Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports
in Disaster Planning and Recovery (28-MAR-07, GAO-07-412).	 
                                                                 
U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than
2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually.	 
Since Sept. 11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports'	 
preparedness has been on preventing potential acts of terror, the
2005 hurricane season renewed focus on how to protect ports from 
a diversity of threats, including natural disasters. This report 
was prepared under the authority of the Comptroller General to	 
examine (1) challenges port authorities have experienced as a	 
result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way to	 
address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port	 
authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents	 
and interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S.	 
ports.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-412 					        
    ACCNO:   A67385						        
  TITLE:     Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would  
Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery			 
     DATE:   03/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Cargo security					 
	     Critical infrastructure				 
	     Critical infrastructure protection 		 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Harbors						 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Hurricanes 					 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     Port security					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Ships						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Program coordination				 

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GAO-07-412

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Port Activities Involve Many Different Entities
          * [4]Federal Role in Port Activities Is Extensive

               * [5]Federal Disaster Planning Guidance

     * [6]Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; So

          * [7]Damage to Infrastructure Affected Operations at Most Ports E
          * [8]Difficulties with Personnel, Communication, and Coordination

     * [9]Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate

          * [10]Steps Taken Include Port-Specific and Industry-Wide Actions
          * [11]Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination
          * [12]Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Rec

     * [13]Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination amo

          * [14]Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted
          * [15]Under the Separate Approach, Disaster Plans Show Wide Variat
          * [16]Combined All-Hazards Approach Shows Promise for Improved Pla

               * [17]Federal Actions Reflect Movement Toward All-Hazards
                 Approach
               * [18]Port Authorities Using an All-Hazards Approach Indicate
                 Bene

          * [19]Under the Separate Approach, Gaps Exist in Coordinating Mari

     * [20]Conclusions
     * [21]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [22]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [23]Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
     * [24]Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Securi
     * [25]Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [26]GAO Contact
          * [27]Staff Acknowledgments

               * [28]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

March 2007

PORT RISK MANAGEMENT

Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and
Recovery

GAO-07-412

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 10
Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery
Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected 18
Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate Challenges 23
Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All Port
Stakeholders 31
Conclusions 40
Recommendations for Executive Action 41
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 45
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 50
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Tables

Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles 11
Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports 14
Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited 38
Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs 40

Figures

Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews 4
Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998 7
Figure 3: Port Elements 13
Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework 17

Abbreviations

AAPA American Association of Port Authorities
AMSC Area Maritime Security Committee
COTP Captain of the Port
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GICA Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association
LEA Local Emergency Management Agency
MIRP Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan
MSRAM Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
NIMS National Incident Management System
NRP National Response Plan
SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

March 28, 2007 

Congressional Committees: 

U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and
import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S.
international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to
world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important as
they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of
natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports
throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of
hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly
susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or
months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery a
concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as
well. U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic
and import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S.
international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to
world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important as
they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of
natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports
throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of
hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly
susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or
months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery a
concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as
well.

Ports' complexities exacerbate the difficulty of taking adequate steps to
deal with possible natural disasters. Ports are often sprawling
enterprises, and each port is unique. Further, a "port" is seldom a single
entity. Rather, a port is usually a collection of varied maritime
stakeholders. Ports usually include a public entity, such as a port
authority. The role of port authorities varies from port to port. For
example, the Port of Mobile operates a coal plant in the port, but it also
has tenants that lease and operate their own facilities in the port area.
Other ports, such as the Port of Miami, are owned and managed by county
government,^1 but terminal operators are responsible for the day-to-day
maintenance and repair of the terminal area. Besides port authorities,
port stakeholders include shipping companies and other tenants that may be
leasing port authority facilities, factories and other industries located
in the area, and local and state law enforcement and emergency management
agencies. Terminals or facilities may also be privately owned. Federal
agencies also have a role at ports including the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast
Guard), U.S. Army Corps of Ports' complexities exacerbate the difficulty
of taking adequate steps to deal with possible natural disasters. Ports
are often sprawling enterprises, and each port is unique. Further, a
"port" is seldom a single entity. Rather, a port is usually a collection
of varied maritime stakeholders. Ports usually include a public entity,
such as a port authority. The role of port authorities varies from port to
port. For example, the Port of Mobile operates a coal plant in the port,
but it also has tenants that lease and operate their own facilities in the
port area. Other ports, such as the Port of Miami, are owned and managed
by county government,^1 but terminal operators are responsible for the
day-to-day maintenance and repair of the terminal area. Besides port
authorities, port stakeholders include shipping companies and other
tenants that may be leasing port authority facilities, factories and other
industries located in the area, and local and state law enforcement and
emergency management agencies. Terminals or facilities may also be
privately owned. Federal agencies also have a role at ports including the
U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Maritime Administration.^23 Despite these complexities, ports have various
forums in which these maritime stakeholders can coordinate on issues that
affect the port as a whole. For terrorism concerns, for example, major
U.S. ports have a Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) that provides a
venue for discussing security concerns. For disaster relief concerns, U.S.
ports would work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
regarding disaster assistance.

^1The Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami-Dade is owned and managed by the
local government, Miami-Dade County.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of the focus on
emergency preparedness has been on preparedness for preventing, mitigating
the effects of, and responding to terrorist attacks. Through legislation
and presidential directives, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
the primary federal organization responsible for preparing the nation both
for terrorist attacks and for major disasters. Homeland Security
Presidential Directives 5 and 8 require that DHS establish a single,
comprehensive approach to and plans for the management of emergency events
whether the result of terrorist attacks or large-scale natural or
accidental disasters.^4 As we have previously reported, the capabilities
needed to respond to major disasters, whether the result of a terrorist
attack or nature, are similar in many ways. The devastating hurricane
season of 2005, which included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,
focused renewed attention on the potential effects that natural disasters
could pose to port operations. The numerous vulnerabilities port
operations face, together with the limited resources available to deal
with them, have also initiated a renewed look at how to protect ports from
a variety of threats.

In light of the continued attention both to port security and to federal
natural disaster response, we are providing a comprehensive view of steps
ports have taken to prepare and mitigate the impacts of natural disasters.
Consequently, we conducted this review, initiated under the Comptroller
General's authority, to examine port disaster preparedness measures and to
examine the federal role in helping ports plan and recover from natural
disaster impacts. More specifically, this report examines (1) the
challenges port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural
disasters, (2) the efforts under way to address challenges from these
disasters, and (3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural
disasters and the effect of this approach on their ability to share
information with port stakeholders and access federal resources.

^2In this report, "port" usually refers to one of two things: (1) the port
authority or (2) the collective group of stakeholders. We have taken care
to ensure that the reference intended is clear. Where necessary, we have
inserted clarifying language (such as "port authority") to help ensure
clarity.

^3Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116
Stat. 2064.

^4GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, [29]GAO-05-652 (Washington, D.C.:
July, 11, 2005).

To address the challenges port authorities experience as a result of
recent disasters and the efforts to address these challenges, we selected
17 U.S. ports for review (see fig. 1). We focused primarily on commercial
ports and various commercial aspects of these ports. The criteria we used
included selecting ports that (1) varied in size (based on cargo value)
and (2) varied in the degree to which they had experienced some type of
natural disaster since 1998.^5 Based on guidance from DHS regarding the
most significant natural disaster threats to ports, we limited the natural
disasters we considered to earthquakes and hurricanes. In particular, we
focused on ports impacted by the 2005 hurricane season; in all, 11 of the
17 ports we selected were affected by hurricanes that year. We conducted
site visits at 7 of the 17 ports, where we interviewed various maritime
stakeholders, including officials from the port authorities, emergency
management agencies, and federal agencies such as the Coast Guard, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Maritime Administration, and FEMA. We contacted
the remaining 10 ports by telephone and conducted a more limited range of
interviews. For all 17 ports, we reviewed numerous planning documents,
including emergency operations plans, business continuity plans, and
hurricane plans.

^5We chose 1998 as the cutoff date for recent disasters based on the
available data from FEMA.

Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews

To determine the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters
and its effect on information sharing and access to federal resources, we
relied primarily on information obtained from our 17 case studies and
phone interviews, supplementing it as necessary with other information
related to risk management and disaster planning. For perspective on risk
management, we used our body of work related to risk management throughout
the federal government^6 and supplemented it with additional risk
management models and tools from a wide range of federal, professional,
and academic stakeholders, as well as interviews and documents from the
Coast Guard and offices within DHS. We did not include any separate
planning efforts conducted by private operators, for two key reasons:
their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to port and;
unlike their planning efforts for homeland security, their efforts for
natural disasters are not subject to the same type of federal requirements
or guidelines. We performed our work from December 2005 through March
2007, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
See appendix I for more detail regarding our objectives, scope, and
methodology.

Results in Brief

Port authorities reported experiencing many different kinds of challenges
during recent natural disasters, with communication, personnel, and
interagency coordination reported as the most problematic challenges. This
was particularly true for ports that were impacted by the 2005 hurricane
season. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had experienced at least one
hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and of these, 8 reported one or more
types of challenges in responding (see fig. 2). The most visibly apparent
challenge port authorities experienced was dealing with damaged
infrastructure, including structural damage to buildings and piers, and
silting and debris clogging key waterways. Port authorities also reported
difficulties restoring power, water, and other utilities. However, the
greatest challenges port officials said they experienced--and in many
cases did not anticipate--were in the following other areas:

           o Communications. Many ports experienced difficulties in
           communicating both outside the port and with port personnel and
           other port stakeholders. Phone outages were extensive and cell
           phone reception was limited. For example, one port was without
           services for 2 to 4 weeks following Hurricane Katrina.
           o Personnel. When many port personnel around the Gulf area were
           evacuated from their homes, the evacuation caused problems both in
           locating personnel and also in letting them know they should
           return to work.
           o Coordination. Officials reported difficulties coordinating with
           local, state, and federal stakeholders, especially for planning
           and recovery efforts. For example, in some cases, port officials
           had difficulty re-entering the port because they lacked the
           credentials required by local police and other emergency
           management officials. Some ports also reported difficulty
           accessing federal resources for recovery efforts. For example,
           officials at some ports said they had problems understanding the
           process in filing for disaster assistance and coordinating damage
           assessments with FEMA or were unaware of resources available
           through the Maritime Administration, such as ships that could be
           used for housing or for conveying supplies.

           Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998

           Port authorities and other stakeholders reported taking a variety
           of steps to address these challenges. Port authorities have
           replaced, repaired, and created redundancies for a variety of
           communications systems and physical infrastructure--for example,
           purchasing backup phone systems and power generators, creating
           alternative administrative sites, and developing alternative
           storage for computer information. Though the 2005 hurricane season
           primarily affected Gulf ports, port authority officials elsewhere
           said the results of that season prompted them to improve their
           preparation as well. One key effort was undertaken by the American
           Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), an industry group. It
           convened work groups to discuss lessons learned and, based on the
           input, issued a manual with guidance for ports on such issues as
           developing alternative communications, setting up an emergency
           operations center, and identifying federal resources for recovery
           efforts. Port authorities reported their changes often extended to
           improving coordination with other stakeholders. Some ports adapted
           forums intended for security planning, such as their AMSC, while
           others with existing natural disaster forums took steps to
           strengthen them. Some port authorities also established plans for
           coordinating with neighboring ports. Actions have also been taken
           at the federal level. For example, the Maritime Administration,
           contributed to a one-time plan developed by FEMA--the Federal
           Support Plan. This plan was specifically cited for the 2006
           Hurricane Season and was specific to the federal government's
           response to support the State of Louisiana. The Maritime
           Administration contributed to this plan by identifying government
           and commercial maritime capabilities that could be employed in
           response to a disaster. To date, while the Maritime Administration
           plans to provide a directive regarding capabilities to all of
           their regional offices in June 2007, no plan exists for
           communicating this information to ports.

           Port authorities we reviewed generally conducted their natural
           disaster planning separately from planning for homeland security
           threats, and this approach has reduced their ability to facilitate
           sharing natural disaster planning information among key
           stakeholders and to access federal resources. Planning for
           homeland security, an activity that is governed by federal law,
           tends to be consistent from port to port. By contrast, natural
           disaster planning, which is not subject to the same type of
           specific federal requirements, varied considerably at the ports we
           reviewed in its extent and thoroughness. Separate planning for
           these two threats means that ports are not able to effectively
           estimate the impact of mitigation alternatives and optimize their
           investments in these alternatives based on costs and benefits.
           Industry experts and port stakeholders, such as the Coast Guard,
           are now encouraging unified consideration of all risks faced by
           ports, but we found few port authorities were taking a unified
           approach. One consequence of divided planning is that key
           stakeholders were not necessarily participating in natural
           disaster planning. Unlike security planning, where the Secretary
           of Homeland Security can establish an AMSC with broad
           representation across port stakeholders, natural disaster planning
           carries no such requirement. During our review, we found
           substantial variation in the maturity of, and participation in,
           natural disaster planning forums at ports. In particular, one port
           had no forum that brought together the port authority and the
           local disaster planning agency, which had knowledge of available
           federal resources, such as FEMA grant programs, as well as the
           expertise to deal with grant requirements. In the absence of such
           a forum, it is not surprising that some ports were limited in
           their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster
           mitigation and postdisaster recovery. To help improve information
           sharing, some ports have begun using their federally authorized
           AMSC, or some other similar forum with wide representation, in
           disaster planning efforts. DHS, which through the Coast Guard
           coordinates the AMSCs, provides an example of how to incorporate a
           wider scope of committee activity for ports across the country.

           To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural
           disasters and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we
           are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
           Security encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for
           discussing their all-hazards planning efforts and include
           appropriate representatives from DHS, the port authority,
           representatives from the local emergency management office, the
           Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility owner/operators.
           To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime
           disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of
           the Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the
           Maritime Administration to develop a communication strategy to
           inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery
           efforts.

           In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS, the Department of
           Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Defense (DOD)
           generally agreed with the facts presented. In its letter, DHS did
           not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency
           planning on existing committees in ports and said these
           responsibilities should remain with state and local emergency
           management planners. Our recommendation was not to place
           responsibility for such planning within port committees, but
           rather to use these existing forums as a way to engage all
           relevant parties in discussing natural disaster planning for
           ports. DOT officials provided a number of comments and
           clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the
           accuracy of our report. The DOT generally concurred with GAO's
           recommendation. The DOD provided technical comments and
           clarifications.
			  
			  Background
			  
			  Port Activities Involve Many Different Entities

           Ports comprise many different stakeholders, both public and
           private. Port authorities also may have jurisdiction over some or
           all of the geographical area of a port. The port authority can be
           an agency of the state, county, or city in which the port is
           located. In most ports in North America, the actual task of
           loading and unloading goods is carried out by private operators
           who lease space or equipment from the port authority. (In some
           ports, the port authority also manages some of these stevedoring
           activities.) The percentage of the port area over which the port
           authority has jurisdiction, and the level of involvement of the
           port authority in the port's operations, is different from port to
           port. This variability in port authority jurisdiction and
           operational involvement has direct consequences for portwide
           disaster preparedness. Even though a port authority may have a
           thorough disaster plan in place, that plan may not be binding on
           any of the private operators in the port.

           The stakeholders involved at any given port can vary but, in
           general, they include port authorities, private-sector operators
           doing business within the port, government agencies, and
           information-sharing forums. Table 1 summarizes these basic
           participants and their roles.^7

6See, for example, GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to
Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, [30]GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).

^7See table 2 for federal agencies involved.

Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles

Port stakeholder             Stakeholder role                              
Quasi-governmental                                                         
Port authority                  o Provides a limited governance structure  
                                   for the port.                              
                                   o Sometimes owns port assets such as       
                                   cranes and pier space.                     
                                   o The role of the port authority varies    
                                   from port to port. Some ports own and      
                                   operate cargo terminals, while others      
                                   lease their equipment and pier space to    
                                   private operators. Others engage in a      
                                   combination of both activities.            
Private sector                                                             
Facility/service operators      o Ship owners and operators                
                                   o Stevedoring companies                    
                                   o Rail carriers/operators                  
                                   o Trucking and shipping companies          
                                   o Other operators to support the           
                                   day-to-day activities of the port          
State and local governments                                                
State or local emergency        o May assist port in planning for natural  
management agency               disasters and security threats. May also   
                                   help to coordinate disaster response       
                                   services such as police, fire, and medical 
                                   teams for the port.                        
Information sharing forums                                                 
Area Maritime Security          o Federally established forum at all ports 
Committee                       for all stakeholders to share information  
                                   on security issues through regularly       
                                   scheduled meetings, electronic bulletins   
                                   on suspicious activities around seaport    
                                   facilities, and sharing of key             
                                   documents.^a                               
                                   o The U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port 
                                   (COTP)^b is authorized to establish and    
                                   coordinate the AMSC and appoint members    
                                   along with other duties as prescribed by   
                                   regulation.                                
Harbor Safety Committee         o Forum at many ports for all stakeholders 
                                   to advise on regulatory and nonregulatory  
                                   safety-related issues, including disaster  
                                   preparedness. Only two Harbor Safety       
                                   Committees, at the Ports of Houston,       
                                   Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, are     
                                   federally mandated.^c                      
Gulf Intracoastal Canal         o The Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association  
Association                     (GICA) is maritime trade association that  
                                   is an advocate for issues regarding the    
                                   Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which is an    
                                   inland navigable waterway located along    
                                   the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is  
                                   to work with it members, as well as the    
                                   Coast Guard and Corps, to identify         
                                   opportunities to improve the safety and    
                                   efficiency of the Gulf Intracoastal        
                                   Waterway.                                  
American Association of Port    o A trade association that represents more 
Authorities                     than 150 public port authorities in the    
                                   United States, Canada, the Caribbean, and  
                                   Latin America.                             
                                   o Coordinated a series of working groups   
                                   to develop best practices for disaster     
                                   preparation and recovery.                  

Source: GAO.

^aMaritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No.
107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, contains many of the homeland security
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified at
46 U.S.C. S 70112(a)(2).

^bA Coast Guard officer designated as the lead official to facilitate
execution of Coast Guard duties in that area. 14 U.S.C. S 634.

^cCoast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-241, S 18 and S
19, 105 Stat. 2208.

These various stakeholders interact in a variety of ways. The port
authority provides a limited governance structure for the port. Many port
authorities lease piers, or "terminals," and equipment to stevedoring
companies and shipping lines that are responsible for the actual loading
and transport of cargo. Some port authorities also operate cargo terminals
alongside the private operators. Figure 3 depicts the main elements of a
typical port. Individual ports may not include all of these elements, or
may include some not depicted here.

Figure 3: Port Elements

Federal Role in Port Activities Is Extensive

Several federal agencies provide support to ports in natural disaster
planning, response, and recovery (see table 2). These agencies have
different missions that relate to port operations, including natural
disaster planning and response. For example, the Coast Guard is the agency
responsible for most federal oversight related to portwide safety and
security. It plays the primary role in coordinating efforts for homeland
security efforts. FEMA plays a role in homeland security planning and also
administers several assistance programs for disaster preparation and
recovery. The Maritime Administration plays a general role in coordinating
efforts to strengthen the maritime system and also has the ability to
provide maritime assets that could be used to support homeland security
interests. These vessels are part of the country's National Defense Ready
Reserve Fleet, including ships and barges, which could be used for
housing, power generation, or the movement of water and other supplies.

Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports

Stakeholders                 Selected mission-related activities           
Department of Homeland                                                     
Security                                                                   
U.S. Coast Guard             Promotes and carries out five operating goals 
                                at every U.S. port: Maritime Safety,          
                                Protection of Natural Resources, Mobility     
                                (i.e., facilitation of the movement of people 
                                and goods), Maritime Security, and National   
                                Defense.                                      
                                                                              
                                Coordinates the AMSC where they have been     
                                created.                                      
                                                                              
                                Responsible for closing the port to vessel    
                                traffic before or during a disaster and       
                                reopening the port to traffic following the   
                                incident.                                     
                                                                              
                                Reviews facility security plans and oversees  
                                compliance with these plans.                  
FEMA                         Administers the Public Assistance Grant       
                                Program that provides funds for the repair,   
                                replacement, or restoration of                
                                disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities.  
                                Few ports have received funding for           
                                post-disaster recovery under this program.    
                                                                              
                                Administers the Hazard Mitigation Grant       
                                Program that provides funds to state and      
                                local governments to implement long-term      
                                hazard mitigation measures after a major      
                                disaster declaration. Ports may be included   
                                as sub-applicants on a state or local         
                                government application. Very few ports have   
                                applied for and received hazard mitigation    
                                grants.                                       
                                                                              
                                Administers the Predisaster Mitigation        
                                Program that provides technical and financial 
                                assistance for hazard mitigation planning and 
                                the implementation of mitigation projects     
                                prior to a disaster event.                    
Preparedness                 Administers the Port Security Grant Program   
Directorate-Office of Grants that provides funds each year to mitigate     
and Training                 security threats to ports. Both port          
                                authorities and private operators may apply.  
                                The program has distributed $876,394,146      
                                since its inception, and $168,052,500 in the  
                                fiscal year 2006 program.                     
Department of Transportation                                               
Maritime Administration         o Seeks to improve and strengthen the U.S. 
                                   marine transportation system--including    
                                   infrastructure, industry and labor--to     
                                   meet the economic and security needs of    
                                   the nation.                                
                                   o Provides ready reserve vessels that      
                                   could be used to support vital homeland    
                                   and national security interests.^b         
                                   o Publishes a Port Risk Management and     
                                   Insurance Guidebook that is currently      
                                   being revised to include disaster          
                                   preparedness guidance for ports.           
Department of Defense                                                      
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers    o Maintains any federal channels leading   
                                   to a port. Following disasters, surveys    
                                   the channel, removes debris, and oversees  
                                   any necessary dredging.                    

Source: GAO.

^aThe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains more than 12,000 miles
(19,200 km) of inland waterways and operates 235 locks.

^bThe Maritime Administration manages this inactive inventory for the
Department of Defense.

  Federal Disaster Planning Guidance

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted additional federal
efforts to address a broad spectrum of emergencies. The Homeland Security
Act of 2002^8 required DHS to develop a comprehensive National Incident
Management System (NIMS). NIMS is intended to provide a consistent
framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless
of the cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles
and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and various
first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency event. To
manage all major incidents, NIMS has a standard incident management
system, called the Incident Command System, with five functional
areas--command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and
administration. NIMS also prescribes interoperable communications systems
and preparedness before an incident happens, including planning, training,
and exercises.

In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), intended to
be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,
comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents where
federal involvement is necessary. The NRP includes planning assumptions,
roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and
incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic Incident
Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national response to a
"catastrophic incident," defined as any natural or man-made incident,
including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels of mass casualties,
damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, or government functions.

^8Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

Developing the capabilities needed to deal with large-scale disasters is
part of an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and
define what needs to be done, where, based on what standards, how it
should be done, and how well it should be done. Along with the NRP and
NIMS, DHS has developed the National Preparedness Goal. Considered as a
group, these three documents are intended to guide investments in
emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The NRP describes what
needs to be done in response to an emergency incident, either natural or
man-made, the NIMS describes how to manage what needs to be done, and the
National Preparedness Goal describes how well it should be done. The
National Preparedness Goal is particularly useful for determining what
capabilities are needed, especially for a catastrophic disaster. The
interim goal addresses both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. It
defines both the 37 major capabilities that first responders should
possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from disaster
incidents and the most critical tasks associated with these
capabilities.^9 An inability to effectively perform these critical tasks
would, by definition, have a detrimental impact on effective protection,
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.

The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP), released by DHS in April
2006, applies these disaster preparedness documents to the maritime
sector. The MIRP is intended to facilitate the restoration of maritime
commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and reflects the
disaster management framework outlined in the National Response Plan. The
MIRP addresses issues that should be considered by ports when planning for
natural disasters. However, it does not set forth particular actions that
should be taken at the port level, leaving those determinations to be made
by the port operators themselves.

^9Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8).

The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can
fully protect against every type of threat. As a result, what is needed is
an approach that considers the relative risks these various threats pose
and determines how best to use limited resources to prevent threats, where
possible, and to respond effectively if they occur. While the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 call
for the use of risk management in homeland security, little specific
federal guidance or direction exists as to how risk management should be
implemented. In previous work examining risk management efforts for
homeland security and other functions, we developed a framework
summarizing the findings of industry experts and best practices.^10 This
framework, shown in figure 4, divides risk management into five major
phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining
constraints; (2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for
addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and
(5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and
results achieved.

Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework

^10GAO-06-91.

Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery Efforts
Were More Difficult Than Expected

Recent natural disasters--particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita
in 2005--challenged affected ports on several fronts, according to port
authority officials. Since 1998, hurricanes have damaged buildings,
cranes, and other equipment owned by seven of the port authorities we
interviewed. Ports also reported damage to utility systems and experienced
delays in water, sewer, and power restoration. Port authorities cited
clearing waterways and debris removal as another difficulty. In the case
of Hurricane Katrina, some ports, such as Gulfport and New Orleans, have
not yet returned or took about 6 months to return to predisaster
operational levels, respectively. Separate from the physical impact of the
disasters, challenges occurred with personnel, communications and
coordination issues and, according to port authority officials, these
challenges proved more difficult than anticipated. In some cases,
personnel had evacuated the area, and port officials were unsure when
staff would be able to return to work. Given that many phone lines were
down, there were delays in restoring phone service and, in most cases,
ports did not have communications alternatives in place. Some port
authorities also reported difficulties in working with local, state, and
federal entities during the recovery process, including coordinating
re-entry to the port of port personnel and filing for FEMA disaster
recovery assistance.

Damage to Infrastructure Affected Operations at Most Ports Experiencing Recent
Natural Disasters

Even though most ports anticipated and had plans in place to mitigate
infrastructure damage from natural disasters, over half of the port
authorities we contacted reported that the disasters created
infrastructure challenges. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had
experienced a hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and among those 12 port
authorities, 7 reported challenges in restoring infrastructure (see
fig.2). While we were unable to review a complete list of disaster
assistance estimates, some port authorities were able to provide specific
dollar amounts for repair damage to buildings, cranes, or other equipment.
For instance, the Port of Miami reported spending more than $6 million on
repairs as a result of Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita, including
damage to facilities, signage, sea wall and storm drainage system.
Likewise, The Port of Houston reported spending $200,000 for facility
repairs following Hurricane Rita. Ports were still faced with these repair
costs even though a majority of the port plans we reviewed included
infrastructure damage mitigation. As a way to work around the damaged
structures, ports also utilized temporary trailers for administrative and
operational functions. For example, this occurred at the Port of Port
Arthur, where the strategy of reserving backup equipment with appropriate
vendors was included in that port's Hurricane Readiness Plan.

Besides the repair costs involved, another indication of the significance
of damage to infrastructure was the effect on port operations. In several
cases, tenants left the port and moved elsewhere. For example, Port of New
Orleans officials said that because they are unsure if departed tenants at
the port will return, they have been reluctant to replace three severely
damaged container cranes. Operations have been even more curtailed at the
Port of Gulfport, also because of Hurricane Katrina. Port authority
officials report that they have been able to repair only 3 of their 12
warehouses, which limited their ability to accommodate storage for some of
their major operators. These operators have since moved their operations
to other nearby ports, such as Pascagoula, Mississippi, or Mobile,
Alabama.

Besides damage to buildings, cranes, and other equipment involved
specifically in moving cargoes, port authorities also reported damages to
their utility systems, including water, sewer, and power. For example,
following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Port Arthur was without power for
approximately 2 weeks. Because of a lack of on-site generators, port
officials limited port operations to daylight hours only. The power outage
also limited operation of certain hangar doors that required electrical
power to be opened. Ports with damage to water and sewer included
Gulfport, where 2 months were needed to restore its sewer and water
capacity. Similarly, the Port of Pascagoula had three damaged water wells
as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Port officials told us one of those
wells was still not operational almost a year later. While some ports
included backup water and power resources in their contingency utility
plans, officials at one port said their backup resources may not be
adequate to address long-term or extensive outages. In fact, 10 of the 17
ports we reviewed did not have plans for utility system restoration. The
lack of anticipation of these vulnerabilities was particularly apparent
for ports affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita; only 4 of the
10 ports impacted by those storms had planned for utility challenges. For
example, Port of New Orleans officials said their supply of 5 to 10 days
of water and 3 to 5 days of power through generators was not enough to
sustain them through the outages caused by Hurricane Katrina.

While many ports indicated that several federal agencies were eventually
able to effectively aid in clearing the waterways and restoring aids to
navigation, ports' experiences varied. Their experiences also demonstrated
that rapid clearing of waterways is key to reestablishing port operations
and emphasizes the need for ports to coordinate and arrange for debris
removal and restoring aids to navigation ahead of time. Following are some
examples:

           o Following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Gulfport had to remove
           large amounts of debris, such as tree limbs that were hanging and
           leaning over roads, as well as containers, cargo, and other
           equipment that winds had scattered into the roadways. Port
           officials said that clearing these obstructions was essential to
           re-establishing port operations. Immediately after the hurricane,
           the local Navy construction battalion (called Seabees) volunteered
           to assist the port by clearing roads with their large bulldozers,
           which enabled supplies and cargo to move in and out of the port.
           The Seabees also cleared boat ramps so that Coast Guard search and
           rescue vessels could safely enter the waterway. Port officials
           estimated that, over a period of 3 weeks, the Seabees cleared
           about 30 percent of the debris in the port area. After the Seabees
           were called to other duties, Port of Gulfport officials hired a
           contractor to remove the remaining debris at a cost of about $5
           million. Port of Gulfport officials said that they applied for
           FEMA reimbursement of these costs. Further, they explained that
           the use of and planning for existing federal resources for debris
           removal, such as the Navy Seabees, could have saved even more time
           and possibly federal dollars that would later be paid to the port
           in the FEMA reimbursement process.
           o Inside the port area, the Port of Mobile experienced challenges
           with debris removal that federal agencies such as the Corps or the
           Coast Guard were not responsible for removing. These challenges
           may have caused additional delays in restoring port operations.
           For instance, port officials explained that storm surge waters
           from Katrina loosened several oil rigs in the Gulf, one of which
           made its way into the port's pier area and damaged several piers.
           They said the port is currently in litigation to resolve who will
           pay for the damages. Port of Mobile officials also estimated that
           dredging expenses, including the removal of branches, sand, and
           silt from pier areas will be more than $7.5 million. Because the
           rig obstruction and other pier damages were not in the federal
           waterway or jurisdiction, Port of Mobile officials said they were
           only able to receive limited assistance from federal agencies in
           resolving their internal damage issues.
			  
			  Difficulties with Personnel, Communication, and Coordination
			  Issues Were Greater Than Expected during Recovery Efforts

           Officials of eight port authorities we contacted reported
           challenges related to personnel, communications, or coordination
           with port stakeholders as a result of hurricanes since 1998 and,
           in conversations with us, they indicated that these challenges
           were more difficult than anticipated. Port plans we reviewed
           addressed some of these types of vulnerabilities to natural
           disasters. However, ports still identified such vulnerabilities as
           a significant obstacle to their ability to return to predisaster
           operational levels. Several ports cited examples about how their
           personnel had evacuated and, for numerous reasons, were unable to
           return to work. For example, several Port of Gulfport employees
           lost their homes during Hurricane Katrina and had no local living
           arrangements for themselves or their families. Likewise, the Port
           of New Orleans said its operations were stifled by the lack of
           personnel and labor in both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita.
           At the Port of Port Arthur, lack of power for area homes kept
           employees from retuning immediately, causing temporary delays in
           port operations.

           Port authorities also did not anticipate the extent to which their
           communications systems would be impacted. High winds and flooding
           from the hurricanes rendered phone lines out of service. With
           phones lines down, port authorities were unable to get in touch
           with their staff or other port stakeholders to share information.
           For instance, we learned that approximately 50 percent of phones
           at the Port of Mobile were out of service for about 2 to 4 weeks.
           Other ports, including New Orleans, Pascagoula, and Port Arthur,
           also experienced phone outages and reported limitations in cell
           phone reception.

           Ports also identified coordination challenges with local, state,
           and federal stakeholders while planning for and recovering from
           natural disasters. At the local level, one coordination problem
           port officials experienced was in re-entering the port after the
           storm. For example, in Gulfport, port officials were denied entry
           to port property for the first 2 weeks following Hurricane
           Katrina. Similarly in Houston, law enforcement agencies blocked
           roads for access back into Houston after the Hurricane Rita
           evacuation. In some cases, port officials did not have the proper
           credentials required by local police and other emergency
           management officials to be allowed roadway access through the city
           to their port.

           In other instances, we found that ports experienced varied levels
           of coordination with local emergency management agencies,
           especially regarding planning efforts. For example, Mobile County
           Emergency Management officials affirmed that they have a close
           working relationship with the Port of Mobile, where they have
           helped the port conduct risk assessments and emergency planning
           activities, and where they coordinate with port officials on other
           plans involving safety, security, and the environment. Conversely,
           Port of Gulfport and Harrison County Emergency Management
           officials in Mississippi said they had limited contact and
           coordination regarding emergency recovery. One county emergency
           management official said that although the agency has made efforts
           to share planning documents with the port, the agency is required
           to work through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency and
           follow any guidance in the state emergency plan to request
           resources from or provide assistance to the port.

           At the federal level, one coordination issue reported by port
           stakeholders involved difficulties in coordinating with FEMA for
           recovery resources. Some local emergency management officials and
           port officials that we interviewed expressed concerns about the
           level of interaction with FEMA officials before an incident
           occurs. For example, Port of Jacksonville officials said they
           would like to see FEMA take a more active role in the disaster
           planning process, such as participation on the AMSC at the local
           level or coordinating with the Florida State Department of
           Community Affairs at the state level.^11 Similarly, Port of Los
           Angeles officials said effective communication with FEMA is
           essential and that they would like to communicate more clearly
           with FEMA about reimbursement policies before a disaster takes
           place. In fact, in November 2006, port officials from Los Angeles
           and Oakland held a joint meeting with FEMA and the California
           Office of Emergency Services to discuss the current federal and
           state regulations and practices regarding disaster relief fund and
           reimbursement policy.

           Port stakeholders also expressed concerns about coordinating with
           FEMA after an incident occurred, including inconsistencies in
           information and difficulty in appropriately completing FEMA forms
           and other documents required for reimbursement. At the county
           emergency management level, one agency official cited an
           inconsistency of the interpretation of FEMA policies and changing
           personnel as some of the challenges in working with FEMA. This
           official suggested that interacting with FEMA officials more
           frequently before a disaster would help the port authority better
           understand which personnel to contact in an emergency situation.
           The official said this coordination problem became obvious during
           the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort when, after the port had
           made several requests, FEMA did not send a representative to the
           area. Port officials in Gulfport also found it difficult to
           reconcile their damages using FEMA's cost estimate process. To
           resolve the paperwork confusion, the Port of Gulfport hired an
           outside company to deal with FEMA directly and to handle all
           reimbursement-related issues on their behalf. While Port of
           Gulfport officials recognized that FEMA's attention to detail was
           an effort to prevent fraud and abuse, they also said FEMA staff
           could have done a better job in providing guidance about the
           reimbursement process.

           Besides having coordination challenges with FEMA, we learned that
           several ports were unclear about resources that were available for
           recovery from the Maritime Administration. Immediately following
           Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf area was in need of critical resources
           such as power, water, and personnel. However, due to
           infrastructure damages around the area, it was difficult to get
           these resources into ports. As such, The Maritime Administration
           provided, with the concurrence of the Department of Defense, ready
           reserve vessels for FEMA's use. These ready reserve vessels are
           strategic sealift assets usually used for defense purposes that
           could be used for command and control, housing, power generation,
           or the movement of water and other supplies. We found that ports'
           knowledge about these assets and how to request them was limited.
           For example, port authority officials at one port turned down the
           Maritime Administration's offer for a housing vessel. The port
           determined that the deep draft and large size of the vessel might
           impede commercial traffic and block other vessels from entering
           their port. Port officials reached this determination without the
           knowledge that smaller vessels for the same purpose could have
           been provided by the Maritime Administration. The vessel offered
           by the Maritime Administration, however, was instead deployed to
           the Port of New Orleans area to house first responders.
			  
			  Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate
			  Challenges

           Many port authorities have taken steps to address the challenges
           resulting from recent natural disasters. Individually, they have
           taken such steps as upgrading communications equipment, adding
           backup communications approaches and power equipment, and creating
           alternative sites for administrative operations and storage of
           computer data. Collectively, they have shared best practices for
           disaster planning and response, most notably through an
           industry-wide publication with detailed planning steps and
           guidelines. Port authorities that were not directly impacted by
           recent disaster events have also taken steps to revise their
           planning efforts, including greater coordination with other port
           stakeholders. Many port authorities have adapted or improved
           existing stakeholder forums to assist in facilitating port
           planning for natural disasters. At the federal level, agencies
           such as the Maritime Administration have taken steps to assist
           ports in identifying federal resources available for disaster
           response and recovery.
			  
			  Steps Taken Include Port-Specific and Industry-Wide Actions

           As a result of the lessons learned from recent natural disasters,
           port authorities report taking many steps to mitigate
           vulnerabilities. One mitigation tactic reported by many port
           authorities is to add equipment and develop redundant systems to
           help during any recovery efforts. The most frequent redundancy
           added was in creating communications alternatives. Various port
           authorities reported purchasing communications equipment that does
           not necessarily rely on traditional land lines for calling, such
           as analog pagers, wireless handheld devices, CB radios, and
           satellite phones. They also integrated more sophisticated
           communications hardware and software programs. Some ports, such as
           Houston and San Diego, implemented 1-800 phone numbers to receive
           calls from port personnel. As an additional precaution, the Port
           of Houston utilizes call centers located out of state in areas
           that are less likely to have been impacted by the same storm. In
           another effort to route calls out of the impacted area, the Port
           of New Orleans has also been assigned phone numbers with
           alternative area codes.

           Besides making improvements to communications systems, many port
           authorities took steps related to power and administrative
           operations. Seven port authorities reported purchasing or
           arranging for alternative power supplies that could be used during
           an outage. For example, the Port of New Orleans purchased
           generators after the 2005 hurricane season. Ports also recognized
           the need for administrative and information technology location
           alternatives. Four port authorities reported changing their
           alternative administrative sites since recent storms. Port
           authorities also told us that they have changed the way they back
           up and store their electronic data and equipment. For example, the
           Port of New Orleans previously had its alternative work site only
           3 miles away from its regular operations location. Since both
           operations sites could be susceptible to the same disaster event,
           Port of New Orleans officials have partnered with the Port of
           Shreveport, Louisiana, almost 200 miles away, to use Shreveport's
           facilities as an alternate operations site if the Port of New
           Orleans is out of business for more than 5 days. Further, the two
           ports have prepared a mutual agreement, which includes cost
           sharing efforts for information technology infrastructure upgrades
           at the Port of Shreveport, to better accommodate New Orleans'
           needs in a disaster.

           Another mitigation tactic by ports has been the sharing of best
           practices and lessons learned from recent natural disasters.
           Through efforts by the AAPA, a nationwide industry group, ports
           from across the U.S. and Canada participated in the development of
           an industry best practices document.^12 In developing this
           document, AAPA organized various working groups, which included
           port officials from ports that had been affected by recent natural
           disasters, as well as ports that had not been affected. Acting as
           a forum for port officials to share their experiences with natural
           disasters, these working groups were able to develop a manual
           focused on port planning and recovery efforts. Vetted by AAPA
           members, the manual includes planning for emergency operations,
           communications, damage assessments, insurance and FEMA claims
           processes, coordinating with federal agencies, and overall
           emergency planning objectives.

           Another industry group, the GICA,^13 has worked closely with the
           Corps, Coast Guard and other maritime agencies to implement new
           practices for a more efficient response to maritime related
           incidents. Many of these efforts have been implemented as result
           of recent hurricanes. For example, a special Logistics Support
           Center is set up during response times for the sole purpose of
           assisting the Corps and Coast Guard with contracting special
           equipment, including water, fuel and crane barges, towing vessels,
           pumps, and generators. Regarding clearing the waterways, GICA
           barge members have provided knowledgeable waterway operators and
           state-of-the-art boats to assist Coast Guard personnel in
           conducting channel assessments immediately following a storm. In
           an effort to restore aids to navigation, GICA contacts also towed
           50 temporary buoys and supplied aircraft for aerial surveillance
           of the waterways. Moreover, the Corps, Coast Guard, and GICA
           formed the Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Team to
           develop a protocol for storm response. Finalized in July 2006, the
           Joint Hurricane Response Protocol^14 is an effort to more fully
           develop lessons learned from previous hurricane seasons and
           waterways management practices, with the goal of implementing an
           effective restoration of Gulf Coast maritime commerce following
           future storms.

           Ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent
           disasters but that are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats
           have also responded to these lessons learned by other ports. For
           example, the Port of Tacoma hired a consultant to assist in
           developing a business continuity plan. The Port of Jacksonville
           has also undertaken a comprehensive enhancement to its continuity
           of operations plan. Likewise, as a result of lessons learned from
           the Loma Prieta Earthquake in Oakland, the Port of Los Angeles
           developed more stringent seismic building codes. Additionally,
           Port of Savannah officials told us that they, too, have changed
           their prehurricane crane operations based on lessons learned from
           hurricanes in the Gulf region.
			  
			  Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination

           We found several examples of port efforts to improve stakeholder
           coordination, including utilizing existing forums to coordinate
           disaster planning, as well as realigning and enhancing their
           current plans. Regarding the use of existing forums, port
           authorities in both New Orleans and Mobile said they were using
           their AMSC to coordinate response and recovery efforts. Moreover,
           GAO has previously reported that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
           information was shared collaboratively through AMSCs to determine
           when it was appropriate to close and then reopen the port.^15
           Port-specific coordination teams, such as those at the Port of
           Houston, have also used their lessons learned to improve
           coordination for natural disaster planning. Houston's port
           coordination teams are an outgrowth of the port's relationships
           with other maritime stakeholders in the Houston-Galveston
           Navigation Safety Committee,^16 which includes a wide variety of
           waterway users and operators. In another example, the Port of
           Oakland works closely with the City Disaster Council on emergency
           planning and participates in various exercises with city, county,
           and state officials.

           We also found several examples of how ports have aligned their
           local planning with the national planning structure and have
           identified various ways to enhance their current coordination
           plans. The national structure, which includes NIMS and NRP, is
           designed to provide a consistent framework and approach for
           emergency management. Port plans that we reviewed, in particular
           those from ports in hurricane impacted areas, have identified the
           importance of adapting to this national structure and emergency
           response system. For example, the Port of Mobile's emergency
           operations plan explains that the complexity of incident
           management and the growing need for stakeholder coordination has
           increased its need for a standard incident management system.
           Therefore, the Port of Mobile's emergency operations plan outlines
           the use of an incident management framework from which all
           agencies can work together in an efficient and effective manner.
           Some port authorities making changes have not experienced any
           significant impact from recent disasters. For instance, Port of
           Jacksonville officials reported that Hurricane Katrina impacts in
           the Gulf region prompted them to revise their disaster
           preparedness plans, including reorganizing the plans to reflect
           NIMS language and alignment with NRP guidelines. Similarly, Port
           of San Diego officials said they hired a consultant to assist them
           with drafting their emergency response and business continuity
           plan. San Diego's plan prioritized risks, clarified roles and
           responsibilities of key departments, and laid out directions on
           how to better coordinate with local emergency management officials
           during a disaster event.
			  
			  Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Recovery
			  Efforts

           Since the 2005 hurricane season, federal agencies have also taken
           steps to help port authorities strengthen ports' ability to
           recover from future natural disasters. These efforts have focused
           on increased coordination and communication with stakeholders and
           also on building stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources
           for port recovery efforts. The efforts primarily involve four
           federal agencies that in some fashion work directly with
           ports--the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, FEMA and the
           U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Efforts for those four agencies are
           as follows:

           Maritime Administration Efforts: The Maritime Administration has
           taken two main steps: developing an approach for activating
           maritime assets in disaster recovery, and updating a risk
           management guidebook. During the 2005 hurricane season, the
           Maritime Administration emerged as a critical resource for the
           Gulf area by providing vessels from the nation's National Defense
           Ready Reserve Fleet to enable recovery operations and provide
           shelter for displaced citizens. Since that time, FEMA developed a
           one-time plan--the Federal Support Plan, which was cited
           specifically for the 2006 Hurricane Season and specific to the
           federal government's response efforts in the State of Louisiana.
           The Maritime Administration contributed to this plan by
           identifying government and commercial maritime capabilities that
           could be employed in response to a disaster.^17 According to
           Maritime Administration officials, while the information is
           focused on the Gulf area, it could be easily adapted to other
           areas in the United States if a disaster occurred. To date, the
           Maritime Administration is completing the process of identifying
           needs and capabilities and plans to provide a directive regarding
           capabilities to its regional offices in June 2007. However, no
           strategy exists for communicating this information to ports.

           The Maritime Administration is also currently updating its
           publication titled Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook
           (2001). This publication is the Maritime Administration's "best
           practices" guide for port risk management. Developed primarily to
           assist smaller ports in conducting risk management, it includes
           information on how ports can obtain insurance coverage, facilitate
           emergency management and port security, and apply risk management.
           The Maritime Administration began updating the guidebook after the
           2005 hurricane season. According to officials from the Maritime
           Administration, ports are actively using this guidebook,
           especially since many of the contributors are port directors and
           risk managers at the ports.

           While these efforts demonstrate the Maritime Administration's
           increased involvement in assisting ports in planning for future
           disasters, we also observed that Maritime Administration regions
           vary in their level of communication and coordination with ports.
           According to a Maritime Administration official, the Gulf and East
           Coast regions have been working with FEMA regional offices to
           quickly activate needed assets in case of a disaster. However,
           while the Gulf and East Coast regions have been strengthening
           these relationships, other regions may not have the same level of
           coordination. We found, in general, port authorities' interaction
           with the Maritime Administration was limited for natural disaster
           planning, and the ports we spoke to said they usually did not work
           directly with the agency in disaster planning.^18 This view was
           echoed by Maritime Administration officials who said that the
           relationship between the agency's regional offices and the ports
           in their respective areas varied across the country.

           Coast Guard efforts: Coast Guard efforts in natural disaster
           planning varied considerably from port to port and were most
           extensive in the Gulf. While in general, the Coast Guard was
           considered successful in its missions during the 2005 hurricane
           season, its officials said they were taking additional steps in
           improving planning for recovery efforts with port stakeholders
           based on their experiences with recent natural disasters. For
           example, at the Port of Mobile, Coast Guard officials said that
           participating in an actual Incident Command System^19emergency
           centers has been as helpful as exercises and, since the 2005
           hurricane season, they have utilized such a unified command at
           least 10 times in preparation for potential hurricane landfalls in
           the region. At other ports, the Coast Guard had a more limited
           role in assisting ports in planning for natural disasters.

           Even at ports that had not experienced substantial damage from a
           recent natural disaster, however, Coast Guard units were applying
           lessons learned from other ports' experiences and increasing their
           level of involvement. For example, the Port of Houston sustained
           minimal damage from Hurricane Rita; however, Coast Guard officials
           said that they identified areas where they could make
           improvements. The Coast Guard at the Port of Houston leads a
           recovery planning effort through port coordination teams, which
           include stakeholders such as the port authority, Coast Guard, and
           private operators, working together during disaster recovery
           efforts. These teams are all-hazards focused and are activated
           differently for terrorist incidents or natural disasters. Coast
           Guard officials said that although the teams were successful in
           planning for Hurricane Rita, there were areas for improvement,
           including outreach and training with port stakeholders and
           communication. Further, Coast Guard officials at the Port of
           Tacoma said that other ports' experiences with recent natural
           disasters has generated interest in them becoming more involved in
           the planning and coordination of natural disasters. They also
           indicated they were interested in adapting, in some form, a
           planning forum similar to the Port of Houston's port coordination
           teams.

           FEMA efforts: While state and local emergency management agencies
           assist in facilitating FEMA disaster planning at the port level,
           FEMA has several efforts under way to improve its assistance to
           ports for disaster recovery. For instance, FEMA officials said
           that through the Public Assistance Program, FEMA is able to
           provide assistance to ports that are eligible applicants after a
           major disaster or emergency. Based on lessons learned from
           Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is also reviewing and updating its
           policies and guidance documents associated with this program. To
           administer the program, FEMA will coordinate closely with federal,
           state, and local authorities (including emergency management
           agencies) through its regional offices. Officials also said that
           through planning, training, and exercise activities sponsored by
           DHS, they hope to have greater opportunities to interact and
           coordinate with port authorities and other local agencies before
           disasters occur. Further, officials agree that coordination with
           their local counterparts is an important part of emergency
           management and disaster recovery efforts.

           U.S. Army Corps of Engineers efforts: Although the U.S. Army Corps
           of Engineers generally does not conduct natural disaster planning
           with ports, staff at the district level have made some efforts to
           increase their level of involvement in this process, particularly
           in the Gulf region. For example, district U.S. Army Corps of
           Engineers staff have (1) organized and chaired yearly hurricane
           planning forums to which all ports in the region are invited; (2)
           organized prestorm teleconferences for port stakeholders, National
           Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Navy, and in some
           instances, the media; (3) participated in the Coast Guard's
           Partner Emergency Action Team, which specifically address disaster
           preparedness; (4) geographically aligned with the Coast Guard to
           better facilitate coordination during an emergency; and (5)
           implemented informational training on planning for hurricanes to
           ports and other maritime stakeholders. Many of these improvements
           were implemented as a result of Hurricane Ivan (2001) and the
           hurricanes from the 2005 season. However, the extent of the U.S.
           Army Corps of Engineers participation in natural disaster planning
           with ports varies. For instance, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
           representatives in Savannah said they do not play a significant
           role in the port's natural disaster planning for recovery efforts.
           Similarly in Jacksonville, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials
           explained that their primary natural disaster recovery duty at the
           Port of Miami is to repair the federal channel and they do not
           participate in the port authority's disaster planning efforts.
           However, the Jacksonville U.S. Army Corps of Engineers does
           cooperate with the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Office in
           Jacksonville in the development of their hurricane preparedness
           plan. For this effort, it assisted in determining what vessels
           could remain in port during a hurricane and what vessels would be
           required to leave.
			  
			  Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All
			  Port Stakeholders

           Most port authorities we reviewed conduct planning for natural
           disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats.
           Federal law established security planning requirements that apply
           to ports. Similar requirements do not exist with regard to natural
           disaster planning. The ports we contacted used markedly different
           approaches to natural disaster planning, and the extent and
           thoroughness of their plans varied widely. A few ports have
           integrated homeland security and natural disaster planning in what
           is called an all-hazards approach, and this approach appeared to
           be generating benefits and is in keeping with experts'
           recommendations and with the newest developments in federal risk
           management policy. A consequence of the divided approach was a
           wide variance in the degree to which port stakeholders were
           involved in natural disaster planning and the degree to which port
           authorities were aware of federal resources available for disaster
           recovery. For homeland security planning, federal law provides for
           the establishment of AMSCs with wide stakeholder representation,
           and some ports are using these committees or another similar forum
           with wide representation in their disaster planning efforts. DHS,
           which through the Coast Guard oversees the AMSCs, provides an
           example of how to incorporate a wider of scope of committee
           activity.
			  
			  Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted
			  Separately from Other Threats

           Of the ports we visited, more than half developed plans for
           natural disasters separately from plans that address security
           threats. This is likely due to the requirement that port
           authorities carry out their planning for homeland security under
           the federal framework created by the Congress in the Maritime
           Transportation Security Act (MTSA),^20 under which all port
           operators are required to draft individual security plans
           identifying security vulnerabilities and approaches to mitigate
           them. Under the Coast Guard's implementing regulations, these
           plans are to include such items as measures for access control,
           responses to security threats, and drills and exercises to train
           staff and test the plan.^21 The plans are "performance-based";
           that is, the security outcomes are specified, but the stakeholders
           are free to identify and implement appropriate solutions as long
           as these solutions achieve the specified outcomes. Because of the
           similarities in security and natural hazard planning these plans
           can be useful for guiding natural disaster response.

           MTSA also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with the
           authority to create AMSCs at the port level. These
           committees--with representatives from the federal, state, local,
           and private sectors--offer a venue to identify and deal with
           vulnerabilities in and around ports, as well as a forum for
           sharing information on issues related to port security. The
           committee assists the Coast Guard's COTP in developing an area
           maritime security plan, which complements the facility security
           plans developed by individual port operators. The plan provides a
           framework for communication and coordination among port
           stakeholders and law enforcement officials and identifies and
           reduces vulnerabilities to security threats throughout the port
           area.

           In contrast, port authority and operator natural disaster planning
           documents are generally not required by law and vary widely.
           According to one member from the AAPA, ports will have various
           interrelated plans, such as hurricane readiness plans, emergency
           operations plans, engineering plans, and community awareness and
           emergency response plans. Taken as a whole, the distinct plans for
           a particular port may represent the port's risk management
           approach to disaster planning.

           In addition, port natural disaster plans are not reviewed by the
           Coast Guard. Representatives of the Coast Guard at locations we
           visited confirmed they do not review port authority or port
           operator planning documents pertaining to natural disaster
           planning. For example, officials at the Port of Oakland and the
           Port of Tacoma said they do not review the port or port
           stakeholders planning documents for natural disaster planning.
           Coast Guard officials at the Port of Savannah also noted that they
           do not review the hurricane plans for port operators. They
           contended that they do not have the expertise to advise the
           operators on how to protect or restart their particular
           operations. Moreover, natural disaster plans developed by port
           authorities generally do not apply to the port's private
           operators. Only in one case did a port authority state that it
           required its private operators to draft a natural disaster plan.
			  
			  Under the Separate Approach, Disaster Plans Show Wide Variation

           We found that the thoroughness of natural disaster plans varied
           considerably from port to port. For instance, the Port of Mobile
           had a relatively thorough plan. The Port of Mobile was affected by
           three major hurricanes in 2005-2006. Roughly a year after
           Hurricane Katrina, the Alabama State Port Authority completed an
           extensive emergency operations plan, based on an analysis that
           considered natural, man-made, and security-related hazards. The
           operations plan describes preparedness, response, recovery, and
           mitigation procedures for each identified threat, establishes
           requirements for conducting exercises, and establishes a schedule
           for regular plan reviews and updates.^22 In contrast, the Port of
           Morgan City does not have a written plan for preparing for natural
           disaster threats but instead relies on port personnel to assess
           disaster risk and prepare appropriately. Following a disaster, the
           port authority relies on senior personnel to direct recovery
           efforts as needed.

           In the absence of uniform federal guidance for port disaster
           planning, some local governments have instituted local planning
           requirements. The differences in these local guidelines account
           for some of the variation in the content and thoroughness of port
           disaster plans. For example, the Miami-Dade County Emergency
           Management Office helps to coordinate disaster preparedness for
           all county agencies, including the Port of Miami. As such, the
           port submits its hurricane plans and continuity of operations plan
           to the office each year for review, which provides a certain level
           of quality assurance. By comparison, the Port of Los Angeles found
           local seismic building codes were insufficient to reach the
           desired level of preparedness, so the port developed its own
           seismic codes to guide infrastructure construction and repair.
			  
			  Combined All-Hazards Approach Shows Promise for Improved Planning

           In contrast to the disjunctional planning for both natural
           disasters and security at ports, industry experts encourage the
           unified consideration of all risks faced by the port. Unified
           disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the threats
           faced by the port, both natural and man-made, be considered
           together. This is referred to as an all-hazards approach. Experts
           consider it to offer several advantages:

           o Application of planning resources to both security and natural
           disaster preparedness. Because of the similarities between the
           effects of terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters,
           much of the planning, personnel, training, and equipment that form
           the basis of protection, response, and recovery capabilities are
           similar across all emergency events. As we have previously
           reported, the capabilities needed to respond to major disasters,
           whether the result of terrorist attack or nature, are similar in
           many ways.^23 Unified risk management can enhance the efficiency
           of port planning efforts because of the similarity in recovery
           plans for both natural and security-related disasters. One expert
           noted that responding to a disaster would likely be the same for a
           security incident and a natural disaster incident from an
           operational standpoint.
           o Efficient allocation of disaster-preparation resources. An
           all-hazards approach allows the port to estimate the relative
           impact of mitigation alternatives and identify the optimal mix of
           investments in these alternatives based on the costs and benefits
           of each. The exclusion of certain risks from consideration, or the
           separate consideration of a particular type of risk, gives rise to
           the possibility that risks will not be accurately assessed or
           compared, and that too many or too few resources will be allocated
           toward mitigation of a particular risk. Port risk management
           experts noted that, in the absence of an all-hazards risk
           management process, it is difficult to accurately assess and
           address the full spectrum of threats faced by a port.
			  
			    Federal Actions Reflect Movement Toward All-Hazards Approach

           At the federal level, the Congress has introduced various elements
           of an all-hazards approach to risk management and assistance to
           ports. Examples are as follows:

           o Single response approach to all types of emergency events. NIMS
           and NRP, which were implemented by DHS, provide a unified
           framework for responding to security and natural disaster events.
           NIMS is a policy document that defines roles and responsibilities
           of federal, state, and local first responders during all types of
           emergency events. The NRP is designed to integrate federal
           government domestic prevention, protection, response, and recovery
           plans into a single operational plan for all-hazards and
           all-emergency response disciplines. Using the framework provided
           by NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures for federal
           support to emergency managers and organizes capabilities,
           staffing, and equipment resources in terms of functions that are
           most likely to be needed during emergency events. In addition,
           along with the NRP and NIMS, DHS has developed the National
           Preparedness Goal, as required by Homeland Security Presidential
           Directive 8. Considered as a group, these three documents are
           intended to guide investments in emergency preparedness and
           response capabilities for all hazards. An inability to effectively
           perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a
           detrimental impact on effective protection, prevention, response,
           and recovery capabilities.
           o Broadened focus for risk mitigation efforts. Security and
           Accountability for Every Port Act, passed in October 2006,
           contains language mandating that the Coast Guard institute Port
           Security Training and Exercise Programs to evaluate response
           capabilities of port facilities to respond to acts of terrorism,
           natural disasters, and other emergencies.^24

           Officials from the DHS Preparedness Directorate's Grants and
           Training Office also noted that the criteria for the Port Security
           Grant Program is beginning to reflect the movement toward
           all-hazards planning in the future. DHS officials stated that the
           program may evolve to focus more on portwide risk management,
           rather than on risk mitigation for particular assets. Furthermore,
           grant applications that demonstrate mitigation of natural hazard
           risks in addition to security risks may be more competitive. Other
           officials noted that while the program may focus more on all
           hazards in the future, it will remain focused on security
           priorities for now.

           Another agency-level movement toward the all-hazards approach is
           occurring in the Coast Guard's improvement of a computer tool it
           uses to compare security risks for targets throughout a port,
           including areas not under the jurisdiction of a local port
           authority. This tool, called the Maritime Security Risk Assessment
           Model (MSRAM), provides information for the U.S. Coast Guard COPT
           to use in deciding the most efficient allocation of resources to
           reduce security risks at a port. The Coast Guard is developing an
           all-hazards risk assessment and management system, partially fed
           by MSRAM, which will allow comparison of risks and risk-mitigation
           activities across all goals and hazards. The Coast Guard directs
           the Area Maritime Security Committee to use MSRAM in the
           development of the Area Maritime Security Plan. Given that the
           Coast Guard is enhancing the MSRAM with a tool that will
           incorporate natural hazards, the risks addressed in the Area
           Maritime Security Plan could likely include both natural and
           security threats in the future.

           An all-hazards approach is in many ways a logical maturation of
           port security planning, which saw an aggressive homeland security
           expansion in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
           2001. One expert in seismic risk management we spoke with said
           port officials he contacted indicated that they were not focused
           on natural disaster risk because, in their view, the federal
           government wanted them to focus on security risks instead. At some
           ports, hurricanes or earthquakes may be a greater threat than
           terrorism, and a case can be made that overall risk to a port
           might be more effectively reduced through greater investment in
           mitigating these risks. While federal law provides guidance on
           addressing security risks through MTSA^25 and its implementing
           regulations, it does not provide similar guidance pertaining to
           mitigation of natural disaster threats.

           Our previous work on risk management has examined the challenges
           involved in comparing risk across broader threat categories.^26 A
           risk management framework that analyzes risks based on the
           likelihood that they will occur and the consequences of their
           occurrence is a useful tool for ensuring that program expenditures
           are prioritized and properly focused. In light of the competition
           for scarce resources available to deal with the threats ports
           face, a clear understanding of the relative significance of these
           threats is an important step.
			  
			    Port Authorities Using an All-Hazards Approach Indicate Benefits
				 Resulted

           Two port authorities we reviewed have begun to take an all-hazards
           approach to disaster planning by developing planning documents and
           structures that address both security risks and natural disasters,
           and officials at both ports said this approach yielded
           benefits.^27 At the Port of Houston, the Coast Guard used its
           authority to mandate the creation of port coordination teams by
           creating teams that include all port stakeholders and combine
           planning and response efforts for both security and natural
           disaster threats. This unified approach to risk management has
           allowed the port to respond efficiently to disasters when they
           occur, according to port officials. In particular, they said, the
           organization of the team changes to match the nature of the
           threat. For security threats, the teams are organized
           geographically and do not require that the entire port close down,
           thereby appropriately matching resources to the threat being
           faced. For natural disasters, the teams are organized functionally
           because of the more dispersed nature of the threat.

           Following the 2005 hurricane season, the Port of Mobile convened a
           task force to reorganize its disaster planning to address both
           security incidents and natural disasters. The task force, which
           recently completed its emergency operations plan, included the
           Port Authority Police Chief; Harbormaster; Environmental, Health
           and Safety Manager; and representatives of the port's rail, cargo,
           intermodal and development divisions. A member of the county
           emergency management agency also served on the task force to
           provide expert guidance on emergency response planning.

           Port stakeholders in other ports that had not moved to an
           all-hazards approach also said preparedness and response practices
           for security incidents and natural disasters are sufficiently
           similar to merit combined planning. Officials in several ports
           said that although they are required to allocate certain resources
           to security risk mitigation, overall risk to the port would be
           more effectively reduced if they had the flexibility to allocate
           some of those resources to mitigating natural disaster risk.
			  
			  Under the Separate Approach, Gaps Exist in Coordinating Maritime
			  Stakeholders and Obtaining Information about Federal Resources

           We have previously reported that, for homeland security planning,
           the AMSCs established under federal law have been an effective
           coordination tool.^28 These committees have provided a structure
           to improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of
           information sharing between federal and nonfederal stakeholders.
           Port stakeholders said that the committees were an improvement
           over previous information-sharing efforts because they established
           a formal structure for communicating information and new
           procedures for sharing information. Stakeholders stated that,
           among other things, the committees have been used as a forum for
           sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on
           illegal or suspicious activities, and providing input on Area
           Maritime Security Plans. Stakeholders, including private
           operators, said the information sharing had increased their
           awareness of security issues around the port and allowed them to
           identify and address security issues at their facilities.
           Likewise, Coast Guard officials said the information they received
           from nonfederal participants had helped in mitigating and reducing
           risks.

           In contrast to the regulatory requirements for the establishment
           of AMSCs, there are no nationwide federal mandates for all-hazards
           planning forums that involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders in
           disaster planning. In the absence of any consistent requirement or
           approach, we found substantial variation in the maturity of, and
           participation in, natural disaster planning forums at ports. As
           table 3 shows, the level of activity and the participants varied
           considerably. Some ports utilized their AMSC for both types of
           planning, while others conducted natural disaster planning efforts
           primarily within the local area's broader emergency management
           forums, and still others conducted their planning piecemeal, with
           various entities meeting separately and not in one coordinated
           forum.

^11The Florida State Department of Community Affairs is the department
that houses the state emergency management agency.

^12Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Planning: Manual
for Best Practices, American Association of Port Authorities, Prepared by:
Phyllis Saathoff, Managing Director, Port Freeport. September 2006.

^13GICA is maritime trade association that is an advocate for issues
regarding the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland navigable
waterway located along the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is to work
with it members, as well as the Coast Guard and Corps, to identify
opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway.

^14Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Response Protocol: Prepared
by the Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Team. July 2006.

^15GAO, Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts are Improving,
[31]GAO-06-933T (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006).

^16Also known as HOGANSAC, this committee's 19 members include pilots
associations, operators, and environmental and academic interests. The
committee addresses a wide range of topics affecting navigation in the
area. Other individuals with experience and interest in navigation safety
issues serve on working groups established by the committee to examine
other issues of local interest.

^17The primary planning instrument for DOT remains the Emergency Support
Function #1 Annex to the National Response Plan; however, the annex does
not detail site specific information as was done for this plan.

^18According to officials from MARAD, the DOT Regional Emergency
Transportation Coordinator and Representatives may play a supporting role
with regards to communicating and coordinating department response
processes and building relationships with local authorities.

^19The Incident Command System, established under NIMS, is a system for
managing all types of major incidents. It defines the operating
characteristics, interactive management components and structure of
incident management and emergency response organizations engaged
throughout the life cycle of an incident.

^20The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No.
107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 contains many of the homeland security
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, (46 U.S.C. S
70112(a)(2)).

^21The requirements for security plans are found in 33 C.F.R. Part 104,
Subpart D for vessels, and 33 C.F.R. Part 105, Subpart D for facilities.

^22Mobile's plan, while relatively thorough, still has gaps in
coordination with port stakeholders. Port authority officials noted that
they do not share their emergency plans with tenants or outside partners.
While many tenants develop their own emergency plans, the port authority
does not require them.

^23 [32]GAO-05-652 .

^24Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-347, S113(a) 114(a) 120 Stat. 1884 (SAFE Port Act).

^25Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).

^26 [33]GAO-06-91 .

^27A third port, the Port of Oakland has taken a step toward employing an
all-hazards approach. The Area AMSC elected to add natural disaster
planning information to their Area Maritime Security Plan as a set of
appendixes.

^28 [34]GAO-06-933T .

Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited

Port     Description of forum                                              
Tacoma   The port does not have a central forum for coordinating           
            stakeholder natural disaster planning efforts. Instead,           
            occasional disaster preparedness exercises with the county        
            emergency management agency and the Coast Guard provide           
            stakeholders with opportunities to share lessons learned.         
            However, the Port of Tacoma conducts planning activities with the 
            county emergency management department.                           
Oakland  The port is an active member of the City's Emergency Management   
            Board (Disaster Council) which works closely with the Port of     
            Oakland on emergency planning and testing of plans/exercises. The 
            port is also involved in a number of city, county, and statewide  
            exercises.                                                        
Houston  The port has an all-hazards forum through the Port Coordination   
            Team and its constituent Port Coordination Centers. These centers 
            and team include representatives from the port authority and the  
            Coast Guard and a range of stakeholders from private entities.    
            The forum plans for natural disasters and security threats and is 
            activated differently depending on the type of event. However,    
            the forum does not include representatives from the local         
            emergency management office.^a                                    
Mobile   The port's AMSC is the most significant forum for disaster        
            planning. Following the 2005 hurricane season, the port authority 
            convened a task force to reorganize its disaster planning to      
            address both security incidents and natural disasters. The task   
            force included stakeholders from across the port area. The port   
            also works with the county emergency management agency.           
Gulfport The port authority meets once a year with customers and tenants   
            to discuss hurricane preparedness and review the hurricane plan.  
            The port provides training on transporting cargo during           
            hurricanes and participates in separate response and recovery     
            planning meetings with other maritime stakeholders, such as the   
            U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.                                     
Miami    The primary forum used to discuss natural disaster planning is    
            the Safety First Committee, which discusses a variety of safety   
            issues. The committee is led by the Port of Miami and meets       
            monthly. To address individual private sector stakeholders, a     
            subcommittee meets with individuals as needed.                    
Savannah The port authority is involved in several port forums that        
            discuss a variety of issues; emergency issues may be addressed in 
            these forums if they are imminent. Externally, the port           
            authority's primary interactions are with the state for hazard    
            mitigation programming and with the local emergency management    
            office for response and evacuation. Until recently, interaction   
            with the local emergency management office was limited.           

Source: GAO.

^aAccording to port officials, the Port of Houston does coordinate with
the local emergency management agency during a disaster event.

The Port of Savannah provides an example of how separate planning for
natural disasters and security can lead to a lack of coordination and
information-sharing. While officials from the local emergency management
agency said they reviewed and provided comments on the Georgia Port
Authority's most recent Hurricane Plan and Draft Emergency Operations
Plan, this had not traditionally been the case over the past several
years. According to a representative from the emergency management agency,
if the port is not sharing its emergency operations plans, it makes it
difficult for responders in the local area to understand what is happening
within the port in terms of planning for natural disasters. Additionally,
while the local EMA is enjoying an ongoing productive dialogue with port
representatives in developing the Emergency Operations Plan and working on
port safety and security issues, they are not having the same level of
success with port representatives responsible for hurricane planning. Even
so, officials said that they had seen marked improvement in the area of
portwide cooperation and involvement among stakeholders.

Port authorities' lack of familiarity with FEMA's programs is another
example of the gaps that exist. We found that port authorities'
understanding of FEMA's assistance was dependent on their relationship
with the local or state emergency management office--a stakeholder that is
not necessarily involved in the forums where the port's natural disaster
planning occurs. We discussed three FEMA programs with officials from our
seven case study ports: the Public Assistance Program, Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program and the Predisaster Mitigation Grant Program (see table 4
for brief descriptions). These programs provide ports with funds for
disaster mitigation efforts before and after disaster events and assist
ports in avoiding costly damages. Of the three programs, port authorities
were most knowledgeable about, and most involved with, the Public
Assistance Program, although even with this program, some port authorities
reported encountering challenges with the process during the 2005
hurricane season. Their knowledge and participation in the two hazard
mitigation grant programs was dependent on their involvement with the
emergency planning office. FEMA officials told us that no ports have
applied as an applicant or subapplicant for the Predisaster Mitigation
Program,^29 and only a few had received assistance through the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program since 1998. AAPA officials made the same
point--that many ports are unaware, unsure how to navigate or do not
understand the resources that are available to them for disasters. In its
new best practices manual for natural disaster planning, AAPA included a
section regarding various federal resources available, including FEMA.

Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs

Public Assistance       Provides grants for the repair, replacement, or    
Program^a               restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned    
                           facilities and the facilities of certain private   
                           nonprofit organizations. The federal share is not  
                           less than 75 percent of the eligible cost for      
                           emergency measures and permanent restoration. The  
                           state determines who pays the nonfederal share.    
Hazard Mitigation Grant Provides grants to states and local governments to 
Program^b               implement long-term hazard mitigation measures     
                           after a major disaster declaration. The purpose of 
                           program is to reduce the loss of life and property 
                           due to natural disasters and to enable mitigation  
                           measures to be implemented during the immediate    
                           recovery from a disaster. Provides up to 75% of    
                           the cost of hazard mitigation measures. The State  
                           or grantee must provide a 25% match.               
Predisaster Hazard      The program provides funds on a competitive basis  
Mitigation Program^c    to states, territories, Indian tribal governments, 
                           and communities for hazard mitigation planning and 
                           the implementation of mitigation projects prior to 
                           a disaster event. Funding these plans and projects 
                           reduces overall risks to the population and        
                           structures, while also reducing reliance on        
                           funding from actual disaster declarations. The     
                           nonfederal share of the grant is at least 25%.     
                           Eligibility for a project grant is dependent on    
                           the applicant and sub-applicant having a FEMA      
                           approved hazard mitigation plan. States are        
                           eligible as applicants for grants and ports are    
                           eligible as a subgrantee of the state.             

Source: GAO.

^aEstablished by Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat.143 (1974), codified in 42
U.S.C. ch. 68.

^bAuthorized in 42 U.S.C. S 5170c.

^cAuthorized in 42 U.S.C. S 5133.

Conclusions

The 2005 hurricane season emphasized the need for ports to plan for other
threats in addition to security. Since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the country has focused on enhancing its security measures, and
ports in particular have been targeted due to their vulnerability and
their criticality to the U.S. economy. While ports have long prepared to
some degree for hurricanes and earthquakes, the hurricanes of 2005
highlighted key areas in which natural disaster planning was often
inadequate. Even ports that were not directly impacted by the hurricanes
recognized their own vulnerabilities and took additional actions. As ports
continue to revise and improve their planning efforts, available evidence
indicates that, if ports take a system-wide approach, thinking
strategically about using resources to mitigate and recover from all forms
of disaster, they will be able to achieve the most effective results. The
federally established framework for ports' homeland security planning
appears to provide useful elements for establishing an all-hazards
approach and adopting these elements appears to be a logical starting
point for an all-hazards approach for port authorities. In particular,
greater coordination between stakeholders appears important to ensure that
available federal resources can be most effectively applied. A forum for
sharing information and developing plans across a wide range of
stakeholders, as occurs with a port's AMSC, is critical for ensuring that
local stakeholders can use federal resources effectively. This is
especially the case for mitigation grants administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the Maritime Administration's
communication of information regarding making ships and other maritime
resources available for disaster recovery.

^29Recently, the Port of Tacoma began participating in the Predisaster
Hazard Mitigation Program as a subgrantee of the county.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural disasters
and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are recommending
that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security encourage port
stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards planning
efforts and include appropriate representatives from DHS, the port
authority, representatives from the local emergency management office, the
Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility owner/operators.

To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime disaster
recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation direct the Administrator of the Maritime Administration to
develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources
available for recovery efforts.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOT, and DOD for their review
and comment.

In DHS's letter, the department generally agreed existing forums provide a
good opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by stakeholders
from various federal, state, and local agencies and, as appropriate,
industry and nongovernmental organizations. However, the department said
it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency
planning on existing committees in ports and said these responsibilities
should remain with state and local emergency management planners. Our
recommendation was not to place responsibility for such planning within
port committees, but rather to use these existing forums as a way to
engage all relevant parties in discussing natural disaster planning for
ports. The problem we found at various locations we visited was that all
parties have not been involved in these efforts. In our view, these
committees represent a ready way to accomplish this task. While we
understand Coast Guard's concern with diluting existing statutorily
mandated port-related committees, we found during the course of our
fieldwork that some ports were already using existing port committees
effectively to plan for all hazards. Further, we believe that the unique
nature of ports and their criticality to goods movement warrants that all
ports be encouraged to have a specific forum for all-hazard planning.
DHS's letter is reprinted in appendix II. DHS officials provided technical
comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to
ensure the accuracy of our report.

In general, DOT agreed with the facts presented in the report. Department
officials provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report. The
department generally concurred with GAO's recommendation.

Additionally, DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the report.
Department officials provided some technical comments and clarifications,
which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report.

We will send copies of this report to the interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties.
We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-6570 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report
are listed in appendix III.

Katherine Siggerud
Director, Physical Infrastructure

List of Committees

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable James Oberstar
Chairman
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable David E. Price
Chairman
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report, initiated under the Comptroller General's authority to
examine government operations, examines (1) the challenges port
authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2)
the efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, and (3)
the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters and the effect
of this approach on their ability to share information with port
stakeholders and access federal resources.

To address these objectives, we focused much of our work on 17 U.S. ports.
We focused primarily on commercial ports and various commercial aspects of
these ports. The main criteria we used to select ports for study were as
follows:

           o Size of port, based on the value of imported cargo. To ensure a
           varied size of ports, we selected ports that were among the top 50
           in size, but within these 50, we chose ports whose total cargo
           values were greater than and less than the average cargo value for
           all 50 top ports.
           o Experience with recent natural disasters. We focused our efforts
           primarily--but not exclusively--on ports that had some degree of
           experience with a natural disaster since 1998. Based on Department
           of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance about the most significant
           disaster threats and potential hazards, we limited our focus to
           ports that have hurricane or seismic threats. In particular, we
           included a number of ports affected by the 2005 hurricane
           season--primarily hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita. In all, 10
           of the 17 ports we selected were affected by hurricanes that year.
           o Operational type. We chose ports that reflected a range of
           operating types, including those that (1) manage port operations
           and provide all services, (2) act as a landlord and lease
           operations and facilities to tenants, and (3) conduct limited
           operations in the port and lease facilities to others.
           o Region of the United States. We selected ports from the East,
           Gulf, and West Coasts. There is an overrepresentation of Gulf
           region ports to ensure adequate coverage of hurricane affected
           ports.

           In making our selections, we used information from the Maritime
           Administration, including port demographics operational, legal
           type, and region from the Public Port Finance Survey Report and
           Maritime Administration waterborne statistics which report the top
           50 ports in terms of total cargo value. We determined that what we
           found at those ports is not generalizable to all U.S. ports. We
           used disaster data from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
           to assess how many natural disasters had affected the counties in
           which each port was located. Based on our review of data
           documentation, we determined that the data we used in applying our
           criteria for port selection were sufficiently reliable for our
           purposes.

           We took two approaches to reviewing these ports--site visits and
           telephone interviews. We conducted site visits at seven ports, as
           follows:

           o Tacoma, Washington
           o Houston, Texas
           o Oakland, California
           o Gulfport, Mississippi
           o Mobile, Alabama
           o Miami, Florida
           o Savannah, Georgia

           During these visits, we gathered information from various maritime
           stakeholders, including officials from port authorities, emergency
           management agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of
           Engineers, and the Maritime Administration. Although we talked to
           four private operators, we excluded interviewing other private
           operators because their roles and responsibilities vary greatly
           from port to port and because their efforts for natural disasters,
           unlike their efforts for homeland security, are not subject to
           federal requirements or guidelines. We designed our case study
           interview questions to provide insight on (1) general governance
           and operations of the port, (2) impacts from recent natural
           disasters, (3) lessons learned from previous natural disasters,
           (4) risk management procedures, and (5) stakeholder collaboration.

           We conducted telephone interviews with officials at 10 ports, as
           follows:

           o Freeport, Texas
           o Jacksonville, Florida
           o Los Angeles, California
           o Morgan City, Louisiana
           o New Orleans, Louisiana
           o Pascagoula, Mississippi
           o Port Arthur, Texas
           o Richmond, Virginia
           o San Diego, California
           o Wilmington, North Carolina

           At these ports, we limited our telephone interviews to port
           authorities only. These semi-structured interviews addressed the
           same topics as the case study but focused more on damages and
           lessons learned as a result of recent natural disasters. For both
           sets of ports, we also reviewed numerous planning documents from
           port stakeholders including emergency preparedness plans, disaster
           recovery plans, hurricane operations, hurricane manuals, seismic
           guidelines, and business continuity plans.

           To assess the challenges port authorities experienced as a result
           of recent natural disasters, we used the interviews we conducted
           and the documents we obtained from officials at the 17 ports. To
           determine the efforts under way to address these challenges, we
           reviewed information from our interviews with and documents from
           American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) officials and
           various federal agencies. In particular, we reviewed the Emergency
           Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Planning: Manual for
           Best Practices that was developed through several working groups
           coordinated by the AAPA. The working groups provided a forum for
           port officials across the United States and Canada to share their
           experience in planning for the impacts of recent natural disasters
           and to share their best practices. We conducted interviews with
           the Chair of the working groups and other AAPA officials to gather
           more information about the working group's procedures and vetting
           process. Additionally, we interviewed various regional and
           headquarter officials of the Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast
           Guard (Coast Guard), Department of Transportation, U.S. Army Corps
           of Engineers, FEMA, and DHS. We reviewed the following federal
           risk management plans:

           o The draft appendix for maritime resources for the Federal
           Support Plan. The appendix is part of a one-time joint planning
           document between the Department of Transportation and FEMA for the
           state of Louisiana (2006 Hurricane Season). The Maritime
           Administration, an agency within the Department of Transportation,
           developed this appendix to assist in future recovery efforts by
           identifying resources, protocols, and organizations for maritime
           resources.
           o The Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook, developed by
           the Maritime Administration. This publication is a best practices
           guide for port risk management, including information on how ports
           obtain insurance coverage and facilitate emergency management.

           To determine how port authorities plan for natural disasters and
           the effects of that approach on information-sharing among port
           stakeholders and access to federal resources, we reviewed port and
           federal disaster planning documents collected from various port
           stakeholders at each of the seven ports we visited in person. In
           order to gain an understanding of best practices for such planning
           efforts, we interviewed academic, industry, and government
           experts.^1 In particular, we interviewed risk management experts
           from the following organizations:

           o Georgia Institute of Technology's Port Seismic Risk Management
           Team conducted damage assessments at seven ports in south
           Louisiana in October 2005 immediately following Hurricane Katrina.
           o ABS Consulting has worked with a variety of clients including
           the Coast Guard, Maritime Administration, and FEMA and thus helped
           develop several port risk management tools.
           o The Office of Grants and Training at DHS administers both Port
           Security and Homeland Security Grants.
           o The Coast Guard has expertise in utilizing the Maritime Security
           Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) to assess security risk and has
           plans to incorporate natural disaster risks into the model.

           We also reviewed related laws and mandates that provide federal
           oversight to ports--namely the Maritime Transportation Security
           Act of 2002 ^2 and its implementing regulations and other
           applicable law. We also reviewed the Puget Sound area maritime
           security plan and attended an Area Maritime Security Committee
           meeting at the Port of Houston-Galveston. To determine steps that
           federal agencies were taking with regard to all-hazards risk
           management, we reviewed (1) the Security and Accountability for
           Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act),^3 which addresses risk mitigation
           of transportation disruptions, including disruptions caused
           natural disasters and (2) policy documents including the National
           Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. We also
           reviewed a presentation on the Coast Guard's MSRAM.

           Our work, which we conducted from December 2005 through February
           2007, was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
           government auditing standards.
			  
^1For risk management, which is a central component of best practices, we
limited our investigation to the context of emergency planning and did not
address insurance-related risk management.

^2Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).

^3Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act),
Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884. We also reviewed the SAFE Port Act
Conference Report- House Report 109-711.

			  Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
			  
			  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 
			  
			  GAO Contact

           Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-6570, [email protected]
			  
			  Staff Acknowledgments

           In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant
           Director; Casey Hanewall; Lindsey Hemly; Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt;
           Bert Japikse; Erica Miles; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Jamilah Moon;
           Sharon Silas; Stan Stenerson; and Randall Williamson made key
           contributions to this report.
			  
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(542083)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-412.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud at (202) 512-6570 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-07-412, a report to congressional committees

March 2007

PORT RISK MANAGEMENT

Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and
Recovery

U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2
billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept. 11,
2001, much of the national focus on ports' preparedness has been on
preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed
focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including
natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the
Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have
experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way
to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port authorities
plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed various
port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports.

[41]What GAO Recommends To ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for
natural disasters, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing
all-hazards planning.

DHS, DOT and DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the report.
However, DHS expressed concern about using existing forums for planning.
Our work showed that these forums are already being used for planning in
several cases which should be further encouraged.

Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season,
experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural
disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials
identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as
their biggest challenges.

Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges.
Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems and
other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. Collectively,
the American Association of Port Authorities developed a best practices
manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as well as lessons
learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that have not
experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are nonetheless
susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons learned by
other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such as the U.S.
Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers have increased their coordination and communication with ports
to strengthen ports' ability to recover from future natural disasters and
to build stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery
efforts.

Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters
separately from planning for homeland security threats. Unlike security
efforts, natural disaster planning is not subject to the same type of
specific federal requirements and, therefore, varies from port to port. As
a result of this divided approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports'
natural disaster planning efforts including:

           o the level of participation in disaster forums, and
           o the level of information sharing among port stakeholders

In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing opportunities
among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in their understanding
of federal resources available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster
recovery. Other ports have begun using existing forums, such as their
federally mandated Area Maritime Security Committee, to coordinate
disaster planning efforts. Port and industry experts, as well as recent
federal actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster
planning and recovery. That is, disaster preparedness planning requires
that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural (such as
hurricanes) and man-made (such as terror events), be considered together.
The Department of Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard
oversees the Area Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how
to incorporate a wider scope of activity for ports across the country.
Additionally, the Maritime Administration should develop a communication
strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery
efforts.

References

Visible links
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-91
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-91
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T
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