Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders
Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts (30-JAN-07, GAO-07-427T).
Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland
fires has increased, often threatening human lives, property, and
ecosystems. The cost of responding to wildland fires has also
grown, especially as more homes are built in or near wildlands,
an area called the wildland-urban interface. Past management
practices, including a concerted federal policy in the 20th
century of suppressing fires to protect communities and
ecosystems, unintentionally resulted in steady accumulation of
dense vegetation that can fuel large, intense, and often costly
wildland fires. GAO was asked to identify actions that federal
wildland fire agencies need to take to help contain federal
wildland fire expenditures. GAO has identified these actions in
three of its reports addressing fuel reduction and cost-sharing
efforts and as part of an ongoing review of federal agencies'
efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression
costs for this committee. Specifically, GAO focused on examining
agencies' efforts to (1) reduce accumulated fuels and address
wildland fire problems, (2) share with nonfederal entities the
costs of responding to multijurisdictional fires, and (3) contain
the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-427T
ACCNO: A65392
TITLE: Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy
Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts
DATE: 01/30/2007
SUBJECT: Cost analysis
Cost control
Cost sharing (finance)
Disaster planning
Emergency preparedness
Emergency response
Emergency response funds
Financial management
Forest fires
Forest management
Strategic planning
Wildfires
Program goals or objectives
Fire Program Analysis System
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GAO-07-427T
* [1]Summary
* [2]Background
* [3]Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire P
* [4]Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of Suppression Cos
* [5]Lack of Clear Goals and Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies'
* [6]Conclusions
* [7]GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
* [8]GAO's Mission
* [9]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [10]Order by Mail or Phone
* [11]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [12]Congressional Relations
* [13]Public Affairs
Testimony
Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT
Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts
Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director
Natural Resources and Environment
GAO-07-427T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the key actions that we believe
federal wildland fire management agencies--the Forest Service within the
Department of Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the
Interior--need to complete to help contain the rising costs of preparing
for and responding to wildland fires. Increasing wildland fire threats to
communities and ecosystems, combined with rising costs of addressing those
threats--trends that we and others have reported on for many years--have
not abated. On average, the acreage burned annually by wildland fires from
2000 to 2005 was 70 percent greater than the acreage burned annually
during the 1990s. Appropriations for wildland fire management activities
tripled from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to nearly $3 billion in
fiscal year 2005. Although the agencies are still refining their data,
2006 was an especially severe year, with almost 10 million acres burned
and what are likely to be the highest federal fire suppression
expenditures ever. A number of factors have contributed to more-severe
fires and corresponding increases in expenditures for wildland fire
management activities. These factors include an accumulation of fuels due
to past fire suppression policies; severe weather and drought in some
areas of the country; and growing numbers of homes built in or near
wildlands, an area often called the wildland-urban interface. In light of
the federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation,
attention has increasingly focused on ways to contain these growing
expenditures and to ensure that the agencies' wildland fire activities are
appropriate and carried out in a cost-effective and efficient manner.
My testimony today includes findings from three of our recent reports,
plus preliminary findings from work under way, which together summarize
key wildland fire management weaknesses we have identified over the last 7
years, as well as critical actions the agencies need to complete if they
are to effectively contain the rising costs of responding to wildland
fires. Specifically, my testimony focuses on three issues: the agencies'
efforts to (1) reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems,^1 (2)
share with nonfederal entities the costs of responding to fires that burn
or threaten to burn multiple jurisdictions,^2 and (3) contain federal
expenditures of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. To
evaluate these issues, we reviewed selected reports that we have issued
since 2000, as well as those by other federal agencies or outside
organizations, that assessed federal wildland fire management. We reviewed
pertinent agency plans, policies, procedures, reports, and financial
documents, and we interviewed federal and nonfederal officials to identify
steps federal agencies have taken to address these areas and the
challenges remaining. We performed our work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards from May 2006 through January 2007.
^1GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to
Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats,
[14]GAO-06-671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006); Wildland Fire Management:
Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a
Cohesive Strategy, [15]GAO-05-147 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).
Summary
In summary, federal wildland fire management agencies need to take a
number of actions to strengthen their overall management of the wildland
fire program, actions that could lead to more effective and efficient use
of scarce resources and help the agencies to better contain costs. While
we have made a number of recommendations over the last 7 years to improve
wildland fire management--and agencies have largely concurred with these
recommendations--the agencies have made limited progress in implementing
the needed changes. Further, our preliminary work on federal agencies'
efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs has
also identified other actions that may be needed. Specifically, we believe
that the agencies need to:
o Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and
associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire
problems. In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and
their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and
cost of suppression efforts, we recommended that a cohesive
strategy be developed that identified the available long-term
options and associated funding for reducing fuels. By 2005, the
agencies had yet to develop such a strategy, and we reiterated the
need for a cohesive strategy and broadened our recommendation's
focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction
efforts and wildland fire response. We also recommended that the
agencies develop a tactical plan outlining the steps and time
frames needed for completing a cohesive strategy. Such a strategy
and plan would be helpful to the Congress and the agencies in
making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term
approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems.
Although the agencies concurred with our recommendations, as of
January 2007, neither a cohesive strategy nor a tactical plan had
been developed.
o Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression
costs with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to help address the
rising costs of responding to fires that threaten both federal and
nonfederal lands and resources, we recommended that the federal
agencies, working with relevant state entities, clarify the
financial responsibility for these fires and provide more specific
guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be
used. The method used to share the costs of suppressing a wildland
fire among responsible entities can have significant financial
consequences for the entities involved--potentially amounting to
millions of dollars. The need for clarity about how to share the
rising costs of wildland fire protection is becoming more acute as
increasing numbers of homes are built in areas at risk from
wildland fires. As of January 2007, the agencies were updating
guidance on possible methods for sharing costs between federal and
nonfederal entities and the circumstances when each method
typically would be used. It is unclear, however, how the agencies
will ensure that such guidance is followed.
o Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to
help contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from our
work under way for this committee indicate that, although the
agencies have taken certain steps to help contain wildland fire
costs, the effectiveness of these steps may be limited because
agencies have not established clear cost-containment goals,
strategies to achieve those goals, or effective performance
measures to track their progress.
Each of these efforts plays an important role in addressing the
issue of containing wildland fire costs, but none of them alone
can solve the problem. For cost-containment efforts to be
effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals
with the other goals of the wildland fire program--such as
protecting life, resources, and property--and to recognize that
trade-offs will be needed to meet desired goals within the context
of fiscal constraints. Further, because the agencies' efforts to
reduce fuels and to prepare for and suppress wildland fires are
interrelated, the cohesive strategy we previously recommended for
responding to wildland fires is fundamental if agencies are to
contain costs.
Background
Wildland fires ignited by lightning are both natural and
inevitable and play an important ecological role on the nation's
landscape. In addition to maintaining habitat diversity, releasing
soil nutrients, and causing the seeds of fire-dependent species to
germinate, fire periodically removes undergrowth, small trees, and
vegetation that can otherwise build up and intensify subsequent
fires. However, various human land use and management practices,
including decades of suppressing wildland fires, have altered the
normal frequency of fires in many forest and rangeland ecosystems,
leading to uncharacteristically dense vegetation and atypical fire
patterns in some places. At the same time, more homes and
communities are being built in areas where fires can occur,
increasing risks to human life, property, and infrastructure.
Experts estimate that between 1990 and 2000, 60 percent of all new
housing units in the United States were built in the
wildland-urban interface, and by 2000, about 38 percent of housing
units overall were located in the wildland-urban interface.^3
Recent media reports indicate that this trend of growth in the
wildland-urban interface continues. Finally, agency analyses
indicate that climate change and related drought may also be
responsible for significant increases in the occurrence of, and
costs of responding to, wildland fire.
Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the
cost of fighting them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally
reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. For decades,
federal agencies aggressively suppressed wildland fires and were
generally successful in decreasing the number of acres burned. In
some areas of the country, however, rather than eliminating severe
wildland fires, decades of suppression disrupted ecological cycles
and began to change the structure and makeup of forests and
rangelands, increasing the land's susceptibility to fire.
Increasingly, the agencies have recognized the key role that fire
plays in many ecosystems and the utility of fire itself as a tool
in managing forests and watersheds. The agencies worked together
to develop the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy in 1995,
which for the first time formally recognized the essential role
that fire plays in maintaining natural systems. This policy was
subsequently reaffirmed and updated in 2001. In addition to noting
the negative effects of past wildland fire suppression, the policy
also recognized that continued development in the wildland-urban
interface has placed more values at risk from wildland fire while
increasing the complexity and cost of wildland fire suppression
operations.
To help address these trends, the policy directed agencies to
consider management objectives and the values at risk when
determining how or whether to suppress a wildland fire. Under this
approach, termed "appropriate management response," the agencies
may fight fires that threaten communities or other highly valued
areas more aggressively than they fight fires in remote areas or
in areas where natural fuel reduction would be beneficial. In some
cases, the agencies may simply monitor the fire, or take only
limited suppression actions, to ensure that it continues to pose
little threat to valued resources. Under current interagency
policy, local federal units must develop land management and fire
management plans that document approved fire management strategies
for each acre of burnable land and other important information
about how the land will be managed, including local values at
risk, needed local fuel reduction, and rehabilitation actions.
Once a fire starts, land management and fire management
specialists are to identify and implement the appropriate
management response, in accordance with the unit's approved land
and fire management plans.
Responding to wildland fires--which can burn across federal and
nonfederal jurisdictions--often requires coordination and
collaboration among federal, tribal, state, and local firefighting
entities to effectively protect lives, homes, and resources. Five
federal agencies--the Forest Service within the Department of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service
within the Department of the Interior--fight wildland fires. These
federal agencies work together with nonfederal firefighting
entities to share personnel, equipment, and supplies and to fight
fires, regardless of which entities have jurisdiction over the
burning lands. Agreements developed and agreed to by cooperating
entities, commonly referred to as master agreements, govern
cooperative fire protection efforts and include general provisions
for sharing firefighting costs among responsible entities.
Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Problems
Agencies need a cohesive strategy that identifies the available
long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess
vegetation and responding to wildland fires if the agencies and
the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and
affordable long-term approach for addressing problems that have
been decades in the making. We first recommended that the agencies
develop such a strategy for addressing fuels in 1999. After we
evaluated a number of related wildland fire management issues, we
reiterated our recommendation in 2005 and 2006 but also recognized
that a comprehensive solution needs to address not only reducing
fuels but also an overall response to wildland fire. To develop an
effective overall strategy, agencies need to complete several key
tasks, which address weaknesses we previously identified.
Our 2005 report summarized several weaknesses in the federal
government's management of fuel reduction and related wildland
fire programs and identified a number of actions to address these
weaknesses.^4 Specifically, these weaknesses included the
following: the agencies lacked basic data, such as the extent and
location of lands needing fuel reduction; the agencies needed to
identify and prioritize fuel reduction projects; many federal land
management units did not have fire management plans that met
agency requirements designed to restore fire's natural role in
ecosystems consistent with human health and safety; and the
agencies were unable to assess the extent to which they were
reducing wildland fire risks, to establish meaningful fuel
reduction performance measures, or to determine the
cost-effectiveness of these efforts because they lacked needed
data. We also identified a number of tasks the agencies needed to
complete to develop a cohesive strategy. These tasks included
finishing data systems that are needed to identify the extent,
severity, and location of wildland fire threats in our national
forests and rangelands; updating local fire management plans to
better specify the actions needed to effectively address these
threats; and assessing the cost-effectiveness and affordability of
options for reducing fuels and responding to wildland fire
problems.
The agencies have made some progress on the three primary tasks we
identified as important to developing a wildland fire management
strategy, although concerns have been raised about when or whether
the agencies will successfully complete them. More specifically,
o LANDFIRE, a geospatial data and modeling system, is being
designed to assist the agencies in identifying the extent,
severity, and location of wildland fire threats to the nation's
communities and ecosystems. LANDFIRE data are nearly complete for
most of the western United States, with data for the remainder of
the country scheduled to be completed in 2009. The agencies will
need to ensure, however, that LANDFIRE data are kept current in
order to reflect landscape-altering events, such as large fires
and hurricanes, and they do not yet have a plan to do so.
o In 2006, we reported that 95 percent of the agencies' individual
land management units had completed fire management plans in
accordance with agency requirements promulgated in 2001. However,
the agencies do not require regular plan updates to ensure that
new data (from LANDFIRE, for example) are incorporated into the
plans. Moreover, in the wake of two court decisions--each holding
that the Forest Service was required to prepare an environmental
assessment or environmental impact statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)^5 to accompany the relevant fire
management plan--the Forest Service decided to withdraw the two
plans instead of completing them. It is unclear whether the agency
would withdraw other fire management plans successfully challenged
under NEPA; nor is it clear whether or to what extent such agency
decisions could undermine the interagency policy directing that
every burnable acre have a fire management plan. Without such
plans, however, current agency policy does not allow use of the
entire range of wildland fire response strategies, including less
aggressive, and potentially less costly, strategies.
o The Fire Program Analysis (FPA) system is a computer-based model
designed to assist the agencies in cost-effectively allocating the
resources necessary to address wildland fires. FPA is being
designed in two phases. Phase I was intended to provide
information for use in allocating resources for the initial
responses to fires and in developing estimates for agencies'
fiscal year 2008 budgets. Phase II was to be focused on additional
activities, including fuel reduction and large-fire suppression. A
"midcourse review" of FPA, completed in 2006, however, has
resulted in recent endorsement by the Wildland Fire Leadership
Council^6 of what may be significant design modifications to
FPA--ones that may not fulfill key project goals of (1) optimizing
how resources are allocated, (2) linking fuel reduction to future
preparedness and suppression costs, (3) ensuring comparability
among different agencies' analyses and resulting decisions, and
(4) enabling aggregation of local costs to identify national
options and related budgets. Agencies plan to have a prototype of
phase II, reflecting this design modification, completed by June
2007. According to a program official, the prototype will enable
project managers to assess and report to the leadership council on
the planned scope, schedule, and cost of FPA, including whether or
not they will meet the scheduled completion date of June 2008.
Further, gaps in the data collected for FPA may also reduce its
usefulness in allocating resources.
Although the agencies had made progress on these three primary
tasks at the time of our 2006 update, they had not developed
either a cohesive strategy identifying options for reducing fuels
or a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps, together
with related time frames, the agencies would take to complete a
cohesive strategy, as we recommended in our 2005 report. In
February 2006, the agencies issued an interagency document titled
Protecting People and Natural Resources: A Cohesive Fuels
Treatment Strategy, but we found that the document did not
identify long-term options or associated funding for reducing
fuels and responding to wildland fires. During our update,
officials from the Office of Management and Budget stated that it
would not allow the agencies to publish long-term funding
estimates until the agencies had sufficiently reliable data on
which to base the estimates. The agencies commented that having
such data would not be possible until LANDFIRE and FPA were more
fully operational. We continue to believe that until a cohesive
strategy can be developed, it is essential that the agencies
create a tactical plan for developing this strategy, so the
Congress understands the steps and time frames involved in
completing the strategy.
Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of Suppression Costs
between Federal and Nonfederal Entities
Federal agencies need to take steps to improve the framework for
sharing wildland fire suppression costs between federal and
nonfederal entities. Effective sharing of suppression costs among
responsible entities can play a role in helping to contain federal
expenditures, especially with the growing number of homes in areas
at risk from wildland fire that may require protection. We
recommended in our 2006 report that federal agencies work with
relevant state entities to clarify the financial responsibilities
for suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across
multiple jurisdictions and provide more specific guidance as to
when particular cost-sharing methods should be used.^7 As of
January 2007, the agencies were updating guidance on options for
sharing costs and under what circumstances each would typically be
used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that such
guidance is followed.
We found that federal and nonfederal entities used a variety of
methods to share the costs of fighting wildland fires affecting
both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Agreements
between federal and nonfederal entities--known as master
agreements--provide the framework for those entities to share
suppression costs for wildland fires that burn or threaten both
federal and nonfederal lands and resources. These agreements
typically list several available cost-sharing methods. The
agreements we reviewed, however, often lacked clear guidance for
officials to use in deciding which method to apply for a specific
fire. Clear guidance is important because local representatives of
federal and nonfederal firefighting entities responsible for
protecting lands and resources affected by the fire use this
guidance in deciding which costs will be shared and for what
period. We found, however, that cost-sharing methods were applied
inconsistently within and among states, even for fires with
similar characteristics. For example, in one state we reviewed,
the costs for suppressing a large fire that threatened homes were
shared solely according to the proportion of acres burned within
each entity's area of fire protection responsibility, a method
that has traditionally been used. Yet costs for a similar fire
within the same state were shared differently. For this fire, the
state agreed to pay for certain aircraft and fire engines used to
protect the wildland-urban interface, while the remaining costs
were shared on the basis of acres burned. In contrast to the two
methods applied in this state, officials in another state used yet
a different cost-sharing method for two similar large fires that
threatened homes, apportioning costs each day for personnel,
aircraft, and equipment deployed on particular lands, such as the
wildland-urban interface. The type of cost-sharing method
ultimately used can have significant financial consequences for
the entities involved, potentially amounting to millions of
dollars. Moreover, as we reported, federal officials expressed
concern that the existing cost-sharing framework insulated state
and local governments from the cost of providing wildland fire
protection in the wildland-urban interface, thus reducing the
incentive for state and local governments to adopt laws--such as
building codes that require fire-resistant materials in areas at
high risk of wildland fires--that in the long run could help
reduce the cost of suppressing wildland fires.
We recommended in our 2006 report that the federal agencies work
with relevant state entities to clarify the financial
responsibility for fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across
multiple jurisdictions and develop more specific guidance as to
when particular cost-sharing methods should be used. The federal
agencies generally agreed with our findings and recommendations
and agreed to improve the guidance on sharing suppression costs.
As of January 2007, the agencies were updating guidance that can
be used when developing master agreements between cooperating
federal and nonfederal entities, as well as agreements on how to
share costs for a specific fire. Agency officials said that this
guidance provides additional information about potential methods
for sharing costs and about the circumstances under which each
cost-sharing method would typically be used. It is unclear,
however, how the agencies will ensure that the guidance is
followed. Further, because master agreements are updated only
every 5 years, it may take a number of years before the new
guidance is fully incorporated into master agreements between
cooperating entities.
Lack of Clear Goals and Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies�
Efforts to Contain Wildland Fire Costs
Preliminary findings from our ongoing work for the committee show
that, despite dozens of federal and nonfederal studies issued
since 2000 that consistently identified similar areas needing
improvement to help contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have
made little progress in addressing these areas. Areas identified
as needing improvement to help contain costs--in addition to
reducing fuels and cost sharing discussed previously--include
acquiring and using firefighting personnel and equipment,
selecting appropriate strategies for responding to wildland fires,
and effectively managing cost-containment efforts. Although the
agencies have begun taking steps to address some of the areas
previous studies have identified as needing improvement, much work
remains to be done. For example:
o Acquiring and using personnel and equipment. The agencies have
taken steps to improve their ability to track and deploy personnel
and equipment, but they have made little progress in completing
the more fundamental step of determining the quantity and type of
firefighting assets needed based on an analysis of values at risk
and appropriate suppression strategies. Further, although the
Forest Service has identified a series of improvements it plans to
make in the acquisition process, it has so far made little
progress.
o Selecting appropriate suppression strategies. The agencies have
also begun to improve analytic tools that assist land and fire
managers identify the appropriate suppression strategy for a given
fire, but shortcomings remain. Federal policies encourage the use
of less intensive suppression strategies when possible, strategies
that may also be less costly. Land and fire managers, however, may
be reluctant to employ anything less than full suppression because
of concerns that a fire will escape control. Currently, much of
the information managers use to estimate potential fire size,
risks, and costs are based on their individual experiences, which
can vary widely. Researchers are developing a new suite of tools
that will analyze fuel conditions and predicted weather conditions
to model expected fire growth and behavior and provide better
information for managers making fire response decisions, but as of
January 2007, these new tools were still being developed and
tested.
o Managing cost-containment efforts. The steps the agencies have
taken to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key
elements fundamental to sound program management, such as clearly
defining cost-containment goals, developing a strategy for
achieving those goals, and measuring progress toward achieving
them. First, the agencies have not clearly articulated the goals
of their cost-containment efforts. For cost-containment efforts to
be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment
goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program--such as
protecting life, property, and resources. For example, the
agencies have established the goal of suppressing wildland fires
at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public safety and
values being protected, but they have not defined criteria by
which these often-competing objectives are to be weighed. Second,
although the agencies are undertaking a variety of steps designed
to help contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have not
developed, and agency officials to this point have been unable to
articulate, a clear plan for how these efforts fit together or the
extent to which they will assist in containing costs. Finally, the
agencies are developing a statistical model of fire suppression
costs that they plan to use to identify when the cost for an
individual fire may have been excessive. The model compares a
fire's cost to the costs of suppressing previous fires with
similar characteristics. However, such comparisons with previous
fires' costs may not fully consider the potential for managers to
select less aggressive--and potentially less costly--suppression
strategies. In addition, the model is still under development and
may take a number of years to fully refine. Without clear program
goals and objectives, and corresponding performance measures to
evaluate progress, the agencies lack the tools to be able to
determine the effectiveness of their cost-containment efforts.
Conclusions
The federal government is expending substantial effort and
billions of dollars in attempting to address our nation's wildland
fire problems. Yet despite promises to do so, the agencies still
cannot articulate how the steps they are taking fit together to
form a comprehensive and cohesive strategy to contain costs or to
address the many wildland fire management problems we and others
have reported over the last 7 years. Given the interrelated nature
of wildland fire issues, they cannot be addressed in isolation but
must be viewed from and addressed within a broader perspective.
Agencies need to understand how each issue affects the others and
determine the trade-offs required to effectively meet program
goals while containing program costs. Therefore, if the agencies
and the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective
and affordable long-term approach to responding to these issues,
agencies need to first develop clearly defined program goals and
objectives and a strategy to achieve them, including identifying
associated funding. Because it will likely be at least 2009 before
the agencies develop a strategy for fuel reduction efforts that
would meet standards required by the Office of Management and
Budget, we continue to believe that in the interim, it is
essential that the agencies create a tactical plan for developing
this strategy, so that the Congress understands the steps and time
frames involved with its completion. In doing so, the agencies
need to make very clear how the final design of FPA will meet the
key program goals enumerated here, how and when the agencies will
complete all fire management plans, and what schedule they
envision for periodically updating LANDFIRE data. At the same
time, to help address the rising cost of protecting the growing
number of homes built in the wildland urban interface--a cost that
may be disproportionately borne by the federal government--federal
agencies also need to work with relevant state entities to ensure
that appropriate methods are used for sharing the costs of
suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple
jurisdictions.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the
Committee may have at this time.
^2GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns
about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities, [22]GAO-06-570
(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006).
^3The wildland-urban interface is defined as the area where structures and
other human developments meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland.
^4 [23]GAO-05-147 .
^5For major federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the
human environment, the National Environmental Policy Act requires all
federal agencies to analyze the environmental impact of the proposed
action. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C).
^6The Wildland Fire Leadership Council was established in April 2002 to
support the implementation and coordination of federal wildland fire
management activities. The council includes membership from Agriculture
and Interior, as well as the agencies with wildland fire management
responsibilities.
^7 [24]GAO-06-570 .
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this statement. David P. Bixler, Assistant Director;
Ellen W. Chu; Jonathan Dent; Janet Frisch; Chester Joy; and
Richard Johnson made key contributions to this statement.
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Highlights of [26]GAO-07-427T , a testimony before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate
January 30, 2007
WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT
Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts
Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland fires
has increased, often threatening human lives, property, and ecosystems.
The cost of responding to wildland fires has also grown, especially as
more homes are built in or near wildlands, an area called the
wildland-urban interface. Past management practices, including a concerted
federal policy in the 20th century of suppressing fires to protect
communities and ecosystems, unintentionally resulted in steady
accumulation of dense vegetation that can fuel large, intense, and often
costly wildland fires.
GAO was asked to identify actions that federal wildland fire agencies need
to take to help contain federal wildland fire expenditures. GAO has
identified these actions in three of its reports addressing fuel reduction
and cost-sharing efforts and as part of an ongoing review of federal
agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression
costs for this committee. Specifically, GAO focused on examining agencies'
efforts to (1) reduce accumulated fuels and address wildland fire
problems, (2) share with nonfederal entities the costs of responding to
multijurisdictional fires, and (3) contain the costs of preparing for and
responding to wildland fires.
Over the past 7 years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal
wildland fire agencies should take to improve their management of wildland
fire activities, actions that could also help contain the rising federal
expenditures for responding to wildland fires. These agencies--the Forest
Service within the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies
within the Department of the Interior--concurred with GAO's
recommendations but have not completed, or in some cases have not yet
begun, needed actions. GAO's ongoing review of federal agencies' efforts
to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs has also
identified other actions that may be needed. Specifically, the agencies
need to:
o Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and
associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire
problems. In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and
their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and the
cost of suppression efforts, GAO recommended that a cohesive
strategy be developed that identified the available long-term
options and associated funding for reducing these fuels. In 2005
and 2006, because the agencies had not yet developed one, GAO
reiterated the need for such a strategy but broadened its focus to
better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction efforts
and wildland fire response. GAO also recommended that, as an
interim step, the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining the
steps and time frames needed for completing a cohesive strategy.
As of January 2007, the agencies had not developed either a
cohesive strategy or a tactical plan.
o Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression
costs with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to address the rising
costs of responding to fires that threaten both federal and
nonfederal lands and resources, GAO recommended that the federal
agencies provide more specific guidance as to when particular
cost-sharing methods should be used. The cost-sharing method used
can have significant financial consequences for the entities
involved--potentially amounting to millions of dollars. As of
January 2007, the agencies were updating their guidance on
possible cost-sharing methods and when each typically would be
used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that the
guidance is followed.
o Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to
help contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from GAO's
ongoing work indicate that the effectiveness of agencies' efforts
to contain costs may be limited because the agencies have not
clearly defined their cost-containment goals, developed a strategy
for achieving those goals, or developed related performance
measures. For these efforts to be effective, the agencies need to
integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the
wildland fire program--such as protecting life and property--and
to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to meet desired goals
within the context of fiscal constraints.
References
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17. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/
18. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
19. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
20. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
21. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
22. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-570
23. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-147
24. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-570
25. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-427T
26. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07427t.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-427T
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