Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at 
Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of	 
U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain (28-FEB-07,		 
GAO-07-404).							 
                                                                 
Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to  
make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of	 
the United States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE)	 
and Defense (DOD) have worked to improve security at sites	 
housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia	 
and other countries. In 1995, DOE established the Materials	 
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement 
these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in	 
improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other 
countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving	 
security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE	 
and DOD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of 
U.S.-funded security upgrades. To address these objectives, among
other things, GAO analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews
with key program officials, and visited four Russian nuclear	 
sites.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-404 					        
    ACCNO:   A66352						        
  TITLE:     Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving     
Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term		 
Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain	 
     DATE:   02/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     International agreements				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Nuclear facilities 				 
	     Nuclear facility security				 
	     Nuclear materials					 
	     Nuclear proliferation				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Nuclear weapons plant security			 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     DOE Materials Protection, Control, and		 
	     Accounting program 				 
                                                                 
	     Russia						 

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GAO-07-404

   

     * [1]Report to Congressional Requesters

          * [2]February 2007

     * [3]NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

          * [4]Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites,
            but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades
            Is Uncertain

     * [5]Contents

          * [6]Results in Brief
          * [7]Background
          * [8]Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to
            Provide Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and
            Other Countries, but DOE's Reporting of the Number of Buildings
            Secured May Be Misleading

               * [9]Through the End of Fiscal Year 2006, DOE Spent About $1.3
                 Billion for Security Upgrades and Other Related Assistance
                 at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other Countries
               * [10]DOE Considers Buildings "Secure" After Only Limited or
                 "Rapid" Upgrades Have Been Installed, Even When More
                 Comprehensive Upgrades Are Planned
               * [11]DOE Is Examining the Impact of an Increased Design Basis
                 Threat for Its MPC&A Program
               * [12]DOE Plans to Complete All Security Upgrades Work by the
                 End of 2008 but Lacks Access or Agreement to Work at Two Key
                 Sites That Contain Vast Amounts of Nuclear Material

          * [13]DOD and DOE Have Spent About $920 Million to Help Russia
            Secure 62 Nuclear Warhead Sites and to Improve Warhead
            Transportation Security

               * [14]DOE and DOD Helped Russia Improve Security at 62 Nuclear
                 Warhead Storage Sites and Provided Assistance to Improve
                 Security of Warheads in Transit
               * [15]Coordination between DOE and DOD's Nuclear Warhead
                 Security Efforts in Russia Has Improved
               * [16]DOE and DOD Use Similar Systems to Manage Large
                 Contracts to Improve Security at Russian Nuclear Warhead
                 Sites

          * [17]Long-term Sustainability of U.S.- Funded Security Upgrades Is
            Uncertain because Access Problems and Other Issues May Hamper DOE
            and DOD Sustainability Efforts

               * [18]DOE Issued Guidelines to Direct Its Efforts to Help
                 Russia Prepare to Maintain U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades
                 without DOE Assistance
               * [19]DOE's Ability to Ensure That U.S.-Funded Security
                 Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites Are Being Sustained May
                 Be Hampered by Access Difficulties, Funding Concerns, and
                 Other Issues
               * [20]Access Difficulties at Some Russian Nuclear Warhead
                 Sites May Prohibit DOE and DOD from Ensuring That Security
                 Upgrades Are Being Sustained

          * [21]Conclusions
          * [22]Recommendations for Executive Action
          * [23]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

     * [24]Scope and Methodology
     * [25]Time Line of Major Events in the History of U.S. Efforts to Secure
       Nuclear Material and Warheads in Russia and Other Countries
     * [26]Additional Information on DOE Efforts to Secure Sites with
       Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material in Countries Other Than Russia

          * [27]Belarus
          * [28]China
          * [29]Georgia
          * [30]India
          * [31]Latvia
          * [32]Lithuania
          * [33]Kazakhstan

               * [34]Institute of Atomic Energy- Kurchatov
               * [35]Institute of Nuclear Physics
               * [36]BN-350 Reactor at Aktau
               * [37]Ulba Metallurgical Plant

          * [38]Ukraine

               * [39]Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology
               * [40]Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research
               * [41]Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and
                 Industry
               * [42]South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant

          * [43]Uzbekistan

               * [44]Institute of Nuclear Physics
               * [45]Foton Facility

     * [46]Additional Information on DOE's National Infrastructure and
       Related Programs

          * [47]Material Consolidation and Conversion
          * [48]Secure Transportation
          * [49]Training and Technical Support Infrastructure
          * [50]Russian Federation Inspection Implementation
          * [51]Protective Forces Assistance
          * [52]Federal Information System
          * [53]Regulatory Development
          * [54]MPC&A Education
          * [55]Material Control and Accounting Measurements
          * [56]MPC&A Security Culture
          * [57]Taxation and Customs

     * [58]Comments from the Department of Energy
     * [59]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * [60]Related GAO Products

Report to Congressional Requesters

February 2007

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the
Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain

Contents

Tables

Figures

February 28, 2007
Letter

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
The Honorable Norm Coleman
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives

Safeguarding nuclear warheads and nuclear materials that can be used to
make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United
States and Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the
largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world with unclassified U.S.
estimates of the number of Russia's nuclear warheads at the end of the
cold war ranging from 18,000 to 25,000. Russia also inherited an estimated
600 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium--materials that
could be used to build nuclear weapons.^1 Terrorists or countries seeking
nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to construct a nuclear weapon. During
the Soviet era, security systems at Soviet nuclear sites emphasized heavy
surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those who
violated security procedures. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and
subsequent social, political, and economic changes in Russia and other
former Soviet republics exposed gaps in the physical security and material
accounting at sites containing nuclear material and revealed weaknesses in
these countries' abilities to secure nuclear sites against internal and
external threats of theft.

Since the early 1990s, there has been concern that unsecured nuclear or
radioactive material could fall into the hands of terrorists and be
smuggled into the United States for use in a nuclear weapon or a device
that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a
"dirty bomb"). For example, in January 2007, international media reported
that authorities in Georgia had seized about 100 grams of highly enriched
uranium from a Russian citizen who was attempting to sell the material on
the black market.^2 Key to the United States' efforts to combat this
threat is securing nuclear materials and warheads at vulnerable civilian
and military sites in the former Soviet Union and other countries. In
1991, the Congress authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan secure and protect former Soviet nuclear weapons.^3 Members
of the Congress were concerned that nuclear weapons or materials might be
lost, stolen, or sold and that nuclear scientists and technicians might be
persuaded to sell their knowledge to nations or terrorists seeking to
develop nuclear weapons. Between fiscal years 1992 and 2006, the Congress
authorized about $9 billion for a variety of nuclear nonproliferation
programs implemented by DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE), including
efforts to help Russia and other countries secure sites where nuclear
material and warheads are located. In 1993, DOE and the Russian government
began working together to secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear
material and, in 1995, DOE established the

Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which is
now administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).^4
Through its MPC&A program,^5 DOE has provided nuclear facilities in Russia
and other countries with modern nuclear security systems that include the
following, among other things:

ophysical protection systems, such as fences around buildings containing
nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where nuclear materials
are stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor storage rooms;

omaterial control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material
containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the
containers, and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into
areas containing nuclear material; and

omaterial accounting systems, such as nuclear measurement equipment and
computerized databases to inventory the amount and type of nuclear
material contained in specific buildings and to track their location.

In 1998, DOE issued guidelines that provide a systematic approach for DOE
program managers to develop and implement MPC&A systems that meet DOE's
objective of helping Russia and other countries secure buildings with
weapons-usable nuclear material and nuclear warhead storage sites.^6 DOE
seeks to improve security at nuclear sites in Russia and other countries
by providing security upgrades that protect against threats of theft from
both internal adversaries, such as disgruntled nuclear workers (called the
"insider" threat), and external adversaries, such as terrorist groups. DOE
conducts these site security upgrades in two phases known as "rapid"
upgrades and "comprehensive" upgrades.

oRapid upgrades include such improvements as bricking up windows in
buildings where nuclear material is stored; installing strengthened doors,
locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing controlled access areas
around nuclear material; and implementing procedures that require the
presence of two people when nuclear material is handled (called the
"two-person rule"). Rapid upgrades are primarily designed to be simple,
easy to implement and maintain, and result in immediate, though limited,
improvements to nuclear material security. Rapid upgrades include upgrades
designed to detect and delay external adversaries and sometimes include
basic material control and accounting equipment and procedures that can be
implemented during a 6-to-12 month period.

oComprehensive upgrades include electronic sensors, motion detectors, and
closed circuit television systems to detect intruders; central alarm
stations, where guards can monitor cameras and alarms; and computerized
nuclear material accounting systems. Comprehensive upgrades are designed
to secure against both internal and external threats and are usually put
in place over the 18-to-24 months after the rapid upgrades have been
installed but can be installed concurrently in some cases.

Buildings that contain nuclear material, which DOE considers to be of a
high proliferation threat receive both rapid and comprehensive upgrades,
and buildings with nuclear material of less concern may receive only rapid
upgrades. In addition to providing security upgrades, DOE provides a
variety of training to foreign officials and nuclear site personnel on how
to operate MPC&A systems.

In February 2006, DOE changed the metrics it uses to track progress in its
MPC&A program from measuring the percentage of nuclear material secured
(out of the estimated 600 metric tons of loose nuclear material in the
former Soviet Union) to measuring the number of buildings in Russia and
other countries with weapons-usable nuclear material that have been
secured.^7 DOE currently plans to secure 210 buildings containing
weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries by the end
of 2008.

The United States has also assisted Russia in improving security at
nuclear warhead storage sites, both temporary sites, such as rail transfer
points, and permanent sites containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began
assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) with enhancing
transportation security for nuclear warheads and security at nuclear
warhead sites. Also, in 1998, at Russia's request, DOE expanded the scope
of its efforts with the Russian Navy from protecting naval reactor fuel to
helping secure nuclear warheads. In February 2005, President Bush and
Russian President Putin issued a joint statement on nuclear security
cooperation, including enhanced cooperation on nuclear terrorism
prevention efforts.^8 In 2006, Presidents Bush and Putin reaffirmed their
commitment to completing security upgrades at nuclear material and warhead
sites in Russia by the end of 2008.^9 DOE and DOD plan to help Russia
secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by the end of 2008.

After completing the installation of site security upgrades, DOE and DOD
provide ongoing technical and financial support to help ensure that
U.S.-funded security upgrades continue to reduce the risk of theft at
foreign nuclear sites. These efforts are known as sustainability
activities. Sustainability support is necessary to ensure that U.S.-funded
security upgrades are properly maintained and continue to support risk
reduction goals as intended. However, security of nuclear material and
warheads in Russia and other countries ultimately depends on these
countries' ability to sustain the continued operation of U.S.-funded
security upgrades after U.S. funding ends. In 2002, the Congress directed
DOE to work with Russia to develop a sustainable MPC&A system to be solely
supported by Russia no later than January 1, 2013.^10

As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to secure
nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries by assessing:
(1) the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other countries secure
weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) the progress DOE and DOD have made in
helping Russia secure its nuclear warhead sites, and (3) the efforts
undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the sustainability and continued use
of U.S.-funded security upgrades at sites that house nuclear materials and
warheads in Russia and other countries.

To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation from DOE and its
contractors at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Sandia National Laboratories;
DOD; and DOD contractors. We conducted interviews with key program
officials at each of these agencies and at the Department of State. We
also discussed the implementation of DOE and DOD's programs with Russian
officials. However, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation (Rosatom), which is responsible for the production of all
nuclear materials in Russia and the development, testing, and production
of Russian nuclear weapons, denied our request for access to facilities
under its control. We were able to complete our audit objectives by
visiting four Russian nuclear facilities--civilian, educational, and
research institutes not under Rosatom's control--where DOE installed MPC&A
upgrades. We discussed security issues and the sustainability of MPC&A
upgrades with officials at these sites. In addition, we analyzed cost and
budgetary information from DOE and DOD on U.S. efforts to help Russia and
other countries secure nuclear materials and warheads. We interviewed
knowledgeable DOE and DOD officials on the reliability of these data,
including issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures,
and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined these data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More details
on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our
review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief

From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3
billion to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to sites
with buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and
other countries, and the agency reports to have "secured" 175 buildings
containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material.
However, the number of secured buildings does not fully present the extent
and nature of upgrades made and work remaining to be completed because DOE
considers a building to be "secure" after it has received only limited
MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive
upgrades have yet to be completed. Specifically, 51 of the 175 buildings
DOE reported to have "secured" by the end of fiscal year 2006 do not have
completed MPC&A upgrades. While DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades
offer a measure of risk reduction against some threats, they also noted
that rapid upgrades do not meet all of DOE's risk reduction goals for most
buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. Further, in response to
terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is examining the
impact of an increased design basis threat for its MPC&A program and
providing additional assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear
sites. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that
includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings
with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan details the remaining
scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does not include two key
sites involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear warheads that contain
many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear
material. Because of the sensitive nature of the work conducted at these
sites, Rosatom has denied DOE's proposals for upgrading the sites,
including proposals with less intrusive access requirements, and informed
DOE that it is not interested in pursuing MPC&A cooperation at these
sites.

Since 1995, DOE and DOD have spent about $920 million to help Russia
improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites, and the agencies plan to
help Russia secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. Through the end
of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $374 million to help Russia secure 50
nuclear warhead sites, while DOD spent about $546 million to secure 12
nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve security for the
transportation of Russian warheads. DOE plans to provide security upgrades
at 23 additional sites, and DOD plans to provide upgrades at 12 additional
sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved
since 2003, when we reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies
for installing site security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites.
For example, DOE and DOD have now jointly developed common designs for
security upgrades at similar Russian warhead sites in order to ensure a
level of consistency in the assistance provided to these sites. We also
found that DOE and DOD use similar approaches to managing large contracts
to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD has
used an earned value management (EVM) system to identify cost and schedule
variances on contracts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear
warhead sites so they can be addressed in a timely manner. DOE does not
require its contractors to implement EVM systems on its fixed-price
contracts for installing security upgrades at Russian warhead sites.
However, during the course of our review, the department augmented its
contract oversight mechanisms, and DOE officials believe that their
improved oversight system constitutes a comparable alternative to an EVM
system.

As DOE and DOD near the completion of their security upgrade programs, the
sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in Russia and
other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring that the
substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is not wasted.
To this end, DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to
help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain)
U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites
after U.S. assistance ends and is working with Rosatom to develop a joint
U.S.-Russian sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management
information system to assist MPC&A management in tracking the progress
being made toward its goal of providing Russia a sustainable MPC&A system
by 2013, similar to the system DOE uses to track the number of buildings
and sites where it has installed security upgrades. Further, access
challenges and other issues could impact DOE and DOD's ability to prepare
Russia to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades on its own. In 2002, the
Congress directed DOE to work with Russia to provide a sustainable MPC&A
system to be solely supported by Russia no later than January 1, 2013. In
response, DOE issued interim guidelines in May 2004 to direct its efforts
to create a sustainable MPC&A system in Russia and finalized these
guidelines in December 2006. DOE's sustainability guidelines include seven
key elements, such as a site MPC&A operational plan and preventative
maintenance program. However, access difficulties, sites' financial
ability to maintain equipment, and other issues could impact DOE's ability
to prepare Russia to sustain security upgrades at nuclear material sites.
For example, at one facility where DOE completed upgrades in 1998, DOE
officials were denied access from 1999 through 2002 and, upon returning to
the facility, found the security upgrades were in a severe state of
disrepair. As a result, DOE had to spend about $800,000 to correct
problems resulting from the site's inability to properly maintain the
security upgrades DOE had provided. Finally, DOE and DOD also plan to
provide Russia with assistance to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades at
nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent the agencies
from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither DOE nor DOD has
reached an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense on access
procedures for sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage
sites. Site access or alternative means of verification are necessary to
ensure that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia maintain security
upgrades at these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the
Russian Ministry of Defense on access procedures for sustainability
activities at these 44 sites, the agencies will be unable to determine if
U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained and may not be
able to spend funds appropriated for these efforts.

To strengthen program management and the effectiveness of DOE's efforts to
improve security at nuclear material and warhead sites in Russia and other
countries, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy, working with
the Administrator of NNSA, (1) revise the metrics used to measure MPC&A
program progress to better reflect the level of security upgrade
completion at buildings reported as "secure" and (2) develop a management
information system to track DOE's progress in providing Russia with a
sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DOD for comment. DOE
generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no written
comments on our report. DOE provided additional information about the
metric it uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its reasons for not
using EVM on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to work with
Rosatom on sustainability issues. DOE and DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Background

In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to secure
sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and, in 1995, DOE
established the MPC&A program, which is now administered by NNSA. DOE's
Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, within NNSA,
consists of five offices whose collective efforts contribute to enhancing
the security of nuclear material and warheads in countries of concern and
to improving the ability to detect illicit smuggling of those materials
(see fig. 1). Four of these offices implement DOE's MPC&A program, which,
among other things, provides security upgrades at nuclear sites in Russia
and other countries, and the fifth office, the Office of the Second Line
of Defense, works to improve detection of illegal nuclear trafficking
activities at border crossings and seaports.^11

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of DOE's Office of International
Material Protection and Cooperation

The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection works with the Russian Ministry
of Defense, including the 12^th Main Directorate--the Russian Defense
Ministry's organization for nuclear munitions, the Strategic Rocket
Forces, and the Navy to install security upgrades at nuclear warhead
storage sites. The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection also oversees
DOE's security upgrades work at naval nuclear fuel sites. The Office of
Weapons Material Protection upgrades MPC&A systems at sites within the
Rosatom nuclear weapons complex and also oversees DOE efforts to sustain
U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear sites within the former Soviet
Union that are not in Russia, such as facilities in Ukraine and
Uzbekistan. The Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites works
to install MPC&A upgrades at nonmilitary nuclear facilities throughout
Russia and oversees efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer
buildings and to convert excess weapons-usable nuclear material into less
attractive forms. The Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites
also manages DOE's efforts to provide nuclear security assistance to
countries outside of the former Soviet Union. The Office of National
Infrastructure and Sustainability manages a variety of crosscutting
programs, including transportation and protective forces assistance, and
oversaw the development of guidelines for DOE's efforts to help ensure
that Russia can sustain the operation of U.S.-funded security systems at
its nuclear sites after U.S. assistance ends.

DOD has also assisted Russia in securing nuclear warhead storage sites,
both temporary sites, such as rail transfer points, and permanent sites
containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began assisting the Russian
Ministry of Defense with enhancing transportation security for nuclear
warheads and security at nuclear warhead sites. DOD's efforts to help
Russia secure its nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve the
security of warheads in transit are implemented by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. Oversight and policy guidance for this work is provided
by DOD's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Additional
information on the history of U.S. efforts to help Russia and other
countries secure nuclear material and warheads can be found in appendix
II.

Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to Provide
Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other Countries,
but DOE's Reporting of the Number of Buildings Secured May Be Misleading

DOE spent about $1.3 billion between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 2006
to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to facilities
that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries
and reports to have "secured" 175 buildings containing about 300 metric
tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet
Union. The number of buildings that DOE reports as secured, however, does
not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some
buildings because DOE considers a building to be "secure" after it has
received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when
additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be completed. Further, in
response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is
examining the impact of an increased design basis threat it uses to
measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian nuclear
facilities and providing additional assistance to protective forces at
Russian nuclear sites. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint
Action Plan that includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites
housing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan
details the remaining scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does
not include two key sites involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear
warheads that contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE has been denied access.

Through the End of Fiscal Year 2006, DOE Spent About $1.3 Billion for
Security Upgrades and Other Related Assistance at Nuclear Material Sites
in Russia and Other Countries

From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3 billion to
enhance security at buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear materials
in foreign countries. The majority of these buildings are located in
Russia and fall into three categories: Rosatom weapons complex sites,
civilian sites, and naval fuel sites. DOE has also helped to secure
buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in nine other countries.^12
Figure 2 shows a breakdown of DOE's spending on MPC&A efforts.

Figure 2: DOE Spending to Secure Nuclear Materials in Russia and Other
Countries through the End of Fiscal Year 2006

Note: Figure does not include program management expenses, and amounts
have been rounded.

As figure 2 shows, DOE spent about $684.7 million to provide security
upgrades to civilian, naval fuel, and Rosatom weapons complex sites with
weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and an additional $131.5 million
to provide security upgrades to sites located outside of Russia. DOE also
spent about $493.9 million on additional and related MPC&A efforts in
Russia, such as assistance for transportation security, providing
equipment for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and efforts to
consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and sites. According to
DOE officials, these efforts are important to increasing the overall
security of nuclear materials in Russia and other countries, and they
support DOE's goal of enhancing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of
weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, because DOE believes that
nuclear materials are most vulnerable while they are in transit, the
department has provided Russia with specialized secure trucks, armored
escort vehicles, and secure containers--called overpacks--to improve the
security of nuclear material transported within and between nuclear sites
in Russia. Further, DOE's assistance to protective forces at Russian
nuclear sites, which includes such items as bulletproof vests, helmets,
and response vehicles, helps ensure that guards at those sites are
properly equipped and trained so that they can quickly respond to alarms.
Additional information on other DOE efforts to improve security at sites
with weapons-usable nuclear materials can be found in appendix IV.

DOE Considers Buildings "Secure" After Only Limited or "Rapid" Upgrades
Have Been Installed, Even When More Comprehensive Upgrades Are Planned

At the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported to have "secured" 175
buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear
material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, but 51 of the 175
buildings DOE reported to have "secured" as of the end of fiscal year 2006
do not have completed MPC&A upgrades. These 51 buildings are located at
sites in the Rosatom weapons complex. In its program metrics, DOE defined
a building to be "secure" after it has received only limited MPC&A
upgrades (called rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive
upgrades, which would further improve security, have yet to be
completed.^13

The buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE is working to
improve security fall into four categories: Rosatom weapons complex,
civilian, naval fuel, and sites outside of Russia. As table 1 shows, all
planned upgrades have been completed at naval fuel sites and sites outside
of Russia. The vast majority of remaining buildings that have not yet
received security upgrades are in the Rosatom weapons complex, where DOE
has historically had access difficulties, including being denied access to
key sites and buildings housing weapons-usable nuclear material.

Table 1: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with
Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material through the End of Fiscal Year 2006

                                        

      Site type        Number of Number of buildings          Total number of 
                   buildings DOE   where DOE has not      buildings where DOE 
                      reports as  installed security         plans to install 
                       "secured"            upgrades        security upgrades 
Rosatom weapons            92                  32                      124 
complex^a                                                                  
Civilian                   47                   3                       50 
Naval fuel                 21                   0                       21 
Outside of                 15                   0                       15 
Russia                                                                     
Total                     175                  35                      210 

Source: DOE.

^aAt some sites in the Rosatom weapons complex, DOE counts individual
material storage or handling areas (material balance areas) within large
buildings separately in its program performance measurements in an attempt
to more accurately reflect the amount of work involved. According to DOE,
the work that would go into securing a material balance area of this size
would be commensurate to the work that goes into securing a smaller
building.

While DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades offer a limited measure of
risk reduction against some threats, they also noted that rapid upgrades
fall short of meeting all of DOE's risk reduction goals for buildings with
weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, rapid upgrades generally
include only limited measures designed to address the insider threat of
theft, such as establishing a two-person rule and providing certain types
of tamper indication devices that would set off alarms at guard stations
in the case of an unauthorized attempt to access nuclear materials.
According to NNSA, which implements the MPC&A program at DOE, the greatest
threat DOE faces in its effort to help Russia secure nuclear materials is
the threat of insider theft. However, the majority of measures to address
the insider threat at Russian nuclear material sites, such as computerized
nuclear material inventory databases and barcoding of nuclear material
containers, are provided in the comprehensive upgrades phase.

DOE Is Examining the Impact of an Increased Design Basis Threat for Its
MPC&A Program

In response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE
recently analyzed the implications of an increased design basis threat it
uses to measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian
nuclear facilities. The design basis threat is defined as the attributes
and characteristics of potential adversaries (a group or groups of armed
attackers) against which a facility's physical protection systems are
designed and evaluated. According to DOE, the design basis threat is
critical to determining an MPC&A system's effectiveness. In 2005, DOE
began examining the impact of increasing the number of adversaries against
which Russian sites with U.S.-funded security upgrades should be able to
defend themselves. DOE is currently reassessing the effectiveness of the
security upgrades it has provided through the MPC&A program and has
increased its emphasis on providing assistance to the protective forces at
Russian nuclear material sites. Specifically, DOE is currently working
with a number of sites to relocate guard forces closer to the target
nuclear material to improve their response times to an incident. For
example, at all four of the nuclear material sites we visited in Russia,
Russian officials told us that they were working with DOE to relocate
guard forces closer to buildings that contain weapons-usable nuclear
material at their sites. However, DOE is limited in the scope of
assistance it can provide to protective forces at nuclear facilities in
Russia and other countries. For example, DOE is neither allowed to provide
weapons or ammunition to these forces, nor is it allowed to pay the
salaries of protective forces at these sites. According to DOE officials,
the department has provided assistance to the protective forces at all
nuclear material sites where the department has access and agreement to
work, including helmets, winter uniforms, radios, and other equipment
intended to improve their effectiveness in responding to alarms and their
survivability against potential adversaries.

DOE Plans to Complete All Security Upgrades Work by the End of 2008 but
Lacks Access or Agreement to Work at Two Key Sites That Contain Vast
Amounts of Nuclear Material

Historically, DOE has had difficulty obtaining access to some sensitive
sites in Russia, especially within the Rosatom weapons complex. For
example, we reported in 2003 that DOE's lack of access to many buildings
that store weapons-usable nuclear material in the Rosatom weapons complex
was the greatest challenge to improving nuclear material security in
Russia. DOE requires access to these buildings to validate Russian
security system designs and to confirm the installation of equipment as
intended. DOE signed an access agreement with the Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy (now called Rosatom) in September 2001 that described
administrative procedures to facilitate access, such as specifying which
DOE personnel are allowed to make site visits and the number and duration
of those visits. We reported in 2003 that this access agreement had done
little to increase DOE's ability to complete its work at many key sites in
the Rosatom weapons complex. Since that time, DOE has worked with Rosatom
through a Joint Acceleration Working Group and other mechanisms to develop
alternative access procedures, such as the use of remote video monitoring,
that have allowed work to progress at some sensitive buildings and sites
that had previously been inaccessible to DOE project teams. In June 2005,
DOE and Rosatom signed a Joint Action Plan detailing the remaining scope
of work to be completed by the 2008 deadline. Rosatom and DOE are using
this plan to guide cooperative activities and to develop a multiyear
budget for DOE's MPC&A program. DOE officials told us that they have been
granted access to almost all of the sites and buildings covered in the
plan and that all security upgrades should be completed, as scheduled, by
the end of 2008. DOE plans to spend about $98 million to complete its
planned security upgrades at 210 buildings containing weapons-usable
nuclear material in Russia and other countries by the end of calendar year
2008.

The DOE-Rosatom Joint Action Plan covers 20 Russian civilian and nuclear
weapons complex sites. However, the Joint Action Plan does not include two
key sites in the Rosatom weapons complex where Russian nuclear weapons are
assembled and disassembled. Because of the nuclear weapons manufacturing
work conducted at these sites, DOE believes these two sites contain many
buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material.
According to DOE officials, the department has offered numerous
alternative access proposals to try to obtain access to install security
upgrades at these two sites. For example, in November 2004, DOE provided
senior Russian officials with access to some of the most sensitive sites
in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, including the Pantex nuclear weapons
plant in Texas, which is the only U.S. nuclear weapons assembly and
disassembly facility. However, Rosatom has refused to grant DOE officials
reciprocal access to analogous Russian sites. Because of the sensitive
nature of the work conducted at these sites, Rosatom has denied DOE's
requests for access, rejected DOE offers to provide assistance without
access, and informed DOE that it is not interested in pursuing MPC&A
cooperation at these sites. DOE officials expressed very little optimism
that Rosatom would allow DOE to help improve security at these facilities
in the near future.

DOD and DOE Have Spent About $920 Million to Help Russia Secure 62 Nuclear
Warhead Sites and to Improve Warhead Transportation Security

Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent about $920 million
to help Russia improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites. The agencies
plan to help Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by the end
of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved since 2003, when we
reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies toward providing
security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead sites. In addition, DOE and
DOD are currently taking similar approaches to managing large contracts to
provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD has used
EVM to identify cost and schedule variances for its contracts to install
security upgrades at Russian warhead sites at early stages so they can be
addressed in a timely manner. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price
contracts to install security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites,
but, during the course of our review, the department augmented its
contract performance management system to include additional reporting
mechanisms to identify and address schedule variances, which DOE officials
believe constitute a comparable alternative to an EVM system. DOE believes
the benefits of EVM techniques do not justify the additional costs to
implement them on fixed-price contracts.

DOE and DOD Helped Russia Improve Security at 62 Nuclear Warhead Storage
Sites and Provided Assistance to Improve Security of Warheads in Transit

Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $374 million to
improve security at 50 Russian nuclear warhead sites and plans to install
security upgrades at 23 additional sites by the end of 2008. Additionally,
DOD spent approximately $546 million to help Russia secure 12 warhead
sites and to provide security for nuclear warheads in transit.^14 DOD
plans to complete security upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of
2008. Figure 3 shows a breakdown of U.S. funding to improve security of
Russian nuclear warheads through the end of fiscal year 2006.

Figure 3: U.S. Spending on Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia through the
End of Fiscal Year 2006

Note: DOD spending for nuclear warhead site security efforts includes
spending on related DOD efforts, such as the development of an Automated
Inventory Control and Management System for Russia's nuclear warhead
stockpile, a personnel reliability program and training equipment for
guard forces at nuclear warhead sites, an emergency response capability,
and a variety of training for site personnel. DOE's program also includes
training for site personnel and the development of a personnel reliability
program for those Russian nuclear commands not supported by DOD.
Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.

DOE plans to provide security upgrades at 23 additional sites, and DOD
plans to provide upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of 2008. DOE
and DOD gained authorization and access to work at 15 of these sites as a
result of an agreement reached at the summit between President Bush and
Russian President Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, in February 2005. After
this summit, Russia offered access to 15 additional nuclear warhead sites
of which DOE has agreed to install upgrades at 7 sites, and DOD will help
secure the remaining 8 sites. Table 2 provides an overview of DOE and
DOD's progress in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites.

Table 2: DOE and DOD Progress in Helping Russia Secure Nuclear Warhead
Sites

                                        

     Site type    DOE sites DOD sites     Total DOE sites DOD sites     Total 
                   complete  complete     sites remaining remaining     sites 
                                      completed                     remaining 
Permanent              8         9        17        14        10        24 
warhead sites                                                              
Temporary             42         3        45         9         2        11 
warhead sites                                                              
Total                 50        12        62        23        12        35 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD information.

Despite the agencies' optimism that all sites within this scope will be
secured by the end of 2008, they face challenges in meeting this goal. For
example, DOE and DOD officials stated that work in Russia involves
extensive bureaucracy, changing requirements to meet Russian demands and,
at times, difficult relationships and coordination with Russian
subcontractors. DOD officials told us that there have been performance
issues with a certain Russian subcontractor, but finding alternatives is
difficult because there are only a limited number of Russian
subcontractors qualified for this type of work and cleared by the Russian
MOD to work at nuclear weapons sites. Additionally, the harsh
environmental conditions at some remote sites have caused delays in the
installation of security upgrades. Specifically, DOD officials stated that
adverse weather conditions delayed the installation of security upgrades
at four Russian warhead sites by about 1 month.

In addition, DOD spent over $125 million through the end of fiscal year
2006 to improve the security of nuclear warheads during transportation by
rail to consolidation and dismantlement sites. According to DOD officials,
security experts consider nuclear warheads to be highly vulnerable to
theft during transport. DOD has attempted to address this threat by
providing the Russian MOD with security enhancements for railcars,
hardened shipping containers for nuclear warheads to protect against small
arms fire and other threats, and payment of railway tariffs associated
with transporting nuclear warheads to consolidation and dismantlement
sites. Since 1995, DOD has supported maintenance on 200 specialized,
secure railcars for transporting nuclear weapons and provided 15 armored
railcars for guard forces protecting shipments of nuclear weapons. DOD is
in the process of procuring up to 100 additional nuclear warhead transport
railcars for use by the Russian MOD.

Coordination between DOE and DOD's Nuclear Warhead Security Efforts in
Russia Has Improved

DOE and DOD have mechanisms for sharing information and avoiding
duplication of effort. Coordination between the agencies has improved
since 2003, when we reported that the agencies did not have consistent
policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead
sites. We recommended in 2003 that the departments work together to
develop a standardized approach to improving security at Russian nuclear
warhead sites. Since our 2003 report, DOD and DOE have expanded their
efforts to share information about their work at Russian nuclear warhead
sites.

Specifically, the departments coordinate their efforts through an
interagency working group, which reports to the National Security
Council.^15 According to DOE and DOD officials, this group was
instrumental in coordinating the U.S. response to proposals for security
upgrades at additional Russian nuclear warhead sites stemming from the
summit between Presidents Bush and Putin at Bratislava, Slovakia, in 2005.
In addition, DOE and DOD participate in joint coordinating groups that
include key representatives from DOE, DOD, and the various branches of the
Russian MOD. All of these groups meet regularly to discuss ongoing work at
Russian nuclear warhead sites and resolve problems or issues that arise in
this effort. Furthermore, DOE and DOD have jointly developed common
designs for security upgrades at similar Russian warhead sites to ensure a
level of consistency in the assistance provided to these sites. DOD
officials stated that having a standardized design between the two
agencies allows DOE and DOD leverage with the Russian MOD, to deny
requests if they are made for items not in the site design plan of either
agency. Further, DOE and DOD seek to present a united image to Russian
officials by writing letters jointly on common issues and answering
Russian site proposals together.

DOE and DOD Use Similar Systems to Manage Large Contracts to Improve
Security at Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites

In their efforts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead
sites, DOE and DOD are taking similar approaches to managing large
contracts. Generally, OMB requires federal agencies to use EVM^16 or an
alternative performance management system on major acquisition contracts
to identify cost and schedule variances at early stages so they can be
addressed in a timely manner.^17 DOD has used EVM to evaluate its
contracts to install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOE does
not require its contractors to implement EVM to evaluate its contracts to
install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites, but, during the course
of our review, augmented its contract performance management system to
include additional reporting mechanisms for identifying and addressing
schedule variances, which DOE officials believe represent a comparable
alternative to an EVM system.

DOD officials stated that EVM is one of many tools that provide empirical
data to validate testimonial information about the status of security
upgrades provided in its contractors' monthly and quarterly reports.
Additionally, EVM enhances program management capabilities by providing an
early warning system for deviations from plans and quantifies technical
and schedule problems in terms of cost. This provides DOD with an
objective basis for considering corrective action. DOD officials told us
that their use of EVM allowed them to identify schedule variances due to
poor contractor performance at one Russian nuclear warhead site where the
department is installing security upgrades. DOD officials stated that this
early detection allowed them to reassign the work to a different Russian
subcontractor and formulate a plan to make up for the lost time and work
in order to meet their scheduled completion date and critical path
milestones.

Similarly, DOE recently proposed requirements that its large contracts for
security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites be managed with a system
similar to EVM. In September 2006, DOE initiated security upgrades at four
large nuclear warhead storage sites in Russia.^18 Until January 2007, DOE
managed these fixed-price contracts according to the NNSA Programmatic
Guidelines, which do not require the use of EVM or an alternative system
to assess contract performance for cost and schedule variances. In part,
as a result of our inquiry into its contracting practices, DOE altered its
oversight mechanisms for these contracts in January 2007 and will now
require monthly reports and other measures to more accurately ascertain
the progress of contracted items, including the identification of schedule
variances due to inclement weather and other unforeseen events and,
subsequently, the development of recovery plans. According to DOE
officials, these new reporting mechanisms represent a comparable
alternative to an EVM system and will give DOE project managers additional
opportunities to identify potential schedule slippages and enable
appropriate management intervention to take place in a timely manner.^19

Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain
because Access Problems and Other Issues May Hamper DOE and DOD
Sustainability Efforts

DOE has developed sustainability guidelines to help Russia prepare to take
financial responsibility for maintaining U.S.-funded security upgrades at
nuclear material and warhead sites without DOE assistance by 2013 as the
Congress mandated. DOE and Rosatom are developing a joint sustainability
plan that will provide an agreed-upon framework to guide DOE's
sustainability efforts at nuclear material sites in Russia. However, DOE's
ability to ensure that U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear material
sites are being sustained may be hampered by access difficulties, funding
concerns, and other issues. Finally, access difficulties at some Russian
nuclear warhead sites may also prohibit DOE and DOD from ensuring that
U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.

DOE Issued Guidelines to Direct Its Efforts to Help Russia Prepare to
Maintain U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades without DOE Assistance

In May 2004, DOE issued interim guidelines (referred to as Sustainability
Guidelines) to direct its efforts to assist Russia in developing
sustainable MPC&A systems at Russian nuclear material and warhead sites by
2013 as the Congress mandated. In December 2006, DOE issued a final
version of its Sustainability Guidelines for the MPC&A program. These
guidelines require DOE program managers to develop assessments of each
site's existing capabilities to sustain MPC&A systems and to identify
requirements that should be met before a site transitions from DOE support
to full Russian responsibility. According to DOE, these assessments will
be used to develop site-specific sustainability plans that detail the
remaining cooperative activities required to address each of the seven
elements of sustainability. The guidelines also require DOE project teams
to develop site-specific transition plans, which would detail how
sustainability activities will be funded as the sites move toward
transition to full Russian responsibility by 2013.

DOE's Sustainability Guidelines set forth seven key elements of a
sustainable MPC&A program at sites receiving MPC&A upgrades, such as the
development of site operating procedures, which form the foundation for
all of DOE's sustainability activities at nuclear material and warhead
sites in Russia and other countries where DOE has provided security
upgrades. DOE uses a variety of sustainability indicators for each of the
seven elements to determine the degree to which the individual elements
are being addressed at Russian sites. Table 2 shows the seven elements of
sustainability outlined in DOE's Sustainability Guidelines and some of the
indicators DOE uses to assess the degree to which each element of
sustainability is being met at a given Russian site.

Table 3: Seven Elements of Sustainability in DOE's Guidelines

                                        

       Element                 Definition             Select sustainability   
                                                            indicators        
Site MPC&A        Site MPC&A operations plans     oSite has an established 
organization      establish management            and documented MPC&A     
                     structures, assign staff        organization with clear  
                     responsibilities that support   roles and                
                     MPC&A operations, identify how  responsibilities.        
                     site actions reduce risk, and                            
                     identify how the site will      oSite has conducted      
                     allocate human and financial    MPC&A sustainability     
                     resources to effectively        planning.                
                     operate the MPC&A systems.                               
                                                     oSite has a budget for   
                                                     MPC&A operations and     
                                                     personnel.               
Site operating    MPC&A systems require a set of  oSite has written        
procedures        procedures to direct site       procedures covering all  
                     personnel in the proper         key MPC&A operations.    
                     operation of equipment. Site                             
                     operating procedures help       oSite procedures are     
                     staff operate systems           consistent with          
                     consistently and effectively    regulations.             
                     in conformance with Russian                              
                     national regulations.           oSite has a mechanism    
                                                     for modifying            
                                                     procedures.              
Human resource    A human resource management     oTraining requirements   
management and    system is designed to provide   for each MPC&A position  
site training     qualified and well-trained      have been identified.    
                     MPC&A professionals to perform                           
                     assigned MPC&A duties.          oThe site has a          
                                                     mechanism to track       
                                                     corrective actions from  
                                                     inspections and offers   
                                                     retraining to staff.     
Operational cost  Operational cost analysis       oSite has identified     
analysis          helps sites to plan and         life cycle costs,        
                     allocate resources for MPC&A    capital equipment        
                     operations throughout the       replacement costs, etc.  
                     system's life cycle by                                   
                     estimating the costs            oSite has established a  
                     associated with long- and       budget for MPC&A         
                     short-term maintenance of       operation, which covers  
                     MPC&A systems.                  the site's system        
                                                     requirements.            
Equipment         Preventative maintenance,       oSite has documented     
maintenance,      repair, and equipment           maintenance              
repair, and       calibration should be governed  requirements, strategy,  
calibration       by a formal maintenance and     and schedule,            
                     repair process to ensure that   prioritized based on     
                     malfunctioning equipment is     relative importance of   
                     promptly repaired, spare parts  the components.          
                     are available, and equipment                             
                     is properly calibrated.         oSite has adequate       
                                                     resources to maintain or 
                                                     repair MPC&A systems.    
                                                                              
                                                     oSite has a documented   
                                                     calibration plan.        
Performance       Performance testing and         oSite has an internal or 
testing and       operational monitoring allows   external review system   
operational       site MPC&A organizations to     to evaluate MPC&A system 
monitoring        assess the effectiveness of     performance.             
                     MPC&A components and systems                             
                     and to take corrective actions  oSite has evidence of    
                     when deficiencies are           identifying and          
                     identified.                     correcting MPC&A         
                                                     deficiencies.            
MPC&A system      MPC&A systems operate as part   oSite has a              
configuration     of the overall nuclear          configuration control    
management        operations at a site.           plan or similar          
                     Configuration management        document.                
                     systems are designed to ensure                           
                     that changes in site            oChanges to              
                     operations do not compromise    configuration are        
                     the effectiveness of the        reviewed by appropriate  
                     site's MPC&A systems.           staff to verify that     
                                                     system effectiveness is  
                                                     not degraded.            

Source: DOE.

According to DOE, the Sustainability Guidelines provide general criteria
for DOE project teams to follow when working with their Russian
counterparts in developing sustainability programs for sites where DOE has
installed MPC&A systems. DOE officials noted that some sites may not
require assistance to address issues in each of the seven categories. For
example, many sites that store naval nuclear fuel are administered by the
Russian Navy, which has its own human resource management system and would
not require DOE assistance to address the human resource management and
site training sustainability element.

In addition, DOE and Rosatom are currently developing a joint
sustainability plan that is intended to govern sustainability activities
at the sites under Rosatom's control where DOE has installed MPC&A
systems. DOE officials told us that this joint sustainability plan may be
completed in March 2007. DOE officials believe that this plan will be an
important step in gaining Rosatom's buy-in to the concepts of
sustainability and will lead to a specific path forward and detailed plan
for funding sustainability activities for DOE, while transitioning to full
Russian responsibility in 2013. According to DOE officials, the plan will
be based largely on DOE's Sustainability Guidelines and will include the
seven key elements of sustainability outlined in those guidelines. DOE
anticipates spending about $437.8 million to provide sustainability
support to sites in Russia and other countries between fiscal year 2007
and fiscal year 2013.

While DOE's Sustainability Guidelines provide a framework for the
department's approach to sustainability implementation, the guidelines do
not call for a tracking system to assist MPC&A management in assessing the
progress being made toward DOE's goal of providing Russia a sustainable
MPC&A system by 2013. Currently, DOE's Metrics Information Management
System (MIMS) contains data detailing the department's progress in
implementing the MPC&A program by tracking the number of buildings and
sites where DOE has installed security upgrades, among other things. DOE
also uses MIMS to track some measures of progress in their sustainability
efforts, such as the development of site-specific plans that document how
MPC&A site management will plan, budget, direct, monitor, and evaluate all
MPC&A systems. DOE managers use MIMS as a tool in their oversight of the
MPC&A program. However, DOE officials acknowledged that the current MIMS
data do not provide an accurate picture of the department's progress
toward its goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for
funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by
2013. Expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements
could give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A
program's progress toward the goal of preparing Russia to take full
responsibility for funding the maintenance and sustainability of
U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Further, DOE officials told us that improved
tracking of sustainability implementation would be useful to allow the
department to provide more accurate information to the Congress on DOE's
progress in its sustainability efforts.

DOE's Ability to Ensure That U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades at Nuclear
Material Sites Are Being Sustained May Be Hampered by Access Difficulties,
Funding Concerns, and Other Issues

Several challenges could impact DOE's ability to prepare Russia to sustain
security upgrades on its own at sites that house weapons-usable nuclear
material, including: (1) access difficulties at some sites, (2) the
limited financial ability of some Russian sites to maintain DOE-funded
MPC&A equipment, (3) the lack of certification of some DOE-funded MPC&A
equipment, and (4) delays in installing the MPC&A Operations Monitoring
(MOM) system at Rosatom facilities.

oAccording to DOE officials, Russia has denied DOE access at some sites
after the completion of security upgrades, making it difficult for the
department to ensure that funds intended for sustainability of U.S.-funded
upgrades are being properly spent. For example, at one facility where DOE
completed upgrades in 1998, DOE officials were denied access from 1999
through 2002. DOE officials told us that after commissioning the MPC&A
system at this facility, the department had not developed specific plans
for sustaining the U.S.-funded security equipment. Upon returning to the
facility in September 2002, DOE officials found that the U.S.-funded
security upgrades were in a severe state of disrepair. As a result, DOE
has had to spend about $800,000 to correct problems resulting from the
site's inability to properly maintain the U.S.-funded security upgrades.
According to DOE officials, these security upgrade replacement efforts are
scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2007.

oDespite improvements in the Russian economy, some sites may not be
financially able to maintain DOE-funded security upgrades. The Russian
economy has improved since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and
the financial troubles of the late 1990s.^20 In September 2006, the Deputy
Head of Rosatom stated that Russia is no longer in need of U.S. assistance
and that it is easier and more convenient for Russia to pay for its own
domestic nuclear security projects. However, during our visit to Russia,
officials at three of the four civilian nuclear research institutes we
visited told us that they are concerned about their sites' financial
ability to maintain U.S.-funded security upgrades after U.S. assistance
ends. Some of these sites do not receive regular funds from the Russian
government to support the operation and maintenance of their MPC&A
systems. As a result, Russian site officials told us that, after DOE
financial support ends in 2013, they will likely face difficult choices
about how to pay for maintenance of the security upgrades DOE has
provided.

oSome U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment is not certified for use at Russian
facilities, which means that the Russian government may not pay for its
maintenance. Certification is a mandatory Russian regulatory requirement
designed to ensure the functionality, safety, and security of specific
equipment, products, and technology used in Russian nuclear sites.
Certification of U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment must be obtained before it
can be legally used at Russian nuclear sites. DOE has historically
maintained that certification is a Russian responsibility, and current DOE
policy generally precludes funding for certification of equipment. Despite
repeated attempts to persuade Russia to fund equipment certification, DOE
is paying for some equipment to be certified on a case-by-case basis.
According to DOE officials, some sites have equipment or MPC&A systems
that are not fully certified for use. For example, at eight sites that
house weapons-usable nuclear material, DOE-funded equipment used to make
accurate measurements of the type and quantity of nuclear material stored
at these sites has not been certified for use. Unless this equipment
receives certification in the near future, DOE may be forced to pay for
maintenance longer than it intends. Rosatom and DOE also have established
a Joint Certification Working Group that is developing a joint plan to
certify key equipment items. DOE developed the Equipment Certification and
Vendor Support project in 1998 to provide DOE project managers with
accurate information on the Russian certification process. DOE spent $23.6
million on this project through the end of fiscal year 2006.

oThere have been delays installing the MOM system at some Rosatom
facilities. In February 2001, we recommended that DOE develop a system, in
cooperation with Russia, to monitor, on a long-term basis, the security
systems installed at the Russian sites to ensure that they continue to
detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear
material.^21 In response to this recommendation, DOE developed the MOM
system, consisting of off-the-shelf video cameras and other equipment
designed to allow Russian officials to ensure that MPC&A systems are
properly staffed, personnel are vigilant, and key security procedures are
enforced. DOE officials told us in 2002 they anticipated that the MOM
system would be an integral part of DOE's sustainability assistance to
Russian sites. However, through the end of fiscal year 2006, only five
sites with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE installed security
upgrades had the MOM system.^22 While DOE also plans to install equipment
at two additional sites in fiscal year 2007, none of the seven sites where
DOE has installed or plans to install MOM systems is controlled by
Rosatom. Rosatom has been unwilling to allow DOE to install MOM systems at
sites under its control.^23 Unfortunately, DOE was unable to anticipate
Rosatom's resistance to the MOM system and, in 2002, the department
pre-purchased MOM equipment for use at Rosatom facilities. As a result,
DOE has had to pay for storage and upkeep of 367 MOM cameras and other
equipment since 2002. DOE officials told us that if Rosatom decides not to
allow MOM equipment at its sites, the excess equipment may be used by
other DOE programs, such as the Second Line of Defense program, which
works with Russia to combat nuclear smuggling by installing radiation
detection equipment at key border crossings. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE
had spent a total of $20.5 million on the MOM project, including about
$270,000 to pay for storage and upkeep of unused MOM equipment that has
been in storage since 2002.

Access Difficulties at Some Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites May Prohibit DOE
and DOD from Ensuring That Security Upgrades Are Being Sustained

DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security
upgrades at nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent the
agencies from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither department
has reached an agreement with the Russian MOD on access procedures for
sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage sites where the
agencies are installing security upgrades. Site access is needed to ensure
that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia maintain security upgrades
at these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the Russian
MOD on access procedures for sustainability activities at these 44 sites,
or develop acceptable alternatives to physical access, the agencies will
be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly
sustained and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts.

DOE and DOD have formed an informal working group to more effectively
coordinate their efforts on sustainability of security upgrades at Russian
nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD have agreed in principle that the seven
elements of sustainability outlined in DOE's Sustainability Guidelines
will be applied to the agencies' efforts to help the Russian MOD sustain
security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD's joint plan to
address sustainability at Russian nuclear warhead sites uses a
three-phased approach, (1) addressing processes and procedural issues, (2)
establishing regional training and maintenance centers, and (3) providing
site-level assistance, such as warrantees and spare parts.

oFirst, DOE is assisting the Russian MOD with the development of
regulations, operating procedures, and an independent inspections process
to help ensure that security systems continue to operate as intended.
Similarly, DOD has supported the development of a personnel reliability
program for the 12^th Main Directorate of the MOD and DOE is planning to
support a similar program for the Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket
Forces.

oSecond, DOE and DOD have funded the construction of regional training and
maintenance centers. For example, DOE recently completed construction of
the Kola Technical Center, near Murmansk, Russia, which serves as the
centralized training and maintenance facility for all Russian MOD sites in
the Murmansk region, both naval nuclear
fuel sites and nuclear warhead storage sites.^24 The Kola Technical Center
was commissioned in fall 2005, and Russian MOD officials told us that the
facility will help them prepare to assume full financial responsibility
for maintenance and sustainability when U.S. assistance ends.

oFinally, at the site level, once DOE and DOD come to agreement with the
Russian MOD on verification of sustainability assistance, they will assist
in sustaining the upgraded security systems with a focus on training and
developing the Russian MOD's capability to maintain the modernized
systems. Initially, DOE and DOD will rely on contractor support for repair
of failed security systems while the Russian MOD's capability is being
developed, gradually transitioning to full Russian system support.

Although DOE and DOD are working closely to provide sustainability
assistance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites, differences exist in
the length of time DOE and DOD intend to fund sustainability activities at
these sites. Specifically, DOE intends to fund sustainability until 2013,
while DOD plans to halt funding in 2011. This has the potential to cause
difficulties for the Russian MOD when it comes to funding sustainability
earlier at sites where DOD installed security upgrades. In addition, DOD
plans no further support with respect to sustainability for warhead
transportation upgrades it has provided to the Russian MOD, because,
according to DOD officials, the Russian MOD has not requested assistance
for this activity.

Conclusions

DOE and DOD have made significant progress in helping Russia and other
countries improve security at vulnerable sites housing weapons-usable
nuclear material and nuclear warheads. Since our 2003 report, DOE has
worked with Russia to resolve many of the access difficulties that we
reported, especially at sites within the Rosatom weapons complex. However,
in our view, DOE's current metric for reporting progress on the number of
buildings secured by its MPC&A program provides the Congress with a
potentially misleading assessment of the security at these facilities.
Specifically, DOE should not report to the Congress that buildings with
weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries are "secure"
until all DOE risk reduction goals have been achieved, and all planned
upgrades at those buildings are completed. Currently, DOE considers
buildings to be "secured" after only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid
upgrades) are installed, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are
planned. Rapid upgrades do not include the majority of measures DOE uses
to address the threat of insider theft at Russian nuclear sites, which DOE
considers to be one of its most pressing concerns. DOE provides most
upgrades designed to address the insider threat during the comprehensive
upgrades phase. Further, DOE officials told us that comprehensive upgrades
are necessary to achieve all risk reduction goals at buildings with
nuclear material, calling into question DOE's decision to report buildings
without such upgrades completed as "secure."

As DOE nears the completion of its security upgrade work in its MPC&A
program, the sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in
Russia and other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring
that the substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is
not wasted. DOE and Rosatom have been cooperating to develop a joint
sustainability plan for the majority of sites where DOE has installed
MPC&A upgrades. We believe this is a critical step in gaining agreement on
what remains to be done before DOE transfers full responsibility for
sustainability of MPC&A upgrades to Russia in 2013. While DOE uses its
Metrics Information Management System to track some measures of progress
in its sustainability efforts, DOE officials acknowledged that the current
MIMS data do not provide an accurate picture of the department's progress
toward its goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for
funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by
2013. Creating a new management information system for sustainability or
expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements could
give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A program's
progress on sustainability and would aid the department in providing the
Congress with a more accurate assessment of the progress made toward DOE's
goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material
and warheads in Russia and other countries, we recommend that the
Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of NNSA, take the
following two actions:

orevise the metrics used to measure progress in the MPC&A program to
better reflect the level of completion of security upgrades at buildings
reported as "secure;" and

odevelop a sustainability management system or modify the Metrics
Information Management System to more clearly track DOE's progress in
developing a sustainable MPC&A system across all sites where it has
installed MPC&A upgrades, including evaluations of progress for each of
the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in DOE's Sustainability
Guidelines.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOE generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no
written comments on our report. DOE and DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

In its comments, DOE provided additional information about the metric it
uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its reasons for not using EVM
on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to work with Rosatom on
sustainability issues. DOE agreed that the current metric it uses to track
progress in the MPC&A program may be confusing. DOE wrote that it is
changing the metric to one that more accurately identifies the level of
completion for upgrades. Similarly, DOE officials told us in January 2007
that they were taking steps to modify the progress metric. However, in
February 2007, DOE issued its Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, which did
not include modifications to clarify the confusions DOE agrees are present
in its progress metric. As a result, DOE's most recent budget
justification continues to present the Congress with an unclear picture of
the progress made in improving security at buildings with weapons-useable
nuclear material in Russia and other countries because DOE's progress
metric does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed
at some buildings that the department lists as being "secure."

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Secretaries of Energy and Defense; the Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
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available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are
listed in appendix VI.

Gene Aloise
Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

We performed our review of U.S. efforts to assist Russia and other
countries in securing nuclear materials and warheads at the Departments of
Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD) and State (State); the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) in Washington, D.C.; the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency in Fort Belvior, Virginia; Oak Ridge National Laboratory
in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New
Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. We
visited Russia to discuss the implementation of U.S. nuclear material and
warhead security assistance programs with Russian officials. We also spoke
with officials from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, DOE's Moscow office, and
the DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Office in Moscow.

While in Russia we met with officials from the Federal Agency for Atomic
Energy of the Russian Federation (Rosatom), Rostekhnadzor (the Russian
nuclear regulatory authority), and the Ministry of Defense
(MOD)--including representatives from the 12^th Main Directorate, Navy,
and Strategic Rocket Forces. We requested visits to the Institute of
Nuclear Materials, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering,
Interdepartmental Special Training Center, Russian Methodological Training
Center, and All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics
(also known as Chelyabinsk-70 and Snezhinsk), but Rosatom denied us access
to all facilities under its control, including these. In fact, we were
denied access to some Russian sites GAO officials had visited during past
reviews of U.S. nonproliferation programs. Rosatom officials told us that
because our names were not on the list of 185 individuals provided by DOE
for access under the terms of a 2001 access arrangement, we would not be
allowed to visit any Rosatom facilities. Rosatom officials did not deny
our request for access until we had already arrived in Russia to begin our
fieldwork for this review. In addition, the Russian MOD denied our request
to visit a naval nuclear fuel facility, Site 49, and a naval nuclear
warhead facility near Murmansk, Russia, due to military exercises
scheduled near these sites during the time of our visit.

We were able meet our audit objectives by visiting four sites--civilian,
educational, and research institutes that are not under Rosatom's
control--where DOE had provided security upgrades through NNSA's Materials
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program: Karpov Institute for
Physical Chemistry, Kurchatov Institute, Joint Institute for Nuclear
Research, and Moscow State Engineering and Physics Institute. During our
visits to these sites, we discussed the implementation of the MPC&A
program, sustainability of U.S.-funded MPC&A upgrades, and the future of
DOE cooperation with Russian officials. In addition, we visited a training
facility near Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training
to Russian MOD personnel in the Murmansk region.

To assess the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other countries
secure nuclear material, we had discussions with officials from NNSA's
MPC&A program, DOE's contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia
National Laboratories, and experts from nongovernmental organizations that
specialize in nuclear nonproliferation. We reviewed various program
documents, including the MPC&A Programmatic Guidelines, MPC&A Program
Management Document, project work plans, and the DOE-Rosatom Joint Action
Plan. We also analyzed financial information detailing program
expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, and contract data
for expenditures of the MPC&A program through the end of fiscal year 2006.
To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned key database
officials about data entry access, internal control procedures, and the
accuracy and completeness of the data, following up with further
questions, as necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data
were noted in the documentation of our work, we determined that the data
we received were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To assess the progress DOE and DOD have made in assisting Russia with
securing nuclear warheads, we reviewed documents and had discussions with
officials from NNSA's MPC&A program, DOE's contractors at Oak Ridge and
Sandia National Laboratories, DOD's Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We spoke with
officials from the Russian MOD and visited a training facility near
Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training to Russian MOD
personnel. We analyzed financial information detailing program
expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, and contract data
from both DOE and DOD through the end of fiscal year 2006. To assess the
reliability of these data, we questioned key database officials about on
data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and
completeness of the data, following up with further questions, as
necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data were noted in
the documentation of our work, we determined that these data were also
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

In addition, we reviewed guidance on government contracting, including the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-11, DOD Earned Value
Management (EVM) Implementation Guide, and DOE Order
413.3A.^1 After reviewing this guidance, we requested copies of DOE and
DOD's ongoing contracts valued over $20 million for work to help Russia
and other countries secure nuclear material and warheads. To determine how
DOE's large contracts were being managed, we reviewed contract documents
and identified a requirement for quarterly reporting in the contracts. We
contacted the Contracting Officers identified in the contracts to request
information on how the contracts are managed in respect to applicable
criteria required by OMB and DOE directives. Additionally, we reviewed
DOD's large contracts for installing security upgrades at Russian nuclear
warhead sites and reviewed documentation from DOD's contractors, Bechtel
National, Inc., and Raytheon Technical Services. After analyzing these
contracts and other related documentation, we determined that both of
DOD's contracts reflected an EVM system. DOD provided us with
certification documentation for Bechtel and Raytheon's EVM systems, a
requirement called for by federal guidance for all EVM systems. Since the
scope of work within the Bechtel contract was at or near completion, we
evaluated only the contract performance management for Raytheon, in order
to determine how DOD was executing and managing its large contracts for
security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOD provided Raytheon's cost
performance reports which GAO contracting experts assessed for cost and
schedule variances in contracted work. After review of Raytheon's cost
performance reports, we determined that shortfalls in scheduled work were
resulting in a schedule variance equivalent to around $13 million.^2

To assess the efforts undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the
sustainability and continued use of U.S.-funded security upgrades, we had
discussions with officials from NNSA's MPC&A program; DOE's contractors at
Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories; DOD's Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency. We analyzed program documents, including DOE's May 2004 interim
Sustainability Guidelines, DOE's December 2006 final Sustainability
Guidelines, DOE-DOD Joint Sustainability Task Force documents, DOE-Rosatom
Joint Sustainability Working Group documents, and project work plans. We
interviewed program officials responsible for the development of DOE's
Sustainability Guidelines and program managers responsible for
implementing them. We also discussed the sustainability of U.S.-funded
upgrades with Russian officials at sites we visited.

We performed our review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II

Time Line of Major Events in the History of U.S. Efforts to Secure Nuclear
Material and Warheads in Russia and Other Countries

Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable
Nuclear Material in Countries Other Than Russia

From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent a total of
$131.5 million on efforts to help countries outside of Russia secure
facilities with nuclear material (see fig. 4). Responsibility for managing
DOE's MPC&A efforts in countries outside of Russia has shifted among a
number of offices within DOE and NNSA.^1 Responsibility for sustainability
of upgrades at sites in the former Soviet Union now rests with the Office
of Weapons Material Protection within the Office of International
Materials Protection and Cooperation in NNSA. The Office of Materials
Consolidation and Civilian Sites within the Office of International
Materials Protection and Cooperation in NNSA is responsible for
implementing MPC&A efforts outside of the former Soviet Union, such as
DOE's efforts in China and India.

Figure 4: Map Showing DOE Spending by Country through the End of Fiscal
Year 2006 for MPC&A Assistance Outside of Russia

Note: In addition to the spending illustrated in the above figure, DOE
also spent $33.7 million on miscellaneous MPC&A efforts outside of Russia
through the end of fiscal year 2006. Also, all dollar amounts are rounded,
and dollars are in millions.

Belarus

DOE provided security upgrades to two buildings at one facility--the Sosny
Scientific and Technical Center (now known as the Joint Institute of Power
and Nuclear Research-Sosny)--in Belarus. DOE began work at this site in
April 1994, and the initial phase of MPC&A upgrades was completed in
December 1997. After this, DOE was unable to conduct additional work in
the country due to sanctions the United States had placed on Belarus.^2
However, in May 2003, the Department of State modified its position and
allowed a team from DOE to visit Sosny solely to review the status of the
MPC&A systems provided with U.S. funds. The DOE team visited the site in
June 2003 and noted several security deficiencies that required immediate
improvement. Shortly thereafter, DOE received approval from the Department
of State to return to Belarus to perform a comprehensive vulnerability
assessment at the Sosny site. According to DOE officials, the Department
of State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund allocated $250,000 for
design work and $1.6 million for further upgrades in 2003 and 2005,
respectively. Since there is currently no government-to-government
agreement between the United States and Belarus, the project is being
administered via the International Scientific and Technical Center's
Partners Program. However, no funding has been spent yet because the
Belarusian government suspended the project due to concerns over sharing
information with a foreign entity. In the fall of 2006, Belarus indicated
that it was again ready to move forward with the project. DOE sent a team
to Sosny in December 2006 and was able to re-establish relations, as well
as, develop a statement of work for the design of a communications system
for the site and a project work plan for material control and accounting.
Additional trips are planned for February and April 2007. DOE hopes to
complete a second phase of MPC&A upgrades at the site in fiscal year 2008.
In total, DOE spent about $3.6 million through the end of fiscal year 2006
to provide MPC&A assistance to Belarus.

China

DOE has a cooperative engagement program with China on issues related to
nuclear material security. The purpose of the engagement is to increase
awareness of our respective approaches to nuclear security issues, as well
as MPC&A methodologies and applicable technologies, and to work
cooperatively to improve security in these areas when and where
appropriate. DOE is pursuing this objective through dialogue and technical
collaboration with the China Atomic Energy Authority in China's civilian
nuclear sector and is attempting initial engagements with the China
Academy of Engineering Physics in China's defense nuclear sector.

DOE is pursuing bilateral cooperation with the Chinese civilian nuclear
sector under the Statement of Intent signed with the China Atomic Energy
Authority in January 2004 and the DOE-China Atomic Energy Authority
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement. In February 2004, DOE and
the China Atomic Energy Authority agreed to conduct a Joint Technology
Demonstration on integrated nuclear material management in Beijing. The
purpose of this demonstration project was to promote the adoption of
modern security practices and technologies at civilian nuclear facilities
by demonstrating established physical protection, nuclear material control
and accounting, and international safeguards technologies that provide a
first line of defense against nuclear material theft, diversion, and
sabotage. The Joint Technology Demonstration took place in Beijing in
October 2005. Following the completion of the technology demonstration
project, DOE is currently discussing ideas for future bilateral work with
the China Atomic Energy Authority and the Chinese Institute of Atomic
Energy. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $4.7 million on
MPC&A cooperation with China.

Georgia

DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Georgia, the
Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tbilisi. Work began at
this site in January 1996 and was completed in May 1996, at a cost of
about $0.2 million. All fresh and spent nuclear fuel was transferred from
the facility to a secure nuclear site in Scotland in April 1998 under a
multinational effort known as Operation Auburn Endeavor.  DOE's MPC&A
program currently has no ongoing work in Georgia.

India

DOE's cooperative security engagement program with India is in its initial
stages. DOE is investigating near-term opportunities to engage India on
issues related to nuclear material security with the intent of initiating
a cooperative program with India on nuclear security best practices.
Potential issues for discussion include the theoretical framework for
developing and implementing a design basis threat; the methodology for
designing effective physical protection systems; a vulnerability
assessment methodology; regulatory infrastructure for material control and
accounting, and physical protection; and general nuclear security culture.
DOE spent about $100,000 on MPC&A cooperation with India through the end
of fiscal year 2006.

Latvia

DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Latvia, the Latvian
Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center (also known as the Latvian 
Institute of Nuclear Physics at Salaspils). Work began at this site in
July 1994 and was completed in February 1996. Since fiscal year 1994, DOE
has spent about $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this
facility. In May 2005, 2.5 kilograms of fresh highly enriched uranium
(HEU) fuel were removed from the Salaspils reactor and returned to Russia.
According to the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation (Rosatom), the HEU fuel will be downblended into low-enriched
uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear power plants. DOE's MPC&A
program currently has no ongoing work in Latvia.

Lithuania

DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Lithuania, the Ignalina
Nuclear Power Plant. Work began at this site in October 1995 and was
completed in August 1996. Since fiscal year 1996, DOE has spent about
$900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this facility. DOE
counted one building at this facility as secure in its progress metric for
the MPC&A program that tracks the number of buildings with weapons-usable
nuclear material secured, even though the facility never possessed such
material.^3 During the course of our review, we brought this to the
attention of DOE management, and they agreed to remove the facility from
the progress report in DOE's fiscal year 2008 budget justification
document. DOE's MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Lithuania.

Kazakhstan

DOE provided security upgrades to four sites in Kazakhstan: the Institute
of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, the Institute of Nuclear Physics at Alatau,
the BN-350 breeder reactor at Aktau, and the Ulba Metallurgical Plant. In
total, DOE spent about $45.3 million from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal
year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Kazakhstan.

Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov

The Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, formerly called
Semipalatinsk-21, is a branch of the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center.
Two nuclear research reactors are located at the site. DOE began providing
both physical security and material control and accounting upgrades to the
site in October 1994, and the site was commissioned in September 1997. The
perimeter security system at the site was commissioned in July 1998. DOE
plans to continue to assist the Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov with
spare parts, extended warranties, and training to sustain its MPC&A
systems in fiscal year 2007.

Institute of Nuclear Physics

The Institute of Nuclear Physics is a branch of the Kazakhstan National
Nuclear Center located in the town of Alatau. The site operates a
10-megawatt research reactor used to manufacture radioisotopes as a
radiation source for industrial and medical use, among other activities.
DOE began work at the site in September 1995 and completed upgrades in
October 1998. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear
Physics at Alatau with extended warranties and training to sustain its
MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

BN-350 Reactor at Aktau

DOE provided upgrades to two buildings at the BN-350 reactor site at
Aktau. MPC&A upgrade work began in September 1994 and was completed in
December 1998. In May 2002, HEU fuel was transferred from the BN-350
breeder reactor in Aktau to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant with the
assistance of a nongovernmental organization involved in nonproliferation
efforts--the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The HEU fuel will be downblended
into low-enriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear
reactors.

Ulba Metallurgical Plant

The Ulba Metallurgical Plant contains a low-enriched uranium fuel
fabrication facility, among other resources. The fuel fabrication facility
produces nuclear fuel pellets with a capacity of 1,000 metric tons per
year. Security upgrades work began in September 1994 and was completed in
September 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the Ulba Metallurgical
Plant with extended warranties and spare parts to sustain its MPC&A
systems in fiscal year 2007.

In addition, on November 21, 1994, 581 kilograms of HEU was transferred
from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the United States in a highly secret
project code-named "Sapphire." The project was carried out with
cooperation from the Kazakhstani government and DOE and DOD.^4  The large
stockpile of HEU, reportedly left over from the Soviet Union's secret Alfa
submarine program, had been stored at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in
unsecured and unsafeguarded facilities without electronic means of
accounting. Experts estimate the nuclear material was sufficient to make
20-25 nuclear bombs. The HEU was downblended into low-enriched uranium for
use in civilian nuclear power plants in the late 1990s.

Ukraine

DOE provided MPC&A assistance to four sites in Ukraine: Kharkiv Institute
of Physics and Technology, Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research, Sevastopol
National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, and South Ukraine
Nuclear Power Plant. In total, DOE spent about $37.7 million from fiscal
year 1993 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Ukraine,
including installation of security upgrades, maintenance of installed
MPC&A systems, and training for site personnel.

Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology

The Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology conducts nuclear fuel
cycle research and has important experimental physics facilities including
a number of electron and ion accelerators. DOE provided upgrades to one
building at this site. Security upgrades work began in May 1995 and was
completed in January 1999. DOE plans to continue to assist the Kharkiv
Institute of Physics and Technology with extended warranties and training
to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research

The Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research was established in 1970 and is
operated by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The institute's primary
function is to perform research in low- and medium-energy nuclear physics.
Security upgrades work began at one building at this site in December 1993
and was completed in October 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the
Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research with extended warranties and training
to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry

The Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry's mission
is to support Ukraine's nuclear power industry by training nuclear power
plant personnel. The facility operates a 200-kilowatt, light-water cooled,
research reactor. Security upgrades work began at one building at this
facility in May 1996 and was completed in January 1999. DOE plans to
continue to assist the Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and
Industry  with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A
systems in fiscal year 2007.

South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant

In addition to these facilities, DOE provided MPC&A upgrades to a fourth
site that does not possess weapons-usable nuclear material, the South
Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. DOE began security upgrades work at this site
in August 1994 and completed its upgrades work in January 1999. DOE
counted this facility as secured in its progress metric for the MPC&A
program, even though the facility never possessed such material. During
the course of our review, we brought this to the attention of DOE
management, and they agreed to remove the facility from their progress
report in DOE's fiscal year 2008 budget justification document. According
to DOE officials, no further MPC&A assistance is planned at this site.

Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan, DOE's project goal is to continue to enhance capabilities
and commitment to operating and maintaining security improvements at two
institutes: the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent and the Foton
facility. In total, DOE spent about $4.4 million from fiscal year 1995
through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Uzbekistan.

Institute of Nuclear Physics

Founded in 1956 as part of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the
Institute of Nuclear Physics operates a 10-megawatt research reactor.
Often described as the largest facility of its kind in central Asia, the
site has an ambitious program to become the primary nuclear research and
isotope production facility for the region. The facility maintains fresh
and irradiated nuclear fuel storage facilities to support continued
reactor operations. Security upgrades at the site began in June 1995 and
were provided by a joint team from the United States, Australia, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance
in the area of material control and accounting, while the United States
and United Kingdom agreed to provide physical protection upgrades.
Upgrades were provided in two phases. Phase I upgrades were completed in
August 1996. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE began to work
with the facility to develop a plan to further improve its security
system. Additional upgrades focused on the facility perimeter and included
the installation of new fencing and exterior intrusion detection sensors.
In addition, the Department of State provided about $0.6 million in fiscal
year 2002 through its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to supply
cameras and lighting for the facility's perimeter. All Phase II upgrades
were completed in September 2002. A commissioning ceremony was held in
October 2002. In 2006, DOE announced the removal of 63 kilograms of HEU in
the form of spent nuclear fuel from the facility. The HEU spent fuel was
returned to Russia through DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative. DOE
plans to continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear Physics with extended
warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

Foton Facility

The Foton facility has a small research reactor containing less than 5
kilograms of HEU. MPC&A upgrades at the site began in January 2005 and
were completed in May 2005. Physical security upgrades at the Foton
facility focused on the research reactor building and included such things
as intrusion detection sensors, improved access controls, and a central
alarm station. DOE plans to continue to assist the Foton facility with
extended warranties to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE's National Infrastructure and Related
Programs 

In addition to DOE's efforts to provide security upgrades at sites with
weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other
countries, the department implements other crosscutting efforts to support
the efforts of its MPC&A program, such as assistance for transportation
security, equipment for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and
efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and sites.
According to DOE officials, these efforts support DOE's goal of improving
security of vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material by
contributing to the overall security systems at nuclear materials sites in
Russia and other countries. As table 4 shows, through the end of fiscal
year 2006, DOE spent about $493.9 million on these efforts.

Table 4: DOE Spending on Crosscutting MPC&A Assistance Efforts through the
End of Fiscal Year 2006

                                        

                     Dollars in millions                                      
                           Project                                   Spending 
Material consolidation and conversion                               $128.8 
Secure transportation                                                 88.1 
Training and technical support infrastructure                         63.6 
Russian Federation inspection implementation                          43.1 
Protective forces assistance                                          30.2 
Federal Information System                                            29.1 
Regulatory development                                                27.0 
Certification^a                                                       23.6 
MPC&A operations monitoring^a                                         20.5 
MPC&A operations/sustainability^a                                     13.9 
MPC&A education                                                       13.4 
Material control and accounting measurements                          10.8 
MPC&A security culture                                                 1.3 
Taxation and customs                                                   0.5 
Total                                                               $493.9 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

^aThe certification, MPC&A operations monitoring, and MPC&A
operations/sustainability projects are discussed in the body of this
report. Dollar amounts are rounded.

Material Consolidation and Conversion

DOE's Material Consolidation and Conversion project supports the transfer
of HEU from Russian sites where it is no longer needed in order to secure
locations within Russia for eventual conversion to low-enriched uranium.
According to DOE, consolidation and conversion efforts significantly
reduce the requirements and costs of securing material. For example, in
2006, DOE announced the completion of a 2-year cooperative effort to
remove HEU from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute, a Russian
research facility located near St. Petersburg. DOE teams worked with their
Russian counterparts to validate the inventory of nuclear material and
confirm that it was securely packaged for transport. DOE paid for the HEU
to be shipped to another facility in Russia where it will be converted
(downblended) to low-enriched uranium, which will eliminate it as a
proliferation concern. Through the Material Consolidation and Conversion
project, DOE has also supported the secure storage and conversion of
Russian-origin HEU that has been returned to Russia from countries such as
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. DOE reported
in July 2006 that more than 8,000 kilograms of HEU had been downblended
into low-enriched uranium under the project. Through the end of fiscal
year 2006, DOE had spent about $128.8 million on the project.

Secure Transportation

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE
increased funding for its efforts to secure nuclear material during
transit. By providing upgraded security for transport and guard railcars,
specialized secure trucks and escort vehicles, and secure
containers--called overpacks--DOE seeks to reduce the risks of theft and
sabotage of nuclear material transported within and between nuclear
facilities in Russia. The goal of the Secure Transportation project is to
reduce the risk of theft or diversion of material or warheads during
transportation operations in Russia by improving security for railcars and
trucks, Russian nuclear material and warhead transport infrastructure, and
communications interface with response forces. Through fiscal year 2006,
DOE had spent about $88.1 million to improve the transportation security
of nuclear material in Russia, by providing 76 cargo trucks, 86 escort
vehicles, as well as 66 cargo railcars, 25 guard railcars, and 283
security overpacks. This included 54 refurbished cargo railcars, 25 new
manufactured guard railcars, 12 new manufactured cargo railcars, and
approximately 78 cargo trucks and 89 escort trucks to support both on-site
and off-site nuclear material shipments.

Training and Technical Support Infrastructure

DOE provides a variety of training and technical support to both the
Russian Navy and Rosatom to help these entities operate and maintain
U.S.-funded security upgrades and MPC&A systems. One of the primary
accomplishments of the project was the construction of the Kola Technical
Center near Murmansk. The facility was designed and constructed by DOE to
be a central training and maintenance center to support naval nuclear fuel
and warhead sites in the Murmansk region. DOE completed construction of
the Kola Technical Center in June 2005 at a cost of $24 million.^1 We
visited the facility during our trip to Russia. Russian officials told us
that the Kola Technical Center is critical to help the Russian MOD
transition to full financial responsibility for sustainability after U.S.
funding ends.

In addition, DOE provides support to Rosatom's regional training
facilities through the Rosatom Training and Technical Support
Infrastructure project. These facilities, such as the Interdepartmental
Special Training Center and the Russian Methodological and Training
Center, seek to train specialists and guard forces to safeguard materials
at Russian nuclear sites. Additionally, these centers seek to assist
Rosatom by providing effective and sustainable training and technical
support infrastructures. To date, DOE has spent $42.5 million on the
establishment of these training and technological support centers.

Russian Federation Inspection Implementation

The Russian Federation Inspection Implementation project seeks to enhance
nuclear material inspections by establishing a sustainable infrastructure
with sufficient resources to enforce MPC&A regulations through federal and
industry oversight. Under this project, DOE provides inspection support to
Rostekhnadzor, Rosatom, and other Russian ministries and agencies. The
project enhances MPC&A nuclear material inspections at the ministerial,
agency, and site-level by providing comprehensive training, inspection,
and technical assistance, as well as sufficient information technology to
aid inspectors in conducting systematic inspections. For example, DOE
assists Russian organizations in developing a systematic inspection
approach that assures the MPC&A objectives are met and assists
organizations in defining the inspection program by benchmarking proposed
inspection methodologies against U.S. and other inspection approaches.
Through fiscal year 2006, DOE has sponsored 83 inspections by Rosatom and
Rostekhnadzor, and 980 Russian personnel have attended inspection courses.
DOE's goal for the project is to maintain a cadre of about 125 trained
inspectors. DOE had spent about $43.1 million on this project through the
end of fiscal year 2006.

Protective Forces Assistance

The objective of the Protective Force Assistance project is to ensure that
a sufficient number of organized, equipped, and trained response forces
are present and able to protect against threats to highly-desirable
nuclear material at Russian and Ukrainian sites and during transit. The
project includes efforts in Russia and Ukraine, although the bulk of the
efforts and money are spent in Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent
about $26.7 million to purchase a variety of equipment, such as
bulletproof vests, helmets, response vehicles, and cold-weather uniforms
for use by the forces that protect sites that store weapons-usable nuclear
material in Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $3.4 million
to purchase the same type of equipment for Ukrainian sites.

Federal Information System

The Federal Information System (FIS) is a computerized management
information system designed to track the location and movement of nuclear
material between organizations throughout Russia. The FIS provides
information on the quantity of nuclear material located at facilities that
report to Rosatom. The system is centralized and automated to ensure that
information can be received, tracked, and monitored by Rosatom. The
development of the FIS is important to the MPC&A program because, prior to
its development, Russian nuclear facilities generally used paper-based
systems to track nuclear material inventories. The FIS will allow the
Russian government to maintain an accurate and complete inventory of its
weapons-usable nuclear material. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported that
21 organizations and facilities throughout Russia report to the FIS.
Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $29.1 million to
develop the FIS.

Regulatory Development

The purpose of the Regulatory Development project is to assist Russian
regulatory and operating agencies and services in developing a sustainable
MPC&A regulatory system for civilian nuclear materials site security and
to also provide assistance to regulatory agencies in Ukraine and
Kazakhstan. The regulatory framework establishes legal requirements for
MPC&A activities for relevant ministries, agencies, services, operating
organizations, and facilities. DOE works with Rosatom,
Rostekhnadzor--Russia's civilian nuclear regulatory authority, and other
agencies to develop consistent MPC&A requirements across ministries,
operating organizations, and facilities. In doing so, DOE aims to create
incentives for effective MPC&A procedures and sanctions for noncompliance
with regulations in order to foster a strong MPC&A culture and help
sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades. Through the end of fiscal year
2006, the project has achieved enactment of 67 regulations, which is 35
percent of the total planned. In addition, DOE has worked with the Russian
MOD to develop a comprehensive regulatory base that ensures MPC&A
practices are implemented consistently throughout all branches and
services of the Russian MOD. DOE spent about $27 million through fiscal
year 2006 on its regulatory development projects.

MPC&A Education

The MPC&A Education project supports efforts in Russia to train existing
and future MPC&A experts. The project consists of two educational degree
programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute and one degree
program at Tomsk Polytechnic University. The first educational degree
program is the MPC&A Graduate Program available only at the Moscow
Engineering Physics Institute. DOE worked with both the Moscow Engineering
Physics Institute and Tomsk Polytechnic University to develop an
undergraduate engineering program, focusing on more technical, hands-on
aspects of nuclear security. For each of these degree programs, DOE works
with the two universities to develop curriculum; identify and acquire
training aids; develop and publish textbooks; and strengthen instructor
skills. In addition, DOE works with the Monterey Institute of
International Studies^2 to support the instruction of nontechnical
nonproliferation courses at universities and high schools located outside
of Moscow. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $13.4
million on the project.

Material Control and Accounting Measurements

The Material Control and Accounting Measurements project provides support
to Russia for developing a national system of reference materials
(standards), nuclear material measurement methods, instruments, and
infrastructure to support the accurate measurement and accounting of
weapons-usable nuclear material at Russian facilities. Reference
materials, measurement methods, and instruments are needed to accurately
measure the quantity and isotopic composition of nuclear material during
inventories and transfers for input into accountability databases.
Accurate material control and accounting measurements are key components
to any MPC&A system. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $10.8
million under this project and has purchased and distributed transportable
equipment that allows for the testing of uranium and plutonium.

MPC&A Security Culture

The MPC&A Security Culture project supports the overall MPC&A goal of
assisting Russia with enhancing its capabilities and strengthening its
commitment to operating and maintaining improved nuclear security by
fostering the development of training centers and developing an outreach
strategy to enhance partner countries' awareness and understanding of
MPC&A benefits, e.g., an MPC&A security "culture." The main objective of
this project is to establish an infrastructure that emphasizes the
importance of MPC&A and increase the commitment throughout Russia to
operate and maintain MPC&A systems with minimal U.S. support by
reinforcing the necessary attitudes and beliefs required to instill a
strong MPC&A culture. Accomplishments under this project include training
1,800 staff in security culture and initiating a pilot security culture
coordinator project at nine sites. Through the end of fiscal year 2006,
DOE had spent about $1.3 million on the MPC&A Security Culture project.

In addition to its efforts to improve the security culture at Russian
nuclear sites, DOE recently conducted a series of workshops for Russian
officials on MPC&A best practices at U.S. nuclear sites. The workshops
included presentations by U.S. MPC&A experts. In conducting this workshop
series, DOE intends to further enhance the security culture at Russian
sites by working to educate Russian site officials on the methods used at
U.S. facilities, so that these best practices can be applied at Russian
sites.

Taxation and Customs

The MPC&A Taxation and Customs project began in 1999 to meet a
congressional mandate that U.S. nuclear safety and security programs not
pay taxes in Russia. The MPC&A program must obtain a certified tax
exemption when providing technical equipment and services. The Taxation
and Customs project assists DOE project teams' understanding of taxation
and customs issues and ensures compliance with Russian laws. The project
stays abreast of Russian taxation and customs legislation, as well as
guidance on bureaucracy and requirements for tax exemption, by holding
workshops for Russian sites; tracking the tax-exemption process; and
maintaining a taxation Web site for DOE project teams. Through the end of
fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $0.5 million on the project.

Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix VI

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or [email protected]

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, R. Stockton Butler, Jeffery
Hartnett, Lisa Henson, and Jim Shafer made significant contributions to
this report. Other assistance was provided by John Delicath, Jennifer
Echard, Brandon Haller, Gregory Marchand, Keith Rhodes, and Karen Richey.

Related GAO Products

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some DOE
Projects in Russia and Other Countries. [64]GAO-05-828 . Washington, D.C.:
August 29, 2005.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal
Controls, but Challenges Remain. [65]GAO-05-329 . Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2005.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. [66]GAO-05-157 . Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.
[67]GAO-03-482 . Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving;
Further Enhancements Needed. [68]GAO-01-312 . Washington, D.C.: February
28, 2001.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material
Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. RCED/NSIAD-00-82.
Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost
More, Achieve Less Than Planned. NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April 13,
1999.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. NSIAD/RCED-96-89.
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S.
Dismantlement Assistance. NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1993.

(360674)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [70]GAO-07-404 , a report to congressional requesters

February 2007

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the
Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain

Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make
nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United
States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) have
worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear
material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE
established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has
made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other
countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving security at
Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD have undertaken
to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. To
address these objectives, among other things, GAO analyzed agency
documents, conducted interviews with key program officials, and visited
four Russian nuclear sites.

[71]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE (1) revise the metrics it uses to track progress
in securing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material and (2) develop
a management information system to track DOE's progress in providing
Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

DOE agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. DOD did not provide
written comments.

Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to provide
security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other
countries that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads. With
regard to securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have "secured" 175
buildings and plans to improve security at 35 additional buildings by the
end of 2008. However, DOE's reported total of buildings "secured" does not
recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some
buildings because DOE considers a building "secured" after it has received
only limited MPC&A upgrades, even when additional comprehensive upgrades
are planned. Further, DOE and Russia have developed a Joint Action Plan
that includes 20 sites and details the remaining work to be accomplished
by 2008. However, the plan does not include two sites containing many
buildings with vast amounts of nuclear material where Russia has denied
DOE access.

DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead sites
and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. The
departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our 2003
report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies
for installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead sites.
Additionally, DOE and DOD are using similar approaches to manage large
security upgrade contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned value
management (EVM), which at early stages can identify cost and schedule
shortfalls. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts, but, during
the course of GAO's review, augmented its contract oversight to increase
reporting frequency, which DOE officials consider a comparable alternative
to EVM.

DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure
that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded
security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S.
assistance ends and is working with Russia to develop a joint
sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management information system to
track the progress made toward its goal of providing Russia with a
sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. DOE and DOD's abilities to ensure the
sustainability of U.S.-funded security upgrades may be hampered by access
difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, DOE and DOD
plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security upgrades at
nuclear warhead sites but have not reached agreement with Russia on access
procedures for sustainability visits to 44 sites. As a result, the
agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are
being properly sustained.

References

Visible links
  64. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-828
  65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-329
  66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-157
  67. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-482
  68. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-312
  70. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404
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