Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders	 
Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts (30-JAN-07, GAO-07-427T).	 
                                                                 
Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland
fires has increased, often threatening human lives, property, and
ecosystems. The cost of responding to wildland fires has also	 
grown, especially as more homes are built in or near wildlands,  
an area called the wildland-urban interface. Past management	 
practices, including a concerted federal policy in the 20th	 
century of suppressing fires to protect communities and 	 
ecosystems, unintentionally resulted in steady accumulation of	 
dense vegetation that can fuel large, intense, and often costly  
wildland fires. GAO was asked to identify actions that federal	 
wildland fire agencies need to take to help contain federal	 
wildland fire expenditures. GAO has identified these actions in  
three of its reports addressing fuel reduction and cost-sharing  
efforts and as part of an ongoing review of federal agencies'	 
efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression	 
costs for this committee. Specifically, GAO focused on examining 
agencies' efforts to (1) reduce accumulated fuels and address	 
wildland fire problems, (2) share with nonfederal entities the	 
costs of responding to multijurisdictional fires, and (3) contain
the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-427T					        
    ACCNO:   A65392						        
  TITLE:     Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy    
Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts			 
     DATE:   01/30/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Cost analysis					 
	     Cost control					 
	     Cost sharing (finance)				 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Emergency response 				 
	     Emergency response funds				 
	     Financial management				 
	     Forest fires					 
	     Forest management					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Wildfires						 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Fire Program Analysis System			 

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GAO-07-427T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire P
     * [4]Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of Suppression Cos
     * [5]Lack of Clear Goals and Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies'
     * [6]Conclusions
     * [7]GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
     * [8]GAO's Mission
     * [9]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [10]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [11]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [12]Congressional Relations
     * [13]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Tuesday, January 30, 2007

WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT

Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director

Natural Resources and Environment

GAO-07-427T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the key actions that we believe
federal wildland fire management agencies--the Forest Service within the
Department of Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the
Interior--need to complete to help contain the rising costs of preparing
for and responding to wildland fires. Increasing wildland fire threats to
communities and ecosystems, combined with rising costs of addressing those
threats--trends that we and others have reported on for many years--have
not abated. On average, the acreage burned annually by wildland fires from
2000 to 2005 was 70 percent greater than the acreage burned annually
during the 1990s. Appropriations for wildland fire management activities
tripled from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to nearly $3 billion in
fiscal year 2005. Although the agencies are still refining their data,
2006 was an especially severe year, with almost 10 million acres burned
and what are likely to be the highest federal fire suppression
expenditures ever. A number of factors have contributed to more-severe
fires and corresponding increases in expenditures for wildland fire
management activities. These factors include an accumulation of fuels due
to past fire suppression policies; severe weather and drought in some
areas of the country; and growing numbers of homes built in or near
wildlands, an area often called the wildland-urban interface. In light of
the federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation,
attention has increasingly focused on ways to contain these growing
expenditures and to ensure that the agencies' wildland fire activities are
appropriate and carried out in a cost-effective and efficient manner.

My testimony today includes findings from three of our recent reports,
plus preliminary findings from work under way, which together summarize
key wildland fire management weaknesses we have identified over the last 7
years, as well as critical actions the agencies need to complete if they
are to effectively contain the rising costs of responding to wildland
fires. Specifically, my testimony focuses on three issues: the agencies'
efforts to (1) reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems,^1 (2)
share with nonfederal entities the costs of responding to fires that burn
or threaten to burn multiple jurisdictions,^2 and (3) contain federal
expenditures of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. To
evaluate these issues, we reviewed selected reports that we have issued
since 2000, as well as those by other federal agencies or outside
organizations, that assessed federal wildland fire management. We reviewed
pertinent agency plans, policies, procedures, reports, and financial
documents, and we interviewed federal and nonfederal officials to identify
steps federal agencies have taken to address these areas and the
challenges remaining. We performed our work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards from May 2006 through January 2007.

^1GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to
Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats,
[14]GAO-06-671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006); Wildland Fire Management:
Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a
Cohesive Strategy, [15]GAO-05-147 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).

Summary

In summary, federal wildland fire management agencies need to take a
number of actions to strengthen their overall management of the wildland
fire program, actions that could lead to more effective and efficient use
of scarce resources and help the agencies to better contain costs. While
we have made a number of recommendations over the last 7 years to improve
wildland fire management--and agencies have largely concurred with these
recommendations--the agencies have made limited progress in implementing
the needed changes. Further, our preliminary work on federal agencies'
efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs has
also identified other actions that may be needed. Specifically, we believe
that the agencies need to:

           o Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and
           associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire
           problems.  In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and
           their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and
           cost of suppression efforts, we recommended that a cohesive
           strategy be developed that identified the available long-term
           options and associated funding for reducing fuels. By 2005, the
           agencies had yet to develop such a strategy, and we reiterated the
           need for a cohesive strategy and broadened our recommendation's
           focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction
           efforts and wildland fire response. We also recommended that the
           agencies develop a tactical plan outlining the steps and time
           frames needed for completing a cohesive strategy. Such a strategy
           and plan would be helpful to the Congress and the agencies in
           making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term
           approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems.
           Although the agencies concurred with our recommendations, as of
           January 2007, neither a cohesive strategy nor a tactical plan had
           been developed.
           o Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression
           costs with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to help address the
           rising costs of responding to fires that threaten both federal and
           nonfederal lands and resources, we recommended that the federal
           agencies, working with relevant state entities, clarify the
           financial responsibility for these fires and provide more specific
           guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be
           used. The method used to share the costs of suppressing a wildland
           fire among responsible entities can have significant financial
           consequences for the entities involved--potentially amounting to
           millions of dollars. The need for clarity about how to share the
           rising costs of wildland fire protection is becoming more acute as
           increasing numbers of homes are built in areas at risk from
           wildland fires. As of January 2007, the agencies were updating
           guidance on possible methods for sharing costs between federal and
           nonfederal entities and the circumstances when each method
           typically would be used. It is unclear, however, how the agencies
           will ensure that such guidance is followed.
           o Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to
           help contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from our
           work under way for this committee indicate that, although the
           agencies have taken certain steps to help contain wildland fire
           costs, the effectiveness of these steps may be limited because
           agencies have not established clear cost-containment goals,
           strategies to achieve those goals, or effective performance
           measures to track their progress.

           Each of these efforts plays an important role in addressing the
           issue of containing wildland fire costs, but none of them alone
           can solve the problem. For cost-containment efforts to be
           effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals
           with the other goals of the wildland fire program--such as
           protecting life, resources, and property--and to recognize that
           trade-offs will be needed to meet desired goals within the context
           of fiscal constraints. Further, because the agencies' efforts to
           reduce fuels and to prepare for and suppress wildland fires are
           interrelated, the cohesive strategy we previously recommended for
           responding to wildland fires is fundamental if agencies are to
           contain costs.
			  
			  Background

           Wildland fires ignited by lightning are both natural and
           inevitable and play an important ecological role on the nation's
           landscape. In addition to maintaining habitat diversity, releasing
           soil nutrients, and causing the seeds of fire-dependent species to
           germinate, fire periodically removes undergrowth, small trees, and
           vegetation that can otherwise build up and intensify subsequent
           fires. However, various human land use and management practices,
           including decades of suppressing wildland fires, have altered the
           normal frequency of fires in many forest and rangeland ecosystems,
           leading to uncharacteristically dense vegetation and atypical fire
           patterns in some places. At the same time, more homes and
           communities are being built in areas where fires can occur,
           increasing risks to human life, property, and infrastructure.
           Experts estimate that between 1990 and 2000, 60 percent of all new
           housing units in the United States were built in the
           wildland-urban interface, and by 2000, about 38 percent of housing
           units overall were located in the wildland-urban interface.^3
           Recent media reports indicate that this trend of growth in the
           wildland-urban interface continues. Finally, agency analyses
           indicate that climate change and related drought may also be
           responsible for significant increases in the occurrence of, and
           costs of responding to, wildland fire.

           Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the
           cost of fighting them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally
           reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. For decades,
           federal agencies aggressively suppressed wildland fires and were
           generally successful in decreasing the number of acres burned. In
           some areas of the country, however, rather than eliminating severe
           wildland fires, decades of suppression disrupted ecological cycles
           and began to change the structure and makeup of forests and
           rangelands, increasing the land's susceptibility to fire.
           Increasingly, the agencies have recognized the key role that fire
           plays in many ecosystems and the utility of fire itself as a tool
           in managing forests and watersheds. The agencies worked together
           to develop the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy in 1995,
           which for the first time formally recognized the essential role
           that fire plays in maintaining natural systems. This policy was
           subsequently reaffirmed and updated in 2001. In addition to noting
           the negative effects of past wildland fire suppression, the policy
           also recognized that continued development in the wildland-urban
           interface has placed more values at risk from wildland fire while
           increasing the complexity and cost of wildland fire suppression
           operations.

           To help address these trends, the policy directed agencies to
           consider management objectives and the values at risk when
           determining how or whether to suppress a wildland fire. Under this
           approach, termed "appropriate management response," the agencies
           may fight fires that threaten communities or other highly valued
           areas more aggressively than they fight fires in remote areas or
           in areas where natural fuel reduction would be beneficial. In some
           cases, the agencies may simply monitor the fire, or take only
           limited suppression actions, to ensure that it continues to pose
           little threat to valued resources. Under current interagency
           policy, local federal units must develop land management and fire
           management plans that document approved fire management strategies
           for each acre of burnable land and other important information
           about how the land will be managed, including local values at
           risk, needed local fuel reduction, and rehabilitation actions.
           Once a fire starts, land management and fire management
           specialists are to identify and implement the appropriate
           management response, in accordance with the unit's approved land
           and fire management plans.

           Responding to wildland fires--which can burn across federal and
           nonfederal jurisdictions--often requires coordination and
           collaboration among federal, tribal, state, and local firefighting
           entities to effectively protect lives, homes, and resources. Five
           federal agencies--the Forest Service within the Department of
           Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
           Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service
           within the Department of the Interior--fight wildland fires. These
           federal agencies work together with nonfederal firefighting
           entities to share personnel, equipment, and supplies and to fight
           fires, regardless of which entities have jurisdiction over the
           burning lands. Agreements developed and agreed to by cooperating
           entities, commonly referred to as master agreements, govern
           cooperative fire protection efforts and include general provisions
           for sharing firefighting costs among responsible entities.
			  
			  Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Problems

           Agencies need a cohesive strategy that identifies the available
           long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess
           vegetation and responding to wildland fires if the agencies and
           the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and
           affordable long-term approach for addressing problems that have
           been decades in the making. We first recommended that the agencies
           develop such a strategy for addressing fuels in 1999. After we
           evaluated a number of related wildland fire management issues, we
           reiterated our recommendation in 2005 and 2006 but also recognized
           that a comprehensive solution needs to address not only reducing
           fuels but also an overall response to wildland fire. To develop an
           effective overall strategy, agencies need to complete several key
           tasks, which address weaknesses we previously identified.

           Our 2005 report summarized several weaknesses in the federal
           government's management of fuel reduction and related wildland
           fire programs and identified a number of actions to address these
           weaknesses.^4 Specifically, these weaknesses included the
           following: the agencies lacked basic data, such as the extent and
           location of lands needing fuel reduction; the agencies needed to
           identify and prioritize fuel reduction projects; many federal land
           management units did not have fire management plans that met
           agency requirements designed to restore fire's natural role in
           ecosystems consistent with human health and safety; and the
           agencies were unable to assess the extent to which they were
           reducing wildland fire risks, to establish meaningful fuel
           reduction performance measures, or to determine the
           cost-effectiveness of these efforts because they lacked needed
           data. We also identified a number of tasks the agencies needed to
           complete to develop a cohesive strategy. These tasks included
           finishing data systems that are needed to identify the extent,
           severity, and location of wildland fire threats in our national
           forests and rangelands; updating local fire management plans to
           better specify the actions needed to effectively address these
           threats; and assessing the cost-effectiveness and affordability of
           options for reducing fuels and responding to wildland fire
           problems.

           The agencies have made some progress on the three primary tasks we
           identified as important to developing a wildland fire management
           strategy, although concerns have been raised about when or whether
           the agencies will successfully complete them. More specifically,

           o LANDFIRE, a geospatial data and modeling system, is being
           designed to assist the agencies in identifying the extent,
           severity, and location of wildland fire threats to the nation's
           communities and ecosystems. LANDFIRE data are nearly complete for
           most of the western United States, with data for the remainder of
           the country scheduled to be completed in 2009. The agencies will
           need to ensure, however, that LANDFIRE data are kept current in
           order to reflect landscape-altering events, such as large fires
           and hurricanes, and they do not yet have a plan to do so.
           o In 2006, we reported that 95 percent of the agencies' individual
           land management units had completed fire management plans in
           accordance with agency requirements promulgated in 2001. However,
           the agencies do not require regular plan updates to ensure that
           new data (from LANDFIRE, for example) are incorporated into the
           plans. Moreover, in the wake of two court decisions--each holding
           that the Forest Service was required to prepare an environmental
           assessment or environmental impact statement under the National
           Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)^5 to accompany the relevant fire
           management plan--the Forest Service decided to withdraw the two
           plans instead of completing them. It is unclear whether the agency
           would withdraw other fire management plans successfully challenged
           under NEPA; nor is it clear whether or to what extent such agency
           decisions could undermine the interagency policy directing that
           every burnable acre have a fire management plan. Without such
           plans, however, current agency policy does not allow use of the
           entire range of wildland fire response strategies, including less
           aggressive, and potentially less costly, strategies.
           o The Fire Program Analysis (FPA) system is a computer-based model
           designed to assist the agencies in cost-effectively allocating the
           resources necessary to address wildland fires. FPA is being
           designed in two phases. Phase I was intended to provide
           information for use in allocating resources for the initial
           responses to fires and in developing estimates for agencies'
           fiscal year 2008 budgets. Phase II was to be focused on additional
           activities, including fuel reduction and large-fire suppression. A
           "midcourse review" of FPA, completed in 2006, however, has
           resulted in recent endorsement by the Wildland Fire Leadership
           Council^6 of what may be significant design modifications to
           FPA--ones that may not fulfill key project goals of (1) optimizing
           how resources are allocated, (2) linking fuel reduction to future
           preparedness and suppression costs, (3) ensuring comparability
           among different agencies' analyses and resulting decisions, and
           (4) enabling aggregation of local costs to identify national
           options and related budgets. Agencies plan to have a prototype of
           phase II, reflecting this design modification, completed by June
           2007. According to a program official, the prototype will enable
           project managers to assess and report to the leadership council on
           the planned scope, schedule, and cost of FPA, including whether or
           not they will meet the scheduled completion date of June 2008.
           Further, gaps in the data collected for FPA may also reduce its
           usefulness in allocating resources.

           Although the agencies had made progress on these three primary
           tasks at the time of our 2006 update, they had not developed
           either a cohesive strategy identifying options for reducing fuels
           or a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps, together
           with related time frames, the agencies would take to complete a
           cohesive strategy, as we recommended in our 2005 report. In
           February 2006, the agencies issued an interagency document titled
           Protecting People and Natural Resources: A Cohesive Fuels
           Treatment Strategy, but we found that the document did not
           identify long-term options or associated funding for reducing
           fuels and responding to wildland fires. During our update,
           officials from the Office of Management and Budget stated that it
           would not allow the agencies to publish long-term funding
           estimates until the agencies had sufficiently reliable data on
           which to base the estimates. The agencies commented that having
           such data would not be possible until LANDFIRE and FPA were more
           fully operational. We continue to believe that until a cohesive
           strategy can be developed, it is essential that the agencies
           create a tactical plan for developing this strategy, so the
           Congress understands the steps and time frames involved in
           completing the strategy.
			  
			  Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of Suppression Costs
			  between Federal and Nonfederal Entities

           Federal agencies need to take steps to improve the framework for
           sharing wildland fire suppression costs between federal and
           nonfederal entities. Effective sharing of suppression costs among
           responsible entities can play a role in helping to contain federal
           expenditures, especially with the growing number of homes in areas
           at risk from wildland fire that may require protection. We
           recommended in our 2006 report that federal agencies work with
           relevant state entities to clarify the financial responsibilities
           for suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across
           multiple jurisdictions and provide more specific guidance as to
           when particular cost-sharing methods should be used.^7 As of
           January 2007, the agencies were updating guidance on options for
           sharing costs and under what circumstances each would typically be
           used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that such
           guidance is followed.

           We found that federal and nonfederal entities used a variety of
           methods to share the costs of fighting wildland fires affecting
           both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Agreements
           between federal and nonfederal entities--known as master
           agreements--provide the framework for those entities to share
           suppression costs for wildland fires that burn or threaten both
           federal and nonfederal lands and resources. These agreements
           typically list several available cost-sharing methods. The
           agreements we reviewed, however, often lacked clear guidance for
           officials to use in deciding which method to apply for a specific
           fire. Clear guidance is important because local representatives of
           federal and nonfederal firefighting entities responsible for
           protecting lands and resources affected by the fire use this
           guidance in deciding which costs will be shared and for what
           period. We found, however, that cost-sharing methods were applied
           inconsistently within and among states, even for fires with
           similar characteristics. For example, in one state we reviewed,
           the costs for suppressing a large fire that threatened homes were
           shared solely according to the proportion of acres burned within
           each entity's area of fire protection responsibility, a method
           that has traditionally been used. Yet costs for a similar fire
           within the same state were shared differently. For this fire, the
           state agreed to pay for certain aircraft and fire engines used to
           protect the wildland-urban interface, while the remaining costs
           were shared on the basis of acres burned. In contrast to the two
           methods applied in this state, officials in another state used yet
           a different cost-sharing method for two similar large fires that
           threatened homes, apportioning costs each day for personnel,
           aircraft, and equipment deployed on particular lands, such as the
           wildland-urban interface. The type of cost-sharing method
           ultimately used can have significant financial consequences for
           the entities involved, potentially amounting to millions of
           dollars. Moreover, as we reported, federal officials expressed
           concern that the existing cost-sharing framework insulated state
           and local governments from the cost of providing wildland fire
           protection in the wildland-urban interface, thus reducing the
           incentive for state and local governments to adopt laws--such as
           building codes that require fire-resistant materials in areas at
           high risk of wildland fires--that in the long run could help
           reduce the cost of suppressing wildland fires.

           We recommended in our 2006 report that the federal agencies work
           with relevant state entities to clarify the financial
           responsibility for fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across
           multiple jurisdictions and develop more specific guidance as to
           when particular cost-sharing methods should be used. The federal
           agencies generally agreed with our findings and recommendations
           and agreed to improve the guidance on sharing suppression costs.
           As of January 2007, the agencies were updating guidance that can
           be used when developing master agreements between cooperating
           federal and nonfederal entities, as well as agreements on how to
           share costs for a specific fire. Agency officials said that this
           guidance provides additional information about potential methods
           for sharing costs and about the circumstances under which each
           cost-sharing method would typically be used. It is unclear,
           however, how the agencies will ensure that the guidance is
           followed. Further, because master agreements are updated only
           every 5 years, it may take a number of years before the new
           guidance is fully incorporated into master agreements between
           cooperating entities.
			  
			  Lack of Clear Goals and Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agenciesï¿½
			  Efforts to Contain Wildland Fire Costs

           Preliminary findings from our ongoing work for the committee show
           that, despite dozens of federal and nonfederal studies issued
           since 2000 that consistently identified similar areas needing
           improvement to help contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have
           made little progress in addressing these areas. Areas identified
           as needing improvement to help contain costs--in addition to
           reducing fuels and cost sharing discussed previously--include
           acquiring and using firefighting personnel and equipment,
           selecting appropriate strategies for responding to wildland fires,
           and effectively managing cost-containment efforts. Although the
           agencies have begun taking steps to address some of the areas
           previous studies have identified as needing improvement, much work
           remains to be done. For example:

           o Acquiring and using personnel and equipment. The agencies have
           taken steps to improve their ability to track and deploy personnel
           and equipment, but they have made little progress in completing
           the more fundamental step of determining the quantity and type of
           firefighting assets needed based on an analysis of values at risk
           and appropriate suppression strategies. Further, although the
           Forest Service has identified a series of improvements it plans to
           make in the acquisition process, it has so far made little
           progress.
           o Selecting appropriate suppression strategies.  The agencies have
           also begun to improve analytic tools that assist land and fire
           managers identify the appropriate suppression strategy for a given
           fire, but shortcomings remain. Federal policies encourage the use
           of less intensive suppression strategies when possible, strategies
           that may also be less costly. Land and fire managers, however, may
           be reluctant to employ anything less than full suppression because
           of concerns that a fire will escape control. Currently, much of
           the information managers use to estimate potential fire size,
           risks, and costs are based on their individual experiences, which
           can vary widely. Researchers are developing a new suite of tools
           that will analyze fuel conditions and predicted weather conditions
           to model expected fire growth and behavior and provide better
           information for managers making fire response decisions, but as of
           January 2007, these new tools were still being developed and
           tested.
           o Managing cost-containment efforts. The steps the agencies have
           taken to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key
           elements fundamental to sound program management, such as clearly
           defining cost-containment goals, developing a strategy for
           achieving those goals, and measuring progress toward achieving
           them. First, the agencies have not clearly articulated the goals
           of their cost-containment efforts. For cost-containment efforts to
           be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment
           goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program--such as
           protecting life, property, and resources. For example, the
           agencies have established the goal of suppressing wildland fires
           at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public safety and
           values being protected, but they have not defined criteria by
           which these often-competing objectives are to be weighed. Second,
           although the agencies are undertaking a variety of steps designed
           to help contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have not
           developed, and agency officials to this point have been unable to
           articulate, a clear plan for how these efforts fit together or the
           extent to which they will assist in containing costs. Finally, the
           agencies are developing a statistical model of fire suppression
           costs that they plan to use to identify when the cost for an
           individual fire may have been excessive. The model compares a
           fire's cost to the costs of suppressing previous fires with
           similar characteristics. However, such comparisons with previous
           fires' costs may not fully consider the potential for managers to
           select less aggressive--and potentially less costly--suppression
           strategies. In addition, the model is still under development and
           may take a number of years to fully refine. Without clear program
           goals and objectives, and corresponding performance measures to
           evaluate progress, the agencies lack the tools to be able to
           determine the effectiveness of their cost-containment efforts.
			  
			  Conclusions

           The federal government is expending substantial effort and
           billions of dollars in attempting to address our nation's wildland
           fire problems. Yet despite promises to do so, the agencies still
           cannot articulate how the steps they are taking fit together to
           form a comprehensive and cohesive strategy to contain costs or to
           address the many wildland fire management problems we and others
           have reported over the last 7 years. Given the interrelated nature
           of wildland fire issues, they cannot be addressed in isolation but
           must be viewed from and addressed within a broader perspective.
           Agencies need to understand how each issue affects the others and
           determine the trade-offs required to effectively meet program
           goals while containing program costs. Therefore, if the agencies
           and the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective
           and affordable long-term approach to responding to these issues,
           agencies need to first develop clearly defined program goals and
           objectives and a strategy to achieve them, including identifying
           associated funding. Because it will likely be at least 2009 before
           the agencies develop a strategy for fuel reduction efforts that
           would meet standards required by the Office of Management and
           Budget, we continue to believe that in the interim, it is
           essential that the agencies create a tactical plan for developing
           this strategy, so that the Congress understands the steps and time
           frames involved with its completion. In doing so, the agencies
           need to make very clear how the final design of FPA will meet the
           key program goals enumerated here, how and when the agencies will
           complete all fire management plans, and what schedule they
           envision for periodically updating LANDFIRE data. At the same
           time, to help address the rising cost of protecting the growing
           number of homes built in the wildland urban interface--a cost that
           may be disproportionately borne by the federal government--federal
           agencies also need to work with relevant state entities to ensure
           that appropriate methods are used for sharing the costs of
           suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple
           jurisdictions.

           Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
           pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the
           Committee may have at this time.
			  
^2GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns
about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities, [22]GAO-06-570
(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006).

^3The wildland-urban interface is defined as the area where structures and
other human developments meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland.

^4 [23]GAO-05-147 .

^5For major federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the
human environment, the National Environmental Policy Act requires all
federal agencies to analyze the environmental impact of the proposed
action. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C).

^6The Wildland Fire Leadership Council was established in April 2002 to
support the implementation and coordination of federal wildland fire
management activities. The council includes membership from Agriculture
and Interior, as well as the agencies with wildland fire management
responsibilities.

^7 [24]GAO-06-570 .
			  
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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?[25]GAO-07-427T .

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Highlights of [26]GAO-07-427T , a testimony before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate

January 30, 2007

WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT

Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts

Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland fires
has increased, often threatening human lives, property, and ecosystems.
The cost of responding to wildland fires has also grown, especially as
more homes are built in or near wildlands, an area called the
wildland-urban interface. Past management practices, including a concerted
federal policy in the 20th century of suppressing fires to protect
communities and ecosystems, unintentionally resulted in steady
accumulation of dense vegetation that can fuel large, intense, and often
costly wildland fires.

GAO was asked to identify actions that federal wildland fire agencies need
to take to help contain federal wildland fire expenditures. GAO has
identified these actions in three of its reports addressing fuel reduction
and cost-sharing efforts and as part of an ongoing review of federal
agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression
costs for this committee. Specifically, GAO focused on examining agencies'
efforts to (1) reduce accumulated fuels and address wildland fire
problems, (2) share with nonfederal entities the costs of responding to
multijurisdictional fires, and (3) contain the costs of preparing for and
responding to wildland fires.

Over the past 7 years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal
wildland fire agencies should take to improve their management of wildland
fire activities, actions that could also help contain the rising federal
expenditures for responding to wildland fires. These agencies--the Forest
Service within the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies
within the Department of the Interior--concurred with GAO's
recommendations but have not completed, or in some cases have not yet
begun, needed actions. GAO's ongoing review of federal agencies' efforts
to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs has also
identified other actions that may be needed. Specifically, the agencies
need to:

           o Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and
           associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire
           problems.  In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and
           their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and the
           cost of suppression efforts, GAO recommended that a cohesive
           strategy be developed that identified the available long-term
           options and associated funding for reducing these fuels. In 2005
           and 2006, because the agencies had not yet developed one, GAO
           reiterated the need for such a strategy but broadened its focus to
           better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction efforts
           and wildland fire response. GAO also recommended that, as an
           interim step, the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining the
           steps and time frames needed for completing a cohesive strategy.
           As of January 2007, the agencies had not developed either a
           cohesive strategy or a tactical plan.
           o Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression
           costs with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to address the rising
           costs of responding to fires that threaten both federal and
           nonfederal lands and resources, GAO recommended that the federal
           agencies provide more specific guidance as to when particular
           cost-sharing methods should be used. The cost-sharing method used
           can have significant financial consequences for the entities
           involved--potentially amounting to millions of dollars. As of
           January 2007, the agencies were updating their guidance on
           possible cost-sharing methods and when each typically would be
           used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that the
           guidance is followed.
           o Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to
           help contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from GAO's
           ongoing work indicate that the effectiveness of agencies' efforts
           to contain costs may be limited because the agencies have not
           clearly defined their cost-containment goals, developed a strategy
           for achieving those goals, or developed related performance
           measures. For these efforts to be effective, the agencies need to
           integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the
           wildland fire program--such as protecting life and property--and
           to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to meet desired goals
           within the context of fiscal constraints.

References

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  19. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  20. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  21. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
  22. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-570
  23. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-147
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  26. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-427T
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