Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs	 
(30-MAR-07, GAO-07-406SP).					 
                                                                 
This report is GAO's fifth annual assessment of selected weapon  
programs. From 2001 to the present, the Department of Defense	 
(DOD) has doubled its planned investment in new systems from	 
approximately $750 billion to almost $1.5 trillion. While DOD	 
expects these systems to transform military operations, their	 
acquisition remains a high-risk area. GAO's reviews of weapons	 
over three decades have found consistent cost increases, schedule
delays, and performance shortfalls. The nation's growing	 
long-range fiscal challenges may ultimately spur Congress to	 
pressure DOD to cut spending on new weapons and to redirect	 
funding to other priorities. In response, DOD might be compelled 
to deliver new weapon programs within estimated costs and to	 
obtain the most from its investments. This report provides	 
congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent,	 
knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs,	 
identifying potential risks and needed actions when a program's  
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best	 
practices. Programs assessed were selected using several factors:
high dollar value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest.
This report also highlights issues raised by the cumulative	 
experiences of individual programs. GAO updates this report	 
annually under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct	 
evaluations on his own initiative.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-406SP					        
    ACCNO:   A67571						        
  TITLE:     Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon     
Programs							 
     DATE:   03/30/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Best practices					 
	     Best practices methodology 			 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Financial analysis 				 
	     Military research and development			 
	     Missiles						 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Technology 					 
	     Weapons research and development			 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Air Force B-2 Radar Modernization			 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     Air Force Small Diameter Bomb			 
	     Air Force Transformational Satellite		 
	     Communications System				 
                                                                 
	     Army Advanced Precision Kill Weapon		 
	     System Program					 
                                                                 
	     Army Advanced Threat Infrared			 
	     Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     Army Excalibur Precision Guided Extended		 
	     Range Artillery Projectile 			 
                                                                 
	     Army Future Combat Systems 			 
	     Army Land Warrior System				 
	     Army Warfighter Information Network		 
	     C-130 Avionics Modernization Program		 
	     C-130J Aircraft					 
	     C-5 Avionics Modernization Program 		 
	     C-5 Reliability Enhancement and			 
	     Reengining Program 				 
                                                                 
	     Combat Search and Rescue Replacement		 
	     Vehicle						 
                                                                 
	     DDG-1000 Destroyer 				 
	     DOD Advanced Extremely High Frequency		 
	     Satellite Program					 
                                                                 
	     DOD Airborne Laser Program 			 
	     DOD Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     DOD Joint Tactical Radio System			 
	     DOD Space Radar Program				 
	     DOD Space Tracking and Surveillance		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     E-2D Advanced Hawkeye				 
	     EA-18G Aircraft					 
	     Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle		 
	     Joint Strike Fighter				 
	     Littoral Combat Ship				 
	     Longbow Apache Helicopter				 
	     MDA Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     MDA Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     MDA Kinetic Energy Interceptor System		 
	     MDA Terminal High Altitude Area Defense		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     MQ-9 Predator B					 
	     National Polar-Orbiting Operational		 
	     Environmental Satellite System			 
                                                                 
	     NAVSTAR Global Positioning System			 
	     Navy Active Electronically Scanned Array		 
	     Radar Program					 
                                                                 
	     Navy Extended Range Guided Munition		 
	     Navy Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21		 
	     Space Based Infrared System-High			 
	     V-22 Joint Service Advance Light			 
	     Aircraft						 
                                                                 
	     VH-71A Helicopter					 
	     Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 

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GAO-07-406SP

   

     * [1]Contents

          * [2]Better Acquisition Outcomes Needed to Accomplish DOD
            Transformation Objectives in Current Fiscal Environment

               * [3]DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Operations Expected
                 to Be the Most Expensive and Complex Attempted
               * [4]The Current Fiscal Environment Presents Challenges to
                 Accomplishing DOD's Transformation Objectives

          * [5]DOD Weapon Programs Consistently Experience a Reduced Return
            on Investment
          * [6]A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition
            Outcomes
          * [7]Most Programs Proceed with Low Levels of Knowledge at Critical
            Junctures

               * [8]Programs That Enter System Development with Immature
                 Technologies Cost More and Take Longer
               * [9]Programs Continue Past Design Reviews without
                 Demonstrating a Stable Design
               * [10]Most Programs Do Not Collect Data to Measure Production
                 Maturity

          * [11]Effective Management Capacity and Control Are Essential to
            Successfully Executing a Knowledge-Based Approach

               * [12]DOD Does Not Provide Program Managers an Environment
                 That Facilitates a Knowledge- Based Acquisition Approach
               * [13]Contractors Increasingly Perform Key Program Management
                 Functions
               * [14]Inadequate Knowledge Development Has Resulted in the
                 Extended Use of Cost Reimbursement Contracts in Some Cases

          * [15]How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed
          * [16]Assessments of Individual Programs

               * [17]Program Essentials
               * [18]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in
                 millions)

     * [19]ABL Program

          * [20]Technology Maturity
          * [21]Design Stability
          * [22]Production Maturity
          * [23]Other Program Issues
          * [24]Agency Comments
          * [25]Program Essentials
          * [26]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [27]ACS Program

          * [28]Technology Maturity
          * [29]Design Stability
          * [30]Other Program Issues
          * [31]Agency Comments
          * [32]Program Essentials
          * [33]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [34]Aegis BMD Program

          * [35]Technology Maturity
          * [36]Design Stability
          * [37]Production Maturity
          * [38]Other Program Issues
          * [39]Agency Comments
          * [40]Program Essentials
          * [41]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [42]AEHF Program

          * [43]Technology Maturity
          * [44]Design Stability
          * [45]Production Maturity
          * [46]Other Program Issues
          * [47]Agency Comments
          * [48]Program Essentials
          * [49]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [50]AESA Program

          * [51]Technology Maturity
          * [52]Design Stability
          * [53]Production Maturity
          * [54]Other Program Issues
          * [55]Agency Comments
          * [56]Program Essentials
          * [57]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [58]AMCM Program

          * [59]Technology Maturity
          * [60]Design Stability
          * [61]Production Maturity
          * [62]Agency Comments
          * [63]Program Essentials
          * [64]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [65]APKWS II Program

          * [66]Technology Maturity
          * [67]Design Stability
          * [68]Production Maturity
          * [69]Other Program Issues
          * [70]Agency Comments
          * [71]GAO Comments
          * [72]Program Essentials
          * [73]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [74]ARH Program

          * [75]Technology Maturity
          * [76]Design Stability
          * [77]Production Maturity
          * [78]Other Program Issues
          * [79]Agency Comments
          * [80]Program Essentials
          * [81]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [82]ATIRCM/CMWS Program

          * [83]Technology Maturity
          * [84]Design Stability
          * [85]Production Maturity
          * [86]Other Program Issues
          * [87]Agency Comments
          * [88]Program Essentials
          * [89]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [90]B-2 RMP Program

          * [91]Technology Maturity
          * [92]Design Stability
          * [93]Production Maturity
          * [94]Agency Comments
          * [95]Program Essentials
          * [96]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [97]BAMS Program

          * [98]Technology Maturity
          * [99]Other Program Issues
          * [100]Agency Comments
          * [101]Program Essentials
          * [102]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [103]C-130 AMP Program

          * [104]Technology Maturity
          * [105]Design Stability
          * [106]Production Maturity
          * [107]Other Program Issues
          * [108]Agency Comments
          * [109]Program Essentials
          * [110]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [111]C-130J Hercules Program

          * [112]Technology Maturity
          * [113]Design Stability
          * [114]Production Maturity
          * [115]Other Program Issues
          * [116]Agency Comments
          * [117]Program Essentials
          * [118]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [119]C-5 AMP Program

          * [120]Technology Maturity
          * [121]Design Stability
          * [122]Production Maturity
          * [123]Other Program Issues
          * [124]Agency Comments
          * [125]Program Essentials
          * [126]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [127]C-5 RERP Program

          * [128]Technology Maturity
          * [129]Design Stability
          * [130]Production Maturity
          * [131]Other Program Issues
          * [132]Agency Comments
          * [133]Program Essentials
          * [134]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [135]CH-53K Program

          * [136]Technology Maturity
          * [137]Design Stability
          * [138]Other Program Issues
          * [139]Agency Comments
          * [140]Program Essentials
          * [141]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [142]CSAR-X Program

          * [143]Technology Maturity
          * [144]Other Program Issues
          * [145]Agency Comments
          * [146]Program Essentials
          * [147]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [148]CVN-21 Program

          * [149]Technology Maturity
          * [150]Design Stability
          * [151]Agency Comments
          * [152]Program Essentials
          * [153]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [154]DDG 1000 Program

          * [155]Technology Maturity
          * [156]Design Stability
          * [157]Agency Comments
          * [158]GAO Comments
          * [159]Program Essentials
          * [160]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [161]E-10A WAS TDP Program

          * [162]Technology Maturity
          * [163]Other Program Issues
          * [164]Agency Comments
          * [165]Program Essentials
          * [166]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [167]E-2D AHE Program

          * [168]Technology Maturity
          * [169]Design Stability
          * [170]Production Maturity
          * [171]Agency Comments
          * [172]Program Essentials
          * [173]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [174]EA-18G Program

          * [175]Technology Maturity
          * [176]Design Stability
          * [177]Production Maturity
          * [178]Agency Comments
          * [179]Program Essentials
          * [180]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [181]EELV Program

          * [182]Technology Maturity
          * [183]Design Stability
          * [184]Production Maturity
          * [185]Other Program Issues
          * [186]Agency Comments
          * [187]Program Essentials
          * [188]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [189]EFSS Program

          * [190]Technology Maturity
          * [191]Design Stability
          * [192]Production Maturity
          * [193]Other Program Issues
          * [194]Agency Comments
          * [195]Program Essentials
          * [196]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [197]EFV Program

          * [198]Technology Maturity
          * [199]Design Stability
          * [200]Production Maturity
          * [201]Other Program Issues
          * [202]Agency Comments
          * [203]Program Essentials
          * [204]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [205]ERM Program

          * [206]Technology Maturity
          * [207]Design Stability
          * [208]Production Maturity
          * [209]Other Program Issues
          * [210]Agency Comments
          * [211]Program Essentials
          * [212]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [213]Excalibur Program

          * [214]Technology Maturity
          * [215]Design Stability and Production Maturity
          * [216]Other Program Issues
          * [217]Agency Comments
          * [218]Program Essentials
          * [219]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [220]F-22A Program

          * [221]Technology Maturity
          * [222]Other Program Issues
          * [223]Agency Comments
          * [224]Program Essentials
          * [225]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [226]FCS Program

          * [227]Technology Maturity
          * [228]Design Stability
          * [229]Other Program Issues
          * [230]Agency Comments
          * [231]GAO Comments
          * [232]Program Essentials
          * [233]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [234]Global Hawk Program

          * [235]Technology Maturity
          * [236]Design Stability
          * [237]Production Maturity
          * [238]Other Program Issues
          * [239]Agency Comments
          * [240]Program Essentials
          * [241]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [242]GMD Program

          * [243]Technology Maturity
          * [244]Design Stability
          * [245]Production Maturity
          * [246]Other Program Issues
          * [247]Agency Comments
          * [248]Program Essentials
          * [249]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [250]GPS Block II Modernization Program

          * [251]Technology Maturity
          * [252]Design Stability
          * [253]Production Maturity
          * [254]Other Program Issues
          * [255]Agency Comments
          * [256]Program Essentials
          * [257]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [258]JLENS Program

          * [259]Technology Maturity
          * [260]Design Stability
          * [261]Other Program Issues
          * [262]Agency Comments
          * [263]Program Essentials
          * [264]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [265]JSF Program

          * [266]Technology Maturity
          * [267]Design Stability
          * [268]Production Maturity
          * [269]Other Program Issues
          * [270]Agency Comments
          * [271]GAO Comments
          * [272]Program Essentials
          * [273]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [274]JTRS AMF Program

          * [275]Technology Maturity
          * [276]Other Program Issues
          * [277]Agency Comments
          * [278]Program Essentials
          * [279]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [280]JTRS GMR Program

          * [281]Technology Maturity
          * [282]Design Stability
          * [283]Other Program Issues
          * [284]Agency Comments
          * [285]GAO Comments
          * [286]Program Essentials
          * [287]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [288]JTRS HMS Program

          * [289]Technology Maturity
          * [290]Design Stability
          * [291]Other Program Issues
          * [292]Agency Comments
          * [293]Program Essentials
          * [294]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [295]KEI Program

          * [296]Technology Maturity
          * [297]Design Stability
          * [298]Other Program Issues
          * [299]Agency Comments
          * [300]Program Essentials
          * [301]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [302]Land Warrior Program

          * [303]Technology Maturity
          * [304]Design Stability
          * [305]Production Maturity
          * [306]Other Program Issues
          * [307]Agency Comments
          * [308]Program Essentials
          * [309]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [310]LCS Program

          * [311]Technology Maturity
          * [312]Design Stability
          * [313]Production Maturity
          * [314]Other Program Issues
          * [315]Agency Comments
          * [316]Program Essentials
          * [317]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [318]LHA 6 Program

          * [319]Technology Maturity
          * [320]Design Stability
          * [321]Other Program Issues
          * [322]Agency Comments
          * [323]Program Essentials
          * [324]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [325]Longbow Apache BLIII Program

          * [326]Technology Maturity
          * [327]Design Stability
          * [328]Other Program Issues
          * [329]Agency Comments
          * [330]Program Essentials
          * [331]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [332]LUH Program

          * [333]Technology Maturity
          * [334]Design Stability
          * [335]Production Maturity
          * [336]Other Program Issues
          * [337]Agency Comments
          * [338]Program Essentials
          * [339]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [340]MKV Program

          * [341]Technology Maturity
          * [342]Design Stability
          * [343]Other Program Issues
          * [344]Agency Comments
          * [345]Program Essentials
          * [346]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [347]MQ-9 (Reaper) Program

          * [348]Technology Maturity
          * [349]Design Stability
          * [350]Production Maturity
          * [351]Other Program Issues
          * [352]Agency Comments
          * [353]Program Essentials
          * [354]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [355]21'' MRUUVS Program

          * [356]Technology Maturity
          * [357]Other Program Issues
          * [358]Agency Comments
          * [359]Program Essentials
          * [360]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [361]MUOS Program

          * [362]Technology Maturity
          * [363]Design Stability
          * [364]Other Program Issues
          * [365]Agency Comments
          * [366]Program Essentials
          * [367]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [368]NPOESS Program

          * [369]Technology Maturity
          * [370]Design Stability
          * [371]Production Maturity
          * [372]Other Program Issues
          * [373]Agency Comments
          * [374]Program Essentials
          * [375]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [376]P-8A MMA Program

          * [377]Technology Maturity
          * [378]Design Stability
          * [379]Other Program Issues
          * [380]Agency Comments
          * [381]Program Essentials
          * [382]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [383]PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program

          * [384]Technology Maturity
          * [385]Design Stability
          * [386]Other Program Issues
          * [387]Agency Comments
          * [388]Program Essentials
          * [389]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [390]SBIRS High Program

          * [391]Technology Maturity
          * [392]Design Stability and Production Maturity
          * [393]Other Program Issues
          * [394]Agency Comments
          * [395]Program Essentials
          * [396]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [397]SDB II Program

          * [398]Technology Maturity
          * [399]Other Program Issues
          * [400]Agency Comments
          * [401]Program Essentials
          * [402]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [403]SR Program

          * [404]Technology Maturity
          * [405]Other Program Issues
          * [406]Agency Comments
          * [407]Program Essentials
          * [408]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [409]SSN 774 Tech Insertion Program

          * [410]Technology Maturity
          * [411]Design Stability
          * [412]Other Program Issues
          * [413]Agency Comments
          * [414]Program Essentials
          * [415]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [416]STSS Program

          * [417]Technology Maturity
          * [418]Design Stability
          * [419]Other Program Issues
          * [420]Agency Comments
          * [421]Program Essentials
          * [422]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [423]THAAD Program

          * [424]Technology Maturity
          * [425]Design Stability
          * [426]Production Maturity
          * [427]Other Program Issues
          * [428]Agency Comments
          * [429]Program Essentials
          * [430]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [431]TSAT Program

          * [432]Technology Maturity
          * [433]Other Program Issues
          * [434]Agency Comments
          * [435]Program Essentials
          * [436]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [437]V-22 Program

          * [438]Design Stability
          * [439]Production Maturity
          * [440]Agency Comments
          * [441]Program Essentials
          * [442]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [443]VH-71 Program

          * [444]Technology Maturity
          * [445]Design Stability and Production Maturity
          * [446]Other Program Issues
          * [447]Agency Comments
          * [448]Program Essentials
          * [449]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [450]Warrior UAS Program

          * [451]Technology Maturity
          * [452]Design Stability
          * [453]Production Maturity
          * [454]Other Program Issues
          * [455]Agency Comments
          * [456]Program Essentials
          * [457]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [458]WGS Program

          * [459]Technology Maturity
          * [460]Design Stability
          * [461]Production Maturity
          * [462]Other Program Issues
          * [463]Agency Comments
          * [464]Program Essentials
          * [465]Program Performance (fiscal year 2007 dollars in millions)

     * [466]WIN-T Program

          * [467]Technology Maturity
          * [468]Design Stability
          * [469]Other Program Issues
          * [470]Agency Comments
          * [471]Agency Comments
          * [472]Scope of Our Review

     * [473]Comments from the Department of Defense
     * [474]Scope and Methodology

          * [475]Macro Analysis
          * [476]System Profile Data on Each Individual Two- Page Assessment
          * [477]Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page
            Assessment

     * [478]Technology Readiness Levels
     * [479]GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

          * [480]GAO Contact
          * [481]Acknowledgments

     * [482]Related GAO Products

          * [483]Best Practice Reports
          * [484]Recent Weapon Systems Reports

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                                   March 2007

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

                    Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

GAO-07-406SP

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

  What GAO Found

GAO assessed 62 weapon systems with a total investment of over $950
billion, some two-thirds of the $1.5 trillion DOD plans for weapons
acquisition (see below). Several of these programs will be developed
without needed technology, design, and production knowledge, and will cost
more and take longer to deliver. Progress in acquisitions is measured by
passage through critical junctures, or knowledge points: Are the product's
technologies mature at the start of development? Is the product design
stable at the design review? Are production processes in control by
production start? By these best practice measures, limited progress has
been made by the programs GAO assessed. Fully mature technologies were
present in 16 percent of the systems at development start------the point
at which best practices indicate mature levels should be present. The
programs that began development with immature technologies experienced a
32.3 percent cost increase, whereas those that began with mature
technologies increased 2.6 percent. Furthermore, 27 percent of the
assessed programs demonstrated a stable design at the time of design
review and in terms of production, very few programs reported using
statistical process control data to measure the maturity of production
processes.

Effective program management and control are essential to executing a
knowledge-based approach. However, DOD does not have an environment that
facilitates effective program management. For example, key personnel are
rotated too frequently. Further, DOD is increasingly relying on
contractors to perform key management functions raising questions about
the capacity of DOD to manage new weapon system programs.

Total Cumulative  Planned  Expenditures  on  Current  Portfolio  of  Major
Defense Acquisition Programs

Billions of 2007 dollars1,600

    1,200

800

400

0

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Contents

[485]Foreword

[486]Letter

3
[487]Better Acquisition Outcomes Needed to Accomplish DOD Transformation
Objectives in Current Fiscal Environment 4
[488]DOD Weapon Programs Consistently Experience a Reduced Return on
Investment 9
[489]A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes 11
[490]Most Programs Proceed with Low Levels of Knowledge at Critical
Junctures 13
[491]Effective Management Capacity and Control Are Essential to
Successfully Executing a Knowledge-Based Approach 18
[492]How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed 20
[493]Assessments of Individual Programs 22
[494]Airborne Laser (ABL) 23
[495]Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) 25
[496]Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) 27
[497]Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites 29
[498]Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA) 31
[499]Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) 33
[500]Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II 35
[501]Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) 37
[502]Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System
(ATIRCM/CMWS) 39
[503]B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP) 41
[504]Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) 43
[505]C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP) 45
[506]C-130J Hercules 47
[507]C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP) 49
[508]C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP) 51
[509]USMC CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) 53
[510]Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) 55
[511]Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21 57
[512]DDG 1000 Destroyer 59
[513]E-10A Wide Area Surveillance Technology Development Program (TDP) 61
[514]E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE) 63
[515]EA-18G 65
[516]Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV 67
[517]Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) 69
[518]Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 71
[519]Extended Range Munition (ERM) 73
[520]Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile 75
[521]F-22A Modernization and Improvement Program 77
[522]Future Combat Systems (FCS) 79
[523]Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System 81
[524]Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 83
[525]Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS 85
[526]Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS) 87
[527]Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 89
[528]Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS
AMF) 91
[529]Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR) 93
[530]JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS) 95
[531]Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) 97
[532]Land Warrior 99
[533]Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 101
[534]Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6) 103
[535]Longbow Apache Block III 105
[536]Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) 107
[537]Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) 109
[538]MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System 111
[539]21'' Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System (MRUUVS)
113
[540]Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 115
[541]National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) 117
[542]P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA) 119
[543]PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit 121
[544]Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High 123
[545]Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II 125
[546]Space Radar (SR) 127
[547]SSN 774 Technology Insertion Program 129
[548]Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) 131
[549]Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 133
[550]Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) 135
[551]V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft 137
[552]VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program 139

Contents

                                    Contents

[553]Appendixes

Appendix I: Appendix II:

Appendix III: Appendix IV:

         [554]Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 141 [555]Wideband Global
    SATCOM (WGS) 143 [556]Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) 145
                        [557]Agency Comments 147 [558]Scope of Our Review 147

[559]Comments from the Department of Defense 150

[560]Scope and Methodology 151 [561]Macro Analysis 151 [562]System Profile
Data on  Each Individual  Two-Page Assessment  153 [563]Product  Knowledge
Data on Each Individual Two-Page

Assessment 155

[564]Technology Readiness Levels 157

[565]GAO  Contact   and   Acknowledgments   159   [566]GAO   Contact   159
[567]Acknowledgments 159

163

[568]Related GAO Products

[569]Best Practice Reports 163 [570]Recent Weapon Systems Reports 165

[571]Table 1: Key Megasystems Currently in Development 7

Tables

[572]Table 2: Average Annual Real Growth in Defense Spending

Accounts 8 [573]Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 27 Weapon  Systems
9 [574]Table 4: Examples of Reduced Buying Power 11

Figure 1:

Figures

Figure 2: Figure 3:

Page iii

Total Cumulative Planned Expenditures on Current Portfolio of Major
Defense Acquisition Programs 5 [575]DOD's Projected Annual Investment in
Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation of [576]Weapon
Systems 6 [577]Percentage of Programs That Achieved Technology
[578]Maturity at Key Junctures 14

GAO-07-406SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

                               Contents Contents

Figure 4: [579]Average Program RDT&E Cost Growth from First Full        
             [580]Estimate                                                 15 
Figure 5: [581]Percentage of Programs That Achieved Design Stability at    
             [582]Key Junctures                                            17 
Figure 6: [583]Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as        
             [584]Compared with Best Practices                             21 

Abbreviations                                                              
AMRAAM           AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile          
ASDS             Advanced SEAL Delivery System                             
ATIRCM/CMWS      Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common            
                    Missile Warning System                                    
BFVS             Bradley Fighting Vehicle System                           
CAVES WAA        conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array    
CEC              Cooperative Engagement Capability                         
DOD              Department of Defense                                     
FBCB2            Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below                
FMTV             Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles                        
FY               fiscal year                                               
GAO              Government Accountability Office                          
GBS              Global Broadcast Service                                  
GPS              Global Positioning System                                 
HIMARS           High Mobility Artillery Rocket System                     
JASSM            Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile                     
JLENS            Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted  
                    Sensor System                                             
JPATS            Joint Primary Aircraft Training System                    
JPEO             Joint Program Executive Office                            
JSOW             Joint Standoff Weapon                                     
MDA              Missile Defense Agency                                    
MDAP             Major Defense Acquisition Program                         
MEADS            Medium Extended Air Defense System                        
MIDS-LVT         Multifunctional Information Distribution System -         
                    Low Volume Terminal                                       
MLRS             Multiple Launch Rocket System                             
MM III GRP       Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program                
MM III PRP       Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program              
MP-RTIP          Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program         
MUE              Modernized User Equipment                                 
NA               not applicable                                            
NAS              National Airspace System                                  
NASA             National Aeronautics and Space Administration             
R&D              research and development                                  
RDT&E            Research, Development, Test and Evaluation                
SAR              Selected Acquisition Report                               
SBX              Sea-Based X-Band                                          
SDD              System Development and Demonstration                      
TBD              to be determined                                          

Contents

TRL                                             Technology Readiness Level 
UAS                                               Unmanned Aircraft System 
USMC                                      U.S. Marine Corps                
U.S.C.                                    United States Code               

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

March 30, 2007

Congressional Committees

This is our fifth annual assessment of selected Department of Defense
(DOD) weapon programs. The breadth of this assessment gives us insights
into a broad range of programs as well as the overall direction of weapon
system acquisitions. Our analysis of individual weapon systems is grounded
in best practices for attaining high levels of product knowledge in the
areas of technology, design, and production. We find that new programs
continue to move through development without sufficient knowledge, thereby
resulting in cost increases and schedule delays. The link between
knowledge and cost is real and predictable. It provides three choices for
decision makers: (1) accept the status quo, (2) demonstrate high knowledge
levels before approving individual programs, or (3) increase cost
estimates to accurately reflect the consequences of insufficient
knowledge.

This report also provides decision makers with an analysis of cumulative
DOD weapon system investment and buying power. Although DOD has doubled
its planned investment in major weapon systems from $750 billion to $1.5
trillion since 2001, unanticipated cost growth has reduced the return on
this investment. The investment level itself represents a significant
policy choice, since during that same period, the government's total
liabilities and unfunded commitments have increased from about $20
trillion to about $50 trillion. The nation's fiscal exposures increase
every day due to known demographic trends, continuing operating deficits,
and compounding interest costs. Given the federal fiscal outlook, what was
once a desire to deliver high-quality products on time and within budget
has become an imperative. DOD simply must maximize its return on
investment to provide the warfighter with needed capabilities and the best
value for the taxpayer. With over $880 billion remaining to invest in the
current portfolio of major systems, the status quo is both unacceptable
and unsustainable.

Recognizing this dilemma, DOD has embraced best practices in its policies,
instilled more discipline in requirements setting, strengthened training
for program managers, and reorganized offices that support and oversee
programs. Yet this intention has not been fully implemented and it has not
had a material effect on weapon system programs. To translate policy into
better programs, several additional elements are essential, including
having a sound business case for each program that focuses on real needs
and embodies best practices, sound business arrangements, and clear lines
of responsibility and accountability. DOD must think strategically,
separate wants from needs, and make tough choices. Specifically, enforcing
stated DOD policy on individual acquisitions will require DOD to have the
will and the congressional support to say "no" to programs that do not
measure up, to recognize and reward savings, and to hold appropriate
parties accountable for poor outcomes. This does not mean that no risks
should be taken or that all problems can be foreseen and prevented. Nor is
it necessary for DOD to sacrifice its record of delivering the best
weaponry in the world to U.S. forces. However, it is possible for DOD to
continue to deliver the best weaponry at a reasonable cost and in a more
timely manner. The taxpayers and our military forces deserve no less.

David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States

A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

March 30, 2007

Congressional Committees

This report is GAO's fifth annual assessment of selected weapon programs.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its planned investment in new
weapon systems from approximately $750 billion in 2001 to almost $1.5
trillion in 2007. In the last 5 years, the number of major defense
acquisition programs (MDAPs) in development has risen from 72 to 85, and
systems are becoming increasingly complex in their interdependency and
technological sophistication. Unfortunately, we have seen little change in
acquisition outcomes over this same period. Although U.S. weapons are
among the best in the world, the cost of developing a weapon system
continues to often exceed estimates by tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars. This, in turn, results in fewer quantities than initially planned
for, delays in product delivery, and performance shortfalls. Not only is
the buying power of the government reduced and opportunities to make other
investments lost, but the warfighter receives less than promised. DOD is
depending on the weapons currently under development to transform military
operations for the 21st century. The size and scale of current planned
investment necessitate better results than we have seen in the past.

The current fiscal environment presents challenges for DOD's plans to
transform military operations. As the nation begins to address long-term
fiscal imbalances, DOD is likely to encounter considerable pressure to
reduce its investment in new weapons. DOD also faces pressures within its
own budget as investment in new weapon systems competes with funds needed
to replace equipment and sustain military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. To make more efficient use of scarce investment dollars, DOD
needs to adhere to a knowledge-based approach to product development that
centers on attaining high levels of knowledge in three elements:
technology, design, and production. Higher levels of knowledge at program
start enable better estimates of how much weapon systems will cost to
finish and improve the likelihood that a program will stay within cost and
on schedule. Building upon this knowledge--as the product proceeds through
design and into production--further increases the likelihood that a
program will stay within cost and schedule targets and deliver promised
capabilities, thus enabling DOD to buy what was originally budgeted. Lack
of knowledge in individual programs is amplified when the program is part
of an interdependent network, as cost overruns and schedule delays
reverberate across systems of related programs. Additionally, successful
acquisition outcomes require that program managers have the capacity to
make knowledge-driven development decisions. In the larger context, DOD
needs to make changes in its requirements and budgeting processes that are
consistent with getting the desired outcomes from the acquisition process.

In this report, we assess 62 programs that represent an investment of over
$950 billion.^1 Our objective is twofold: to provide decision makers with
a cross-cutting analysis of DOD weapon system investment and also to
provide independent, knowledge-based assessments of how well DOD has
attained knowledge for individual systems.

Programs were selected for individual assessment based on several factors,
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and
(3) congressional interest. The majority of the 62 programs covered in the
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD.^2

  Better Acquisition Outcomes Needed to Accomplish DOD Transformation Objectives
  in Current Fiscal Environment

Without improved acquisition outcomes, achieving DOD's transformation
objectives will be difficult given the current fiscal environment. DOD is
currently investing in weapon systems that it is depending on to transform
military operations. While these weapon systems are expected to provide
unprecedented capabilities, the cost and complexity to develop these new
systems will be exceptional. However, the nation's long-term fiscal
imbalances will likely place pressure on the affordability of DOD's
planned investments. Without better acquisition outcomes, there is greater
risk that DOD will not be able to achieve its transformation objectives.

^1This estimate includes total research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E); procurement; military construction; and acquisition operation and
maintenance appropriations to develop the weapon systems. The macro
analyses contained in this report are based on data as of January 15,
2007, and may not reflect subsequent events.

^2MDAPs are programs identified by DOD as programs that require eventual
RDT&E expenditures of more than $365 million or $2.19 billion in
procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.

    DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Operations Expected to Be the Most
    Expensive and Complex Attempted

DOD is undertaking new efforts to fundamentally transform military
operations that are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever. In
the next 5 to 7 years, DOD plans to increase its investment in weapon
systems that are key to this transformation. As figure 1 shows, DOD's
total planned investment in major defense acquisition programs is almost
$1.5 trillion (2007 dollars) for its current portfolio, with over $880
billion of that investment yet to be made.

Figure 1: Total  Cumulative Planned Expenditures  on Current Portfolio  of
Major Defense Acquisition Programs

Billions of 2007 dollars 1,600

      1,200

800

400

0

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: The MDA  portion of investment  data only goes  through fiscal  year
2011 and does not include full cost of developing MDA systems.

DOD's annual investment in the research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E) and procurement of major weapon systems is expected to rise from
$157 billion in 2007 to $173 billion in 2011(see fig. 2), peaking at
approximately $195 billion in 2013.^3

Figure 2: DOD's Projected Annual  Investment in Procurement and  Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation of Weapon Systems

                            Billions of 2007 dollars

                                      185

                                      175

                                      165

                                      155

       157.35          170.50         176.16        173.61         173.05     

0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

The complexity of DOD's transformational efforts is especially evident in
the development of several large megasystems, major weapon systems that
depend on the integration of multiple systems--some of which are developed
as separate programs--to achieve desired capabilities. This strategy often
requires interdependent programs in concurrent
development to be closely synchronized and managed, as they may, for
example, depend on integrated architectures and common standards as a
foundation for interoperability. If dependent systems are not available
when needed, then a program could face cost increases, schedule delays, or
reduced capabilities. Furthermore, the larger scope of development
associated with these megasystems produces a much greater fiscal impact
when cost and schedule estimates increase. Table 1 describes three of the
department's largest and most complex megasystems that are currently under
way.

^3Estimates for 2013 in constant 2007 dollars as reported by the
Congressional Budget Office in "Long-Term Implications of Current Defense
Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2007," pg. 13.

               Table 1: Key Megasystems Currently in Development

Future Combat Systems (FCS)*

FCS* is a suite of manned and unmanned ground and air vehicles, sensors,
and munitions linked by an information network that will enable
warfighters to respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality.
FCS consists of 18 components and depends on numerous complimentary
systems outside of FCS. For example, FCS is dependent on JTRS* and WIN-T*
to provide key communication and networking capabilities that it requires
to operate effectively. If these systems--which have both been fraught
with cost, schedule, and performance problems of their own--are not
available as planned, FCS may need to seek costly backup technologies,
adjust its schedule, or accept reduced capabilities.

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)

BMDS consists of 10 elements that will work in concert to defeat enemy
missiles launched from any range during any phase of their flight,
including STSS*, GMD*, Aegis BMD*, ABL*, MKV*, KEI*, and THAAD*. While
almost all of the elements will work separately, some sensor data must be
shared among the elements for them to work in concert and for BMDS to
provide full coverage against enemy missiles. For example, the Aegis BMD
program provides long-range surveillance and tracking for the GMD system.
While Aegis BMD's functionality has been successfully tested in several
events, it has never been validated in an end-to-end flight test with the
GMD system.

Global Information Grid (GIG)

The GIG is the cornerstone of DOD's net-centricity strategy. It is a
system of interdependent systems that make up a secure, reliable network
that enables users to access and share information at virtually any
location and at any time. Five major programs are related to GIG's core
network: TSAT*, JTRS*, GIG-Bandwidth Expansion, Network Centric Enterprise
Services, and the Cryptography Transformation Initiative. Both JTRS* and
TSAT* have recently been restructured due to--among other
things--technical difficulties, complicating DOD's efforts to realize the
GIG as planned.

Source: GAO.

Note: Programs with an asterisk are assessed in this report.

  The Current Fiscal Environment Presents Challenges to Accomplishing DODï¿½s
  Transformation Objectives

The nation's long-term fiscal imbalances will likely place pressure on the
affordability of DOD's planned investment in major weapon systems,
reducing the ability of budgets to accommodate typical margins of error in
terms of cost increases and schedule delays. As entitlement programs like
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid consume a growing percentage of
available resources, discretionary programs--including defense--face
competition for the increasingly scarce remaining funds. Sustaining real
top line budget increases in any discretionary program will be difficult
in this constrained resource environment.

DOD budget projections conform to this tightening framework by offsetting
growth in procurement spending with reductions in RDT&E, personnel, and
other accounts. The minimal real increases projected in defense spending
through fiscal year 2011 depend on these offsets. However, as table 2
shows, these projections do not reflect recent experience, nor do they
take into account higher than anticipated cost growth and schedule delays,
which can compound the fiscal impact and affordability of DOD's planned
investment.

        Table 2: Average Annual Real Growth in Defense Spending Accounts

Account                       2000-2006 (actual)     2007-2011 (projected) 
Procurement                                   5.61%                  6.46% 
RDT&E                                         8.42%                 -2.95% 
Military personnel                            3.67%                 -0.68% 
Operation and Maintenance                     5.55%                  1.00% 
Other                                         5.18%                 -3.85% 
Total                                         5.45%                  0.90% 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Since 2004, total costs for a common set^4 of 64 major weapon systems
under development have grown in real terms by 4.9 percent per year--
costing $165 billion (constant 2007 dollars) more in 2007 than planned for
in 2004. Over this same period, the funding needed to complete these
programs has increased despite the significant investment that has already
been made. Furthermore, as congressional leaders advise DOD to

incorporate the costs of the war into the annual budget rather than into
supplemental appropriations, trade-offs will likely be required among the
resource demands of repairing or replacing those weapon systems damaged in
Iraq and Afghanistan and future investments to modernize and transform the
armed forces. If DOD cannot deliver its new weapon programs within
estimated costs, difficult choices may have to be made regarding which
investments to pursue and which to discontinue.

^4This common set refers to all programs that were reported as major
defense acquisition programs in both the 2004 and 2007 assessment periods.
This includes several programs whose knowledge attainment is not assessed
in this report. The 64 programs that make up this common set are AEHF,
AESA, AIM-9X, AMRAAM, ASDS, ATIRCM/CMWS, BFVS A3 Upgrade, C-130 AMP,
C-130J, C-17, C-5 RERP, CEC, CH-47F, CVN-21, CVN-77, DDG 1000, DDG 51, E-2
AHE, E-2C REP, EELV, EFV, Excalibur, F-22A Raptor, F/A-18E/F, FBCB2, FCS,
FMTV, GBS, Global Hawk, GOSHAWK, GPS II MSO Navstar, GPS II MUE Navstar,
HIMARS, JASSM, Javelin, JDAM, JPATS, JSF, JSOW Baseline, JSOW, JTRS, Land
Warrior, Longbow Apache Airframe Mods, LPD 17, MH-60R, MIDS-LVT, MLRS, MM
III GRP, MM III PRP, NAS, NPOESS, Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment, SBIRS
High, SSGN, SSN 774, Stryker, T-AKE, Tomahawk, Trident II, UH-60M, USMC
H-1 Upgrade, V-22, WGS, and WIN-T.

  DOD Weapon Programs Consistently Experience a Reduced Return on Investment
  
While DOD is pursuing plans to transform military operations and
committing more investment dollars to realize these new weapon systems, it
regularly realizes a reduced return on their investment. DOD programs
typically take longer to develop and cost more to buy than planned,
placing additional demands on available funding. As shown in table 3,
total RDT&E costs for a common set^5 of 27 weapon programs that we were
able to assess since development began increased by almost $35 billion, or
33.5 percent, over the original business case (first full estimate). The
same programs have also experienced an increase in the time needed to
develop capabilities with a weighted average schedule increase of over 23
percent.^6

Table 3: Cost  and Cycle Time  Growth for 27  Weapon Systems (billions  of
constant 2007 dollars)

                          First full estimate  Latest estimate Percent change 
Total cost                          $506.4           $603.1          19.1% 
RDT&E cost                          $104.7           $139.7          33.5% 
Weighted average                     137.9            170.2          23.5% 
acquisition cycle timea                                                    
(months)                                                                   

                       Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

^5This common set refers to 27 programs included in this report that we
were able to assess since development began. The 27 program are AEHF,
MUOS, NPOESS, WGS, Patriot/MEADS, ARH, Excalibur, FCS, Warrior UAS,
EA-18G, EFSS, V-22, AESA, E-2D AHE, JTRS HMS, JTRS GMR, Land Warrior,
WIN-T, ERM, CVN-21, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, F-22A Modernization, Global Hawk,
JSF, Reaper, and P-8A MMA. We limited analysis to these 27 programs
because all data including cost, schedule, and quantities were available
for comparison between program estimates.

^6A weighted average gives more expensive programs a greater value.

^aThis is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for the 27
programs based on total program costs at the first full and latest
estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was
98.9 months for the first full estimate and 124.6 months for the latest
estimate resulting in a 26.1 percent change.

The consequence of cost and cycle time growth is often manifested in a
reduction of the buying power of the defense dollar. As costs rise and key
schedule milestones are delayed, programs are sometimes forced to make
trade-offs in quantities, resulting in a reduction in buying power.
Quantities for 12 of the common set programs have been reduced since their
first estimate.^7 Additionally, the weighted average program acquisition
unit cost for 26 of the 27 programs increased by roughly 39 percent,
meaning that each unit cost significantly more to buy than originally
planned.^8 Table 4 illustrates 6 programs with a significant reduction of
buying power. Some of these programs experienced higher costs for the same
initial quantity.

^7The programs are AEHF, NPOESS, Excalibur, EA-18G, V-22, JTRS GMR, C-5
AMP, C-5 RERP, F-22A Modernization, Global Hawk, JSF, and P-8A MMA.

^8This estimate is a weighted average based on total program cost and does
not include the Excalibur program because of its extreme unit cost growth.
The simple average program unit cost increase for the same 26 programs is
34 percent. The weighted average, including the Excalibur, is 90 percent.

       Table 4: Examples of Reduced Buying Power (constant 2007 dollars)

                                                                   Percentage 
                                                                    of unit   
                      Initial   Initial    Latest    Latest           cost    
Program            estimate  quantity   estimate  quantity       increase  
Joint Strike       $196. 5        2,866 $223.3    2,458aircraft    32.8    
Fighter            billion     aircraft billion                            
Future Combat      $85.5     15 systems $131.7     15 systems      54.1    
Systems            billion              billion                            
V-22 Joint                                                                 
ServicesAdvanced   $36.9        913     $50.0      458aircraft    170.2    
Vertical Lift      billion    aircraft  billion                            
Aircraft                                                                   
Evolved            $16.0        181     $28.6                              
Expendable Launch  billion    vehicles  billion    138 vehicles   134.7    
Vehicle                                                                    
Space Based          $4.2        5      $10.4                              
Infrared System     billion  satellites billion   3 satellites    311.6    
High                                                                       
Expeditionary        $8.4         1,025 $11.3             1,025    33.7    
Fighting Vehicle    billion    vehicles billion        vehicles            

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. Imagessourced in their respective order:
JSF Program Office;  Program Manager,  Future Combat  Systems (BCT);  V-22
Joint Program Office;  (Left) (c)  2005 ILS/Lockheed  Martin, (right)  (c)
2003 The Boeing  Company; Lockheed Martin  Space Systems Company;  General
Dynamics Land Systems.

  A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes

Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work that
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective centered on best
practices in system development. We have found that leading commercial
firms pursue an approach that is based in knowledge, where high levels of
product knowledge are demonstrated at critical points in development.
Programs take steps to gather knowledge that demonstrates that their
technologies are mature, their designs are stable, and their production
processes are in control. This knowledge helps programs identify risks
early and address them before they become problems. The result of a
knowledge-based approach is a product delivered on time, within budget,
and with the promised capabilities. Based on our best practice work, we
have identified three key knowledge points--junctures where programs need
to display critical levels of knowledge to proceed. These knowledge points
and associated indicators are defined as follows:

     o Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This point occurs when a
       sound business case is made for the product--that is, a match is made
       between the customer's requirements and the product developer's
       available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and capacity.
       Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
       development is an important indicator of whether this match has been
       made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential
       product requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
       environment.
     o Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a
       program determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will
       meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability
       targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the
       system-level critical design review, usually held midway through
       development. Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings
       at the system design review provides tangible evidence that the design
       is stable.
     o Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature and the design is
       reliable. This point is achieved when it has been demonstrated that
       the company can manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and
       quality targets. A best practice is to ensure that all key
       manufacturing processes are in statistical control--that is, they are
       repeatable, sustainable, and capable of consistently producing parts
       within the product's quality tolerances and standards--at the start of
       production. Demonstration of a prototype that meets reliability and
       performance requirements prior to the production decision, can
       minimize production and post-production costs.

The attainment of each successive knowledge point builds upon the
preceding one. If a program is falling short in one element, like
technological maturity, it is harder to achieve design stability and
almost impossible to achieve production maturity. In particular,
separating
technology development from product development can help reduce costs  and
deliver a product on time and within budget.

  Most Programs Proceed with Low Levels of Knowledge at Critical Junctures
  
To get the most out of its weapon system investments, DOD revised its
acquisition policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based,
evolutionary framework. However, DOD's policy does not incorporate
adequate controls to ensure the effective implementation of a
knowledgebased acquisition process. As we have reported in the past, most
of the programs we reviewed this year proceeded with lower levels of
knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product
knowledge later in development than specified in DOD policy. The cost and
schedule consequences of delayed knowledge attainment are significant.

    Programs That Enter System Development with Immature Technologies Cost More
    and Take Longer

Our 2007 assessment continues to show that very few programs start with
mature technologies (see fig. 3). This initial knowledge deficit cascades
through design and production, so that at each key juncture, decision
makers have to rely on assumptions in lieu of knowledge. Only 16 percent
of programs in our assessment demonstrated all of their critical
technologies as mature at the start of development, meaning that the vast
majority of programs failed to achieve knowledge point 1 when they should
have. By design review, when programs should have attained knowledge point
2 by demonstrating a stable design, only 44 percent had attained knowledge
point 1. In the past 2 years alone, several programs have passed through
their development start or design review with immature technologies.^9
Without mature technologies, it is difficult to know whether the product
being designed and produced will deliver the desired capabilities or,
alternatively, if the design allows enough space for technology
integration. Yet, 33 percent of the programs we assessed had still not
attained knowledge point 1 by the time of their decision to start
production.

^9Since April 2005, CH-53K, ARH, JLENS, Warrior UAS, MKV, SSN 774
Technology Insertion, and Longbow Apache Block III programs have all
entered development with immature technologies. Likewise, EA-18G, JSF, DDG
1000, E2D-AHE, Land Warrior, and Warrior UAS have all held design reviews
since April 2005. All six programs passed through their design reviews
with immature technologies.

Figure 3: Percentage of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at  Key
Junctures

Percent 100 75

50

25

0

Development DOD Production start design decision review

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Over the next 5 years, many of the programs in our assessment plan to hold
a design review or make a production decision without demonstrating the
level of technology maturity that should have been seen before the start
of development. Twenty-three of the programs we assessed plan to hold a
design review in the next 5 years. Six of those 23 did not provide a
projection of their expected technology maturity by that point. Of the
remaining 17 programs, only 6 reported that they expect to have achieved
technology maturity by the time of their design review. Similarly, 31 of
the programs in our assessment plan to make a production decision in the
next 5 years, but 12 programs did not provide a projection of the
technology maturity at that point and 5 of the remaining 19 programs still
expect to have immature technologies at that time--not having achieved any
of the knowledge points (technology maturity, design stability, or
production maturity) at production start.

Consequences accrue to programs that are still working to mature
technologies well into system development, when they should be focusing on
maturing system design and preparing for production. Programs that start
with mature technologies experience less cost growth than those that start
with immature technologies. Figure 4 shows that programs that start with
mature technologies saw their research, development, test and evaluation
cost estimates increase by 2.6 percent over the first full estimate.

      Figure 4: Average Program RDT&E Cost Growth from First Full Estimate

                                    Percent

40

30

20

10

0

Mature Immature technologiestechnologies

                                           32.3     
                           2.6                                   

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

In comparison, RDT&E costs for programs that began development with
immature technologies increased by 32.3 percent over the first full
estimate. Programs that started development with mature technologies also
manage to stay on schedule, averaging less than a 1-month delay over their
initial timetable. Alternatively, programs that began development with
immature technologies have experienced average delays of more than 20
months over their original schedules. Furthermore, programs that enter
development with all of their technologies mature tend to maintain their
buying power, achieving their promised return on investment. Program
acquisition unit costs increased by less than 1 percent for programs that
reached knowledge point 1 by development start, whereas the programs that
started development with immature technologies experienced an average
program acquisition unit cost increase of 30 percent over the first full
estimate.^10

DOD's policy states that technologies should be demonstrated in at least a
relevant environment before a program enters system development; whereas
GAO utilizes the best practice standard that calls for technology to be
assessed one step higher--demonstration in a realistic environment. If we
applied DOD's lower standard, 32 percent of programs entered development
with all of their technologies mature compared with 16 percent using the
best practice standard. Using either standard, most programs still do not
begin development with mature technology. There is a cost consequence of
entering development with technologies at DOD's lower standard. Programs
that meet DOD's technology maturity standard experience an average RDT&E
cost growth of approximately 8.4 percent, whereas programs that enter
development with all technologies at the higher standard specified by best
practices saw their RDT&E cost estimates grow by 2.6 percent.

    Programs Continue Past Design Reviews without Demonstrating a Stable Design

The majority of programs in our assessment that have held a design review
did so without first achieving a stable design. As illustrated in figure
5, only 27 percent of programs in our assessment demonstrated that they
had attained a stable design at the time of design review. Thirty-three
percent of programs had still not achieved design stability by the time
they decided to start production. Twenty-three programs in our assessment
are currently scheduled to hold their critical design reviews by the year
2012. Only 5 of these programs expect to have achieved design stability by
the time of their critical design reviews.

^10These percentages are program cost weighted averages. The simple
average increase for RDT&E costs is 7 percent for the programs that
started development with mature technologies and 56 percent for the
programs that started development with immature technologies. The simple
average increase for program acquisition unit costs is 21 percent for
programs that started development with mature technologies and 31 percent
for the programs that started development with immature technologies.

Figure 5: Percentage of Programs That Achieved Design Stability at Key Junctures

Percent 100

80

60

40

20

0

DOD Production design decision review

                                                            67     
                                            27                                

                       Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

    Most Programs Do Not Collect Data to Measure Production Maturity

Only 2 of the 20 programs we assessed that are now in production reported
using statistical process control data to measure the maturity of the
production process, which is the data needed to demonstrate knowledge
point 3.^11 Neither of these programs had reached production maturity--
having all of the production processes under statistical control--by
knowledge point 3.

In addition to ensuring that the program meets all knowledge points prior
to starting production, prototypes should be constructed and tested to
make sure that the weapons being produced meet performance and reliability
requirements. For example, despite having achieved technology maturity and
design stability, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
discovered reliability failures during preproduction testing. As a result,
the program has delayed production and is being restructured to
incorporate improvements in the vehicle design. Thirty-two of the programs
we assessed provided us information on when they had or planned to have
first tested a fully configured, integrated production representative
article (i.e., prototype) in its intended environment. Of those programs,
47 percent reported they have already conducted or planned to conduct a
developmental test of a production representative article (i.e.,
prototype) before they make their initial production decision. GAO's work
has shown that production and postproduction costs are minimized when a
prototype is demonstrated to meet reliability and performance requirements
prior to the production decision.

^11The two programs are ATIRCM/CMWS and Global Hawk.

  Effective Management Capacity and Control Are Essential to Successfully
  Executing a Knowledge-Based Approach

Effective program management and control are essential to facilitating a
knowledge-based acquisition approach. The capacity to manage requirements,
control funding, and oversee the contracted development of critical
technologies, product designs, and production processes better ensures
that programs stay within budget, keep on schedule, and deliver the
capabilities originally promised. However, our past work has shown that
DOD does not have an environment that facilitates effective program
management. At the same time, DOD is increasingly relying on contractors
to perform key management functions. In addition, inadequate knowledge
development has resulted in the extended use of cost reimbursement
contracts in some cases. Under these contracts, the government bears most
of the cost risk.

    DOD Does Not Provide Program Managers an Environment That Facilitates a
    Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach

Our past work has shown that DOD does not have an environment that
facilitates effective program management and programs have little
incentive to pursue knowledge-based acquisition paths.^12 In particular,
our work has shown that program managers are not empowered to execute
weapons acquisition programs nor are they set up to be accountable for
results. Program managers cannot veto new requirements, control funding,
or control staff. In addition, DOD has not established effective controls
that require decision makers to measure progress against specific criteria
and ensure that managers capture key knowledge before moving to the next
acquisition phase. Without effective controls that require program
officials to satisfy specific criteria, it is difficult to hold decision
makers or program managers accountable to cost and schedule targets.
Moreover, the incentive structure of program managers--based primarily on
maintaining program funding--contributes to the consistent underestimation
of costs, optimistic schedules, and the suppression of bad news that could
jeopardize funding. Furthermore, rather than lengthy assignment periods
between key milestones as suggested by best practices, many of the
programs we reviewed had multiple program managers within the same
milestone. This promotes shortsightedness and reduces accountability for
poor outcomes. Consequently, programs have little incentive to pursue
knowledge-based acquisition paths as program funding is not tied to
successfully reaching knowledge points before a program can proceed.

^12GAO, Best Practices: Better Support  of Weapon System Program  Managers
Needed to Improve  Outcomes, [585]GAO-06-110 (Washington,  D.C.: Nov.  30,
2005).

    Contractors Increasingly Perform Key Program Management Functions

DOD is relying on contractors in new ways to manage and deliver weapon
systems. While DOD has downsized its acquisition workforce by almost half
in the last decade, DOD has increased its contract obligations for
professional, administrative, and management support from $10.8 billion in
1996 to $28.3 billion in 2005 (both in constant 2005 dollars). Based on
our work looking at various major weapon systems, we have observed that
DOD has given contractors increased program management responsibilities to
develop requirements, design products, and select major system and
subsystem contractors. In part, this increased reliance has occurred
because DOD is experiencing a critical shortage of certain acquisition
professionals with technical skills related to systems engineering,
program management, and cost estimation. The increased dependence on
contractors raises questions about the capacity of DOD to manage new
weapon system programs, an undertaking made more difficult when
technology, design, and production knowledge are lacking.

Inadequate Knowledge Development Has Resulted in the Extended Use of Cost
Reimbursement Contracts in Some Cases

The extended use of cost reimbursement contracts may be a further
consequence of inadequate knowledge attainment. Under a cost reimbursement
contract, the government bears most of the cost risk-- the risk of paying
more than it expected. DOD typically uses cost reimbursement contracts for
development and can use fixed price contracts for production and
deployment. If technologies are mature, designs are stable, and production
processes are in place, then production costs are more likely to be known.
In these cases the program can more easily award a fixed price contract.
However, we found several examples of programs extending the use of cost
reimbursement contracts into
production and deployment instead of using fixed price contracts,
reflecting uncertainties in program development. While the extended use of
cost reimbursement contracts may be appropriate under these circumstances,
it is indicative of programs proceeding through the acquisition process
with inadequate knowledge.

  How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed

We assess each program in two pages and depict the extent of knowledge in
a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of the
first page. As illustrated in figure 6, the knowledge graph is based on
the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the attainment of
knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange), design stability
(depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted in blue). A "best
practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment of the three types
of knowledge at the three knowledge points. The closer a program's
attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the more likely the
weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and schedule. A knowledge
deficit at the start of development--indicated by a gap between the
technology knowledge attained and the best practice line--means the
program proceeded with immature technologies and faces a greater
likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks are
discovered and resolved.

Figure 6: Depiction of  a Notional Weapon  System's Knowledge as  Compared
with Best Practices

Source: GAO.

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design
review, as some technologies were still not mature and only a small
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for the
production decision show that the program is expected to achieve greater
levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that this
program would have had significant cost and schedule increases.

We conducted our review from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II
contains detailed information on our methodology.

  Assessments of Individual Programs

Our assessments of the 62 weapon systems follow.

                              Airborne Laser (ABL)

MDA's ABL element is being developed in capabilitybased blocks to destroy
enemy missiles during the boost phase of flight. Carried aboard a modified
Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to
focus the beam on a target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the
fuel tanks of enemy missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan
and execute engagements. We assessed the Block 2004 design, which is being
further developed in Block 2006, and is expected to lead to a lethality
demonstration in 2009.

                     Source: Airborne Laser Program Office.

Program Transition 6-module   Initial   Long    GAO     Lethality   Demonstrated 
                            beam/fire                                            
start     to MDA      laser  control  duration review demonstration   capability 
                       test  flight                                              
                              test    laser                                      
                                      test                                       
(11/96)  (10/01)    (11/04)  (12/04)  (12/05)  (1/07)    (2009)     (Block 2016) 

Program officials expected ABL to provide an initial capability during
Block 2006, but this event was delayed and none of ABL's seven critical
technologies are fully mature. During Block 2006, the program continues
work on a prototype expected to provide the basic design for a future
operational capability. Program officials expected to demonstrate the
prototype's critical technologies during a flight test in late 2008, but
recent testing problems delayed the test until fiscal year 2009. MDA
released 100 percent of the engineering drawings for the prototype's
design, but additional drawings may be needed if problems encountered
during future testing force design changes. The program's prime contractor
replanned future contract work in August 2004. However, the program
continues to overrun its fiscal year cost and schedule budgets.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                   GAO    Development       DOD      Production 
                 review       start       design       decision 
                 (1/07)   (TBD)           review          (TBD) 
                                           (TBD)                

ABL Program

Technology Maturity

The program office assessed all seven of its critical technologies--the
six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric compensation, transmissive
optics, optical coatings, jitter control, and managing the high-power
beam--as nearly mature. According to program officials, all of these
technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment and are
needed to provide the system with an initial operational capability.

Although the program office assessed jitter control as nearly mature, the
technology will pose a high risk until it is demonstrated in flight tests.
Jitter--a phenomenon pertaining to the technology of controlling and
stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that vibration unique to the
aircraft does not degrade the laser's aimpoint--is critical to the
operation of the laser. The ABL's laser beam must be stable enough to
impart sufficient energy on a fixed spot of the target to rupture its fuel
tank. Program officials told us that they will continue to refine jitter
mitigation efforts and will learn more about jitter control in future
tests.

Since our last assessment, the program office has reevaluated the maturity
level for one of its critical technologies--managing the high-power beam.
The technology was reported as fully mature, but has since been assessed
as nearly mature as it has not yet been demonstrated in a realistic
environment. The program plans to demonstrate all technologies in a
realistic environment during a flight test of the system prototype,
referred to as a lethal demonstration, in which ABL will attempt to shoot
down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges with integrating the
laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents have delayed this test
into 2008, and recent technical challenges associated with developing and
testing the beam control/fire control software have caused further delays
in the lethal demonstration.

Design Stability

We could not assess ABL's design stability because the element's initial
capability will not be fully developed until the second aircraft is well
under way. While the program has released 100 percent of its engineering
drawings for the prototype, it is unclear whether the design of the
prototype aircraft can be relied upon as a good indicator of design
stability for the second aircraft. More drawings may be needed if the
design is enhanced or if problems encountered during flight testing force
design changes.

Production Maturity

The program is producing a limited quantity of hardware for the system's
prototype. However, we did not assess the production maturity of ABL
because MDA has not made a production decision.

Other Program Issues

In 2004, the ABL program restructured its prime contract to focus on
near-term milestones and to provide a more realistic budget and schedule
for the remaining work. The program further refined its work plan in 2005.
However, recent technical challenges associated with the program's beam
control/fire control ground test series are causing the contractor to
experience further cost growth and schedule slip. As of June 2006, the
program was overrunning its fiscal year 2006 budget by approximately $49
million and was unable to complete approximately $23 million of planned
work.

Additionally, the program has experienced a number of quality-related
issues that may have impacted laser performance. During fiscal year 2006,
several laser subcomponents failed or were found to be deficient. Program
officials believe that a number of the deficiencies and failures were
attributable to poor quality control and may have contributed to the laser
achieving 83 percent of its design power, rather than the 100 percent
originally planned. According to officials, the program will test the
laser power again once all deficiencies are resolved.

Agency Comments

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                           Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)

The Army's ACS is an airborne reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance,
and target acquisition system and is being designed to provide timely
intelligence data on threat forces to the land component commander. The
ACS will replace the Guardrail Common Sensor and the Airborne
Reconnaissance Low airborne systems. ACS will coexist with current systems
until it is phased in and current systems retire.

  Source: Graphic artist rendering of generic Airborne ISR platform. No photo
                                image available.

Program Contract   Development GAO     Design    Production        Initial 
start  termination review  start       review     decision      capability 
(7/99)   (1/06)    (1/07)  (4/09)       (NA)        (NA)              (NA) 

Due to a significant increase in ACS weight, the Army terminated the
development contract. By the time the contract was terminated, three
technologies had reached maturity and one more was nearing maturity. The
Army expected to demonstrate the maturity of all but one critical
technology by the original design review in December 2006. The program
office estimated that 50 percent of drawings would have been releasable at
that time. The Army is currently reassessing requirements for the program
and plans to restart development in the third quarter of fiscal year 2009.
The new date for design review has not been determined. Some requirements
may be eliminated, moved to a future spiral, or assigned to another
system. ACS system technologies maturity, design, cost, and schedule will
likely be affected.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

             Development GAO                DOD         Production 
             review      start            design          decision 
             (1/07)      (4/09)           review              (NA) 
                                           (NA)                    

ACS Program

Technology Maturity

Only one of ACS's six critical technologies was mature when the program
initially started development in July 2004 and two more were nearing
maturity. When the Army terminated the development contract, one
additional technology was nearing maturity. The maturity of one of the
remaining technologies was tied to the development of the airborne version
of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which would not have been available
until after ACS was fielded. The Army expected that all of the critical
technologies except the one tied to the radios would be fully mature by
December 2006. It is not currently clear which requirements might be
eliminated or the resulting impact to the technology maturity. However,
the Army plans to seek approval for development start only after all its
critical technologies have reached maturity.

Design Stability

The program office estimated that 50 percent of the drawings expected for
ACS would have been releasable by the original design review, which was
scheduled for December 2006. However, in December 2004, 5 months after the
program began development, the contractor informed the Army that the
weight of the prime mission equipment had exceeded the structural limits
of the aircraft. In September 2005, the Army ordered the contractor to
stop all work under the existing contract and in January 2006 terminated
the contract for system development. As a result, the new date for design
review has not been determined, but it is unlikely that any of the
original drawings will be relevant at the time of program restart due to
technology obsolescence and program redefinition.

Other Program Issues

In December 2005, just prior to contract termination, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense directed the Army and Navy, in coordination with the Air Force,
Joint Staff, and others to conduct a study of joint multiintelligence
airborne ISR needs. The report findings, which were due to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense by the end of July 2006, are still pending. Four
options are being considered. One option would be to restart system
development with most or all of the previous requirements intact. The
second option would be to field a system that is more capable than those
currently operating while deferring some requirements for future spirals.
This option would probably still require a business jet or larger platform
to permit growth. The third option would be to field two systems with some
requirements on a manned platform and some on an unmanned platform. The
fourth option would be to field an unmanned system. The Army expects to
make a decision in time for it to be reflected in the fiscal year 2008
president's budget.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                  Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)

MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed U.S.
forces, allies, and friends from short-to-medium-range ballistic missile
attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit-to-kill
missiles, and command and control systems. It will also be used as a
forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of intercontinental
ballistic missiles. We assessed the missile to be delivered in Block 2006,
the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1A.

                       Source: Aegis BMD Program Office.

Program Transition Missile  Surveillance/ Design  Block 2004 Block     GAO 
start       to MDA contract   tracking    review  completion 2006   review 
                      awarded   capability                      start         
(10/95)     (1/02)  (8/03)     (9/04)     (10/04)    (12/05) (1/06) (1/07) 

According to program officials, the Block 1A missile being fielded during
2006-2007 has mature technologies and a stable design. However, we believe
that two critical technologies are less mature because full functionality
of these two capabilities of the new missile has not been demonstrated in
a realistic environment. If events occur that require the new capability,
program officials believe the upgrades will perform as expected. Even
without them, officials noted that the missile provides a credible defense
against the Block 2004 threat set and some of the Block 2006 threat set.
All drawings have been released to manufacturing. The program is not
collecting statistical data on its production process of the Block 1A
missile but is using other means to gauge production readiness.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (10/95) review
(9/06) (1/07) (10/04)

Aegis BMD Program

Technology Maturity

Program officials believe that all three technologies critical to the SM-3
Block 1A missile are mature. However, we believe that two of these
critical technologies are less mature. The warhead's seeker has been fully
demonstrated in flight tests and is mature. We believe two other
technologies, which were upgraded to create the SM-3 Block 1A, are less
mature: the Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS) and the Third
Stage Rocket Motor. While some modes of these technologies have been
demonstrated in flight tests, the "pulse mode" of the SDACS, which
provides endgame divert for the kinetic warhead, and the "zero pulse mode"
of the Third Stage Rocket Motor, which increases the missile's capability
against shorter-range threats, have not been successfully flight-tested.
The SDACS operation in pulse mode failed during a June 2003 flight test.
According to program officials, the test failure was a result of multiple
issues with the original design. The program has implemented changes to
address these problems. While recent ground tests have demonstrated
performance of the new configuration, the changes have not yet been flight
tested. A flight test in December 2006 that would have partially
demonstrated the pulse SDACS was not completed because the missile failed
to launch. A flight test that will fully test the new SDACS design is not
planned until 2008.

The Third Stage Rocket Motor is capable of three modes of operation, two
of which have been added in Block 2006. While both new modes failed
initial ground testing, one was later successfully flight tested in June
2006 after design changes. The second, zero pulse mode, has also undergone
design changes. While program officials believe they have a working design
and that the missile can use this mode if needed, it has not yet been
flight-tested. The first flight-test that could demonstrate this
capability is not scheduled until fiscal year 2009.

Design Stability

Program officials reported that the design for the SM-3 Block 1A missiles
being produced during Block 2006 is stable with 100 percent of its
drawings released to manufacturing. Although two upgrades to the SM-3
Block 1A missile have not been fully flight-tested, the program does not
anticipate any additional design changes related to these upgrades.

Production Maturity

We did not assess the production maturity of the 22 SM-3 missiles being
procured for Block 2006. Program officials stated that the contractor's
processes are not yet mature enough to statistically track production
processes. The Aegis BMD program is using other means to assess progress
in production and manufacturing, such as tracking rework hours, cost of
defects per unit, and other defect and test data.

Other Program Issues

The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of
Aegis-equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic
missile defense mission. In particular, the program is upgrading Aegis
destroyers for longrange surveillance and tracking of intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The program plans to complete the upgrade of 14
destroyers by the end of the Block 2006 period. In several events, this
functionality has been successfully tested, but it has never been
validated in an end-to-end flight test with the GMD system, for which it
is providing long-range surveillance and tracking. Since our last
assessment, Aegis BMD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 increased
by $362.4 million (4.2 percent), primarily in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.

Agency Comments

The program office provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.

              Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing Milstar
system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, worldwide, secure
communication capabilities for strategic and tactical warfighters. The
program includes satellites and a mission control segment. Terminals used
to transmit and receive communications are acquired separately by each
service. AEHF is an international partnership program that includes
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. We assessed the satellite
and mission control segments.

Source: Advanced EHF Program Office.

Program   Development       Design Production      GAO First       Initial 
start     start             review decision     review launch   capability 
(4/99)    (9/01)            (4/04) (6/04)       (1/07) (4/08)       (6/10) 

The AEHF program's technologies are mature and the design is stable. In
late 2004, the program was delayed and restructured because key
cryptographic equipment would not be delivered in time and to allow the
program time to replace some critical electronic components and add
testing. Schedule risk remained due to the continued concurrent
development of two critical path items managed and developed outside the
program. According to the program office, these issues have been resolved
and the first satellite is entering into final integration and testing and
is on schedule for first launch. Current plans are to meet full
operational capability with three AEHF satellites and the first
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) satellite.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (9/01) review
(6/04) (1/07) (4/04)

AEHF Program

Technology Maturity

According to the program office, all of the 14 critical technologies are
mature, having been demonstrated in a relevant environment. The
technologies are being integrated into the first satellite and for final
environmental testing.

Design Stability

AEHF's design is stable. All expected design drawings have been released.
The program completed its system-level critical design review in April
2004.

Production Maturity

Production maturity could not be assessed, as the program office does not
collect statistical process control data.

Other Program Issues

The program was restructured in October 2004, when the National Security
Agency did not deliver key cryptographic equipment to the payload
contractor in time to meet the launch schedule. The restructuring delayed
the program 1 year to allow time to resolve the cryptographic delivery
problems and other program issues including replacement of critical
electronic components and additional payload testing. Resolving these
issues added about $800 million to the program. Last year, we reported
that the program still faced schedule risk due to concurrent development
of two critical path items developed and managed outside the program: the
cryptographic components developed and produced by the National Security
Agency and the Command Post Terminal managed by another Air Force program
office.

The program office reported all cryptographic hardware and components for
the satellites were delivered, meeting all revised delivery milestones. In
addition, the replacement of critical electronic components and additional
payload testing was completed.

Since our assessment of the AEHF last year, the Command Post Terminal, a
critical path item, was delayed. However, the program office will now use
the test terminal that was originally built to provide end-to-end testing
of the system to control the satellites. Program officials stated that
utilizing the test terminal, developed by Lincoln Laboratories, will have
no adverse schedule or operational impact on the satellites.

Program officials told us the mission control segment continues to meet or
exceed its schedule and performance milestones. Three AEHF satellite
launches are scheduled for 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively. In the last
year, the program completed most systems-level testing and started final
integration and environmental testing on the first satellite. The program
office stated that the program remains on schedule to meet the first
launch date. The flight structure for the second satellite has been
delivered for payload integration. The third satellite is on contract and
includes procurement of long lead components. Full operational capability
is planned with three AEHF satellites and the first TSAT.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
AEHF remains on track for a first launch date of April 2008 with events
proceeding as expected in accordance with the December 2004 program
replan. The Air Force further stated that the program is currently in
fabrication and production of the first two satellites, and the third
satellite will begin assembly, integration, and test in fiscal year 2009.
It noted that the cryptographic chip development has remained on schedule
since the January 2005 summit between the Air Force and the National
Security Agency. In addition, the Air Force stated that all spacecraft
flight cryptographic units were received on schedule and that chips for
the ground terminals are due over the next couple of years to support
terminal production schedules. Moreover, according to Air Force officials,
DOD explored the option of adding a fourth AEHF satellite to mitigate the
potential gap caused by schedule slips in the TSAT program, but decided to
restructure the TSAT program baseline and not purchase a fourth AEHF
satellite at this time.

                Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA)

The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness of
the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be inserted in
new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and above aircraft.

                               Source: U.S. Navy.

       Program/      Design   Low-rate  GAO    Initial   Full-rate   First    
development start review   decision review capability decision  deployment 
        (2/01)       (8/01)     (6/03) (1/07)   (3/07)    (4/07)     (5/08)   

The AESA radar's critical technologies appear to be mature and the design
appears stable, but radar development continues during production.
According to the program office, there has been significant progress in
radar maturation, performance, and stability. However, risks and problems
remain. Software development continues to be a top challenge, and spurious
radar emissions could require software and/or hardware changes.
Development of design improvements is ongoing. The program also carries a
challenging risk associated with the production rate. Although program
costs appear somewhat stable, two key milestones--initial operational
capability and full-rate production-- have slipped by several months, and
first deployment of the radar in a full squadron has been delayed by the
carrier airwing schedule.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

                                     vel of knowledge
             Desired le                                                       
                Datanot available                                             

                 Development       DOD       Production   GAO   
                 start            design       decision  review 
                 (2/01)           review         (6/03)  (1/07) 
                                  (8/01)                

AESA Program

Technology Maturity

A fiscal year 2004 technology readiness assessment for the radar
determined that the four critical technologies were mature. To further
ensure technology maturity, a final technology assessment was held in
November 2005. Program officials now consider critical technologies to
work in their final form and under expected conditions.

Design Stability

Although the AESA design appears to be stable, development has continued
during production. That development has been slowed by software
immaturity, and the software has caused inconsistent radar performance.
Several advanced radar capabilities were deferred to future software
configurations, but program officials said it did not affect key
performance parameters. Software hangups have forced radar restarts in
each of the six AESA operational test aircraft. The problem is improving,
but is still above the required rate.

Other deficiencies are being pursued, such as improving target breakout,
track scheduling, and fault detection. Integrating AESA software
capabilities and correcting deficiencies continue under a technical
delivery order contract. Spurious radiated emissions may degrade
performance of other subsystems, which could result in unacceptable weapon
system performance. Redesign of radar modules and/or software changes may
be required to reduce emissions. Officials said development of design
improvements has been completed or is almost complete, but ongoing
verification tests may require additional design changes.

Operational evaluation started later than planned due to delays in
maturing air-to-air software, so it was not completed until November 2006,
and the report is not expected until January 2007, resulting in a 5-month
delay for initial operational capability. Follow-on tests are scheduled
through fiscal year 2008 to test, for example, advanced air-to-air modes
and integration with aircraft electronic warfare systems. Unsatisfactory
results could result in system software changes.

Development of the radar's anti-tamper capability is on schedule according
to officials. Operational testing of this capability is to be completed in
fiscal year 2008. While the anti-tamper capability is required to have no
effect on radar performance, operational tests of anti-tamper models may
identify problems requiring design changes. By then, about 116 radars are
to have been produced.

Production Maturity

We could not assess production maturity because statistical process
control data are not being collected. Manufacturing processes continue to
be monitored and controlled at each manufacturing center and laboratory.
Twenty percent of the 415 radars have been approved for production now
that the fourth and final low-rate production has been approved. Most of
the 415 radars will be installed in F/A-18E/Fs on the aircraft production
line, but 135 radars are to be retrofitted into existing aircraft. As of
November 2006, 24 radars had been delivered and installed in aircraft.
Long-lead funding for full production has been approved, but due to the
testing delay, full-rate production has slipped by 3 months. The program
has a challenging production risk. On-time delivery of radars is risky for
the fourth low-rate production lot because production must increase from 2
to 4 radars per month, retrofit radars begin in fiscal year 2008, and
foreign military sales follow. Thus, on-time delivery of aircraft could be
affected by missing or late radars.

Other Program Issues

The first deployment of AESA radars in a full squadron has been delayed by
6 months due to a Navy decision on the carrier airwing schedule, not AESA
problems, according to officials.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated AESA software
development continues in a spiral fashion during production as planned.
Operational evaluation was completed in December 2006 and is expected to
support initial operational capability in March 2007 and full-rate
production in April 2007, both within thresholds. Due to schedule delays,
some advanced radar capabilities were deferred, as approved. Many of the
deferred items for most of the deficiencies identified during operational
evaluation have been incorporated in the next aircraft software build, and
will undergo operational tests prior to first system deployment in 2008.
Final advanced capabilities will be incorporated in the following year.

                      Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM)

          Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City (PMA-299).

                        Low-rate     GAO     Initial    
                        production  review capabilities 
                        decisions                       
                        (5/05-8/08) (1/07) (10/07-9/10) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development DOD GAO Production start design review decision (various)
review (1/07) (various) (various)

The Navy is developing new Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) systems
that will be fielded with aircraft mission kits on MH-60S Block 2
helicopters. Together, these systems will provide carrier strike groups
and expeditionary strike groups with organic airborne mine countermeasures
capability. To successfully field this capability, the Navy must develop,
test, and integrate 5 new mine countermeasures systems with a modified
MH-60S airframe. We assessed the Navy's progress in developing the mine
countermeasures systems.

                               Development starts

                                  (4/00-1/03)

The MH-60S Block 2 AMCM helicopter will rely upon 5 new mine
countermeasures systems, the AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar, Airborne
Laser Mine Detection System, Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep
System, Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System, and Airborne Mine
Neutralization System. The Navy has not yet fully matured technologies for
3 of these systems, although it asserts a high degree of design stability
in these programs. However, if technologies do not mature as planned,
design changes for the affected systems may be required. In addition, the
Navy is not collecting statistical process control data for the 2 systems
in production, preventing us from assessing production maturity. The
achievement of key product knowledge shown is for the Organic Airborne and
Surface Influence Sweep System, Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System, and
Airborne Mine Neutralization System.

AMCM Program

Technology Maturity

Thirty-three of the 38 critical technologies comprising the 5 MH-60S mine
countermeasures systems are fully mature, and the remaining five
technologies are approaching maturity. Technologies supporting the
AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar and the Organic Airborne and Surface
Influence Sweep System are all fully mature. However, the Airborne Laser
Mine Detection System and the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System each
have one immature technology, while the Airborne Mine Neutralization
System has three technologies that have not been fully matured.

The Airborne Laser Mine Detection System is currently in production. This
system detects, classifies, and localizes floating and near surface moored
mines by firing a laser into the water and using cameras to capture water
reflections to create images. One technology that enables this process is
the system's active pixel sensor, which the Navy has not fully matured.
Although the Navy has identified a mature backup technology for the active
pixel sensor that will be used in the event problems are discovered during
testing, this alternative will impose schedule delays upon the program as
it will require integration into the existing system design.

The Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System is currently in development, with
initial production planned for August 2008. This system will use a 30
millimeter gun and targeting sensor to neutralize near-surface and surface
(floating) moored mines. One technology critical to achieving full
functionality of this system is its fire control system, which the Navy is
still developing. The Navy plans to test the fire control system in a
relevant environment in the second quarter of fiscal year 2007.

The Airborne Mine Neutralization System is currently in development and is
scheduled to enter production in June 2007. This system will provide the
capability to neutralize bottom and moored mines using an airborne
delivered expendable mine neutralization device. The Navy has fully
matured this system's neutralizer technology, and is approaching full
maturity with its launch and handling subsystem, deployment subassembly,
and warhead assembly technologies.

Design Stability

All 5 of the MH-60S mine countermeasures systems have completed design
readiness reviews. To date, 98 percent of design drawings have been
released for these systems, and the Navy anticipates that only the
Airborne Mine Neutralization System and the Airborne Laser Mine Detection
System will require completion of additional drawings. While the Navy
considers the design for the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System to be
complete, if this system's fire control system technology does not mature
as planned, design changes could be required.

Production Maturity

Both the AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar and Airborne Laser Mine Detection
System are currently in production. Currently, the Navy is not collecting
statistical process control data for these systems-- an approach it
attributes to the limited number of initial production units being
procured. Consequently, we could not assess production maturity for either
the AN/AQS-20A Mine Detecting Sonar or the Airborne Laser Mine Detection
System.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II

The Army's APKWS II is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed
to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system is intended to add
a new laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and is
expected to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the Hellfire
missile. Future block upgrades are planned to improve system
effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance technology used in the new
seeker.

                 Source: APKWS II Program Office, BAE Systems.

Development        GAO Design       Low-rate      Initial             Last 
start         review review         decision    capability     procurement 
(4/06)            (1/07) (5/07)      (9/08)       (6/11)            (2020) 

      The APKWS II program entered system Attainment of Product Knowledge

development with its one critical technology mature and its design stable.
Since our previous assessment, the Army restructured the program and, in
April 2006, awarded a 2-year, $41.9 million system development and
demonstration contract for the new APKWS II program. Last year, we
reported that the combination of a number of problems, including the
placement of the laser seeker on the fins rather than in the head of the
missile, led to the Army's curtailment of the original APKWS contract in
January 2005. Although the APKWS II laser guidance technology appears
mature, its integration on the missile's fins still presents a risk since
this design is essentially the same as the original APKWS. Due to funding
uncertainty, the schedule for the design review slipped from June 2006 to
May 2007 and flight tests were delayed from August 2006 to January 2007.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                           vel of knowledge
                                       Desir ed le                            

                  Development     GAO    DOD       Production 
                      start     designreview         decision 
                     (4/06)     review (1/07)          (9/08) 
                                     (5/07)                   

APKWS II Program

Technology Maturity

Program officials consider the one APKWS critical technology, laser
guidance, to be mature. However, on the original APKWS program,
integration of the laser seeker and guidance proved to be more problematic
than originally estimated, and this difficulty contributed to contract
curtailment and program restructuring. The Army restructured the program
under the same set of key performance parameters and, in April 2006,
awarded the APKWS II contract to one of the original program participants
using the same laser seeker and guidance technology as in the original
program. According to program officials, the contractor funded its own
work on the revised APKWS II during the 15-month period between the
original program curtailment and contract award for the follow-on program.
The contractor's effort focused on the problems that plagued the original
program. Program officials stated that during the interim 15-month period,
the contractor successfully addressed the original APKWS problems and also
conducted three successful missile flights.

Design Stability

The number of engineering drawings increased from 115 to 160 from the
original APKWS to the APKWS II program. According to program officials,
the drawings now include guidance and telemetry section drawings. Program
officials expect to have all the engineering drawings released by the
design review in May 2007. Due to funding uncertainty, the system critical
design review slipped from June 2006 to May 2007.

Production Maturity

According to program officials, key manufacturing processes have not yet
been determined. However, officials stated that statistical process
control will be employed and all key manufacturing processes will be
placed under control during low-rate initial production.

Other Program Issues

Program officials expected to hold the APKWS II system critical design
review in June 2006 and flight tests in August 2006. However, funding
uncertainty has caused those schedules to slip. The Army requested that
some of the procurement money originally slated for the first APKWS be
reprogrammed to support the development of APKWS II. This request was
followed by two additional requests from the Army to reprogram money from
another source. However, Congress has not yet approved any reprogramming
requests for APKWS II. Subsequently, in June 2006, the Army directed the
prime contractor to take actions to manage the contract within current
funding constraints and to execute the contract through November 2006 with
existing funding. That has caused the schedule for the design review to
slip to May 2007 and the flight test to January 2007. Due to the
uncertainty of future funds, APKWS II program officials predict further
schedule slippages and subsequent increased program costs related to
replanning activities.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials stated that
having a design with the laser seeker on the wings was not an issue that
led to the Army's curtailment of the original APKWS contract. Program
officials further noted that this design presents no major difficulties to
the ongoing integration of the APKWS laser seeker and guidance section
into the Hydra-70 Rocket components. They believe the placement of the
laser seeker provides significant advantages during extreme environmental
operations and adjacent rocket firings. Also, program officials noted that
the lack of required funding in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 resulted in
moving the first flight to January 2007 and the design review to May 2007.
Finally, they stated that efforts are ongoing to establish a revised,
realistic baseline within current funding constraints and that they are
confident the revised cost and schedule will not breach the current
Acquisition Program Baseline.

The Army also provided technical changes, which were incorporated as
appropriate.

GAO Comments

Our prior work has shown that the placement of the laser seeker on the
fins rather than in the head of the missile was problematic for the
original APKWS program. The integration difficulty contributed to the cost
overrun and protracted schedule, which subsequently led to program
curtailment and restructuring.

                     Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)

The Army's ARH is expected to provide reconnaissance and security
capability for air and ground maneuver teams. The ARH combines a modified
off-the-shelf airframe with a nondevelopmental item mission equipment
package and is replacing the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior fleet. A streamlined
acquisition strategy was proposed for the ARH program, as it will be
fielded to support current military operations.

    Source: ARH Prototype #1 Flight Testing at Bell Helicopter, (c)2006 Bell
                         Helicopter, A Textron Company.

Development      GAO Design   Low-rate     Full-rate Initial          Last 
start           review review decision   decision capability   procurement 
(7/05)          (1/07) (1/07)  (5/07)      (2/09) (6/09)            (2013) 

The ARH program began system development without designating any
technologies as critical. Since then, the program has identified two
critical technologies--the sensor package and the engine--both of which
are approaching full maturity. The ARH program is scheduled to hold its
critical design review in January 2007, and it is not certain that the
critical technologies will be mature by that time. The program has
mandated that 85 percent of the drawings be released by the design review.
About 88 percent have been released to date. The Army does not plan to
collect statistical process control data in preparation for the production
decision scheduled for May 2007. Rather, the Army will evaluate ARH's
engineering and manufacturing readiness levels. Further, the Army's
oversight of ARH may be compromised due to the decertification of the
prime contractor's earned value management system.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                            Development start (7/05)

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

GAO DOD Production

review design decision (1/07) review (5/07) (1/07)

ARH Program

Technology Maturity

The ARH program had not designated any technologies as critical at the
time of development start. However, in October 2005 (90 days after
contract award), two technologies were determined to be critical. Both
technologies, the sensor package and the engine, are approaching full
maturity. Although the sensor is a derivative of a currently fielded and
flying system, it contains some updated components. The sensor was tested
earlier this year in a prototype configuration and improvements are
currently being incorporated into the design. The system will be retested
in late calendar year 2006. The engine has recently completed the
compressor rig test, the results of which will be critical in reducing the
risk of the engine and increasing the maturity level. However, the program
office is unsure if these technologies will be fully mature by critical
design review, scheduled for January 2007.

Design Stability

According to the program office, the ARH is a limited design effort and
will take an off-the-shelf aircraft and convert it to military use by
incorporating existing military and commercial equipment. The ARH program
office has imposed a critical design review entrance criterion of 85
percent drawing release. The review, currently scheduled for January 2007,
will not be held until this entrance criterion is satisfied. Currently,
the program has released 88 percent of the drawings.

Production Maturity

We could not assess production maturity because, according to the program
office, it does not plan to collect statistical process control data.
However, the program office stated that production is managed through the
use of engineering and manufacturing readiness levels (EMRLs).To determine
production capability, the ARH program stated it will conduct a production
readiness review (including an assessment of the EMRL), review facility
plans and limited tooling development, conduct an operations capacity
analysis, and assess lean manufacturing initiatives such as design for six
sigma. In addition, the program office stated that the production status
of the ARH program will be evaluated by tracking the cost of repairs and
rework.

Other Program Issues

In March 2006, the lead contractor lost its earned value management
certification due to a recent compliance review that found lack of
progress in addressing long-standing systemic deficiencies. Without
certified earned value management data, the Army will not have timely
information on the contractor's ability to perform work within estimated
cost and schedule. According to the program office, the contractor did not
make its first milestone detailed in the Defense Contract Management
Agency's corrective action plans in efforts to obtain earned value
compliance. Still, the contractor plans to be compliant by the end of
August 2007, 3 months after ARH low-rate initial production is scheduled
to begin.

According to program officials, the Army plans to start low-rate
production in May 2007 and procure two lots of 18 and 20 to conclude in
May 2008. However, the Army does not plan to start full-rate production
until February 2009. This schedule creates a 10-month production break
between lowrate initial production and full-rate production. During the
production break, the program plans to purchase development and production
needs such as support equipment, pilot and maintenance trainers, and
spares. Further, according to program officials, the budget reduction of
$39 million in fiscal year 2007 exacerbates the break issue which could be
very disruptive. The program office's proposed solution to the production
break is to increase lowrate production, but this would have to be
approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics. Another possible solution could be to extend low-rate
production to three lots, as opposed to two, which would help the program
ramp up production and fill the 10-month production break.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System

                              Source: BAE Systems.

               Low-rate   GAO   Full-rate          Initial             Last   
               decision  review decision  procurementcapability
               (11/03)   (1/07)  (6/11)     (TBD)            (2023)  

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (6/95) review
(11/03) (1/07) (2/97)

The Army's and Special Operations' ATIRCM/CMWS is a component of the Suite
of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures planned to defend U.S. aircraft
from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will be employed on
Army and Special Operations aircraft. ATIRCM/CMWS includes an active
infrared jammer, missile warning system, and countermeasure dispenser
capable of loading and employing expendables, such as flares, chaff, and
smoke.

                       Program/ Design development start review (6/95) (2/97)

The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with
technologies mature and designs stable. However, one of the five critical
technologies was recently downgraded due to continued technical
difficulties. Currently, the program's production processes are at various
levels of control. The CMWS portion of the program entered limited
production in February 2002 to meet urgent deployment requirements.
However, full-rate production for both components was delayed because of
reliability problems. Over the past several years, the program has had to
overcome cost and schedule problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge.
Key technologies were demonstrated late in development, and only a small
number of design drawings were completed by design review.

ATIRCM/CMWS Program

Technology Maturity

The program's five critical technologies were considered mature until a
government/industry team recently downgraded the maturity level of the
infrared jamming head due to technical issues. Additionally, the other
four technologies did not mature until after the design review. Most of
the early technology development effort focused on the application to
rotary wing aircraft. When system development began in 1995, requirements
were expanded to include Navy and Air Force fixed-wing aircraft. This
change caused problems that contributed to cost increases of over 150
percent. The Navy and the Air Force subsequently dropped out of the
program, but the Navy and the Army are currently pursuing future joint
production planning.

Design Stability

The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the time
of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings complete due to
the expanded requirements. Two years after the design review, 90 percent
of the drawings were released and the design was stable. This resulted in
inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional testing, and a 3-year
schedule delay. However, the number of drawings may be changing because
the infrared jam laser and the infrared lamp will be replaced with a
multi-band laser.

Production Maturity

According to program officials, the program has 26 key manufacturing
processes in various phases of control. The CMWS production portion of the
system has stabilized and benefited from increased production rates. Also,
processes supporting both ATIRCM and CMWS will continue to be enhanced as
data is gathered and lessons learned will be included in the processes.

The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to meet an
urgent need. Subsequently, full rate production was delayed for both
components due to reliability testing failures. The program implemented
reliability fixes to six production representative subsystems for use in
initial operational test and evaluation. These systems were delivered in
March 2004. The full-rate production decision for the complete system was
delayed until June 2011 due to ATIRCM performance issues.

Other Program Issues

The Army uses the airframe as the acquisition quantity unit of measure
even though it is not buying an ATIRCM/CMWS system for each aircraft. When
the program began, plans called for putting an ATIRCM/CMWS on each
aircraft. Due to funding constraints, the Army reduced the number of
systems to be procured and will rotate the systems to aircraft as needed.
The Army is buying kits for each aircraft, which include the modification
hardware, wiring harness, and cables necessary to install and interface
the ATIRCM/CMWS to each platform. In May 2006, the quantity of ATIRCM/CMWS
systems was increased from 1,710 to 2,752, and kits to use for aircraft
integration was increased from 3,571 to 4,393. However, a new cost
estimate for the additional systems has not been completed. Based on the
number of systems before the May 2006 increase, the true unit procurement
cost for each ATIRCM/CMWS system is more on the order of $2.95 million.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that the
ATIRCM/CMWS program continues to focus efforts on the Global War on
Terrorism force protection requirements. In response to an Acting
Secretary of the Army November 2003 memo to equip all Army helicopters to
be deployed to the war zone with the most costeffective defensive systems,
the program office proposed accelerating the CMWS portion of ATIRCM. In
July 2006, the CMWS was provided to each deployed aircraft with CMWS
installation kits. These accelerated efforts provided the CMWS ahead of
the planned schedule (February 2007). CMWS initial operational test and
evaluation and full-rate production decision events were successfully
completed during this reporting period.

The Army also stated that the ATIRCM funding was utilized to maintain the
CMWS acceleration due to delays in receipt of reprogramming funding. The
rebaselined ATIRCM program efforts are now continuing, with initial
operational test and evaluation planned for November 2009. This
rebaselined plan was presented and approved by the Army Acquisition
Executive in December 2005.

                   B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP)

The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system to
resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with
federal requirements the frequency must be changed to a band where the DOD
has been designated as the primary user. The modified radar system is
being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of
stealth, range, payload, and nearprecision weapons delivery capabilities.

        Source: U.S. Air Force, U.S. Edwards Air Force Base, California.

  Program Development Design    GAO Low-rate Full-rate  Initial      Last     
  start      start    review review decision  decision capability procurement 
  (10/02)   (8/04)    (5/05) (1/07) (4/07)      (4/08)   (TBD)      (2009)    

All four of the B-2 RMPs critical technologies are considered mature and
100 percent of the design drawings have been released. Production maturity
metrics will be formulated as part of a production readiness review prior
to the April 2007 start of production. However, the first of two radar
antenna software sets will not complete operational testing until 2008.
Further, the program will not begin tracking the radar's operational
reliability until early 2007. Recent program flight-testing delays may
lead to a delay in the planned start of production. Also, six operational
B-2s will receive development radar units prior to the completion of
flight testing. These units are necessary to obtain reliability and
maintainability data and for crew training, but building them early in
development may add to the risk of future design changes.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

                Development      DOD  GAO            Production
                start         design review            decision 
                (8/04)        review      (1/07)        (4/07)  
                              (5/05)       

B-2 RMP Program

Technology Maturity

All four B-2 RMP critical technologies were considered mature at the
design review in May 2005. While the program entered development in August
2004 with two of these four critical technologies mature and two
approaching maturity, the receiver/exciter for the electronic driver cards
and aspects of the antenna designed to help keep the B-2's radar signature
low, all four are now considered mature.

Design Stability

The program currently has released 100 percent of its drawings and plans
to maintain this 100 percent level by the planned start of production in
April 2007. The program, however, does not use the release of design
drawings as the sole measure of design stability but instead uses the
successful completion of design events, such as subsystem design reviews,
as its primary measure of design stability. The program has completed its
design readiness review and at that time had released 85 percent of its
design drawings.

Production Maturity

The program does not use manufacturing process control data as the sole
measure of production maturity because of the small number of production
units. However, the program has identified one key process related to the
assembly of the radar antenna array. Instead of using manufacturing
process control data, the program plans to formulate other metrics to
measure progress toward production. The program plans to use these other
metrics as part of a production readiness review prior to the start of
production in April 2007.

The program plans to enter production in April 2007 and procure four
radars at a cost of $160.7 million. However, recent flight-testing delays
may lead to a reconsideration of April 2007 as the start of production and
it will not be until the beginning of fiscal year 2008 when radar
flight-testing has progressed to the point that the first of two planned
radar antenna software sets are fully tested and certified. Furthermore,
the program does not plan to track the operational reliability of the
radar until January 2007. Also, an operational assessment of the radar was
delayed from March 2006 to early 2007. This is an important schedule event
leading up to production and its delay will impact when information will
be available leading up to the start of production. Producing units before
testing is able to demonstrate the design is mature and works in its
intended environment increases the likelihood of future costly design
changes.

The program plans to build six radar units during development to be used
on B-2 aircraft to gather developmental reliability and maintainability
data and provide for crew training and proficiency operations when the
legacy radar frequency is no longer available. Last year, the Air Force
plan was for six of these radar units to be placed on B-2 aircraft for
this purpose, but because some B-2s are needed for other operations and
will not be available, only two operational aircraft will initially be
fitted with the new radars, with the remaining four to be fitted later in
2007. The Air Force and prime contractor have determined this will not
affect training but will mean less radar reliability and maintainability
data will initially be collected for analysis.

Agency Comments

The Air Force agrees that producing radar units before testing has been
completed does increase the risk of future potentially costly design
changes. However, they have decided the risk is low compared to the
benefits gained by having operational production units in place to meet
requirements.

The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.

                    Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)

               Source: D.P. Associates, Inc./ Andrew Kirschbaum.

                Production                  Initial               Last        
                decision                         capability       procurement 
                (2011)                               (2013)             (TBD) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

             Development GAO                 DOD         Production 
             review      start             design          decision 
             (1/07)      (10/07)           review            (8/11) 
                                           (11/09)                  

The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System (BAMS
UAS) is to provide a persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Along with the Multi-mission Maritime
Aircraft and Aerial Common Sensor, BAMS UAS will be part of a broad area
maritime surveillance family of systems integral to the Navy's
recapitalization of its Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force. DOD is
negotiating international participation in the program.

GAO Program/ review development start

(1/07) (10/07)

The BAMS UAS program plans to begin system development in October 2007.
The program previously planned to reach system development during the
first quarter of fiscal year 2005. However, the Navy did not allocate
funds to the program for fiscal year 2006, which delayed development start
to 2007 and postponed the initial operational capability from fiscal year
2010 to 2013. Program officials have not currently identified any critical
technologies, but contractor proposals will be required to identify
critical technologies during the source selection period from April to
September 2007. The program plans to conduct a technology readiness
assessment in parallel with source selection and anticipates results by
August 2007. According to program officials, each critical technology must
be approaching maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment prior
to development contract award.

BAMS Program

Technology Maturity

BAMS UAS is taking steps to evaluate technologies prior to the start of
program development. The Navy awarded four contracts using a broad agency
announcement in conjunction with its Persistent Unmanned Maritime Airborne
Surveillance (PUMAS) effort to engage industry in support of developing
unmanned ISR mission performance metrics and capabilities within a family
of systems as well as to gain insight into the state of industry research
and technology. BAMS UAS has received the study results and is in the
process of using the information to develop technical baselines and assess
program risks. In addition, the Navy has acquired 2 Global Hawk Maritime
Demonstration (GHMD) UAS to provide a rapid technology demonstration
capability. GHMD data and test results are being used to refine BAMS UAS
doctrine, concept of operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Program officials have not currently identified any critical technologies,
but contractor proposals will be required to identify critical
technologies during the source selection, period from April to September
2007. According to program officials, critical technologies must be
approaching maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to
the start of development in October 2007.

Other Program Issues

As one component of a family of systems, BAMS UAS is intended to serve as
an adjunct to the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The program
intends to colocate BAMS UAS mission crews with Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance (MPR) Forces to allow operators to closely coordinate
missions and utilize common support infrastructure. BAMS UAS will share
its persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role with
MMA. If the BAMS UAS does not develop as planned or continues to
experience schedule delays, the MMA is its fallback, and according to the
Navy, the overall cost of the MMA program would increase due to a need to
procure additional aircraft.

The Navy's Aerial Common Sensor (ACS), a cooperative Army-led program, was
the replacement for the Navy's current airborne intelligence platform, the
EP-3. It, in conjunction with MMA and BAMS UAS is intended to constitute
the MPR family of systems. Due to a significant increase in the weight of
ACS, the Army terminated the development contract. According to BAMS UAS
officials, problems with the ACS have not affected the BAMS UAS program
and future spirals may include planned ACS capabilities such as signals
intelligence.

The program is seeking government-to-government dialogue and exchange of
information among allied and friendly nations that have common maritime
surveillance needs. Program officials indicated that several nations have
expressed interest in possible participation in the program.

Agency Comments

The BAMS UAS program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.

                C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP)

The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and
avionics for 13 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It provides
Navigation/ Safety modifications and Communication Navigation
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management upgrades; installs a Terrain Avoidance
Warning System; replaces weather avoidance radars, compass systems, and
dual autopilots; installs dual flight mangement systems; and provides high
frequency, ultra high frequency, and very high frequency datalinks.

Development    Design     GAO Production Full-rate production         Last 
start          review  review  decision  readiness review      procurement 
(7/01)        (8/05)   (1/07)  (11/07)          (5/09)              (2015) 

According to the program office, the C-130 AMP Attainment of Product
Knowledge technologies are mature and the design is stable [Production,]
for the basic combat delivery aircraft. However, ^design and

                                   technology

production maturity is unknown because the maturity program has not
collected key manufacturing information and flight testing just began. The

                                   Design and

production decision has been delayed 17 months [technology]since last
year's review. This allows time for more maturity flight testing before
making a production decision in November 2007. However, the program will
have limited flight testing completed of a fully integrated, capable
version of the basic [Technology]configuration. Estimated costs for the
program maturity are expected to increase. In October 2006, the Air Force
Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimated the total program cost at over
twice the current cost estimate. An updated acquisition strategy
reflecting the results of the program restructuring has yet to be
approved. ^Development DOD GAO Production

        start design review decision (7/01) review (1/07) (11/07) (8/05)

C-130 AMP Program

Technology Maturity

All of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature.

Design Stability

The C-130 AMP basic configuration is stable with nearly all of the
expected drawings released. The basic configuration is critical because it
provides the foundation for all 13 mission system designs. The program
completed its critical design review in August 2005 for the basic
configuration. However, during installation trials to demonstrate system
integration, program officials realized that they did not have a sound
understanding of the installation complexity. As a result, drawings have
been revised based on the lessons learned, and the program acknowledges
that additional drawings or changes may be needed to incorporate the
unique features of each variant.

Production Maturity

The program did not collect statistical process control data during
development. Program officials stated that details on what data they will
collect regarding manufacturing processes and quality control have yet to
be defined for low-rate initial production. The Milestone B approved exit
criteria established the production readiness review as one of the three
criteria the C-130 AMP must meet to begin low-rate production in 2008.
According to the program office, a low-rate production readiness review
will be held in May 2007, and a full-rate production readiness review is
scheduled for May 2009.

Since last year's review, the production decision has been delayed 17
months. The program office stated that the program will now have more than
two-thirds of total development test points completed for the basic
configuration before entering the production phase. However, the program
will have only limited flight testing completed with a fully integrated,
capable version. Future design variants are scheduled for demonstrations
even later and will be done concurrently, leaving little time for
corrections if problems arise. An official from the Office of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, expressed similar concerns
about the level of concurrent flight testing and production.

Other Program Issues

The program has been undergoing a program restructure for some time,
putting the program in a state of flux. Since GAO's last review of the
C-130 AMP, the program has encountered several delays in its schedule, the
quantities expected to be purchased have been reduced by 31 aircraft, and
the Special Operations Command removed funding from the C-130 AMP for the
Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration program from fiscal year 2008
forward. In October 2006, the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group
estimated the total program cost at over twice the current cost estimate.
According to the program office, an updated acquisition strategy, program
baseline, and test plan are expected to be approved prior to the
production decision in fiscal year 2008.

Agency Comments

The Air Force provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment,
which were incorporated where appropriate.

                                C-130J Hercules

          Source: C-130J Program Office (657th AESS), U.S. Air Force.

                    Program/       First                      GAO        Last 
              production start     delivery                review    delivery 
                     (6/96)        (3/99)                  (1/07)     (12/09) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                           Datanot available vel of knowledge
      Desired le                                                              

                 Development       DOD       Production   GAO   
                 start            design       decision  review 
                 (NA)             review         (6/96)  (1/07) 
                                   (NA)                 

The C-130J is the latest addition to DOD's fleet of C-130 aircraft and
constitutes a major upgrade for the aircraft series. The aircraft is
designed primarily for the transport of cargo and personnel within a
theater of operation. Variants of the C-130J are being acquired by the Air
Force (e.g., Air Mobility Command and Special Operations Command), Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard to perform their respective missions. We reviewed
the Air Force's C-130J program.

The C-130J program was initiated at production in June 1996. We did not
access technology, design, or production maturity because the Air Force
does not have the information necessary to do so. Officials stated this is
because the C-130J was originally procured as a commercial item that
precluded DOD from obtaining the information. The program uses other
means, such as Defense Contract Management Agency oversight of production,
to assess maturity. In September 2006, DOD declared initial operational
capability for the C-130J aircraft despite being rated as only partially
mission capable in some areas. Program officials stated that options to
address these shortfalls have been developed. In October 2006, the program
completed the transition to a noncommercial negotiated contract to provide
full insight into cost and pricing data for the remaining procurement of
39 C-130J aircraft.

C-130J Hercules Program

Technology Maturity

We did not assess the C-130J's critical technologies because, according to
program officials, the technologies that make possible the major upgrades
from earlier C-130 aircraft were assumed to be mature. Since the
contractor initiated development of the C-130J at its own expense in the
early 1990s, DOD took no responsibility for the system's technology
maturity.

Design Stability

We did not assess the C-130J's design because, according to program
officials, the Air Force does not have design drawings used to measure
maturity. It believed the design was stable when the program was
initiated, based on the fact that the C-130J was offered as a commercial
item and evolved from an earlier C-130 design. However, when compared to
earlier C-130 models the C-130J's development was approximately 70 percent
new effort. Design changes provided major improvements such as a new
propulsion system, an advanced integrated diagnostics system, a glass
cockpit, digital avionics, and cargo compartment enhancements. Despite
being considered a commercial development, the C-130J encountered numerous
deficiencies early on that had to be corrected in order to meet minimum
warfighter requirements. Other design shortfalls have recently been
discovered which impact the aircraft's ability to meet its airdrop
operations requirements. Program officials stated that options to address
these shortfalls have been developed.

Production Maturity

We did not assess the production maturity of the C-130J because, according
to program officials, the Air Force does not have data to show the total
number of key product characteristics, the maturity of critical
manufacturing processes, or capability indices. Program officials stated
this is because the C-130J was originally procured as a Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 commercial item, which limits DOD's
access to the full range of contractor manufacturing process information.
Further, officials stated that the program's recent conversion to a
noncommercial FAR Part 15 (negotiated) contract did not increase their
visibility into these types of production metrics. The program relies on
oversight by the Defense Contract Management Agency at the contractor's
facility to ensure that the C-130J aircraft is manufactured in accordance
with applicable standards and contactor critical manufacturing process
documents.

Other Program Issues

According to program officials, Air Mobility Command declared the
aircraft's initial operational capability in September 2006. Yet, in April
2006, DOD testing officials reported several shortfalls with substantial
operational impact resulting in the aircraft being rated as only partially
mission capable. Program officials plan to address future Air Force needs
and correct deficiencies identified during operational testing with
ongoing modernization efforts funded by DOD and foreign military
customers.

The program office was directed to change the acquisition of C-130J
aircraft from a FAR Part 12 commercial item acquisition to a
non-commercial Part 15 negotiated acquisition to provide full insight into
cost and pricing of the aircraft. In response, a definitized contract was
negotiated in October 2006 for the remaining procurement of 39 aircraft.
Program officials estimate the Air Force will save approximately $168
million by converting to a noncommercial negotiated acquisition.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                  C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP)

                  Source: Lockheed-Martin Aeronautics Company.

              Production  Initial GAO                                    Last 
              decision   review capability                        procurement 
              (2/03)                         (11/06) (1/07)             (TBD) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                               Development       DOD       Production   GAO   
                               start            design       decision  review 
                               (1/99)           review         (2/03)  (1/07) 
                                                (5/01)                

The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 to
improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and reduce
ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic Management,
navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, and an
allweather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the C-5
Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We
assessed the C-5 AMP.

                                Development Design start review (1/99) (5/01)

The program's technologies and design are considered mature. We could not
assess production maturity as the components are commercial-off-the-shelf
items that are installed in other commercial and military aircraft.
However, according to a DOD test official the program has many maintenance
issues including 240 deficiencies, the most severe include the autopilot
disconnecting during flight, flight management system problems, and engine
display issues that were identified during testing. The program has a
contract in place to fix many deficiencies, while a block upgrade is being
considered to address more significant deficiencies. An Air Force mobility
study recommended modification of all 111 C-5 aircraft. However, according
to program officials, they currently do not have the funds to modify 52
aircraft. Future budgets will address funding for the remainder of the
fleet.

C-5 AMP Program

Technology Maturity

We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the program
used commercial technologies that are considered mature.

Design Stability

The program reports that the contractor has released all of the drawings
for the AMP. Last year we reported that the C-5 AMP had released 100
percent of its drawings; however, due to modifications in the design, 270
drawings were added. As a result, the program had completed only 54
percent of the total number of drawings for the system by the time of the
production decision.

Production Maturity

We could not assess the production maturity because most components are
readily available as commercial off-the-shelf items. This equipment is
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. To ensure production
maturity, the program office is collecting data regarding modification kit
availability and the installation schedules.

The program still has not demonstrated that the system will work as
intended and is reliable. In fiscal year 2006, officials halted the flight
test program for over 6 months due to problems resulting mainly from
maintenance technical orders and maturity issues. Testing activities were
eventually resumed in April 2006 and operational testing was completed in
June 2006. According to a test official, there are still many outstanding
maintenance issues for the program, including 240 deficiencies. Among
those deficiencies, the three most severe problems affect safety of flight
and require corrective action, including the autopilot disconnecting
during flight, flight management system problems, and engine display
issues. The program office has a contract in place to fix many
deficiencies as part of sustainment, and a block upgrade is being
considered to address the more significant deficiencies. In addition,
there are 14 requirements for the program that have been delayed for 2
years but should have been met by August 2005, two of which are major
program requirements that concern takeoff and landing data. Some of the 14
requirements will be addressed by the RERP program and others may be
addressed by the block upgrade program. According to the test official,
the C-5 AMP officials consider development complete.

Other Program Issues

In February 2006, the C-5 AMP program was reclassified as a Major Defense
Acquisition Program. Over the past 2 years, the program has run into
significant problems while trying to complete software development that
have impacted the cost and schedule of the program. Most notably, a
software build was added to fix problems with AMP integration, flight
management system stability, and system diagnostics. The added build
caused a $23 million cost overrun, which was paid for by shifting funds
from the RERP program and extended developmental testing to 10 months.

Last year we reported that the Air Force was conducting mobility studies
to determine the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft it would need in the
future. The study was issued in 2006 and recommended modification of all
111 C-5 aircraft. However, according to C-5 program officials they
currently do not have the funds to modify the remaining 52 aircraft. To
fund the modifications could cost nearly $800 million based on current
unit cost.

Agency Comments

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment,
which were incorporated as appropriate.

         C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP)

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. RERP is
designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and availability of
the C-5 through engine replacement and modifications to subsystems, i.e.,
electrical and fuel, while the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) is
designed to enhance the avionics. The upgrades are part of a two-phased
modernization effort to improve the mission capability rate, performance,
and transport throughput capabilities and reduce total ownership costs. We
assessed the C-5 RERP.

                Source: Edwards AFB, CA. Photo taken by LM Aero.

  Program Development Design     GAO Low-rate Full-rate Full-rate    Last     
  start      start    review  review decision decision  decision  procurement 
                                               B model   A model              
  (2/00)    (11/01)   (12/03) (1/07) (12/07)   (1/09)    (10/13)    (FY 18)   

 The program's technologies are mature and the Attainment of Product Knowledge

design is stable. We did not assess production [Production,] maturity
because the Air Force is buying ^design and

                                   technology

commercially available items. The program maturity recently delayed the
low-rate initial production decision by 1 year because of cost pressures
with

                                   Design and

the first production unit and Berry Amendment [technology]issues
(requirement to use U.S. sources) with the maturity engine. These issues
contributed to a delay in awarding the long-lead contract for the first
production unit. A major supplier has stated its unwillingness to bring
their commercial [Technology]manufacturing processes into Berry Amendment
maturity compliance. DOD is pursuing a waiver for this supplier. The Air
Force expects to award the longlead contract in April 2007, 14 months
later than planned. This delay in production should allow the program more
time for flight testing and to gain a better understanding of the kits'
costs. ^Development DOD GAO Production

                                           vel of kno^wledge
                                       Desired le                             

start design review decision (11/01) review (1/07) (12/07) (12/03)

C-5 RERP Program

Technology Maturity

The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent technology
readiness assessment conducted in October 2001.

Design Stability

According to program officials, the basic design of the C-5 RERP is
stable. At the design review, the program had more than 90 percent of its
drawing released. However, since then, a redesign of the pylon/thrust
reverser was needed to address overweight conditions and safety concerns
for the engine mount area. According to program officials, the redesign,
now complete, contributed to a 4-month delay to the program.

Production Maturity

We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air Force
is buying commercially available items.

The program had planned to enter low-rate initial production in late 2006
without demonstrating through flight testing that the RERP would work as
intended. However, program officials stated that this decision has been
delayed until December 2007 due to upward production cost pressures and
Berry Amendment specialty metal issues (requirements to use U.S. sources)
with the engine. The program has not yet awarded the initial contract to
purchase the long-lead items for the first production unit, which was
expected to be awarded in February 2006, because of supplier noncompliance
with the Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. 2533a). A major supplier has
specifically stated its unwillingness to bring their commercial
manufacturing process into compliance, citing increased costs in domestic
specialty metals and the risk compliance poses to its competitiveness in
the global marketplace. According to program officials, the Air Force
considered several options and is now pursuing a waiver to resolve issues
concerning Berry Amendment compliance. Program officials currently
estimate the long-lead contract will be awarded in April 2007, 14 months
later than originally planned. In addition, Air Force officials have
indicated that cost pressures with the engine also contributed to this
delay. This delay in production should allow the program more time for
flight testing and to gain a better understanding of the production costs

Other Program Issues

The C-5 RERP is dependent on the C-5 AMP because the aircraft must undergo
AMP modifications prior to RERP modifications. A recent DOD study on
mobility recommended modification of all 111 C-5 aircraft. However,
according to Air Force officials they currently do not have the funds to
modify 52 C-5 AMP aircraft. In addition, the C-5 AMP has performance
shortfalls that need to be fixed. According to the program office, it has
a sustainment contract in place to fix some of the deficiencies, but a
block upgrade program will be needed to fix the more significant
deficiencies. The Air Force expects to request funds for the block upgrade
program beginning in fiscal year 2010.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that the
risk associated with entering production before flight testing has been
completed is being partially mitigated by two operational assessments. The
favorable results of the first operational assessment supports the
long-lead production decision review by the Air Force. Other technical
comments were provided and incorporated as appropriate.

                    USMC CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR)

     Source:Sikorsky Aircraft Company, (c) 2003 Sikorsky Aircraft Company.

Low-rate                      Initial Full-rate                       Last 
decision                   capability decision                 procurement 
(12/12)                        (9/15) (12/15)                       (2022) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                         vel of knowledge
                      Desired le                   
                                                   Projection                 

The Marine Corps' CH-53K system will perform the marine expeditionary
heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and personnel
to support distributed operations deep inland from a sea-based center of
operations. The CH-53K program is expected to replace the current CH-53E
helicopter with a new design to improve range and payload, survivability
and force protection, reliability and maintainability, coordination with
other assets, and overall cost of ownership.

Program                  Development             GAO                Design 
start                       start               review              review 
(11/03)                    (12/05)              (1/07)              (3/09) 

The CH-53K program entered system development in December 2005 without
demonstrating that its 3 critical technologies had reached full maturity.
The program expects one of these technologies to reach full maturity in
2009 and the remaining two technologies to be mature by 2012, three years
after the program's design review. While an initial readiness assessment
for the program identified 10 critical technologies, a subsequent
assessment reduced that number to 3. Elements of the 7 eliminated
technology areas, including the engines, are not considered critical,
although they may still present challenges to the program as many of them
are currently being developed or used by other programs and will be
integrated later into the CH-53K.

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (12/05) (1/07)
review (12/12) (3/09)

CH-53K Program

Technology Maturity

The three critical technologies for the CH-53K program--the main rotor
blade, the main gearbox, and the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper--are
not fully mature. The viscoelastic lag damper, which serves to prevent
excessive blade lagging, is expected to be fully mature by 2009, while the
other two technologies are expected to be fully mature by 2012.

The main rotor blade will be 6 percent longer than that of the CH-53E and
will require improved performance to meet the vertical lift requirement.
Current testing of smaller-scale models of the rotor blades is expected to
demonstrate increased maturity for the main rotor blade, with the actual
sized main rotor blade achieving full maturity by 2012.

The main gearbox is not mature. While other helicopters have utilized
similar technology for greater loads, they differed from the CH-53K in
operational requirements. Tests of the gearbox later this year are
expected to demonstrate increased maturity, while full maturity is
expected by 2012.

A viscoelastic lag damper similar to that planned for use is currently in
operation on other helicopters. However, while currently approaching full
maturity, it must be resized for use on the larger CH-53K rotor head and
will not reach full maturity until 2009. The viscoelastic lag damper is
expected to result in improvements in maintainability and supportability
over the hydraulic damper used on the CH-53E. Prototype dampers are
currently being procured and testing of their damping characteristics is
scheduled for later this year.

An assessment conducted in September 2004 reduced 10 original critical
technologies to the 3 above. Of the 7 eliminated technologies, 2 are being
developed by the CH-53K program and 5 are being developed by or used on
other programs and will be integrated onto the CH-53K platform. While the
program does not anticipate problems with the 5 technologies, they are
dependent on the development and maturity schedules of the other programs.

Design Stability

We did not assess the design stability of the CH-53K because the total
number of drawings expected is not known at this time.

Other Program Issues

Due to unexpected attrition of CH-53E aircraft, the need for an
operational replacement has increased, resulting in the return of
decommissioned CH-53Es to operational status. Supplemental funding has
been provided to reclaim five aircraft, and funding has been requested to
reclaim two more while the program continues to review the condition of
remaining aircraft.

Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft have flown at three times the planned
utilization rate. This operational pace is expected to result in higher
airframe and component repair costs, including short-term fatigue repairs
necessary to minimize CH-53E inventory reductions until CH-53K deliveries
reach meaningful levels.

To address these challenges, the program intends to manufacture 29 of the
156 total helicopters (19 percent) during low-rate initial production and
concurrent with initial operational testing. While concurrent production
may help to field the systems sooner, it could also result in greater
retrofit costs if unexpected design changes are required.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
CH-53K Program conducted a Technology Readiness Assessment in September
2004, which assessed 10 candidate technologies. Three of those
technologies met the criteria for designation as critical technology
elements (CTE): main rotor blade, main gearbox, and the visoelastic lag
damper. According to the Navy's comments, the technology readiness level
(TRL) of the visoelastic lag damper was assessed as a model or prototype
demonstrated in a relevant environment and the main rotor blade and main
gearbox were assessed as components in a lab environment. Further, the
Navy stated that the CH-53K Program has a technical maturation plan to
achieve maturity of these three CTEs by Milestone C in 2012, which is
progressing as planned, and risk due to these CTEs is considered low. This
plan was staffed through the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) and is reviewed semiannually by DDR&E.

             Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X)

                      Production                            Full-rate Initial 
                      decision                            decision capability
                      (9/09)              (6/12)            (9/12)    

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                         vel of knowledge
                      Desired le 

The Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) is planned to
provide the United States Air Force with a vertical take-off and landing
aircraft that is quickly deployable and capable of main base and austere
location operations for worldwide CSAR and personnel recovery missions.
The CSAR-X will be developed in two blocks and will replace the aging
HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. We assessed CSAR-X Block 0, the first
block to be developed.

Development GAO start review (10/06) (1/07)

CSAR-X program officials report that all of the critical technologies for
Block 0 were mature before the program committed to product development in
October 2006. The development contract was awarded to Boeing in November
2006, but a bid protest by competitors was filed with GAO and has required
the program to suspend development activities. The protest was sustained
in February 2007 and the Air Force is currently considering its response
to the GAO recommendation. Information regarding design stability and
production maturity was not available at the time of this review.

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (10/06) (1/07)
review (9/09) (TBD)

Technology Maturity

CSAR-X program officials identified eight critical technologies for Block
0 and report that all eight were mature before development start. They
also identified a number of other critical technologies expected to
support Block 10, but did not provide data on their levels of maturity.
These additional technologies will be assessed prior to the start of Block
10 development.

CSAR-X Program

Other Program Issues

CSAR-X is being managed as an incremental development program. Block 0,
the block assessed in this review, and Block 10 will be managed as
separate programs, each with its own requirements, program baseline, and
milestone reviews.

The initiation of CSAR-X Block 0 development has been delayed several
times. According to program officials, the largest part of the schedule
slip resulted from the Air Force adding $849 million to the program's
future budget to move the beginning of Block 10 development ahead 2 years,
from 2011 to 2009, to more closely align with the scheduled conclusion of
Block 0 development. As a result of those changes, the program office went
back to the competitors and asked them to incorporate the new Block 10
development plan and funding profile into their proposals.

The Air Force awarded the CSAR-X Block 0 development contract to Boeing in
November 2006. However, a bid protest by competitors challenging the award
was filed with GAO, requiring the Air Force to suspend the beginning of
product development activities. In February 2007, GAO sustained the
protest, recommending that the Air Force amend the solicitation and
request revised proposals. If the new evaluation results in a
determination that Boeing's proposal no longer represents the best value
to the government GAO recommended that the Air Force terminate its
contract. The Air Force is currently considering its response to the GAO
recommendation.

Agency Comments

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.

                         Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21

The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion,
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability. These
technologies are to allow for increased sortie rates and decreased manning
rates as compared to existing systems. Construction of the first ship of
the class--CVN 78--is scheduled to begin in January 2008.

                         Source: CVN-21 Program Office.

Program Development    GAO Design  Construction   Construction     Initial 
start      start    review review contract        contract      capability 
                                     award--         award--                  
                                       first ship    second ship              
(6/00)    (4/04)    (1/07) (5/07)     (1/08)      (1/12)            (9/16) 

CVN 21 expects to have 6 of 17 current critical technologies fully mature
and another 7 approaching maturity by critical design review now scheduled
for May 2007. Program officials stated that the extended construction and
design period allows further time for development. Fallback technologies
still exist for 6 of 17 total critical technologies, but their use entails
drawbacks, such as decreased performance and/or an increase in manpower
requirements. While the design process appears on track, weight and
stability issues have presented a challenge. In 2006 the Navy decided to
delay awarding the contract for construction of the first two ships of the
class by 1 year to meet other Navy priorities. The Navy expects to award
the CVN 78 construction contract in January 2008.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (4/04) (1/07)
review (1/08) (5/07)

CVN-21 Program

Technology Maturity

Only 4 of CVN 21's 17 current critical technologies are fully mature--the
nuclear propulsion and electrical plant, a new desalination system, the
Multi-Function Radar, and a high strength alloy steel. A plasma-arc waste
destruction system and the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System
(EMALS) are expected to be fully mature and 7 are expected to be
approaching maturity prior to critical design review. A total of 9 are
expected to be fully mature in time for construction contract award in
2008. The program reported 16 critical technologies at development start,
with as many as 22 technologies in 2006. Since last year's assessment, the
Navy eliminated a technology; and redefined another.

Programs other than CVN-21 are developing 6 of the critical
technologies--the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), a missile; Multi-Function
Radar, Volume Search Radar, an automated weapon information system; and a
GPS-based landing system--known as JPALS. Progress in those programs could
affect the CVN-21 schedule. Four of these technologies have mature
alternate systems as backups. No backup is feasible for the radars without
major ship redesign. While the Multi-function Radar demonstrated maturity
through at-sea testing, the Volume Search Radar will not achieve maturity
until 2014 after operational testing on the future destroyer. Program
officials stated that they will most likely install AAG--even if it is not
fully mature when a decision to use a backup must be made. CVN 78's
optimal build sequence could be impacted, if AAG is not delivered on time.

EMALS will replace steam catapults and is expected to demonstrate maturity
through land based testing. EMALS will not be tested at sea, but officials
believe that this testing is the only alternative designed to approximate
an aircraft carrier environment.

The Navy eliminated an integrated inventory system and intended to pursue
materials aimed at reducing carrier weight. The materials were ultimately
eliminated because the Navy believes that it can already achieve its goals
for ship weight and stability. Only high-strength and toughness steel is
expected to be used on CVN 78.

Four critical technologies will not be mature until after construction
start in 2008. While a selfpropelled weapons loading device is not
required until ship delivery in 2015, an armor protection system is needed
for installation starting in 2009-- the same year it is expected to
demonstrate maturity. Risks associated with the 1,100-ton air conditioning
plants are considered low since the components are available and used
today, but this size has never been installed on a ship. Finally, the
advanced weapons elevators are not expected to reach maturity until after
shipboard system testing just prior to delivery.

Design Stability

A design review is currently planned for May 2007, but program officials
stated that the design is regularly reviewed. Since the program does not
measure design stability by percentage of drawings completed, it was not
assessed according to this metric. Rather, the program measures progress
in developing the product model. According to program officials, the ship
is meeting its design targets--in part because of a 1 year delay in the
construction contract, which resulted in additional time to develop the
design. However, since a number of systems are still in development, the
final design could be impacted.

Meeting the ship's requirements for weight and stability has been a
challenge. EMALS and AAG have exceeded their allocated weight margins and
weight must be compensated elsewhere on the ship. Additional degradation
of its weight allowance could occur as the final designs for critical
technologies become known.

Agency Comments

The Navy concurred with our assessment, but emphasized that a lengthy
construction period provides additional time to mature technologies. The
Navy noted that technology readiness is closely managed through proven
design processes, risk assessments, site visits, and contracting methods
to ensure adequate maturity. Specific attention is given to requirements,
legacy system availability, technology readiness, affordability, schedule,
and return on investment. In addition, initial construction efforts aimed
at validating new designs, tooling, and construction processes are already
under way.

Finally, the Navy stressed that the decision to delay the program in 2006
was not related to technology maturity, weight, or stability issues.

                               DDG 1000 Destroyer

The Navy's DDG 1000--formerly known as DD(X)-- destroyer is a multimission
surface ship designed to provide advanced land attack capability in
support of forces ashore and contribute to U.S. military dominance in
littoral operations. The program awarded contracts for detail design and
construction of two lead ships in August 2006. The program will continue
to mature its technologies and design as it approaches construction start,
currently planned for July 2008.

Source: PEO Ships (PMS 500), (c) 2006 DDG1000.com Northrop Grumman Ship Systems.

Program  Development             Production    GAO Construction    Initial 
start       start     decision--first ships review    start     capability 
(1/98)   (3/04)                     (11/05) (1/07)    (7/08)        (1/14) 

Three of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are fully mature. While 7
other technologies are approaching full maturity, 5 of them will not be
fully mature until after ship installation as testing in a realistic
environment is not considered feasible. The 2 remaining technologies--the
volume search radar and total ship computing environment--have only
completed component level demonstrations and subsequently remain at lower
levels of maturity. Concurrent with its efforts to mature ship
technologies, the Navy has initiated detail design activities in the
program. While the Navy is planning to complete at least 75 percent of DDG
1000's total detail design products ahead of lead ship construction, any
challenges encountered in remaining technology development activities
could place this target at risk.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (3/04) review
(11/05) (1/07) (9/05)

DDG 1000 Program

Technology Maturity

Three of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are fully mature. Seven other
technologies, including the advanced gun system and its projectile, hull
form, infrared signature mockups, integrated deckhouse, integrated power
system, and peripheral vertical launching system, are approaching full
maturity. The Navy currently plans to complete development of the
integrated deckhouse and peripheral vertical launching system prior to
beginning construction on DDG 1000's two lead ships. However, practical
limitations prevent the advanced gun system and its projectile, hull form,
integrated power system, and infrared signature mockups from being fully
demonstrated in an at-sea environment until after lead ship installation.
Two other technologies--the volume search radar and total ship computing
environment--remain at lower levels of maturity.

The volume search radar, along with the multifunction radar, together
comprise DDG 1000's dual band radar system. While the multi-function radar
has reached maturity, considerable testing remains for the volume search
radar. The Navy is currently planning to install volume search radar
equipment at a land-based test facility in March 2007. Following
installation, the volume search radar will undergo land-based testing,
which the Navy plans to complete by March 2008 in an effort to increase
the radar's maturity prior to lead ship construction start in July 2008.
However, full maturity of this technology will not occur until after ship
installation. In addition, because the efforts are concurrent, there is
risk that any delays or problems discovered in testing for the volume
search radar could ultimately impact dual band radar production plans.
According to Navy officials, in the event the volume search radar
experiences delays in testing, it will not be integrated as part of the
dual band radar into the deckhouse units that will be delivered to the
shipbuilders. Instead, the Navy will have to task the shipbuilder with
installing the volume search radar into the deckhouse, which program
officials report will require more labor hours than currently allocated.

The Navy's total ship computing environment for DDG 1000 requires
developing hardware infrastructure and writing and releasing six blocks of
software code. Although development of the first three software blocks
progressed in line with cost and schedule estimates, program officials
report that changes in the availability of key subsystems developed
external to the DDG 1000 program, introduction of nondevelopment items,
and changes in program integration and test needs prompted the Navy to
defer some of the functionalities planned in software release four to
software blocks five and six, and full maturity of the integrated system
will not be attained until after ship construction start.

Design Stability

The DDG 1000 program recently entered detail design phase. The Navy is now
assessing design stability by reviewing detail design products, including
system drawings, detail drawings, manufacturing drawings, and calculations
and analyses. According to program officials, 175 of 3,723 (projected)
detail design products for DDG 1000 have been completed. The Navy
estimates that at least 75 percent of DDG 1000's total detail design
products will be completed prior to start of lead ship construction in
July 2008. Successfully meeting this target depends on maturing DDG 1000
technologies as planned.

Agency Comments

The Navy stated that our assessment was factually correct, but misleading
in areas of technology maturity and program funding. According to the
Navy, DDG 1000 critical technologies achieved technology readiness levels
appropriate to gain authorization in November 2005 to enter detail design
phase. Since that event, technologies have been further tested, and all
are on track to meet cost and schedule targets. Also, given the unique
nature of shipbuilding, with detail design and construction efforts spread
over approximately 5 years, the Navy claimed that comparing DDG 1000
technology readiness levels to GAO-developed best practices criteria is
not valid. Further, the Navy noted that GAO's cost comparison computing
percent change from January 1998 to the current program baseline does not
account for program progression through the acquisition cycle and may be
misinterpreted as cost growth.

GAO Comments

Our approach is valid because our work has shown that technological
unknowns discovered late in development lead to cost increases and
schedule delays.

                           Source: Northrop Grumman.

Low-rate Initial decision capability (TBD) (TBD)

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

             Development GAO                DOD         Production 
             review      start            design          decision 
             (1/07)      (TBD)            review             (TBD) 
                                           (TBD)                   

The Air Force's E-10A, equipped with the wide-area surveillance variant of
the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) radar, is
intended to provide next-generation air and ground moving target detection
capabilities and an imaging capability for surface surveillance. The
system is also intended to provide a battle management capability that
will integrate other intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
weapons assets. The Boeing 767-400ER aircraft is being used as the TDP
testbed.

                          GAO          Development                     Design 
                          review       start                           review 
                          (1/07)       (TBD)                            (TBD) 

The E-10A TDP has not yet started development. In May 2006, DOD approved
the TDP acquisition, technology development, and test and evaluation
strategies. The program has identified 18 critical technologies, five of
which are currently assessed as being fully mature. The program projects
that nearly all critical technologies will be fully mature by 2011--when
the TDP demonstrations are scheduled for completion. The TDP
demonstrations will include the live fire engagement of cruise missiles,
the live fire engagement of ground targets, and the use of information
services via internet protocol-enabled communication channels. The
demonstrations constitute the TDP exit criteria. If an E-10A development
program is initiated, capabilities will be acquired through an
evolutionary acquisition process.

E-10A WAS TDP Program

Technology Maturity

Of the TDP's 18 critical technologies, 5 are fully mature, with the
remaining 13 projected to be mature or approaching maturity by 2011. TDP
technologies will be matured in two ways. In some cases, the technologies
will be demonstrated on the E-10A testbed or in the system integration
laboratory during the TDP test program. In other cases, the program office
will monitor and leverage the advances made by other programs and agencies
to mature relevant technologies.

Eight technologies will be matured directly by the TDP. The program
projects that 7 of the 8 will be fully mature at the end of the TDP. The
one critical technology that is projected to not reach full maturity is
information assurance, which is projected to be approaching full maturity
by the end of the TDP.

The other 10 critical technologies will be matured as part of program
activities. For example, the narrowband communications critical technology
is expected to be provided by the Joint Tactical Radio System, and the
Wideband Beyond Line-of-Sight critical technology is expected to be
provided by the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals. The
program projects that 9 of the 10 critical technologies will be fully
mature at the end of the TDP; the remaining critical technology is
projected to be either approaching full maturity or fully mature.

Other Program Issues

The E-10A's MP-RTIP radar is a modular, scalable, two-dimensional active
electronically scanned radar. The MP-RTIP also supports the Global Hawk
program. MP-RTIP will deliver a "large sensor" variant for the E-10A
aircraft and a "small sensor" variant for the Global Hawk. The MP-RTIP
development effort currently plans to provide two E-10A sensors and three
Global Hawk sensors. The E-10A and Global Hawk programs will fund
production of the MP-RTIP sensors for their respective operational
platforms. The two E-10A MP-RTIP development sensors will be integrated
into the E-10A system integration laboratory and testbed, and are
scheduled for delivery in 2009 and 2010. The Global Hawk variants of the
radar are scheduled for delivery in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

The MP-RTIP radar began development in 2003. The Global Hawk variant of
the radar has 8 critical technologies and the E-10A has 1 additional
critical technology (pulse compression unit) for a total of 9. The
majority of the critical technologies have reached full maturity and the
remaining critical technologies are approaching full maturity. Regarding
design stability, all of the drawings expected are releasable for both
variants of the MP-RTIP radar.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred with
the information provided in this report.

                        E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE)

The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based,
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It is
the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C Hawkeye
platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2D AHE is designed to
improve battle space target detection and situational awareness,
especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and Missile Defense
operations; and improve operational availability.

     Source: Program Executive Office, Tactical Aircraft Programs(PMA-231).

Program/            Design  GAO   Low-rate   Initial Full-rate        Last 
development start   review review capabilitydecision decision  procurement 
(6/03)             (10/05) (1/07)  (3/09)    (4/11)  (12/12)        (2020) 

The E-2D AHE program entered system development in June 2003 with four
immature critical technologies. Since that time, one of the program's four
critical technologies has reached full maturity. Although the design met
best practice standards at the time of the October 2005 design review, the
total number of engineering drawings has subsequently increased. The
program office reports that the design is almost 100 percent complete, but
technology maturation and system integration may lead to more design
changes or increased costs. We could not assess production maturity
because the program does not plan to use statistical process controls.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                             Development      DOD  GAO             Production
                                start      design review             decision 
                             (6/03)        review       (1/07)        (3/09)  
                                          (10/05)       

E-2D AHE Program

Technology Maturity

One of the E-2D AHE's four critical technologies (the space time adaptive
processing algorithms) is mature. More mature backup technologies exist
for the three remaining technologies: the rotodome antenna, a silicon
carbide-based transistor for the power amplifier to support UHF radio
operations, and the multichannel rotary coupler for the antenna. These
technologies were flown on a larger test platform in 2002 and 2003.
However, use of the backup technologies would result in degraded system
performance and would not support aircraft weight and volume contraints as
well as accommodate future system growth. Flight testing, which will
include the four critical technologies, is planned to begin in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2007. The next AHE technology readiness assessment
is to be performed prior to the low rate initial production decision in
fiscal year 2009, and the program office anticipates that the remaining
technologies will be mature at that time.

Design Stability

The program had completed 90 percent of planned drawings prior to the
October 17, 2005 design review. However, the number of drawings required
has since increased, driven primarily by underestimating total structural
and wiring drawings, part discrepancies discovered during aircraft
assembly, and rework associated with the prime contractor's new design
software, which resulted in the need for unique drawings for suppliers.
This increase in drawings means that the program had completed less than
75 percent of total drawings at design review. The program office reports
that 99 percent of total drawings are complete and projects that 100
percent of the drawings will be complete by the planned start of
production in March 2009. However, the technology maturation process may
lead to more design changes.

The program office reported that the systems integration laboratory is
being created this year and a fully integrated prototype will be delivered
in 2007. Without the benefit of an integration laboratory or a prototype
prior to entering the system demonstration phase, the program increases
the likelihood that problems will be discovered late in development when
they are more costly to address.

Production Maturity

The program expects a low-rate initial production decision in March 2009,
but does not require the contractor to use statistical process controls to
ensure its critical processes are producing highquality and reliable
products. According to the program, the contractor assembles the
components using manual, not automated, processes that are not conducive
to statistical process control. The program relies on postproduction data,
such as defects per unit, to track variances and nonconformance. The
program also conducts production assessment reviews every 6 months to
assess the contractor's readiness for production. The program has updated
the manufacturing processes that were established and used for the E-2C
over the past 30 years. The program considers the single station joining
tool; the installation of electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic lines; and
the installation of the prime mission equipment all critical manufacturing
processes.

The program is currently building the first two development aircraft.
According to the program office, there are no significant differences in
the manufacturing processes for the development aircraft and the
production aircraft.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the E-2D
AHE program is executing the development contract and critical
technologies do not represent a high risk to the program at present. The
increase in drawings is due to some suppliers not using modern technology,
so rework was necessary by the prime contractor to convert the drawings to
support legacy manufacturing processes.

Flight testing, which will include the four critical technologies, is
planned to begin in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The test
program will demonstrate design maturity of all technologies and
capabilities. A Technology Readiness Assessment will be conducted prior to
the low-rate production decision. Integration of statistical process
controls would require significant Navy investment to update the E-2D
aircraft manufacturing process. The Navy has elected not to make this
investment due to the maturity of the 30-plus-year E-2 production history.

                                     EA-18G

The EA-18G Growler aircraft will replace the carrierbased EA-6B and
provide electronic warfare capability to the Navy beginning in 2009. It is
a combination of the Improved Capability (ICAP) III electronic suite and
the F/A-18F platform. The EA-6B now provides support to the Navy as well
as the Air Force and Marine Corps. Only 14 EA-6Bs have been funded to
receive the ICAP III. Plans to develop a joint service airborne electronic
attack system of systems have not developed as planned.

                            Source: (c)2006 US Navy.

Program Development Design    GAO Low-rate  Full-rate  Initial        Last 
start      start    review review decision decision capability procurement 
(8/02)    (12/03)   (4/05) (1/07) (4/07)      (4/09) (9/09)         (2012) 

 ^design andtechnology
											 
 Design and											 

The EA-18G entered system development without Attainment of Product
Knowledge demonstrating that its five critical technologies [Production,]
had reached full maturity, but has since made progress in maturing these
technologies. However, all
technologies are still not fully mature. The design appears stable, with
almost all drawings
complete. However, until all technologies [technology]demonstrate
maturity, the potential for design maturity changes remains. The program
is executing a compressed development schedule to address an expected
decline in the EA-6B inventory. However, upgrades have slowed the EA-6B
[Technology]inventory decline. The program now plans to maturity reduce
total procurement to 80 aircraft, but one third of the EA-18G aircraft
will still be procured as low-rate initial production aircraft. Additional
procurement and/or retrofit costs could occur if design deficiencies are
discovered during the
development and test phase.

Development DOD GAO Production start design
review decision (12/03) review (1/07) (4/07) (4/05)

EA-18G Program

Technology Maturity

None of the EA-18G's five critical technologies were mature when the
program started development. Two of the critical technologies, the ALQ-99
pods and the F/A-18F platform, are mature. We assess the remaining three
technologies--the ALQ-218 receiver system, the communications
countermeasures set (CCS), and the tactical terminal system--as
approaching full maturity. Software needed for full functionality of these
technologies is not yet released. Tests to assess their performance will
not occur until late fiscal year 2007.

The program considers the EA-18G development effort as low to medium risk
because they consider the fielded F/A-18F aircraft and the ICAP III
electronic suite mature. The program assessed all but the CCS mature
because they include both what has been demonstrated as well as the level
of development risk. We believe the assessment of the CCS is correct given
that it will function on the EA-18G in a new environment with space
constraints that will be a challenge. However, there are other technology
form and fit challenges. The ALQ-218 receiver is being transferred from
the EA-6B where it is housed in a larger pod on the vertical tail. For the
EA-18G, the ALQ-218 has been redesigned to fit on the wing tips. This wing
tip environment is known to cause severe under wing and wing tip noise and
vibration that could degrade the performance of the receiver.

Design Stability

The design of the EA-18G appears to be stable. Program officials state
that all drawings have been released and the design complete. However,
flight tests are needed to verify the impact of loads on some of designs
and whether redesign might be needed. In addition, the program continues
to identify a number of risks that could impact eventual design and
retrofit cost. One risk addresses the effect of vibration on reliability
and performance of the wingtip pods for the ALQ-218 receiver. The effect
of the wing tip environment on the performance and reliability of the
ALQ-218 will not be known until flight tests are conducted. Currently all
suitability performance measures and almost all ALQ-218 technical
performance measures are based on calculated values. Actual values not are
gathered until EA-18G flight tests are conducted. The first test EA-18G
was delivered to the Navy for flight tests in September 2006. Schedules
call for ALQ-218 flight performance tests to begin in February 2007 and
operational tests in 2008. Initial operational capability for the EA-18G
is planned for September 2009.

Production Maturity

We could not assess production maturity. The program does not collect
statistical process control data. The program is executing a compressed
development schedule to address an expected decline in EA-6B aircraft.
Initial plans called for purchasing 90 EA-18Gs. The Navy/DOD is proposing
to reduce the total quantity to 80 aircraft in the FY 2008 budget. The
proposed reduction in procurement quantities from 90 to 84 is a result of
re-evaluating inventory requirements in association with the Navy's
proposed FY 2008 budget and the application of tiered readiness. A
reduction totaling an additional 4 aircraft from the first low-rate
initial production buy is also being considered, making the total
procurement quantity 80 aircraft. Low-rate initial production aircraft
will total one third of the total buy. This is significantly greater than
the traditional DOD benchmark of 10 percent. Program officials state that
the large initial production buy is driven in part by the scheduled
replacement of the EA-6Bs due to the extensive flight hours on EA-6Bs, and
the age of the existing inventory. However, in April 2006 we reported that
EA-6B inventory levels were projected to meet the Navy's requirements at
least until 2017.

Program officials state that EA-18G development continues to meet or
exceed all cost, schedule and technical performance requirements. They
also state that flight tests performed to date have shown the Advanced
Electronic Attack system is very mature, and that software is being
delivered ahead of schedule. However, the program also reports that post
operational test and evaluation efforts have been funded to correct any
deficiencies discovered during these tests. Also, the production and/or
retrofit cost to correct design deficiencies discovered during the
development and test phase are excluded from the production contract price
and would require separate contract authorization.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Navy provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

          Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV

    Source: (Left) (c) 2005 ILS/Lockheed Martin; (right) (c) 2003 The Boeing
                                    Company.

            Production    First flight-- First flight--    GAO      Initial   
            decision         Atlas V        Delta IV      review   capability 
            (unknown)        (8/02)          (11/02)      (1/07)     (TBD)    

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                            Development      DOD  GAO              Production
                               start      design review              decision 
                            (10/98)       review (1/07)             (unknown)
                                         (10/99)       

The Air Force's EELV program acquires satellite launch services for
military, intelligence, and civil missions from two families of launch
vehicles-- Atlas V and Delta IV. The program's goal is to preserve the
space launch industrial base, sustain assured access to space, and reduce
life cycle cost of space launches by at least 25 percent over previous
systems. A number of vehicle configurations are available depending on the
satellite vehicles weight and mission specifications. We assessed both the
Atlas V and Delta IV.

Program Development start start (12/96) (10/98)

While the EELV program office now has access to technology, design, and
production maturity information, such data is treated as proprietary due
to the commercial nature of the existing launch services contracts. Three
launches occurred since GAO's last assessment--one government, one NASA
and one commercial bringing the total launches to 14. In May 2005, Boeing
Launch Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems announced an agreement
to create a joint venture (United Launch Alliance, or ULA) that will
combine production, engineering, test, and launch operations associated
with U.S. government launches of Boeing Delta and Lockheed Martin Atlas
rockets. In October 2006, the Federal Trade Commission announced its
acceptance, subject to final approval, of an agreement containing a
consent order with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and ULA.

EELV Program

Technology Maturity

We could not assess the technology maturity of EELV because the Air Force
has not formally contracted for information on technology maturity from
its contractors.

Design Stability

We could not assess the design stability of EELV because the Air Force has
not formally contracted for the information needed to conduct this
assessment.

Production Maturity

We could not assess the production maturity of EELV because the Air Force
has not formally contracted for information that would facilitate this
assessment.

Other Program Issues

To meet national security space needs, congressional mandates, and
national space transportation policy requirements for assured access to
space, the government is sharing a level of risk with the launch providers
through a new program strategy for EELV launches. Implemented in 2006, the
strategy is expected to cover missions scheduled to launch starting in
2008. In 2005, the Air Force released requests for proposals for EELV
launch services and EELV launch capabilities contracts. The Air Force
awarded a cost plus award fee contract for launch capabilities to Lockheed
Martin in February 2006 and to Boeing Launch Services in November 2006.
The Air Force is currently negotiating a firm fixed price contract with a
mission success incentive with Lockheed Martin for EELV launch services.
The launch services contract with Boeing will follow.

As part of the proposed joint venture, the contractors expect to combine
the Atlas V and Delta IV production at the Boeing plant in Decatur,
Alabama, and engineering at the Lockheed Martin Facility in Denver,
Colorado. The Federal Trade Commission has provisionally accepted a
consent order regarding the joint venture. The proposed consent order was
placed on public record for 30 days and addresses ancillary competitive
harms that DOD has identified as not inextricably tied to the national
security benefits of the proposed joint venture between Lockheed Martin
and Boeing Launch Services. The Federal Trade Commission is currently
reviewing public comments on the proposed consent order.

A 2006 congressionally mandated study on future launch requirements
concluded that the EELV program can satisfy the nation's military space
launch needs through 2020. However, the study noted that it is important
to revalidate the requirements for heavy lift capability, assured access
to space, the RL-10 upper stage, and the use of the Russian-built RD-180
engines in parallel with cost and performance assessments. According to
EELV program officials, the program office is continually engaged on these
issues, which under the new contract structure and the ULA joint venture
can be more easily addressed.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that the
program is transitioning from a commercial services program, with limited
insight, to a more traditional government program with full cost and
program oversight. According to the Air Force, the transition will be
completed in 2007 when both providers are awarded the EELV launch services
contracts. Program officials also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated where appropriate.

                    Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS)

         Source: EFSS/ITV Program Office, Marine CorpsSystems Command.

                   Production                             GAO         Initial 
                   decision                            review      capability 
                   (6/05)                              (1/07)          (8/07) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                               Development       DOD       Production   GAO   
                               start            design       decision  review 
                               (11/04)          review         (6/05)  (1/07) 
                                                (4/05)                

The Marine Corps' EFSS includes a launcher, prime mover, ammo prime mover,
and ammunition. It will be the primary fire support system for the
vertical assault element of the Marine Corps' Ship to Objective Maneuver
force and is designed to be internally transportable by the MV-22 and
CH-53E. The EFSS prime mover is a variant of the Internally Transportable
Vehicle (ITV), which is being developed in a separate program, but under
common management with EFSS. We assessed all components of the EFSS.

Development Design start review (11/04) (4/05)

While the EFSS is in production, we could not assess production maturity
as the program is not collecting statistical data on its production
processes. However, according to the program office, an ITV operational
assessment revealed manufacturing problems. In addition, the EFSS passed
its design review and entered production without having achieved design
stability. Deficiencies were identified during EFSS developmental testing
of selected requirements. Although 18 requirements were fully met, 3 were
not. Also, while other variants of the ITV have received an interim flight
certification for the V-22, CH-53, and C-130 aircraft during the ITV
operational assessment, the EFSS vehicle has not yet been certified as it
was not a part of that assessment. The EFSS program has, however,
completed about 95 percent of the certification indicating it can safely
transport munitions on Navy ships.

EFSS Program

Technology Maturity

We have assessed the EFSS as having mature technologies. Program officials
have stated that the EFSS is relying on existing technologies.

Design Stability

The EFSS design was not stable at the time of the EFSS design review as
only an estimated 60 percent of the system drawings were complete at that
point. Furthermore, EFSS entered production still short of having obtained
design stability, though it was nearing stability with 84 percent of the
drawings completed. During ongoing ITV operational testing, the vehicle's
half shaft (an axle component) did not perform adequately and there were
problems with some fuel flow gauges. While most of the EFSS components are
modified commercial-off-the-shelf items, the half shaft used during the
ITV operational test was a custom-built item. The program office is now
replacing it with a stronger commercial one to address the operational
shortfalls noted. The operational assessment also revealed problems with
the accuracy of the fuel gauges. Fixes for these deficiencies are
undergoing reliability testing. As these issues are resolved, the EFSS
design is expected to change.

The EFSS is currently an unarmored vehicle. In fiscal year 2007, Congress
added $8 million to the EFSS program for armor kits. Because the program
is constrained by weight and size requirements (a key performance
parameter is its ability to be transported internally by the MV-22
aircraft and CH-53E helicopter), the program office is designing two types
of kits. The "A" kit will be permanently attached and add about 60 pounds
to the vehicle. The "B" kit will be added after the vehicle exits the
aircraft and is expected to add an additional 85 pounds. Also, the program
office is installing blast-attenuating seats on the EFSS vehicles. These
changes will result in additional design modifications, as many lessons
are learned in the course of further testing.

Production Maturity

We could not assess EFSS production maturity as the program is not
collecting statistical control data on its production processes. The
program is currently in low-rate initial production and is on schedule to
enter full-rate production by the third quarter of fiscal year 2007.
According to the program office, during the ongoing operational assessment
of the ITV, EFSS experienced 24 failures--18 of which were associated with
2 components. The remaining 6 failures were associated with assembly
problems. For example, 3 vehicles did not have their fuel pumps set at the
right setting for the type of fuel used. According to the program office,
these manufacturing problems remain a challenge for the program.

Other Program Issues

While an EFSS developmental test revealed that 3 of the 24 tested
requirements were not met, officials said that to date all but 1 have been
resolved. When placed in a firing position and with a projectile ready to
load, the system should be able to fire the first round within 30 seconds.
The average first round response time was 57.3 seconds with live fire. In
addition, the program office told us it has successfully reduced the
vehicle weight by 180 pounds, completed 95 percent of the process designed
to ensure that the system can safely carry munitions on-board Navy ships,
and will meet insensitive munitions requirements. In addition, other ITV
variants have received interim flight certification for the V-22, CH-53,
and C-130 aircraft. However, the EFSS vehicles have not yet been flight
certified. However, according to the program office, all EFSS vehicles are
on track for final certification by April 2007.

In addition to the internal EFSS program issues discussed above, the space
available on the MV-22 constrains the EFSS vehicle design and weight. As a
result, if the MV-22 interior design is altered, it could adversely impact
the EFSS program. The V-22 program office is aware of these contraints and
is committed to them.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                      Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)

The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships offshore
to their inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer distances
than the system it is designed to replace, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle
7A1 (AAV-7A1). The EFV will have two variants--a troop carrier for 17
combat-equipped Marines and 3 crew members and a command vehicle to manage
combat operations in the field. We assessed both variants.

                     Source: General Dynamics Land Systems.

  Program Development Design  GAO   Low-rate Full-rate  Initial      Last     
  start      start    review review decision  decision capability procurement 
  (3/95)    (12/00)   (1/01) (1/07) (TBD)        (TBD)  (12/10)     (2018)    

The EFV's technologies are mature and the system design was thought to be
stable. Given the recent discovery of problems associated with
reliability, a decision on how to proceed is pending by the Marine Corps
that could significantly impact the program cost, schedule, and quantity
parameters. Congress recently zeroed out the EFV's fiscal year 2007
procurement budget request and directed that the EFV program extend its
development phase. Further, growth in the number of lines of software code
needed for the EFV vehicle continues and could contribute to the already
escalating program cost growth.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                 Development          DOD   GAO   Production  
                                 start             design review   decision   
                                 (12/00)           review (1/07)     (TBD)    
                                                   (1/01)         

EFV Program

Technology Maturity

All five of the EFV system's critical technologies are mature and have
been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype.

Design Stability

The EFV has released 82 percent of its initial production design drawings
to the manufacturer. The program had planned to release the remaining
drawings before the production decision in December 2006. According to a
program official, because of recent system reliability failures discovered
during the early operational assessment (EOA) testing, the production
decision has been delayed. During the recent EOA, the EFV failed to
perform reliably and only achieved a fraction of the required operational
goal of 43.5 hours of operations before maintenance was required.

Production Maturity

Congress recently zeroed out the EFV's fiscal year 2007 procurement budget
request and directed that it extend its system development and
demonstration phase. The Marine Corps is currently considering production
options that could impact cost, schedule, and quantity parameters.

Other Program Issues

The EFV program relies on software to provide all electronic, firepower,
and communication functions. The program is collecting metrics relating to
cost, schedule, and quality and is using an evolutionary development
approach. Nevertheless, software development continues to present a risk.
The program continues to experience growth in the total lines of software
code needed. Since development started in 2000, the total lines of
software code required by the system has increased by about 238 percent,
with approximately 36 percent of this amount being new code. Additionally,
software planned for the EFV initial production version will be different
from the software used in the SDD versions. Furthermore, software testing
has identified 187 software defects. The Marine Corps testing agency
identified software failure as a factor impacting the system's
reliability. We believe that software issues could put the program at risk
for cost growth. In addition, to the recently discovered reliability
issues that will require some, yet, undisclosed system changes, the
program is already planning changes to the EFV baseline program, which are
driven by the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Strategic Planning
Guidance.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the EFV
program is being restructured as a result of proposed quantity reductions
and to incorporate reliability performance improvements in the vehicle
design. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics was briefed on the program office's plans in October 2006, and
has declined to make an acquisition decision. The Under Secretary has
concurred with the Department of the Navy to convene an Independent Expert
Program Review (IEPR) to examine the EFV program and recommend a path
forward. The IEPR is scheduled for completion in December 2006, with a
program review in the January-February 2007 time frame. After which, an
acquisition path forward will be decided.

                         Extended Range Munition (ERM)

  Source: Naval Gunnery Project Office, PEO IWS3C/Raytheon, (c)2006 Raytheon.

 Low-rate Initial Full-rate decision capability decision (9/10) (9/11) (10/11)

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

                              Development      DOD  GAO            Production
                              start         design review            decision 
                              (7/96)        review      (1/07)        (9/10)  
                                            (5/03)       

The Navy's ERM is a 5-inch, rocket-assisted projectile that will provide
fire support to expeditionary forces operating near the littorals. ERM is
being designed to fire to an objective range of 63 nautical miles using
modified 5-inch guns onboard 32 Arleigh Burke class destroyers. ERM
represents a continuation of the Navy's Extended Range Guided Munition
program, which entered system development and demonstration in 1996. The
Navy is currently restructuring the program to reflect an updated initial
fielding date of 2011.

                                    Program/           Design             GAO 
                              development start        review          review 
                                     (7/96)            (5/03)          (1/07) 

The Navy identifies 17 critical technologies for ERM, 11 of which have
reached maturity. A series of flight tests in 2005 revealed reliability
problems with several ERM components. The Navy continues to evaluate data
from these flight tests, but anticipates that design changes for some
technologies may be required. In addition, the Navy has identified a
number of obsolete components in the ERM design. As a result, ERM is
undergoing significant redesign, and 63 percent of the munition's design
drawings have been released to date. According to program officials, the
Navy continues to evaluate plans and identify resources required for
completing development of the munition. Until these plans are approved and
performance of redesigned components is validated through testing,
uncertainty remains on whether the Navy's goal to begin fielding ERM in
2011 is realistic.

ERM Program

Technology Maturity

Eleven of ERM's 17 critical technologies are fully mature. Four
technologies--the anti-jam electronics, control actuation system, data
communication interface, and safe/arm device and fuze--are approaching
full maturity. However, the Navy's maturity assessment for two
technologies may need to be reduced pending reports from failure review
boards the Navy initiated after ERM flight test failures in 2005.
According to program officials, these review boards have preliminarily
identified ERM's control actuation system and rocket motor igniter as
potential contributors to the test failures, which could require redesign
of these components. In addition, the Navy has encountered obsolescence
issues with ERM's global positioning satellite receiver and inertial
measurement unit technologies. As a result, program officials report they
have had to identify alternative components for these technologies and
redesign the munition to accommodate these new components. Until these
replacement components are integrated and tested with the munition, the
global positioning satellite receiver and inertial measurement unit
technologies will remain at lower levels of maturity. Although program
officials report that the Navy continues to evaluate schedule and cost
options for completing ERM system development, a comprehensive test plan
for the munition has not been established.

Design Stability

The program has released approximately 63 percent of ERM's anticipated 140
production representative engineering drawings. None of these drawings
were released in time for the munition's May 2003 design review. Instead,
the Navy conducted this review with less mature drawings and used them to
validate the design of the developmental test rounds. According to program
officials, recent changes to ERM components to address obsolescence and
reliability issues have required significant redesign of the munition.
Program officials state that this redesign process for ERM will be
complete before further developmental tests are initated for the munition.
The completed design will then be reviewed and certified by a mission
control panel within the Navy.

Production Maturity

The Navy plans to collect statistical process control data for ERM once
hardware production begins. According to Navy officials, approximately 60
ERM units will be built during system development using process control
methods developed in the Excalibur program. The Navy anticipates that this
strategy will result in mature production processes for ERM at the
beginning of low-rate production.

Other Program Issues

As a result of challenges in developing ERM, the Navy awarded a
demonstration contract in May 2004 for the Ballistic Trajectory Extended
Range Munition (BTERM). This munition's rocket motor caused test failures
that led the Navy to abandon plans to recompete the development contract
for ERM. According to a Navy official, the Navy concluded that ERM was a
more viable option for fielding a tactical round by fiscal year 2011, and
it is no longer requesting funding for BTERM. Navy officials state a
competition could still occur in 2011 for ERM production.

In August 2006, oversight of the ERM program was elevated by requiring
that major programmatic decisions, such as approval of the Navy's estimate
for resources needed for completion and the strategy for development and
testing, be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics rather than by the Navy. While this
restructuring has elevated oversight, program plans continue to evolve,
and a comprehensive review of the program by the Under Secretary has not
been performed.

Agency Comments

The Navy stated that a revised acquisition strategy and acquisition
program baseline for ERM are under review by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. In addition, the
prime contractor for ERM, Raytheon, has conducted an extensive trade study
and downselect process to minimize technical risk for replacing obsolete
components. The Navy is also updating ERM's test and evaluation master
plan to include three development test phases of 20 rounds each in fiscal
years 2008 through 2010 as well as a 40-round shipboard operational test
series in fiscal year 2011. Each test series must be successfully
completed as defined in annual continuation criteria certified by ERM's
milestone decision authority. In addition, contractor production processes
will be evaluated as part of an open competition for initial and full-rate
production of ERM.

         Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile

                       Source: PM Excalibur and Raytheon.

                      Low-rate     GAO    Full-rate    Initial       Last     
                      decision    review   decision  capability   procurement 
                      (5/05)      (1/07)    (9/08)     (9/08)       (2020)    

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                      vel of knowledge
                Desired le                                                    
                         Datanot available                                    

                 Development       DOD       Production   GAO   
                 start            design       decision  review 
                 (5/97)           review         (5/05)  (1/07) 
                                   (NA)                 

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based,
fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended to
improve the range and accuracy of cannon artillery. The Excalibur's near
vertical angle of fall should reduce collateral damage area around the
intended target, making it more effective in urban environments than the
current projectiles. The Future Combat System's non-line-of-sight cannon
requires the Excalibur to meet its required range. Only the unitary
variant block is currently being developed.

                       Program/ development start (5/97)

The Excalibur program has begun early production to support an urgent
early fielding requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery that will
reduce collateral damage. According to program officials, this early
production run of the Excalibur's first incremental block will involve 500
rounds and fielding has been delayed due to test issues until sometime in
the second quarter of fiscal year 2007. They also noted that Excalibur's
critical technologies reached full maturity in May 2005, and all of its
790 drawings were completed in July 2005. The Excalibur unitary variant
will be developed in three incremental blocks, which will incorporate
increased capabilities and accuracy over time. Since development began in
1997, the program has encountered a number of significant changes
including four major restructures, reduced initial production quantities
and increased unit costs.

Excalibur Program

Technology Maturity

The Excalibur program is developing its unitary variant in three
incremental blocks. All three of the unitary variant's critical
technologies reached full technology maturity in May 2005 at the time of
the Excalibur's design review. These technologies were the airframe,
guidance system, and warhead.

Design Stability and Production Maturity

In May 2005, Excalibur held its design review and entered production.
Excalibur's design appears to be stable. At the time of the design review,
750 of 790 design drawings were releasable. All 790 were complete for the
first Excalibur block in July 2005. By August 2006, the number of
releasable drawings had grown to 943.

We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity. The first block has
entered limited production, to support an urgent fielding requirement in
Iraq, with limited statistical control data. The program expects to begin
collecting statistical control data for all key manufacturing processes
starting in fiscal year 2007. Production of the second block is scheduled
for fiscal year 2007 and the third block in fiscal year 2010.

Other Program Issues

Excalibur started as a combination of three smaller artillery programs
with the intent to extend the range of artillery projectiles with an
integrated rocket motor. It is expected to enable three different Army
howitzers and the Swedish Archer howitzer to fire further away and defeat
threats more quickly while lowering collateral damage and reducing the
logistic support burden. The program has encountered a number of changes
and issues since development began in 1997, including a decrease in
planned quantities, a relocation of the contractor's plant, early limited
funding, technical problems, and changes in program requirements. Since
1997, it has been restructured four times including when the program was
merged, in 2002, with a joint Swedish/U.S. program known as the Trajectory
Correctable Munition. This merger helped the Excalibur deal with design
challenges, including issues related to its original folding fin design.
Also in 2002, the program was directed to include the development of the
Excalibur for the Army's Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon.

The net effect of these changes has been to lengthen the program's
schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities. As
a result, program overall cost and unit cost have dramatically increased.

The Excalibur plan currently focuses on developing its unitary version in
three incremental blocks. In the first block, the projectile would meet
its requirements for accuracy in a non-jammed environment and lethality
and would be available for early fielding. In the second block, the
projectile would be improved to meet its requirements for accuracy in a
jammed environment, extended range, and increased reliability. It would be
available for fielding to the Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon in September 2008 or when the cannon is available. Finally, in the
third block, the projectile would be improved to further increase
reliability, lower unit costs, and would be available for fielding to all
systems in late fiscal year 2011. The other two Excalibur variant
blocks--smart and discriminating--would enter system development in fiscal
year 2010.

In 2002, an early fielding plan for the unitary version was approved.
According to the program office, test issues have now delayed its fielding
to Iraq from the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2006 until the second quarter
of fiscal year 2007. Also, first article testing was completed with an
intial reliability of over 80 percent. The program office also noted that
the initial block will exceed the objective requirements for accuracy and
effectiveness. A limited user test is scheduled for the second quarter of
fiscal year 2007 prior to fielding in Iraq. Development of the second
incremental block is ongoing.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                  F-22A Modernization and Improvement Program

                      Source: F-22A System Program Office.

Development Initial complete capability (FY12) (FY14)

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority
fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It was designed
with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to make it less
detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for long ranges. The
F-22A's modernization and improvement program is intended to provide
enhanced ground attack, information warfare, counterair, and other
capabilities and improve the reliability and maintainability of the
aircraft.

Development GAO start review (3/03) (1/07)

In 2003, the F-22A established a modernization program to add enhanced
air-to-ground capabilities to aircraft. At that time, all three of the
critical technologies needed were mature according to the program office.
Since then, however, the program has added three additional critical
technologies, all of which are not mature. The F-22A continues to fall
short of its required reliability rates. The F-22A program implemented a
reliability and maintainability maturation program to increase aircraft
reliability rates to required levels. Although the F-22A program has made
improvements to systems used to diagnose maintenance problems, these
systems are still reporting inaccurate information 20 percent of the time.

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (3/03) (1/07)
review (NA) (NA)

F-22A Program

Technology Maturity

According to program officials, the F-22A modernization effort started
development in 2003 with all three of its critical technologies mature.
The three identified technologies involved 32-bit stores management
system, processing memory, and cryptography. However, since the
modernization started the program has added three additional critical
technologies. These technologies involve smaller and more powerful radio
frequency components, larger bandwidth, and radio frequency low observable
features. At the time of our review, none of these technologies had been
demonstrated in a realistic environment. Program officials characterized
their current stages of development as laboratory settings demonstrating
basic performance, technical feasibility, and functionality but not form
and fit (size, weight, materials, etc.). Overall technology maturity is
consequently lower now than when the modernization effort began. Program
officials cited funding instability and new program requirements as
contributors to slower progress than planned. However, according to
program office officials, the F-22A has a disciplined systems engineering
process in place that ensures the technology is developed and matured
before integrating the technologies onto the system.

Other Program Issues

In an effort to improve the reliability and maintainability of the F-22A,
the Air Force budgeted $102 million in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. The
F-22A continues to be below its expected reliability rates. A key
reliability requirement for the F-22A is a 3-hour mean time between
maintenance, defined as the number of operating hours divided by the
number of maintenance actions. This is required by the time it reaches
100,000 operational flying hours, projected to be reached in 2010.
Currently the mean time between maintenance is less than 1 hour, or half
of what was expected at the end of system development.

In November 2005, the F-22A completed follow-on operational test and
evaluation. The purpose of this test was to evaluate the capability of the
F-22A to execute the air-to-ground mission, evaluate deferred initial
operational test and evaluation items, and support initial operational
capability declaration. The F-22A was evaluated as mission capable to
complete some limited air-to-ground missions such as accurate delivery of
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs).

The Air Force has identified deficiencies that may impact the F-22A's
ability to complete planned operations. For example, problems with the
thermal management system have impacted the F-22A's ability to operate in
hot weather conditions. The Air Force implemented a modification to
correct the thermal management problems in early 2006. The F-22A's
diagnostics and health management system continues to report some
inaccurate data. Although the technical order data fault isolation
accuracy has improved, the maintenance jobs created for corrective
maintenance actions to return an aircraft to flyable status are still
reporting inaccuracies around 20 percent of the time.

The Air Force identified structural cracks in two sections of the aircraft
during fatigue testing that resulted in unplanned modifications to the
F-22A. Fatigue testing identified cracks in the aircraft's aft boom where
the horizontal tail attaches to the fuselage. The Air Force is planning
modifications to strengthen the structure to get the 8,000-hour service
life. These modifications are being implemented under the Structural
Retrofit Program (SRP). The Air Force estimates the cost to modify 78
F-22As will be approximately $115 million. The modifications to correct
this problem will not be fully implemented until 2010. The second
structural problem involved cracking in "titanium casting" materials near
the engine. Program officials stated that the problem with this titanium
was a defect in the material from the subcontractor. The cost to correct
this problem is not included in the SRP. The Air Force did not provide
information on the cost to correct this problem.

Agency Comments

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.

                          Future Combat Systems (FCS)

The FCS program will equip the Army's new transformational modular combat
brigades and consists of an integrated family of advanced, networked
combat and sustainment systems; unmanned ground and air vehicles; and
unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of-systems architecture,
FCS features 18 major systems and other enabling systems along with an
overarching network for information superiority and survivability. This
assessment focuses on the full FCS program.

             Source: Program Manager, Future Combat Systems (BCT).

  Program Development GAO    Design Low-rate    Initial Full-rate    Last     
  start      start    review review decision capability decision  procurement 
  (5/00)    (5/03)    (1/07) (9/10) (9/12)      (12/14)  (8/16)     (unknown) 

The FCS program has made progress maturing critical technologies, but only
1 of the FCS' 46 critical technologies is fully mature. Technology
maturation will continue throughout development, with an associated risk
of cost growth and schedule delays. The Army does not expect to complete
the definition of FCS' requirements until at least 2008. As FCS
requirements continue to evolve, the Army anticipates making additional
trade-offs. For example, a recent trade-off resulted in increased
ballistic protection levels for manned ground vehicles but at an increased
design weight. The Army anticipates that a high percentage of design
drawings will be completed by the design review but that will not take
place until 2010. FCS cost estimates have increased significantly as the
Army has gained more product knowledge.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (5/03) (1/07)
review (9/12) (9/10)

FCS Program

Technology Maturity

The FCS program has made progress maturing critical technologies in the
last year, yet it still has not demonstrated the level of knowledge
expected of a program entering development. Only 1 of the FCS' 46 critical
technologies is fully mature. The program office provided its own updated
critical technology assessment, which showed that 36 of 46 technologies
are nearing full maturity. An independent assessment of FCS' critical
technologies is expected before the preliminary design review in 2008.

The FCS program is not following the best practice standard of having
mature technologies prior to starting system development. The program
employs integration phases to facilitate incremental introduction of
technologies into the FCS system of systems, and to allow for capability
augmentation over time. The Army's approach, however, will allow
technologies to be included in the integration phases before they approach
full maturity. FCS officials insist fully matured technologies are not
necessary until after the design readiness review in 2011, which is
contrary to best practices and the intent of DOD acquisition policy.

The program has made progress defining FCS requirements, but the process
may not be complete until the preliminary design review in 2008. In August
2006, the program documented the desired functional characteristics of FCS
systems and the criteria for achieving those characteristics. Although a
notable accomplishment, this event should have occurred before the start
of development 4 years ago. Furthermore, if technologies do not mature as
planned, Army officials say that they may trade off FCS capabilities. As
the requirements process has proceeded, the Army has made key trade-offs,
including one that increased the ballistic protection levels of the manned
ground vehicles (to meet expected threats) and resulted in an increased
design weight. The requirements definition process will continue at least
until the preliminary design review in 2008 when the Army is expected to
confirm the technical feasibility and affordability of the FCS
system-level requirements.

Design Stability

The Army expects to conduct the preliminary design review in 2008--much
later than recommended by best practices. However, it may be the point at
which the FCS program finally approaches a match between requirements and
resources. Beyond that, the FCS acquisition strategy includes a very
aggressive schedule, with critical design review in 2010 and a Milestone C
decision in 2012. Although it is early in the design process, the Army
expects to release 95 percent of FCS's design drawings by 2010. Further,
testing of the entire FCS concept will not occur until 2012, or just prior
to an initial production decision, illustrating the late accumulation of
key knowledge.

Other Program Issues

Program office estimates show that the FCS program's costs have increased
substantially since the program began. The increases were primarily
attributed to increased program scope and an extension of the development
and procurement phases. Also, current cost estimates are built with
greater program knowledge and are therefore more realistic and accurate.
However, the most recent Army cost estimate does not yet reflect some
recent requirements changes that increased the number and type of systems
to be developed and procured. Further, recent independent cost estimates
point out several major risk areas in the Army cost estimates. Although
the program is working to reduce unit costs, those desired savings may not
be realized until much later in the program, if at all.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the FCS program manager
stated that this assessment does not give the Army credit for the
technical progress shown during recent demonstrations and experiments.

GAO Comments

While this assessment does not specifically focus on such demonstrations,
they would be reflected to some extent in the Army's own technology
assessments. Also, while some progress is being made on individual FCS
systems, that progress is not consistent across the family of FCS systems
and the information network.

                      Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System

The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high altitude, long-endurance
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. After a
successful technology demonstration, the system entered development and
limited production in March 2001. The acquisition program has been
restructured several times. The current plan acquires 7 aircraft similar
to the original demonstrators (the RQ-4A) and 47 of a larger and more
capable model (the RQ-4B).

                     Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.

Demonstration   Development start/  GAO   Initial    Full-rate    Last     
program start    low-rate decision review capability decision  procurement 
(2/94)                      (3/01)    (1/07) (9/07)   (4/09)     (2013)    

^design and 
                                   technology
 Design and	technology			
 maturity		  [Technology
]
											 
RQ-4A production is complete and two deployed Attainment of Product
Knowledge in 2006 to support military operations. RQ-4B is in
production with key technologies mostly mature. 

Representative prototypes of the two sensors maturity driving the
requirement for the larger aircraft are in flight test. Airframe design is
now stable, but differences between the two models were much
more extensive and complex than anticipated; 
these differences and ongoing support of military
operations resulted in extended development
times, frequent engineering changes, and
significant cost increases. Statistical process controls are being 
implemented for some maturity
manufacturing processes, but delayed testing
constrain efforts to mature processes. Dates for
integrating and testing new technologies and for
achieving initial operational capability have been
delayed about 2 years. DOD is rebaselining the
program with a substantial increase in cost. ^Development DOD Development
GAO

start design (NA) review (NA)

start/production review decision (1/07) (3/01)

Global Hawk Program

Technology Maturity

Critical technologies on the RQ-4B have made good progress during the last
year with all 10 technologies mature or nearing maturity. This includes
the advanced signals intelligence and improved radar sensors, the two key
capabilities that drove the decision to develop and acquire the larger
aircraft. Representative prototypes of both sensors are in flight tests.

Design Stability

The RQ-4B basic airframe design is now stable with 100 percent of
engineering drawings released. During the first year of production,
however, frequent and substantive engineering changes increased
development and airframe costs and delayed delivery and testing schedules.
Differences between the two aircraft models were much more extensive and
complex than anticipated.

Production Maturity

The contractor has completed RQ-4A production. Four aircraft have been
officially accepted into the operational inventory and three will be
delivered in 2007. Completing the RQ-4A operational assessment has been
delayed about 2 1/2 years and performance problems were identified in
communications, imagery processing, and engines. Officials reported that
the deficiencies have been addressed and the assessment will be completed
by April 2007.

The first RQ-4B aircraft completed production in August 2006 and will soon
start develomental flight testing. Another 11 are on order through the
fiscal year 2006 buy. Statistical process controls are being implemented
for some manufacturing processes. Officials have identified critical
processes and started to collect data for demonstrating capability to meet
cost, schedule, and quality targets. Other performance indicators such as
defects and rework rates are also used to monitor quality.

Continuing delays in flight and operational tests may affect efforts to
mature production processes. Performance and flight issues identified
during tests could result in design changes, revised production processes,
and rework. Completing operational tests to verify the basic RQ-4B design
works as intended have been delayed more than 2 years to February 2009. By
that time, the Air Force plans to have bought about one-half the entire
fleet. Schedules for integrating, testing, and fielding the new advanced
sensors have also been delayed, raising risks that these capabilities may
not meet the warfighter's performance and time requirements.

Other Program Issues

We have previously reported significant cost, schedule, and performance
problems for the Global Hawk program. Soon after its March 2001 start, DOD
restructured the program from a low-risk incremental approach to a
high-risk, highly concurrent strategy to develop and acquire the larger
RQ-4B aircraft with advanced, but immature, technologies on a much
accelerated production schedule. Since then, the development time has been
extended another 3 years with a substantial contract cost overrun,
production costs have increased, and software and component parts
deliveries have slipped as have the schedules for many critical milestones
and testing dates. The Air Force reported breaches of Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost thresholds (10 U.S.C. 2433) and DOD had to certify the need for the
program to Congress and establish improved cost controls. Due to the unit
cost and schedule breaches, the Global Hawk program is being rebaselined
for the fourth time since the March 2001 start. The revised average unit
procurement cost estimate is 56.5 percent higher than the 2002 approved
baseline.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that the
Global Hawk program is stronger today than it was last year. As noted
above, technology, design, and production have progressed at the same time
management, technical and risk management processes have improved. RQ-4A
systems entered Global War on Terror operations providing warfighters with
over 83,500 intelligence images, while other aircraft are currently being
deployed to the user. The basic RQ-4B aircraft has completed development,
entered production, and started testing. The advanced payload developers
moved into early component testing, which is an important risk reduction
milestone for integration. The program continues to focus on military
operations and conducting comprehensive testing as that capability moves
into production and deployment. Program challenges include software
production, advanced sensors payload integration, and sustainment
normalization.

                      Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)

MDA's GMD element is being developed incrementally to defend the United
States against long-range ballistic missile attacks. Block 2006 provides a
limited defensive capability and consists of a collection of radars and
interceptors, which are integrated by a central control system that
formulates battle plans and directs the operation of GMD components. We
assessed the maturity of all technologies critical to the Block 2006 GMD
element, but we assessed design and production maturity for the
interceptors only.

                         Source: Department of Defense.

Program Directive to  Integrated    Initial   Block  Block  End-to-    GAO 
start   field initial   design   capability    2004  2006     end   review 
            capability     review              completion       test          
                                               start                          
(2/96)     (12/02)      (3/03)       (8/04)  (12/05) (1/06) (9/06)  (1/07) 

^design and

                                   technology
Design and
								
 [Production,] 			[Technology]
 			  
Even though only 9 of GMD's 13 critical Attainment of Product Knowledge
technologies are fully mature, MDA released allhardware
drawings to manufacturing and 
expected to have 14 interceptors available for maturity operational use by
December 2006. Ongoing efforts to mature remaining technologies, along
with concurrent testing and fielding efforts may lead to
additional design changes. Although MDA maturity is producing hardware for
operational use, it has not made a formal production decision.
Additionally, we could not assess the stability of the production
processes because the program is not collecting statistical
data for them. As maturity reported in our last assesment, we expect that
the prime contract could overrun its target cost by $1.5 billion.
According to program officials, the primary cost drivers are challenges
with the EKV, testing, redesign of the BV+ booster, and maintenance and
repair on the SBX platform. ^Development DOD GAO Production

          start design review decision (NA) review (1/07) (TBD) (3/03)

GMD Program

Technology Maturity

Program officials assessed 9 out of 13 critical technologies as mature.
The 4 remaining technologies have not been demonstrated in a realistic
environment; therefore they do not meet the criteria for a full level of
maturity. Mature technologies include the fire control software, the Block
2004 exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) infrared seeker; EKV
discrimination; the Orbital Sciences Corporation booster; the Cobra Dane
radar; the Beale radar; the sea-based X-band radar, the guidance,
navigation, and control subsystems, and the in-flight interceptor
communications system. The remaining technologies, which are nearing
maturity, are the Block 2006 version of the upgraded infrared seeker and
onboard discrimination for the EKV units, and the BV+ booster, including
its guidance, navigation, and control subsystem. These remaining
technologies are due to be initially fielded in 2008.

Design Stability

The design of the Block 2006 ground-based interceptor appears stable with
100 percent of its drawings released to manufacturing. However, program
officials acknowledge that changes to the interceptor's design and
drawings may be necessary because the program is developing the
interceptor in parallel with testing, fielding, and operations.

Production Maturity

Officials do not plan to make an official production decision as the
program will evolve and mature interceptors through block capability
enhancements as they are fielded for limited defensive operations. We
could not assess the maturity of the production processes for these
interceptors because the program is not collecting statistical control
data. According to program officials, data are not tracked because current
and projected quantities of GMD component hardware are low. Instead, the
GMD program measures production capability and maturity with a monthly
evaluation process called a manufacturing capability assessment that
assesses critical manufacturing indicators for readiness and execution.

MDA had 10 interceptors ready for alert by December 2005 and expected to
emplace 6 more by the end of December 2006 for a total of 16. However, at
the time of our assessment, program officials estimated that only 14
interceptors would be fielded by that time. By the end of Block 2006, in
December 2007, MDA plans to have 24 interceptors fielded. Fielding delays
have occurred as the contractor increased the robustness of its quality
assurance program. All interceptors fielded to date use the Orbital
Science Corporation's OBV booster. The BV+ booster is continuing to mature
and is expected to be ready for flight testing in fiscal year 2008.

Other Program Issues

The GMD test program was restructured in 2005 because of flight test
failures and quality control problems. GMD successfully completed two
flight tests utilizing operational interceptors in fiscal year 2006.
Flight test 2 was an end-to-end test of one engagement scenario resulting
in a target intercept. Flight test 3, scheduled for December 2006, planned
to have a target intercept as an objective, but the test has been delayed
until at least the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. Accordingly, further
tests are needed before models and simulations that estimate GMD's
performance can be relied upon.

As reported in our last assessment, we estimate that at the contract's
completion the GMD prime contractor, Boeing, could experience a cost
overrun of approximately $1.5 billion. Program officials, however, believe
that this cost data is distorted because the work plan that the contractor
is being measured against does not reflect ongoing work. The program is in
the process of implementing a new plan that will reflect new quality
control processes and the latest flight test plan. Since our last
assessment, GMD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 has increased by
$860 million (2.9 percent).

Agency Comments

MDA provided technical comments, which were incoporated as appropriate.

        Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS

GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department of
Transportation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, United Kingdom,
and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system nominally
consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation and timing
data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000, Congress approved
the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF satellites. In addition to
satellites, GPS includes a control system and receiver units. We focused
our review on the Block IIF.

  Source: Navstar GPS Joint Program Office, Space and Missile Systems Center.

Program    Development      Production      GAO First satellite  Initial   
start      start              decision   review     launch      capability 
(1/99)     (2/00)               (7/02)   (1/07)     (5/08)         (NA)    

Attainment of Product Knowledge

Since our assessment of the GPS Block IIF effort 
last year, significant cost increases and schedule delays have occurred.
The program has requested an additional $151 million to cover testing and
production costs, did not award the contractor $21.4 million in award
fees, and incurred an estimated 17-month delay in the launch of the first
IIF satellite. According to the program office, the Block IIF technologies
are mature. Since the start of the GPS program in 1973, GPS satellites
have been modernized in blocks with the newer blocks providing additional
capabilities. The contractor was not required to provide data on design
drawings so design stability could not be assessed. Since these satellites
are not mass-produced, statistical process control techniques are not used
to monitor production.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

GPS Block II Modernization Program

Technology maturity

                                        vel of knowledge
                   Desired le 

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (2/00) review
(7/02) (1/07) (NA)

GPS Block II Modernization Program

Technology Maturity

The only critical technology on the Block IIF satellites is the
space-qualified atomic frequency standards and it is considered mature.

Design Stability

We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract does
not require that design drawings be delivered to the program. Last year
design of the software for the Application Specific Integrated Circuit
microcircuit chips and delays in security clearances resulted in $46
million in cost overruns.

Production Maturity

We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not
collect statistical process control data. The program office had relied on
earned value management reports to monitor the contractor's production
efforts, but discovered this past year that the contractor's earned value
management reporting system was not accurately reporting cost and schedule
performance data. According to program officials, they have addressed
these reporting deficiencies and have requested separate audits to
identify the root causes of the problems. In addition, the program office
has increased its personnel at the contractor's facility to observe
operations and to verify that corrective measures are being taken to
address deficiencies.

Other Program Issues

The program office estimates that the planned launch of the first IIF
satellite will be delayed 17 months from January 2007 to May 2008 due to
schedule and testing delays. This past year, the contractor encountered a
series of delays with the delivery of hardware components from
subcontractors as well as the development of the software that runs
equipment used to test payload and bus components. The concurrent
development and production of the first three IIF satellites has led to
significant cost increases and schedule delays. As a result, the program
office has requested approximately $151 million in funds to be
reprogrammed this year. This amount is based on the contractor's cost
estimate to complete development and production of the first three
satellites.

In June 2006 the program reported that 40 modernized GPS satellites (a
combination of IIR, IIR-M and IIF satellites) would be procured. However,
the program office now plans to procure 7 fewer satellites--meaning 12 IIF
satellites are to be procured instead of 19. In order to sustain the GPS
constellation, 12 IIF satellites are needed until the first GPS III
satellite is launched in fiscal year 2013. If approved, the reduced number
of IIF satellites and a possible increase in program funding will increase
unit cost per satellite, potentially breaching Nunn-McCurdy thresholds.

The program office did not award the contractor $21.4 million in 2006
available award fees due to cost overruns and schedule delays. According
to program officials, the $21.4 million will be used to cover a portion of
the cost overruns. The procurement of the IIF satellites and control
system used a contracting approach that gave the contractor full
responsibility for the life cycle of the program and allowed parallel
development and production efforts which resulted in cost overruns and
schedule delays.

Agency Comments

The Air Force generally concurred with this assessment and provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and
tracking of land attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is completed and served as a
testbed to demonstrate initial capability. Spiral 2 will utilize two
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well as
mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing stations.
JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other systems, such
as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2.

  Source: Cruise Missile Defense Systems Project Office, JLENS Product Office.

Development        GAO Design  Low-rate Full-rate Initial             Last 
start           review review  decision  decision capability   procurement 
(8/05)          (1/07) (9/08)   (9/10)   (6/13)   (9/13)            (2019) 

The program began development in August 2005 with only one of its five
critical technologies mature. Currently, of the four remaining
technologies, one is near full maturity and the others are not expected to
be mature until the production decision in September 2010. The size of the
aerostat was increased to accommodate the weight load for detection and
tracking equipment requirements. Although the program plans to release 90
percent of the engineering drawings by the design review in September
2008, the program faces risk of redesign until technologies demonstrate
full maturity and weight issues are resolved. Furthermore, the program
recently definitized its development contract in December 2006 after the
program ordered a change to the contract in October 2005.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (8/05) (1/07)
review (9/10) (9/08)

JLENS Program

Technology Maturity

JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its five
critical technologies mature. The communications payload technology
consisting of radios and fiber optic equipment is mature and the
processing station technology--which serves as the JLENS operations
center--is approaching full maturity. Both sensors--the fire control radar
(formerly the precision track illumination radar) and the surveillance
radar along with the platform--have not yet reached maturity. The program
expects to integrate and demonstrate these technologies by the production
decision in 2010.

The JLENS platform consists of the aerostat, mobile mooring station, power
and fiber optic data transfer tethers, and ground support equipment. The
aerostat, a buoyant aircraft used for payload attachment and support, has
been increased in size from 71 meters to 74 meters--the length necessary
to lift 7,000 pounds of total payload weight to an altitude that will
allow the radar to meet detection and tracking requirements. The primary
payload weight comes from the radar. However, additional fiber optic data
cables to meet information assurance requirements increased the weight by
300 pounds. This is largely due, according to program officials, to the
incorporation of the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) into
the system's design. CEC is a system that fuses high quality radar
tracking data to create a single, common air picture. The addition of CEC
adds a high-powered antenna to the aerostat and increases the number of
aerostat fiber optic cables from 3 to 9 to accommodate the CEC and to
provide spare cables for alternate JLENS payloads.

JLENS sensors support the system's primary mission to acquire, track,
classify, and discriminate targets. According to the project office, many
of the JLENS sensor technologies have legacy components. A majority of the
surveillance radar components have been tested in an environment similar
to the expected JLENS deployment environment and many of the fire control
radar components have prototypes. However, these technologies will require
physical modification and demonstration of subcomponents for use in the
JLENS operational environment. Tests to characterize and integrate fire
control radar and surveillance radar components are currently being
conducted in the program's system integration laboratory.

Design Stability

The program estimates that 90 percent of its 6,230 drawings will be
released by the design review in September 2008. However, until the
maturity of the JLENS's critical technologies has been demonstrated the
potential for design changes remains.

Other Program Issues

The JLENS product office ordered a change to the contract in October 2005.
According to program officials, upon review of the proposal from the
contractor, the government discovered that the contractor did not meet the
JLENS funding profile provided with the change order. Furthermore, a
review of the proposal found that several requirements had not been
addressed in revisions that took place after August 2005--when the program
entered product development. The contractor submitted a revised proposal
in July 2006. According to program officials, negotiations and
definitization of the contract that met the program's funding profile and
requirements were completed in December 2006.

The JLENS program intends to hand over the task of making JLENS
interoperable with other systems to an integrated air and missile defense
(IAMD) program office. The IAMD program office will develop a standard set
of interfaces between sensors such as JLENS and other sensors, weapons and
battle management, command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence capabilities. According to program officials, the impact of
IAMD requirements on the JLENS schedule are not currently known.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                           Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy,
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S.
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier-suitable
version will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The conventional takeoff
and landing version will primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for the
Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and will complement the F-22A. The
short takeoff and vertical landing version will replace the Marine Corps'
F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.

                          Source: JSF Program Office.

Program  Development      GAO Low-rate      Initial   Initial         Last 
start    start        review capabilitydecision  capability    procurement 
                                               USMC USAF and USN              
(11/96)  (10/01)           (1/07) (1/07)  (3/12)      (3/13)        (2027) 

JSF program data indicates that two of the system's eight critical
technologies are now mature, four are approaching maturity but two are
immature despite being past the design review. Design stability was not
reached by the design review, the two variants had released fewer drawings
than suggested by best practices and the program had not demonstrated the
successful integration of the system. The program plans to enter
production in 2007 with little demonstrated knowledge about performance
and producibility. All three variants will not be in flight testing until
2 years after production begins with a fully integrated aircraft in flight
testing 4 years after it begins. DOD organizations have raised concerns
with the program highlighting cost, schedule, and performance risks.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

                Development      DOD  GAO            Production
                start         design review            decision 
                (10/01)       review      (1/07)        (1/07)  
                              (2/06)       

JSF Program

Technology Maturity

In 2001, the JSF entered development without its eight critical
technologies being mature. Two are now mature, four are approaching
maturity but two (mission systems integration and prognostics and health
maintenance) are immature despite being past the design review.

Design Stability

As of October 2006, JSF officials report that 91 percent of the short
takeoff and vertical landing variant and 46 percent of the conventional
variant drawings have been released. At the February 2006 design review,
the program reported that 46 and 3 percent of the drawings had been
released respectively, less than the best practices standard. Also, the
program had not prototyped the expected designs or demonstrated the
successful integration of the system. The program projects it will have
released 47 percent of the carrier variant drawings at its design review
in 2007. Issues with stabilizing the design have impacted the delivery of
the first production representative aircraft by about 2  1/2 years.

Production Maturity

The program is collecting information on the maturity of manufacturing
processes. However, because the design has not been proven to work, the
potential for design changes during flight testing weakens efforts to
mature processes. A change in design can also require a change in the
manufacturing processes--a costly proposition once production begins. The
development uncertainties still facing the program are reflected in DOD's
plans to use cost reimbursement contracts for initial production orders.
The 7-year flight test program began in late 2006 and a fully integrated
variant is scheduled to fly in 2011 leaving a significant time period
where changes could occur. By 2011, DOD expects to have invested more than
$20 billion in production aircraft. Further, manufacturing processes
currently planned have not been proven. The first test aircraft
(nonproduction representative) encountered inefficiencies requiring 32
percent more manufacturing hours to date than planned. Since entering
manufacturing, the aircraft design and the manufacturing processes have
changed substantially.

Other Program Issues

Since the program rebaseline in 2004, costs have increased more than $30
billion (then year dollars), delivery of the key development aircraft has
slipped as much as 10 months with other development activities slipping as
well. The contractor's cost performance has also decreased. Internal DOD
organizations have expressed concerns about the program. A February 2006
operational assessment noted risks with the flight test schedule, software
development, maintainability and mission effectiveness. DOD cost analyst
and contract management officials have expressed concerns that costs to
complete the program will be higher than estimates.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JSF program office said
that for the third year, GAO ignores F-35 successes, does not measure
against the 2004 replan, and misapplies commercial best practices. F-35 is
more mature than any comparable program at a similar development point.
Advanced virtual prototyping tools ensure structure, avionics and
propulsion fit together before production. The first test aircraft is
complete with unprecedented assembly fit and quality, problem-free
power-on, rapid execution of engine and secondary-power tests and actual
weight within 1 percent of predictions. Ten development aircraft are now
in manufacturing. Lab investment is substantially larger and earlier than
in legacy programs promoting early risk burndown. The acquisition strategy
provides the best balance of cost, schedule and risk via sequential
development of variants and spiral blocks of mission capabilities. GAO's
approach would result in multibillion-dollar cost increases and
significant legacy fleet impact.

GAO Comments

In our evaluation we did consider all pertinent information including JSF
progress and program office technical comments on this assessment and
found the JSF program consistently proceeding through critical junctures
with knowledge gaps that expose the program to significant risks. Like
past programs that have followed this approach, the consequences have been
predictable as the JSF has continually missed its cost and schedule
targets-- even after the 2004 replan. If the program were to follow a
knowledge-based approach it would lower risks allowing for more realistic
cost and schedule estimates.

                        Source: JTRS AMF Program Office.

                              Production decision

                                     (6/10)

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

             Development GAO                DOD         Production 
             review      start            design          decision 
             (1/07)      (6/07)           review            (6/10) 
                                          (3/08)                   

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across the
services. Program/product offices are developing radio hardware and
software for users with similar requirements. The AMF program will develop
radios that will be integrated into nearly 100 different types of
aircraft, ships, and fixed stations for all the services.

              Pre-SDD              GAO Development                Design 
        competitive             review start                      review 
        contract award                                                   
              (9/04)            (1/07) (6/07)                     (3/08) 

JTRS AMF has taken steps to develop knowledge prior to the start of system
development. As part of the program's acquisition strategy, a presystem
development phase started in September 2004 with the award of competitive
system design contracts to two industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed
Martin. Through this acquisition strategy, program officials expect
competitive designs that will help mitigate costs and other risks. While
challenges remain, program officials noted that significant progress has
been made by both industry teams in demonstrating technology and design
maturity. The program is scheduled to enter system development in June
2007. The JTRS AMF system development program will be designed to
introduce capabilities incrementally, consistent with the approved 2006
restructuring of the overall JTRS acquisition program.

JTRS AMF Program

Technology Maturity

To help mitigate technical risks and address key integration challenges,
JTRS AMF awarded competitive predevelopment contracts to two industry
teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. In June 2007, after a full and
open competition, a contracting team will be selected for the JTRS AMF
system development. The program office will use an Army organization to
prepare an independent Technology Readiness Assessment before entry into
the system development and demonstration acquisition phase. The
identification of critical technologies was completed by Boeing and
Lockheed Martin in early 2006, and validated by the independent assessment
team through the design work leading up to the preliminary design reviews.
Both companies submitted self-assessment reports of their design's
critical technologies to the program office and the independent assessment
team. The independent assessment of the maturity of the program's critical
technologies was completed by the independent assessment team in October
2006, and has been submitted to the Joint Program Executive Officer for
review and completion of the Technology Readiness Assessment prior to the
program Milestone B decision, scheduled for June 2007.

Both teams have demonstrated progress in developing key functions of the
radio through in-lab and field demonstrations with representative hardware
and software components of their designs. Preliminary design reviews were
held in August 2005 for both teams, and program officials indicated that
both preliminary designs met the National Security Agency's information
assurance requirements for that stage of development. As the JTRS program
was being restructured in late 2005 and early 2006, the JTRS AMF contracts
were extended to continue risk reduction and design maturity work. These
extensions to the contracts were completed in October 2006, with each
company presenting its detailed preliminary designs during 3-weeks of
reviews. These reviews focused on the design details necessary to meet the
JTRS AMF Increment 1 requirements. Although the program is likely to face
challenges as it proceeds through systems development and demonstration,
program officials are confident that the program can enter the system
development and demonstration phase in June 2007 with sufficiently mature
technologies. This assurance is based on the independent technology
maturity assessment results, the technical exchanges and design reviews
held with the contractors, along with rigorous risk reduction and
demonstration activities done by both the contractors and program office
during the 2-year pre-system development and demonstration contracts.

Other Program Issues

The restructuring of the JTRS program under the Joint Program Executive
Office is in place and its emphasis on an incremental approach will defer
costly nontransformational requirements to later increments. The first
increment has been defined and prioritizes development of high-priority
networking waveforms and achieving interoperability with key legacy
waveforms. For JTRS AMF, Increment 1 will include the development of a
small radio variant for airborne platforms that will support the Wideband
Networking Waveform, the Soldier Radio Waveform, the NATO Link 16/Tactical
Digital Information Link J (TADIL-J) waveform, and the Mobile User
Objective System (MUOS) waveform. Increment 1 will also include the
development of a large radio variant for ships and fixed stations that
will support MUOS and legacy UHF satellite communications (SATCOM).

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments which were incorporated as
appropriate.

           Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR)

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with select radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across the
services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and software
for users with similar requirements. The JTRS Ground Mobile Radio
(formerly Cluster 1) product office, within the JTRS Ground Domain program
office, is developing radios for ground vehicles.

                        Source: PdM Ground Mobile Radio.

Program       Development          GAO Design       Low-rate     Full-rate 
start            start          review review       decision      decision 
(9/97)          (6/02)          (1/07) (11/07)       (9/10)        (11/12) 

The JTRS GMR program has recently been restructured due to significant
cost and schedule problems that came to light in late 2004. Since
development began in 2002, the program has struggled to mature and
integrate key technologies and has been forced to make design changes. The
program restructuring appears to put the program in a better position to
succeed by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach to
developing capabilities. The program reported that all but one of JTRS
GMR's critical technologies are mature or approaching maturity.
Nonetheless, several risks remain. The radio has only demonstrated limited
networking capabilities and the program continues to reconcile size,
weight and power requirements. In addition, the new JTRS joint management
structure is new and untested.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (6/02) (1/07)
review (9/10) (11/07)

JTRS GMR Program

Technology Maturity

The maturity of JTRS GMR critical technologies is questionable. The
program reported that 13 of its 20 critical technologies were mature
indicating that progress has been made since the program entered system
development in 2002 when none of the program's critical technologies were
mature. However, this progress is based on a series of contractor
demonstrations conducted in spring 2005 that used only partially
functioning prototypes. Among other things, the demonstrations did not
show extensive Wideband Networking Waveform capabilities. For example, the
demonstrated network only linked 4 users, far fewer than the required 250.
The Wideband Networking Waveform represents the core of the JTRS
networking capability and its integration is the most significant
technical challenge to the radio's development, according to program
officials. In addition, critical technologies such as the network bridging
software are immature. The program expects to demonstrate the maturity of
all critical technologies during a System Integration Test in early fiscal
year 2010. This test will be conducted in an operational environment using
fully functioning prototypes.

Design Stability

The program reported that 83 percent of its design drawings have been
released to manufacturing. Although security requirements continue to be a
challenge, the current design incorporates the security requirements that
include the ability of the GMR system to be used in an open networked
environment.

The program--in collaboration with the user community--also continues to
reconcile size, weight, and power requirements. The delivery of new power
amplifiers that were developed as part of a science and technology program
could help address these concerns. Nonetheless, these challenges and the
uncertainty of technology maturity raise concern about the program's
design stability. The program will undergo a second design review in
November 2007.

Other Program Issues

The restructuring appears to put the program in a better position to
succeed, by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach to
developing and fielding capabilities. The incremental approach defers the
development for some of the more challenging requirements to later
increments, allowing more time to mature critical technologies, integrate
the components and test the radio system before committing to production.
DOD also expects that the establishment of the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office and other management changes will improve oversight and
coordination of the JTRS program.

While the restructuring appears to address many of the problems that
affected JTRS in the past, the long-term technical challenges discussed
previously must be overcome for the program to be successful. In addition,
the JPEO is assessing different options to enable network interoperability
between JTRS networks and anticipates that development of this effort will
start in 2007.

Although the new joint management structure is an improvement over the
previous fragmented structure, it is new and untested. Joint development
efforts in DOD have often been hampered by an inability to obtain and
sustain commitments and support from the military services. Some agency
officials also expressed concern whether the services will have the budget
capacity to fund integration costs once the radio sets were available for
installation.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office noted that the baseline information of June 2002--the
start of development--should reflect the lower risk "Threshhold" values
rather than the higher risk "Objective" values for both cost and schedule
to more appropriately provide a medium-risk program comparison between the
start of development in 2002 and GAO's assessment period in September
2006. The restructured program is medium risk. The JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office also provided technical comments which were incorporated
as appropriate.

GAO Comments

We did not change the baseline cost and schedule information as suggested
by the Joint Progarm Executive Office. We assess all programs in this
report by their original development baseline.

               JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS)

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with select radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across the
services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and software
for users with similar requirements. The JTRS HMS (formerly Cluster 5)
product office, within the JTRS Ground Domain program office, is
developing handheld, manpack, and small form radios.

                 Source: PdM Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit.

Program/            GAO Design    Low-rate  Full-rate  Initial operational 
development start  review review  decision   decision           capability 
        (4/04)        (1/07) (2/07)   (9/08)     (8/10)                (2/11) 

The JTRS HMS program has recently been restructured, along with the entire
JTRS Joint Program Executive Office enterprise. The program restructuring
appears to put the program in a better position to succeed by emphasizing
an incremental, more moderate risk approach to developing capabilities.
The program reports that all of JTRS HMS's critical technologies are
mature or appoaching maturity. Nonetheless, several risks remain. Meeting
the radios' size, weight, and power requirements continues to be a
challenge. In addition, while the key networking waveform has been
integrated onto JTRS HMS radios, program officials expect that it will
take additional effort to transition the waveform from a static laboratory
environment to a realistic operational platform. Solutions enabling
multinetwork interoperability are also still being developed.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (4/04) (1/07)
review (9/08) (2/07)

JTRS HMS Program

Technology Maturity

The maturity of JTRS HMS critical technologies is questionable. The
program reported that 3 of its 6 critical technologies were mature
indicating that progress has been made since system development began in
2004 when only one of its critical technologies was mature. The remaining
critical technologies are approaching maturity. However, in most cases,
the reported maturity is not justified because the technologies either
were not demonstrated in a realistic environment or they were not
demonstrated using an adequately functioning prototype. Nonetheless, the
program office believes that the delivery of early prototypes in late
October 2006 indicates that significant progress has been made.

The restructuring of the program combined with requirements relief has
allowed for the maturing of JTRS HMS critical technologies. The program
expects that all 6 of its critical technologies will mature sufficiently
to begin low-rate production deliveries of the small form radios by the
end of fiscal year 2009 and for the manpack/handheld radios by the end of
fiscal year 2010. However, meeting the requirements of the JTRS HMS radios
will continue to be a challenge because of their small size, weight, and
power constraints. Program officials expect that the requirements relief
provided by the restructuring should help to address these issues. In
particular, the restructuring reduces the number of JTRS HMS radio
variants from 15 to 9. Reducing the number of variants provides relief in
the hardware design and platform integration work. In addition, the
restructuring reduces the number of waveforms from 19 to 5 required to
operate on the various HMS radios, which is expected to reduce power
demands, thereby reducing the size and weight demands.

Importantly, JTRS HMS radios will also not be required to operate the
Wideband Networking Waveform. The Wideband Networking Waveform provides
key networking capabilities to JTRS but carries with it a large power
requirement. As an alternative, JTRS HMS radios will operate the Soldier
Radio Waveform which is a low-power, short-range networking waveform
optimized for radios with severe size, weight, and power constraints such
as dismounted soldier radios and small-form radios. The initial version of
the Soldier Radio Waveform has been successfully integrated onto early
prototypes. While the waveform has demonstrated some functionality,
program officials noted that it will take some effort to transition the
waveform from a static laboratory environment to a realistic operational
platform. In particular, program officials are concerned about the
waveform's security architecture and how this may affect integrating it
onto a JTRS radio. Given these concerns, the waveform's development
schedule may be ambitious. The contract to further develop this waveform
was awarded early in fiscal year 2007.

Design Stability

We did not assess the design stability of JTRS HMS because the total
number of drawings is not known and there are currently no releasable
drawings complete. Design review is scheduled for February 2007.

Other Program Issues

Although the production decision for HMS radios has been delayed for 2
years, the recent restructuring of the JTRS program appears to put the
program in a better position to succeed by emphasizing an incremental,
more moderate risk approach to developing and fielding capabilities. The
success of the first "spin-out" of Future Combat Systems is dependent on
the delivery of select JTRS HMS radios that operate the Soldier Radio
Waveform.

While the restructuring reduces program risk, the long-term technical
challenges discussed previously must be overcome for the program to be
successfully executed. In addition, the JPEO is assessing different
options to enable network interoperability between JTRS networks and
anticipates that development of this effort will start in 2007.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments which were incorporated as
appropriate.

                       Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI)

MDA's KEI element is a missile defense system designed to destroy medium,
intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost and
midcourse phases of flight. Key components include hit-to-kill
interceptors, mobile launchers, and fire control and communications units.
We assessed the proposed land-based KEI capability, which according to
program officials, could be available in 2014.

     Source: Kinetic Energy Interceptors Program Office, Northrop Grumman.

Program     Prime         GAO   Booster    Design     First     Block 2014
start    contractor    review flight test  review    integrated completion
             selection                                flight test     
(10/02)    (12/03)   (1/07) (2nd Q/FY11) (3rd Q/FY14)(4th Q/FY08)  (2015)  

KEI's seven critical technologies are at a relatively low level of
maturity, with two rated as high risk-- the interceptor's booster motors
and the algorithm that enables the kill vehicle to identify the threat
missile's body from the luminous exhaust plume. During fiscal year 2006,
program officials conducted a series of static fire tests and wind tunnel
tests in preparation for a 2008 booster flight test. After the booster
flight test, MDA will assess KEI's achievements and decide how the program
should proceed. If a decision is made to move forward, MDA plans to
finalize the design during the second quarter of fiscal year 2011.
According to program officials, by that time 4 of the 7 critical
technologies will be demonstrated in flight tests, but the other 3 will
have only completed ground testing.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

             Development GAO                DOD         Production 
             review      start            design          decision 
             (1/07)      (TBD)            review             (TBD) 
                                           (TBD)                   

KEI Program

Technology Maturity

All seven KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of
maturity. During fiscal year 2006, program officials conducted several
static fire tests and wind tunnel tests in an effort to mature the
technologies. Each of the technologies is a part of the element's
interceptor--the weapon component of the element consisting of a kill
vehicle mounted atop a boost vehicle. Four of the seven technologies are
critical to the performance of the boost vehicle, which propels the kill
vehicle into space. Boost vehicle technologies include three stages of
booster motors, an attitude control system, and a thrust vector control
sytem. The remaining three technologies are related to the kill
vehicle--its infrared seeker, divert system, and plume-to-hardbody
algorithms. Backup technologies exist for all technologies, with the
exception of the infrared seeker. However, these technologies are at the
same low level of maturity as the critical technologies.

MDA plans to demonstrate three critical technologies--the thrust vector
control system, attitude control system, and the three-stage booster
motor--in two booster flight tests by the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2011. Other technologies will have been demonstrated in ground tests, such
as hardware-in-the-loop tests. The integration of all critical
technologies will be demonstrated in an element characterization test
early in fiscal year 2013, a sea risk reduction flight test in mid-fiscal
year 2013, followed by the first integrated flight test late in fiscal
year 2013.

Design Stability

Program officials noted that they expect the design of the demonstration
hardware to be the same as the design of the operational hardware.
Therefore, integration and manufacturability issues are being addressed in
the design of the demonstration hardware. According to program officials,
KEI's operational design will be finalized in 2011. KEI officials estimate
that KEI's design will incorporate about 7,500 drawings. The officials
expect 5,000 of these drawings to be complete when it holds a critical
design/production readiness review for the land-based capability in 2011.
However, it is too early to make an accurate assessment of KEI's designs
because not all of KEI's technologies are mature.

Other Program Issues

The KEI program is undergoing a rebaseline plan to compensate for funding
reductions from fiscal year 2004 through 2006, and the addition of new
requirements such as a larger booster, 2-color seeker, and development
verification tests. Currently the KEI contract is scheduled to end in
January 2012, however funding reductions forced program officials to delay
the completion of its land mobile based capabilities--originally planned
for Block 2012--to Block 2014. According to program officials, once the
re-baseline is complete and negotiations are finished, the KEI contract
will extend through June 2015. Additionally, program officials noted that
the addition of new requirements, the reductions in funding, and the
deferring of activities has increased the overall program cost by $1.5
billion.

Agency Comments

The Program Office provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                                  Land Warrior

The Army's Land Warrior is a modular, integrated, soldier-worn system of
systems intended to enhance the lethality, situational awareness, and
survivability of dismounted combat and support soldiers. It consists of a
wearable computer, a radio, a navigation module for friendly force
tracking, a helmet-mounted display to provide a common operational
picture, and power. We assessed Land Warrior in support of the Army's
Stryker Brigades.

                   Source: Program Executive Office Soldier.

Program/           Design  GAO   Low-rate Full-rate Initial           Last 
development start  review review decision decision  capability procurement 
(8/94)             (1/06) (1/07)  (3/07)   (9/08)   (3/09)          (2017) 

In 2005, the Army terminated a spiral of Land Warrior--the Dismounted
Battle Command System--intended to provide a limited, near-term capability
to the current force, and it renewed its focus on the full Land Warrior
system. The program office reports that the full system's three critical
technologies (power, radio, and navigation module) are mature. In 2006,
the program conducted a user representative assessment and a Limited User
Test that were to inform the decision-maker regarding Land Warrior's entry
into low-rate initial production in March 2007. According to the Army,
test results indicate that Land Warrior is generally effective, suitable,
and survivable. However, due to significant Army-wide resource challenges,
the Army has decided to not pursue further development and production of
Land Warrior.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

                Development      DOD  GAO            Production
                start         design review            decision 
                (8/94)        review      (1/07)        (3/07)  
                              (1/06)       

Land Warrior Program

Technology Maturity

The program office reports that Land Warrior's three critical
technologies--a navigation module, radio, and power (rechargeable
batteries)--are mature, and prototypes of these technologies have been
tested in a realistic environment. Two backup technologies--disposable
batteries and a navigation module with GPS only--are also mature. Since
our last review, the program has focused on reducing the weight of
subsystems and enhancing reliability by better integrating the subsystems
and improving connections to the processor.

The Land Warrior system was to have used the JTRS radio (assessed
elsewhere in this report), scheduled to be available in fiscal year 2011.
In the meantime, the program is using a radio compatible with Stryker
communications to provide voice, position, and command and control
information at the team/squad level and higher.

The Stryker vehicle component of Land Warrior allows for battery
recharging in the vehicle, communication between the dismounted soldier
and vehicle using the radio, and access to the lower tactical internet
through a gateway installed in the vehicle.

Design Stability

The program reported that 23 design drawings out of a total expected
number of 70 were releasable at the January 2006 critical design review
for Land Warrior, and that all 70 drawings are currently releasable.

Production Maturity

We could not assess the maturity of production processes for Land Warrior
because the program does not collect statistical process control data
during the system development phase. In the last quarter of fiscal year
2006, the Army Training and Doctrine Command conducted a user
representative assessment of the system and the Army Test and Evaluation
Command led a Limited User Test, both of which will inform a production
decision in March 2007. According to the program office, General Dynamics
plans to take lessons learned from the assessment to mature manufacturing
processes.

Other Program Issues

The Land Warrior program has experienced significant challenges and delays
in its 12-year history. The program restructured after contractor
prototypes failed basic certification tests in 1998. Government testing
revealed technical and reliability problems with Block I (Land
Warrior-Initial Capability), which was subsequently terminated in 2003.
Block II (Land Warrior-Stryker Interoperable) was restructured in 2004 in
response to congressional direction to immediately field some Land Warrior
capabilities to the current force. The restructured program--the
Dismounted Battle Command System (DBCS)--was refocused in 2005 following a
test event that concluded it had not demonstrated the necessary
capabilities and was not mature. Elements of DBCS--such as a friendly
force tracking capability--were modified and integrated into the next
phase of the system, Land Warrior in support of Stryker.

The current program has been focused on developing an integrated Land
Warrior capability in support of the Army's Stryker Brigades. Slightly
less capable than Block II, this system was used to equip one Stryker
battalion in fiscal year 2006 for assessment purposes. A program official
reports that, following the assessment, the battalion decided to take the
Land Warrior system with it to Iraq when it deploys in the third quarter
of fiscal year 2007.

The Ground Soldier System--a future iteration of Land Warrior
capability--will provide advanced capabilities. This future iteration is
intended to provide a dismounted soldier capability to the Army's Future
Combat Systems (FCS) and to units not associated with FCS.

Due to significant Army-wide resource challenges, the Army has decided to
not pursue further development and production of Land Warrior.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided technical
comments which were incorporated as appropriate.

                           Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

The Navy's LCS is a surface combatant optimized for littoral warfare with
innovative hull designs and reconfigurable mission packages to counter
threats in three mission areas: mine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare.
The ship and mission packages are being developed in spirals with the
first 15 ships, Flight 0, produced in two designs. The first ships of each
design are currently under construction with deliveries expected in June
and November 2007. We assessed only Flight 0 ships and their associated

           Source: (top) Lockheed Martin, (bottom) General Dynamics.

          Production            Production           GAO          Initial     
          decision--            decision--              review     capability 
          first design      second design                                     
               (12/04)            (10/05)               (1/07)         (3/08) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                               mission packages.

Program                      Development 
start                              start 
(9/02)                            (6/04) 

The LCS program began production in December 2004 and recently began
acquiring some elements of the mission packages. The program office
identified 36 critical technologies for the mission packages and 21
technologies for the two ship designs. The Navy continues to test and
mature technologies for the three mission packages, currently 22 of the 36
mission package technologies are fully mature; 9 are near full maturity;
and 5 remain in development. The technologies that remain immature affect
all three mission packages. All but one of the ship-specific technologies
are fully mature or near maturity. Some cost and schedule growth has been
experienced in ship construction due to issues in design and production.

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (6/04) review
(NA) (1/07) (11/04)

LCS Program

Technology Maturity

Seven of the technologies under development for LCS are used in multiple
applications or mission packages. Since these technologies are used on
different platforms or environments, the program office chose to assess
them in each setting separately, resulting in a total of 36 critical
technologies, 22 of which are currently mature.

Delivery of the first mine warfare mission package will align with
delivery of the first ship in June 2007. Of the 16 technologies currently
used for mine warfare, only the organic airborne and surface influence
sweep system, remains immature. Tests to demonstrate this technology in a
relevant environment are scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year
2007. Five other technologies are close to full maturity, while 10 others
are fully mature.

The first antisubmarine and surface warfare packages will align with
delivery of the second LCS in fiscal year 2008. Of the 13 technologies
dedicated to antisubmarine warfare, 3 remain in development, including the
advanced deployable system and two subsystems for the antisubmarine
variant of the remote mine-hunting vehicle. While the program expects to
demonstrate the two subsystems in a relevant environment in late fiscal
2007, plans to mature advanced deployable system are unclear. An
additional 4 technologies are near full maturity, while the remaining 6
are fully mature. Of the 7 technologies dedicated to surface warfare, the
non-line-of-sight missile system is the only one not fully mature. It is
expected to be demonstrated in a relevant environment in mid-fiscal year
2007. Since our last review, the unmanned surface vehicle was removed from
the surface warfare mission, although it is still used in other missions.

The majority of ship-specific technologies are mature or close to full
maturity. The Lockheed Martin design, the first to enter production,
currently has 9 of 10 technologies mature or close to full maturity, only
a system used to launch and retrieve small boats is not mature. The
General Dynamics design currently has all of its technologies mature or
close to full maturity. Since our last review the program has reduced the
number of critical technologies monitored to conform with DOD's definition
of a critical technology--a new or novel technology used to meet key
requirements. Although not designated as critical, these technologies
remain in the ships' design.

Design Stability

Design of mission packages and ships are tracked in a unique manner. To
ensure technologies used in mission packages will be compatible with LCS,
the program has established interface specifications that each system must
meet. Design stability is tracked by monitoring changes to the
requirements documents, execution of engineering change proposals, and the
completion of contract deliverables related to drawings, ship
specifications, and independent certification of the design. Developing
commercial design standards for military use has created some challenges,
contributing to a 6 month delay in the delivery of the first ship.

Production Maturity

Rather than using statistical process controls to monitor production
readiness, the LCS program uses a number of metrics to track production.
The primary means of monitoring production is an earned value management
system, additionally the program tracks hours spent on rework,
deficiencies detected and corrected, and the number of test procedures
performed. Delays in delivery of ship propulsion components have also
contributed to schedule growth for the first ship.

Other Program Issues

Costs for constructing Flight 0 ships have grown due to development of a
formal cost estimate, incorporation of lessons learned in construction of
the first ships, and the congressionally mandated addition of requirements
for force protection and survivability.

Agency Comments

The Navy stated that the LCS modular open system architecture strategy
decouples core seaframe design and construction from the phased delivery
of focused mission package payloads. A robust risk management process
tracks technologies under development to ensure they are matured and
fulfill program requirements according to planned deployment timelines.
The Navy continues to apply all available management tools to optimize
unit cost and schedule through the challenges of first of class
construction.

              Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6)

The Navy's LHA 6 will replace aging Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships
and is designed to embark, land, and support expeditionary forces. The LHA
6 design will feature enhanced aviation capabilities and is optimized to
support new aircraft such as the V-22 Osprey and Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF). LHA 6 is planned to be a modified variant of the LHD 8 amphibious
assault ship currently under construction with delivery of the first ship
expected in late 2011.

                    Source: LHA 6 Program Office, U.S. Navy.

Program   Development Design    Production  GAO   Construction     Initial 
start       start     review      decision review start         capability 
(7/01)      (5/05)    (10/05)      (12/06) (1/07) (11/07)           (9/13) 

 In 2005, DOD and the Navy determined that the Attainment of Product Knowledge

LHA 6 program had no critical development technologies because all of the
ship's critical systems and equipment utilize technologies from existing
Navy programs. However, the program office has identified six key
subsystems needed to achieve the system's full capability, one of which is
not mature. Almost 45 percent of LHA 6 is based on the design of the LHD 8
ship currently under construction. A design review of LHA 6 was conducted
in October 2005, and the Navy determined that LHA 6's preliminary design
was stable.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                        vel of knowledge
                   Desired le             

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (5/05) review
(12/06) (1/07) (10/05)

LHA 6 Program

Technology Maturity

In August 2005, the Navy concluded that all LHA 6 components and
technologies are fully mature and that the program met technology
requirements to enter system development. The Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Science and Technology concurred and the program proceeded
without a formal technology readiness assessment. However, the program
office has identified six key subsystems needed to achieve LHA 6's full
capability--five of which are mature. The Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence suite (C4I); Ship Self Defense
System (SSDS); Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC); Rolling Airframe
Missile (RAM); and Evolved NATO Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) are all mature
technologies used on numerous Navy ships. According to program officials,
these technologies will not be modified for LHA 6 and further development
will not be required for ship integration. The 500 ton air conditioning
(AC) plants modified for LHA 6 are undergoing testing to ensure
functionality. Finally, the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System
(JPALS)--a new GPS-based aircraft landing system--is not yet mature.

The AC plant is the only machinery/auxiliary technology that will differ
from the LHD 8 ship, but according to program officials it will be a minor
adaptation of plants used aboard Virginia-class submarines. Program
officials state that first article testing of the plant is in progress and
scheduled to continue through June 2007. According to program officials,
the plant met all ship specifications during its initial testing.

JPALS will be used to support the all-weather landings of next-generation
Navy aircraft, including the Joint Strike Fighter. The system, however, is
not yet mature because its major components have not been tested together.
JPALS has not yet started system development, but is expected to be
fielded on other ships prior to its integration on LHA 6. Program
officials state that the LHA 6 design has incorporated space for the
system based on initial estimates of its specifications. Furthermore, the
legacy aviation control system, SPN-41A, will serve as the backup
technology in the event that JPALS development is delayed beyond LHA 6
deployment and the introduction of the JSF. According to the program
office, JPALS is not needed to achieve the operational requirements of LHA
6 and SPN-41A is sufficient to land the JSF if the aircraft is fielded
before JPALS.

Design Stability

The program does not measure design stability by percentage of engineering
drawings completed, and therefore was not assessed according to this
metric. However, the Navy certified that LHA 6 has a stable preliminary
design based on the determination of an independent technical evaluation
board during the critical design review in October 2005. The program
office plans to award a detail design and construction contract to
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in December 2006. Program officials state
that they will use the engineering drawing schedule to track design
stability.

According to program officials, almost 45 percent of the design effort
will be based on drawings from LHD 8. Over half of the ship will require
newly created designs or drawings modified from LHD 8. Major adjustments
made from the LHD 8 design include expansion of the ship's aviation hanger
deck to create additional space for future aircraft, removal of the well
deck to accommodate the increased hanger space and additional aviation
fuel capacity, and updated warfare systems.

Other Program Issues

According to program officials, one area of risk for the ship is the
development of new software code for a portion of the machinery control
system. LHA 6 is dependent on LHD 8 to provide 75 percent of its machinery
control system software, as well as the automated bridge and diesel
generator control systems software. Program officials said that this
software has not yet been tested or demonstrated. All other software will
be used on other Navy systems prior to LHA 6's delivery. Program officials
expect LHA 6's schedule will accommodate this software development.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy concurred with the
information provided in this report.

                            Longbow Apache Block III

          Source: Boeing; Army Systems Program Office; Huntsville, AL.

     Low-rate                       Initial                              Last 
     decision                     capability                      procurement 
     (4/10)                         (1/13)                             (2021) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (7/06) (1/07)
review (4/10) (1/08)

The Army's AH-64D Longbow Apache can be employed day or night, in adverse
weather and obscurants, and is capable of engaging and destroying advanced
threat weapon systems. The primary targets of the aircraft are mobile
armor and air defense units, with secondary targets being threat
helicopters. Block III enhancements are to ensure the Longbow Apache is
compatible with the Future Combat System architecture, is a viable member
of the future force, and is supportable through 2030. We assessed the
Block III portion of the Apache.

                                             Development      GAO      Design 
                                                 start      review     review 
                                                (7/06)      (1/07)     (1/08) 

The Apache Block III program entered the system development and
demonstration phase in July 2006 with one critical technology, an improved
drive system, approaching full maturity. The Apache Block III program
plans to complete three phases of development and meet requirements
through a series of technology insertions, each requiring integration,
test, and qualification activities. The Army is reporting that at the
start of development, these technology insertions were fully mature. Only
the first phase of insertions will need to be installed at the factory;
the others can be installed in the field. A production decision for the
first phase is scheduled in 2010. Also, when it was approved for
development, the Army was directed to extend the development schedule due
to an aggressive test schedule, thereby increasing development cost.

Longbow Apache BLIII Program

Technology Maturity

The Army is reporting that the Apache Block III program entered system
development in July 2006 with one critical technology, an improved drive
system. That technology is approaching full maturity. The improved drive
system technology will be used in a helicopter transmission for the first
time. The technology improves the available power and increases
reliability over the existing transmission. The drive system has been
demonstrated in a relevant environment, and plans exist for flight testing
in 2009 and 2010 to evaluate its full maturity.

The Army was reporting on 15 critical technologies prior to development
start. However, as it reached development start, the Army opted to report
on only 1 technology as critical. The remainder of the 15 technologies are
not considered critical. The program plans to meet requirements through a
series of technology insertions that will require integration, test, and
qualification activities. The Army is reporting that at the start of
development, these technology insertions were fully mature and will be
incorporated into the system development and demonstration program in
three phases. Each Apache aircraft will go to the factory for Block III
modification only one time--for the first phase of insertions--and other
modifications will be retrofitable in the field. A production decision for
that initial phase of development is scheduled in 2010.

The technology insertions are divided into two primary categories: those
related directly to processor upgrades and those independent of processor
upgrades. The first phase of planned insertions addresses some of the
processor upgrades and all of the nonprocessor upgrades. The
processor-dependent insertions involve both hardware and software upgrades
and are not field retrofitable. They include level IV unmanned aerial
vehicle control, improved electronics/modular open system approach,
aircraft survivability equipment, interim communications suite, modernized
signal processor unit, instrument meteorological conditions/instrument
flight rules hardware and software, and radar electronic unit. Those
insertions that are independent of the processor include the improved
drive system, engine enhancements, composite main rotor blades, airframe
life extension, and training device concurrency. This phase is planned to
be complete in 2014. The second and third development efforts are
processor upgrades that are software modifications and are field
retrofitable. Phase two is scheduled for completion in 2016 and includes
the insertion of embedded diagnostics and a common data link. The final
phase includes cognitive decision aids, image fusion, aided target,
detection and classification, supportability improvements, multimode
laser, fire control radar, and radio frequency interferometer
improvements. The final phase will be completed after 2016.

According to program officials, the technical risk involved with these
technologies is low even though no backup technology exists. If, for some
reason, the technology is unavailable for insertion at its given time, the
program would proceed with existing technology until the new technology
can be incorporated. Further, cost impact for incorporating the
technologies is expected to be minimal given the ability to add software
changes in the field and because the helicopter would have to be returned
to the production plant only once to accomplish upgrades.

Design Stability

Program officials estimate that 100 percent of its 1,546 drawings will be
released by the design review scheduled for January 2008. However, until
the maturity of critical technologies and technology insertions have been
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains.

Other Program Issues

The Apache Block III program was approved for system demonstration and
development in July 2006. On approval, the Defense Acquisition Board
directed the Army to extend the development schedule due to an aggressive
test plan that resulted in a higher development cost for the program.
Also, the Apache Block III's production decision slipped from March 2009
to April 2010.

Agency Comments

The Army was provided an opportunity to comment on a draft of this
assessment, but did not have any comments.

                         Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)

               Source: EADS North America Contract Photographer.

               GAO Program start/         Initial       Initial      Last     
               production      review operational test capability procurement 
                  decision               and evaluation                       
                 (6/06)        (1/07)        (3/07)     (5/07)       (TBD)    

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                    vel of knowledge                          
                 Desired le                                                   

The Army's Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) is a new aircraft acquisition
that will conduct exclusively noncombat missions in support of specific
Army tasks to include homeland security support operations, disaster
relief, search and rescue, general support, medical evacuation, and
support for Army training and test centers. The Army is purchasing a
commercially available helicopter for this mission rather than enter into
a new development program. The commercial system has been in use as a
medical evacuation helicopter.

The LUH is a commercial off-the-shelf procurement. No developmental
efforts are planned, and the system's technology and design are mature.
Production maturity is high since the selected system is a Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) certified aircraft, the Eurocopter-145, that
is currently in use commercially. The contract for the system was awarded
on June 30, 2006. The system is scheduled to undergo limited operational
test and evaluation in March 2007 and its initial operational capability
is planned for May 2007.

Development DOD Production GAO start design decision review (NA) review
(6/06) (1/07) (NA)

LUH Program

Technology Maturity

We did not assess the LUH's critical technologies because the LUH is an
off-the-shelf procurement of a fully developed, FAA-certified commercial
aircraft. As a result, the LUH program office states that the system's
five critical technologies are mature. These critical technologies are (1)
network-ready communications, (2) cabin size sufficient for 2 crew and 6
passenger seats, (3) force protection defined as the capability of the
crew to operate all flight controls while wearing standard protection
suits,

(4)
           survivability defined as meeting FAA standards for crashworthy
           seats and fuel tanks, and

(5)
           performance defined as the ability to carry 2 patients on litters
           with a medical attendant and equipment. Program officials state
           that no development efforts are to take place and that the
           aircraft will not be modified.

Design Stability

We did not assess the LUH's design stability because program officials
said that the design of the LUH is stable, since the aircraft is already a
fully developed commercial aircraft. Also, since the LUH is a currently
flying, fully developed aircraft, the program office is not requiring the
contractor to provide technical drawings for the system.

Production Maturity

Program officials state that production maturity is at a high level
because the aircraft is a commercially available helicopter and production
lines are already established. For this reason, they will not require
statistical process control data on the system as it is produced. The
system will undergo limited operational tests in March 2007 and be fielded
shortly thereafter, in May 2007.

Other Program Issues

The Army awarded a low-rate initial production contract for up to 42
aircraft in June 2006, with fullrate production decision scheduled for May
2007. The Army plans to acquire a total of 322 aircraft. The program is an
FAA-certified aircraft already being commercially produced and the
contractor will provide total logistics support. The helicopter will not
fly combat missions or be deployed into combat areas.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of  this assessment, the Army provided  technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

                          Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV)

                            Source: Lockheed Martin.

                                    Preliminary      Critical         Initial 
                                    design            design       capability 
                                    review            review                  
                                    (1/09)            (5/10)          (12/13) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (3/06) (1/07)
review (TBD) (5/10)

MDA's MKV is being designed as an optional payload for midcourse defense
systems. It will engage midcourse threat clusters with multiple small kill
vehicles launched from a carrier vehicle. Key components to the system
include the carrier and kill vehicles, payload communications, adapter,
telemetry, and shroud. We assessed the carrier vehicle and kill vehicle
capabilities currently under development and expected to be available in
the Block 2012-2014 time frame.

        Program             System                 GAO      System       
        start               concept             review      requirements 
                            review                          review       
        (3/06)              (8/06)              (1/07)      (3/07)       

The MKV program transitioned from a technology development to system
development in 2006 with, we believe, none of its 18 critical technologies
mature. While the program assessed 14 of its 18 critical technologies as
approaching maturity, these technologies have yet to demonstrate the form
and fit required for the MKV. The program is trying to lower program risk
by creating a decision point in 2009 to assess the maturity of its highest
risk technology, engagement management algorithms. If the algorithms are
not mature at that time, the program will consider continuing development
of the carrier vehicle as a unitary kill vehicle without multiple kill
vehicles. Additionally, we were unable to assess design stability because,
according to program officials, the program has not yet selected a final
concept that includes the number of kill vehicles on the carrier vehicle.

MKV Program

Technology Maturity

According to our analysis, none of the program's 18 critical technologies
are mature. The technologies on the carrier vehicle are the divert and
attitude control system (DACS), cooler, inertial measurement units (IMU),
kill enhancement device (KED), focal plane array (FPA), optics, power,
processor, and carrier vehicle-ground datalink. The technologies on the
kill vehicle are the DACS, seeker FPA, KED, cooler, optics, IMUs, power,
processors, and carrier vehicle-to-kill vehicle datalink. According to the
program, 14 of these technologies are approaching maturity and 4 are not
mature--the FPA and optics on the carrier vehicle, and the KED on both the
carrier vehicle and the kill vehicle. We disagree with the program's
evaluation of the readiness of the 14 technologies assessed as approaching
maturity. Although all of the critical technologies have been used in
previous programs, the hardware has not been tested in a smaller form and
with the correct fit for the MKV program. Program officials agreed that
these technologies may need to be repackaged to properly fit on the MKV
and further testing may be needed at that time to ensure the technology is
mature. The KEDs are optional hardware, which the program will decide
either to pursue or defer in the Block 2008 time frame.

The program assessed its top risk for the program to be payload system
algorithm maturity. Without the maturity of these algorithms, the system
will not be able to engage targets with the multiple kill vehicles. While
the program has developed risk mitigation plans, program officials are
also designing for low risk by developing the carrier vehicle prior to
developing the kill vehicles. At a key decision point in 2009, the program
will assess the maturity of the algorithms and, if they are still
immature, consider whether to continue development of the carrier vehicle
without multiple kill vehicles. Program officials say that if the program
continues with a single carrier vehicle, multiple kill vehicles could be
added at a later date. However, pursuing this option would make MKV very
similar to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System's Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle, although program officials claim the unitary carrier vehicle
would be more producible.

Design Stability

We were unable to assess the design stability of the MKV program because
the program has not yet selected the final configuration of the MKV
system. According to program officials, the configuration has been
narrowed down to two main concepts with varying numbers of kill vehicles
on the carrier vehicle. Program officials hoped to finalize the MKV
concept by late October 2006. The program intends to use engineering and
manufacturing readiness levels, technology readiness levels, and software
readiness levels to assess the maturity of the MKV design leading up to
the system critical design review scheduled for 2010.

Other Program Issues

Program officials are anticipating schedule delays for the program due to
the $20 million cut in the fiscal year 2007 budget they received in
September 2006. The officials stated that they expect that the system
requirement reviews for the payload, carrier vehicle, and kill vehicle
planned for summer 2007 will be postponed.

Agency Comments

The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.

                      MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System

The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole,
medium-to-high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable
of flying at higher speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor, the
MQ-1 Predator A. The Reaper is designed to provide a ground attack
capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess small ground
mobile or fixed targets. Each system will consist of four aircraft, a
ground control station, and a satellite communications suite. We assessed
the first increment of the air vehicle.

          Source: General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated.

Program   Development    GAO Design    Full-rate  Initial             Last 
start        start      review review   decision  capability   procurement 
(1/02)       (2/04)     (1/07) (3/07)    (3/09)   (12/09)           (2014) 

[Production,] ^design and technology Design and  [technology]

The Reaper entered system development in Attainment of Product Knowledge
February 2004 with three of its four critical technologies
mature. The fourth technology has 
experienced several delays, but it began weapons maturity release testing
in December 2006. Once mature, the technology will enable the program to
perform its primary mission--to destroy enemy targets. The Air Force
has completed over 80 percent of maturity the design drawings for the
first increment and projects that it will have achieved design stability
by the 2007 critical design review. However, the program has already begun
producing aircraft for [Technology]an interim combat capability and plans
to produce maturity additional preproduction aircraft with improved
interim capabilities without demonstrating production maturity. Initial
operational testing is not scheduled to begin until 2008. At that point,
nearly one-third of the quantity will be on contract or delivered.

 Development GAO DOD Production start review design
decision (2/04) (1/07) review (3/09) (3/07)

MQ-9 (Reaper) Program

Technology Maturity

Three of the Reaper's four critical technologies--the synthetic aperture
radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air vehicle--are fully
mature. The fourth technology, the stores management subsystem, is
designed to integrate and store data necessary to launch munitions. This
subsystem has experienced several delays; it was initially expected to be
mature in 2004. The latest delay was a result of incorporating the
Hellfire missile into the subsystem. It began weapons release testing in
December 2006. Once mature, the technology will enable the Reaper to
perform its primary mission, to destroy enemy targets. Subsequent
increments may require other new technologies.

Design Stability

The program office currently reports that over 80 percent of the drawings
for the first increment are complete. Since our last report, the program's
critical design review has slipped about 4 months, primarily due to the
requirement to incorporate the Hellfire missile. The program office
expects 94 percent of the drawings for the first increment will be
completed by the critical design review, now scheduled for March 2007.
Program officials acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for
subsequent increments.

Production Maturity

The program does not plan to use statistical process controls to ensure
product quality. Instead, it plans to use other quality control measures
such as scrap, rework, and repair to track product quality. Production
work on the Predator and Reaper and the Army's Warrior have greatly
increased the contractor's business base and workforce requirements. OSD
and Air Force officials have raised concerns about the contractor's
production capacity to meet this expanded business base.

Other Program Issues

The Reaper program has undergone two significant changes over the past
year. First, the requirement to add the Hellfire missile delayed the
delivery of the interim combat capability aircraft by about 7 months.
Second, the Air Force decided to provide an early fielding capability to
the user. While these aircraft will be more capable than the interim
combat aircraft, they will not have the full capability.

According to program officials, the hardware in the early fielding
aircraft will meet most of the required capabilities; subsequent aircraft
will have upgrades to the radar and weapons as well as further software
developments and technical orders.

The Reaper's acquisition approach increases the risks of concurrent design
and production. The Air Force will have already contracted for one-third
of the total production aircraft quantity before it completes initial
operational testing. Changes stemming from the test program would further
cause a perturbation to the aircraft's cost, schedule, and manufacturing
plan.

Agency Comments

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.

               Source: Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Program Office.

                       Low-rate            Initial                  Full-rate
                       decision                           capability decision
                       (6/12)                                  (7/14) (7/14)  

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Launched and recovered from submarine torpedo tubes, the Navy's 21" MRUUVS
will independently perform a range of information-gathering activities. It
supplants two related programs now limited to prototype development, the
long-term mine reconnaissance system and the advanced development unmanned
undersea vehicle. Each MRUUVS will include the vehicle, combat and control
interfaces, and equipment for either mine countermeasure or intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions (ISR).

                           GAO          Development                    Design 
                           review       start                          review 
                           (1/07)       (8/09)                         (1/11) 

One of the MRUUVS program's six critical technologies is currently mature
and the remaining five are approaching maturity. While the program expects
to have four of the remaining five critical technologies mature by
development start--now scheduled for August 2009--the sonar is not
expected to reach maturity until 2010. Although many technologies have
undergone atsea testing, the program plans to rely on development efforts
in other programs to demonstrate full maturity of some of MRUUVS's
critical technologies. As a result of program restructuring and budget
reductions, the milestone review to authorize development start has
slipped by over 2 years since last year's assessment.

                        Development GAO                DOD         Production 
                        review      start            design          decision 
                        (1/07)      (8/09)           review            (6/12) 
                                                     (1/11)       

21'' MRUUVS Program																	              

Technology Maturity

One of six critical technologies is currently mature and the remaining
five are approaching maturity. The program expects to have all but one
critical technology fully mature by system development start--now planned
for August 2009. In some cases the program plans to rely on development
efforts in other programs to demonstrate maturity for MRUUVS technologies.

The maturity of software that provides MRUUVS's autonomous capability has
been demonstrated. Commercial unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV) have
demonstrated autonomy, and at-sea testing on a prototype vehicle in
January 2006 demonstrated autonomous control and decision-making
capabilities. Nevertheless, software development will continue, with
incremental improvements added as they are developed.

Technology to manage the vehicle launch and recovery process involves
acoustic signaling and mechanical activities. A predecessor vehicle on
which MRUUVS is based has demonstrated homing, docking, and replacement
into a model submarine hull. MRUUVS's launch capability was demonstrated
in January 2006 during at-sea tests with a submarine. Due to a mechanical
failure, however, the vehicle could not be recovered back into the
submarine. A test is planned for 2007 to demonstrate end-to-end vehicle
recovery with a submarine.

The Littoral Precision Undersea Mapping Array enables object
identification and obstacle avoidance. An advanced development model has
been developed, tested, and deployed on a 21" vehicle, thereby
demonstrating its mine identification capability. The Navy had planned to
test a more advanced, lighter-weight prototype, but has now eliminated
this development based on budget cuts. Instead, the program believes it
can achieve full maturity through modeling and simulation and
demonstrations of the array-- without a test vehicle.

ISR technology already exists and is operational on Navy unmanned aerial
vehicles. However, packaging the required technology within the size,
space, and weight constraints of MRUUVS will require miniaturized, highly
compact, and lightweight components that can be adapted for an ocean
environment. In 2006 the ISR suite was packaged into a 21" prototype for
at-sea testing. While this demonstrated partial maturity, the program does
not expect additional testing and development to occur until after a
development contract is awarded. The program believes that maturity will
be demonstrated by October 2008 through sensor development on other
programs.

While conventional batteries that could support MRUUVS endurance
requirements have successfully been demonstrated on other UUVs, the
program office intends to leverage development of rechargeable batteries
from the Advanced SEAL Delivery System program for use on MRUUVS. While
these batteries have attained functional capability, further development
is necessary to ensure fit into a small unmanned undersea vehicle.

In January 2006 the synthetic aperture sonar was tested at-sea using a
larger UUV. The Navy eliminated further development of a final prototype
due to cost growth and design failures. Full maturity of the sonar is not
expected until fiscal year 2010-- after a contract for MRUUVS development
is awarded.

Other Program Issues

Since last year's assessment the program has undergone significant
restructuring. In February 2006 the Navy implemented a new program
strategy, which delayed development start from July 2006 to late 2008.
According to program officials, program restructuring was necessary not
only because of Navy-wide fiscal issues, but also because of technology
immaturity and problems with system integration.

Additional changes resulted from the most recent appropriations, which
reduced the program by $16.9 million in fiscal year 2007. As a consequence
of this reduction, the acquisition and contracting strategies are again
being revised. Program officials expect additional delays in the MRUUVS
program, with development start slipping to 2009.

Agency Comments

The Navy provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which
were incorporated as appropriate.

                      Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)

Source: Lockheed Martin Corporation, (c)2006 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

    Production                      On-orbit                             Full 
    decision                       capability                      capability 
    (10/07)                          (3/10)                            (3/14) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to provide
low data rate voice and data communications capable of penetrating most
weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is designed to replace the
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite system currently in
operation and provide support to worldwide, multiservice, mobile, and
fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a network of advanced UHF
satellites and multiple ground segments. We assessed both the space and
ground segments.

    Program                Development                      GAO       Design 
    start                     start                      review       review 
    (9/02)                    (9/04)                     (1/07)       (3/07) 

In September 2004, the MUOS program was authorized to begin development.
All seven of the program's critical technologies are mature. The program
is ordering long lead items for the first two satellites before achieving
a final design. This early procurement could lead to rework, causing cost
increases and schedule delays if relevant designs change prior to critical
design review. While the MUOS development has become timecritical due to
the operational failure of two UHF Follow-On satellites, the program's
ground software development represents significant cost and schedule
growth risk. In addition, problems encountered under the Joint Tactical
Radio System program may result in underutilization of MUOS capabilities.

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (9/04) (1/07)
review (10/07) (3/07)

MUOS Program

Technology Maturity

Eight of nine critical technologies were mature at the development start
decision in September 2004. The number of critical technologies has since
varied due to continuing program analyses of required technologies.
According to the program office, all seven of the program's critical
technologies are mature.

Design Stability

The MUOS program is procuring long lead items for the first two satellites
before achieving a final design. According to the program office, $71.9
million (constant 2007 dollars) in long lead items is to be ordered before
critical design review in March 2007. Such procurement could lead to
rework if relevant designs change prior to the system-level critical
design review, causing program cost increases and schedule delays.
According to the program office, delaying long lead procurement until
after critical design review would cause the program schedule to slip. In
addition, the program office noted that the majority of the long lead
procurements are planned after respective segmentlevel critical design
reviews (which precede the system-level critical design review) and that
most are for standard commercial satellite bus components.

The program office estimates 3,020 drawings to be required for the MUOS
design. The development contract requires 90 percent of the design
drawings as a condition of conducting critical design review. As of
September 2006, 1,692 drawings had been completed.

Other Program Issues

The importance of the first MUOS launch has increased due to the
unexpected failures of two UHF Follow-On satellites, one in June 2005 and
another in September 2006. As a result, communication capabilities are
expected to degrade below those required in November 2007, almost 3 years
earlier than estimated at MUOS development start. DOD is examining options
for addressing a communications capability gap, including developing an
integrated waveform to increase communications capacity provided by
existing satellites and continuing to lease satellite communications
capacity. According to the MUOS program manager, accelerating the MUOS
schedule likely would increase program cost and schedule risks and options
to develop new gapfiller satellites would not be viable due to the short
development timeframes required.

According to the program office, development of MUOS ground software
represents one of the highest risks to the program due to the size and
complexity of the contractor's design. A 2006 independent program
assessment also concluded that MUOS software development represents
significant risk. The program office stated that the ground software is to
be developed in three builds consisting of multiple increments to mitigate
schedule risk. Additionally, the program intends to track and assess
software development using numerous metrics we have found to be useful for
program success, such as those for cost, schedule, defects, and quality.
As of August 2006, early software development efforts are meeting cost and
schedule goals. However, cost and schedule growth risks remain due to the
concurrent development of the three builds. Specifically, during the
approximate 4-year software development effort, about one-half of this
period is to consist of concurrent development among the software builds.
Such concurrency can increase the severity of software problems due to
their cascading cost and schedule impacts on other builds.

Full utilization of MUOS capabilities is dependent on the fielding of
terminals developed under the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program.
However, development problems encountered under the JTRS program have
resulted in deferrals of requirements and have increased risk that MUOS
capabilities will be underutilized until MUOS-compliant terminals are
fielded.

According to the program office, MUOS satellites can be launched, and
their legacy payload capability can be used to support warfighter
requirements if problems are encountered with MUOS ground software or JTRS
synchronization.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

  National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)

NPOESS is a tri-agency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the year
2026. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single
national system. The program consists of five segments: space; command,
control, and communications; interface data processing; launch; and field
terminal software. We assessed all segments.

                   Source: NPOESS Integrated Program Office.

                Development start/       GAO     First satellite      Initial 
                production decision     review        launch       capability 
                       (8/02)           (1/07)        (1/13)           (9/16) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development DOD start design (NA) review (NA)

Development GAO start/production review decision (1/07) (8/02)

Program start (3/97)

Following our review last year, 7 of the original 14 critical technologies
were removed from the NPOESS program. One was removed in 2005 and 6 more
in June 2006 as part of the program's restructure due to a Nunn-McCurdy
(10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost breach at the 25 percent threshold. The 7
remaining technologies are expected to be mature by design review in
January 2009. The program office is not collecting statistical process
control data to assess production maturity because of the small number of
satellites to be produced. As part of a mandatory certification process,
the program was restructured and will only include the procurement of two
satellites and the deletion of a critical sensor. The launch of the first
satellite was delayed an additional 28 months to early 2013.

NPOESS Program

Technology Maturity

Only 1 of the program's 14 original critical technologies was mature at
the production decision in August 2002. In 2005, 1 critical technology was
deleted and 6 more were deleted in 2006. Four of the deleted technologies
were associated with a major sensor, which was removed from NPOESS. Four
of the 7 remaining technologies are mature, and the program projects that
all 7 will be mature by the design review in January 2009. Only 3 of the
remaining technologies have a backup technology.

The program undertook the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a demonstration
satellite, to reduce risk and provide a bridging mission for NASA's Earth
Observing System. This project is to provide data processing centers with
an early opportunity to work with sensors, ground controls, and
dataprocessing systems and allow for incorporating lessons learned into
the four NPOESS satellites. Under the restructured NPOESS program, the
satellite is to demonstrate the remaining three major sensors and one
noncritical sensor in an operational environment and was scheduled for
launch in May 2006. Since our assessment last year, the launch has been
delayed from May 2006 until January 2010--a total of about 44 months.

Design Stability

In August 2002, the program committed to the fabrication and production of
two satellites with operational capability before achieving design
stability or production maturity. There are no drawing numbers available
at this time due to the program restructure. Program officials indicated
they are in the process of revising the design drawings to accommodate the
deletion of a major sensor. These revisions could result in significant
spacecraft design modifications. The design review date has been delayed
33 months to January 2009.

Production Maturity

We could not assess production maturity because, according to the program
office, it does not collect statistical process control data due to the
small number of satellites to be built. However, program officials stated
that the contractors track and use various metrics to track subcomponent
production, such as rework percentages and defect containment.

Other Program Issues

The launch of the first satellite has been delayed an additional 28 months
to early 2013. The restructured NPOESS program includes two satellites
funded using RDT&E appropriations, with the option in fiscal year 2010 for
two additional satellites using the existing contract, funded with
procurement appropriations. In addition, a deleted major sensor was to
collect data to produce microwave imagery and other meteorological and
oceanographic data. However, the program will now include developing a
competition for a new replacement sensor coinciding with the second R&D
satellite. The program restructure will also result in reduced satellite
data collection coverage, requiring dependence on a European satellite for
coverage during midmorning hours. Although the program has reduced the
number of satellites it will produce, the program acquisition unit cost
per satellite is about 23 percent above the 2005 approved program
baseline.

Agency Comments

In commenting on our draft, the Air Force generally concurred with our
findings and offered technical comments for our consideration. We
incorporated the technical comments where appropriate. In addition, the
Air Force stated that the NPOESS program completed the Nunn-McCurdy (10
U.S.C. 2433) certification process on June 5, 2006. The Air Force noted
that the Integrated Program Office is now tracking NPOESS development to
an interim program plan and that the program office has increased
contractor oversight through additional staff and processes. Moreover,
according to Air Force officials, the program executive's office is
establishing various independent review teams.

                P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA)

            Source: The Boeing Company, (c)2005 The Boeing Company.

              Low-rate               Full-rate    Initial          Last       
              decision                decision capability         procurement 
              (5/10)                    (4/13)     (7/13)         (2017)      

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (5/04) (1/07)
review (5/10) (7/07)

The Navy's P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA) is the
replacement for the P-3C Orion. Its primary roles are persistent
antisubmarine warfare; antisurface warfare; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The P-8A shares an
integrated maritime patrol mission with the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Unmanned Aerial System (BAMS UAS). These two systems are
intended to sustain and improve the Navy's maritime warfighting
capability.

       Program                    Development      GAO            Design 
       start                    start                review       review 
       (3/00)                  (5/04)            (1/07)           (7/07) 

The P-8A program entered development with none of its four critical
technologies mature. The program developed maturation plans and identified
mature backup technologies for each of the critical technologies.
According to program officials, the P-8A would lose some capabilities but
still meet its minimum requirements if it used these backups. Since our
assessment of the P-8A effort last year, the program has decided to use
one of its backups. Two of the remaining three critical technologies are
not anticipated to reach maturity until 2008 and 2009, at least 4 years
later than recommended by best practices. The program office was unable to
provide the number of drawings completed, but expects that 80 percent of
the design drawings will be released by critical design review in 2007.

P-8A MMA Program

Technology Maturity

None of the P-8A's four critical technologies were mature when it entered
development in May 2004. The program had previously expected all four
technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design review
in July 2007. Since our last assessment, the program has decided not to
use the acoustic bellringer algorithms. They will instead use the backup
technology, which is baseline signal processing without the bellringers.
Bellringers are advanced signal-processing aids that provide sorting and
identification of specific sounds. The backup is being used because an
analysis of bellringer performance showed that it would not meet
expectations. The bellringer algorithms were not required to meet baseline
performance requirements, but had the potential to provide increased
performance above the required capability.

None of the three remaining critical technologies-- electronic support
measures (ESM) digital receiver, data fusion, and integrated rotary
sonobuoy launcher--are mature. These technologies have not moved beyond
the laboratory environment, and have not matured since the beginning of
development in May 2004. The program office stated that decisions on using
backup technologies for the ESM digital receiver and the sonobuoy launcher
may not be made until after design review.

The final production hardware is complete for the ESM digital receiver, a
technology being leveraged from the EA-18G program. Technology maturity
will be demonstrated by design review, 3 years later than recommended by
best practices standards. The data fusion and the integrated rotary
sonobuoy launcher have not been integrated into a prototype system, but
are expected to reach maturity in 2008 and 2009 respectively, at least 4
years later than recommended by best practice standards.

Design Stability

The P-8A program office was unable to provide the number of drawings
expected or currently completed. As a result, we could not assess current
design stability. The program office expects that 80 percent of the design
drawings will be released to manufacturing at critical design review in
2007.

Other Program Issues

As of June 2006, the P-8A program is on budget and on schedule. However,
if the P-8A fails to develop as expected or experiences schedule slippage,
the Navy would have to continue relying on its aging P-3C Orion fleet.

The P-8A shares the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance role with the BAMS UAS. The BAMS UAS development start was
delayed 2 years until October 2007. If the BAMS UAS does not develop as
planned or continues to experience schedule delays, the P-8A is its
fallback and according to the Navy, the overall cost of the program would
increase due to a need to procure additional P-8A aircraft.

Another program that may impact the P-8A program is the Aerial Common
Sensor (ACS). The ACS is intended to replace three current systems,
including the Navy's EP-3. However, the Army terminated the ACS contract
in January 2006 because the airframe selected could not accommodate the
intended mission equipment. Decisions concerning the ACS program will
determine whether the Navy participates in a future Army-led ACS program.
One of the alternatives assessed by the Navy to replace the EP-3 included
incorporating the ACS equipment onto the P-8A airframe.

Agency Comments

The Navy concurred with GAO's assessment of the P-8A MMA program. The Navy
stated that the program continues to manage the three remaining critical
technologies. Furthermore, the maturation of these technologies is on
schedule and will be assessed at the critical design review planned for
the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. The airplane design remains
approximately 70 percent in common with that of the commercial 737-800
baseline. Over 25 percent of the detailed design drawings are now
complete. The metrics for measuring drawing release are now defined and
are being used as one critical measurement to assess design maturity for
the critical design review. According to the Navy, the program continues
to meet or exceed the cost, schedule, and performance parameters defined
in the program baseline.

            PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit

The Army's Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program is the process by
which the Patriot missile system transitions to the MEADS. The MEADS
mission is to provide low-to-medium altitude air and missile defense with
the capability to counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and other air-breathing threats. MEADS is a codevelopment
program among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the MEADS
fire unit portion of the program.

Source: Lower Tier Project Office, Combined Aggregate Program (LTPO-CAP).

Development   GAO   Design   Initial production Last production  Initial   
      start    review  review        decision             decision capability 
     (8/04)    (1/07)  (10/09)       (11/12)                (3/17)   (9/17)   

The MEADS fire unit began development in 2004 with two mature critical
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one
immature critical technology. The technologies remain at these levels.
Program plans call for a system design review in 2009, but officials
estimate that only one of the six fire unit technologies will be more
mature at that time than at development start. The program office
anticipates that all critical technologies will be fully mature by the
start of production in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013.

Current plans call for the insertion of MEADS components into Patriot Fire
Units beginning in 2008 and continuing in 2010 and 2013. However, this
could change because plans for these insertions are under review.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (8/04) (1/07)
review (11/12) (10/09)

PATRIOT/MEADS CAP
Fire Unit Program

Technology Maturity

Only two of the six critical technologies--launcher electronics and
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile integration--are mature. Three
other critical technologies--the low noise exciter that manages the
radars' frequencies, the cooling system for the radars, and a slip ring
that carries power and coolants to the radars--are nearing maturity. The
remaining critical technology--the transmit/receive module that
transmits/receives signals for the fire control radar--is immature.

The project office estimates that the maturity level of the low noise
exciter, the radar cooling system, and the slip ring will remain unchanged
when product development begins and that the transmit receive module will
be near full maturity. The office expects all critical technologies to be
fully mature by the start of production in late 2012. There are no backup
technologies for any of the MEADS critical technologies.

Design Stability

We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of
releasable drawings and total drawings expected were not available. The
program office expects to know the total number of releasable drawings at
the design review in 2009.

Other Program Issues

MEADS is being developed to employ the current PAC-3 missile and the
future PAC-3 missile segment enhancement variant. The missile segment
enhancement is a U.S.-funded effort to improve on the current PAC-3
missile capability. Program estimates indicate that the Army plans to
develop and procure missiles at a cost of approximately $6.1 billion. We
did not assess the missile and the missile segment enhancement, and the
associated costs are not included in our funding information.

The MEADS program has adopted an incremental acquisition approach wherein
MEADS major items are incrementally inserted into the current Patriot
force. The first of the three insertions is to begin in 2008, with another
in 2010, and the final in 2013. The program office plans for each
increment to introduce new or upgraded capability into the program. The
2008 and 2010 increments are under review as the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the U.S. Army consider the means to consolidate and align
multiple Air and Missile Defense command and control development efforts.
The Army's objective is to provide a joint integrated network-centric
architecture for common Battle Management Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. The 2013 increment is not
effected by the potential realignment and the Army expects MEADS to
achieve initial operating capability in 2017 with four units.

Agency Comments

The Army concurred with this assessment.

                    Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High

                 Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company.

                First          Second        GAO        First          Second 
                sensor         sensor         review  satellite     satellite 
                delivery      delivery                 delivery      delivery 
                (8/04)         (9/05)      (1/07)       (9/08)         (9/09) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                          vel of knowledge
                       Desired le                                             

Development Design review/ Production GAO start production decision review
(10/96) decision (NA) (1/07) (8/01)

The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to meet
requirements in the missile warning, missile defense, technical
intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. A replacement for
the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High was to consist of four satellites
(plus a spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two sensors on host
satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and fixed and mobile ground
stations. In 2005, the number of GEO satellites was reduced to three. We
assessed the sensors and satellites.

          Program               Development             Design review/ 
          start                    start                    production 
                                                              decision 
          (2/95)                  (10/96)                       (8/01) 

The SBIRS High program's critical technologies and design are now mature.
Production maturity could not be determined because the contractor does
not collect production statistical process control data. After delays of
18 and 21 months, both HEO sensors have now been delivered. According to
program officials, early HEO 1 sensor performance on-orbit confirms the
sufficiency of the payload design and workmanship. In 2005, the program
incurred two Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost breaches and made a
decision not to buy two satellites. Although program officials acknowledge
that the GEO satellites are orders of magnitude more complex than the HEO
sensors, they believe a more realistic program schedule has been
developed. The first GEO satellite delivery is scheduled for late 2008.

SBIRS High Program

Technology Maturity

The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies--the infrared sensor,
thermal management, and onboard processor--are mature. However, program
officials stated that flawed initial systems engineering created
first-time integration and test risk associated with the complex GEO
satellite. According to program officials, early test results of the
scanning and staring sensors are positive. The staring sensor is to have
the ability to stare at one earth location and then rapidly change its
focus area, representing a significant leap in capability over the current
system.

Design Stability and Production Maturity

The program's design is considered stable since almost all drawings have
been released, but designrelated problems may arise. Design problems led
to delayed delivery of both HEO sensors, which were accepted for
operations without meeting all program specifications. Given the greater
complexity of the GEO satellites over the HEO sensors, the probability is
high that major design flaws will be discovered on the GEO satellites as
well.

Program officials are using 10 milestones to indicate progress. Four have
been completed so far. Key events remaining include delivery of flight
software to support the payload testing, payload delivery, ground software
deliveries, and system ground connectivity tests.

Although the contractor does not collect statistical process control data,
the program office tracks and assesses production maturity through
detailed monthly test data and updates. According to program officials,
about 95 percent of flight hardware for the first GEO satellite and 85
percent for the second have been delivered. Some testing is complete for
the first GEO satellite, including the payload engineering thermal-vacuum
test and testing to verify that the spacecraft will operate as intended in
conditions comparable to those it will encounter on-orbit.

Other Program Issues

Given the high probability of design flaws, costly redesigns that further
delay GEO delivery are possible. According to program officials, tests
have been added to identify design issues and reduce the likelihood of
significant schedule impacts. The program office has identified four focus
areas that are most likely to impact the program, including flight
software development and test, database development, resource contention
between ground operations and software test and development, and human
error in manufacturing.

In July 2005, the program reported its third and fourth Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breaches (10 U.S.C. 2433). As part of the mandatory program
certification process, the program was restructured in late 2005. The
resulting Acquisition Decision Memorandum certified the program to
complete the GEO 1 and 2 development activity and allowed for the option
to procure one additional GEO satellite. In December 2005, the Air Force
was directed to begin efforts to develop a viable competing capability in
parallel with the SBIRS program, known as the Alternative Infrared
Satellite System (AIRSS). The Air Force recently awarded contracts to
Raytheon and SAIC for sensor assembly development for AIRSS. AIRSS is
being designed in part to provide an alternative to the SBIRS GEO 3
satellite.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that the
GEO payload and spacecraft have successfully completed several risk
reduction activities and appear mature and stable. It noted however, that
if unforeseen difficulties arise during the GEO integration and test
sequence, current direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense is
to maintain schedule, even at the sacrifice of performance. The Air Force
stated that in the interest of preserving schedule, it may delay full
capability. The Air Force expects GEO 1 payload delivery in the summer of
2007 for integration with the spacecraft bus. It further noted that
integrated system test activities will be the focus of GEO 1 efforts in
2008, with the first GEO satellite launch anticipated late that year. The
Air Force expects that the GEO 2 payload and bus will undergo integration
and test activities in 2008 in anticipation of a launch in late 2009.
Technical comments were provided and incorporated as necessary.

                    Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II

                         Source:SDB II Program Office.

                         Low-rate                   Initial       Last        
                         decision                capability       procurement 
                         (12/12)                     (9/14)       (TBD)       

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb Increment II will provide the
capability to attack mobile targets from stand-off range in adverse
weather. The program builds on a previous increment that provided
capability against fixed targets. SDB II will also provide capability for
multiple kills per pass, multiple ordnance carriage, near-precision
munitions, and reduced munitions footprint. The weapon will be installed
on the Air Force's F-15E and the Navy's Joint Strike Fighter and is
designed to work with other aircraft, such as the F-22A and B-1.

Program  GAO   Development 
    start  review    start    
(5/06)  (1/07)   (12/09)   

Two of SDB II's five critical technologies are mature and are currently in
use on the SDB I program. The remaining technologies are expected to be
nearly mature by development start in December 2009. SDB II awarded two
risk reduction phase contracts to Boeing and Raytheon in May 2006. The
risk reduction phase will last 42 months, at the end of which Boeing and
Raytheon will compete for the system development and demonstration
contract to be awarded in December 2009. The risk reduction approach is
said to allow higher risk and less mature technologies to be fielded in an
evolutionary fashion. First SDB II delivery is expected in 2014.

                        Development GAO                DOD         Production 
                        review      start            design          decision 
                        (1/07)      (12/09)          review           (12/12) 
                                                      (NA)                    

SBIRS High Program

Technology Maturity

Two of the five critical technologies--the airframe and the guidance and
control system--are considered mature. These two technologies were
leveraged from legacy Air Force and Navy weapons. Three others, the
multi-mode seeker, net-ready data link, and payload (warhead and fuze)
need further development. The seeker is currently the least mature, and
according to program officials, will be the most challenging technology to
demonstrate due to the complexity of the algorithms it will require and
the need to package the multimode seeker into a small volume. The program
expects that each critical technology will be mature or approaching full
maturity when the program begins system development and demonstration in
December 2009.

According to program officials, the strategy for maturing these
technologies is to "test early, test often," using modeling and simulation
techniques, and relying on other programs that have used the same or
similar technologies. Each contractor will conduct these activities
separately. At the down select point, the program plans to evaluate the
contractors on the level of technology maturity they achieved during the
risk reduction phase.

Other Program Issues

The government plans to procure the SDB II based on contractor-developed
and government-approved system performance specifications, which will
become contractually binding at down select in 2009. The contractor will
be accountable for system performance. Accordingly, the contractor is
responsible not only for the design of the weapon system, but also for
planning the developmental test and evaluation program to verify the
system performance. The government will assess the contractor's
verification efforts for adequacy before three major decision points:
award of low-rate production contract, declaration that the system is
ready for dedicated operational test, and award of full-rate production
after the beyond low rate production assessment.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred with
the information presented and provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.

                                Space Radar (SR)

                 Source:Space Radar Integrated Program Office.

              Production                 First    Initial          Last       
              decision                  launch   capability       procurement 
              (3/13)                    (5/16)     (TBD)           (TBD)      

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

SR is an Air Force-led, joint DOD and intelligence community program to
develop a satellite system to provide persistent, all-weather, day and
night surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in denied areas. As
envisioned, SR would generate volumes of radar imagery data for
transmission to ground-, air-, ship-, and space-based systems. We assessed
the space segment.

           Program         GAO     Development                 Design 
              start       review   start                       review 
           (7/03)         (1/07)   (4/09)                      (1/12) 

Five critical technologies will support the SR program, and they are still
being matured. The program office is focusing its efforts on technology
risk reduction and concept definition activities. The Air Force has made
several changes to the acquisition approach, including schedule and cost
changes, to address concerns about the affordability of SR. The program
also recently revised its development start date from the last quarter of
2008 to the third quarter of 2009, an 8-month extension. Launch of the
first fully operational SR satellite is scheduled for fiscal year 2016.
Design and production maturity could not be assessed because SR has not
begun product development.

                        Development GAO                DOD         Production 
                        review      start            design          decision 
                        (1/07)      (4/09)           review            (3/13) 
                                                     (1/12)                   

SR Program

Technology Maturity

The program office recently revised its critical technologies. It assessed
the integrated radio frequency assembly, advanced analog/digital
converters, surface moving target indication processing algorithms, open
ocean surveillance processing algorithms, and low earth orbit laser
communication terminals as the critical technologies needing further
development. The program office also stated that critical technology
identification is an ongoing process and that technologies could be
removed or additional technologies could be added as studies,
requirements, and performance analyses are further refined. The program
office expects almost all of the technologies to be mature when it begins
the product development phase.

Other Program Issues

For fiscal year 2007, the Appropriations Conferees reduced the program's
requested budget by $80 million. DOD and other SR users have created a new
path for developing a single space radar system to meet user needs. As a
result, the Air Force has restructured the program and is evaluating the
SR schedule and associated costs. The new path includes several changes to
the SR acquisition approach. First, in early 2005, a new Space Radar
Integrated Program Office was established in Chantilly, Virginia, to work
more closely with the intelligence community, DOD and other users, senior
Air Force leadership, and the Congress. Second, the new SR senior
leadership established a framework with overarching guidance for maturing
the critical technologies, emphasizing use of more mature and less risky
technology in a block development approach. For example, the program
office recently employed this approach by deferring high-risk
technologies, such as onboard processing and more advanced solar cells and
batteries, from the first block of satellites to be developed. The program
office plans to incorporate these technologies as they mature. Third, a
team of program office personnel and mission partners established a new
plan to drive fiscal year 2006 risk reduction activities and revised cost
estimates. Finally, the SR development approach reduced the total number
of satellites to be acquired from 22 to

10. While this reduction decreases recurring costs, it does not decrease
research and development costs.

In fact, with the decrease in total quantity, research and development
costs are amortized over fewer satellites, resulting in an increase in the
average unit cost. While DOD and the intelligence community in January
2005 committed to pursue a single space radar capability, a cost-share
agreement between DOD and the intelligence community for this effort has
yet to be established.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force stated that it is
still coordinating plans for demonstrating the maturity of one technology
(advanced analog/digital converters). It has established an initial test
program but needs to resolve whether or not testing is required at a
higher level of assembly to meet the standard for demonstrating technology
maturity. In any case, the program office intends to demonstrate adequate
maturity for all critical technologies before it begins the product
development phase.

                      SSN 774 Technology Insertion Program

The Navy is seeking to enhance the performance and lower the cost of the
Virginia class submarine by inserting new technologies, like those for
electromagnetic signature reduction and sensors for CAVES WAA, and
improving its production processes and design. The Navy seeks to lower the
cost of two submarines per year to $2 billion each (2005 dollars) by 2012,
a reduction of about $400 million. We assessed the maturity of the
technologies planned for insertion, and discuss some of the design and
production improvements.

                     Source: Northrop Grumman Newport News.

Development  GAO     Development        Production Production     Initial      Initial   
                        start             decision              capability               
start    review Electromagnetic Electromagnetic  decision  Electromagnetic capability 
CAVES WAA          Signature        Signature Reduction CAVES Signature Reduction CAVES
                   Reduction                              WAA WAA         
  (10/06)   (1/07)     (10/08)       (5/10)       (10/12)       (4/13)        (8/17)

The program office identified three critical technologies for insertion
into the Virginia-class submarine beginning in 2010, including one
software package for electromagnetic signature reduction and two
technologies for sensor arrays. Development start for the array
technologies occurred in October 2006, while development start for
software will occur in October 2008. Currently all three technologies are
immature. The achievement of key product knowledge shown is for the sensor
technologies. Prior to 2010 the program office is making additional
changes to the submarine's design and production processes to reduce cost
or enhance capabilities. According to program officials, one of these
changes, the introduction of the advanced sail, was recently deferred from
2009 to 2014.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Development GAO DOD Production start review design decision (10/06) (1/07)
review (10/12) (10/09)

SSN 774 Tech Insertion Program

Technology Maturity

The Virginia class submarine program is developing three new technologies
for insertion into submarines beginning in 2010. The first of these is a
software package containing improved algorithms to monitor and, if
necessary, reduce the submarine's electromagnetic signature. This software
will be installed in submarines under construction in 2010 and 2011,
SSN-781 through SSN-786, as well as all future submarines. Program
officials state that after the software is installed, at-sea testing and
calibration are required to ensure full functionality. Similar software
has been demonstrated in British submarines, but due to alterations and
additional testing needed for use with Virginia-class submarines, the
software is considered immature. The other two technologies selected for
insertion will be integrated to form the conformal acoustic velocity
sensor wide aperture array (CAVES WAA), a sensor designed to replace
existing systems and lower the cost of construction while maintaining or
improving performance. The two technologies, fiber optic sensors and the
integrated panels that contain the sensors and manage their signature, are
both immature. Currently rough models of both technologies are being
tested in a laboratory environment. If the fiber optic sensors do not
develop as expected, a more mature ceramic sensor may be used to preserve
cost savings and performance. If both technologies encounter difficulties
in development, the program will continue to use the existing systems.

Design Stability

While the program office will track the stability of design for these new
technologies, it will use metrics other than the engineering drawings. In
addition to these new technologies, the program office will introduce a
series of design changes beginning with the submarine authorized for
construction in 2008. Redesign could include anything from new lighting
systems to replacing the front section of the submarine. The program
office is also investigating replacing some hydraulic systems with
lower-cost electric systems and simplifying other components like the
propulsion lubrication system. Eventually the program office hopes to
achieve savings of $100 million per submarine by 2012 through changes to
technology and design.

According to program officials, one of these design changes, the
introduction of the advanced sail, was recently deferred from 2009 until
2014 to allow further design development and risk reduction. Near term
funding for this effort has been reallocated to take advantage of other
cost reduction opportunities. When implemented, this design change will
replace the existing sail, the structure that sits atop the main body of
the submarine, with one that provides expanded space for sensor systems or
equipment for special forces teams. The advanced sail will be constructed
of composite materials whose feasibility has already been demonstrated
under a separate development program.

Other Program Issues

The Navy is also attempting to reduce cost in the Virginia-class submarine
program by improving production processes. The program office seeks to
reduce construction time by up to 24 months through improvements to
construction efficiency. Some of the methods proposed include increasing
the size and weight of the sections of the submarine while decreasing the
number of sections produced, installing more equipment in the sections
prior to assembling them, and performing hull treatments prior to
delivery. These changes will be assisted by the construction of new, more
efficient equipment and facilities at the shipyards, an initiative funded
by the Navy and enabled by contract incentives. The Navy anticipates
per-submarine savings of $65 million to $110 million through these
initiatives, but acknowledges the significant increase in maturity of
construction processes required to achieve these savings.

Agency Comments

The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.

                 Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)

MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built under
the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch these
satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the context of the
missile defense system. MDA is also studying improvements to the STSS
program, and it will be building next-generation satellites. We assessed
the two demonstration satellites.

                           Source:STSS Program Brief.

SBIRS-Low      Transition  STSS program    GAO       Demonstrator Software 
program start    to MDA        start     review  satellite launch upgrades 
(1995)           (10/00)      (2002)     (1/07)       (2007)       (2008)  

All of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature. The STSS
design appears otherwise stable, with all drawings released to
manufacturing. Both satellites' acquisition and tracking sensors, which
are the satellites' payloads, were delivered in 2006. However, continuing
quality and workmanship problems with the first satellite's payload as
well as space vehicle integration and test issues, according to MDA,
caused the contractor to overrun its fiscal year 2006 budget and
experience schedule delays. This and a funding reduction have caused a
5-month slip in the launch date for the demonstration satellites. The
launch is now scheduled for December 2007.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                             Development      DOD  GAO             Production
                                start      design review             decision 
                             (NA)          review       (1/07)        (TBD)   
                                          (11/03)       

SSN 774 Tech Insertion Program

Technology Maturity

All five critical technologies--satellite communication cross-links,
onboard processor, acquisition sensor, track sensor, and the single-stage
cryocooler--are mature. The last two technologies--track sensor and the
single-stage cryocooler--reached maturity when the thermal vacuum testing
on the first satellite's payload was completed in February 2006.

Design Stability

The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings and
the satellite components for the partially built satellites from the Space
Based Infrared System Low effort were released to manufacturing. By the
time STSS went through its design review in November 2003, the program
office had released all subsequent design drawings.

Other Program Issues

The payload for the first satellite was delivered on February 28, 2006,
and has been integrated onto the satellite. The second satellite's payload
completed thermal vacuum testing and was delivered on December 19, 2006.
The payload was supposed to be delivered in August 2006, but an issue
surfaced with higher than expected friction on the elevation gimbal that
restricted movement of the track sensor to above-the-horizon viewing. This
was resolved and a full range of motion was demonstrated in a thermal
vacuum test. The STSS ground segment activities have progressed well. The
first part of the ground acceptance test was successfully completed, and
the last part is expected to be conducted in January 2007. In addition,
the ground segment operations and training-related materials have been
turned over to system test personnel.

The program experienced quality and workmanship problems with its payload
subcontractor over the past several years, particularly with the first
satellite's payload. More recently, the prime contractor tightened its
inspection and supervision of the subcontractor's processes, and an
education effort was undertaken to ensure that all personnel on the
program knew and understood the program instructions. The subcontractor's
performance with respect to the payload for the second satellite improved
significantly as a result of these more recent actions.

The program office is in the process of negotiating a contract change that
will move the contract launch date from July 2007 to December 2007. There
are two reasons for the change in contract and forecast launch date.
First, the program office directed additional testing of the first
satellite's track sensor and a second thermal vacuum test of its payload
because the test data from the original tests were ambiguous. The tests
added a couple of months to the program schedule. Second, MDA received a
$200 million funding cut that placed the STSS program under tight
financial restrictions in fiscal year 2006, allowing no funds for
contingencies and forcing the program office to push some work into fiscal
year 2007. The program was unable to shift the deferred work into fiscal
year 2007 and still make the July 2007 launch date. Thus, the program
office expects that the two demonstration satellites will be launched in
December 2007.

Agency Comments

MDA provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were
incorporated as appropriate.

                  Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend
against short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and
communications system. We assessed the design for the Block 2008 initial
capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to hand off to the Army in
fiscal year 2009 for limited operational use.

                         Source: THAAD Project Office.

Program    Transition          1st successful  GAO    Initial capability   
start      to MDA                   intercept review available, Block 2008 
(1/92)     (10/01)                     (7/06) (1/07)        (FY09)         

Program officials assessed THAAD's technologies as mature and its design
as generally stable, with 93 percent of its design drawings released.
During Block 2006, the program is continuing to mature THAAD's design and
expects to deliver a limited operational capability during Block 2008. In
fiscal year 2006, the program successfully conducted three of five
scheduled tests. One of the tests that was not successfully completed was
Flight Test 4. During this test, the target malfunctioned, causing program
officials to call this a "no test." The program does not plan to conduct
this test at a later date. Rather, the objectives of this test will be
rolled into a later flight test, allowing the program to gain the
knowledge, but at a later date.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

                Development      DOD  GAO             Production
                   start      design review             decision 
                (6/00)        review       (1/07)       (12/09)  
                             (12/04)       

THAAD Program

Technology Maturity

Program officials assessed all of THAAD's critical technologies as mature.
All of these technologies are included in four major components: the fire
control and communications component; the interceptor; the launcher; and
the radar.

Program officials made changes in the execution of the THAAD program that
allowed it to make progress in maturing critical technologies. Officials
placed more emphasis on risk reduction efforts, including adopting
technology readiness levels to assess technological maturity.

Design Stability

THAAD's basic design is nearing completion with approximately 93 percent
of the 13,010 drawings expected to be available at the start of
production. The number of drawings increased from the approximately 9,850
reported last year primarily due to design changes that testing identified
as being needed.

Production Maturity

We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because the program is only
delivering test units until fiscal year 2009. MDA plans to purchase two
fire units while simultaneously conducting developmental activities. The
first will be delivered in fiscal year 2009, with a second expected to
become available during fiscal year 2010. Prior to a production decision,
the program office plans to assess production maturity using risk
assessments and verification reviews for assurance of the contractor's
readiness to proceed with repeatable processes and quality.

Other Program Issues

THAAD officials expected to complete five flight tests prior to the end of
fiscal year 2006 but were only able to conduct four tests. During flight
tests 1 and 2 program officials demonstrated missile performance, divert
attitude control system operations, and kill vehicle control. While
conducting integrated system flight test 3, the seeker demonstrated the
ability to locate a target in the high endo-atmosphere--the primary
objective of the test--and successfully intercepted a target. During
flight test 4--which was scheduled to be the program's first objective
intercept attempt--the target malfunctioned shortly after launch and
forced program officials to destroy the target. As a result of the
malfunction, program officials were forced to declare flight test 4 a
"no-test." Program officials are planning to add the objectives from
flight test 4 into a later flight test, which will allow them to gain the
knowledge they initally planned on receiving from this test at a later
date.

Additionally, hardware issues and technical problems are causing the
program's prime contractor to experience negative cost and schedule
variances. The variances can primarily be attributed to the missile,
launcher, and THAAD fire control and communications components. As of
September 30, 2006 the THAAD program was behind schedule in completing
$38.2 million of fiscal year 2006 work and overruning its fiscal year 2006
cost budget by $89.2 million.

Agency Comments

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

            Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT)

The Air Force's TSAT system is the spaceborne element of the Global
Information Grid that will provide high data rate military satellite
communications services to DOD users. The system is designed to provide
survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose radio
frequency and laser cross-links with other air and space systems. The TSAT
system will consist of a constellation of five satellites, plus a sixth
satellite to ensure mission availability. We assessed the six satellites.

                          Source: TSAT Program Office.

GAO    Development               Design review/            First satellite 
review start                   production decision                  launch 
(1/07) (4/07)                        (1/11)                         (9/14) 

Since our last assessment, DOD rescinded the approval to begin preliminary
design activities and restructured the TSAT program strategy to align
program activity with the December 2004 National Security Space
Acquisition Policy 03-01 into an incremental development approach. Each
increment will incorporate available mature technology to lower program
risk and improve confidence in launching TSAT satellites according to
schedule. DOD also directed the Air Force to ensure that all critical
technologies are mature and Systems Design Review is complete prior to
seeking preliminary design development approval for the space segment.
According to program officials, a new acquisition strategy is being
developed, which will result in a new program baseline.

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

             Development GAO                DOD         Production 
             review      start            design          decision 
             (1/07)      (4/07)           review            (1/11) 
                                          (1/11)                   

TSAT Program

Technology Maturity

In June 2006, DOD rescinded the prior approval for TSAT to enter the
preliminary design phase to align the program with current national
security space acquisition policy. The program is now in the concept
development phase. Currently, four of the program's seven technologies are
mature.

Of the seven technologies, four technologies-- packet processing payload,
communication-on-the-move antenna, information assurance space for
internet protocol encryption and informationassurance for transmission
security--are mature. The other three--dynamic bandwidth and resource
allocation, protected bandwidth efficient modulation waveforms, and single
access laser communication--are scheduled to reach maturity before
development start, currently scheduled for April 2007. All of the
technologies are needed to be mature prior to entering the preliminary
design phase again.

The wide-field of view multi-access laser communication technology was
part of the original TSAT baseline program. However, it is no longer part
of the baseline due to the lower risk incremental approach. The program is
currently budgeting $16.7 million for maturation of this technology which
could be inserted into future increments, according to the program office.

Other Program Issues

According to program officials, the TSAT program has spent about $1
billion to date. However, given that the program is in the concept
development phase, information on cost, design stability, production
maturity, or software development for satellite production is not yet
available. According to DOD officials, a request for proposals for the
space segment is expected to be released in May 2007, and the contract is
expected to be awarded in December 2007.

The program awarded a contract in January 2006 to develop the TSAT Mission
Operations System (TMOS) that will provide network management, and to
develop the overall network architecture. The program awarded this
contract first to allow the competing space contractors to focus their
satellite designs on a single architecture and mission operations system,
thereby reducing program complexity. According to the TSAT program office,
TMOS will include software development that will take place in four
increments, with a projected

5.2 million total lines of code in the final system.

The June 2004 program baseline showed a first satellite launch scheduled
for October 2011. The date was later moved to October 2013, and then to
September 2014, due to TSAT appropriations reductions in fiscal years 2005
and 2006, according to the program office. Congress made these reductions
due to concerns about the maturity of critical technologies and an
aggressive acquisition schedule. Congress continues to express concerns
about the program. For fiscal year 2007, the Appropriations conferees
reduced the program's requested budget by $130 million. According to the
program office, the initial launch date is now October 2014 due to the
latest reduction. While encouraged by changes to the program's acquisition
strategy, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted that even with reduced
funding, the program budget was still significantly higher than the prior
year. The committee stated that excessive cost growth across a short time
span facilitates inefficiencies that can create future program management
and cost overrun problems.

Agency Comments

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment,
which were incorporated as appropriate.

              V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft

         Full-rate      GAO Initial                                      Last 
         decision  capabilityreview                               procurement 
         (9/05)                                (1/07) (9/07)           (2016) 

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                                     vel of knowledge
             Desired le                                                       
                Datanot available                                             

                 Development       DOD       Production   GAO   
                 start            design       decision  review 
                 (4/86)           review         (9/05)  (1/07) 
                                  (9/02)                

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor aircraft developed by the Navy for Marine
Corps, Air Force, and Navy use. As of fiscal year 2006, 85 Marine Corps
MV-22s and 7 Air Force CV-22s were procured. The MV-22 will replace the
Marine Corps CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters. There currently are two
versions of the MV-22, the Block A, which incorporates safetyrelated
changes, and Block B, which is built upon the Block A to provide enhanced
maintainability. We assessed Block A but have comments concerning Block B,
the version that will be deployed.

Program                  Development       Development 
start                  start              restart      
(12/82)                (4/86)             (9/94)       

While the design of Block A is considered stable, Block A will not be
deployed in combat. Design stability of Block B--the deployed
configuration--will be better known after its limited operational
assessment in late 2007. Design changes are possible in order to address
any deficiencies identified during this test and those identified during
prior Block A tests as well as to lower production costs, and to field
future upgrades. Fuselage structural design changes are possible if
improved troop seat crash retention capability is directed. The current
budget reinstated a funding shortfall from last year's budget submittal,
and as a result, adequate funding to fully procure 185 aircraft exists.
However, a bearing defect has been found in some critical assemblies of
production aircraft and is being addressed.

V-22 Program

Design Stability

The design of the MV-22 Block A is considered stable and mature. The Block
B version, which will be the deployed version, is built upon the Block A
to provide enhanced maintainability. Its maturity will be better known
after operational tests planned prior to its initial operational
capability in September 2007. Further design changes to Block B may be
needed to address deficiencies identified during this assessment and the
2005 operational tests of Block A, to lower the production cost, and to
field future upgrades.

The Navy desires to increase the crashworthiness capability of the troop
seat and fuselage structure above the current specification requirements.
A new improved troop seat has been purchased for the V-22 aircraft, a
medium risk has been accepted for the new troop seat installation with the
current fuselage structure, and the program is evaluating engineering
change alternatives to add crashworthiness capability to the fuselage
structure to further enhance crashworthiness capability. Improved troop
seats may, in some crash conditions, impart higher loads into the airframe
than originally intended due to new higher qualification standards.

According to program officials, engineering change proposals may be used
to lower unit recurring flyaway cost to a level contractors believe is
needed to generate foreign military sales of the aircraft. The government
has invested and intends additional investments in cost reduction. At an
initial meeting program officials stated that on cost type contracts most
engineering change proposals are usually done at the government's expense
even if the change is within the scope of the contract. However, when
providing written technical comments the program office stated that the
contractor has made and continues to make corporate investments as well to
drive recurring flyaway costs down.

Production Maturity

We could not assess production maturity because statistical process
control data were not available. In September 2005, DOD approved the V-22
for full-rate production after conducting a production readiness review.
The review identified program management, production engineering and
planning, and material and procured parts as high-risk areas requiring
intense management attention. A number of initiatives were proposed to
reduce these risks including the approval of a multi-year procurement
contract in order to achieve a low product cost--one of the components of
the high program management risk areas. Congress recently authorized the
program to enter into a multiyear procurement contract. Initially program
officials did not believe they could buy the number of aircraft proposed
in the multi-year justification because of a reduction in program funding
levels. This reduction was the result of the milestone decision authority
adopting a lower independent cost estimate than the program estimate.
However, according to the Navy, the current budget reinstated the funding
shorfall from last year's budget submittal and adequate funding exists to
fully procure the 185 aircraft in the multiyear buy.

Production aircraft continue to be accepted with numerous deviations and
waivers. Program officials stated that this practice will continue due to
the time needed to address these items. Analysis of the acceptance
documentation for the latest three aircraft delivered before November
2006, revealed several potentially serious defects such as the aircraft
being conditionally accepted with bearing assemblies that contain a thin
dense chrome plating/coating that did not meet contract requirements for
two assemblies inside the proprotor gearbox. One of these assemblies is in
a critical area. Program officials state that this deficiency has been
addressed by (1) stripping chrome plating from bearings and replating in
accordance with improved manufacturing processes, and (2) qualifying newly
manufactured bearings for use without the chrome plating. Program
officials state that these bearing assemblies may not meet the contract
requirements in two critical assemblies.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Navy provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

               VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program

The Navy's VH-71 will be a dual-piloted, multiengine, helicopter employed
by Marine Helicopter Squadron One to provide safe, reliable, and timely
transportation for the President and Vice President of the United States,
heads of state, and others in varied and at times adverse climatic and
weather conditions. When the President is aboard, the VH-71 will serve as
the Commander in Chief's primary command and control platform. The system
will replace the VH-3D and VH-60N. It will be developed in two increments.
We assessed increment one.

                Source: Presidential Helicopters Program Office.

                 Development start/       GAO Design                  Initial 
                 production decision               review review   capability 
                       (1/05)                      (1/07) (2/07)      (10/09) 

In January 2005, the VH-71 program began system development and committed
to production without fully maturing technologies, achieving design
stability, or demonstrating production maturity due to an aggressive
high-risk schedule driven by White House needs. The program is approaching
technology maturity and design stability for increment one. However, this
design may not be useable to meet increment two performance requirements.
The range requirement in the prime contract was reduced because the
estimated weight of the aircraft is over 1,200 pounds more than the
original limit. The program is also reassessing the requirements for
increment two and considering cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs
because the current program may not be executable. Concurrency in
development, design, and production continues to put the program at risk
for cost growth and schedule delays.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                         Development    DOD                 Development GAO   
                         start         design         start/production review
                         (NA)          review       decision           (1/07)
                                        (NA)          (1/05)            

VH-71 Program
Technology Maturity

The VH-71 program's two critical technologies were nearing maturity when
the program began development and committed to production in January 2005.
Since then, one of those technologies, the 10-inch cockpit control
displays, matured. A prototype of the other critical technology, the
Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded Resource Communications
Controller, is not projected to be demonstrated in a realistic environment
until 2007. The program's design review and ongoing technology readiness
assessment efforts identified no significant technology risk for increment
one. The critical technologies for increment two have not been identified.
The program is reassessing the requirements for increment two and
considering cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs because it may not
be affordable and executable within the current program schedule.

Design Stability and Production Maturity

In January 2005, the VH-71 program committed to the production of five
aircraft without a final design or fully defined production processes. The
program's August 2006 design review was held ten months later than planned
and did not meet the Navy's criteria for a successful system-level review.
An additional design review is planned for February 2007. In August 2006,
87 percent of the program's drawings were releasable to manufacturing with
the remaining drawings primarily related to installation. The program
obtained customer agreement to reduce the range requirement in the prime
contract and is working to stabilize the weight of the aircraft. The
program also obtained customer agreement to defer several other
requirements to increment two, including those related to the auxiliary
power unit and rotor track and balance technology.

Concurrency in development, design, and production continues to drive the
risk of cost growth and schedule delays on the program. Design development
will continue through low-rate initial production as the program
concurrently develops its manufacturing processes, increasing the
likelihood that components being procured may have to be reworked to meet
the final design. The program will not collect statistical process control
data to demonstrate production maturity, but it will monitor indicators,
such as number of non-conforming products, quality notifications, hours
per process, and scrap and rework rates.

Other Program Issues

Program officials told us that the five increment one aircraft will have a
limited service life and its design may not be usable for increment two.
Changes to the main gear box, drive train, engines, tail unit, and main
rotor blades are required to meet increment two performance requirements.
Program officials anticipate that five additional increment two aircraft
will be produced to support full operational capability in 2015 rather
than modifying increment one aircraft to the increment two configuration.
This scenario is included in the program's overall cost.

Earned value data show a potential increase of $341 million or 18 percent,
in the estimated cost to complete the current prime contract. While the
program indicates that this increase is supported by its current budget,
there is the potential for future program cost increases as the program
reexamines requirements, schedules, and costs for increment two. The
magnitude of any cost increase will likely not be known until after DOD's
2008 budget is submitted.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy concurred with the
information provided in this report.

                     Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)

The Army expects its Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft
System, Warrior, to fill what it terms a capability gap for an unmanned
aircraft system at the division level. A Warrior system will include 12
aircraft, ground control stations, ground and air data terminals,
automatic take-off and landing systems, and ground support equipment. The
Army plans for Warrior to operate alone or with other platforms such as
the Apache helicopter and perform missions including reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition and attack.

                          Source: UAVS Project Office.

Development       Design GAO   Low-rate  Full-rate Initial            Last 
start           review review  decision   decision capability  procurement 
(4/05)         (10/06) (1/07)   (7/08)      (2/10) (3/10)            (TBD) 

Currently, two of Warrior's four critical technologies are mature.
Although the remaining two technologies were immature in early 2006, the
Army reports that they were nearing maturity as of the design review in
late 2006. The Army anticipates that they will be mature by the time of
the Warrior production start, currently scheduled for August 2008. While
there are backup technologies available for both if they do not mature as
the Army expects, these backups would result in a less capable Warrior
system than the Army originally planned. The program office indicated that
about 92 percent of the Warrior design drawings were released to
manufacturing as of the design review.

                        Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology maturity

Design and technology maturity

Technology maturity

                             Development      DOD  GAO             Production
                                start      design review             decision 
                             (4/05)        review       (1/07)        (7/08)  
                                          (10/06)       

Warrior UAS Program

Technology Maturity

Two of Warrior's four critical technologies--the heavy fuel engine and the
automatic takeoff and landing system--are considered to be mature.
According to the program office, representative configurations of these
two technologies have been integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. However,
there is still some risk because neither the engine nor the complete
takeoff and landing system have been integrated onto an unmanned aircraft
using exactly the same configuration as planned for Warrior. Further, the
Army reported that the engine requires some additional modification in
order to perform at the flight altitudes planned for Warrior.

The two remaining critical technologies--the airborne ethernet and the
multi-role tactical common data link--were not mature at the time the Army
awarded the Warrior system development and demonstration contract in
August 2005 and remained immature in early 2006. As of the design review
in late 2006, the Army reported that they are nearing maturity and expects
they will be fully mature by the time of the production start planned for
August 2008. The airborne ethernet is expected to provide real-time
communications capabilities among Warrior's internal aircraft components,
including the avionics, payloads, and weapons. Similarly, the multirole
tactical common data link is being developed to provide communications
between Warrior aircraft and ground control stations as well as
interoperability with other Army aviation platforms. While the contractor
has integrated an airborne ethernet into an unmanned aircraft, neither it
nor the data link has been integrated onto an umanned aircraft exactly as
they are to be used on Warrior.

The Army has technologies in place as backups for the ethernet and data
link, but these technologies would result in a less capable system than
the Army originally planned. In particular, the backups for the data link
suffer from slower data transmission rates or are not yet mature.

Design Stability

The Warrior program office stated that about 92 percent of the design
drawings were released to manufacturing as of the design readiness review.
In last year's assessment, the Army anticipated that the review would
occur in June 2006. However, the review slipped until late 2006 as a
result of the Army's decision to field an early model of the Warrior,
known as Block 0.

Production Maturity

We could not assess Warrior's production maturity because the Warrior
contractor does not use statistical process control as its metric.
Instead, the contractor employs global technology standards per the
International Standards Organization as its method for monitoring,
controlling, and improving processes. The Warrior program office stated
that this approach is acceptable to the Army because Warrior production is
relatively low-volume and the contractor generally employs nearly 100
percent testing of all critical items. Since May 2006, Warrior's low-rate
and full-rate production decision dates both have slipped by about 3
months due to the Army's decision to field the Block 0 version of Warrior.

Other Program Issues

The Army expects to buy 1 developmental system with 17 aircraft and 11
complete production systems with a total of 132 production aircraft
through 2015. However, the Army has not yet decided on the number of
systems it might buy beyond that date.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided updated
program information as well as technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate. The program office also provided a more detailed
description of the Warrior's planned capabilities and roles, including
information on such characteristics as the aircraft system's control by
division commander, payload flexibility, communications relay capability,
ability to change missions in flight, and operation and maintenance by
soldiers.

                          Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)

WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the
next generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment.

                          Source: WGS Program Office.

       Development      Design  GAO    First  Initial                    Full 
       start/production review review capabilitysatellite          capability 
           decision                   launch                                  
           (11/00)      (7/02) (1/07)       (6/07)       (8/08)        (6/13) 

Attainment of Product Knowledge [Production,] design and technology
[technology] [Technology]

The WGS program's technology and design are 
mature. We did not review production maturity data
because of the commercial nature of the WGS
acquisition contract, but unit-level manufacturing maturity for WGS is
complete. The program made progress in integrating and testing the first
satellite, which is to be launched in June 2007. For example, rework on
improperly installed fasteners is maturity complete, contractors have
redesigned computers to rectify data transmission errors, and
environmental tests were successful. The Air Force is considering a
three-block approach for WGS. Block 1 includes the first three
satellites. maturity Block 2 includes two satellites, with an unfunded
option for a third satellite, which will transfer data at higher rates
than those in the initial block. The Air Force has awarded a $1.07 billion
contract for the Block 2 satellites and has begun studying the possibility
of a WGS Block 3. 
^Development DOD ^Development ^GAO

                                     Desired level of kno^wledge                     
start design (NA) review (NA)

start/production review decision (1/07) (11/00)

WGS Program

Technology Maturity

WGS has two technologies that are vital to program success: the digital
channelizer and the phased array antenna. According to program officials,
both technologies were mature when the program made a production decision
in November 2000.

Design Stability

The design for WGS is mature, as the program office has released all the
expected drawings to manufacturing. Each of the initial three satellites
is at some level of assembly, integration, or testing.

Production Maturity

The commercial nature of the WGS acquisition contract precludes the
program office from having access to production process control data.
Manufacturing processes for WGS are complete, as all units for the first
satellite have been delivered.

Other Program Issues

The program made progress in integrating and testing the first satellite.
For example, rework due to incorrect installation of fasteners is complete
and the contractors have redesigned computers to correct data transmission
errors. In addition, no significant problems were identified during
spacelike environmental testing or tests in which the contractors shook
the satellite to simulate launch conditions and demonstrate the quality of
workmanship on the satellite. During these tests, the program office also
conducted low-level signal testing associated with satellite launch.
Interoperability testing on the first satellite was completed in December
2006, in preparation for satellite launch, which is still scheduled for
June 2007. Satellites 2 and 3 are to launch in December 2007 and May 2008,
respectively.

To address DOD's growing communication needs, the Air Force is considering
a three-block approach for WGS. Block 1 includes the first three
satellites. Block 2 includes satellites 4 and 5, with an unfunded option
for satellite 6. These satellites will transfer data at higher rates than
those in the initial block, and the Air Force has awarded a $1.07 billion
contract for the three satellites. The Air Force also has begun studying
the possibility of including enhanced capability in a WGS Block 3 for
added airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that in
October 2006 it awarded a fixed price incentive fee with firm target
contract to Boeing Satellite Systems for WGS satellites 4 and 5, with an
unfunded option for WGS 6. The fourth and fifth satellites will complete
the currently planned WGS constellation and will be modified to provide
more capacity for airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
users.

                Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T)

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone communications
network. It is to provide reliable, secure, and seamless video, data,
imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate simultaneously
at various levels of security. WIN-T is to connect Army units with higher
levels of command and provide Army's tactical portion of the Global
Information Grid. In addition, it will provide key communications elements
for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS), the linchpin of the
transformation to a lighter, more capable force.

                               Source: PM WIN-T.

       Program/        GAO   Design    Low-rate       Full-rate    Initial    
development start review  review    decision        decision  capability   
        (7/03)       (1/07)  (6/09)     (5/11)    (3rd Q/FY 14) (4th Q/FY 14) 
		  

      Attainment of Product Knowledge

Production, design and technology Design and [technology] [Technology]

WIN-T is currently being restructured to meet emerging FCS requirements
and a shift in the Army's funding priorities. The proposed
restructuring will provide the program with more maturity time to complete
system development. WIN-T entered system development in August 2003 with
3 of its 12 critical technologies nearing maturity. According
to the Army, a November 2005 maturity developmental test/operational test
demonstrated all of WIN-T's critical technologies in a relevant
environment. In August, the Army completed a revised technology readiness
assessment that supports the WIN-T program office's position.
maturity However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not fully
concur with this assessment. While design stability is evaluated during
WIN-T's design reviews, it cannot be assessed using our methodology
because the program office does not track the number of releasable
drawings. 

^Development GAO DOD Production

start review design decision (7/03) (1/07) review (5/11) (6/09)

WIN-T Program

Technology Maturity

WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies
close to reaching full maturity. The program office maintains that the
maturity of these technologies was demonstrated in a relevant environment
during a November 2005 developmental test/operational test event. A March
2006 system assessment, prepared by the Army Test and Evaluation Command,
concluded that a WIN-T prototype demonstrated the potential to provide
communications both "on the move" and "at the halt" in a limited network.
According to WIN-T program office and other Army representatives, this
test event demonstrates the viability of the WIN-T system architecture and
progress in maturing WIN-T's critical technologies. However, this test was
limited in scope, and the system assessment report did not explicitly
address the extent to which WIN-T's critical technologies had matured. In
late August, to support WIN-T's restructuring, the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology submitted a revised
Technology Readiness Assessment to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
concurring that WIN-T's critical technologies had been demonstrated in a
relevant environment. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's Director of
Defense Research and Engineering did not concur with the Army's assessment
for two of these technologies. In order to gain the Director's
concurrence, the WIN-T program office is updating data to reaffirm its
ratings for WIN-T's critical technologies and is submitting plans to
achieve full technology maturity by the start of production.

Design Stability

Design stability could not be assessed because the program office does not
plan to track the number of releasable drawings as a design metric.
According to the program, WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but
primarily an information technology system integration effort.
Consequently, the government does not obtain releasable design drawings
for many of WIN-T's components, particularly commercial components.
Instead, design stability is evaluated at the preliminary and critical
design reviews using the exit criteria developed by the government.
According to DOD, the WIN-T design will evolve using performance-based
specifications and open systems design and is to conform to an
architecture that specifies the minimum set of standards and guidance for
the acquisition of all DOD information systems.

Other Program Issues

The Army has also taken action to synchronize its FCS networking needs and
WIN-T's planned capabilities, largely by restructuring the WIN-T program.
The FCS program office led the Army's development of a study that examined
ways to better synchronize the Army's communications programs, including
WIN-T and FCS. The study concluded that the WIN-T program needed to make
significant changes to both the hardware and software items it planned to
deliver to FCS. For example, the size, weight, and power of the WIN-T
elements that are needed to support FCS platforms had to be reduced
significantly. These requirements were not part of the original WIN-T
program, and, according to WIN-T program office representatives,
additional time and funding will be required to address these new
requirements. During this time, the Army was also looking for ways to
address shortfalls in funding for high-priority items needed to support
the Global War on Terrorism. To fund these shortfalls, the Army proposed
cutting $655 million from WIN-T for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, which
DOD approved. Recognizing that WIN-T could no longer be executed within
its established costs and schedule, the Army determined that the program
needed to be restructured.

The Army's proposed restructuring of WIN-T would extend the program's
development for about 5 years, and thereby delay the production decision
from 2006 until 2011. DOD intends to complete a program review in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2007 for which the Army must prepare a
revised acquisition strategy, cost estimate, and technology assessment. On
November 6, 2006, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the
WIN-T Capability Development Document.

Agency Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

  Agency Comments
  
DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of this report, but did
provide technical comments. These comments, along with agency comments
received on the individual assessments, were included as appropriate. (See
app. I for a copy of DOD's response).

                              Scope of Our Review

For the 62 programs, each assessment provides the historical and current
program status and offers the opportunity to take early corrective action
when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges significantly
from the best practices. The assessments also identify programs that are
employing practices worthy of emulation by other programs. If a program is
attaining the desired levels of knowledge, it has less risk--but not zero
risk--of future problems. Likewise, if a program shows a gap between
demonstrated knowledge and best practices, it indicates an increased
risk--not a guarantee--of future problems. The real value of the
assessments is in recognizing gaps early, which provides opportunities for
constructive intervention--such as adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in
requirements, and additional funding--before cost and schedule
consequences mount.

We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors,
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and

(3) congressional interest. The majority of the 62 programs covered in
this report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A
program is defined as major if its estimated research and development
costs exceed $365 million or its procurement costs exceed $2.19 billion in
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Paul L. Francis
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Appendix I
											  
                     Comments from the Department of Defense											  

Appendix II

                             Scope and Methodology

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from each
of the programs included in this report. We summarized our assessments of
each individual program in two components--a system profile and a product
knowledge assessment. We did not validate the data provided by the
Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took several steps to address
data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the data and performed various
quality checks, which revealed some discrepancies in the data. We
discussed the underlying data and these discrepancies with program
officials and adjusted the data accordingly. We determined that the data
provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable for our engagement purposes
after reviewing DOD's management controls for assessing data reliability.

  Macro Analysis
  
Data for the total planned investment of major defense acquisition
programs were obtained from funding stream data included in DOD's Selected
Acquisition Reports (SAR) or from data obtained directly from the program
offices and then aggregated across all programs in base year 2007 dollars.

The number of weapon systems in development for the 2003 and 2007
assessment periods encompasses all programs with SARs on December 31,
2001, (2003 assessment period) and December 31, 2005, (2007 assessment
period) with the exception of the Ballistic Missile Defense System and the
Chemical Demilitarization programs.

The data presented in figure 2 on page 6 were obtained from table 6-1
"Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority by Title, Constant
fiscal year 2007 Dollars" in the National Defense Budget Estimates for
fiscal year 2007. Likewise, the data presented in table 2 were drawn from
table 6-1, "Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority by Title,
Constant fiscal year 2007 Dollars" in the National Defense Budget
Estimates for fiscal year 2007. The average annual real growth rate was
calculated using the compound annual growth rate formula.

To assess the total cost growth of major weapon systems between 2004 and
2007 presented on page 8, we identified the common set of 64 major defense
acquisition programs since 2004, with the exception of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System and the Chemical Demilitarization programs. Figures
for the total cost of these programs were obtained from funding stream
data included in SARs or from data acquired directly from the program
offices, and then aggregated across all programs in base year 2007 dollars
for the 2004 and 2007 assessment periods. To calculate the average
annual rate of cost growth for this common set of programs, we applied the
compound annual growth rate formula using the total funding data points
for assessment periods 2004 and 2007.

To assess the total cost, schedule, and quantity changes of the programs
included in our assessment presented in table 3 and on page 9, it was
necessary to identify those programs with all of the requisite data
available. Of the 62 programs in our assessment, 27 constituted the common
set of programs where data were available for cost, schedule, and quantity
at the first full estimate, generally milestone B, and the latest
estimate. We excluded programs that had planning estimates as their first
full estimate and if the first full estimate and latest estimate fell
within a 1-year period of each other. Data utilized in this analysis were
drawn from information contained in SARs or data provided by program
offices as of January 15, 2007. We summed the costs associated with
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and total costs
consisting of RDT&E, procurement, military construction, and acquisition
operation and maintenance. The schedule assessment is based on the change
in the average acquisition cycle time, defined as the number of months
between program start and the achievement of initial operation capability
or an equivalent fielding date.

The weighted calculations of acquisition cycle time and program
acquisition unit cost for the common set of programs were derived by
taking the total cost estimate for each of the 27 programs and dividing it
by the aggregate total cost of all 27 programs in the common set. The
resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the simple
percentage change in program acquisition unit costs to obtain the weighted
unit cost change of each program. Next, the sum of this weighted cost
change for all programs was calculated to get the weighted unit cost
change for the common set as a whole. To assess the weighted average
acquisition cycle time change, we multiplied the weight calculation by the
acquisition cycle time estimate for each corresponding program. A simple
average was then taken to calculate the change between the first full
estimate and the latest estimate. We believe these calculations best
represent the overall progress of programs by placing them within the
context of the common set's aggregate cost.

To assess the percentage of programs with technology maturity, design
stability, and production maturity at each key juncture presented in
figure 3 and figure 5 and on pages 14 and 17, we identified programs that
had actually proceeded through each key juncture--development start,
system
design review, and production start--and obtained their assessed maturity.
The percentages in figures 3, 4, and 5 on pages 14, 15, and 17 include
programs in the 2007 assessment only. The population size for the
technology maturity at development start is 37 programs, design review is
25 programs, and production start is 18 programs. The population size for
the design stability at design review is 22 programs, and 12 programs at
production start. The population size for production maturity at
production start is 20 programs. This information was drawn from data
provided by the program office as of January 15, 2007. For more
information, see the product knowledge assessment section in this
appendix.

Data on the date each program plans to conduct development tests of a
production representative article (i.e., prototype) was obtained from
program offices, and was then compared to the scheduled production
decision. The population size for this analysis is 32 programs.

  System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment

In the past 6 years, DOD has revised its policies governing weapon system
acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major acquisition
events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more consistent across the
62 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for key program
events. In the individual program assessments, "program start" refers to
the initiation of a program; DOD usually refers to program start as
milestone I or milestone A, which begins the concept and technology
development phase. Similarly, "development start" refers to the commitment
to system development that coincides with either milestone II or milestone
B, which begins DOD's system development and demonstration phase. The
"production decision" generally refers to the decision to enter the
production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate initial
production. Initial capability refers to the initial operational
capability, sometimes also called first unit equipped or required asset
availability. For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of key program
events in relation to milestones varies for each individual program. Our
assessments of shipbuilding programs report key program events as
determined by each program's individual strategy. For the Missile Defense
Agency programs that do not follow the standard Department of Defense
acquisition model, but instead develop systems in incremental
capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology development
efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block assessed.

The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal
year 2007 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on
information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some
instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the
term "to be determined" (TBD), or "not applicable," annotated (NA). The
quantities listed refer only to procurement quantities. Satellite
programs, in particular, produce a large percentage of their total
operational units as development quantities, which are not included in the
quantity figure.

To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we
reviewed DOD's SARs or obtained data directly from the program offices. In
general, we compared the latest available SAR information with a baseline
for each program. For programs that have started product
development--those that are beyond milestone II or B--we compared the
latest available SAR to the development estimate from the first selected
acquisition report issued after the program was approved to enter
development. For systems that have not yet started system development, we
compared the latest available data to the planning estimate issued after
milestone I or A. For systems not included in SARs, we attempted to obtain
comparable baseline and current data from the individual program offices.
For MDA systems for which a baseline was not available, we compared the
latest available cost information to the amount reported last year.

All cost information is presented in base year 2007 dollars using Office
of the Secretary of Defense-approved deflators to eliminate the effects of
inflation. We have depicted only the programs' main elements of
acquisition cost--research and development and procurement. However, the
total program costs also include military construction and acquisition
operation and maintenance costs. Because of rounding and these additional
costs, in some situations the total cost may not match the exact sum of
the research and development and procurement costs. The program unit costs
are calculated by dividing the total program cost by the total quantities
planned. These costs are often referred to as program acquisition unit
costs. In some instances, the data were not applicable, and we annotate
this by using the term "NA." In other instances, the current absence of
data on procurement funding and quantities precludes calculation of a
meaningful program acquisition unit cost, and we annotate this by using
the term "TBD." The quantities listed refer to total quantities, including
both procurement and development quantities.

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as the
number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or A, and
the achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent
fielding
date. In some instances, the data were not yet available, and we annotate
this by using the term "TBD," or were classified.

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum total
of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those of the
program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of detailed analyses
of changes that attempt to link specific changes with triggering events or
causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such detailed distinctions.

  Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment

To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key points
in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to each program
office. The results are graphically depicted in each two-page assessment.
We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such as the operational
requirements document, the acquisition program baseline, test reports, and
major program reviews.

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a tool,
referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed technology
readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force science and technology
research organizations use them to determine when technologies are ready
to be handed off from science and technology managers to product
developers. Technology readiness levels are measured on a scale of 1 to 9,
beginning with paper studies of a technology's feasibility and culminating
with a technology fully integrated into a completed product. (See app. III
for the definitions of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices
work has shown that a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a
technology in a realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity
that constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. In
our assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness
level 7, a prototype demonstrated in a realistic environment, are referred
to as mature or fully mature and those that have reached technology
readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment, are
referred to as approaching or nearing maturity and are assessed as
attaining 50 percent of the desired level of knowledge. Satellite
technologies that have achieved technology readiness level 6 are assessed
as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating maturity in an
operational environment--space.

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system at
key decision points after the passage of many years.

To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion
by the design review, the production decision, and as of our current
assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the percentage of
engineering drawings provided by the program office. We sought to clarify
the percentage of drawings completed in those cases where information
existed that raised concerns. Completed engineering drawings were defined
as the number of drawings released or deemed releasable to manufacturing
that can be considered the "build-to" drawings.

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify the
number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those processes.
In most cases, we did not verify or validate this information provided by
the program office. We sought to clarify the number of critical
manufacturing processes and percentage of statistical process control
where information existed that raised concerns. We used a standard called
the Process Capability Index, which is a process performance measurement
that quantifies how closely a process is running to its specification
limits. The index can be translated into an expected product defect rate,
and we have found it to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as
scrap and rework trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical
control data were unavailable.

Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential
risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a
program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our
detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller
treatment of risk elements.

Appendix III

                          Technology Readiness Levels

Hardware Demonstration  Technology  Readiness Level  Description  Software
Environment

     1. Basic principles observed and Lowest level of technology readiness.
        None (paper studies and None
     2. reported. Scientific research begins to be translated analysis) into
        applied research and development. Examples might include paper
        studies of a technology's basic properties

     1. Technology concept and/or Invention begins. Once basic principles
        None (paper studies and None
     2. application formulated. are observed, practical applications can
        analysis) be invented. The application is speculative and there is no
        proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. Examples are
        still limited to paper studies.

    1. Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic
       proof of concept.

Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical
studies and laboratory studies to physically validate analytical
predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include
components that are not yet integrated or representative.

Analytical studies and Lab demonstration of nonscale individual components
(pieces of subsystem).

4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation in laboratory environment.

Basic technological components are integrated to establish that the pieces
will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" compared to the
eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad hoc" hardware in a
laboratory.

Low-fidelity breadboard. Lab Integration of nonscale components to show
pieces will work together. Not fully functional or form or fit but
representative of technically feasible approach suitable for flight
articles.

       5. Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment.

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic
technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic
supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a simulated
environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory integration of
components.

High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent but not necessarily form
and/or fit (size, weight, materials, etc.). Should be approaching
appropriate scale. May include integration of several components with
reasonably realistic support elements/subsystems to demonstrate
functionality.

Lab demonstrating functionality but not form and fit. May include flight
demonstrating breadboard in surrogate aircraft. Technology ready for
detailed design studies.

6. System/subsystemmodel or prototype demonstration in a relevant
environment.

Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the
breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment.
Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness.
Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory
environment or in simulated realistic environment.

Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit, and function. Probably
includes the integration of many new components and realistic supporting
elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full functionality of the
subsystem.

High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/restricted flight demonstration
for a relevant environment. Integration of technology is well defined.

7. System prototype demonstration in a realistic environment.

Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major step
up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an actual system prototype
in a realistic environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle, or space.
Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft.

Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function integrated with other key
supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate full functionality of
subsystem.

Flight demonstration in representative realistic environment such as
flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft. Technology is well substantiated
with test data.

8. Actual system     Technology has been Flight-qualified Developmental    
completed and      proven to work in its hardware         Test and         
"flight qualified"  final form and under                  Evaluation       
through test and    expected conditions.                  (DT&E) in the    
demonstration.     In almost all cases,                   actual system    
                      this TRL represents                    application      
                      the end of true                                         
                      system development.                                     
                           Examples include                                   
                         developmental test                                   
                                        and                                   
                      evaluation of the                                       
                      system in its                                           
                      intended                                                
                      weapon system to                                        
                      determine if it meets                                   
                      design                                                  
                      specifications.                                         
9. Actual system   Actual application of Actual system in Operational Test 
"flight proven"    the technology in its final form       and              
through successful final form and under                   Evaluation       
mission            mission conditions,                    (OT&E) in        
operations.                such as those                  operational      
                             encountered in                  mission          
                                operational                                   
                      test and evaluation.                   conditions       
                      In almost all cases,                                    
                      this is the end of                                      
                      the last "bug fixing"                                   
                      aspects of true                                         
                      system development.                                     
                           Examples include                                   
                           using the system                                   
                                      under                                   
                      operational mission                                     
                      conditions.                                             

 Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration
                                     data.

Appendix IV

                        GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

  GAO Contact
  
Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841

  Acknowledgments

Ridge C. Bowman, Alan R. Frazier, Jordan Hamory, and Bruce H. Thomas
made key contributions to this report. Other key contributors included
David B. Best, Beverly A. Breen, Maricela Cherveny, Thomas J. Denomme,
Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David J. Hand, Barbara H. Haynes,
Michael J. Hazard, Ivy G. Hubler, Judy T. Lasley, Matthew B. Lea, Diana L.
Moldafsky, Brian T. Mullins, John E. Oppenheim, Kenneth E. Patton, Charles
W. Perdue, Michael J. Sullivan, Robert S. Swierczek, Adam Vodraska,
Viraphonh Vongvanith, and Karen S. Zuckerstein.

The following staff were responsible for individual programs:

System                                   Primary Staff                     
Airborne Laser (ABL)                     LaTonya D. Miller                 
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)               Dayna L. Foster/Rae Ann H. Sapp   
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis   Ivy G. Hubler/Steven B. Stern     
BMD)                                                                       
Advanced Extremely High Frequency        Bradley L. Terry                  
Satellites                                                                 
(AEHF)                                                                     
Active Electronically Scanned Array      Joseph E. Dewechter/Jerry W.      
Radar                                    Clark                             
(AESA)                                                                     
Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM)     Christopher R. Durbin/            
                                            Moshe Schwartz                    
Advance Precision Kill Weapon System II  Michele R. Williamson/            
(APKWS)                                  Wendy P. Smythe                   
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)    Michael J. Hesse/Tana M. Davis    
Advanced Threat Infrared                 Danny G. Owens                    
Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning                                      
System (ATIRCM/CMWS)                                                       
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2     Don M. Springman/Andrew H. Redd   
RMP)                                                                       
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)  W. William Russell IV/Michael T.  
                                            Dice                              
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program     Sean D. Merrill /Marvin E. Bonner 
(C-130                                                                     
AMP)                                                                       
C-130J Hercules                          Matthew T. Drerup/Cheryl K.       
                                            Andrew                            
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5  Sameena N. Ismailjee/             
AMP)                                                                       
                                            Cheryl K. Andrew                  
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and          Sameena N. Ismailjee/             
Reengining                                                                 
Program (C-5 RERP)                       Cheryl K. Andrew                  
USMC CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement       Kevin J. Heinz/Stephen V.         
                                            Marchesani                        
Combat Search and Rescue Replacement     Travis J. Masters/Julie C. Hadley 
Vehicle (CSAR-X)                                                           
Future Aircraft Carrier (CVN- 21)        Diana L. Moldafsky/Lisa L.        
                                            Berardi                           
DDG 1000 Destroyer                       Christopher R. Durbin             
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE)         Gary L. Middleton/                
                                            Daniel J. Novillo/Joseph H.       
                                            Zamoyta                           
E-10A Wide Area Surveillance Technology  Paul G. Williams/James S. Kim     
Development Program (E-10A WAS TDP)                                        
EA-18G                                   Jerry W. Clark/                   
                                            Christopher A. DePerro/Judy T.    
                                            Lasley                            
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle--Atlas Maria A. Durant/Richard Y.        
V,                                       Horiuchi                          
Delta IV (EELV)                                                            
Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) Bonita P. Oden/Jerry W. Clark     

(Continued From Previous Page)            
System                                    Primary Staff                    
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)      Leon S. Gill/Danny G.            
                                             Owens/Steven                     
                                             B. Stern                         
Extended Range Munition (ERM)             J. Kristopher Keener/Christopher 
                                             R.                               
                                             Durbin                           
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range John P. Swain                    
Artillery Projectile                                                       
F-22A Modernization and Improvement       Marvin E. Bonner/Robert K.       
Program                                   Miller                           
Future Combat Systems (FCS)               Marcus C. Ferguson/William C.    
                                             Allbritton                       
Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System      Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie       
                                             Shivers                          
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)      Steven B. Stern/Ivy G. Hubler    
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS)   Jean N. Harker/Josie H. Sigl     
II                                                                         
Modernized Space/OCS                                                       
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense  Alan R. Frazier/Wendy P. Smythe  
Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS)                                      
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)                Matthew B. Lea/Gary L. Middleton 
Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne,     Paul G. Williams/Nicholas C.     
Maritime,                                                                  
Fixed-Station (JTRS AMF)                  Alexander                        
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams 
Radio (JTRS GMR)                                                           
JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit    Ridge C. Bowman/Michael D.       
(JTRS                                                                      
HMS)                                      O'Neill/Paul G. Williams         
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)          Jonathan E. Watkins/LaTonya D.   
                                             Miller                           
Land Warrior                              Susan K. Woodward                
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)                J. Kristopher Keener             
Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement       Ryan D. Consaul/Jordan Hamory    
Program                                                                    
(LHA 6)                                                                    
Longbow Apache Block III                  Wendy P. Smythe                  
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)            Beverly A. Breen/Michael J.      
                                             Hesse                            
Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV)               Meredith M. Allen/               
                                             Richard A. Cederholm             
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System (MQ-9)    Rae Ann H. Sapp/Sara R. Margraf  
21 Inch Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned   Diana L. Moldafsky               
Undersea Vehicle System (MRUUVS)                                           
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)       Richard Y. Horiuchi/Peter E.     
                                             Zwanzig                          
National Polar-orbiting Operational       Suzanne S. Olivieri/             
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)   Carol R. Cha/Sharron R. Candon   
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft      Heather L. Barker Miller/        
(P-8A MMA)                                                                 
                                             W. William Russell IV            
PATRIOT/ MEADS Combined Aggregate         Richard A. Cederholm/            
Program (CAP) Fire Unit                   Ronald N. Dains                  

Space Based  Infrared  System High  (SBIRS  Maricela Cherveny/  Claire  A.
Cyrnak High)

Small Diameter Bomb, Increment II (SDB II) Carrie R. Wilson/ Letisha T.
Jenkins-Marks

              Space Radar (SR) Lisa P. Gardner/Richard Y. Horiuchi

SSN 774  Technology  Insertion Program  J.  Kristopher Keener/  Thomas  P.
Twambly

 Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Sigrid L. McGinty/Josie H. Sigl

Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Jonathan E. Watkins/ LaTonya D.
Miller/Steven B. Stern

Transformational  Satellite  Communications  Arturo  Holguin  Jr./Tony  A.
Beckham System (TSAT)

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical  Lift Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P.  Oden
Aircraft

VH-71 Presidential  Helicopter  Replacement Ronald  E.  Schwenn/Joseph  H.
Program Zamoyta

Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (Warrior Tana M. Davis UAS)

                  Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) Tony A. Beckham

        Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) James P. Tallon

Source: GAO.

Related GAO Products

  Best Practice Reports
  
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology

Transition Processes. [587]GAO-06-883. Washington, D.C.: September 14,
2006.

DOD Acquisitions: Contracting for Better Outcomes. [588]GAO-06-800T.
Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and
Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy. [589]GAO-06-368. Washington,
D.C.: April 13, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Wastes Billions of Dollars through Poorly
Structured Incentives. [590]GAO-06-409T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons
Systems Investments. [591]GAO-06-585T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees
Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes. [592]GAO-06-66. Washington, D.C.:
December 19, 2005.

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to
Improve Outcomes. [593]GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2005.

DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. [594]GAO-06-257T. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to Improve
DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [595]GAO-04-393. Washington,
D.C.: March 1, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, but
More Controls Are Needed. [596]GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 10,
2003.

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [597]GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February
11, 2003.

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [598]GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices.
[599]GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better
Weapon System Outcomes. [600]GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001.

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon
System Outcomes. [601]GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000.

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
System Decisions. [602]GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26,
2000.

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Program
Implement Best Practices. [603]GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, D.C.: August
16, 1999.

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
Weapon System Outcomes. [604]GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.: July 30,
1999.

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes. [605]GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. [606]GAO/T-
[607]NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998.

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment. [608]GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:
February 24, 1998.

Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD's Earned Value
Management Process. [609]GAO/NSIAD-97-108. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1997.

                         Recent Weapon Systems Reports

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer Improvements
for DOD. [610]GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26, 1996.

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for
Naval Surface Fire Support. [611]GAO-07-115. Washington, D.C.: November
30, 2006.

Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address Unrealistic
Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. [612]GAO-07-96. Washington, D.C.:
November 17, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service
Acquisition Outcomes. [613]GAO-07-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but
Significant Challenges Remain. [614]GAO-06-955. Washington, D.C.:
September 11, 2006.

Correspondence: Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business
Case Before Making Further Investments. [615]GAO-06-455R. Washington,
D.C.: June 20, 2006.

Correspondence: Space System Acquisition Risks and Keys to Addressing
Them. [616]GAO-06-776R. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2006.

Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs New Additional Knowledge as It Embarks on a
New Approach for Transformational Satellite Communications System.
[617]GAO-06-537. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2006.

Correspondence: Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Cancellation of the Joint Strike
Fighter Alternative Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive
Analysis. [618]GAO-06-717R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful
Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System.
[619]GAO-06-593. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Encountered
Difficulties in Design Demonstration and Faces Future Risks.
[620]GAO-06-349. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006.

Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce
Risk in Development of EA-18G. [621]GAO-06-446. Washington, D.C.: April
26, 2006.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. [622]GAO-06-610T. Washington,
D.C.: April 6, 2006.

Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions and
Keys to Achieving Them. [623]GAO-06-626T. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat
System's Success. [624]GAO-06-564T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy's Long-Range
Shipbuilding Plan. [625]GAO-06-587T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.

Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by
Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. [626]GAO-06-523T.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing
Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. [627]GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but
Falls Short of Original Goals. [628]GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: March
15, 2006.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to
Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies. [629]GAO-06-447.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.

Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for Pursuing
Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities. [630]GAO-06-449.
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

Joint Strike Fighter: Management of the Technology Transfer Process.
[631]GAO-06-364. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future Combat
System's Successful Outcome. [632]GAO-06-367. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key for
Future Combat System's Success. [633]GAO-06-478T. Washington, D.C.: March
1, 2006.

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References

Visible links
 585. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-110
 587. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-883
 588. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-800T
 589. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-368
 590. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-409T
 591. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-585T
 592. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-66
 593. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-110
 594. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-257T
 595. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-393
 596. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-53
 597. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-57
 598. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-701
 599. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-469T
 600. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-288
 601. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-199
 602. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137
 603. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-206
 604. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-162
 605. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116
 606. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123
 607. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123
 608. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-56
 609. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-108
 610. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96-162
 611. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-115
 612. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-96
 613. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-20
 614. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-955
 615. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-455R
 616. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-776R
 617. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-537
 618. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-717R
 619. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-593
 620. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-349
 621. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-446
 622. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-610T
 623. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-626T
 624. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-564T
 625. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-587T
 626. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-523T
 627. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-356
 628. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-327
 629. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-447
 630. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-449
 631. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-364
 632. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-367
 633. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-478T
*** End of document. ***