Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports
in Disaster Planning and Recovery (28-MAR-07, GAO-07-412).
U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than
2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually.
Since Sept. 11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports'
preparedness has been on preventing potential acts of terror, the
2005 hurricane season renewed focus on how to protect ports from
a diversity of threats, including natural disasters. This report
was prepared under the authority of the Comptroller General to
examine (1) challenges port authorities have experienced as a
result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way to
address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port
authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents
and interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S.
ports.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-412
ACCNO: A67385
TITLE: Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would
Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery
DATE: 03/28/2007
SUBJECT: Cargo security
Critical infrastructure
Critical infrastructure protection
Disaster planning
Emergency preparedness
Harbors
Homeland security
Hurricanes
Lessons learned
Natural disasters
Port security
Risk management
Ships
Strategic planning
Policies and procedures
Program coordination
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GAO-07-412
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Port Activities Involve Many Different Entities
* [4]Federal Role in Port Activities Is Extensive
* [5]Federal Disaster Planning Guidance
* [6]Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; So
* [7]Damage to Infrastructure Affected Operations at Most Ports E
* [8]Difficulties with Personnel, Communication, and Coordination
* [9]Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate
* [10]Steps Taken Include Port-Specific and Industry-Wide Actions
* [11]Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination
* [12]Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Rec
* [13]Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination amo
* [14]Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted
* [15]Under the Separate Approach, Disaster Plans Show Wide Variat
* [16]Combined All-Hazards Approach Shows Promise for Improved Pla
* [17]Federal Actions Reflect Movement Toward All-Hazards
Approach
* [18]Port Authorities Using an All-Hazards Approach Indicate
Bene
* [19]Under the Separate Approach, Gaps Exist in Coordinating Mari
* [20]Conclusions
* [21]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [22]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [23]Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* [24]Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Securi
* [25]Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [26]GAO Contact
* [27]Staff Acknowledgments
* [28]Order by Mail or Phone
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
March 2007
PORT RISK MANAGEMENT
Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and
Recovery
GAO-07-412
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 5
Background 10
Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery
Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected 18
Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate Challenges 23
Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All Port
Stakeholders 31
Conclusions 40
Recommendations for Executive Action 41
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 45
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 50
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52
Tables
Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles 11
Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports 14
Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited 38
Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs 40
Figures
Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews 4
Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998 7
Figure 3: Port Elements 13
Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework 17
Abbreviations
AAPA American Association of Port Authorities
AMSC Area Maritime Security Committee
COTP Captain of the Port
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GICA Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association
LEA Local Emergency Management Agency
MIRP Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan
MSRAM Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
NIMS National Incident Management System
NRP National Response Plan
SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
March 28, 2007
Congressional Committees:
U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and
import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S.
international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to
world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important as
they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of
natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports
throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of
hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly
susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or
months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery a
concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as
well. U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic
and import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S.
international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to
world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important as
they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of
natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports
throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of
hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly
susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or
months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery a
concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as
well.
Ports' complexities exacerbate the difficulty of taking adequate steps to
deal with possible natural disasters. Ports are often sprawling
enterprises, and each port is unique. Further, a "port" is seldom a single
entity. Rather, a port is usually a collection of varied maritime
stakeholders. Ports usually include a public entity, such as a port
authority. The role of port authorities varies from port to port. For
example, the Port of Mobile operates a coal plant in the port, but it also
has tenants that lease and operate their own facilities in the port area.
Other ports, such as the Port of Miami, are owned and managed by county
government,^1 but terminal operators are responsible for the day-to-day
maintenance and repair of the terminal area. Besides port authorities,
port stakeholders include shipping companies and other tenants that may be
leasing port authority facilities, factories and other industries located
in the area, and local and state law enforcement and emergency management
agencies. Terminals or facilities may also be privately owned. Federal
agencies also have a role at ports including the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast
Guard), U.S. Army Corps of Ports' complexities exacerbate the difficulty
of taking adequate steps to deal with possible natural disasters. Ports
are often sprawling enterprises, and each port is unique. Further, a
"port" is seldom a single entity. Rather, a port is usually a collection
of varied maritime stakeholders. Ports usually include a public entity,
such as a port authority. The role of port authorities varies from port to
port. For example, the Port of Mobile operates a coal plant in the port,
but it also has tenants that lease and operate their own facilities in the
port area. Other ports, such as the Port of Miami, are owned and managed
by county government,^1 but terminal operators are responsible for the
day-to-day maintenance and repair of the terminal area. Besides port
authorities, port stakeholders include shipping companies and other
tenants that may be leasing port authority facilities, factories and other
industries located in the area, and local and state law enforcement and
emergency management agencies. Terminals or facilities may also be
privately owned. Federal agencies also have a role at ports including the
U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Maritime Administration.^23 Despite these complexities, ports have various
forums in which these maritime stakeholders can coordinate on issues that
affect the port as a whole. For terrorism concerns, for example, major
U.S. ports have a Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) that provides a
venue for discussing security concerns. For disaster relief concerns, U.S.
ports would work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
regarding disaster assistance.
^1The Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami-Dade is owned and managed by the
local government, Miami-Dade County.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of the focus on
emergency preparedness has been on preparedness for preventing, mitigating
the effects of, and responding to terrorist attacks. Through legislation
and presidential directives, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
the primary federal organization responsible for preparing the nation both
for terrorist attacks and for major disasters. Homeland Security
Presidential Directives 5 and 8 require that DHS establish a single,
comprehensive approach to and plans for the management of emergency events
whether the result of terrorist attacks or large-scale natural or
accidental disasters.^4 As we have previously reported, the capabilities
needed to respond to major disasters, whether the result of a terrorist
attack or nature, are similar in many ways. The devastating hurricane
season of 2005, which included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,
focused renewed attention on the potential effects that natural disasters
could pose to port operations. The numerous vulnerabilities port
operations face, together with the limited resources available to deal
with them, have also initiated a renewed look at how to protect ports from
a variety of threats.
In light of the continued attention both to port security and to federal
natural disaster response, we are providing a comprehensive view of steps
ports have taken to prepare and mitigate the impacts of natural disasters.
Consequently, we conducted this review, initiated under the Comptroller
General's authority, to examine port disaster preparedness measures and to
examine the federal role in helping ports plan and recover from natural
disaster impacts. More specifically, this report examines (1) the
challenges port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural
disasters, (2) the efforts under way to address challenges from these
disasters, and (3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural
disasters and the effect of this approach on their ability to share
information with port stakeholders and access federal resources.
^2In this report, "port" usually refers to one of two things: (1) the port
authority or (2) the collective group of stakeholders. We have taken care
to ensure that the reference intended is clear. Where necessary, we have
inserted clarifying language (such as "port authority") to help ensure
clarity.
^3Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116
Stat. 2064.
^4GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, [29]GAO-05-652 (Washington, D.C.:
July, 11, 2005).
To address the challenges port authorities experience as a result of
recent disasters and the efforts to address these challenges, we selected
17 U.S. ports for review (see fig. 1). We focused primarily on commercial
ports and various commercial aspects of these ports. The criteria we used
included selecting ports that (1) varied in size (based on cargo value)
and (2) varied in the degree to which they had experienced some type of
natural disaster since 1998.^5 Based on guidance from DHS regarding the
most significant natural disaster threats to ports, we limited the natural
disasters we considered to earthquakes and hurricanes. In particular, we
focused on ports impacted by the 2005 hurricane season; in all, 11 of the
17 ports we selected were affected by hurricanes that year. We conducted
site visits at 7 of the 17 ports, where we interviewed various maritime
stakeholders, including officials from the port authorities, emergency
management agencies, and federal agencies such as the Coast Guard, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Maritime Administration, and FEMA. We contacted
the remaining 10 ports by telephone and conducted a more limited range of
interviews. For all 17 ports, we reviewed numerous planning documents,
including emergency operations plans, business continuity plans, and
hurricane plans.
^5We chose 1998 as the cutoff date for recent disasters based on the
available data from FEMA.
Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews
To determine the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters
and its effect on information sharing and access to federal resources, we
relied primarily on information obtained from our 17 case studies and
phone interviews, supplementing it as necessary with other information
related to risk management and disaster planning. For perspective on risk
management, we used our body of work related to risk management throughout
the federal government^6 and supplemented it with additional risk
management models and tools from a wide range of federal, professional,
and academic stakeholders, as well as interviews and documents from the
Coast Guard and offices within DHS. We did not include any separate
planning efforts conducted by private operators, for two key reasons:
their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to port and;
unlike their planning efforts for homeland security, their efforts for
natural disasters are not subject to the same type of federal requirements
or guidelines. We performed our work from December 2005 through March
2007, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
See appendix I for more detail regarding our objectives, scope, and
methodology.
Results in Brief
Port authorities reported experiencing many different kinds of challenges
during recent natural disasters, with communication, personnel, and
interagency coordination reported as the most problematic challenges. This
was particularly true for ports that were impacted by the 2005 hurricane
season. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had experienced at least one
hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and of these, 8 reported one or more
types of challenges in responding (see fig. 2). The most visibly apparent
challenge port authorities experienced was dealing with damaged
infrastructure, including structural damage to buildings and piers, and
silting and debris clogging key waterways. Port authorities also reported
difficulties restoring power, water, and other utilities. However, the
greatest challenges port officials said they experienced--and in many
cases did not anticipate--were in the following other areas:
o Communications. Many ports experienced difficulties in
communicating both outside the port and with port personnel and
other port stakeholders. Phone outages were extensive and cell
phone reception was limited. For example, one port was without
services for 2 to 4 weeks following Hurricane Katrina.
o Personnel. When many port personnel around the Gulf area were
evacuated from their homes, the evacuation caused problems both in
locating personnel and also in letting them know they should
return to work.
o Coordination. Officials reported difficulties coordinating with
local, state, and federal stakeholders, especially for planning
and recovery efforts. For example, in some cases, port officials
had difficulty re-entering the port because they lacked the
credentials required by local police and other emergency
management officials. Some ports also reported difficulty
accessing federal resources for recovery efforts. For example,
officials at some ports said they had problems understanding the
process in filing for disaster assistance and coordinating damage
assessments with FEMA or were unaware of resources available
through the Maritime Administration, such as ships that could be
used for housing or for conveying supplies.
Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998
Port authorities and other stakeholders reported taking a variety
of steps to address these challenges. Port authorities have
replaced, repaired, and created redundancies for a variety of
communications systems and physical infrastructure--for example,
purchasing backup phone systems and power generators, creating
alternative administrative sites, and developing alternative
storage for computer information. Though the 2005 hurricane season
primarily affected Gulf ports, port authority officials elsewhere
said the results of that season prompted them to improve their
preparation as well. One key effort was undertaken by the American
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), an industry group. It
convened work groups to discuss lessons learned and, based on the
input, issued a manual with guidance for ports on such issues as
developing alternative communications, setting up an emergency
operations center, and identifying federal resources for recovery
efforts. Port authorities reported their changes often extended to
improving coordination with other stakeholders. Some ports adapted
forums intended for security planning, such as their AMSC, while
others with existing natural disaster forums took steps to
strengthen them. Some port authorities also established plans for
coordinating with neighboring ports. Actions have also been taken
at the federal level. For example, the Maritime Administration,
contributed to a one-time plan developed by FEMA--the Federal
Support Plan. This plan was specifically cited for the 2006
Hurricane Season and was specific to the federal government's
response to support the State of Louisiana. The Maritime
Administration contributed to this plan by identifying government
and commercial maritime capabilities that could be employed in
response to a disaster. To date, while the Maritime Administration
plans to provide a directive regarding capabilities to all of
their regional offices in June 2007, no plan exists for
communicating this information to ports.
Port authorities we reviewed generally conducted their natural
disaster planning separately from planning for homeland security
threats, and this approach has reduced their ability to facilitate
sharing natural disaster planning information among key
stakeholders and to access federal resources. Planning for
homeland security, an activity that is governed by federal law,
tends to be consistent from port to port. By contrast, natural
disaster planning, which is not subject to the same type of
specific federal requirements, varied considerably at the ports we
reviewed in its extent and thoroughness. Separate planning for
these two threats means that ports are not able to effectively
estimate the impact of mitigation alternatives and optimize their
investments in these alternatives based on costs and benefits.
Industry experts and port stakeholders, such as the Coast Guard,
are now encouraging unified consideration of all risks faced by
ports, but we found few port authorities were taking a unified
approach. One consequence of divided planning is that key
stakeholders were not necessarily participating in natural
disaster planning. Unlike security planning, where the Secretary
of Homeland Security can establish an AMSC with broad
representation across port stakeholders, natural disaster planning
carries no such requirement. During our review, we found
substantial variation in the maturity of, and participation in,
natural disaster planning forums at ports. In particular, one port
had no forum that brought together the port authority and the
local disaster planning agency, which had knowledge of available
federal resources, such as FEMA grant programs, as well as the
expertise to deal with grant requirements. In the absence of such
a forum, it is not surprising that some ports were limited in
their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster
mitigation and postdisaster recovery. To help improve information
sharing, some ports have begun using their federally authorized
AMSC, or some other similar forum with wide representation, in
disaster planning efforts. DHS, which through the Coast Guard
coordinates the AMSCs, provides an example of how to incorporate a
wider scope of committee activity for ports across the country.
To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural
disasters and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we
are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for
discussing their all-hazards planning efforts and include
appropriate representatives from DHS, the port authority,
representatives from the local emergency management office, the
Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility owner/operators.
To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime
disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of
the Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the
Maritime Administration to develop a communication strategy to
inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery
efforts.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS, the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Defense (DOD)
generally agreed with the facts presented. In its letter, DHS did
not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency
planning on existing committees in ports and said these
responsibilities should remain with state and local emergency
management planners. Our recommendation was not to place
responsibility for such planning within port committees, but
rather to use these existing forums as a way to engage all
relevant parties in discussing natural disaster planning for
ports. DOT officials provided a number of comments and
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the
accuracy of our report. The DOT generally concurred with GAO's
recommendation. The DOD provided technical comments and
clarifications.
Background
Port Activities Involve Many Different Entities
Ports comprise many different stakeholders, both public and
private. Port authorities also may have jurisdiction over some or
all of the geographical area of a port. The port authority can be
an agency of the state, county, or city in which the port is
located. In most ports in North America, the actual task of
loading and unloading goods is carried out by private operators
who lease space or equipment from the port authority. (In some
ports, the port authority also manages some of these stevedoring
activities.) The percentage of the port area over which the port
authority has jurisdiction, and the level of involvement of the
port authority in the port's operations, is different from port to
port. This variability in port authority jurisdiction and
operational involvement has direct consequences for portwide
disaster preparedness. Even though a port authority may have a
thorough disaster plan in place, that plan may not be binding on
any of the private operators in the port.
The stakeholders involved at any given port can vary but, in
general, they include port authorities, private-sector operators
doing business within the port, government agencies, and
information-sharing forums. Table 1 summarizes these basic
participants and their roles.^7
6See, for example, GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to
Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, [30]GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
^7See table 2 for federal agencies involved.
Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles
Port stakeholder Stakeholder role
Quasi-governmental
Port authority o Provides a limited governance structure
for the port.
o Sometimes owns port assets such as
cranes and pier space.
o The role of the port authority varies
from port to port. Some ports own and
operate cargo terminals, while others
lease their equipment and pier space to
private operators. Others engage in a
combination of both activities.
Private sector
Facility/service operators o Ship owners and operators
o Stevedoring companies
o Rail carriers/operators
o Trucking and shipping companies
o Other operators to support the
day-to-day activities of the port
State and local governments
State or local emergency o May assist port in planning for natural
management agency disasters and security threats. May also
help to coordinate disaster response
services such as police, fire, and medical
teams for the port.
Information sharing forums
Area Maritime Security o Federally established forum at all ports
Committee for all stakeholders to share information
on security issues through regularly
scheduled meetings, electronic bulletins
on suspicious activities around seaport
facilities, and sharing of key
documents.^a
o The U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port
(COTP)^b is authorized to establish and
coordinate the AMSC and appoint members
along with other duties as prescribed by
regulation.
Harbor Safety Committee o Forum at many ports for all stakeholders
to advise on regulatory and nonregulatory
safety-related issues, including disaster
preparedness. Only two Harbor Safety
Committees, at the Ports of Houston,
Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, are
federally mandated.^c
Gulf Intracoastal Canal o The Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association
Association (GICA) is maritime trade association that
is an advocate for issues regarding the
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which is an
inland navigable waterway located along
the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is
to work with it members, as well as the
Coast Guard and Corps, to identify
opportunities to improve the safety and
efficiency of the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway.
American Association of Port o A trade association that represents more
Authorities than 150 public port authorities in the
United States, Canada, the Caribbean, and
Latin America.
o Coordinated a series of working groups
to develop best practices for disaster
preparation and recovery.
Source: GAO.
^aMaritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No.
107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, contains many of the homeland security
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified at
46 U.S.C. S 70112(a)(2).
^bA Coast Guard officer designated as the lead official to facilitate
execution of Coast Guard duties in that area. 14 U.S.C. S 634.
^cCoast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-241, S 18 and S
19, 105 Stat. 2208.
These various stakeholders interact in a variety of ways. The port
authority provides a limited governance structure for the port. Many port
authorities lease piers, or "terminals," and equipment to stevedoring
companies and shipping lines that are responsible for the actual loading
and transport of cargo. Some port authorities also operate cargo terminals
alongside the private operators. Figure 3 depicts the main elements of a
typical port. Individual ports may not include all of these elements, or
may include some not depicted here.
Figure 3: Port Elements
Federal Role in Port Activities Is Extensive
Several federal agencies provide support to ports in natural disaster
planning, response, and recovery (see table 2). These agencies have
different missions that relate to port operations, including natural
disaster planning and response. For example, the Coast Guard is the agency
responsible for most federal oversight related to portwide safety and
security. It plays the primary role in coordinating efforts for homeland
security efforts. FEMA plays a role in homeland security planning and also
administers several assistance programs for disaster preparation and
recovery. The Maritime Administration plays a general role in coordinating
efforts to strengthen the maritime system and also has the ability to
provide maritime assets that could be used to support homeland security
interests. These vessels are part of the country's National Defense Ready
Reserve Fleet, including ships and barges, which could be used for
housing, power generation, or the movement of water and other supplies.
Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports
Stakeholders Selected mission-related activities
Department of Homeland
Security
U.S. Coast Guard Promotes and carries out five operating goals
at every U.S. port: Maritime Safety,
Protection of Natural Resources, Mobility
(i.e., facilitation of the movement of people
and goods), Maritime Security, and National
Defense.
Coordinates the AMSC where they have been
created.
Responsible for closing the port to vessel
traffic before or during a disaster and
reopening the port to traffic following the
incident.
Reviews facility security plans and oversees
compliance with these plans.
FEMA Administers the Public Assistance Grant
Program that provides funds for the repair,
replacement, or restoration of
disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities.
Few ports have received funding for
post-disaster recovery under this program.
Administers the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program that provides funds to state and
local governments to implement long-term
hazard mitigation measures after a major
disaster declaration. Ports may be included
as sub-applicants on a state or local
government application. Very few ports have
applied for and received hazard mitigation
grants.
Administers the Predisaster Mitigation
Program that provides technical and financial
assistance for hazard mitigation planning and
the implementation of mitigation projects
prior to a disaster event.
Preparedness Administers the Port Security Grant Program
Directorate-Office of Grants that provides funds each year to mitigate
and Training security threats to ports. Both port
authorities and private operators may apply.
The program has distributed $876,394,146
since its inception, and $168,052,500 in the
fiscal year 2006 program.
Department of Transportation
Maritime Administration o Seeks to improve and strengthen the U.S.
marine transportation system--including
infrastructure, industry and labor--to
meet the economic and security needs of
the nation.
o Provides ready reserve vessels that
could be used to support vital homeland
and national security interests.^b
o Publishes a Port Risk Management and
Insurance Guidebook that is currently
being revised to include disaster
preparedness guidance for ports.
Department of Defense
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers o Maintains any federal channels leading
to a port. Following disasters, surveys
the channel, removes debris, and oversees
any necessary dredging.
Source: GAO.
^aThe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains more than 12,000 miles
(19,200 km) of inland waterways and operates 235 locks.
^bThe Maritime Administration manages this inactive inventory for the
Department of Defense.
Federal Disaster Planning Guidance
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted additional federal
efforts to address a broad spectrum of emergencies. The Homeland Security
Act of 2002^8 required DHS to develop a comprehensive National Incident
Management System (NIMS). NIMS is intended to provide a consistent
framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless
of the cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles
and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and various
first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency event. To
manage all major incidents, NIMS has a standard incident management
system, called the Incident Command System, with five functional
areas--command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and
administration. NIMS also prescribes interoperable communications systems
and preparedness before an incident happens, including planning, training,
and exercises.
In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), intended to
be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,
comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents where
federal involvement is necessary. The NRP includes planning assumptions,
roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and
incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic Incident
Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national response to a
"catastrophic incident," defined as any natural or man-made incident,
including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels of mass casualties,
damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, or government functions.
^8Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
Developing the capabilities needed to deal with large-scale disasters is
part of an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and
define what needs to be done, where, based on what standards, how it
should be done, and how well it should be done. Along with the NRP and
NIMS, DHS has developed the National Preparedness Goal. Considered as a
group, these three documents are intended to guide investments in
emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The NRP describes what
needs to be done in response to an emergency incident, either natural or
man-made, the NIMS describes how to manage what needs to be done, and the
National Preparedness Goal describes how well it should be done. The
National Preparedness Goal is particularly useful for determining what
capabilities are needed, especially for a catastrophic disaster. The
interim goal addresses both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. It
defines both the 37 major capabilities that first responders should
possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from disaster
incidents and the most critical tasks associated with these
capabilities.^9 An inability to effectively perform these critical tasks
would, by definition, have a detrimental impact on effective protection,
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.
The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP), released by DHS in April
2006, applies these disaster preparedness documents to the maritime
sector. The MIRP is intended to facilitate the restoration of maritime
commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and reflects the
disaster management framework outlined in the National Response Plan. The
MIRP addresses issues that should be considered by ports when planning for
natural disasters. However, it does not set forth particular actions that
should be taken at the port level, leaving those determinations to be made
by the port operators themselves.
^9Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8).
The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can
fully protect against every type of threat. As a result, what is needed is
an approach that considers the relative risks these various threats pose
and determines how best to use limited resources to prevent threats, where
possible, and to respond effectively if they occur. While the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 call
for the use of risk management in homeland security, little specific
federal guidance or direction exists as to how risk management should be
implemented. In previous work examining risk management efforts for
homeland security and other functions, we developed a framework
summarizing the findings of industry experts and best practices.^10 This
framework, shown in figure 4, divides risk management into five major
phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining
constraints; (2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for
addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and
(5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and
results achieved.
Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework
^10GAO-06-91.
Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery Efforts
Were More Difficult Than Expected
Recent natural disasters--particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita
in 2005--challenged affected ports on several fronts, according to port
authority officials. Since 1998, hurricanes have damaged buildings,
cranes, and other equipment owned by seven of the port authorities we
interviewed. Ports also reported damage to utility systems and experienced
delays in water, sewer, and power restoration. Port authorities cited
clearing waterways and debris removal as another difficulty. In the case
of Hurricane Katrina, some ports, such as Gulfport and New Orleans, have
not yet returned or took about 6 months to return to predisaster
operational levels, respectively. Separate from the physical impact of the
disasters, challenges occurred with personnel, communications and
coordination issues and, according to port authority officials, these
challenges proved more difficult than anticipated. In some cases,
personnel had evacuated the area, and port officials were unsure when
staff would be able to return to work. Given that many phone lines were
down, there were delays in restoring phone service and, in most cases,
ports did not have communications alternatives in place. Some port
authorities also reported difficulties in working with local, state, and
federal entities during the recovery process, including coordinating
re-entry to the port of port personnel and filing for FEMA disaster
recovery assistance.
Damage to Infrastructure Affected Operations at Most Ports Experiencing Recent
Natural Disasters
Even though most ports anticipated and had plans in place to mitigate
infrastructure damage from natural disasters, over half of the port
authorities we contacted reported that the disasters created
infrastructure challenges. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had
experienced a hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and among those 12 port
authorities, 7 reported challenges in restoring infrastructure (see
fig.2). While we were unable to review a complete list of disaster
assistance estimates, some port authorities were able to provide specific
dollar amounts for repair damage to buildings, cranes, or other equipment.
For instance, the Port of Miami reported spending more than $6 million on
repairs as a result of Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita, including
damage to facilities, signage, sea wall and storm drainage system.
Likewise, The Port of Houston reported spending $200,000 for facility
repairs following Hurricane Rita. Ports were still faced with these repair
costs even though a majority of the port plans we reviewed included
infrastructure damage mitigation. As a way to work around the damaged
structures, ports also utilized temporary trailers for administrative and
operational functions. For example, this occurred at the Port of Port
Arthur, where the strategy of reserving backup equipment with appropriate
vendors was included in that port's Hurricane Readiness Plan.
Besides the repair costs involved, another indication of the significance
of damage to infrastructure was the effect on port operations. In several
cases, tenants left the port and moved elsewhere. For example, Port of New
Orleans officials said that because they are unsure if departed tenants at
the port will return, they have been reluctant to replace three severely
damaged container cranes. Operations have been even more curtailed at the
Port of Gulfport, also because of Hurricane Katrina. Port authority
officials report that they have been able to repair only 3 of their 12
warehouses, which limited their ability to accommodate storage for some of
their major operators. These operators have since moved their operations
to other nearby ports, such as Pascagoula, Mississippi, or Mobile,
Alabama.
Besides damage to buildings, cranes, and other equipment involved
specifically in moving cargoes, port authorities also reported damages to
their utility systems, including water, sewer, and power. For example,
following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Port Arthur was without power for
approximately 2 weeks. Because of a lack of on-site generators, port
officials limited port operations to daylight hours only. The power outage
also limited operation of certain hangar doors that required electrical
power to be opened. Ports with damage to water and sewer included
Gulfport, where 2 months were needed to restore its sewer and water
capacity. Similarly, the Port of Pascagoula had three damaged water wells
as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Port officials told us one of those
wells was still not operational almost a year later. While some ports
included backup water and power resources in their contingency utility
plans, officials at one port said their backup resources may not be
adequate to address long-term or extensive outages. In fact, 10 of the 17
ports we reviewed did not have plans for utility system restoration. The
lack of anticipation of these vulnerabilities was particularly apparent
for ports affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita; only 4 of the
10 ports impacted by those storms had planned for utility challenges. For
example, Port of New Orleans officials said their supply of 5 to 10 days
of water and 3 to 5 days of power through generators was not enough to
sustain them through the outages caused by Hurricane Katrina.
While many ports indicated that several federal agencies were eventually
able to effectively aid in clearing the waterways and restoring aids to
navigation, ports' experiences varied. Their experiences also demonstrated
that rapid clearing of waterways is key to reestablishing port operations
and emphasizes the need for ports to coordinate and arrange for debris
removal and restoring aids to navigation ahead of time. Following are some
examples:
o Following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Gulfport had to remove
large amounts of debris, such as tree limbs that were hanging and
leaning over roads, as well as containers, cargo, and other
equipment that winds had scattered into the roadways. Port
officials said that clearing these obstructions was essential to
re-establishing port operations. Immediately after the hurricane,
the local Navy construction battalion (called Seabees) volunteered
to assist the port by clearing roads with their large bulldozers,
which enabled supplies and cargo to move in and out of the port.
The Seabees also cleared boat ramps so that Coast Guard search and
rescue vessels could safely enter the waterway. Port officials
estimated that, over a period of 3 weeks, the Seabees cleared
about 30 percent of the debris in the port area. After the Seabees
were called to other duties, Port of Gulfport officials hired a
contractor to remove the remaining debris at a cost of about $5
million. Port of Gulfport officials said that they applied for
FEMA reimbursement of these costs. Further, they explained that
the use of and planning for existing federal resources for debris
removal, such as the Navy Seabees, could have saved even more time
and possibly federal dollars that would later be paid to the port
in the FEMA reimbursement process.
o Inside the port area, the Port of Mobile experienced challenges
with debris removal that federal agencies such as the Corps or the
Coast Guard were not responsible for removing. These challenges
may have caused additional delays in restoring port operations.
For instance, port officials explained that storm surge waters
from Katrina loosened several oil rigs in the Gulf, one of which
made its way into the port's pier area and damaged several piers.
They said the port is currently in litigation to resolve who will
pay for the damages. Port of Mobile officials also estimated that
dredging expenses, including the removal of branches, sand, and
silt from pier areas will be more than $7.5 million. Because the
rig obstruction and other pier damages were not in the federal
waterway or jurisdiction, Port of Mobile officials said they were
only able to receive limited assistance from federal agencies in
resolving their internal damage issues.
Difficulties with Personnel, Communication, and Coordination
Issues Were Greater Than Expected during Recovery Efforts
Officials of eight port authorities we contacted reported
challenges related to personnel, communications, or coordination
with port stakeholders as a result of hurricanes since 1998 and,
in conversations with us, they indicated that these challenges
were more difficult than anticipated. Port plans we reviewed
addressed some of these types of vulnerabilities to natural
disasters. However, ports still identified such vulnerabilities as
a significant obstacle to their ability to return to predisaster
operational levels. Several ports cited examples about how their
personnel had evacuated and, for numerous reasons, were unable to
return to work. For example, several Port of Gulfport employees
lost their homes during Hurricane Katrina and had no local living
arrangements for themselves or their families. Likewise, the Port
of New Orleans said its operations were stifled by the lack of
personnel and labor in both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita.
At the Port of Port Arthur, lack of power for area homes kept
employees from retuning immediately, causing temporary delays in
port operations.
Port authorities also did not anticipate the extent to which their
communications systems would be impacted. High winds and flooding
from the hurricanes rendered phone lines out of service. With
phones lines down, port authorities were unable to get in touch
with their staff or other port stakeholders to share information.
For instance, we learned that approximately 50 percent of phones
at the Port of Mobile were out of service for about 2 to 4 weeks.
Other ports, including New Orleans, Pascagoula, and Port Arthur,
also experienced phone outages and reported limitations in cell
phone reception.
Ports also identified coordination challenges with local, state,
and federal stakeholders while planning for and recovering from
natural disasters. At the local level, one coordination problem
port officials experienced was in re-entering the port after the
storm. For example, in Gulfport, port officials were denied entry
to port property for the first 2 weeks following Hurricane
Katrina. Similarly in Houston, law enforcement agencies blocked
roads for access back into Houston after the Hurricane Rita
evacuation. In some cases, port officials did not have the proper
credentials required by local police and other emergency
management officials to be allowed roadway access through the city
to their port.
In other instances, we found that ports experienced varied levels
of coordination with local emergency management agencies,
especially regarding planning efforts. For example, Mobile County
Emergency Management officials affirmed that they have a close
working relationship with the Port of Mobile, where they have
helped the port conduct risk assessments and emergency planning
activities, and where they coordinate with port officials on other
plans involving safety, security, and the environment. Conversely,
Port of Gulfport and Harrison County Emergency Management
officials in Mississippi said they had limited contact and
coordination regarding emergency recovery. One county emergency
management official said that although the agency has made efforts
to share planning documents with the port, the agency is required
to work through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency and
follow any guidance in the state emergency plan to request
resources from or provide assistance to the port.
At the federal level, one coordination issue reported by port
stakeholders involved difficulties in coordinating with FEMA for
recovery resources. Some local emergency management officials and
port officials that we interviewed expressed concerns about the
level of interaction with FEMA officials before an incident
occurs. For example, Port of Jacksonville officials said they
would like to see FEMA take a more active role in the disaster
planning process, such as participation on the AMSC at the local
level or coordinating with the Florida State Department of
Community Affairs at the state level.^11 Similarly, Port of Los
Angeles officials said effective communication with FEMA is
essential and that they would like to communicate more clearly
with FEMA about reimbursement policies before a disaster takes
place. In fact, in November 2006, port officials from Los Angeles
and Oakland held a joint meeting with FEMA and the California
Office of Emergency Services to discuss the current federal and
state regulations and practices regarding disaster relief fund and
reimbursement policy.
Port stakeholders also expressed concerns about coordinating with
FEMA after an incident occurred, including inconsistencies in
information and difficulty in appropriately completing FEMA forms
and other documents required for reimbursement. At the county
emergency management level, one agency official cited an
inconsistency of the interpretation of FEMA policies and changing
personnel as some of the challenges in working with FEMA. This
official suggested that interacting with FEMA officials more
frequently before a disaster would help the port authority better
understand which personnel to contact in an emergency situation.
The official said this coordination problem became obvious during
the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort when, after the port had
made several requests, FEMA did not send a representative to the
area. Port officials in Gulfport also found it difficult to
reconcile their damages using FEMA's cost estimate process. To
resolve the paperwork confusion, the Port of Gulfport hired an
outside company to deal with FEMA directly and to handle all
reimbursement-related issues on their behalf. While Port of
Gulfport officials recognized that FEMA's attention to detail was
an effort to prevent fraud and abuse, they also said FEMA staff
could have done a better job in providing guidance about the
reimbursement process.
Besides having coordination challenges with FEMA, we learned that
several ports were unclear about resources that were available for
recovery from the Maritime Administration. Immediately following
Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf area was in need of critical resources
such as power, water, and personnel. However, due to
infrastructure damages around the area, it was difficult to get
these resources into ports. As such, The Maritime Administration
provided, with the concurrence of the Department of Defense, ready
reserve vessels for FEMA's use. These ready reserve vessels are
strategic sealift assets usually used for defense purposes that
could be used for command and control, housing, power generation,
or the movement of water and other supplies. We found that ports'
knowledge about these assets and how to request them was limited.
For example, port authority officials at one port turned down the
Maritime Administration's offer for a housing vessel. The port
determined that the deep draft and large size of the vessel might
impede commercial traffic and block other vessels from entering
their port. Port officials reached this determination without the
knowledge that smaller vessels for the same purpose could have
been provided by the Maritime Administration. The vessel offered
by the Maritime Administration, however, was instead deployed to
the Port of New Orleans area to house first responders.
Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate
Challenges
Many port authorities have taken steps to address the challenges
resulting from recent natural disasters. Individually, they have
taken such steps as upgrading communications equipment, adding
backup communications approaches and power equipment, and creating
alternative sites for administrative operations and storage of
computer data. Collectively, they have shared best practices for
disaster planning and response, most notably through an
industry-wide publication with detailed planning steps and
guidelines. Port authorities that were not directly impacted by
recent disaster events have also taken steps to revise their
planning efforts, including greater coordination with other port
stakeholders. Many port authorities have adapted or improved
existing stakeholder forums to assist in facilitating port
planning for natural disasters. At the federal level, agencies
such as the Maritime Administration have taken steps to assist
ports in identifying federal resources available for disaster
response and recovery.
Steps Taken Include Port-Specific and Industry-Wide Actions
As a result of the lessons learned from recent natural disasters,
port authorities report taking many steps to mitigate
vulnerabilities. One mitigation tactic reported by many port
authorities is to add equipment and develop redundant systems to
help during any recovery efforts. The most frequent redundancy
added was in creating communications alternatives. Various port
authorities reported purchasing communications equipment that does
not necessarily rely on traditional land lines for calling, such
as analog pagers, wireless handheld devices, CB radios, and
satellite phones. They also integrated more sophisticated
communications hardware and software programs. Some ports, such as
Houston and San Diego, implemented 1-800 phone numbers to receive
calls from port personnel. As an additional precaution, the Port
of Houston utilizes call centers located out of state in areas
that are less likely to have been impacted by the same storm. In
another effort to route calls out of the impacted area, the Port
of New Orleans has also been assigned phone numbers with
alternative area codes.
Besides making improvements to communications systems, many port
authorities took steps related to power and administrative
operations. Seven port authorities reported purchasing or
arranging for alternative power supplies that could be used during
an outage. For example, the Port of New Orleans purchased
generators after the 2005 hurricane season. Ports also recognized
the need for administrative and information technology location
alternatives. Four port authorities reported changing their
alternative administrative sites since recent storms. Port
authorities also told us that they have changed the way they back
up and store their electronic data and equipment. For example, the
Port of New Orleans previously had its alternative work site only
3 miles away from its regular operations location. Since both
operations sites could be susceptible to the same disaster event,
Port of New Orleans officials have partnered with the Port of
Shreveport, Louisiana, almost 200 miles away, to use Shreveport's
facilities as an alternate operations site if the Port of New
Orleans is out of business for more than 5 days. Further, the two
ports have prepared a mutual agreement, which includes cost
sharing efforts for information technology infrastructure upgrades
at the Port of Shreveport, to better accommodate New Orleans'
needs in a disaster.
Another mitigation tactic by ports has been the sharing of best
practices and lessons learned from recent natural disasters.
Through efforts by the AAPA, a nationwide industry group, ports
from across the U.S. and Canada participated in the development of
an industry best practices document.^12 In developing this
document, AAPA organized various working groups, which included
port officials from ports that had been affected by recent natural
disasters, as well as ports that had not been affected. Acting as
a forum for port officials to share their experiences with natural
disasters, these working groups were able to develop a manual
focused on port planning and recovery efforts. Vetted by AAPA
members, the manual includes planning for emergency operations,
communications, damage assessments, insurance and FEMA claims
processes, coordinating with federal agencies, and overall
emergency planning objectives.
Another industry group, the GICA,^13 has worked closely with the
Corps, Coast Guard and other maritime agencies to implement new
practices for a more efficient response to maritime related
incidents. Many of these efforts have been implemented as result
of recent hurricanes. For example, a special Logistics Support
Center is set up during response times for the sole purpose of
assisting the Corps and Coast Guard with contracting special
equipment, including water, fuel and crane barges, towing vessels,
pumps, and generators. Regarding clearing the waterways, GICA
barge members have provided knowledgeable waterway operators and
state-of-the-art boats to assist Coast Guard personnel in
conducting channel assessments immediately following a storm. In
an effort to restore aids to navigation, GICA contacts also towed
50 temporary buoys and supplied aircraft for aerial surveillance
of the waterways. Moreover, the Corps, Coast Guard, and GICA
formed the Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Team to
develop a protocol for storm response. Finalized in July 2006, the
Joint Hurricane Response Protocol^14 is an effort to more fully
develop lessons learned from previous hurricane seasons and
waterways management practices, with the goal of implementing an
effective restoration of Gulf Coast maritime commerce following
future storms.
Ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent
disasters but that are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats
have also responded to these lessons learned by other ports. For
example, the Port of Tacoma hired a consultant to assist in
developing a business continuity plan. The Port of Jacksonville
has also undertaken a comprehensive enhancement to its continuity
of operations plan. Likewise, as a result of lessons learned from
the Loma Prieta Earthquake in Oakland, the Port of Los Angeles
developed more stringent seismic building codes. Additionally,
Port of Savannah officials told us that they, too, have changed
their prehurricane crane operations based on lessons learned from
hurricanes in the Gulf region.
Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination
We found several examples of port efforts to improve stakeholder
coordination, including utilizing existing forums to coordinate
disaster planning, as well as realigning and enhancing their
current plans. Regarding the use of existing forums, port
authorities in both New Orleans and Mobile said they were using
their AMSC to coordinate response and recovery efforts. Moreover,
GAO has previously reported that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
information was shared collaboratively through AMSCs to determine
when it was appropriate to close and then reopen the port.^15
Port-specific coordination teams, such as those at the Port of
Houston, have also used their lessons learned to improve
coordination for natural disaster planning. Houston's port
coordination teams are an outgrowth of the port's relationships
with other maritime stakeholders in the Houston-Galveston
Navigation Safety Committee,^16 which includes a wide variety of
waterway users and operators. In another example, the Port of
Oakland works closely with the City Disaster Council on emergency
planning and participates in various exercises with city, county,
and state officials.
We also found several examples of how ports have aligned their
local planning with the national planning structure and have
identified various ways to enhance their current coordination
plans. The national structure, which includes NIMS and NRP, is
designed to provide a consistent framework and approach for
emergency management. Port plans that we reviewed, in particular
those from ports in hurricane impacted areas, have identified the
importance of adapting to this national structure and emergency
response system. For example, the Port of Mobile's emergency
operations plan explains that the complexity of incident
management and the growing need for stakeholder coordination has
increased its need for a standard incident management system.
Therefore, the Port of Mobile's emergency operations plan outlines
the use of an incident management framework from which all
agencies can work together in an efficient and effective manner.
Some port authorities making changes have not experienced any
significant impact from recent disasters. For instance, Port of
Jacksonville officials reported that Hurricane Katrina impacts in
the Gulf region prompted them to revise their disaster
preparedness plans, including reorganizing the plans to reflect
NIMS language and alignment with NRP guidelines. Similarly, Port
of San Diego officials said they hired a consultant to assist them
with drafting their emergency response and business continuity
plan. San Diego's plan prioritized risks, clarified roles and
responsibilities of key departments, and laid out directions on
how to better coordinate with local emergency management officials
during a disaster event.
Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Recovery
Efforts
Since the 2005 hurricane season, federal agencies have also taken
steps to help port authorities strengthen ports' ability to
recover from future natural disasters. These efforts have focused
on increased coordination and communication with stakeholders and
also on building stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources
for port recovery efforts. The efforts primarily involve four
federal agencies that in some fashion work directly with
ports--the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, FEMA and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Efforts for those four agencies are
as follows:
Maritime Administration Efforts: The Maritime Administration has
taken two main steps: developing an approach for activating
maritime assets in disaster recovery, and updating a risk
management guidebook. During the 2005 hurricane season, the
Maritime Administration emerged as a critical resource for the
Gulf area by providing vessels from the nation's National Defense
Ready Reserve Fleet to enable recovery operations and provide
shelter for displaced citizens. Since that time, FEMA developed a
one-time plan--the Federal Support Plan, which was cited
specifically for the 2006 Hurricane Season and specific to the
federal government's response efforts in the State of Louisiana.
The Maritime Administration contributed to this plan by
identifying government and commercial maritime capabilities that
could be employed in response to a disaster.^17 According to
Maritime Administration officials, while the information is
focused on the Gulf area, it could be easily adapted to other
areas in the United States if a disaster occurred. To date, the
Maritime Administration is completing the process of identifying
needs and capabilities and plans to provide a directive regarding
capabilities to its regional offices in June 2007. However, no
strategy exists for communicating this information to ports.
The Maritime Administration is also currently updating its
publication titled Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook
(2001). This publication is the Maritime Administration's "best
practices" guide for port risk management. Developed primarily to
assist smaller ports in conducting risk management, it includes
information on how ports can obtain insurance coverage, facilitate
emergency management and port security, and apply risk management.
The Maritime Administration began updating the guidebook after the
2005 hurricane season. According to officials from the Maritime
Administration, ports are actively using this guidebook,
especially since many of the contributors are port directors and
risk managers at the ports.
While these efforts demonstrate the Maritime Administration's
increased involvement in assisting ports in planning for future
disasters, we also observed that Maritime Administration regions
vary in their level of communication and coordination with ports.
According to a Maritime Administration official, the Gulf and East
Coast regions have been working with FEMA regional offices to
quickly activate needed assets in case of a disaster. However,
while the Gulf and East Coast regions have been strengthening
these relationships, other regions may not have the same level of
coordination. We found, in general, port authorities' interaction
with the Maritime Administration was limited for natural disaster
planning, and the ports we spoke to said they usually did not work
directly with the agency in disaster planning.^18 This view was
echoed by Maritime Administration officials who said that the
relationship between the agency's regional offices and the ports
in their respective areas varied across the country.
Coast Guard efforts: Coast Guard efforts in natural disaster
planning varied considerably from port to port and were most
extensive in the Gulf. While in general, the Coast Guard was
considered successful in its missions during the 2005 hurricane
season, its officials said they were taking additional steps in
improving planning for recovery efforts with port stakeholders
based on their experiences with recent natural disasters. For
example, at the Port of Mobile, Coast Guard officials said that
participating in an actual Incident Command System^19emergency
centers has been as helpful as exercises and, since the 2005
hurricane season, they have utilized such a unified command at
least 10 times in preparation for potential hurricane landfalls in
the region. At other ports, the Coast Guard had a more limited
role in assisting ports in planning for natural disasters.
Even at ports that had not experienced substantial damage from a
recent natural disaster, however, Coast Guard units were applying
lessons learned from other ports' experiences and increasing their
level of involvement. For example, the Port of Houston sustained
minimal damage from Hurricane Rita; however, Coast Guard officials
said that they identified areas where they could make
improvements. The Coast Guard at the Port of Houston leads a
recovery planning effort through port coordination teams, which
include stakeholders such as the port authority, Coast Guard, and
private operators, working together during disaster recovery
efforts. These teams are all-hazards focused and are activated
differently for terrorist incidents or natural disasters. Coast
Guard officials said that although the teams were successful in
planning for Hurricane Rita, there were areas for improvement,
including outreach and training with port stakeholders and
communication. Further, Coast Guard officials at the Port of
Tacoma said that other ports' experiences with recent natural
disasters has generated interest in them becoming more involved in
the planning and coordination of natural disasters. They also
indicated they were interested in adapting, in some form, a
planning forum similar to the Port of Houston's port coordination
teams.
FEMA efforts: While state and local emergency management agencies
assist in facilitating FEMA disaster planning at the port level,
FEMA has several efforts under way to improve its assistance to
ports for disaster recovery. For instance, FEMA officials said
that through the Public Assistance Program, FEMA is able to
provide assistance to ports that are eligible applicants after a
major disaster or emergency. Based on lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is also reviewing and updating its
policies and guidance documents associated with this program. To
administer the program, FEMA will coordinate closely with federal,
state, and local authorities (including emergency management
agencies) through its regional offices. Officials also said that
through planning, training, and exercise activities sponsored by
DHS, they hope to have greater opportunities to interact and
coordinate with port authorities and other local agencies before
disasters occur. Further, officials agree that coordination with
their local counterparts is an important part of emergency
management and disaster recovery efforts.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers efforts: Although the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers generally does not conduct natural disaster planning
with ports, staff at the district level have made some efforts to
increase their level of involvement in this process, particularly
in the Gulf region. For example, district U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers staff have (1) organized and chaired yearly hurricane
planning forums to which all ports in the region are invited; (2)
organized prestorm teleconferences for port stakeholders, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Navy, and in some
instances, the media; (3) participated in the Coast Guard's
Partner Emergency Action Team, which specifically address disaster
preparedness; (4) geographically aligned with the Coast Guard to
better facilitate coordination during an emergency; and (5)
implemented informational training on planning for hurricanes to
ports and other maritime stakeholders. Many of these improvements
were implemented as a result of Hurricane Ivan (2001) and the
hurricanes from the 2005 season. However, the extent of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers participation in natural disaster planning
with ports varies. For instance, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
representatives in Savannah said they do not play a significant
role in the port's natural disaster planning for recovery efforts.
Similarly in Jacksonville, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials
explained that their primary natural disaster recovery duty at the
Port of Miami is to repair the federal channel and they do not
participate in the port authority's disaster planning efforts.
However, the Jacksonville U.S. Army Corps of Engineers does
cooperate with the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Office in
Jacksonville in the development of their hurricane preparedness
plan. For this effort, it assisted in determining what vessels
could remain in port during a hurricane and what vessels would be
required to leave.
Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All
Port Stakeholders
Most port authorities we reviewed conduct planning for natural
disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats.
Federal law established security planning requirements that apply
to ports. Similar requirements do not exist with regard to natural
disaster planning. The ports we contacted used markedly different
approaches to natural disaster planning, and the extent and
thoroughness of their plans varied widely. A few ports have
integrated homeland security and natural disaster planning in what
is called an all-hazards approach, and this approach appeared to
be generating benefits and is in keeping with experts'
recommendations and with the newest developments in federal risk
management policy. A consequence of the divided approach was a
wide variance in the degree to which port stakeholders were
involved in natural disaster planning and the degree to which port
authorities were aware of federal resources available for disaster
recovery. For homeland security planning, federal law provides for
the establishment of AMSCs with wide stakeholder representation,
and some ports are using these committees or another similar forum
with wide representation in their disaster planning efforts. DHS,
which through the Coast Guard oversees the AMSCs, provides an
example of how to incorporate a wider of scope of committee
activity.
Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted
Separately from Other Threats
Of the ports we visited, more than half developed plans for
natural disasters separately from plans that address security
threats. This is likely due to the requirement that port
authorities carry out their planning for homeland security under
the federal framework created by the Congress in the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA),^20 under which all port
operators are required to draft individual security plans
identifying security vulnerabilities and approaches to mitigate
them. Under the Coast Guard's implementing regulations, these
plans are to include such items as measures for access control,
responses to security threats, and drills and exercises to train
staff and test the plan.^21 The plans are "performance-based";
that is, the security outcomes are specified, but the stakeholders
are free to identify and implement appropriate solutions as long
as these solutions achieve the specified outcomes. Because of the
similarities in security and natural hazard planning these plans
can be useful for guiding natural disaster response.
MTSA also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with the
authority to create AMSCs at the port level. These
committees--with representatives from the federal, state, local,
and private sectors--offer a venue to identify and deal with
vulnerabilities in and around ports, as well as a forum for
sharing information on issues related to port security. The
committee assists the Coast Guard's COTP in developing an area
maritime security plan, which complements the facility security
plans developed by individual port operators. The plan provides a
framework for communication and coordination among port
stakeholders and law enforcement officials and identifies and
reduces vulnerabilities to security threats throughout the port
area.
In contrast, port authority and operator natural disaster planning
documents are generally not required by law and vary widely.
According to one member from the AAPA, ports will have various
interrelated plans, such as hurricane readiness plans, emergency
operations plans, engineering plans, and community awareness and
emergency response plans. Taken as a whole, the distinct plans for
a particular port may represent the port's risk management
approach to disaster planning.
In addition, port natural disaster plans are not reviewed by the
Coast Guard. Representatives of the Coast Guard at locations we
visited confirmed they do not review port authority or port
operator planning documents pertaining to natural disaster
planning. For example, officials at the Port of Oakland and the
Port of Tacoma said they do not review the port or port
stakeholders planning documents for natural disaster planning.
Coast Guard officials at the Port of Savannah also noted that they
do not review the hurricane plans for port operators. They
contended that they do not have the expertise to advise the
operators on how to protect or restart their particular
operations. Moreover, natural disaster plans developed by port
authorities generally do not apply to the port's private
operators. Only in one case did a port authority state that it
required its private operators to draft a natural disaster plan.
Under the Separate Approach, Disaster Plans Show Wide Variation
We found that the thoroughness of natural disaster plans varied
considerably from port to port. For instance, the Port of Mobile
had a relatively thorough plan. The Port of Mobile was affected by
three major hurricanes in 2005-2006. Roughly a year after
Hurricane Katrina, the Alabama State Port Authority completed an
extensive emergency operations plan, based on an analysis that
considered natural, man-made, and security-related hazards. The
operations plan describes preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation procedures for each identified threat, establishes
requirements for conducting exercises, and establishes a schedule
for regular plan reviews and updates.^22 In contrast, the Port of
Morgan City does not have a written plan for preparing for natural
disaster threats but instead relies on port personnel to assess
disaster risk and prepare appropriately. Following a disaster, the
port authority relies on senior personnel to direct recovery
efforts as needed.
In the absence of uniform federal guidance for port disaster
planning, some local governments have instituted local planning
requirements. The differences in these local guidelines account
for some of the variation in the content and thoroughness of port
disaster plans. For example, the Miami-Dade County Emergency
Management Office helps to coordinate disaster preparedness for
all county agencies, including the Port of Miami. As such, the
port submits its hurricane plans and continuity of operations plan
to the office each year for review, which provides a certain level
of quality assurance. By comparison, the Port of Los Angeles found
local seismic building codes were insufficient to reach the
desired level of preparedness, so the port developed its own
seismic codes to guide infrastructure construction and repair.
Combined All-Hazards Approach Shows Promise for Improved Planning
In contrast to the disjunctional planning for both natural
disasters and security at ports, industry experts encourage the
unified consideration of all risks faced by the port. Unified
disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the threats
faced by the port, both natural and man-made, be considered
together. This is referred to as an all-hazards approach. Experts
consider it to offer several advantages:
o Application of planning resources to both security and natural
disaster preparedness. Because of the similarities between the
effects of terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters,
much of the planning, personnel, training, and equipment that form
the basis of protection, response, and recovery capabilities are
similar across all emergency events. As we have previously
reported, the capabilities needed to respond to major disasters,
whether the result of terrorist attack or nature, are similar in
many ways.^23 Unified risk management can enhance the efficiency
of port planning efforts because of the similarity in recovery
plans for both natural and security-related disasters. One expert
noted that responding to a disaster would likely be the same for a
security incident and a natural disaster incident from an
operational standpoint.
o Efficient allocation of disaster-preparation resources. An
all-hazards approach allows the port to estimate the relative
impact of mitigation alternatives and identify the optimal mix of
investments in these alternatives based on the costs and benefits
of each. The exclusion of certain risks from consideration, or the
separate consideration of a particular type of risk, gives rise to
the possibility that risks will not be accurately assessed or
compared, and that too many or too few resources will be allocated
toward mitigation of a particular risk. Port risk management
experts noted that, in the absence of an all-hazards risk
management process, it is difficult to accurately assess and
address the full spectrum of threats faced by a port.
Federal Actions Reflect Movement Toward All-Hazards Approach
At the federal level, the Congress has introduced various elements
of an all-hazards approach to risk management and assistance to
ports. Examples are as follows:
o Single response approach to all types of emergency events. NIMS
and NRP, which were implemented by DHS, provide a unified
framework for responding to security and natural disaster events.
NIMS is a policy document that defines roles and responsibilities
of federal, state, and local first responders during all types of
emergency events. The NRP is designed to integrate federal
government domestic prevention, protection, response, and recovery
plans into a single operational plan for all-hazards and
all-emergency response disciplines. Using the framework provided
by NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures for federal
support to emergency managers and organizes capabilities,
staffing, and equipment resources in terms of functions that are
most likely to be needed during emergency events. In addition,
along with the NRP and NIMS, DHS has developed the National
Preparedness Goal, as required by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8. Considered as a group, these three documents are
intended to guide investments in emergency preparedness and
response capabilities for all hazards. An inability to effectively
perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a
detrimental impact on effective protection, prevention, response,
and recovery capabilities.
o Broadened focus for risk mitigation efforts. Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act, passed in October 2006,
contains language mandating that the Coast Guard institute Port
Security Training and Exercise Programs to evaluate response
capabilities of port facilities to respond to acts of terrorism,
natural disasters, and other emergencies.^24
Officials from the DHS Preparedness Directorate's Grants and
Training Office also noted that the criteria for the Port Security
Grant Program is beginning to reflect the movement toward
all-hazards planning in the future. DHS officials stated that the
program may evolve to focus more on portwide risk management,
rather than on risk mitigation for particular assets. Furthermore,
grant applications that demonstrate mitigation of natural hazard
risks in addition to security risks may be more competitive. Other
officials noted that while the program may focus more on all
hazards in the future, it will remain focused on security
priorities for now.
Another agency-level movement toward the all-hazards approach is
occurring in the Coast Guard's improvement of a computer tool it
uses to compare security risks for targets throughout a port,
including areas not under the jurisdiction of a local port
authority. This tool, called the Maritime Security Risk Assessment
Model (MSRAM), provides information for the U.S. Coast Guard COPT
to use in deciding the most efficient allocation of resources to
reduce security risks at a port. The Coast Guard is developing an
all-hazards risk assessment and management system, partially fed
by MSRAM, which will allow comparison of risks and risk-mitigation
activities across all goals and hazards. The Coast Guard directs
the Area Maritime Security Committee to use MSRAM in the
development of the Area Maritime Security Plan. Given that the
Coast Guard is enhancing the MSRAM with a tool that will
incorporate natural hazards, the risks addressed in the Area
Maritime Security Plan could likely include both natural and
security threats in the future.
An all-hazards approach is in many ways a logical maturation of
port security planning, which saw an aggressive homeland security
expansion in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. One expert in seismic risk management we spoke with said
port officials he contacted indicated that they were not focused
on natural disaster risk because, in their view, the federal
government wanted them to focus on security risks instead. At some
ports, hurricanes or earthquakes may be a greater threat than
terrorism, and a case can be made that overall risk to a port
might be more effectively reduced through greater investment in
mitigating these risks. While federal law provides guidance on
addressing security risks through MTSA^25 and its implementing
regulations, it does not provide similar guidance pertaining to
mitigation of natural disaster threats.
Our previous work on risk management has examined the challenges
involved in comparing risk across broader threat categories.^26 A
risk management framework that analyzes risks based on the
likelihood that they will occur and the consequences of their
occurrence is a useful tool for ensuring that program expenditures
are prioritized and properly focused. In light of the competition
for scarce resources available to deal with the threats ports
face, a clear understanding of the relative significance of these
threats is an important step.
Port Authorities Using an All-Hazards Approach Indicate Benefits
Resulted
Two port authorities we reviewed have begun to take an all-hazards
approach to disaster planning by developing planning documents and
structures that address both security risks and natural disasters,
and officials at both ports said this approach yielded
benefits.^27 At the Port of Houston, the Coast Guard used its
authority to mandate the creation of port coordination teams by
creating teams that include all port stakeholders and combine
planning and response efforts for both security and natural
disaster threats. This unified approach to risk management has
allowed the port to respond efficiently to disasters when they
occur, according to port officials. In particular, they said, the
organization of the team changes to match the nature of the
threat. For security threats, the teams are organized
geographically and do not require that the entire port close down,
thereby appropriately matching resources to the threat being
faced. For natural disasters, the teams are organized functionally
because of the more dispersed nature of the threat.
Following the 2005 hurricane season, the Port of Mobile convened a
task force to reorganize its disaster planning to address both
security incidents and natural disasters. The task force, which
recently completed its emergency operations plan, included the
Port Authority Police Chief; Harbormaster; Environmental, Health
and Safety Manager; and representatives of the port's rail, cargo,
intermodal and development divisions. A member of the county
emergency management agency also served on the task force to
provide expert guidance on emergency response planning.
Port stakeholders in other ports that had not moved to an
all-hazards approach also said preparedness and response practices
for security incidents and natural disasters are sufficiently
similar to merit combined planning. Officials in several ports
said that although they are required to allocate certain resources
to security risk mitigation, overall risk to the port would be
more effectively reduced if they had the flexibility to allocate
some of those resources to mitigating natural disaster risk.
Under the Separate Approach, Gaps Exist in Coordinating Maritime
Stakeholders and Obtaining Information about Federal Resources
We have previously reported that, for homeland security planning,
the AMSCs established under federal law have been an effective
coordination tool.^28 These committees have provided a structure
to improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of
information sharing between federal and nonfederal stakeholders.
Port stakeholders said that the committees were an improvement
over previous information-sharing efforts because they established
a formal structure for communicating information and new
procedures for sharing information. Stakeholders stated that,
among other things, the committees have been used as a forum for
sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on
illegal or suspicious activities, and providing input on Area
Maritime Security Plans. Stakeholders, including private
operators, said the information sharing had increased their
awareness of security issues around the port and allowed them to
identify and address security issues at their facilities.
Likewise, Coast Guard officials said the information they received
from nonfederal participants had helped in mitigating and reducing
risks.
In contrast to the regulatory requirements for the establishment
of AMSCs, there are no nationwide federal mandates for all-hazards
planning forums that involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders in
disaster planning. In the absence of any consistent requirement or
approach, we found substantial variation in the maturity of, and
participation in, natural disaster planning forums at ports. As
table 3 shows, the level of activity and the participants varied
considerably. Some ports utilized their AMSC for both types of
planning, while others conducted natural disaster planning efforts
primarily within the local area's broader emergency management
forums, and still others conducted their planning piecemeal, with
various entities meeting separately and not in one coordinated
forum.
^11The Florida State Department of Community Affairs is the department
that houses the state emergency management agency.
^12Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Planning: Manual
for Best Practices, American Association of Port Authorities, Prepared by:
Phyllis Saathoff, Managing Director, Port Freeport. September 2006.
^13GICA is maritime trade association that is an advocate for issues
regarding the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland navigable
waterway located along the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is to work
with it members, as well as the Coast Guard and Corps, to identify
opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway.
^14Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Response Protocol: Prepared
by the Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Team. July 2006.
^15GAO, Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts are Improving,
[31]GAO-06-933T (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006).
^16Also known as HOGANSAC, this committee's 19 members include pilots
associations, operators, and environmental and academic interests. The
committee addresses a wide range of topics affecting navigation in the
area. Other individuals with experience and interest in navigation safety
issues serve on working groups established by the committee to examine
other issues of local interest.
^17The primary planning instrument for DOT remains the Emergency Support
Function #1 Annex to the National Response Plan; however, the annex does
not detail site specific information as was done for this plan.
^18According to officials from MARAD, the DOT Regional Emergency
Transportation Coordinator and Representatives may play a supporting role
with regards to communicating and coordinating department response
processes and building relationships with local authorities.
^19The Incident Command System, established under NIMS, is a system for
managing all types of major incidents. It defines the operating
characteristics, interactive management components and structure of
incident management and emergency response organizations engaged
throughout the life cycle of an incident.
^20The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No.
107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 contains many of the homeland security
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, (46 U.S.C. S
70112(a)(2)).
^21The requirements for security plans are found in 33 C.F.R. Part 104,
Subpart D for vessels, and 33 C.F.R. Part 105, Subpart D for facilities.
^22Mobile's plan, while relatively thorough, still has gaps in
coordination with port stakeholders. Port authority officials noted that
they do not share their emergency plans with tenants or outside partners.
While many tenants develop their own emergency plans, the port authority
does not require them.
^23 [32]GAO-05-652 .
^24Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-347, S113(a) 114(a) 120 Stat. 1884 (SAFE Port Act).
^25Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
^26 [33]GAO-06-91 .
^27A third port, the Port of Oakland has taken a step toward employing an
all-hazards approach. The Area AMSC elected to add natural disaster
planning information to their Area Maritime Security Plan as a set of
appendixes.
^28 [34]GAO-06-933T .
Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited
Port Description of forum
Tacoma The port does not have a central forum for coordinating
stakeholder natural disaster planning efforts. Instead,
occasional disaster preparedness exercises with the county
emergency management agency and the Coast Guard provide
stakeholders with opportunities to share lessons learned.
However, the Port of Tacoma conducts planning activities with the
county emergency management department.
Oakland The port is an active member of the City's Emergency Management
Board (Disaster Council) which works closely with the Port of
Oakland on emergency planning and testing of plans/exercises. The
port is also involved in a number of city, county, and statewide
exercises.
Houston The port has an all-hazards forum through the Port Coordination
Team and its constituent Port Coordination Centers. These centers
and team include representatives from the port authority and the
Coast Guard and a range of stakeholders from private entities.
The forum plans for natural disasters and security threats and is
activated differently depending on the type of event. However,
the forum does not include representatives from the local
emergency management office.^a
Mobile The port's AMSC is the most significant forum for disaster
planning. Following the 2005 hurricane season, the port authority
convened a task force to reorganize its disaster planning to
address both security incidents and natural disasters. The task
force included stakeholders from across the port area. The port
also works with the county emergency management agency.
Gulfport The port authority meets once a year with customers and tenants
to discuss hurricane preparedness and review the hurricane plan.
The port provides training on transporting cargo during
hurricanes and participates in separate response and recovery
planning meetings with other maritime stakeholders, such as the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Miami The primary forum used to discuss natural disaster planning is
the Safety First Committee, which discusses a variety of safety
issues. The committee is led by the Port of Miami and meets
monthly. To address individual private sector stakeholders, a
subcommittee meets with individuals as needed.
Savannah The port authority is involved in several port forums that
discuss a variety of issues; emergency issues may be addressed in
these forums if they are imminent. Externally, the port
authority's primary interactions are with the state for hazard
mitigation programming and with the local emergency management
office for response and evacuation. Until recently, interaction
with the local emergency management office was limited.
Source: GAO.
^aAccording to port officials, the Port of Houston does coordinate with
the local emergency management agency during a disaster event.
The Port of Savannah provides an example of how separate planning for
natural disasters and security can lead to a lack of coordination and
information-sharing. While officials from the local emergency management
agency said they reviewed and provided comments on the Georgia Port
Authority's most recent Hurricane Plan and Draft Emergency Operations
Plan, this had not traditionally been the case over the past several
years. According to a representative from the emergency management agency,
if the port is not sharing its emergency operations plans, it makes it
difficult for responders in the local area to understand what is happening
within the port in terms of planning for natural disasters. Additionally,
while the local EMA is enjoying an ongoing productive dialogue with port
representatives in developing the Emergency Operations Plan and working on
port safety and security issues, they are not having the same level of
success with port representatives responsible for hurricane planning. Even
so, officials said that they had seen marked improvement in the area of
portwide cooperation and involvement among stakeholders.
Port authorities' lack of familiarity with FEMA's programs is another
example of the gaps that exist. We found that port authorities'
understanding of FEMA's assistance was dependent on their relationship
with the local or state emergency management office--a stakeholder that is
not necessarily involved in the forums where the port's natural disaster
planning occurs. We discussed three FEMA programs with officials from our
seven case study ports: the Public Assistance Program, Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program and the Predisaster Mitigation Grant Program (see table 4
for brief descriptions). These programs provide ports with funds for
disaster mitigation efforts before and after disaster events and assist
ports in avoiding costly damages. Of the three programs, port authorities
were most knowledgeable about, and most involved with, the Public
Assistance Program, although even with this program, some port authorities
reported encountering challenges with the process during the 2005
hurricane season. Their knowledge and participation in the two hazard
mitigation grant programs was dependent on their involvement with the
emergency planning office. FEMA officials told us that no ports have
applied as an applicant or subapplicant for the Predisaster Mitigation
Program,^29 and only a few had received assistance through the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program since 1998. AAPA officials made the same
point--that many ports are unaware, unsure how to navigate or do not
understand the resources that are available to them for disasters. In its
new best practices manual for natural disaster planning, AAPA included a
section regarding various federal resources available, including FEMA.
Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs
Public Assistance Provides grants for the repair, replacement, or
Program^a restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned
facilities and the facilities of certain private
nonprofit organizations. The federal share is not
less than 75 percent of the eligible cost for
emergency measures and permanent restoration. The
state determines who pays the nonfederal share.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Provides grants to states and local governments to
Program^b implement long-term hazard mitigation measures
after a major disaster declaration. The purpose of
program is to reduce the loss of life and property
due to natural disasters and to enable mitigation
measures to be implemented during the immediate
recovery from a disaster. Provides up to 75% of
the cost of hazard mitigation measures. The State
or grantee must provide a 25% match.
Predisaster Hazard The program provides funds on a competitive basis
Mitigation Program^c to states, territories, Indian tribal governments,
and communities for hazard mitigation planning and
the implementation of mitigation projects prior to
a disaster event. Funding these plans and projects
reduces overall risks to the population and
structures, while also reducing reliance on
funding from actual disaster declarations. The
nonfederal share of the grant is at least 25%.
Eligibility for a project grant is dependent on
the applicant and sub-applicant having a FEMA
approved hazard mitigation plan. States are
eligible as applicants for grants and ports are
eligible as a subgrantee of the state.
Source: GAO.
^aEstablished by Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat.143 (1974), codified in 42
U.S.C. ch. 68.
^bAuthorized in 42 U.S.C. S 5170c.
^cAuthorized in 42 U.S.C. S 5133.
Conclusions
The 2005 hurricane season emphasized the need for ports to plan for other
threats in addition to security. Since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the country has focused on enhancing its security measures, and
ports in particular have been targeted due to their vulnerability and
their criticality to the U.S. economy. While ports have long prepared to
some degree for hurricanes and earthquakes, the hurricanes of 2005
highlighted key areas in which natural disaster planning was often
inadequate. Even ports that were not directly impacted by the hurricanes
recognized their own vulnerabilities and took additional actions. As ports
continue to revise and improve their planning efforts, available evidence
indicates that, if ports take a system-wide approach, thinking
strategically about using resources to mitigate and recover from all forms
of disaster, they will be able to achieve the most effective results. The
federally established framework for ports' homeland security planning
appears to provide useful elements for establishing an all-hazards
approach and adopting these elements appears to be a logical starting
point for an all-hazards approach for port authorities. In particular,
greater coordination between stakeholders appears important to ensure that
available federal resources can be most effectively applied. A forum for
sharing information and developing plans across a wide range of
stakeholders, as occurs with a port's AMSC, is critical for ensuring that
local stakeholders can use federal resources effectively. This is
especially the case for mitigation grants administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the Maritime Administration's
communication of information regarding making ships and other maritime
resources available for disaster recovery.
^29Recently, the Port of Tacoma began participating in the Predisaster
Hazard Mitigation Program as a subgrantee of the county.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural disasters
and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are recommending
that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security encourage port
stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards planning
efforts and include appropriate representatives from DHS, the port
authority, representatives from the local emergency management office, the
Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility owner/operators.
To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime disaster
recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation direct the Administrator of the Maritime Administration to
develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources
available for recovery efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOT, and DOD for their review
and comment.
In DHS's letter, the department generally agreed existing forums provide a
good opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by stakeholders
from various federal, state, and local agencies and, as appropriate,
industry and nongovernmental organizations. However, the department said
it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency
planning on existing committees in ports and said these responsibilities
should remain with state and local emergency management planners. Our
recommendation was not to place responsibility for such planning within
port committees, but rather to use these existing forums as a way to
engage all relevant parties in discussing natural disaster planning for
ports. The problem we found at various locations we visited was that all
parties have not been involved in these efforts. In our view, these
committees represent a ready way to accomplish this task. While we
understand Coast Guard's concern with diluting existing statutorily
mandated port-related committees, we found during the course of our
fieldwork that some ports were already using existing port committees
effectively to plan for all hazards. Further, we believe that the unique
nature of ports and their criticality to goods movement warrants that all
ports be encouraged to have a specific forum for all-hazard planning.
DHS's letter is reprinted in appendix II. DHS officials provided technical
comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to
ensure the accuracy of our report.
In general, DOT agreed with the facts presented in the report. Department
officials provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report. The
department generally concurred with GAO's recommendation.
Additionally, DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the report.
Department officials provided some technical comments and clarifications,
which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report.
We will send copies of this report to the interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties.
We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-6570 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Katherine Siggerud
Director, Physical Infrastructure
List of Committees
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable James Oberstar
Chairman
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable David E. Price
Chairman
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report, initiated under the Comptroller General's authority to
examine government operations, examines (1) the challenges port
authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2)
the efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, and (3)
the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters and the effect
of this approach on their ability to share information with port
stakeholders and access federal resources.
To address these objectives, we focused much of our work on 17 U.S. ports.
We focused primarily on commercial ports and various commercial aspects of
these ports. The main criteria we used to select ports for study were as
follows:
o Size of port, based on the value of imported cargo. To ensure a
varied size of ports, we selected ports that were among the top 50
in size, but within these 50, we chose ports whose total cargo
values were greater than and less than the average cargo value for
all 50 top ports.
o Experience with recent natural disasters. We focused our efforts
primarily--but not exclusively--on ports that had some degree of
experience with a natural disaster since 1998. Based on Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance about the most significant
disaster threats and potential hazards, we limited our focus to
ports that have hurricane or seismic threats. In particular, we
included a number of ports affected by the 2005 hurricane
season--primarily hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita. In all, 10
of the 17 ports we selected were affected by hurricanes that year.
o Operational type. We chose ports that reflected a range of
operating types, including those that (1) manage port operations
and provide all services, (2) act as a landlord and lease
operations and facilities to tenants, and (3) conduct limited
operations in the port and lease facilities to others.
o Region of the United States. We selected ports from the East,
Gulf, and West Coasts. There is an overrepresentation of Gulf
region ports to ensure adequate coverage of hurricane affected
ports.
In making our selections, we used information from the Maritime
Administration, including port demographics operational, legal
type, and region from the Public Port Finance Survey Report and
Maritime Administration waterborne statistics which report the top
50 ports in terms of total cargo value. We determined that what we
found at those ports is not generalizable to all U.S. ports. We
used disaster data from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to assess how many natural disasters had affected the counties in
which each port was located. Based on our review of data
documentation, we determined that the data we used in applying our
criteria for port selection were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes.
We took two approaches to reviewing these ports--site visits and
telephone interviews. We conducted site visits at seven ports, as
follows:
o Tacoma, Washington
o Houston, Texas
o Oakland, California
o Gulfport, Mississippi
o Mobile, Alabama
o Miami, Florida
o Savannah, Georgia
During these visits, we gathered information from various maritime
stakeholders, including officials from port authorities, emergency
management agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Maritime Administration. Although we talked to
four private operators, we excluded interviewing other private
operators because their roles and responsibilities vary greatly
from port to port and because their efforts for natural disasters,
unlike their efforts for homeland security, are not subject to
federal requirements or guidelines. We designed our case study
interview questions to provide insight on (1) general governance
and operations of the port, (2) impacts from recent natural
disasters, (3) lessons learned from previous natural disasters,
(4) risk management procedures, and (5) stakeholder collaboration.
We conducted telephone interviews with officials at 10 ports, as
follows:
o Freeport, Texas
o Jacksonville, Florida
o Los Angeles, California
o Morgan City, Louisiana
o New Orleans, Louisiana
o Pascagoula, Mississippi
o Port Arthur, Texas
o Richmond, Virginia
o San Diego, California
o Wilmington, North Carolina
At these ports, we limited our telephone interviews to port
authorities only. These semi-structured interviews addressed the
same topics as the case study but focused more on damages and
lessons learned as a result of recent natural disasters. For both
sets of ports, we also reviewed numerous planning documents from
port stakeholders including emergency preparedness plans, disaster
recovery plans, hurricane operations, hurricane manuals, seismic
guidelines, and business continuity plans.
To assess the challenges port authorities experienced as a result
of recent natural disasters, we used the interviews we conducted
and the documents we obtained from officials at the 17 ports. To
determine the efforts under way to address these challenges, we
reviewed information from our interviews with and documents from
American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) officials and
various federal agencies. In particular, we reviewed the Emergency
Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Planning: Manual for
Best Practices that was developed through several working groups
coordinated by the AAPA. The working groups provided a forum for
port officials across the United States and Canada to share their
experience in planning for the impacts of recent natural disasters
and to share their best practices. We conducted interviews with
the Chair of the working groups and other AAPA officials to gather
more information about the working group's procedures and vetting
process. Additionally, we interviewed various regional and
headquarter officials of the Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast
Guard (Coast Guard), Department of Transportation, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, FEMA, and DHS. We reviewed the following federal
risk management plans:
o The draft appendix for maritime resources for the Federal
Support Plan. The appendix is part of a one-time joint planning
document between the Department of Transportation and FEMA for the
state of Louisiana (2006 Hurricane Season). The Maritime
Administration, an agency within the Department of Transportation,
developed this appendix to assist in future recovery efforts by
identifying resources, protocols, and organizations for maritime
resources.
o The Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook, developed by
the Maritime Administration. This publication is a best practices
guide for port risk management, including information on how ports
obtain insurance coverage and facilitate emergency management.
To determine how port authorities plan for natural disasters and
the effects of that approach on information-sharing among port
stakeholders and access to federal resources, we reviewed port and
federal disaster planning documents collected from various port
stakeholders at each of the seven ports we visited in person. In
order to gain an understanding of best practices for such planning
efforts, we interviewed academic, industry, and government
experts.^1 In particular, we interviewed risk management experts
from the following organizations:
o Georgia Institute of Technology's Port Seismic Risk Management
Team conducted damage assessments at seven ports in south
Louisiana in October 2005 immediately following Hurricane Katrina.
o ABS Consulting has worked with a variety of clients including
the Coast Guard, Maritime Administration, and FEMA and thus helped
develop several port risk management tools.
o The Office of Grants and Training at DHS administers both Port
Security and Homeland Security Grants.
o The Coast Guard has expertise in utilizing the Maritime Security
Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) to assess security risk and has
plans to incorporate natural disaster risks into the model.
We also reviewed related laws and mandates that provide federal
oversight to ports--namely the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 ^2 and its implementing regulations and other
applicable law. We also reviewed the Puget Sound area maritime
security plan and attended an Area Maritime Security Committee
meeting at the Port of Houston-Galveston. To determine steps that
federal agencies were taking with regard to all-hazards risk
management, we reviewed (1) the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act),^3 which addresses risk mitigation
of transportation disruptions, including disruptions caused
natural disasters and (2) policy documents including the National
Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. We also
reviewed a presentation on the Coast Guard's MSRAM.
Our work, which we conducted from December 2005 through February
2007, was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
^1For risk management, which is a central component of best practices, we
limited our investigation to the context of emergency planning and did not
address insurance-related risk management.
^2Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
^3Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act),
Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884. We also reviewed the SAFE Port Act
Conference Report- House Report 109-711.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-6570, [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant
Director; Casey Hanewall; Lindsey Hemly; Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt;
Bert Japikse; Erica Miles; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Jamilah Moon;
Sharon Silas; Stan Stenerson; and Randall Williamson made key
contributions to this report.
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(542083)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-412.
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Highlights of GAO-07-412, a report to congressional committees
March 2007
PORT RISK MANAGEMENT
Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and
Recovery
U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2
billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept. 11,
2001, much of the national focus on ports' preparedness has been on
preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed
focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including
natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the
Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have
experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way
to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port authorities
plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed various
port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports.
[41]What GAO Recommends To ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for
natural disasters, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing
all-hazards planning.
DHS, DOT and DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the report.
However, DHS expressed concern about using existing forums for planning.
Our work showed that these forums are already being used for planning in
several cases which should be further encouraged.
Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season,
experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural
disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials
identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as
their biggest challenges.
Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges.
Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems and
other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. Collectively,
the American Association of Port Authorities developed a best practices
manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as well as lessons
learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that have not
experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are nonetheless
susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons learned by
other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such as the U.S.
Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers have increased their coordination and communication with ports
to strengthen ports' ability to recover from future natural disasters and
to build stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery
efforts.
Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters
separately from planning for homeland security threats. Unlike security
efforts, natural disaster planning is not subject to the same type of
specific federal requirements and, therefore, varies from port to port. As
a result of this divided approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports'
natural disaster planning efforts including:
o the level of participation in disaster forums, and
o the level of information sharing among port stakeholders
In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing opportunities
among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in their understanding
of federal resources available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster
recovery. Other ports have begun using existing forums, such as their
federally mandated Area Maritime Security Committee, to coordinate
disaster planning efforts. Port and industry experts, as well as recent
federal actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster
planning and recovery. That is, disaster preparedness planning requires
that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural (such as
hurricanes) and man-made (such as terror events), be considered together.
The Department of Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard
oversees the Area Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how
to incorporate a wider scope of activity for ports across the country.
Additionally, the Maritime Administration should develop a communication
strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery
efforts.
References
Visible links
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-91
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-91
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T
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