Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions
Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning (22-MAR-07,
GAO-07-444).
Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the
Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions
storage sites during and after major combat operations. Because
of the broad interest in this issue, GAO conducted this work
under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations.
This report examines (1) the security provided by U.S. forces
over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD
actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's
conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the
basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO
reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, and
intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-444
ACCNO: A67126
TITLE: Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions
Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning
DATE: 03/22/2007
SUBJECT: Defense contingency planning
Explosives
Facility management
Facility security
Foreign governments
Lessons learned
Military forces
Military policies
Munitions
Risk assessment
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Warfare
Weapons
Weapons of mass destruction
DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-07-444
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure C
* [4]U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conve
* [5]U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequat
* [6]DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy
* [7]Unsecured Conventional Munitions from the Former Regime Cont
* [8]Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites H
* [9]DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Fo
* [10]Despite the Strategic Implications, Securing Conventional Mu
* [11]DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Emphas
* [12]A Critical OIF Lesson Learned Is That Unsecured Conventional
* [13]Conclusions
* [14]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [15]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [16]GAO's Mission
* [17]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [18]Order by Mail or Phone
* [19]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [20]Congressional Relations
* [21]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
March 2007
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning
GAO-07-444
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 5
U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional
Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting 6
DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on
Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations 15
Conclusions 22
Recommendations for Executive Action 23
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28
Appendix II Analysis of Military Guidance Contained in 17 DOD Publications
28
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35
Table
Table 1: Extent Existing Joint and Multiservice Doctrine Addressed the
Security of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites 29
Abbreviations
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CRS Congressional Research Service
DOD Department of Defense
EOD Explosive ordnance disposal
IED Improvised explosive device
JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
MNC-I Multi-National Coalition-Iraq
MNF-I Multinational Forces in Iraq
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
TTP Tactics, techniques, and procedures
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
March 22, 2006
Congressional Committees
In March 2003, citing the failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons
inspectors and other concerns, the United States and its coalition allies
invaded Iraq in an operation known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The
commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was primarily responsible
for developing and executing the war plan for OIF.^1 The strategic goals
of this plan included (1) establishing a stable Iraqi nation and a
broad-based government that renounces weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
does not support terrorism, and is not a threat to its neighbors; and (2)
leveraging success in Iraq to convince or compel other countries to cease
support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD. The plan's military
priorities included overthrowing the Iraqi regime by rapidly capturing
Baghdad and disarming Iraq of its WMD. Although WMD stockpiles were not
found, Iraq had dispersed hundreds of thousands of tons of conventional
munitions throughout the country at various storage sites.^2 During the
rapid march to Baghdad, U.S. commanders were faced with the dilemma of
bypassing conventional munitions storage sites or diverting troops from
the war plan's top priorities to provide security at those sites. Baghdad
was a top planning priority because the city represented a key concept,
the "strategic center of gravity" for the regime. As the strategic center
of gravity, if Baghdad were attacked and neutralized or destroyed, CENTCOM
believed that the regime's control over the remaining military and
security forces and the population would be severed.
The widespread looting of some Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites
during OIF has been the subject of media reports. We previously reported
on the looting and dispersal of radiological sources from a number of
sites in Iraq after the invasion and the Department of Defense's (DOD)
efforts to collect and secure those sources.^3 Because of the broad
congressional interest in this issue, we conducted this work under the
Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative. This report examines (1) the security provided by U.S. forces
over conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq and (2) DOD actions to
mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions
storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned.
We are issuing this report to you because of your oversight
responsibilities.
^1CENTCOM is one of five geographic combatant commands. A combatant
command is a unified command established by the President of the United
States with a broad continuing mission under a single commander.
^2Conventional munitions are complete devices charged with explosives,
propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition that are not nuclear,
biological, or chemical for use in military operations.
To examine the security over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites
provided by U.S. forces, we reviewed field unit reporting and intelligence
products and interviewed DOD officials. We also collected and analyzed the
various iterations of OIF plans, doctrine, and concepts of operations for
coverage of the security of conventional munitions storage sites. To
examine DOD's actions to learn from its experience with securing
conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq and apply these lessons
learned to mitigate risks during future operations, we interviewed DOD
officials about their efforts to identify and document lessons learned and
examined documents on operations in Iraq. We also developed a data
collection instrument to use in analyzing draft and published joint
doctrine; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) instructions and
manuals; multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and the
joint improvised explosive device (IED) defeat handbook to determine to
what extent those documents addressed the security of conventional
munitions storage sites. We performed our work from November 2005 through
October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology can be
found in appendix I.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated
December 14, 2006.^4 That report provided additional details on the
estimated amounts of prewar Iraqi conventional munitions and the security
over former Iraqi conventional munitions sites at the time of our review.
^3GAO, Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source
Recovery Effort and Apply Lessons Learned to Further Recovery Missions,
[22]GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).
^4 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites
to Future Operations Planning, [23]GAO-07-71C (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20,
2006).
Results in Brief
The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites
in Iraq, combined with prewar planning priorities and certain prewar
planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces
not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to
DOD sources. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied
significantly, with the higher estimate being five times greater than the
low estimate. Although the amount looted is unknown, field unit reports,
numerous intelligence reports, and imagery products showed that many
conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat
operations and some may remain vulnerable. Moreover, in October 2006, we
could not verify that all sites had been physically secured. However, DOD
does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and risk assessment
regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq, despite the strategic
risk posed by IEDs made from those munitions. According to lessons learned
reports and knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials, including field
commanders, the widespread looting occurred during and immediately after
major combat operations because DOD had insufficient troop levels to
secure conventional munitions storage sites because of several OIF
planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF priorities, set forth in
the February 2003 war plan, included taking Baghdad as quickly as possible
on the basis of surprise and speed rather than using an overwhelming
force, such as that used in 1991 during the first Gulf War. The OIF war
plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and
provide internal security." Knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials
stated that these Iraqi army units would have been used to secure
conventional munitions storage sites. Our analysis of the various
iterations of the war plan found that the OIF war plan did not document
risk mitigation strategies--such as branch plans as recommended by joint
planning doctrine--in case planning assumptions were proven wrong.
According to a 2006 Joint Staff assessment developed as part of the
lessons learned process, these priorities and assumptions resulted in a
force structure plan that did not consider several missions requiring
troops, including the security of conventional munitions storage sites.^5
Furthermore, the Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I) stated that DOD did
not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy
munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred
because, according to knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials, the OIF
war plan's assumptions did not lead DOD to consider conventional munitions
storage sites as a risk, as DOD planned to use the Iraqi army to secure
the country. However, not securing these conventional munitions storage
sites has been costly. For example, looted munitions are being used to (1)
construct IEDs that have killed or maimed many people and (2) maintain the
level of violence against U.S. and coalition forces and their Iraqi
partners, sustaining the conditions necessary to hamper reconstruction and
economic stabilization efforts. Moreover, estimates indicate that the
looted munitions will likely continue to support terrorist attacks
throughout the region. Finally, DOD spent about $4.9 billion from fiscal
years 2004 through 2006 on countering the IED campaign in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
^5U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two) (Norfolk,
Va.: January 2006).
While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned,
because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, DOD has given
little focus to mitigating the risk to U.S. forces posed by an adversary's
conventional munitions storage sites for future operations planning.
Instead, the department's actions in response to OIF lessons learned
generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or
terrorists during posthostility operations. For example, the Army and the
Marine Corps have developed an interim handbook on IED defeat, and DOD has
conducted a joint assessment of the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
function to determine the sufficiency of EOD assets for future operations.
Although these actions are good first steps, our review of DOD
publications--such as doctrine, policy, guidance, and procedures issued by
the CJCS--which are used to guide operational planning and execution found
little evidence of guidance concerning the security of conventional
munitions storage sites. We believe that U.S. forces will face increased
risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses
unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths, or where the
disintegration of a hostile regime is likely to lead to civil disorder,
armed resistance, or civil war during a U.S. occupation. For example, one
potential adversary is also estimated to have significant amounts of
munitions; this would require an occupying force to dedicate significant
manpower to secure or destroy the contents of conventional munitions
storage sites. We also believe that this situation indicates both that
Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information
on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent an
important strategic planning and prioritizing consideration for future
operations. However, without appropriate joint doctrine, policy, guidance,
and procedures, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned regarding the
security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be a
strategic planning and priority-setting consideration that is integrated
into future operations planning and execution, including development of
appropriate force levels.
In this report, we are making three recommendations. We recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to
(1) conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured
conventional munitions in Iraq; (2) report ensuing risk mitigation
strategies and results to Congress; and (3) incorporate consideration of
conventional munitions storage sites security into all levels of planning
policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and
other directives.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III of this
report.
Background
On March 17, 2003, citing the failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons
inspectors and other concerns, the United States and its coalition allies
invaded Iraq. Three days later, on March 19, 2003, offensive operations
began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15,
after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of
all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had
disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major
combat operations.
When the invasion began and the Iraqi government no longer functioned,
many areas experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public
services, such as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and coalition
forces were then confronted with the challenges of restoring public order
and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Given the
extensive looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not assume that
facilities and items within the facilities would remain intact or in place
for later collection without being secured.^6 Many facilities, such as
abandoned government research facilities and industrial complexes, were no
longer under the control of Iraqis and had been looted. For example,
hundreds of tons of explosive materials that had been documented by the
International Atomic Energy Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa
explosives and munitions facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003,
through the theft and looting of the government installations resulting
from lack of security. We also reported that regarding radiological
sources in Iraq, DOD was not ready to collect and secure radiological
sources when the war began in March 2003 and for about 6 months
thereafter.^7 Until radiological sources could be collected, some sources
were looted and scattered, and some troops were diverted from their
regular combat duties to guard sources in diverse places.
^6 [24]GAO-05-672 .
U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional
Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting
According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons
learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition forces
were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage sites in
Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These DOD sources
indicated that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by the number
and size of these sites, and DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure
conventional munitions storage sites because of prewar planning priorities
and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. Despite war plan and
intelligence estimates of large quantities of munitions in Iraq,
knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did not plan for or set up a
program to centrally manage and destroy enemy munitions until August 2003,
well after the completion of major combat operations in May 2003. The
costs of not securing these conventional munitions storage sites have been
high, as explosives and ammunition from these sites used in the
construction of IEDs that have killed and maimed people. Furthermore,
estimates indicate such munitions are likely to continue to support
terrorist attacks in the region.
U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional Munitions
Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting
U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional
munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure these
sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat
operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit
reports, lessons learned reports, and intelligence information. Pre-OIF
estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly with the
higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. The
commander of CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations on September 24, 2003, that "there is more ammunition in
Iraq than any place I've ever been in my life, and it is all not
securable."^8
7 [25]GAO-05-672 .
^8Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan: Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, United
States Senate, 108th Cong. 133 (2003).
Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the
time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April 2003
through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons associated with
Iraq's former republican guard had been extensively looted and vandalized
after the military campaign phase of OIF ended. It concluded that the most
prized areas for looting were the depots or storage areas. The assessment
further concluded that the thorough nature of the looting and the
seemingly targeted concentration on storage areas suggested that much of
the looting was conducted by organized elements that were likely aided or
spearheaded by Iraqi military personnel.
Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites--including fixed garrisons, field
sites, and ammunition production facilities--were reviewed to assess their
vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces were obtaining
munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small number of sites were
considered highly vulnerable because of the large quantity of munitions,
inadequate security, and a high level of looting. The majority of the
sites were assessed as having low vulnerability--not because they had been
secured, but because they had been abandoned or totally looted. The review
considered virtually all the sites to be partially secured at best and
concluded that U.S. and coalition troops were able to guard only a very
small percentage of the sites.
Furthermore, since late 2004, insurgents and militia have continued to
exploit former regime depots. Insurgents appear to have had continuing
access to some sites over extended periods, even sites earmarked for
demolition. For example, government information showed that insurgents,
residents, and local officials looted weapons from a former regime
military depot over a 6-month period despite a contract for local Iraqis
to dispose of the facility's munitions. In addition, in April 2005, an
Iraqi police officer found unsecured munitions at a former regime depot
that the officer concluded had not been destroyed by coalition forces
after they seized the depot in 2003. Moreover, in early 2006, local Iraqis
stole rockets and mortars from an old storage area after rumors began to
circulate that the site was to be cleaned up.
U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security Because
of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions
DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S.
forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate security
for conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of OIF planning
priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. According to
DOD officials, ground commanders had two top priorities during major
combat operations that were set forth in the February 2003 OIF war plan.
First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned for and successfully executed
a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on surprise and speed rather than
massive troop buildup, such as was used in 1991 during the first Gulf War.
This rapid march to Baghdad successfully resulted in the removal of the
regime. Another critical planning priority was finding and securing the
regime's stockpiles of WMD, which the administration believed were a
threat to coalition forces and other countries in the region. The OIF war
plan assumed that there was a high probability that the regime would use
WMD against U.S. and coalition forces in a final effort to survive when
those forces reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM planner for OIF
stated that ground commanders had to prioritize limited available
resources against the volume of tasks, both stated and implied, contained
in the war plan.
Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF war
plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being
insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage
sites, including the following:
o The Iraqi regular army would "capitulate and provide security."
The OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and
security forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual
surrender or desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S.
Commander, CENTCOM, intended to preserve, as much as possible, the
Iraqi military to maintain internal security and protect Iraq's
borders during and after major combat operations. According to a
study prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, this
assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of
combat power deployed to Iraq.^9 Several knowledgeable
senior-level and command DOD officials and a joint lessons learned
report pointed out that if this planning assumption had reflected
actual conditions in Iraq, those Iraqi military units would have
provided security over conventional munitions storage sites on
their bases as well as other Iraqi military infrastructure.
Furthermore, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the civilian
authority established by the administration to oversee the
reconstruction of Iraq, dissolved the Iraqi Army on May 23,
2003--the same army that the CENTCOM commander assumed would
provide internal security.
o Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid
out the probability of several courses of action that the regime
might take in response to an invasion, the plan did not consider
the possibility of protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S.
and coalition forces after the conclusion of major combat
operations. As a result, DOD officials stated that the regime's
conventional munitions storage sites were not considered a
significant risk.
o Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The
OIF war planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons
learned report, was based on the assumption that the bulk of the
Iraqi government would remain in place after major combat
operations and therefore civil functions, including rebuilding and
humanitarian assistance, could be shifted from military forces to
U.S. and international organizations and, ultimately, the Iraqis,
within about 18 months after the end of major combat
operations.^10 Therefore, DOD initially did not plan for an
extended occupation of the country or the level of troops that
would be needed to secure conventional munitions storage sites in
particular or the country in general.
^9Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, On Point: U.S. Army in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, D.C.: 2004).
Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions contributed
to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report by the Joint
Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not examine the
consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further contributing to
insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of civil order in
Iraq.^11 The Joint Staff strategic-level lessons learned report also
discussed the effect inaccurate planning assumptions had on force levels.
According to this report, overemphasis on planning assumptions that could
not be validated prior to critical decision points resulted in a force
structure plan that did not consider several missions requiring troops,
such as providing security for enemy conventional munitions storage sites.
^10U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One) (Norfolk,
Va.: January 2006).
^11U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two).
Our analysis of various iterations of the OIF war plan, which was
confirmed by a CENTCOM OIF planner and lessons learned reports, indicated
that the OIF war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies if the
planning assumptions were proven wrong. One approach to mitigating risks
associated with planning assumptions is to develop branch plans. According
to joint doctrine,^12 branch plans are options built into the basic war
plan to anticipate shifting priorities, changing unit organization and
command relationships, or changes to the very nature of the joint
operation itself. Branch plans anticipate situations that could alter the
basic plan, including those situations resulting from an adversary's
action or availability of friendly capabilities or resources. However, we
were told by a CENTCOM OIF planner and other senior-level DOD officials
that the OIF war plan did not develop a branch plan for an insurgency or
otherwise document risk mitigation strategies. The Joint Center for
Operational Analysis reported in January 2006 that difficulties and
challenges after major combat operations had ended in Iraq resulted from
poor planning and resources that did not meet the full range of possible
situations.^13 The report also noted that (1) neither CENTCOM nor the
Joint Staff took strong action to mitigate risk if assumptions were wrong
and (2) the coalition began the postcombat phase without an effective and
integrated plan that coordinated the military war planning with civilian
planning for the reconstruction of Iraq. Lacking effective branch plans
and an integrated postconflict plan, the U.S. government faced several
critical problems, including widespread looting of conventional munitions
storage sites.
^12Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint
Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2001). (An
updated version of this publication was published on Sept. 17, 2006.)
^13U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One).
DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy Iraqi Munitions
until after the Completion of Major Combat Operations
Despite prewar intelligence estimates of large amounts of conventional
munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did not set up a
central office until July 2003 or set up a program to centrally manage and
destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003, well after major combat
operations were completed in May 2003, because it did not perceive these
sites as a threat. The office was set up to address operational problems
found during an assessment of nine Iraqi sites. This assessment found that
DOD lacked priorities for securing the sites and uniform procedures and
practices for securing and disposing of munitions. It also uncovered
serious safety problems in the handling, transportation, storage, and
disposal of munitions. For example, unsafe handling and storage of
conventional munitions resulted in a fire at an Iraqi storage site that
injured six soldiers and killed one Iraqi civilian.
In July 2003, the office turned to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
Engineering and Support Center and private sector contractors to
administer a centrally managed program for the destruction of enemy
munitions--called the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program. The Corps'
center has personnel experienced in removing and destroying ordnance and
explosives and also had contracts in place that could be used to procure
services from private sector firms. The Corps and contractor support were
needed, according to DOD, because the requirement to secure the large
stockpiles would have diverted military personnel from the primary mission
of fighting anticoalition forces. Furthermore, military units in theater
were unable to destroy the large amounts of enemy munitions.
In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center also awarded contracts
for the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first demolition of
munitions under the program was conducted in September 2003. The program's
initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six depots and to have all
enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or transported to the
depots. The program also was tasked with assisting in the establishment,
management, and transfer of depots to the new Iraqi army.
According to the Engineering and Support Center, at the time of our review
the program had received more than $1 billion and has destroyed or secured
more than 324,000 tons of munitions. This number, combined with military
disposal operations, had accounted for more than 417,000 tons of
munitions, leaving an unknown quantity of conventional munitions in the
hands of resistance groups or unsecured. The amount of unaccounted
conventional munitions could range significantly from thousands to
millions of tons.
Unsecured Conventional Munitions from the Former Regime Continue to Pose a Risk
to U.S. Forces and Others
According to MNC-I officials, unsecured conventional munitions from the
former regime continue to pose a risk to U.S. forces and others. For
example, some conventional munitions storage sites in remote locations
have not been assessed recently to verify whether they pose any residual
risk. Smaller caches of weapons, munitions, and equipment as well as
remaining unexploded ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent a more
pressing and continuing risk, according to the MNC-I officials. These
officials said that the coalition is working to reduce this risk by
searching for and finding a growing number of caches, but it will be some
time before it can clean up all the munitions in Iraq. The extent of the
threat from smaller caches, however, is difficult to quantify because the
location or amount of munitions hidden or scattered around the country is
unknown.
Despite the problems associated with IEDs, DOD does not appear to have
conducted a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured
munitions in Iraq--the source of explosives for IEDs. In our judgment,
given the risk posed by IEDs and looted munitions to the achievement of
OIF strategic goals, the Joint Staff needs to determine the theaterwide
risk to U.S. forces and others represented by unsecured conventional
munitions from the former regime. One risk mitigation strategy, for
example, might be to provide more forces for securing conventional
munitions storage sites and caches. Such an assessment, as stated in joint
doctrine, would assist DOD in conserving lives and resources and avoiding
or mitigating unnecessary risk. Furthermore, we believe that DOD should
report the risk mitigation strategies and the results of implementing
these strategies to Congress to enhance congressional oversight.
Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites Have Been High
As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic, and
financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage sites have
been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and explosives looted from
unsecured conventional munitions storage sites will likely continue to
support terrorist attacks throughout the region. Government agencies also
assessed that looted munitions are being used in the construction of IEDs.
IEDs have proven to be an effective tactic because they are inexpensive,
relatively simple to employ, deadly, anonymous, and have great strategic
value.^14 To illustrate, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported
in 2005 that IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and
casualties in Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis. Earlier this year,
MNF-I reported that most IED attacks target convoys and patrols. Moreover,
MNF-I reported that the attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi
partners have continued to increase through July 2006, representing at
least 40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces. The deliberate
targeting of civilians with IEDs has also increased, although coalition
forces remain the primary focus of IED attack.
In addition to the human costs, IEDs have been an effective weapon against
the achievement of OIF's strategic goal--establishing a stable Iraqi
nation. By maintaining the level of violence against the coalition forces
and its Iraqi partners, insurgent groups have sustained the conditions
necessary for a nonpermissive environment, adversely affecting
reconstruction and economic stabilization efforts and undermining popular
support for the Iraqi government and tolerance for the coalition presence.
The State Department also reported in July 2006 that the upturn in
violence has prevented it from fully engaging its Iraqi partners, noting
that a baseline of security is a necessary prerequisite for moving forward
on political and economic tasks. As we reported in July 2006,^15 poor
security conditions have impinged on U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to
revitalize Iraq's economy and restore essential services in the oil and
electricity sectors. A task force for the Defense Science Board also
stated that the continued injuries and loss of life among Iraqi
civilians--because of IEDs--will diminish the viability and political
acceptance of the new Iraqi government and will have a negative effect on
the U.S. ability to shift the burden of responsibility for security and
operations to the Iraqi Security Force.^16
Furthermore, DOD has spent about $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2004
through 2006 on countering an IED campaign in Iraq that continually
evolves, making DOD's countermeasures less effective. For example, the
Defense Science Board reported in April 2006 that to date, the bulk of the
counter-IED efforts have been based on technical means, which are
defensive and reactive, such as jammers and up-armor, to which the enemy
quickly adapts, making these efforts less effective.^17 The report's
principle theme is that the IED battle cannot be won by playing defense at
the tactical level--that is, the employment of units in combat--but rather
by offensive operations at a higher level strategic campaign. In addition,
the Joint Forces Command in a recent handbook recognizes that a focus on
technology can lead to an "evolving dialectic contest between the IED
bomber and the target."^18 For example, the handbook noted that when U.S.
forces began looking for wires, the bombers began using garage door
openers, cell phones, or toy car remote controls to detonate the devices.
The enemy is devising IEDs that can penetrate armor. Furthermore, if U.S.
countermeasures are effective, then the enemy's first response will be to
change the target to go after other coalition forces or the Iraqi military
and civilians.
^14Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq:
Effects and Countermeasures, RS22330 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 2005).
^15GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to
Help Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges, [26]GAO-06-953T
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).
^16Defense Science Board, Task Force on Improvised Explosive Devices
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
To develop a more strategic approach to countering IEDs, DOD established
the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in February 2006. JIEDDO is to
combine the best technology solutions for combating IEDs with relevant
intelligence and innovative operational methods. The Defense Science
Board's task force reviewed the blueprint for JIEDDO and stated that the
JIEDDO is a step in the right direction. However, the task force expressed
concerns that JIEDDO still appeared to be almost entirely focused on
defense. GAO has been asked to review JIEDDO and its efforts to counter
IEDs in a separate congressional request.
^17Defense Science Board, April 2006.
^18U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Organizing for IED
Defeat at the Operational Level (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006 ).
DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on Securing
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations
While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we
found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security of
an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic
planning and priority-setting consideration during planning for future
operations. Despite the strategic implications, military policy and
guidance, such as joint doctrine, have not been revised to address the
security of these sites. Instead, DOD is revising joint doctrine on the
basis of OIF lessons learned on countering IEDs, but DOD has been
understandably focused on current rather than future operations. A
critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured conventional munitions
storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces. For example, one
potential adversary has considerable munitions stockpiles that would
require a sizable occupying force to secure or destroy.
Despite the Strategic Implications, Securing Conventional Munitions Storage
Sites Is Not Explicitly Addressed in Military Policy and Guidance
Despite the strategic implications regarding unsecured conventional
munitions storage sites, our analysis shows that securing those sites
generally is not explicitly addressed in military policy and guidance,
particularly at the joint level. We reviewed 17 DOD publications--which
Joint Staff officials told us were relevant to our review--to determine
the extent to which each of those publications contained guidance on the
security of conventional munitions storage sites. A list of these
publications can be found in appendix II. Of these 17 DOD publications, 5
are either in development or in the process of being updated. The DOD
publications we reviewed included the following:
o Three CJCS publications, which provide standardization to the
joint planning system used for the execution of complex
multiservice exercises, campaigns, and operations. For example,
the CJCS manual, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(JOPES), Volume I,^19 provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force
commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected joint tactics,
techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It
provides military guidance for use by the armed forces in
preparing their appropriate plans. More specifically, JOPES is a
DOD-wide management information process that is used for planning
and executing force deployments.
o Ten joint doctrine publications that guide U.S. military forces
toward a common objective and represent what is taught, believed,
and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best). Joint
doctrine serves to make U.S. policy and strategy effective in the
application of U.S. military power.
o Two multiservice TTPs that are to provide tactical guidance on
the actions and methods that implement doctrine agreed to by two
or more services.
o One service TTP that is to provide tactical guidance on the
actions and methods that implement service-level doctrine.
o The draft joint IED defeat handbook that will be used to test
and validate counter-IED approaches.
^19Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,, Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures),
CJCSM 3122.01 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 22, 2004).
In reviewing these documents, we found little evidence of guidance
regarding conventional munitions storage site security. Although several
publications addressed defeating IEDs during an insurgency after major
combat operations have ended or provided tactical-level guidance on how to
dispose of explosive hazards, including munitions, or rending those
hazards safe, none explicitly addressed the security of conventional
munitions storage sites during or after major combat operations as a
tactical, operational, or strategic risk. For example, the joint
publication, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare (Draft, Feb. 28, 2006),
was updated to include a section on IEDs, but the guidance does not
discuss securing conventional munitions storage sites as a way to limit
the availability of supplies needed to make IEDs.^20 Moreover,
conventional munitions storage sites, if mentioned at all, were not
specifically addressed in the military guidance we reviewed. For example,
the TTP for sensitive sites provides tactical-level guidance for Army
forces conducting operations in a combat zone known or suspected to
contain highly sensitive enemy facilities. In the case of OIF, we were
told that this guidance applied to the search of Iraqi military
facilities, which included any conventional munitions storage sites that
the United States thought contained WMD.^21 However, the Army's TTPs did
not require the security of conventional munitions storage sites that were
searched and found not to contain WMD. In addition, the IED defeat
handbook recognizes that conventional munitions storage sites are likely
to be the primary source of explosives for IEDs, but the handbook does not
directly address the importance of securing those sites during or after
major combat operations as part of a strategic campaign to counter IED use
by adversaries. Finally, although the multiservice TTPs for the EOD
function include a tactical planning checklist that suggests performing an
intelligence estimate of information necessary to counter the IED threat,
this checklist does not mention conventional munitions storage sites.
^20Joint Staff, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint
Operations, JP 3-15 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2006).
^21U.S. Army, Futures Development and Integration Center, U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical
Operations Involving Sensitive Sites, Version 1 (Washington, D.C.:
December 2002).
Since DOD states that joint doctrine is to present fundamental principles
that guide the employment of forces, we believe that it is important that
DOD clearly and explicitly address the security of conventional munitions
storage sites in revisions to joint doctrine. We also believe that the
security of those storage sites should be addressed in the CJCS policy,
guidance, and procedures in planning for future operations because of the
strategic implications of unsecured sites. To illustrate the strategic
implications, Iraqi conventional munitions storages sites have been a
major source of explosives for IEDs and consequently have contributed to
the sustained operations of Saddam Hussein loyalists, internal factions,
and external terrorists. This ability to sustain operations, in turn, has
adversely affected the ability of U.S. and coalition forces to achieve the
OIF strategic goal to create a stable, democratic government in Iraq.
Without appropriate joint policy, doctrine, guidance, and procedures, DOD
cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned regarding the security of an
adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into
all levels of future operations planning and execution.
DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Emphasized Countering IED
Campaigns during an Insurgency
Because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, the
department's actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have
emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists
during posthostility operations. Among the actions that DOD has taken are
the following:
o Army safety policy for captured enemy ammunition: In response to
accidents resulting in 26 fatalities and 70 injuries, the Army
issued a safety policy in 2004 on how commanders were to handle
enemy munitions at the tactical level. This policy primarily
emphasized the protection of U.S. personnel and assets from
accidental detonations. However, it also stated that during
wartime operations the commander must determine--based on safety,
security, and intelligence considerations--whether enemy munitions
will be destroyed, moved, or held in place. The policy also holds
the commander responsible for securing enemy munitions until their
final disposition, but as tactical-
level guidance it does not ensure that appropriate force levels or
other resources are provided to the commanders to secure those
sites.
o Interim Army and Marine Corps manual on IED defeat:22 The
manual incorporates OIF lessons learned to provide commanders,
leaders, and staff with fundamental principles and TTPs for the
defeat of an adversary's IED operations. The manual also
articulates an IED defeat framework that provides guidance on
proactive and reactive actions U.S. forces can take to predict,
detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect against IED
events. One of those actions is to target adversary supplies,
including munitions caches. Another action is to keep friendly
forces from IEDs when prevention activities are not possible or
have failed--in other words, after an adversary has begun an IED
campaign against U.S. forces.
o Joint assessment of the EOD capability: The Joint Staff assessed
the EOD capability of the U.S. armed forces to identify
recommendations for change to move toward the establishment of a
more joint and integrated EOD force. An OIF lesson learned is that
U.S. forces did not have enough EOD support to deal with the
massive quantities of Iraqi munitions. Knowledgeable DOD officials
said that EOD planning for OIF occurred as an afterthought, with
the deployment of EOD personnel into Iraq being a low priority at
the beginning of the invasion. To address this issue, the Joint
Staff is recommending that DOD establish a single organization, a
Joint EOD support element, at the Joint Forces Command that would
not only review combatant commanders' operational plans and
requests for EOD forces, but would also provide, on demand,
additional personnel to assist during operational planning,
thereby ensuring necessary involvement and consideration of EOD
throughout the planning process.^23 The report also noted that EOD
personnel reiterated that a lack of dedicated transportation and
adequate security for responding EOD forces was a recurring
problem and caused a lag between incident reporting and EOD
response. Therefore, the Joint Staff is recommending that joint
EOD forces be issued common "warfighting" equipment, such as
communications and vehicles, and "dedicated security support."
o Joint systems approach to counter IEDs as an emerging threat to
U.S. forces: DOD has developed a joint "enemy IED activity model"
in response to criticisms that its IED defeat efforts have been
too centered on technological solutions, such as jammers and
up-armor, which are defensive and reactive. The activity model is
to provide a thorough understanding of the enemy and the common
activities, such as material procurement and bomb making,
associated with an IED attack. By attacking or isolating one or
more of the model's key activities, DOD believes that commanders
can mount an offensive campaign to prevent the adversary from
achieving its goals through the use of IEDs.
^22Department of Defense, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat, FMI
3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 (Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
^23Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Final Report of Assessment for
Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006).
These actions are good first steps toward broadening DOD's focus beyond
the ongoing tactical and operational counter-IED efforts used against
Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or external terrorist groups in Iraq to
planning and executing strategic counter-IED campaigns for future
operations. However, the actions do not directly address the strategic
importance of securing conventional munitions storage sites during major
combat operations so that they do not become the source of materials for
making IEDs during an occupation or become used for other forms of armed
resistance. For example, while the Army's safety policy holds units
responsible for securing enemy munitions, it does not provide guidance on
the security of conventional munitions storage sites during major combat
operations. As tactical guidance, the policy also does not provide the
commander with direct guidance on how to balance the requirement to
provide security of enemy munitions with DOD's emphasis on rapid tempo
during major combat operations. Without strategic and joint guidance, the
forces or other resources needed to secure conventional munitions sites
are unlikely to be considered in planning for future operations.
Additionally, the joint EOD assessment discusses the importance of EOD
units having dedicated security forces but does not include those forces
as a component of EOD units. Instead, DOD officials told us that the units
are to rely on combat units for personnel as well as site security.
A Critical OIF Lesson Learned Is That Unsecured Conventional Munitions Storage
Sites Can Be an Asymmetric Threat to U.S. Forces
Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured
conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat to
U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential
adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States' experiences
in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S. invading
forces. We believe these potential adversaries will likely develop
military doctrine to avoid direct military confrontation with the United
States if possible and try to undermine the United States' political
commitment with unconventional warfare. Therefore, the number, size, and
geographic separation of an adversary's munitions storage sites could pose
a significant security challenge during an occupying force's follow-on
operations. A large amount of munitions in such an adversary's country
could require an occupying force to dedicate significant manpower to
secure or destroy the contents of the major munitions storage sites.
Furthermore, the remnants of an adversary's forces, insurgents, or
terrorists could draw from any large conventional munitions storage
network left unsecured by an occupying force.
Conclusions
A fundamental gap existed between the OIF war plan assumptions and the
experiences of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, contributing to
insufficient troops being on the ground to prevent widespread looting of
conventional munitions storage sites and resulting in looted munitions
being a continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and coalition forces. The
human, strategic, and financial costs of this failure to provide
sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs made with looted munitions
causing about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in Iraq
and killing hundreds of Iraqis. The United States may be facing even
higher costs as the continuing violence in Iraq, fueled by munitions used
in IEDs, threatens achievement of OIF war plan's strategic goal to create
a stable Iraqi nation. DOD does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide
survey and assessment of the risk associated with unsecured conventional
munitions storage sites to U.S. forces and others. Such a survey and
assessment combined with associated risk mitigation strategies--such as
providing more troops or other security measures--could assist DOD in
conserving lives and in meeting its strategic goal to leave a stable
nation behind when U.S. forces ultimately leave Iraq. Moreover, Congress
has expressed its concern over looted munitions and their use against U.S.
forces and others. Given the seriousness of this issue, DOD should
facilitate congressional oversight by reporting on the results of the
theaterwide survey and risk assessment as well as the related mitigation
strategies.
Prospectively, DOD's actions in response to OIF lessons learned primarily
have focused on countering IEDs and not on the security of conventional
munitions storage sites as a strategic planning and priority-setting
consideration for future operations. Although good first steps, these
actions do not address what we believe is a critical OIF lesson learned,
the strategic importance of securing conventional munitions storage sites
during and after major combat operations. As illustrated by DOD's
experience in Iraq and assessments regarding a potential adversary, the
widespread looting of unsecured conventional munitions storage sites in
Iraq is not likely to be an anomaly or only a tactical-level issue.
Instead, unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can represent an
asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would require significant manpower
or other resources during and after major combat operations to secure.
Therefore, since joint doctrine is to present fundamental principles as
well as contemporary lessons that guide the employment of forces, we
believe that it is important that DOD clearly and explicitly address the
security of conventional munitions storage sites in revisions to joint
doctrine. We also believe that the security of those storage sites should
be addressed in the CJCS policy, guidance, and procedures in planning for
future operations because of the strategic implications of unsecured
sites. Until joint policy, guidance, and procedures are revised to
incorporate fundamental principles and lessons learned about the strategic
and operational implications of an adversary's conventional munitions
storage sites, DOD's planning for future operations may not set priorities
or establish assumptions that address this critical lesson learned,
potentially increasing the operational risk for U.S. forces and the
achievement of U.S. strategic goals and military objectives. Furthermore,
if revised as recommended, joint policy, guidance, and procedures should
result in an integrated approach that includes securing conventional
munitions storage sites as a risk mitigation strategy in planning and
executing future operations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following three recommendations to DOD. To develop risk
mitigation strategies for the current threat in Iraq posed by looted
munitions and enhance congressional oversight, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to
o conduct theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding
unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq, and
o report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of
those strategies to Congress.
To better mitigate the asymmetric risk associated with an adversary's
conventional munitions storage sites for future operations, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the CJCS to incorporate conventional
munitions storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all
levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine,
instructions, manuals, and other directives.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our three recommendations. DOD's written comments are reprinted in
their entirety in appendix III.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the department
conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured
conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is imperative
that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional munitions storage
sites be conducted, military commanders in theater are aware of the
significant risk posed by the sites, and similar studies and assessments
have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD also stated that from a
manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide survey is not feasible
without significantly degrading ongoing efforts in Iraq and the region. As
the evidence in our report clearly supports, we made this recommendation
because we did not see any evidence of a strategic-level survey or an
effective, theaterwide risk mitigation strategy to address the commanders'
awareness of this significant risk or the findings of the studies and
assessments regarding security of conventional munitions storage sites.
Accordingly, the intent behind our recommendation is to have DOD assess
the risks associated with unsecured conventional munitions sites on a
strategic, theaterwide basis to develop an effective risk mitigation
strategy. In developing courses of action for this risk mitigation
strategy, if DOD determines that additional U.S. forces are needed to
adequately secure Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites while also
conducting the ongoing warfighting mission, then those troops should be
requested and provided.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the department
report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of those
strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation, DOD stated
that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the department and
Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress remain at the
strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was not our intention
to detract tactical units from the current warfighting mission or to
suggest congressional oversight is needed for each tactical unit. Instead,
we are recommending that DOD alert Congress of its assessment and the
actions being taken to mitigate the strategic risk associated with
unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the department
incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a
strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance
and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the appropriate language
in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD also stated that the
security and demolition of captured conventional munitions must be
properly resourced. Finally, DOD stated that (1) Iraq is a separate case
and should not be considered the standard for all future operations and
(2) war plans must reflect proper prioritization based on desired
operational effects and resources available, as it may not always be
possible or desirable in a resource- and time-constrained environment to
secure all sites or destroy all munitions. We agree with these statements.
The purpose of this report was not to suggest that Iraq be the standard
for all future conflicts or to restrict commanders' planning prerogatives.
Instead, the report suggests that as DOD incorporates OIF lessons learned
into joint doctrine, it includes what is a key OIF lesson learned--an
adversary's stockpile of conventional munitions can be an asymmetric
threat to U.S. forces. Therefore, the security of conventional munitions
storage sites should be considered as one of the many factors involved in
planning major combat operations. Furthermore, the risk associated with
not having enough time or troops to secure those sites should be made
explicit during the planning process so that mitigation strategies can be
developed. As DOD's own comments indicate, the manpower resources needed
to address conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq may not be
available. Incorporating the security of conventional munitions storage
sites as a strategic planning factor in planning for future conflicts
would help ensure that future planners consider the manpower needed to
secure and destroy an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites
during major combat operations.
Lastly, we did not assess or report on the adequacy of intelligence
resources to monitor or track conventional munitions storage sites.
Instead, our objectives were to examine (1) the security provided by U.S.
forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD's
actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional
munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons
learned. While we acknowledge that DOD relies on intelligence resources to
assist the department in assessing risks, monitoring potential
adversaries, and planning operations, the focus of our report was on the
physical security of conventional munitions storage sites captured from
the former regime during OIF--a task that was not the responsibility of
intelligence resources.
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5491 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Office's of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Major contributors to this report were Michael
Kennedy, Assistant Director; Renee Brown; Donna Byers; Brian Pegram; and
Nicole Volchko.
Davi M. D'Agostino
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the security provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) over
conventional munitions storage sites captured in Iraq, we reviewed DOD,
Joint Staff, and service policies, guidance, procedures, and plans. We
obtained documentation from and interviewed officials from the U.S. Joint
Forces Command; the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); U.S. Army Forces
Command; Third Army, which is also the U.S. Army Central and Coalition
Forces Land Component Command; Joint IED Defeat Task Force; Defense
Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National
Ground Intelligence Center; and Central Intelligence Agency. We also
obtained documentation from and interviewed officials from the Joint
Staff, including the J-3 Operations Directorate; J-7 Operational Plans and
Joint Force Development; and J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment Directorate. In addition, we interviewed previous command
officers and active duty personnel who served as operational war planners
prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). We also interviewed field
commanders and explosive ordnance disposal specialists on the challenges
faced by U.S. troops during OIF. Moreover, we asked to meet with the
former CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, who was responsible for
the OIF war planning, but he declined to meet with us. To assist in
determining the type of security provided by U.S. forces for conventional
munitions storage sites captured in Iraq, we reviewed various iterations
of operational plans and stability plans prepared by CENTCOM and the
Coalition Forces Land Component Command. We also analyzed briefings,
reports, and intelligence assessments from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Central Command, and U.S. Army
National Ground Intelligence Center.
To assess DOD's actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's
conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of
OIF lessons learned, we examined joint staff and service-specific lessons
learned from OIF on the securing of munitions storage sites in Iraq. We
also reviewed joint and multiservice doctrines, tactics, techniques, and
procedures; and the Joint IED Defeat handbook to determine how those
documents address the security of conventional munitions storage sites.
Through structured coding and analysis of the documents, we consistently
verified the information from the doctrine. We discussed with CENTCOM
operational planners and other officials, as well as brigade commanders,
intelligence provided to field commanders prior to the invasion, as well
as the challenges encountered once combat began in Iraq. We also discussed
DOD's efforts to identify and document lessons learned with officials from
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, CENTCOM
Lessons Learned, Center for Army Lessons Learned, and Marine Corps Center
for Lessons Learned and reviewed service after-action reports and
fragmentary orders.
We performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance Contained in 17 DOD
Publications
We reviewed 17 Department of Defense (DOD) publications--which Joint Staff
officials told us were relevant to our review--to determine the extent to
which each of those publications contained guidance on the security of
conventional munitions storage sites. To determine to what extent OIF
lessons learned concerning the security of conventional munitions storage
sites are being incorporated into military guidance, we reviewed 15 DOD
publications that have been published since May 2003, the end of major
combat operations in Iraq, and 5 joint publications currently under
revision. We also reviewed military guidance that was applicable during
the OIF war planning to determine to what extent the security of
conventional munitions storage sites was explicitly addressed. Of the 17,
only 1 publication, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical
Operations Involving Sensitive Sites (ST 3-90.15), December 2002, provides
tactical-level guidance on the security of sensitive military facilities
in general, which could be interpreted to include conventional munitions
storage sites. DOD officials told us that this guidance was used in OIF
during the search and exploitation for intelligence purposes of sensitive
sites thought to contain WMD.
As shown in table 1, to assess these publications for the applicability of
securing conventional munitions storage sites, we systematically reviewed
them. We analyzed each document and also conducted a word search using key
terms^1 and then coded the information in the data collection instrument
and verified the interpretation of the coding to ensure accuracy. We
selected these terms to provide a broad search of all topics that might
address the security of conventional munitions storage sites.
^1Key terms include Depot, Ammunition Supply Point, Ammunition Storage
Point, ASP, Caches, Captured Enemy Ammunition, CEA, Explosive Remnants of
War, ERW, Improvised Explosive Device, and IED/IEDs.
Table 1: Extent Existing Joint and Multiservice Doctrine Addressed the
Security of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites
Generally Does not
Publication Description addresses^a address^b
Joint Chiefs of Provides (1) planning policies
Staff Manual and procedures to govern the
joint activities and
performance of the armed
forces of the United States;
(2) military guidance for the
exercise of authority by
combatant commanders and other
joint force commanders and
doctrine and selected joint
tactics, techniques, and
procedures for joint
operations and training; and
(3) military guidance for use
by the armed forces in
preparing their appropriate
plans.
Joint Operation Provides the policy guidance X
Planning and and procedures for the
Execution System development, coordination,
Volume I, Planning review, approval, and
Policies and implementation of joint
Procedures, October operational plans and
22, 2004 operational orders.
Joint Operation Provides instructions for X
Planning and preparing operations plans,
Execution System and is functionally oriented
Volume II, Planning and provides directional,
Formats, February procedural, and planning
28, 2006 guidance key to certain plan
annexes.
Joint Operation Provides the procedures for X
Planning and the development of time-phased
Execution System force and deployment data and
Volume III, Crisis for the deployment and
Action Time-Phased redeployment of forces within
Force and Deployment the context of the Joint
Data Development and Operation Planning and
Deployment Execution System in support of
Execution, July 19, joint military operations,
2006 force rotations, and
exercises.
Joint doctrine Provides the fundamental
principles that guide the
employment of U.S. military
forces in coordinated action
toward a common objective and
is authoritative, but requires
judgment in application.
JP3-10, Joint Provides military guidance for X
Security Operations the exercise of authority for
in Theater, August combatant commanders and other
1, 2006 Joint Force Commands and
prescribes joint doctrine for
operations and training.
JP 3-0, Joint Provides the doctrinal X
Operations, December foundation and fundamental
23, 2005 principles that guide the
Armed Forces of the United
States in conduct of joint
operations across the range of
military operations.
JP 3-07.2, Provides doctrine on how to X
Antiterrorism, April organize, plan, train for, and
14, 2006 conduct joint antiterrorism
operations.
JP 3-15, Barriers, Provides doctrinal guidance X
Obstacles, and Mine for planning and executing
Warfare for Joint barrier, obstacle, and mine
Operations, February warfare for joint operations
28, 2006 (Revision as they relate to strategic
First Draft) operational and tactical
mobility and countermobility
across the range of military
operations.
JP 3-31, Command and Provides guidance for the X
Control for Joint planning and conduct of land
Land Operations, operations by joint forces
March 23, 2004 under the command and control
of a joint force land
component commander in an area
of operation.
JP 3-34, Joint Provides the joint doctrine X
Engineer Operations, necessary to plan, coordinate,
May 14, 2006 and conduct timely and
(Revision) tailored joint engineer
operations across the range of
military operations.
JP 3-40, Joint Provides the principles to X
Doctrine for plan for and conduct
Combating Weapons of operations for combating
Mass Destruction, weapons of mass destruction
July 8, 2004 and their means of delivery.
JP 3-54, Operations Provides (1) fundamental X
Security, August 11, principles and doctrine for
2005 (Revision) planning, preparation, and
execution of operations
security in joint operations;
and (2) procedures for
conducting operations security
assessments.
JP 5-0, Joint Provides the military's X
Operation Planning, contribution to national
July 21, 2006 strategic planning consisting
(Draft) of joint strategic planning
with its three subsets:
security cooperation planning,
joint operation planning, and
force planning.
JP 5-00.1, Joint Provides overarching guidance X
Doctrine for and principles governing the
Campaign Planning, planning of campaigns at the
January 25, 2002 combatant command and
subordinate joint force
levels.
Joint handbook Provides approaches and
strategic, operational, and
tactical guidance to U.S.
forces.
Joint IED Defeat Provides validation of lessons X
Handbook, February learned, documents current
23, 2006 best practices, and provides a
model needed to conduct future
Improvised Explosive Device
defeat operations.
Multiservice Provides principles; terms;
Publication and tactics, techniques, and
procedures used by the forces
of two or more services to
perform a common military
function. It may include
differing perspectives on
operational employment and is
authoritative to the same
extent as other service
publications but requires
judgment in application. It
also must be consistent with
approved joint publications.
Unexploded Explosive Provides descriptions of UXO X
Ordnance (UXO): threats and provides
Multiservice TTP for guidelines to minimize the
Unexploded Explosive impact of UXO hazards. It
Ordnance Operations, provides warfighting personnel
August 2005 at the operational and
tactical levels with
information to optimize UXO
safety and to increase
efficiency, while reducing or
eliminating losses of
personnel and equipment to UXO
hazards.
EOD Multiservice TTP Provides guidance and X
for Explosive procedures for the employment
Ordnance Disposal in of a joint explosives ordnance
a Joint Environment, disposal force. It assists
October 2005 commanders and planners in
understanding the Explosive
Ordnance Device capabilities
of each service.
Service tactics, Provides doctrine and TTP that
techniques, and have been published and
procedures (TTP) contain references to
publications where users may
obtain more detail.
ST 3-90.15, TTP for Provides definitions of X
Tactical Operations sensitive sites and develops
Involving Sensitive the tactical context in which
Sites, December 2002 Army forces may be required to
deal with them. The capture
and subsequent exploitation of
sensitive sites may be crucial
to the outcome of a campaign.
Source: GAO analysis of military guidance, including Joint Chiefs of Staff
manuals; joint and service doctrine; handbooks; and tactics, techniques,
and procedures.
aGenerally addresses: Document addresses the security of key terms
searched in the document.
bDoes not address: Document does not address the security of key terms
searched in the document.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix III:
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
(350969)
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
[email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548
Public Affairs
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-444 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431or
[email protected].
Highlights of [34]GAO-07-444 , a report to congressional committees
March 2007
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning
Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense
(DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after
major combat operations. Because of the broad interest in this issue, GAO
conducted this work under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct
evaluations. This report examines (1) the security provided by U.S. forces
over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to
mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions
storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine
and policy, and intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD
officials.
[35]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide survey and risk
assessment on unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq, (2) report related
risk mitigation strategies and results to Congress, and (3) incorporate
conventional munitions storage site security as a strategic planning
factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance. DOD partially
concurred with our recommendations.
The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites
in Iraq, combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to
be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites
and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and
intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions
varied significantly, with the higher estimate being five times greater
than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted
after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October
2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials,
the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels
to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning
priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly
taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming
force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would
"capitulate and provide internal security." GAO analysis showed that the
war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies--such as branch plans
as recommended by joint planning doctrine--in case assumptions were proven
wrong. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been
costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being
used to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that have killed or maimed
many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the
region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that
some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any
residual risk nor have they been physically secured. However, DOD does not
appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessment of the
current risk unsecured conventional munitions represent to U.S. forces and
others.
DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, such as
setting up the Joint IED Defeat Organization to develop a more strategic
approach to countering IEDs, which typically are made using looted
munitions. However, our review of DOD doctrine, policy, guidance, and
procedures used to guide operational planning and execution found little
evidence of guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage
sites. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs
by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that
U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat
when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military
strengths. For example, one potential adversary is also estimated to have
a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower
to secure or destroy. GAO also concludes that this situation shows both
that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that
information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can
represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations.
However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons
learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions
storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and
execution.
References
Visible links
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-71C
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-953T
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-444
*** End of document. ***