO budgetary limit for
    fiscal year 2006--a staffing level that TSA's Assistant Secretary stated
    is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage screening
    services.^35 According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request,
    the $2.6 billion requested for the federal TSO workforce represents an
    increase of about $131 million over fiscal year 2007 for cost of living
    adjustments and a travel document checker initiative. Under this
    initiative, about 1,330 full-time equivalent TSOs would be placed at the
    40 highest risk category X and I airports to conduct document checking for
    passengers approaching the passenger screening checkpoint.^36 According to
    the budget request, the $2.6 billion is to fund the personnel,
    compensation, and benefits of approximately 43,688 full-time equivalent
    TSOs and about 1,045 full-time equivalent Screening Managers. Table 1
    shows the total TSO and Screening Manager full-time equivalents and the
    funding levels for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, as reported by TSA.

    ^35As part of TSA's Screening Partnership Program, six airports used
    private contract screeners in lieu of federal TSOs during fiscal year
    2006. Despite the fact that these airports do not use federal screeners,
    TSA still used the Staffing Allocation Model to determine the full-time
    equivalent screening staff at each of these airports for fiscal year 2006.
    These staffing levels, as determined by the model, were to serve as a
    limit on the number of private screeners that the private screening
    contractors could employ. According to TSA, the 1,702 total full-time
    equivalent staffing allocation at these airports does not count against
    TSA's nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalents for TSO staff. In
    addition, according to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for
    TSA, TSA is accepting two additional airports--Key West and Marathon
    Florida--with a combined total of 30 full-time equivalent TSOs, into the
    Screening Partnership Program.

    ^36According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, under
    previous passenger checkpoint screening procedures (prior to August 10,
    2006), airport contract employees conducted all document checking for
    passengers approaching the checkpoint. TSA has determined that a security
    gap exists in verifying the documentation of the traveling public, and is
    seeking to close this gap to better meet its security responsibilities
    through more rigorous document checking procedures than those being done
    by private industry.

    Table 1: Passenger and Checked Baggage TSO and Screening Manager Full-time
    Equivalents and Actual Spending for TSO Personnel, Compensation, &
    Benefits, by Fiscal Year

    Fiscal year                          FY 2004   FY 2005   FY 2006 FY 2007^a
    Total TSOs and Screening Managers     45,252    45,690    42,187    43,779
    at airports nationwide
    Actual spending (dollars in       $2,191,551 2,291,572 2,251,503 2,418,329
    thousands)

    Source: TSA

    ^aFiscal year 2007 figures are projected.

    FSDs we interviewed in 2006^37 as part of our ongoing review of TSA's
    staffing model generally reported that the model is a more accurate
    predictor of staffing needs than TSA's prior staffing model, which took
    into account fewer factors that affect screening operations.^38 However,
    FSDs identified that some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006
    staffing model did not reflect actual operating conditions. For example,
    FSDs noted that the staffing model's assumption of a 20 percent part-time
    workforce--measured in terms of full-time equivalents--had been difficult
    to achieve, particularly at larger (category X and I) airports, because
    of, among other things, economic conditions leading to competition for
    part-time workers, remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass
    transit, TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002, and
    part-time workers' desire to convert to full-time status. TSA data show
    that for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the nation's category X airports had
    a TSO workforce composed of about 8 percent part-time equivalents, and the
    part-time TSO attrition rate nationwide remains considerably higher than
    the rate for full-time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 16
    percent for full-time TSOs for fiscal year 2006). FSDs also expressed
    concern that the model did not specifically account for the recurrent
    training requirement for TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged over a fiscal
    year quarter. Further, FSDs identified that the model for fiscal year 2006
    did not account for time away from screening to perform operational
    support duties. FSDs we interviewed stated that because they are not
    authorized to hire a sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are
    being routinely used to perform certain operational support functions,
    such as payroll processing, scheduling, distribution and maintenance of
    uniforms, data entry, and workman's compensation processing. Similarly, in
    September 2006, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector
    General reported that TSA had not determined the precise number of FSD
    administrative positions it needed and was using TSOs to perform
    administrative work.

    ^37We visited 14 airports as part of this ongoing review. We did not use
    probability sampling methods to select the airports at which the FSDs were
    located; therefore, information provided by these FSDs cannot be
    generalized to other airports.

    ^38The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted
    in December 2004, required TSA to, among other things, develop and submit
    to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the
    House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
    standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all airports
    at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 2005. These
    standards are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and
    ensure that the average aviation security related delay experienced by
    passengers is minimized. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
    Act also mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards.
    Pub. L. No. 108-458, S 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004).

    In response to FSDs' input and the various mechanisms TSA has implemented
    to monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation outputs, TSA made
    changes to some assumptions in the model for fiscal year 2007. Our
    preliminary observations indicate that these revisions should help address
    the concerns identified by FSDs. For example, TSA recognized that some
    airports cannot likely achieve a 20 percent part-time full-time equivalent
    level and others (most likely smaller airports) may operate more
    effectively with other levels of part-time TSO staff. As a result, for
    fiscal year 2007, TSA modified this assumption to include a variable
    part-time goal based on each airport's historic part-time to full-time TSO
    ratio. TSA also included an allowance in the fiscal 2007 Staffing
    Allocation Model for training to provide additional assurance that TSOs
    complete the required training on detecting improvised explosive
    devices--which TSA has identified as the most significant threat to
    commercial aviation. Additionally, TSA included an allowance for
    operational support duties in the 2007 Staffing Allocation Model to
    account for the current need for TSOs to perform these duties.

    Factors outside of the staffing model's determination of overall TSO
    staffing levels also affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their TSO
    workforce. Specifically, FSDs we interviewed as part of our ongoing review
    of TSA's staffing model cited difficulties in recruiting and retaining
    sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full
    allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints appropriately
    given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism and injuries; and
    managing around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, such
    as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage check areas despite demand
    levels that would justify such added capacity. TSA has made progress in
    addressing these challenges through a variety of human capital
    initiatives. For example, to allow FSDs to more efficiently address
    staffing needs, TSA has shifted responsibility for hiring TSOs from TSA
    headquarters to FSDs at individual airports and, according to TSA
    officials, provided contractor support to assist in this effort. TSA data
    show that since local hiring began in March 2006, TSA has increased the
    number of new hire TSOs from approximately 180 per pay period in February
    2006 to nearly 450 each pay period under the local hiring initiative.

    In addition to having an adequate number of TSOs, effective screening
    involves TSOs being properly trained to do their job. Since we first
    reported on TSO training in September 2003,^39 TSA has taken a number of
    actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO workforce
    beyond the basic training requirement. For example, TSA has expanded
    training available to the TSO workforce, such as introducing an Online
    Learning Center that makes self-guided courses available over TSA's
    intranet and the Internet, and enhanced training on explosives detection.
    This training included both classroom and hands-on experience, and focused
    particularly on identifying X-ray images of improvised explosives device
    component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb. According to TSA,
    as of February 6, 2007, about 98 percent of the 48,236 TSOs on board had
    received classroom, checkpoint, or computer-based improvised explosive
    device recognition training. TSA has also developed new training
    curriculums to support new screening approaches. For example, TSA recently
    developed a training curriculum for TSOs in behavior observation and
    analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers exhibiting behaviors
    indicative of stress, fear, or deception. The President's fiscal year 2008
    budget request includes $89.7 million to fully implement TSO training
    programs and related TSO workforce development programs.

    TSA has also made progress in addressing challenges that made it difficult
    for TSOs to access training. We reported in May 2005 that insufficient TSO
    staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access
    the Online Learning Center made it difficult for all TSOs at many airports
    to receive required training, and had limited TSO access to TSA training
    tools.^40 We stated that without addressing the challenges to delivering
    ongoing training, including installing high-speed connectivity at airport
    training facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a screening
    workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to perform at a
    desired level. As previously discussed, our preliminary observations from
    our ongoing review of TSA's staffing model indicate that TSA has taken
    steps to address the TSO staffing challenges, including providing an
    allowance for TSO training in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal
    year 2007. However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA's efforts will
    address TSA's ability to provide required training while maintaining
    adequate coverage for screening operations. TSA established its Online
    Learning Center to provide passenger and baggage TSOs with online,
    high-speed access to training courses. However, effective use of the
    Online Learning Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which
    TSA has not been able to provide to all airports. We reported that as of
    October 2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have
    high-speed Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. Given
    the importance of the Online Learning Center in both delivering training
    and serving as the means by which the completion of TSO training is
    documented, we recommended that TSA develop a plan that prioritizes and
    schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to
    all TSA's airport training facilities to help facilitate the delivery of
    TSO training and the documentation of training completion. Since that
    time, TSA has made progress in deploying high-speed connectivity to
    airports. According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, 95
    percent of the nation's airports now have high-speed connectivity.
    According to the budget request, TSA expects to meet the goal of all
    airports having high-speed connectivity during fiscal year 2007.

    39GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
    Made and Challenges Remaining, [42]GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
    24, 2003).

    40GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
    Strengthened but More Work Remains, [43]GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May
    2, 2005).

    TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
    Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Monitoring of the Procedures

    In addition to TSA's efforts to train and deploy a federal TSO workforce,
    steps have also been taken to strengthen passenger and checked baggage
    screening procedures to enhance detection capabilities. However, TSA could
    improve its evaluation and oversight of these procedures. With regard to
    passenger checkpoint screening procedures, between April and December
    2005, proposed modifications were made in various ways and for a variety
    of reasons, and a majority of the proposed modifications-- 48 of 92--were
    ultimately implemented at airports. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's
    process for determining whether and how screening procedures should be
    modified, we found that TSA officials proposed standard operating
    procedure (SOP) modifications based on risk information (threat and
    vulnerability information), daily experiences of staff working at
    airports, and complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public.^41
    In addition to these factors, our preliminary observations indicate that
    consistent with its mission, TSA senior leadership made efforts to balance
    the impact that proposed SOP modifications would have on security,
    efficiency, and customer service when deciding whether proposed SOP
    modifications should be implemented. For example, in August 2006, TSA
    sought to increase security by banning liquids and gels from being carried
    onboard aircraft in response to the alleged terrorist plot to detonate
    liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft en route from the United
    Kingdom to the United States. In September 2006, after obtaining more
    information about the alleged terrorist plot--to include information from
    the United Kingdom and U.S. intelligence communities, discussions with
    explosives experts, and testing of explosives--TSA officials decided to
    lift the total ban on liquids and gels to allow passengers to carry small
    amounts of liquids and gels onboard aircraft. TSA officials also lifted
    the total ban because banning liquids and gels as carry-on items was shown
    to affect both efficiency and customer service. Specifically, following
    the implementation of the total ban in August 2006, the number of bags
    checked per passenger increased by approximately 27 percent--thus placing
    a strain on the efficiency of the checked-baggage screening system. In
    addition, TSA recognized that passengers have legitimate needs that may
    require them to carry some liquids and gels onboard aircraft. Moreover, in
    an effort to harmonize its liquid screening procedures with other
    countries, in November 2006, TSA revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid
    ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols onboard aircraft, which is
    equivalent to 100 milliliters--the amount permitted by the 27 countries in
    the European Union, as well as Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and
    Iceland. According to TSA, this means that approximately half of the
    world's travelers will be governed by similar measures with regard to this
    area of security.

    In some cases, TSA first tested proposed modifications to screening
    procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the changes
    would achieve their intended purpose, such as to enhance detection of
    prohibited items or free up TSO resources to perform screening activities
    focused on threats considered to pose a high risk, such as explosives.
    TSA's efforts to collect quantitative data through testing proposed
    procedures prior to deciding whether to implement or reject them is
    consistent with our past work that has shown the importance of data
    collection and analyses to support agency decision making. However, as
    part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA's data collection and
    analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed
    procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended
    purpose. Specifically, we found that for the tests of proposed screening
    procedures TSA conducted during the period April 2005 through December
    2005, including the removal of small scissors and small tools from the
    prohibited items list,^42 although TSA collected some data on the
    efficiency of and customer response to the procedures at selected
    airports, the agency generally did not collect the type of data or conduct
    the necessary analysis that would yield information on whether proposed
    procedures would achieve their intended purpose.^43 We will report on the
    results of our analysis of TSA's efforts to test proposed modifications to
    screening procedures later this year.

    41We will report on the results of this work later this year.

    Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that TSA
    have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with
    established procedures. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's process for
    revising passenger screening procedures, we identified that TSA monitors
    TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs through its
    performance accountability and standards system and through local and
    national covert testing.^44 According to TSA officials, the performance
    accountability and standards system was developed in response to a 2003
    report by us that recommended that TSA establish a performance management
    system that makes meaningful distinctions in employee performance,^45 and
    in response to input from TSA airport staff on how to improve passenger
    and checked baggage screening measures. This system will be used by TSA to
    assess agency personnel at all levels on various competencies, including,
    among other things, technical proficiency. The technical proficiency
    component of the performance accountability and standards system will be
    used to measure TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening
    procedures. In addition to implementing the performance accountability and
    standards system, TSA conducts local and national covert tests to
    evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with the SOPs
    affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in
    accessible property or concealed on a person. Our preliminary observations
    indicate that TSA airport officials have experienced resource challenges
    in implementing these compliance monitoring methods. TSA headquarters
    officials stated that they are taking steps to address these challenges.
    For example, officials said that they have automated many of the data
    entry functions of the performance accountability and standards system to
    relieve the field of the burden of manually entering this information into
    the online system.

    42In December 2005, TSA revised the prohibited and permitted items list by
    removing (1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4 inches or less
    in length as measured from the fulcrum and (2) tools--such as pliers,
    screwdrivers, and wrenches--7 inches or less in length (excluding
    crowbars, drills, hammers, and saws) from the list. Pursuant to the
    change, passengers are able to bring these items onboard commercial
    aircraft on domestic flights and international flights departing the
    United States. See 70 Fed. Reg. 79,930 (Dec. 8, 2005). In addition to
    assessing the December 2005 prohibited items list change as part of our
    ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying passenger checkpoint
    screening procedures, we recently initiated a mandated review of the
    public safety impacts and risks, if any, of TSA's decision to allow small
    and tools onboard aircraft, and will report on the results of this work
    later this year.

    43TSA conducted tests of several proposed procedures that officials
    believed would have a significant impact on how TSOs perform daily
    screening functions, TSO training, and customer acceptance.

    44Covert testing involves TSA headquarters officials (national testing) or
    TSA field staff and other federal employees (local testing) attempting to
    carry simulated threat objects through the checkpoint without the objects
    being detected by TSOs. The results of the local covert tests are
    sensitive security information and the results of national covert tests
    are classified, and therefore are not included in this testimony.

    TSA has also taken steps to strengthen checked baggage screening through
    reducing the need to use alternative screening procedures. In addition to
    screening with standard procedures using EDS and ETD, which TSA had
    determined to provide the most effective detection of explosives, TSA also
    allows alternative screening procedures to be used when volumes of baggage
    awaiting screening pose security vulnerabilities or when TSA officials
    determine that there is a security risk associated with large
    concentrations of passengers in an area. These alternative screening
    procedures include the use of EDS and ETD machines in nonstandard ways,^46
    and also include three procedures that do not use EDS or ETD--screening
    with explosives detection canines, physical bag searches, and matching
    baggage to passenger manifests to confirm that the passenger and his or
    her baggage are on the same plane. TSA's use of alternative screening
    procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.^47 However,
    the extent of the security trade-offs is not fully known because TSA has
    not tested the effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an
    operational environment. In our July 2006 report on TSA's use of
    alternative screening procedures, we recommended that TSA conduct local
    testing of alternative screening procedures to determine whether checked
    baggage TSOs can detect simulated improvised explosives when using these
    procedures.^48 Since then, TSA has conducted covert testing of alternative
    screening procedures at some airports.

    45GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build
    a Results Oriented Culture, [44]GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January
    2003).

    46The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive security
    information.

    TSA is pursuing several mitigating actions to reduce the need to use
    alternative screening procedures. These actions include deploying more
    efficient checked baggage screening systems, strengthening its
    coordination with groups such as tour operators to better plan for
    increases in baggage screening needs, deploying "optimization teams" to
    airports that were frequently using alternative screening procedures to
    determine why the procedures were being used so often and to suggest
    remedies, and deploying additional EDS machines. However, although TSA has
    taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening procedures at
    airports, TSA's oversight of FSDs' use of alternative screening procedures
    could be strengthened. For example, in July 2006, we reported that FSDs
    and their staff did not always accurately report the occurrences when a
    particular alternative baggage screening procedure was used, impeding
    TSA's ability to reliably determine how often and for how long the
    alternative screening procedures were used. In addition, FSDs and their
    staff did not always report the use of alternative screening procedures as
    required. TSA officials stated that they were working with FSDs to correct
    these reporting problems and had issued guidance clarifying requirements
    for reporting alternative screening procedures.

    Additionally, while TSA is working to minimize the need to use alternative
    screening procedures at airports, TSA has not created performance measures
    or targets related to the use of these procedures. By creating a
    performance measure for the use of alternative screening procedures as
    part of the checked baggage screening index or as a stand-alone measure,
    TSA could gauge whether it is making progress towards minimizing the need
    to use these procedures at airports and have more complete information on
    how well the overall checked baggage screening system is performing.
    Furthermore, performance targets for the use of alternative screening
    procedures would provide an indicator of how much risk TSA is willing to
    accept in using these procedures, and TSA's monitoring of this indicator
    would identify when it has exceeded the level of risk that it has
    determined acceptable. We recommended that TSA develop performance
    measures and performance targets for the use of alternative screening
    procedures. Additionally, in September 2006, Congress directed TSA to take
    a variety of actions--most of which we recommended in our July 2006
    report--to monitor and assess the use of alternative screening procedures,
    including (1) develop performance measures and performance targets for the
    use of alternative screening procedures; (2) track the use of alternative
    screening procedures at airports; (3) assess the effectiveness of these
    measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports that use alternative
    screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop alternative screening
    procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and (6) report to the
    Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Homeland
    Security by January 23, 2007, on implementation of these requirements.^49
    According to TSA officials, the agency is continuing to monitor and track
    the use of alternative screening procedures, which has allowed it to
    identify areas for improvement nationwide and address local issues to
    minimize the need for alternative screening procedures.

    47Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosives
    detection technologies and their effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage
    screening operations is classified or is considered by TSA to be sensitive
    security information. Accordingly, the results of our review of this
    information have been removed from this testimony.

    48GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
    Procedures Could Be Strengthened, [45]GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: Jul.
    28, 2006).

    49See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 113 (2006) (accompanying H.R. 5441,
    enacted into law as the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
    Act, 2007, Pub. L. No.109-295, 120 Stat. 1362 (2006)).

    TSA is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of Explosives and Other
    Threats, but Faces Management and Funding Challenges in Fielding Technologies to
    Airports

    TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to
    strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and funding
    challenges. For example, TSA and DHS's S&T are exploring new passenger
    checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of explosives
    and other threats. However, limited progress has been made in fielding
    explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, in
    part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in coordinating research and
    development efforts. In addition, TSA has begun to systematically plan for
    the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, but resources
    have not been made available to fund the installation of in-line EDS
    machines on a large-scale basis.

      Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies

    To enhance passenger checkpoint screening, TSA is currently working with
    DHS S&T's Transportation Security Laboratory to develop new passenger
    checkpoint screening technologies.^50 TSA designated about $80.5 million
    in fiscal year 2007 to acquire and deploy emerging screening technologies,
    and has requested $81.6 million for similar purposes in fiscal year 2008.
    Our preliminary work has found that of the various research and
    development projects funded by TSA and DHS S&T, six checkpoint screening
    projects are currently in the applied research or advanced development
    phases.^51 Projects in the applied research phase include liquid bottle
    screening devices, explosives trace portals that will reduce the size of
    the current explosives trace portals at checkpoints, and shoe scanners.
    Three other projects in the advanced development phase include whole body
    imagers, cast and prosthesis scanners, and checkpoint explosives detection
    systems. TSA plans to place whole body imagers and checkpoint explosives
    detection systems at certain airport locations to collect initial
    operational data, and plans to continue to conduct similar tests of the
    cast and prosthesis scanners during fiscal year 2007. Table 2 provides a
    description and status of the passenger checkpoint screening technologies
    TSA and DHS S&T are currently researching and developing.

    50DHS's S&T is responsible for research and development of checkpoint
    technologies related to aviation security, managing the activities
    conducted at the Transportation Security Laboratory, and coordinating
    these efforts with TSA. TSA's Passenger Screening Program is responsible
    for evaluating and deploying systems to detect explosives and weapons
    concealed on persons or in carry-on items, while strengthening access
    control, improving screener performance, and reducing staffing
    requirements.

    51Research and development projects generally fall within the following
    phases: (1) basic research includes all scientific efforts and
    experimentation directed to increase knowledge and understanding in the
    fields of science related to long-term national needs; (2) applied
    research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems with a
    focus on developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed solutions;
    (3) advanced development includes efforts directed toward the development
    of hardware for field experiments; and (4) operational testing includes
    evaluation of technologies in a realistic operating environment to assess
    the performance or cost reduction potential of advanced technology.

    Table 2: Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies in the
    Research and Development Phase, as of January 2007

    Technology       Description                  Status
    Liquid bottle    Screens for liquid           In the applied research
    screening        explosives                   phase. DHS S&T is currently
    devices                                       testing various devices.
    Explosives trace Detects trace amounts of     In the applied research
    portals II       explosives on persons (will  phase.
                        reduce the size of the
                        current explosives trace
                        portals at checkpoints)
    Shoe scanners    Scans passengers shoes with  In the applied research
                        explosives detection         phase. Private industry
                        capability                   developed this device to be
                                                     used in combination with
                                                     other technologies to screen
                                                     registered travelers.
                                                     Vendors requested that TSA
                                                     assess this technology for
                                                     effectiveness.
    Whole body       Provides two-dimensional,    In the advanced development
    imagers          full-body images of all      phase. TSA plans to place
                        items on a passenger's body, some units at collect
                        including plastic explosives initial operational data
                        and concealed metallic,      during operational tests
                        non-metallic, and ceramic or using the whole body imager
                        plastic objects              at one U.S. airport in early
                                                     2007.
    Cast and         Provides a 2-dimensional     In the advanced development
    prosthesis       image of the area beneath a  phase. TSA placed this
    scanners         cast or inside a prosthetic  equipment at an airport in
                        device                       September 2006 and collected
                                                     operational data. TSA is
                                                     considering deploying this
                                                     technology in 2007.
    Checkpoint       Creates a three dimensional  In the advanced development
    explosives       image of bags to detect      phase. TSA plans to place
    detection        explosives and other         this equipment at airports
    systems          nonmetallic items            and collect operational data
                                                     in fiscal year 2007.

    Source: TSA

    Despite TSA's efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening
    technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that
    limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology
    at checkpoints. For example, TSA's fiscal year 2007 budget justification
    requested $80.5 million in budget authority to acquire and deploy
    screening technologies emerging from research and development programs,
    including the acquisition of 92 additional explosives trace portal
    machines and funds to operate and service approximately 434 portals. TSA
    had anticipated that the portals would be in operation throughout the
    country during fiscal year 2007. However, due to performance and
    maintenance issues, TSA halted the acquisition and deployment of the
    portals in June 2006, and the acquisition of additional portals is
    contingent on resolution of these issues. As a result, TSA has fielded
    less than 25 percent of the 434 portals it projected it would deploy by
    fiscal year 2007. In addition to the portals, TSA has fallen behind in its
    projected acquisition of other emerging screening technologies. For
    example, the acquisition of 91 Whole Body Imagers has been delayed in part
    because TSA needed to develop a means to protect the privacy of passengers
    screened by this technology. For fiscal year 2008, TSA has requested an
    additional $81.6 million to evaluate, acquire, and install emerging
    technologies. We will continue to assess DHS S&T and TSA's deployment of
    checkpoint screening technologies during our on-going review.

    While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research,
    development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, our ongoing work
    has identified that challenges remain. For example, TSA and DHS S&T
    officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating
    research and development efforts due to reorganizations of TSA and S&T. A
    senior TSA official also stated that while TSA and the DHS S&T have
    executed a memorandum of understanding to establish the services that the
    Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA, coordination with
    S&T remains a challenge because the organizations have not fully
    implemented the terms of the memorandum of understanding. In addition to
    challenges in coordinating with each other, our preliminary observations
    suggest that TSA and DHS S&T also face challenges in coordinating with
    external stakeholders. Specifically, while TSA and DHS S&T have taken
    steps to coordinate efforts with external stakeholders, some airport
    managers we interviewed in October 2006 stated that TSA did not adequately
    communicate with them about when new technologies were to be deployed in
    their airports. TSA officials stated that they do not have a master
    schedule that establishes milestones for conducting operational tests and
    evaluations of emerging technologies or for deploying these technologies.
    Lack of such a schedule could limit TSA's ability to coordinate
    operational tests and deployments with stakeholders.

    Additionally, TSA does not yet have a strategic plan to guide its efforts
    to acquire and deploy screening technologies. As part of our ongoing work,
    we will assess further TSA's efforts to develop an overall strategic
    approach to guide the deployment of checkpoint technologies. A lack of a
    strategic plan or approach could limit TSA's ability to deploy emerging
    technologies at those airport locations deemed at highest risk. TSA
    officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing a
    strategic plan for the checkpoint that is scheduled to be completed in
    early 2007. TSA officials stated that the completion of the plan was
    delayed due to competing priorities, including ensuring the screening of
    checked baggage using explosives detection systems and responding to new
    and emerging threats, such as homemade explosives. TSA officials also said
    that reorganizations at TSA and DHS S&T have contributed to the delay.

    It is important that TSA continue to invest in and develop technologies
    for detecting explosives, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006
    terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board multiple commercial
    aircraft bound for the United States from the United Kingdom. The
    President's fiscal year 2007 budget request notes that emerging checkpoint
    technology will enhance the detection of prohibited items, especially
    firearms and explosives, on passengers. We are currently evaluating DHS's
    and TSA's progress in planning for, managing, and deploying research and
    development programs in support of airport checkpoint screening operations
    and will report on the results of our work later this year.

      Checked Baggage Screening Technologies

    At checked baggage screening stations, TSA has been effective in deploying
    EDS machines and ETD machines. However, initial deployment of EDS machines
    in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--and ETD machines
    resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as compared with
    using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor
    systems. As we reported in March 2005,^52 to initially deploy EDS and ETD
    equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA
    implemented interim airport lobby solutions rather than in-line EDS
    baggage screening systems.^53 TSA officials stated that they used EDS
    machines in stand-alone mode and ETD machines as an interim solution in
    order to meet the congressional deadline for screening all checked baggage
    for explosives. Officials stated that they employed these interim
    solutions because of the significant costs required to install in-line
    systems and the need to reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor
    systems to accommodate the equipment. TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD
    machines has required a greater number of TSOs and resulted in screening
    fewer bags for explosives each hour. Additionally, because in-line EDS
    checked baggage screening systems can significantly reduce the need for
    TSOs to handle baggage, installing them may also reduce the number of TSO
    on-the-job injuries. Moreover, screening with in-line EDS systems could
    also result in security benefits by reducing congestion in airport lobbies
    and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures.^54

    52 [46]GAO-05-365 .

    53TSA was required to provide for the screening of all checked baggage for
    explosives using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2003. See 49
    U.S.C. S 44901(d).

    In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed to
    help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that
    screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government
    about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that a
    savings of approximately $4.7 billion could be realized over a period of
    20 years by installing optimal checked baggage screening systems,
    including in-line EDS machines, at the airports with the highest checked
    baggage volumes. However, TSA also reported in February 2006 that many of
    the initial in-line EDS systems had not achieved the degree of anticipated
    savings initially estimated. TSA has since determined that recent
    improvements to the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS screening
    technology now offer the opportunity for higher-performance and lower-cost
    screening systems. In June 2006, TSA issued guidance to airports to
    provide options, ideas, and suggestions for airports to choose from when
    considering security requirements in the planning and design of new or
    renovated airport facilities.^55 This guidance also provides
    recommendations for airports in constructing in-line systems.

    TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked
    baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available to
    fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale basis. In
    March 2005, we reported that while TSA had made progress in deploying EDS
    and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis
    of the optimal deployment of these machines to achieve long-term savings
    and enhanced efficiencies and security. We recommended that TSA
    systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports. In February
    2006, TSA released its strategic planning framework for checked baggage
    screening aimed at increasing security through deploying more EDS
    machines, lowering program life-cycle costs, minimizing impacts to TSA and
    airport and airline operations, and providing a flexible security
    infrastructure. According to TSA, the framework will be used to establish
    a comprehensive strategic plan for TSA's checked baggage screening
    program. As part of this planning effort, TSA identified, among other
    things, the top 25 airports that should first receive federal funding for
    projects related to the installation of in-line EDS systems, and the
    optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the 250 airports with the
    highest checked baggage volumes.^56 DHS's budget execution reports for TSA
    for fiscal year 2007 show that TSA received $524.4 million for the
    purchase, installation, maintenance, and operations integration of EDS and
    ETD machines. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request includes
    $692 million for these activities--an increase of $167.6 million over the
    previous year's appropriations. Most (about 72 percent) of this increase
    is for installation of EDS and ETD machines.^57

    54TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and
    international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over
    current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an average of 0.76
    checked bags per passenger were to remain constant through 2010, TSA would
    be screening about 96 million more bags than it now screens. This could
    increase airports' need to rely on alternative screening procedures in the
    future in the absence of additional or more efficient checked baggage
    screening systems.

    55TSA, Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and
    Construction, Revised June 15, 2006.

    In February 2006, TSA officials reported that if some of the top 25
    airports do not receive in-line checked baggage screening systems, they
    will require additional screening equipment to be placed in airport
    lobbies and additional TSO staffing in order to remain in compliance with
    the mandate for screening all checked baggage using explosive detection
    systems. Additionally, in May 2006, TSA reported that under current
    investment levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage screening
    systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. According to TSA,
    as of September 30, 2006, 36 airports had operational in-line systems-- 18
    airports had airport-wide systems, while the remaining 18 airports had
    systems at a particular terminal or terminals. Over the next 2 years, TSA
    expects full and partial in-line systems to become operational at 25
    additional airports. This level of effort, according to TSA, balances
    resources with other risks to transportation security.

    In March 2005, we reported that TSA and airport operators were relying on
    several sources of funding to construct in-line checked baggage screening
    systems. One source of funding airport operators initially used was the
    Federal Aviation Administration's Airport Improvement Program, which
    traditionally funds grants to maintain safe and efficient airports. With
    Airport Improvement Program funds no longer available after fiscal year
    2003 for this purpose, airports turned to other sources of federal funding
    to construct in-line systems.^58 The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated
    Appropriations Resolution approved the use of letter of intent agreements
    as a vehicle to leverage federal government and industry funding to
    support facility modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage
    screening systems.^59 TSA also uses other transaction agreements as an
    administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments,
    airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects.^60
    Under these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator
    provides a portion of the funding required for the modification. To fund
    the procurement and installation of explosive detection systems in-line,
    TSA uses annual appropriations and the $250 million mandatory
    appropriation of the Aviation Security Capital Fund.^61 For example, in
    fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007, TSA received appropriations of $175
    million, $180 million, and $141.4 million, respectively, for the
    procurement of explosive detection systems. It received appropriations of
    $45 million in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and $138 million in fiscal year
    2007 for the installation of explosive detection systems, in addition to
    the $250 million made available through the capital fund.^62 Congress also
    authorized an additional appropriation of $400 million per year through
    fiscal year 2007 for airport security improvement projects, including the
    installation of in-line EDS systems. However, appropriations have not been
    made under this authorization.^63 Figure 5 shows TSA obligated funding
    levels for EDS installation and integration.

    56According to TSA, these 250 airports process 99 percent of all checked
    baggage transported.

    57The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request acknowledges that it
    does not take into account amounts from the Aviation Security Capital Fund
    because the Fund was only authorized through fiscal year 2007. As such,
    although the amount requested for installation reflects an increase of
    $121 million from the amount specifically appropriated in fiscal year
    2007, it also reflects an overall decrease of $129 million in total
    funding from fiscal year 2007 absent the $250 million previously available
    from the Fund.

    58The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, prohibited the use of Airport
    Improvement Program funds for activities related to the installation of
    in-line explosive detection systems. See Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3,
    283. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, and the Department of
    Transportation Appropriations Act, 2006, continued this prohibition. See
    Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 3203 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119
    Stat. 2396, 2400-01 (2005).

    59Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, S 367,
    117 Stat. 423-24. The letter of intent agreements entered into between TSA
    and the airport authorities, though not a binding commitment of federal
    funding, represent TSA's intent to reimburse the airport authority for
    costs incurred in executing the security improvement project--in future
    years and up to the agreed upon amount--contingent upon the receipt and
    availability of sufficient appropriations to fulfill the agreement.

    60Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by TSA to
    directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification projects
    without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions take many
    forms and are generally not required to comply with federal laws and
    regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements;
    and enable the federal government and others entering into these
    agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually agreeable.

    61The Aviation Security Capital Fund provides TSA with a mandatory
    appropriation of $250 million for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007
    in support of airport improvement projects related to the installation of
    explosive detection systems. See 49 U.S.C. S 44923. A provision of the DHS
    Appropriations Act, 2004, precluded the use of passenger security fees to
    establish the capital fund in fiscal year 2004, but the capital fund has
    been made available to TSA in each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007.
    Congress must reauthorize the capital fund for it to continue beyond
    fiscal year 2007.

    62Of the $250 million available through the Aviation Security Capital
    Fund, $125 million is designated as priority funding to fulfill letters of
    intent, with the remaining $125 million available for allocation in
    accordance with a formula based on the size of the airport and risks to
    aviation security. See 49 U.S.C. S 44923(h).

    63Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization must follow the same
    50 percent split as mandated under the Aviation Security Capital Fund. See
    49 U.S.C. S 44923(i).

    Figure 5: TSA Obligated Funding Levels for EDS Installation and
    Integration

    aThis is an estimate as of August 2006.

    TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and
    financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening
    systems. In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage
    screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a member,
    released a study outlining an investment strategy for funding TSA's
    checked baggage screening program.^64 According to TSA, this study, which
    has been provided to the Office of Management and Budget for review, is
    the final component of TSA's strategic plan for checked baggage screening.
    The investment study recommended four investment options, including (1)
    tax credit bonds,^65 (2) continued appropriations for the procurement and
    installation of EDS machines, (3) combined line items for the purchase and
    installation of EDS machines in order to provide TSA increased flexibility
    in directing the funding where it is most needed, and (4) enhanced
    eligibility for the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC).^66 The working group
    estimated that under its recommended approach, the present value cost of
    the checked baggage screening program is $23.3 billion over the next 20
    years. Of these costs, the aviation industry is projected to bear $3.6
    billion and the federal government is projected to bear $19.7 billion.
    According to the working group, the net effect of investing in optimal
    systems would be to reduce overall life-cycle costs by $1.2 billion
    relative to the current rate of investment, primarily through TSO staff
    cost savings and avoidance of increased TSO staff costs in the future. In
    addition, in its August 2006 study, the working group identified that in
    order to achieve these cost savings, a formal cost management process is
    needed given evolving technology and design practices, the various parties
    involved in design and operation, and the amount of capital investment to
    be made over the next several years. The working group identified a
    variety of actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation
    industry, including implementing a structured process for ongoing
    government and industry collaboration and increasing program management
    resources to provide for more substantial TSA involvement throughout the
    planning, design, and construction process. (App. I includes a complete
    list of the specific actions the working group identified for Congress,
    TSA, and the aviation industry.)

    64Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group Report, Baggage
    Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory
    Committee, August 9, 2006.

    Federal Action Is Needed to Strengthen Air Cargo Security

    In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions
    intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but, as we reported,
    factors existed that may have limited their effectiveness. Since our
    report was released, TSA has issued an air cargo security rule that
    revised some of the requirements air carriers are required to follow to
    ensure air cargo security, and has drafted new and revised security
    programs for domestic and foreign passenger and all-cargo carriers that
    contain more specific security requirements. However, more work remains to
    ensure that TSA has a comprehensive strategy to secure air cargo that
    fully incorporates risk management principles.

    65Tax credit bonds are bonds where bondholders receive credit against
    their federal income tax liabilities instead of cash interest.

    66The Passenger Facility Charge Program allows the collection of PFC fees
    up to $4.50 for every enplaned passenger at commercial airports controlled
    by public agencies. Airports use these fees to fund FAA-approved projects
    that enhance safety, security, or capacity; reduce noise; or increase air
    carrier competition.

    TSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Risk Management Principles into Its Decision
    Making to Secure Domestic Air Cargo, but Most Efforts Are in the Early Stages

    TSA has taken steps towards applying a risk-based management approach to
    addressing domestic air cargo security, including conducting threat
    assessments. However, opportunities exist to strengthen these efforts.
    Applying a risk management framework to decision making is one tool to
    help provide assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are
    properly prioritized and focused. TSA has underscored the importance of
    implementing a risk-based approach that protects against known threats,
    but that is also sufficiently flexible to direct resources to mitigate new
    and emerging threats. According to TSA, the ideal risk model would be one
    that could be used throughout the transportation sector and applicable to
    different threat scenarios. As part of TSA's risk-based approach, TSA
    issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that focused on
    securing the domestic air cargo supply chain.^67 TSA coordinated with air
    cargo industry stakeholders representing passenger and all-cargo carriers
    to develop this plan. TSA officials stated that they are revising their
    existing domestic air cargo strategic plan, but as of February 5, 2007,
    agency officials had not set a timeframe for when TSA will complete this
    revision. TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan describes, among other things, an
    approach for screening or reviewing information on all domestic air cargo
    shipments to determine their level of relative risk, ensuring that 100
    percent of cargo identified as posing an elevated risk is physically
    inspected, and pursuing technological solutions to physically inspect air
    cargo. TSA officials anticipate that the agency's system for targeting
    domestic air cargo, referred to as Freight Assessment, will minimize the
    reliance on the random physical inspections currently conducted by air
    carriers. According to agency plans, air carriers would receive targeting
    information from TSA on specific cargo items identified as posing an
    elevated risk. Upon notification by TSA's Freight Assessment System, air
    carrier personnel would be responsible for conducting the inspection of
    cargo identified as elevated risk. In October 2005, we reported that
    although TSA had identified data elements that could be used in its
    Freight Assessment System, the agency had not yet ensured that these data
    are complete, accurate, and current. We recommended that TSA take steps to
    do so; however, as of February 2007, TSA has not yet addressed this
    recommendation. Further, while TSA planned to phase in implementation and
    deployment of the targeting system for cargo transported on passenger
    carriers during calendar years 2006 and 2007, as of February 2007, TSA's
    system for targeting domestic cargo is still under development.

    67U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan,
    November 2003.

    In addition to developing a strategic plan, a risk management framework in
    the homeland security context should include risk assessments, which
    typically involve three key elements--threats, vulnerabilities, and
    criticality or consequence. Information from these three assessments
    provides input for setting priorities, evaluating alternatives, allocating
    resources, and monitoring security initiatives. In September 2005, TSA's
    Office of Intelligence (formerly known as the Transportation Security
    Intelligence Service) completed an overall threat assessment for air
    cargo, which identified general and specific threats to domestic air
    cargo.^68 However, we reported that TSA had not conducted a vulnerability
    assessment to identify the range of security weaknesses that could be
    exploited by terrorists.^69 TSA plans to conduct this assessment of
    domestic air cargo vulnerabilities--as we recommended--and expects it to
    be completed in late 2007.

    TSA Has Implemented Measures Intended to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security,
    but More Work Remains

    In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions
    intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but that factors
    existed that may limit the effectiveness of these actions. For example, we
    reported that TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper database to
    streamline the process by which shippers (individuals and businesses) are
    made known to carriers with whom they conduct business.^70 However, at
    that time, the information in this database on the universe of shippers
    was incomplete, because participation in this database was voluntary.
    Moreover, we identified problems with the reliability of the information
    in the database. TSA estimated that the agency's centralized database
    contained information on about 400,000 known shippers, or less than
    one-third of the total population of known shippers, which is estimated to
    be about 1.5 million. In May 2006, TSA issued an air cargo security rule
    that included a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of
    air cargo.^71 For example, TSA made participation in the Known Shipper
    database mandatory, requiring air carriers and indirect air carriers to
    submit information on their known shippers to TSA's Known Shipper
    database. However, the May 2006 security rule did not modify TSA's current
    process for validating known shippers, which remains the responsibility of
    indirect air carriers and air carriers. Accordingly, passenger, all cargo,
    and indirect air carriers will continue to be responsible for determining
    the integrity of the shipper, which may allow for potential conflicts of
    interest because air carriers who conduct business with shippers will also
    continue to have the authority to validate these same shipping customers.

    68TSA's Office of Intelligence (formerly know as the Transportation
    Security Intelligence Service) does not independently gather intelligence
    information but rather produces threat assessments using available
    intelligence from sources such as DHS's Directorate of Information
    Analysis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central
    Intelligence Agency. The details of TSA's threat assessment are
    classified.

    69At the departmental level, DHS does not have any efforts under way
    specifically aimed at assessing the vulnerabilities of inbound air cargo.
    However, agency officials stated that the Office of Infrastructure
    Protection, an office within DHS charged with coordinating national
    critical infrastructure protection efforts, is coordinating with TSA on
    conducting risk assessments associated with U.S. airports.

    70A known shipper is an individual or business with an established history
    of shipping cargo on passenger carriers.

    In October 2005, we also reported that TSA had established requirements
    for air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo, but had exempted some
    cargo from inspection, potentially creating security weaknesses.^72 We
    recommended that TSA examine the rationale for existing air cargo
    inspection exemptions, determine whether such exemptions leave the air
    cargo system unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack, and make any
    needed adjustments to the exemptions. TSA established a working group to
    examine the rationale for existing air cargo inspection exemptions, and in
    October 2006, issued a security directive and emergency amendment to
    domestic and foreign passenger air carriers operating within and from the
    United States that limited the inspection exemptions. According to TSA
    officials, the agency is still considering revisions to the inspection
    exemptions for cargo being transported into the United States.

    In October 2005, we also reported that TSA conducted compliance
    inspections of air carriers to ensure that they were complying with
    existing air cargo security requirements. These compliance inspections
    ranged from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all air cargo
    security requirements by an air carrier or indirect air carrier to a
    review of just one or several security requirements.^73 However, TSA had
    not developed measures to assess the adequacy of air carrier compliance
    with air cargo security requirements, or assessed the results of its
    compliance inspections to target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air
    carriers for future reviews. More recently, TSA reported that the agency
    has increased the number of inspectors dedicated to conducting air cargo
    inspections, and has begun analyzing the results of the compliance
    inspections to help focus their inspections on those entities that have
    the highest rates of noncompliance. For fiscal year 2008, the President's
    budget includes a request of about $56 million for TSA's air cargo
    security program, which includes funding for, among other things, 300 air
    cargo security inspectors, TSA-certified canines for air cargo related
    activities, and the development and deployment of a Freight Assessment
    System to target elevated-risk cargo.

    7171 Fed. Reg. 30,478 (May 26, 2006).

    72GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
    Cargo Security, [47]GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005).

    In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA is
    working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically, TSA,
    together with DHS's S&T, is currently developing and pilot testing a
    number of technologies to assess their applicability to inspecting and
    securing air cargo. These efforts include:

               o an air cargo explosives detection pilot program implemented at
               three airports, testing the use of explosive detection systems,
               explosive trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine teams,
               technologies that can locate a stowaway through detection of a
               heartbeat or increased carbon dioxide levels in cargo, and manual
               inspections of air cargo;^74
               o an EDS pilot program, which is testing the use of computer-aided
               tomography to measure the densities of objects in order to
               identify potential explosives in air cargo;^75
               o an air cargo security seals pilot, which is exploring the
               viability of potential security countermeasures, such as
               tamper-evident security seals, for use with certain
               classifications of exempt cargo;
               o the use of hardened unit-loading devices, which are containers
               made of blast-resistant materials that could withstand an
               explosion onboard the aircraft; and
               o the use of pulsed fast neutron analysis, which allows for the
               identification of the material signatures of contraband,
               explosives, and other threat objects.

    73TSA compliance inspections are fundamentally different from air
    carriers' inspections of air cargo. TSA inspections are designed to ensure
    air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, while air
    carrier inspections focus on ensuring that air cargo does not contain an
    improvised explosive device or human stowaway.

    74The Conference Report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security
    Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub L. No. 109-90, directed $30 million to the
    Science and Technology Directorate to conduct three cargo screening pilot
    programs testing different concepts of operation. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
    109-241, at 53 (2005).

    75Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three-dimensional
    image of the internal structures of an object from a large series of
    two-dimensional X-ray images taken around a single axis of rotation.

    According to TSA officials, the agency will determine whether it will
    require the use of any of these technologies once it has completed its
    assessments and analyzed the results. However, TSA has not established a
    timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA officials,
    the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges
    that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies
    to inspect or secure air cargo. These challenges include factors such as
    the nature, type, and size of the cargo; environmental and climatic
    conditions; inspection throughput rates; staffing and training issues for
    individuals who inspect air cargo; the location of air cargo facilities
    (centralized versus decentralized); cost and availability; and employee
    health and safety concerns. To effectively inspect domestic air cargo that
    TSA deems to pose an elevated risk, the agency will need to make decisions
    regarding which technologies will be used to inspect such cargo. According
    to TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently and
    effectively inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of
    potential terrorist threats, including explosives and weapons of mass
    destruction.

    We will soon report on the second phase of our review of air cargo
    security, which focuses on DHS's efforts to secure air cargo that is
    transported into the United States from abroad, referred to as inbound air
    cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have taken to
    secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts could be
    strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and select
    foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance TSA's
    efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent to which
    TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance their air
    cargo security efforts.

    Concluding Observations

    DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
    security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for
    these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline
    passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since
    that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger
    prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs,
    strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more
    effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic air
    cargo security, among other efforts. TSA has made progress in all of these
    areas, but opportunities exist to further strengthen their efforts, in
    particular in the areas of risk-based decision making, program planning
    and monitoring, and stakeholder collaboration. Our work has shown--in
    homeland security and in other areas--that a comprehensive risk management
    approach can help inform decision makers in the allocation of finite
    resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that risk
    management has been a cornerstone of DHS and TSA policy, and that TSA has
    implemented risk-based decision making into a number of its efforts.
    Despite this commitment, however, TSA will continue to face difficult
    decisions and trade-offs--particularly as threats to commercial aviation
    evolve--regarding acceptable levels of risk and the need to balance
    security with efficiency and customer service. We recognize that doing so
    will not be easy. In implementing a risk-based approach, DHS and TSA must
    also address the challenges we identified in our work related to program
    planning, risk assessments, and implementation and monitoring of aviation
    security programs. Without rigorous planning and prioritization, and
    knowledge of the effectiveness of aviation security programs, DHS and TSA
    cannot be sure that they are focusing their finite resources on the areas
    of greatest need. Risk-based decision making will be particularly
    important as TSA begins to place more focus on the security of
    non-aviation modes of transportation, including passenger rail, and
    resource decisions and related trade-offs will have to be made not only
    within aviation, but across all transportation modes.

    TSA must also continue its work to strengthen partnerships with other
    federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and
    international partners to improve the security of the commercial aviation
    system. Securing all aspects of commercial aviation is shared a
    responsibility among these parties. Accordingly, it is important that all
    stakeholders be involved, as appropriate, in coordinating security-related
    priorities and activities, and reviewing and sharing best practices and
    developing common security frameworks. Such efforts are particularly
    important with international partners due to our interdependence with
    foreign nations in securing the aviation system--as evidenced by the
    recent alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard
    multiple aircraft departing the United Kingdom for the United States. TSA
    has strengthened its coordination efforts with domestic and international
    partners, which has aided its security efforts and helped to avoid
    duplication of effort. Existing risk-based decision making, program
    planning and monitoring, and coordination efforts will need to continue
    and be strengthened as TSA works to address continuing challenges and
    threats facing commercial aviation.

    Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
    any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at this
    time.

    Contact Information

    For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
    Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov . Contact points for our
    Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
    last page of this statement.

    In addition to the contact named above, Mike Bollinger, Kristy Brown,
    Carissa Bryant, Tony Cheesebrough, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett,
    Samantha Goodman, John Hansen, Mike Harmond, Dawn Hoff, Suzanne Heimbach,
    Adam Hoffman, Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi, Steve Morris, Katrina Moss,
    Mona Nichols-Blake, Leslie Sarapu, Brian Sklar, Edith Sohna, Maria
    Strudwick, Meg Ullengren, and Candice Wright made contributions to this
    testimony.

    Appendix I: Key Actions for Congress, TSA, and the Aviation Industry, as
    Recommended by the Baggage Screening Investment Study Working Group

    In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage screening
    investment study working group, of which TSA is a member, released a study
    outlining an investment strategy for the funding of TSA's checked baggage
    screening program.^1 The working group's investment study identified five
    key actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation
    industry, respectively, with regard to funding these systems. Table 3
    provides a summary of the key actions identified by the working group.

    Table 3: Summary of key actions for Congress, TSA, and the aviation
    industry, as recommended by the baggage screening investment study working
    group

    Congress                   TSA                       Aviation industry
    Authorize a voluntary tax  Finalize and publish the  Use upcoming industry
    credit bond program of $3  draft baggage screening   conferences to
    billion for fiscal years   investment study          communicate the key
    2008 through 2011, which   guidelines developed by   findings and
    airports could access to   the baggage screening     recommendations of
    fund the infrastructure    investment study          the baggage screening
    necessary for automated    technical team. Include a investment study.
    EDS baggage screening      detailed explanation of
    systems.                   the upgraded design
                                  review and approval
                                  process in the baggage
                                  screening investment
                                  study guidelines. Update
                                  the baggage screening
                                  investment study
                                  guidelines at least
                                  yearly to reflect ongoing
                                  lessons learned.
    Permit use of tax credit   Issue detailed funding    For those airports
    bonds for refunding by     guidance to the aviation  and airlines that
    airports or airlines that  industry explaining the   have already
    have or will self-fund     alternatives available    developed designs for
    their in-line screening    for funding baggage       in-line systems but
    systems through the tax    screening systems and     not yet initiated
    credit bond authorization  communicate the process   construction, prepare
    period (with the airport   and business rules to     refined designs
    facilitating conduit       access facility           consistent with the
    financing on behalf of     modification grants for   baggage screening
    airlines as needed, as tax airports and airlines not investment study
    credit bonds require the   wishing or not able to    guidelines.
    issuer to be a public      use the tax credit bond
    entity).                   program.
    Continue or increase the   Provide Congress with     Create integrated
    existing rate of annual    requested information     local design teams
    appropriations for         regarding an estimated    for individual design
    purchase and installation  deployment timeline on an efforts to facilitate
    of EDS equipment ($435     airport-by-airport basis. stakeholder
    million per year,                                    coordination at the
    escalating annually). TSA                            local level.
    would be responsible for
    prioritizing the use of
    these funds, which could
    include provision of (a)
    equipment to airports that
    use the voluntary tax
    credit bond program, (b)
    grants and equipment to
    airports and airlines that
    do not use the voluntary
    tax credit bond program,
    (c) grants to airports and
    airlines requiring
    reimbursement for
    self-funded optimal
    screening systems that do
    not use the tax credit
    bond program, (d) ongoing
    support for expansion of
    optimal screening systems
    to accommodate future
    traffic growth, and (e)
    life-cycle replacement and
    refurbishment of
    previously installed
    equipment.
    Eliminate any restrictions Work with DHS and         Develop contracts
    associated with combining  equipment manufacturers   with baggage handling
    purchase and installation  to actively manage the    systems designers,
    funds to provide TSA with  timely development and    suppliers, and other
    increased flexibility to   deployment of new         associated
    manage the impact of the   screening technologies    contractors that
    voluntary tax credit bond  critical to the costs and require compliance
    program.                   performance assumptions   with the baggage
                                  in the baggage screening  screening investment
                                  investment study.         study guidelines and
                                                            the performance
                                                            standards specified
                                                            therein.
    Enhance passenger facility Establish an integrated   Actively participate
    charge program flexibility national deployment team  in the integrated
    to include (a) tax credit  composed of               national deployment
    bond sinking fund payments representatives from TSA, team, including
    and (b) modification or    airport, airline, and key providing dedicated
    construction of            industry trade            representatives to
    exclusive-use outbound     associations to actively  work with TSA during
    baggage systems to         and collaboratively       the initial
    accommodate EDS screening  manage the cost and       deployment of optimal
    systems.                   quality of automated EDS  screening systems to
                                  baggage screening systems all categories X, I,
                                  at a national level.      II, and III airports.

    1Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Working Group Report, Baggage
    Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory
    Committee, August 9, 2006.

    Source: Aviation Security Advisory Committee

    Related GAO Products^1

    Airline Passenger Prescreening

    Transportation Security Administration's Office of Intelligence: Responses
    to Post Hearing Questions on Secure Flight. [49]GAO-06-1051R . Washington
    D.C.: August 4, 2006.

    Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
    Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. [50]GAO-06-864T .
    Washington D.C.: June 14, 2006.

    Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect
    Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's Secure
    Flight Program. [51]GAO-06-374T . Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006.

    Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully
    Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program Testing
    in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More Fully
    Inform the Public. [52]GAO-05-864R . Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
    Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. [53]GAO-05-356 .
    Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial
    Data for the Secure Flight Program. [54]GAO-05-324 . Washington, D.C.:
    Feb. 23, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-Assisted
    Passenger Prescreening System. [55]GAO-04-504T . Washington, D.C.: March
    17, 2004.

    Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces
    Significant Implementation Challenges. [56]GAO-04-385 . Washington, D.C.:
    Feb. 13, 2004.

    1Note: GAO products that are not available to the public because they are
    considered Security Sensitive Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive, or
    National Security Secret are not included in this list of related
    products.

    Airline Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening

    Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures
    Could Be Strengthened. [57]GAO-06-869 . Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.

    Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal
    Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding Uncertainties
    Remain. [58]GAO-06-875T . Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.

    Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
    Screening, but Challenges Remain. [59]GAO-06-371T . Washington, D.C.:
    April 4, 2006.

    Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made
    Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at
    U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. [60]GAO-06-597T . Washington, D.C.:
    April 4, 2006.

    Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
    Checked Baggage Screening Systems. [61]GAO-05-896T . Washington, D.C.:
    July 13, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
    Strengthened, but More Work Remains. [62]GAO-05-457 . Washington, D.C.:
    May 2, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment
    of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. [63]GAO-05-365 . Washington, D.C.:
    March 15, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger
    and Baggage Screening Operations. [64]GAO-04-440T . Washington, D.C.: Feb.
    12, 2004.

    Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and
    Challenges Remaining. [65]GAO-03-1173 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003.

    Air Cargo

    Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo
    Security. [66]GAO-06-76 . Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.

    Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's
    Enforcement Approach. [67]GAO-03-22 . Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003.

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
    Cargo System. [68]GAO-03-344 . Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002.

    In-Flight Security

    Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better
    Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying
    Less-than-Lethal Weapons. [69]GAO-06-475 . Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006.

    Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved
    Planning and Controls, [70]GAO-06-203 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
    Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.
    [71]GAO-05-781 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of
    Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
    [72]GAO-04-242 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003.

    Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots.
    [73]GAO-02-822R . Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.

    Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation

    Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted
    Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. [74]GAO-05-928T .
    Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.

    General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
    Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
    Success. [75]GAO-05-144 . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004.

    Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
    Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. [76]GAO-04-728 .
    Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.

    Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
    [77]GAO-04-785T . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.

    Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter
    Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. [78]GAO-04-519 .
    Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.

    Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
    Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
    Advertising Operations. [79]GAO-04-499R . Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.

    The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-based
    Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. [80]GAO-04-341R .
    Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004.

    Other Aviation Security

    [81]Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the
    Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to
    Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375 [82]. Washington, D.C.: Jan.
    24, 2007.

    Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on
    the Public. [83]GAO-06-1031 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006.

    Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of
    Federal Security Directors Is Needed. [84]GAO-05-935 . Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 23, 2005.

    Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation Security
    Efforts. [85]GAO-04-592T . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.

    Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
    Security Programs. [86]GAO-04-285T . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003.

    Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
    Challenges. [87]GAO-04-232T . Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003.

    Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges
    Ahead. [88]GAO-03-1150T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.

    Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
    Airports' Planned Capital Development. [89]GAO-03-497T . Washington, D.C.:
    Feb. 25, 2003.

    Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
    Affected Some Development Projects. [90]GAO-03-27 . Washington, D.C.: Oct.
    15, 2002.

    Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect
    Competition. [91]GAO-03-171T . Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002.

    Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
    and Long-Term Challenges. [92]GAO-02-971T . Washington, D.C.: July 25,
    2002.

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
    Screening Security Operations. [93]GAO-01-1171T . Washington, D.C.: Sept.
    25, 2001.

    Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
    Assigning Screening Responsibilities. [94]GAO-01-1165T . Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 21, 2001.

    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
    Security at the Nation's Airports. [95]GAO-01-1162T . Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 20, 2001.

    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
    Security. [96]GAO-01-1166T . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.

    (440586)

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    Highlights of [104]GAO-07-448T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
    Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

    February 13, 2007

    AVIATION SECURITY

    Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions,
    but More Work Remains

    The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in November
    2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to secure the
    commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA funding
    related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal
    year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as
    the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and
    Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing commercial
    aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts TSA has taken or
    planned to strengthen aviation security, and the challenges that remain,
    in three key areas: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and
    checked baggage screening, and air cargo screening. My comments are based
    on issued GAO reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations
    from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures and
    technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers
    (TSO).

    [105]What GAO Recommends

    In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
    strengthen aviation security, including recommendations related to
    passenger prescreening, passenger and checked baggage screening, and air
    cargo security. TSA has generally agreed with our recommendations.

    DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
    security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for
    these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional
    mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a
    tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to,
    among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently
    allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; strengthening
    screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and
    efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo
    security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas were in response
    to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with GAO's recommendation
    to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has developed a strategic
    planning framework and identified several funding and financing strategies
    for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems.

    While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation security,
    GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based
    decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For example,
    as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight--TSA's prospective domestic
    passenger prescreening program--it will need to employ a range of program
    management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control
    program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA has put in
    place a new management team, but it is too early to know how this change
    will affect the program's development. In addition, while TSA has tested
    some proposed modifications to passenger screening procedures at airports
    to help determine whether to implement the changes, GAO identified that
    TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved. GAO also found that
    limited progress has been made in developing and deploying technologies
    due to planning and funding challenges. For example, limited progress has
    been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger
    screening checkpoints, and while TSA has begun to systematically plan for
    the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and to
    identify funding and financing strategies for installing these systems,
    the agency has identified that under current investment levels,
    installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be
    completed until approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government
    and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome
    to effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as
    ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the
    delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is
    needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo,
    including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments
    of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA stated that the
    agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo
    operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and plans to complete
    this assessment in 2007.

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