    Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at
    Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of
    U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain (28-FEB-07,
    GAO-07-404).

    Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to
    make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of
    the United States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE)
    and Defense (DOD) have worked to improve security at sites
    housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia
    and other countries. In 1995, DOE established the Materials
    Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement
    these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in
    improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other
    countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving
    security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE
    and DOD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of
    U.S.-funded security upgrades. To address these objectives, among
    other things, GAO analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews
    with key program officials, and visited four Russian nuclear
    sites.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-404
        ACCNO:   A66352
      TITLE:     Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving
    Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term
    Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain
         DATE:   02/28/2007
      SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries
    	     Foreign governments
    	     International agreements
    	     International cooperation
    	     International relations
    	     Nuclear facilities
    	     Nuclear facility security
    	     Nuclear materials
    	     Nuclear proliferation
    	     Nuclear weapons
    	     Nuclear weapons plant security
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Strategic planning
    	     DOE Materials Protection, Control, and
    	     Accounting program

    	     Russia

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    GAO-07-404

         * [1]Report to Congressional Requesters

              * [2]February 2007

         * [3]NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

              * [4]Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites,
                but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades
                Is Uncertain

         * [5]Contents

              * [6]Results in Brief
              * [7]Background
              * [8]Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to
                Provide Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and
                Other Countries, but DOE's Reporting of the Number of Buildings
                Secured May Be Misleading

                   * [9]Through the End of Fiscal Year 2006, DOE Spent About $1.3
                     Billion for Security Upgrades and Other Related Assistance
                     at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other Countries
                   * [10]DOE Considers Buildings "Secure" After Only Limited or
                     "Rapid" Upgrades Have Been Installed, Even When More
                     Comprehensive Upgrades Are Planned
                   * [11]DOE Is Examining the Impact of an Increased Design Basis
                     Threat for Its MPC&A Program
                   * [12]DOE Plans to Complete All Security Upgrades Work by the
                     End of 2008 but Lacks Access or Agreement to Work at Two Key
                     Sites That Contain Vast Amounts of Nuclear Material

              * [13]DOD and DOE Have Spent About $920 Million to Help Russia
                Secure 62 Nuclear Warhead Sites and to Improve Warhead
                Transportation Security

                   * [14]DOE and DOD Helped Russia Improve Security at 62 Nuclear
                     Warhead Storage Sites and Provided Assistance to Improve
                     Security of Warheads in Transit
                   * [15]Coordination between DOE and DOD's Nuclear Warhead
                     Security Efforts in Russia Has Improved
                   * [16]DOE and DOD Use Similar Systems to Manage Large
                     Contracts to Improve Security at Russian Nuclear Warhead
                     Sites

              * [17]Long-term Sustainability of U.S.- Funded Security Upgrades Is
                Uncertain because Access Problems and Other Issues May Hamper DOE
                and DOD Sustainability Efforts

                   * [18]DOE Issued Guidelines to Direct Its Efforts to Help
                     Russia Prepare to Maintain U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades
                     without DOE Assistance
                   * [19]DOE's Ability to Ensure That U.S.-Funded Security
                     Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites Are Being Sustained May
                     Be Hampered by Access Difficulties, Funding Concerns, and
                     Other Issues
                   * [20]Access Difficulties at Some Russian Nuclear Warhead
                     Sites May Prohibit DOE and DOD from Ensuring That Security
                     Upgrades Are Being Sustained

              * [21]Conclusions
              * [22]Recommendations for Executive Action
              * [23]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

         * [24]Scope and Methodology
         * [25]Time Line of Major Events in the History of U.S. Efforts to Secure
           Nuclear Material and Warheads in Russia and Other Countries
         * [26]Additional Information on DOE Efforts to Secure Sites with
           Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material in Countries Other Than Russia

              * [27]Belarus
              * [28]China
              * [29]Georgia
              * [30]India
              * [31]Latvia
              * [32]Lithuania
              * [33]Kazakhstan

                   * [34]Institute of Atomic Energy- Kurchatov
                   * [35]Institute of Nuclear Physics
                   * [36]BN-350 Reactor at Aktau
                   * [37]Ulba Metallurgical Plant

              * [38]Ukraine

                   * [39]Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology
                   * [40]Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research
                   * [41]Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and
                     Industry
                   * [42]South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant

              * [43]Uzbekistan

                   * [44]Institute of Nuclear Physics
                   * [45]Foton Facility

         * [46]Additional Information on DOE's National Infrastructure and
           Related Programs

              * [47]Material Consolidation and Conversion
              * [48]Secure Transportation
              * [49]Training and Technical Support Infrastructure
              * [50]Russian Federation Inspection Implementation
              * [51]Protective Forces Assistance
              * [52]Federal Information System
              * [53]Regulatory Development
              * [54]MPC&A Education
              * [55]Material Control and Accounting Measurements
              * [56]MPC&A Security Culture
              * [57]Taxation and Customs

         * [58]Comments from the Department of Energy
         * [59]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
         * [60]Related GAO Products

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    February 2007

    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the
    Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain

    Contents

    Tables

    Figures

    February 28, 2007
    Letter

    The Honorable Carl Levin
    Chairman
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
    The Honorable Norm Coleman
    Ranking Member
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    United States Senate

    The Honorable John D. Dingell
    Chairman
    Committee on Energy and Commerce
    House of Representatives

    Safeguarding nuclear warheads and nuclear materials that can be used to
    make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United
    States and Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the
    largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world with unclassified U.S.
    estimates of the number of Russia's nuclear warheads at the end of the
    cold war ranging from 18,000 to 25,000. Russia also inherited an estimated
    600 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium--materials that
    could be used to build nuclear weapons.^1 Terrorists or countries seeking
    nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched
    uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to construct a nuclear weapon. During
    the Soviet era, security systems at Soviet nuclear sites emphasized heavy
    surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those who
    violated security procedures. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and
    subsequent social, political, and economic changes in Russia and other
    former Soviet republics exposed gaps in the physical security and material
    accounting at sites containing nuclear material and revealed weaknesses in
    these countries' abilities to secure nuclear sites against internal and
    external threats of theft.

    Since the early 1990s, there has been concern that unsecured nuclear or
    radioactive material could fall into the hands of terrorists and be
    smuggled into the United States for use in a nuclear weapon or a device
    that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a
    "dirty bomb"). For example, in January 2007, international media reported
    that authorities in Georgia had seized about 100 grams of highly enriched
    uranium from a Russian citizen who was attempting to sell the material on
    the black market.^2 Key to the United States' efforts to combat this
    threat is securing nuclear materials and warheads at vulnerable civilian
    and military sites in the former Soviet Union and other countries. In
    1991, the Congress authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish
    the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
    and Kazakhstan secure and protect former Soviet nuclear weapons.^3 Members
    of the Congress were concerned that nuclear weapons or materials might be
    lost, stolen, or sold and that nuclear scientists and technicians might be
    persuaded to sell their knowledge to nations or terrorists seeking to
    develop nuclear weapons. Between fiscal years 1992 and 2006, the Congress
    authorized about $9 billion for a variety of nuclear nonproliferation
    programs implemented by DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE), including
    efforts to help Russia and other countries secure sites where nuclear
    material and warheads are located. In 1993, DOE and the Russian government
    began working together to secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear
    material and, in 1995, DOE established the

    Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which is
    now administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).^4
    Through its MPC&A program,^5 DOE has provided nuclear facilities in Russia
    and other countries with modern nuclear security systems that include the
    following, among other things:

    ophysical protection systems, such as fences around buildings containing
    nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where nuclear materials
    are stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor storage rooms;

    omaterial control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material
    containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the
    containers, and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into
    areas containing nuclear material; and

    omaterial accounting systems, such as nuclear measurement equipment and
    computerized databases to inventory the amount and type of nuclear
    material contained in specific buildings and to track their location.

    In 1998, DOE issued guidelines that provide a systematic approach for DOE
    program managers to develop and implement MPC&A systems that meet DOE's
    objective of helping Russia and other countries secure buildings with
    weapons-usable nuclear material and nuclear warhead storage sites.^6 DOE
    seeks to improve security at nuclear sites in Russia and other countries
    by providing security upgrades that protect against threats of theft from
    both internal adversaries, such as disgruntled nuclear workers (called the
    "insider" threat), and external adversaries, such as terrorist groups. DOE
    conducts these site security upgrades in two phases known as "rapid"
    upgrades and "comprehensive" upgrades.

    oRapid upgrades include such improvements as bricking up windows in
    buildings where nuclear material is stored; installing strengthened doors,
    locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing controlled access areas
    around nuclear material; and implementing procedures that require the
    presence of two people when nuclear material is handled (called the
    "two-person rule"). Rapid upgrades are primarily designed to be simple,
    easy to implement and maintain, and result in immediate, though limited,
    improvements to nuclear material security. Rapid upgrades include upgrades
    designed to detect and delay external adversaries and sometimes include
    basic material control and accounting equipment and procedures that can be
    implemented during a 6-to-12 month period.

    oComprehensive upgrades include electronic sensors, motion detectors, and
    closed circuit television systems to detect intruders; central alarm
    stations, where guards can monitor cameras and alarms; and computerized
    nuclear material accounting systems. Comprehensive upgrades are designed
    to secure against both internal and external threats and are usually put
    in place over the 18-to-24 months after the rapid upgrades have been
    installed but can be installed concurrently in some cases.

    Buildings that contain nuclear material, which DOE considers to be of a
    high proliferation threat receive both rapid and comprehensive upgrades,
    and buildings with nuclear material of less concern may receive only rapid
    upgrades. In addition to providing security upgrades, DOE provides a
    variety of training to foreign officials and nuclear site personnel on how
    to operate MPC&A systems.

    In February 2006, DOE changed the metrics it uses to track progress in its
    MPC&A program from measuring the percentage of nuclear material secured
    (out of the estimated 600 metric tons of loose nuclear material in the
    former Soviet Union) to measuring the number of buildings in Russia and
    other countries with weapons-usable nuclear material that have been
    secured.^7 DOE currently plans to secure 210 buildings containing
    weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries by the end
    of 2008.

    The United States has also assisted Russia in improving security at
    nuclear warhead storage sites, both temporary sites, such as rail transfer
    points, and permanent sites containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began
    assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) with enhancing
    transportation security for nuclear warheads and security at nuclear
    warhead sites. Also, in 1998, at Russia's request, DOE expanded the scope
    of its efforts with the Russian Navy from protecting naval reactor fuel to
    helping secure nuclear warheads. In February 2005, President Bush and
    Russian President Putin issued a joint statement on nuclear security
    cooperation, including enhanced cooperation on nuclear terrorism
    prevention efforts.^8 In 2006, Presidents Bush and Putin reaffirmed their
    commitment to completing security upgrades at nuclear material and warhead
    sites in Russia by the end of 2008.^9 DOE and DOD plan to help Russia
    secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by the end of 2008.

    After completing the installation of site security upgrades, DOE and DOD
    provide ongoing technical and financial support to help ensure that
    U.S.-funded security upgrades continue to reduce the risk of theft at
    foreign nuclear sites. These efforts are known as sustainability
    activities. Sustainability support is necessary to ensure that U.S.-funded
    security upgrades are properly maintained and continue to support risk
    reduction goals as intended. However, security of nuclear material and
    warheads in Russia and other countries ultimately depends on these
    countries' ability to sustain the continued operation of U.S.-funded
    security upgrades after U.S. funding ends. In 2002, the Congress directed
    DOE to work with Russia to develop a sustainable MPC&A system to be solely
    supported by Russia no later than January 1, 2013.^10

    As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to secure
    nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries by assessing:
    (1) the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other countries secure
    weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) the progress DOE and DOD have made in
    helping Russia secure its nuclear warhead sites, and (3) the efforts
    undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the sustainability and continued use
    of U.S.-funded security upgrades at sites that house nuclear materials and
    warheads in Russia and other countries.

    To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation from DOE and its
    contractors at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Sandia National Laboratories;
    DOD; and DOD contractors. We conducted interviews with key program
    officials at each of these agencies and at the Department of State. We
    also discussed the implementation of DOE and DOD's programs with Russian
    officials. However, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian
    Federation (Rosatom), which is responsible for the production of all
    nuclear materials in Russia and the development, testing, and production
    of Russian nuclear weapons, denied our request for access to facilities
    under its control. We were able to complete our audit objectives by
    visiting four Russian nuclear facilities--civilian, educational, and
    research institutes not under Rosatom's control--where DOE installed MPC&A
    upgrades. We discussed security issues and the sustainability of MPC&A
    upgrades with officials at these sites. In addition, we analyzed cost and
    budgetary information from DOE and DOD on U.S. efforts to help Russia and
    other countries secure nuclear materials and warheads. We interviewed
    knowledgeable DOE and DOD officials on the reliability of these data,
    including issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures,
    and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined these data
    were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More details
    on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our
    review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3
    billion to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to sites
    with buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and
    other countries, and the agency reports to have "secured" 175 buildings
    containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material.
    However, the number of secured buildings does not fully present the extent
    and nature of upgrades made and work remaining to be completed because DOE
    considers a building to be "secure" after it has received only limited
    MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive
    upgrades have yet to be completed. Specifically, 51 of the 175 buildings
    DOE reported to have "secured" by the end of fiscal year 2006 do not have
    completed MPC&A upgrades. While DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades
    offer a measure of risk reduction against some threats, they also noted
    that rapid upgrades do not meet all of DOE's risk reduction goals for most
    buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. Further, in response to
    terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is examining the
    impact of an increased design basis threat for its MPC&A program and
    providing additional assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear
    sites. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that
    includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings
    with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan details the remaining
    scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does not include two key
    sites involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear warheads that contain
    many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear
    material. Because of the sensitive nature of the work conducted at these
    sites, Rosatom has denied DOE's proposals for upgrading the sites,
    including proposals with less intrusive access requirements, and informed
    DOE that it is not interested in pursuing MPC&A cooperation at these
    sites.

    Since 1995, DOE and DOD have spent about $920 million to help Russia
    improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites, and the agencies plan to
    help Russia secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. Through the end
    of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $374 million to help Russia secure 50
    nuclear warhead sites, while DOD spent about $546 million to secure 12
    nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve security for the
    transportation of Russian warheads. DOE plans to provide security upgrades
    at 23 additional sites, and DOD plans to provide upgrades at 12 additional
    sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved
    since 2003, when we reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies
    for installing site security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites.
    For example, DOE and DOD have now jointly developed common designs for
    security upgrades at similar Russian warhead sites in order to ensure a
    level of consistency in the assistance provided to these sites. We also
    found that DOE and DOD use similar approaches to managing large contracts
    to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD has
    used an earned value management (EVM) system to identify cost and schedule
    variances on contracts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear
    warhead sites so they can be addressed in a timely manner. DOE does not
    require its contractors to implement EVM systems on its fixed-price
    contracts for installing security upgrades at Russian warhead sites.
    However, during the course of our review, the department augmented its
    contract oversight mechanisms, and DOE officials believe that their
    improved oversight system constitutes a comparable alternative to an EVM
    system.

    As DOE and DOD near the completion of their security upgrade programs, the
    sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in Russia and
    other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring that the
    substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is not wasted.
    To this end, DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to
    help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain)
    U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites
    after U.S. assistance ends and is working with Rosatom to develop a joint
    U.S.-Russian sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management
    information system to assist MPC&A management in tracking the progress
    being made toward its goal of providing Russia a sustainable MPC&A system
    by 2013, similar to the system DOE uses to track the number of buildings
    and sites where it has installed security upgrades. Further, access
    challenges and other issues could impact DOE and DOD's ability to prepare
    Russia to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades on its own. In 2002, the
    Congress directed DOE to work with Russia to provide a sustainable MPC&A
    system to be solely supported by Russia no later than January 1, 2013. In
    response, DOE issued interim guidelines in May 2004 to direct its efforts
    to create a sustainable MPC&A system in Russia and finalized these
    guidelines in December 2006. DOE's sustainability guidelines include seven
    key elements, such as a site MPC&A operational plan and preventative
    maintenance program. However, access difficulties, sites' financial
    ability to maintain equipment, and other issues could impact DOE's ability
    to prepare Russia to sustain security upgrades at nuclear material sites.
    For example, at one facility where DOE completed upgrades in 1998, DOE
    officials were denied access from 1999 through 2002 and, upon returning to
    the facility, found the security upgrades were in a severe state of
    disrepair. As a result, DOE had to spend about $800,000 to correct
    problems resulting from the site's inability to properly maintain the
    security upgrades DOE had provided. Finally, DOE and DOD also plan to
    provide Russia with assistance to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades at
    nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent the agencies
    from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither DOE nor DOD has
    reached an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense on access
    procedures for sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage
    sites. Site access or alternative means of verification are necessary to
    ensure that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia maintain security
    upgrades at these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the
    Russian Ministry of Defense on access procedures for sustainability
    activities at these 44 sites, the agencies will be unable to determine if
    U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained and may not be
    able to spend funds appropriated for these efforts.

    To strengthen program management and the effectiveness of DOE's efforts to
    improve security at nuclear material and warhead sites in Russia and other
    countries, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy, working with
    the Administrator of NNSA, (1) revise the metrics used to measure MPC&A
    program progress to better reflect the level of security upgrade
    completion at buildings reported as "secure" and (2) develop a management
    information system to track DOE's progress in providing Russia with a
    sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

    We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DOD for comment. DOE
    generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no written
    comments on our report. DOE provided additional information about the
    metric it uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its reasons for not
    using EVM on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to work with
    Rosatom on sustainability issues. DOE and DOD also provided technical
    comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

    Background

    In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to secure
    sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and, in 1995, DOE
    established the MPC&A program, which is now administered by NNSA. DOE's
    Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, within NNSA,
    consists of five offices whose collective efforts contribute to enhancing
    the security of nuclear material and warheads in countries of concern and
    to improving the ability to detect illicit smuggling of those materials
    (see fig. 1). Four of these offices implement DOE's MPC&A program, which,
    among other things, provides security upgrades at nuclear sites in Russia
    and other countries, and the fifth office, the Office of the Second Line
    of Defense, works to improve detection of illegal nuclear trafficking
    activities at border crossings and seaports.^11

    Figure 1: Organizational Structure of DOE's Office of International
    Material Protection and Cooperation

    The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection works with the Russian Ministry
    of Defense, including the 12^th Main Directorate--the Russian Defense
    Ministry's organization for nuclear munitions, the Strategic Rocket
    Forces, and the Navy to install security upgrades at nuclear warhead
    storage sites. The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection also oversees
    DOE's security upgrades work at naval nuclear fuel sites. The Office of
    Weapons Material Protection upgrades MPC&A systems at sites within the
    Rosatom nuclear weapons complex and also oversees DOE efforts to sustain
    U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear sites within the former Soviet
    Union that are not in Russia, such as facilities in Ukraine and
    Uzbekistan. The Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites works
    to install MPC&A upgrades at nonmilitary nuclear facilities throughout
    Russia and oversees efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer
    buildings and to convert excess weapons-usable nuclear material into less
    attractive forms. The Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites
    also manages DOE's efforts to provide nuclear security assistance to
    countries outside of the former Soviet Union. The Office of National
    Infrastructure and Sustainability manages a variety of crosscutting
    programs, including transportation and protective forces assistance, and
    oversaw the development of guidelines for DOE's efforts to help ensure
    that Russia can sustain the operation of U.S.-funded security systems at
    its nuclear sites after U.S. assistance ends.

    DOD has also assisted Russia in securing nuclear warhead storage sites,
    both temporary sites, such as rail transfer points, and permanent sites
    containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began assisting the Russian
    Ministry of Defense with enhancing transportation security for nuclear
    warheads and security at nuclear warhead sites. DOD's efforts to help
    Russia secure its nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve the
    security of warheads in transit are implemented by the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency. Oversight and policy guidance for this work is provided
    by DOD's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Additional
    information on the history of U.S. efforts to help Russia and other
    countries secure nuclear material and warheads can be found in appendix
    II.

    Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to Provide
    Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other Countries,
    but DOE's Reporting of the Number of Buildings Secured May Be Misleading

    DOE spent about $1.3 billion between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 2006
    to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to facilities
    that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries
    and reports to have "secured" 175 buildings containing about 300 metric
    tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet
    Union. The number of buildings that DOE reports as secured, however, does
    not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some
    buildings because DOE considers a building to be "secure" after it has
    received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when
    additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be completed. Further, in
    response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is
    examining the impact of an increased design basis threat it uses to
    measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian nuclear
    facilities and providing additional assistance to protective forces at
    Russian nuclear sites. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint
    Action Plan that includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites
    housing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan
    details the remaining scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does
    not include two key sites involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear
    warheads that contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of
    weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE has been denied access.

    Through the End of Fiscal Year 2006, DOE Spent About $1.3 Billion for
    Security Upgrades and Other Related Assistance at Nuclear Material Sites
    in Russia and Other Countries

    From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3 billion to
    enhance security at buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear materials
    in foreign countries. The majority of these buildings are located in
    Russia and fall into three categories: Rosatom weapons complex sites,
    civilian sites, and naval fuel sites. DOE has also helped to secure
    buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in nine other countries.^12
    Figure 2 shows a breakdown of DOE's spending on MPC&A efforts.

    Figure 2: DOE Spending to Secure Nuclear Materials in Russia and Other
    Countries through the End of Fiscal Year 2006

    Note: Figure does not include program management expenses, and amounts
    have been rounded.

    As figure 2 shows, DOE spent about $684.7 million to provide security
    upgrades to civilian, naval fuel, and Rosatom weapons complex sites with
    weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and an additional $131.5 million
    to provide security upgrades to sites located outside of Russia. DOE also
    spent about $493.9 million on additional and related MPC&A efforts in
    Russia, such as assistance for transportation security, providing
    equipment for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and efforts to
    consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and sites. According to
    DOE officials, these efforts are important to increasing the overall
    security of nuclear materials in Russia and other countries, and they
    support DOE's goal of enhancing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of
    weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, because DOE believes that
    nuclear materials are most vulnerable while they are in transit, the
    department has provided Russia with specialized secure trucks, armored
    escort vehicles, and secure containers--called overpacks--to improve the
    security of nuclear material transported within and between nuclear sites
    in Russia. Further, DOE's assistance to protective forces at Russian
    nuclear sites, which includes such items as bulletproof vests, helmets,
    and response vehicles, helps ensure that guards at those sites are
    properly equipped and trained so that they can quickly respond to alarms.
    Additional information on other DOE efforts to improve security at sites
    with weapons-usable nuclear materials can be found in appendix IV.

    DOE Considers Buildings "Secure" After Only Limited or "Rapid" Upgrades
    Have Been Installed, Even When More Comprehensive Upgrades Are Planned

    At the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported to have "secured" 175
    buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear
    material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, but 51 of the 175
    buildings DOE reported to have "secured" as of the end of fiscal year 2006
    do not have completed MPC&A upgrades. These 51 buildings are located at
    sites in the Rosatom weapons complex. In its program metrics, DOE defined
    a building to be "secure" after it has received only limited MPC&A
    upgrades (called rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive
    upgrades, which would further improve security, have yet to be
    completed.^13

    The buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE is working to
    improve security fall into four categories: Rosatom weapons complex,
    civilian, naval fuel, and sites outside of Russia. As table 1 shows, all
    planned upgrades have been completed at naval fuel sites and sites outside
    of Russia. The vast majority of remaining buildings that have not yet
    received security upgrades are in the Rosatom weapons complex, where DOE
    has historically had access difficulties, including being denied access to
    key sites and buildings housing weapons-usable nuclear material.

    Table 1: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with
    Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material through the End of Fiscal Year 2006

          Site type        Number of Number of buildings          Total number of
                       buildings DOE   where DOE has not      buildings where DOE
                          reports as  installed security         plans to install
                           "secured"            upgrades        security upgrades
    Rosatom weapons            92                  32                      124
    complex^a
    Civilian                   47                   3                       50
    Naval fuel                 21                   0                       21
    Outside of                 15                   0                       15
    Russia
    Total                     175                  35                      210

    Source: DOE.

    ^aAt some sites in the Rosatom weapons complex, DOE counts individual
    material storage or handling areas (material balance areas) within large
    buildings separately in its program performance measurements in an attempt
    to more accurately reflect the amount of work involved. According to DOE,
    the work that would go into securing a material balance area of this size
    would be commensurate to the work that goes into securing a smaller
    building.

    While DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades offer a limited measure of
    risk reduction against some threats, they also noted that rapid upgrades
    fall short of meeting all of DOE's risk reduction goals for buildings with
    weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, rapid upgrades generally
    include only limited measures designed to address the insider threat of
    theft, such as establishing a two-person rule and providing certain types
    of tamper indication devices that would set off alarms at guard stations
    in the case of an unauthorized attempt to access nuclear materials.
    According to NNSA, which implements the MPC&A program at DOE, the greatest
    threat DOE faces in its effort to help Russia secure nuclear materials is
    the threat of insider theft. However, the majority of measures to address
    the insider threat at Russian nuclear material sites, such as computerized
    nuclear material inventory databases and barcoding of nuclear material
    containers, are provided in the comprehensive upgrades phase.

    DOE Is Examining the Impact of an Increased Design Basis Threat for Its
    MPC&A Program

    In response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE
    recently analyzed the implications of an increased design basis threat it
    uses to measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian
    nuclear facilities. The design basis threat is defined as the attributes
    and characteristics of potential adversaries (a group or groups of armed
    attackers) against which a facility's physical protection systems are
    designed and evaluated. According to DOE, the design basis threat is
    critical to determining an MPC&A system's effectiveness. In 2005, DOE
    began examining the impact of increasing the number of adversaries against
    which Russian sites with U.S.-funded security upgrades should be able to
    defend themselves. DOE is currently reassessing the effectiveness of the
    security upgrades it has provided through the MPC&A program and has
    increased its emphasis on providing assistance to the protective forces at
    Russian nuclear material sites. Specifically, DOE is currently working
    with a number of sites to relocate guard forces closer to the target
    nuclear material to improve their response times to an incident. For
    example, at all four of the nuclear material sites we visited in Russia,
    Russian officials told us that they were working with DOE to relocate
    guard forces closer to buildings that contain weapons-usable nuclear
    material at their sites. However, DOE is limited in the scope of
    assistance it can provide to protective forces at nuclear facilities in
    Russia and other countries. For example, DOE is neither allowed to provide
    weapons or ammunition to these forces, nor is it allowed to pay the
    salaries of protective forces at these sites. According to DOE officials,
    the department has provided assistance to the protective forces at all
    nuclear material sites where the department has access and agreement to
    work, including helmets, winter uniforms, radios, and other equipment
    intended to improve their effectiveness in responding to alarms and their
    survivability against potential adversaries.

    DOE Plans to Complete All Security Upgrades Work by the End of 2008 but
    Lacks Access or Agreement to Work at Two Key Sites That Contain Vast
    Amounts of Nuclear Material

    Historically, DOE has had difficulty obtaining access to some sensitive
    sites in Russia, especially within the Rosatom weapons complex. For
    example, we reported in 2003 that DOE's lack of access to many buildings
    that store weapons-usable nuclear material in the Rosatom weapons complex
    was the greatest challenge to improving nuclear material security in
    Russia. DOE requires access to these buildings to validate Russian
    security system designs and to confirm the installation of equipment as
    intended. DOE signed an access agreement with the Russian Ministry of
    Atomic Energy (now called Rosatom) in September 2001 that described
    administrative procedures to facilitate access, such as specifying which
    DOE personnel are allowed to make site visits and the number and duration
    of those visits. We reported in 2003 that this access agreement had done
    little to increase DOE's ability to complete its work at many key sites in
    the Rosatom weapons complex. Since that time, DOE has worked with Rosatom
    through a Joint Acceleration Working Group and other mechanisms to develop
    alternative access procedures, such as the use of remote video monitoring,
    that have allowed work to progress at some sensitive buildings and sites
    that had previously been inaccessible to DOE project teams. In June 2005,
    DOE and Rosatom signed a Joint Action Plan detailing the remaining scope
    of work to be completed by the 2008 deadline. Rosatom and DOE are using
    this plan to guide cooperative activities and to develop a multiyear
    budget for DOE's MPC&A program. DOE officials told us that they have been
    granted access to almost all of the sites and buildings covered in the
    plan and that all security upgrades should be completed, as scheduled, by
    the end of 2008. DOE plans to spend about $98 million to complete its
    planned security upgrades at 210 buildings containing weapons-usable
    nuclear material in Russia and other countries by the end of calendar year
    2008.

    The DOE-Rosatom Joint Action Plan covers 20 Russian civilian and nuclear
    weapons complex sites. However, the Joint Action Plan does not include two
    key sites in the Rosatom weapons complex where Russian nuclear weapons are
    assembled and disassembled. Because of the nuclear weapons manufacturing
    work conducted at these sites, DOE believes these two sites contain many
    buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material.
    According to DOE officials, the department has offered numerous
    alternative access proposals to try to obtain access to install security
    upgrades at these two sites. For example, in November 2004, DOE provided
    senior Russian officials with access to some of the most sensitive sites
    in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, including the Pantex nuclear weapons
    plant in Texas, which is the only U.S. nuclear weapons assembly and
    disassembly facility. However, Rosatom has refused to grant DOE officials
    reciprocal access to analogous Russian sites. Because of the sensitive
    nature of the work conducted at these sites, Rosatom has denied DOE's
    requests for access, rejected DOE offers to provide assistance without
    access, and informed DOE that it is not interested in pursuing MPC&A
    cooperation at these sites. DOE officials expressed very little optimism
    that Rosatom would allow DOE to help improve security at these facilities
    in the near future.

    DOD and DOE Have Spent About $920 Million to Help Russia Secure 62 Nuclear
    Warhead Sites and to Improve Warhead Transportation Security

    Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent about $920 million
    to help Russia improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites. The agencies
    plan to help Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by the end
    of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved since 2003, when we
    reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies toward providing
    security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead sites. In addition, DOE and
    DOD are currently taking similar approaches to managing large contracts to
    provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD has used
    EVM to identify cost and schedule variances for its contracts to install
    security upgrades at Russian warhead sites at early stages so they can be
    addressed in a timely manner. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price
    contracts to install security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites,
    but, during the course of our review, the department augmented its
    contract performance management system to include additional reporting
    mechanisms to identify and address schedule variances, which DOE officials
    believe constitute a comparable alternative to an EVM system. DOE believes
    the benefits of EVM techniques do not justify the additional costs to
    implement them on fixed-price contracts.

    DOE and DOD Helped Russia Improve Security at 62 Nuclear Warhead Storage
    Sites and Provided Assistance to Improve Security of Warheads in Transit

    Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $374 million to
    improve security at 50 Russian nuclear warhead sites and plans to install
    security upgrades at 23 additional sites by the end of 2008. Additionally,
    DOD spent approximately $546 million to help Russia secure 12 warhead
    sites and to provide security for nuclear warheads in transit.^14 DOD
    plans to complete security upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of
    2008. Figure 3 shows a breakdown of U.S. funding to improve security of
    Russian nuclear warheads through the end of fiscal year 2006.

    Figure 3: U.S. Spending on Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia through the
    End of Fiscal Year 2006

    Note: DOD spending for nuclear warhead site security efforts includes
    spending on related DOD efforts, such as the development of an Automated
    Inventory Control and Management System for Russia's nuclear warhead
    stockpile, a personnel reliability program and training equipment for
    guard forces at nuclear warhead sites, an emergency response capability,
    and a variety of training for site personnel. DOE's program also includes
    training for site personnel and the development of a personnel reliability
    program for those Russian nuclear commands not supported by DOD.
    Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.

    DOE plans to provide security upgrades at 23 additional sites, and DOD
    plans to provide upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of 2008. DOE
    and DOD gained authorization and access to work at 15 of these sites as a
    result of an agreement reached at the summit between President Bush and
    Russian President Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, in February 2005. After
    this summit, Russia offered access to 15 additional nuclear warhead sites
    of which DOE has agreed to install upgrades at 7 sites, and DOD will help
    secure the remaining 8 sites. Table 2 provides an overview of DOE and
    DOD's progress in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites.

    Table 2: DOE and DOD Progress in Helping Russia Secure Nuclear Warhead
    Sites

         Site type    DOE sites DOD sites     Total DOE sites DOD sites     Total
                       complete  complete     sites remaining remaining     sites
                                          completed                     remaining
    Permanent              8         9        17        14        10        24
    warhead sites
    Temporary             42         3        45         9         2        11
    warhead sites
    Total                 50        12        62        23        12        35

    Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD information.

    Despite the agencies' optimism that all sites within this scope will be
    secured by the end of 2008, they face challenges in meeting this goal. For
    example, DOE and DOD officials stated that work in Russia involves
    extensive bureaucracy, changing requirements to meet Russian demands and,
    at times, difficult relationships and coordination with Russian
    subcontractors. DOD officials told us that there have been performance
    issues with a certain Russian subcontractor, but finding alternatives is
    difficult because there are only a limited number of Russian
    subcontractors qualified for this type of work and cleared by the Russian
    MOD to work at nuclear weapons sites. Additionally, the harsh
    environmental conditions at some remote sites have caused delays in the
    installation of security upgrades. Specifically, DOD officials stated that
    adverse weather conditions delayed the installation of security upgrades
    at four Russian warhead sites by about 1 month.

    In addition, DOD spent over $125 million through the end of fiscal year
    2006 to improve the security of nuclear warheads during transportation by
    rail to consolidation and dismantlement sites. According to DOD officials,
    security experts consider nuclear warheads to be highly vulnerable to
    theft during transport. DOD has attempted to address this threat by
    providing the Russian MOD with security enhancements for railcars,
    hardened shipping containers for nuclear warheads to protect against small
    arms fire and other threats, and payment of railway tariffs associated
    with transporting nuclear warheads to consolidation and dismantlement
    sites. Since 1995, DOD has supported maintenance on 200 specialized,
    secure railcars for transporting nuclear weapons and provided 15 armored
    railcars for guard forces protecting shipments of nuclear weapons. DOD is
    in the process of procuring up to 100 additional nuclear warhead transport
    railcars for use by the Russian MOD.

    Coordination between DOE and DOD's Nuclear Warhead Security Efforts in
    Russia Has Improved

    DOE and DOD have mechanisms for sharing information and avoiding
    duplication of effort. Coordination between the agencies has improved
    since 2003, when we reported that the agencies did not have consistent
    policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead
    sites. We recommended in 2003 that the departments work together to
    develop a standardized approach to improving security at Russian nuclear
    warhead sites. Since our 2003 report, DOD and DOE have expanded their
    efforts to share information about their work at Russian nuclear warhead
    sites.

    Specifically, the departments coordinate their efforts through an
    interagency working group, which reports to the National Security
    Council.^15 According to DOE and DOD officials, this group was
    instrumental in coordinating the U.S. response to proposals for security
    upgrades at additional Russian nuclear warhead sites stemming from the
    summit between Presidents Bush and Putin at Bratislava, Slovakia, in 2005.
    In addition, DOE and DOD participate in joint coordinating groups that
    include key representatives from DOE, DOD, and the various branches of the
    Russian MOD. All of these groups meet regularly to discuss ongoing work at
    Russian nuclear warhead sites and resolve problems or issues that arise in
    this effort. Furthermore, DOE and DOD have jointly developed common
    designs for security upgrades at similar Russian warhead sites to ensure a
    level of consistency in the assistance provided to these sites. DOD
    officials stated that having a standardized design between the two
    agencies allows DOE and DOD leverage with the Russian MOD, to deny
    requests if they are made for items not in the site design plan of either
    agency. Further, DOE and DOD seek to present a united image to Russian
    officials by writing letters jointly on common issues and answering
    Russian site proposals together.

    DOE and DOD Use Similar Systems to Manage Large Contracts to Improve
    Security at Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites

    In their efforts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead
    sites, DOE and DOD are taking similar approaches to managing large
    contracts. Generally, OMB requires federal agencies to use EVM^16 or an
    alternative performance management system on major acquisition contracts
    to identify cost and schedule variances at early stages so they can be
    addressed in a timely manner.^17 DOD has used EVM to evaluate its
    contracts to install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOE does
    not require its contractors to implement EVM to evaluate its contracts to
    install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites, but, during the course
    of our review, augmented its contract performance management system to
    include additional reporting mechanisms for identifying and addressing
    schedule variances, which DOE officials believe represent a comparable
    alternative to an EVM system.

    DOD officials stated that EVM is one of many tools that provide empirical
    data to validate testimonial information about the status of security
    upgrades provided in its contractors' monthly and quarterly reports.
    Additionally, EVM enhances program management capabilities by providing an
    early warning system for deviations from plans and quantifies technical
    and schedule problems in terms of cost. This provides DOD with an
    objective basis for considering corrective action. DOD officials told us
    that their use of EVM allowed them to identify schedule variances due to
    poor contractor performance at one Russian nuclear warhead site where the
    department is installing security upgrades. DOD officials stated that this
    early detection allowed them to reassign the work to a different Russian
    subcontractor and formulate a plan to make up for the lost time and work
    in order to meet their scheduled completion date and critical path
    milestones.

    Similarly, DOE recently proposed requirements that its large contracts for
    security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites be managed with a system
    similar to EVM. In September 2006, DOE initiated security upgrades at four
    large nuclear warhead storage sites in Russia.^18 Until January 2007, DOE
    managed these fixed-price contracts according to the NNSA Programmatic
    Guidelines, which do not require the use of EVM or an alternative system
    to assess contract performance for cost and schedule variances. In part,
    as a result of our inquiry into its contracting practices, DOE altered its
    oversight mechanisms for these contracts in January 2007 and will now
    require monthly reports and other measures to more accurately ascertain
    the progress of contracted items, including the identification of schedule
    variances due to inclement weather and other unforeseen events and,
    subsequently, the development of recovery plans. According to DOE
    officials, these new reporting mechanisms represent a comparable
    alternative to an EVM system and will give DOE project managers additional
    opportunities to identify potential schedule slippages and enable
    appropriate management intervention to take place in a timely manner.^19

    Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain
    because Access Problems and Other Issues May Hamper DOE and DOD
    Sustainability Efforts

    DOE has developed sustainability guidelines to help Russia prepare to take
    financial responsibility for maintaining U.S.-funded security upgrades at
    nuclear material and warhead sites without DOE assistance by 2013 as the
    Congress mandated. DOE and Rosatom are developing a joint sustainability
    plan that will provide an agreed-upon framework to guide DOE's
    sustainability efforts at nuclear material sites in Russia. However, DOE's
    ability to ensure that U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear material
    sites are being sustained may be hampered by access difficulties, funding
    concerns, and other issues. Finally, access difficulties at some Russian
    nuclear warhead sites may also prohibit DOE and DOD from ensuring that
    U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.

    DOE Issued Guidelines to Direct Its Efforts to Help Russia Prepare to
    Maintain U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades without DOE Assistance

    In May 2004, DOE issued interim guidelines (referred to as Sustainability
    Guidelines) to direct its efforts to assist Russia in developing
    sustainable MPC&A systems at Russian nuclear material and warhead sites by
    2013 as the Congress mandated. In December 2006, DOE issued a final
    version of its Sustainability Guidelines for the MPC&A program. These
    guidelines require DOE program managers to develop assessments of each
    site's existing capabilities to sustain MPC&A systems and to identify
    requirements that should be met before a site transitions from DOE support
    to full Russian responsibility. According to DOE, these assessments will
    be used to develop site-specific sustainability plans that detail the
    remaining cooperative activities required to address each of the seven
    elements of sustainability. The guidelines also require DOE project teams
    to develop site-specific transition plans, which would detail how
    sustainability activities will be funded as the sites move toward
    transition to full Russian responsibility by 2013.

    DOE's Sustainability Guidelines set forth seven key elements of a
    sustainable MPC&A program at sites receiving MPC&A upgrades, such as the
    development of site operating procedures, which form the foundation for
    all of DOE's sustainability activities at nuclear material and warhead
    sites in Russia and other countries where DOE has provided security
    upgrades. DOE uses a variety of sustainability indicators for each of the
    seven elements to determine the degree to which the individual elements
    are being addressed at Russian sites. Table 2 shows the seven elements of
    sustainability outlined in DOE's Sustainability Guidelines and some of the
    indicators DOE uses to assess the degree to which each element of
    sustainability is being met at a given Russian site.

    Table 3: Seven Elements of Sustainability in DOE's Guidelines

           Element                 Definition             Select sustainability
                                                                indicators
    Site MPC&A        Site MPC&A operations plans     oSite has an established
    organization      establish management            and documented MPC&A
                         structures, assign staff        organization with clear
                         responsibilities that support   roles and
                         MPC&A operations, identify how  responsibilities.
                         site actions reduce risk, and
                         identify how the site will      oSite has conducted
                         allocate human and financial    MPC&A sustainability
                         resources to effectively        planning.
                         operate the MPC&A systems.
                                                         oSite has a budget for
                                                         MPC&A operations and
                                                         personnel.
    Site operating    MPC&A systems require a set of  oSite has written
    procedures        procedures to direct site       procedures covering all
                         personnel in the proper         key MPC&A operations.
                         operation of equipment. Site
                         operating procedures help       oSite procedures are
                         staff operate systems           consistent with
                         consistently and effectively    regulations.
                         in conformance with Russian
                         national regulations.           oSite has a mechanism
                                                         for modifying
                                                         procedures.
    Human resource    A human resource management     oTraining requirements
    management and    system is designed to provide   for each MPC&A position
    site training     qualified and well-trained      have been identified.
                         MPC&A professionals to perform
                         assigned MPC&A duties.          oThe site has a
                                                         mechanism to track
                                                         corrective actions from
                                                         inspections and offers
                                                         retraining to staff.
    Operational cost  Operational cost analysis       oSite has identified
    analysis          helps sites to plan and         life cycle costs,
                         allocate resources for MPC&A    capital equipment
                         operations throughout the       replacement costs, etc.
                         system's life cycle by
                         estimating the costs            oSite has established a
                         associated with long- and       budget for MPC&A
                         short-term maintenance of       operation, which covers
                         MPC&A systems.                  the site's system
                                                         requirements.
    Equipment         Preventative maintenance,       oSite has documented
    maintenance,      repair, and equipment           maintenance
    repair, and       calibration should be governed  requirements, strategy,
    calibration       by a formal maintenance and     and schedule,
                         repair process to ensure that   prioritized based on
                         malfunctioning equipment is     relative importance of
                         promptly repaired, spare parts  the components.
                         are available, and equipment
                         is properly calibrated.         oSite has adequate
                                                         resources to maintain or
                                                         repair MPC&A systems.

                                                         oSite has a documented
                                                         calibration plan.
    Performance       Performance testing and         oSite has an internal or
    testing and       operational monitoring allows   external review system
    operational       site MPC&A organizations to     to evaluate MPC&A system
    monitoring        assess the effectiveness of     performance.
                         MPC&A components and systems
                         and to take corrective actions  oSite has evidence of
                         when deficiencies are           identifying and
                         identified.                     correcting MPC&A
                                                         deficiencies.
    MPC&A system      MPC&A systems operate as part   oSite has a
    configuration     of the overall nuclear          configuration control
    management        operations at a site.           plan or similar
                         Configuration management        document.
                         systems are designed to ensure
                         that changes in site            oChanges to
                         operations do not compromise    configuration are
                         the effectiveness of the        reviewed by appropriate
                         site's MPC&A systems.           staff to verify that
                                                         system effectiveness is
                                                         not degraded.

    Source: DOE.

    According to DOE, the Sustainability Guidelines provide general criteria
    for DOE project teams to follow when working with their Russian
    counterparts in developing sustainability programs for sites where DOE has
    installed MPC&A systems. DOE officials noted that some sites may not
    require assistance to address issues in each of the seven categories. For
    example, many sites that store naval nuclear fuel are administered by the
    Russian Navy, which has its own human resource management system and would
    not require DOE assistance to address the human resource management and
    site training sustainability element.

    In addition, DOE and Rosatom are currently developing a joint
    sustainability plan that is intended to govern sustainability activities
    at the sites under Rosatom's control where DOE has installed MPC&A
    systems. DOE officials told us that this joint sustainability plan may be
    completed in March 2007. DOE officials believe that this plan will be an
    important step in gaining Rosatom's buy-in to the concepts of
    sustainability and will lead to a specific path forward and detailed plan
    for funding sustainability activities for DOE, while transitioning to full
    Russian responsibility in 2013. According to DOE officials, the plan will
    be based largely on DOE's Sustainability Guidelines and will include the
    seven key elements of sustainability outlined in those guidelines. DOE
    anticipates spending about $437.8 million to provide sustainability
    support to sites in Russia and other countries between fiscal year 2007
    and fiscal year 2013.

    While DOE's Sustainability Guidelines provide a framework for the
    department's approach to sustainability implementation, the guidelines do
    not call for a tracking system to assist MPC&A management in assessing the
    progress being made toward DOE's goal of providing Russia a sustainable
    MPC&A system by 2013. Currently, DOE's Metrics Information Management
    System (MIMS) contains data detailing the department's progress in
    implementing the MPC&A program by tracking the number of buildings and
    sites where DOE has installed security upgrades, among other things. DOE
    also uses MIMS to track some measures of progress in their sustainability
    efforts, such as the development of site-specific plans that document how
    MPC&A site management will plan, budget, direct, monitor, and evaluate all
    MPC&A systems. DOE managers use MIMS as a tool in their oversight of the
    MPC&A program. However, DOE officials acknowledged that the current MIMS
    data do not provide an accurate picture of the department's progress
    toward its goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for
    funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by
    2013. Expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements
    could give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A
    program's progress toward the goal of preparing Russia to take full
    responsibility for funding the maintenance and sustainability of
    U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Further, DOE officials told us that improved
    tracking of sustainability implementation would be useful to allow the
    department to provide more accurate information to the Congress on DOE's
    progress in its sustainability efforts.

    DOE's Ability to Ensure That U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades at Nuclear
    Material Sites Are Being Sustained May Be Hampered by Access Difficulties,
    Funding Concerns, and Other Issues

    Several challenges could impact DOE's ability to prepare Russia to sustain
    security upgrades on its own at sites that house weapons-usable nuclear
    material, including: (1) access difficulties at some sites, (2) the
    limited financial ability of some Russian sites to maintain DOE-funded
    MPC&A equipment, (3) the lack of certification of some DOE-funded MPC&A
    equipment, and (4) delays in installing the MPC&A Operations Monitoring
    (MOM) system at Rosatom facilities.

    oAccording to DOE officials, Russia has denied DOE access at some sites
    after the completion of security upgrades, making it difficult for the
    department to ensure that funds intended for sustainability of U.S.-funded
    upgrades are being properly spent. For example, at one facility where DOE
    completed upgrades in 1998, DOE officials were denied access from 1999
    through 2002. DOE officials told us that after commissioning the MPC&A
    system at this facility, the department had not developed specific plans
    for sustaining the U.S.-funded security equipment. Upon returning to the
    facility in September 2002, DOE officials found that the U.S.-funded
    security upgrades were in a severe state of disrepair. As a result, DOE
    has had to spend about $800,000 to correct problems resulting from the
    site's inability to properly maintain the U.S.-funded security upgrades.
    According to DOE officials, these security upgrade replacement efforts are
    scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2007.

    oDespite improvements in the Russian economy, some sites may not be
    financially able to maintain DOE-funded security upgrades. The Russian
    economy has improved since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and
    the financial troubles of the late 1990s.^20 In September 2006, the Deputy
    Head of Rosatom stated that Russia is no longer in need of U.S. assistance
    and that it is easier and more convenient for Russia to pay for its own
    domestic nuclear security projects. However, during our visit to Russia,
    officials at three of the four civilian nuclear research institutes we
    visited told us that they are concerned about their sites' financial
    ability to maintain U.S.-funded security upgrades after U.S. assistance
    ends. Some of these sites do not receive regular funds from the Russian
    government to support the operation and maintenance of their MPC&A
    systems. As a result, Russian site officials told us that, after DOE
    financial support ends in 2013, they will likely face difficult choices
    about how to pay for maintenance of the security upgrades DOE has
    provided.

    oSome U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment is not certified for use at Russian
    facilities, which means that the Russian government may not pay for its
    maintenance. Certification is a mandatory Russian regulatory requirement
    designed to ensure the functionality, safety, and security of specific
    equipment, products, and technology used in Russian nuclear sites.
    Certification of U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment must be obtained before it
    can be legally used at Russian nuclear sites. DOE has historically
    maintained that certification is a Russian responsibility, and current DOE
    policy generally precludes funding for certification of equipment. Despite
    repeated attempts to persuade Russia to fund equipment certification, DOE
    is paying for some equipment to be certified on a case-by-case basis.
    According to DOE officials, some sites have equipment or MPC&A systems
    that are not fully certified for use. For example, at eight sites that
    house weapons-usable nuclear material, DOE-funded equipment used to make
    accurate measurements of the type and quantity of nuclear material stored
    at these sites has not been certified for use. Unless this equipment
    receives certification in the near future, DOE may be forced to pay for
    maintenance longer than it intends. Rosatom and DOE also have established
    a Joint Certification Working Group that is developing a joint plan to
    certify key equipment items. DOE developed the Equipment Certification and
    Vendor Support project in 1998 to provide DOE project managers with
    accurate information on the Russian certification process. DOE spent $23.6
    million on this project through the end of fiscal year 2006.

    oThere have been delays installing the MOM system at some Rosatom
    facilities. In February 2001, we recommended that DOE develop a system, in
    cooperation with Russia, to monitor, on a long-term basis, the security
    systems installed at the Russian sites to ensure that they continue to
    detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear
    material.^21 In response to this recommendation, DOE developed the MOM
    system, consisting of off-the-shelf video cameras and other equipment
    designed to allow Russian officials to ensure that MPC&A systems are
    properly staffed, personnel are vigilant, and key security procedures are
    enforced. DOE officials told us in 2002 they anticipated that the MOM
    system would be an integral part of DOE's sustainability assistance to
    Russian sites. However, through the end of fiscal year 2006, only five
    sites with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE installed security
    upgrades had the MOM system.^22 While DOE also plans to install equipment
    at two additional sites in fiscal year 2007, none of the seven sites where
    DOE has installed or plans to install MOM systems is controlled by
    Rosatom. Rosatom has been unwilling to allow DOE to install MOM systems at
    sites under its control.^23 Unfortunately, DOE was unable to anticipate
    Rosatom's resistance to the MOM system and, in 2002, the department
    pre-purchased MOM equipment for use at Rosatom facilities. As a result,
    DOE has had to pay for storage and upkeep of 367 MOM cameras and other
    equipment since 2002. DOE officials told us that if Rosatom decides not to
    allow MOM equipment at its sites, the excess equipment may be used by
    other DOE programs, such as the Second Line of Defense program, which
    works with Russia to combat nuclear smuggling by installing radiation
    detection equipment at key border crossings. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE
    had spent a total of $20.5 million on the MOM project, including about
    $270,000 to pay for storage and upkeep of unused MOM equipment that has
    been in storage since 2002.

    Access Difficulties at Some Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites May Prohibit DOE
    and DOD from Ensuring That Security Upgrades Are Being Sustained

    DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security
    upgrades at nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent the
    agencies from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither department
    has reached an agreement with the Russian MOD on access procedures for
    sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage sites where the
    agencies are installing security upgrades. Site access is needed to ensure
    that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia maintain security upgrades
    at these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the Russian
    MOD on access procedures for sustainability activities at these 44 sites,
    or develop acceptable alternatives to physical access, the agencies will
    be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly
    sustained and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts.

    DOE and DOD have formed an informal working group to more effectively
    coordinate their efforts on sustainability of security upgrades at Russian
    nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD have agreed in principle that the seven
    elements of sustainability outlined in DOE's Sustainability Guidelines
    will be applied to the agencies' efforts to help the Russian MOD sustain
    security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD's joint plan to
    address sustainability at Russian nuclear warhead sites uses a
    three-phased approach, (1) addressing processes and procedural issues, (2)
    establishing regional training and maintenance centers, and (3) providing
    site-level assistance, such as warrantees and spare parts.

    oFirst, DOE is assisting the Russian MOD with the development of
    regulations, operating procedures, and an independent inspections process
    to help ensure that security systems continue to operate as intended.
    Similarly, DOD has supported the development of a personnel reliability
    program for the 12^th Main Directorate of the MOD and DOE is planning to
    support a similar program for the Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket
    Forces.

    oSecond, DOE and DOD have funded the construction of regional training and
    maintenance centers. For example, DOE recently completed construction of
    the Kola Technical Center, near Murmansk, Russia, which serves as the
    centralized training and maintenance facility for all Russian MOD sites in
    the Murmansk region, both naval nuclear
    fuel sites and nuclear warhead storage sites.^24 The Kola Technical Center
    was commissioned in fall 2005, and Russian MOD officials told us that the
    facility will help them prepare to assume full financial responsibility
    for maintenance and sustainability when U.S. assistance ends.

    oFinally, at the site level, once DOE and DOD come to agreement with the
    Russian MOD on verification of sustainability assistance, they will assist
    in sustaining the upgraded security systems with a focus on training and
    developing the Russian MOD's capability to maintain the modernized
    systems. Initially, DOE and DOD will rely on contractor support for repair
    of failed security systems while the Russian MOD's capability is being
    developed, gradually transitioning to full Russian system support.

    Although DOE and DOD are working closely to provide sustainability
    assistance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites, differences exist in
    the length of time DOE and DOD intend to fund sustainability activities at
    these sites. Specifically, DOE intends to fund sustainability until 2013,
    while DOD plans to halt funding in 2011. This has the potential to cause
    difficulties for the Russian MOD when it comes to funding sustainability
    earlier at sites where DOD installed security upgrades. In addition, DOD
    plans no further support with respect to sustainability for warhead
    transportation upgrades it has provided to the Russian MOD, because,
    according to DOD officials, the Russian MOD has not requested assistance
    for this activity.

    Conclusions

    DOE and DOD have made significant progress in helping Russia and other
    countries improve security at vulnerable sites housing weapons-usable
    nuclear material and nuclear warheads. Since our 2003 report, DOE has
    worked with Russia to resolve many of the access difficulties that we
    reported, especially at sites within the Rosatom weapons complex. However,
    in our view, DOE's current metric for reporting progress on the number of
    buildings secured by its MPC&A program provides the Congress with a
    potentially misleading assessment of the security at these facilities.
    Specifically, DOE should not report to the Congress that buildings with
    weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries are "secure"
    until all DOE risk reduction goals have been achieved, and all planned
    upgrades at those buildings are completed. Currently, DOE considers
    buildings to be "secured" after only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid
    upgrades) are installed, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are
    planned. Rapid upgrades do not include the majority of measures DOE uses
    to address the threat of insider theft at Russian nuclear sites, which DOE
    considers to be one of its most pressing concerns. DOE provides most
    upgrades designed to address the insider threat during the comprehensive
    upgrades phase. Further, DOE officials told us that comprehensive upgrades
    are necessary to achieve all risk reduction goals at buildings with
    nuclear material, calling into question DOE's decision to report buildings
    without such upgrades completed as "secure."

    As DOE nears the completion of its security upgrade work in its MPC&A
    program, the sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in
    Russia and other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring
    that the substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is
    not wasted. DOE and Rosatom have been cooperating to develop a joint
    sustainability plan for the majority of sites where DOE has installed
    MPC&A upgrades. We believe this is a critical step in gaining agreement on
    what remains to be done before DOE transfers full responsibility for
    sustainability of MPC&A upgrades to Russia in 2013. While DOE uses its
    Metrics Information Management System to track some measures of progress
    in its sustainability efforts, DOE officials acknowledged that the current
    MIMS data do not provide an accurate picture of the department's progress
    toward its goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for
    funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by
    2013. Creating a new management information system for sustainability or
    expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements could
    give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A program's
    progress on sustainability and would aid the department in providing the
    Congress with a more accurate assessment of the progress made toward DOE's
    goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material
    and warheads in Russia and other countries, we recommend that the
    Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of NNSA, take the
    following two actions:

    orevise the metrics used to measure progress in the MPC&A program to
    better reflect the level of completion of security upgrades at buildings
    reported as "secure;" and

    odevelop a sustainability management system or modify the Metrics
    Information Management System to more clearly track DOE's progress in
    developing a sustainable MPC&A system across all sites where it has
    installed MPC&A upgrades, including evaluations of progress for each of
    the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in DOE's Sustainability
    Guidelines.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    DOE generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no
    written comments on our report. DOE and DOD also provided technical
    comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

    In its comments, DOE provided additional information about the metric it
    uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its reasons for not using EVM
    on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to work with Rosatom on
    sustainability issues. DOE agreed that the current metric it uses to track
    progress in the MPC&A program may be confusing. DOE wrote that it is
    changing the metric to one that more accurately identifies the level of
    completion for upgrades. Similarly, DOE officials told us in January 2007
    that they were taking steps to modify the progress metric. However, in
    February 2007, DOE issued its Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, which did
    not include modifications to clarify the confusions DOE agrees are present
    in its progress metric. As a result, DOE's most recent budget
    justification continues to present the Congress with an unclear picture of
    the progress made in improving security at buildings with weapons-useable
    nuclear material in Russia and other countries because DOE's progress
    metric does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed
    at some buildings that the department lists as being "secure."

    As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
    the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
    Secretaries of Energy and Defense; the Administrator, National Nuclear
    Security Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
    and interested congressional committees. We also will make copies
    available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be made
    available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov . Contact points for our
    Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
    last page of this report. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are
    listed in appendix VI.

    Gene Aloise
    Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    Appendix I

    Scope and Methodology

    We performed our review of U.S. efforts to assist Russia and other
    countries in securing nuclear materials and warheads at the Departments of
    Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD) and State (State); the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) in Washington, D.C.; the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency in Fort Belvior, Virginia; Oak Ridge National Laboratory
    in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New
    Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. We
    visited Russia to discuss the implementation of U.S. nuclear material and
    warhead security assistance programs with Russian officials. We also spoke
    with officials from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, DOE's Moscow office, and
    the DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Office in Moscow.

    While in Russia we met with officials from the Federal Agency for Atomic
    Energy of the Russian Federation (Rosatom), Rostekhnadzor (the Russian
    nuclear regulatory authority), and the Ministry of Defense
    (MOD)--including representatives from the 12^th Main Directorate, Navy,
    and Strategic Rocket Forces. We requested visits to the Institute of
    Nuclear Materials, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering,
    Interdepartmental Special Training Center, Russian Methodological Training
    Center, and All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics
    (also known as Chelyabinsk-70 and Snezhinsk), but Rosatom denied us access
    to all facilities under its control, including these. In fact, we were
    denied access to some Russian sites GAO officials had visited during past
    reviews of U.S. nonproliferation programs. Rosatom officials told us that
    because our names were not on the list of 185 individuals provided by DOE
    for access under the terms of a 2001 access arrangement, we would not be
    allowed to visit any Rosatom facilities. Rosatom officials did not deny
    our request for access until we had already arrived in Russia to begin our
    fieldwork for this review. In addition, the Russian MOD denied our request
    to visit a naval nuclear fuel facility, Site 49, and a naval nuclear
    warhead facility near Murmansk, Russia, due to military exercises
    scheduled near these sites during the time of our visit.

    We were able meet our audit objectives by visiting four sites--civilian,
    educational, and research institutes that are not under Rosatom's
    control--where DOE had provided security upgrades through NNSA's Materials
    Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program: Karpov Institute for
    Physical Chemistry, Kurchatov Institute, Joint Institute for Nuclear
    Research, and Moscow State Engineering and Physics Institute. During our
    visits to these sites, we discussed the implementation of the MPC&A
    program, sustainability of U.S.-funded MPC&A upgrades, and the future of
    DOE cooperation with Russian officials. In addition, we visited a training
    facility near Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training
    to Russian MOD personnel in the Murmansk region.

    To assess the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other countries
    secure nuclear material, we had discussions with officials from NNSA's
    MPC&A program, DOE's contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia
    National Laboratories, and experts from nongovernmental organizations that
    specialize in nuclear nonproliferation. We reviewed various program
    documents, including the MPC&A Programmatic Guidelines, MPC&A Program
    Management Document, project work plans, and the DOE-Rosatom Joint Action
    Plan. We also analyzed financial information detailing program
    expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, and contract data
    for expenditures of the MPC&A program through the end of fiscal year 2006.
    To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned key database
    officials about data entry access, internal control procedures, and the
    accuracy and completeness of the data, following up with further
    questions, as necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data
    were noted in the documentation of our work, we determined that the data
    we received were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    To assess the progress DOE and DOD have made in assisting Russia with
    securing nuclear warheads, we reviewed documents and had discussions with
    officials from NNSA's MPC&A program, DOE's contractors at Oak Ridge and
    Sandia National Laboratories, DOD's Office of the Undersecretary of
    Defense for Policy, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We spoke with
    officials from the Russian MOD and visited a training facility near
    Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training to Russian MOD
    personnel. We analyzed financial information detailing program
    expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, and contract data
    from both DOE and DOD through the end of fiscal year 2006. To assess the
    reliability of these data, we questioned key database officials about on
    data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and
    completeness of the data, following up with further questions, as
    necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data were noted in
    the documentation of our work, we determined that these data were also
    sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    In addition, we reviewed guidance on government contracting, including the
    Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-11, DOD Earned Value
    Management (EVM) Implementation Guide, and DOE Order
    413.3A.^1 After reviewing this guidance, we requested copies of DOE and
    DOD's ongoing contracts valued over $20 million for work to help Russia
    and other countries secure nuclear material and warheads. To determine how
    DOE's large contracts were being managed, we reviewed contract documents
    and identified a requirement for quarterly reporting in the contracts. We
    contacted the Contracting Officers identified in the contracts to request
    information on how the contracts are managed in respect to applicable
    criteria required by OMB and DOE directives. Additionally, we reviewed
    DOD's large contracts for installing security upgrades at Russian nuclear
    warhead sites and reviewed documentation from DOD's contractors, Bechtel
    National, Inc., and Raytheon Technical Services. After analyzing these
    contracts and other related documentation, we determined that both of
    DOD's contracts reflected an EVM system. DOD provided us with
    certification documentation for Bechtel and Raytheon's EVM systems, a
    requirement called for by federal guidance for all EVM systems. Since the
    scope of work within the Bechtel contract was at or near completion, we
    evaluated only the contract performance management for Raytheon, in order
    to determine how DOD was executing and managing its large contracts for
    security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOD provided Raytheon's cost
    performance reports which GAO contracting experts assessed for cost and
    schedule variances in contracted work. After review of Raytheon's cost
    performance reports, we determined that shortfalls in scheduled work were
    resulting in a schedule variance equivalent to around $13 million.^2

    To assess the efforts undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the
    sustainability and continued use of U.S.-funded security upgrades, we had
    discussions with officials from NNSA's MPC&A program; DOE's contractors at
    Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories; DOD's Office of
    the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency. We analyzed program documents, including DOE's May 2004 interim
    Sustainability Guidelines, DOE's December 2006 final Sustainability
    Guidelines, DOE-DOD Joint Sustainability Task Force documents, DOE-Rosatom
    Joint Sustainability Working Group documents, and project work plans. We
    interviewed program officials responsible for the development of DOE's
    Sustainability Guidelines and program managers responsible for
    implementing them. We also discussed the sustainability of U.S.-funded
    upgrades with Russian officials at sites we visited.

    We performed our review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II

    Time Line of Major Events in the History of U.S. Efforts to Secure Nuclear
    Material and Warheads in Russia and Other Countries

    Appendix III

    Additional Information on DOE Efforts to Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable
    Nuclear Material in Countries Other Than Russia

    From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent a total of
    $131.5 million on efforts to help countries outside of Russia secure
    facilities with nuclear material (see fig. 4). Responsibility for managing
    DOE's MPC&A efforts in countries outside of Russia has shifted among a
    number of offices within DOE and NNSA.^1 Responsibility for sustainability
    of upgrades at sites in the former Soviet Union now rests with the Office
    of Weapons Material Protection within the Office of International
    Materials Protection and Cooperation in NNSA. The Office of Materials
    Consolidation and Civilian Sites within the Office of International
    Materials Protection and Cooperation in NNSA is responsible for
    implementing MPC&A efforts outside of the former Soviet Union, such as
    DOE's efforts in China and India.

    Figure 4: Map Showing DOE Spending by Country through the End of Fiscal
    Year 2006 for MPC&A Assistance Outside of Russia

    Note: In addition to the spending illustrated in the above figure, DOE
    also spent $33.7 million on miscellaneous MPC&A efforts outside of Russia
    through the end of fiscal year 2006. Also, all dollar amounts are rounded,
    and dollars are in millions.

    Belarus

    DOE provided security upgrades to two buildings at one facility--the Sosny
    Scientific and Technical Center (now known as the Joint Institute of Power
    and Nuclear Research-Sosny)--in Belarus. DOE began work at this site in
    April 1994, and the initial phase of MPC&A upgrades was completed in
    December 1997. After this, DOE was unable to conduct additional work in
    the country due to sanctions the United States had placed on Belarus.^2
    However, in May 2003, the Department of State modified its position and
    allowed a team from DOE to visit Sosny solely to review the status of the
    MPC&A systems provided with U.S. funds. The DOE team visited the site in
    June 2003 and noted several security deficiencies that required immediate
    improvement. Shortly thereafter, DOE received approval from the Department
    of State to return to Belarus to perform a comprehensive vulnerability
    assessment at the Sosny site. According to DOE officials, the Department
    of State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund allocated $250,000 for
    design work and $1.6 million for further upgrades in 2003 and 2005,
    respectively. Since there is currently no government-to-government
    agreement between the United States and Belarus, the project is being
    administered via the International Scientific and Technical Center's
    Partners Program. However, no funding has been spent yet because the
    Belarusian government suspended the project due to concerns over sharing
    information with a foreign entity. In the fall of 2006, Belarus indicated
    that it was again ready to move forward with the project. DOE sent a team
    to Sosny in December 2006 and was able to re-establish relations, as well
    as, develop a statement of work for the design of a communications system
    for the site and a project work plan for material control and accounting.
    Additional trips are planned for February and April 2007. DOE hopes to
    complete a second phase of MPC&A upgrades at the site in fiscal year 2008.
    In total, DOE spent about $3.6 million through the end of fiscal year 2006
    to provide MPC&A assistance to Belarus.

    China

    DOE has a cooperative engagement program with China on issues related to
    nuclear material security. The purpose of the engagement is to increase
    awareness of our respective approaches to nuclear security issues, as well
    as MPC&A methodologies and applicable technologies, and to work
    cooperatively to improve security in these areas when and where
    appropriate. DOE is pursuing this objective through dialogue and technical
    collaboration with the China Atomic Energy Authority in China's civilian
    nuclear sector and is attempting initial engagements with the China
    Academy of Engineering Physics in China's defense nuclear sector.

    DOE is pursuing bilateral cooperation with the Chinese civilian nuclear
    sector under the Statement of Intent signed with the China Atomic Energy
    Authority in January 2004 and the DOE-China Atomic Energy Authority
    Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement. In February 2004, DOE and
    the China Atomic Energy Authority agreed to conduct a Joint Technology
    Demonstration on integrated nuclear material management in Beijing. The
    purpose of this demonstration project was to promote the adoption of
    modern security practices and technologies at civilian nuclear facilities
    by demonstrating established physical protection, nuclear material control
    and accounting, and international safeguards technologies that provide a
    first line of defense against nuclear material theft, diversion, and
    sabotage. The Joint Technology Demonstration took place in Beijing in
    October 2005. Following the completion of the technology demonstration
    project, DOE is currently discussing ideas for future bilateral work with
    the China Atomic Energy Authority and the Chinese Institute of Atomic
    Energy. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $4.7 million on
    MPC&A cooperation with China.

    Georgia

    DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Georgia, the
    Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tbilisi. Work began at
    this site in January 1996 and was completed in May 1996, at a cost of
    about $0.2 million. All fresh and spent nuclear fuel was transferred from
    the facility to a secure nuclear site in Scotland in April 1998 under a
    multinational effort known as Operation Auburn Endeavor.  DOE's MPC&A
    program currently has no ongoing work in Georgia.

    India

    DOE's cooperative security engagement program with India is in its initial
    stages. DOE is investigating near-term opportunities to engage India on
    issues related to nuclear material security with the intent of initiating
    a cooperative program with India on nuclear security best practices.
    Potential issues for discussion include the theoretical framework for
    developing and implementing a design basis threat; the methodology for
    designing effective physical protection systems; a vulnerability
    assessment methodology; regulatory infrastructure for material control and
    accounting, and physical protection; and general nuclear security culture.
    DOE spent about $100,000 on MPC&A cooperation with India through the end
    of fiscal year 2006.

    Latvia

    DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Latvia, the Latvian
    Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center (also known as the Latvian
    Institute of Nuclear Physics at Salaspils). Work began at this site in
    July 1994 and was completed in February 1996. Since fiscal year 1994, DOE
    has spent about $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this
    facility. In May 2005, 2.5 kilograms of fresh highly enriched uranium
    (HEU) fuel were removed from the Salaspils reactor and returned to Russia.
    According to the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian
    Federation (Rosatom), the HEU fuel will be downblended into low-enriched
    uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear power plants. DOE's MPC&A
    program currently has no ongoing work in Latvia.

    Lithuania

    DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Lithuania, the Ignalina
    Nuclear Power Plant. Work began at this site in October 1995 and was
    completed in August 1996. Since fiscal year 1996, DOE has spent about
    $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this facility. DOE
    counted one building at this facility as secure in its progress metric for
    the MPC&A program that tracks the number of buildings with weapons-usable
    nuclear material secured, even though the facility never possessed such
    material.^3 During the course of our review, we brought this to the
    attention of DOE management, and they agreed to remove the facility from
    the progress report in DOE's fiscal year 2008 budget justification
    document. DOE's MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Lithuania.

    Kazakhstan

    DOE provided security upgrades to four sites in Kazakhstan: the Institute
    of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, the Institute of Nuclear Physics at Alatau,
    the BN-350 breeder reactor at Aktau, and the Ulba Metallurgical Plant. In
    total, DOE spent about $45.3 million from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal
    year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Kazakhstan.

    Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov

    The Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, formerly called
    Semipalatinsk-21, is a branch of the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center.
    Two nuclear research reactors are located at the site. DOE began providing
    both physical security and material control and accounting upgrades to the
    site in October 1994, and the site was commissioned in September 1997. The
    perimeter security system at the site was commissioned in July 1998. DOE
    plans to continue to assist the Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov with
    spare parts, extended warranties, and training to sustain its MPC&A
    systems in fiscal year 2007.

    Institute of Nuclear Physics

    The Institute of Nuclear Physics is a branch of the Kazakhstan National
    Nuclear Center located in the town of Alatau. The site operates a
    10-megawatt research reactor used to manufacture radioisotopes as a
    radiation source for industrial and medical use, among other activities.
    DOE began work at the site in September 1995 and completed upgrades in
    October 1998. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear
    Physics at Alatau with extended warranties and training to sustain its
    MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

    BN-350 Reactor at Aktau

    DOE provided upgrades to two buildings at the BN-350 reactor site at
    Aktau. MPC&A upgrade work began in September 1994 and was completed in
    December 1998. In May 2002, HEU fuel was transferred from the BN-350
    breeder reactor in Aktau to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant with the
    assistance of a nongovernmental organization involved in nonproliferation
    efforts--the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The HEU fuel will be downblended
    into low-enriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear
    reactors.

    Ulba Metallurgical Plant

    The Ulba Metallurgical Plant contains a low-enriched uranium fuel
    fabrication facility, among other resources. The fuel fabrication facility
    produces nuclear fuel pellets with a capacity of 1,000 metric tons per
    year. Security upgrades work began in September 1994 and was completed in
    September 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the Ulba Metallurgical
    Plant with extended warranties and spare parts to sustain its MPC&A
    systems in fiscal year 2007.

    In addition, on November 21, 1994, 581 kilograms of HEU was transferred
    from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the United States in a highly secret
    project code-named "Sapphire." The project was carried out with
    cooperation from the Kazakhstani government and DOE and DOD.^4  The large
    stockpile of HEU, reportedly left over from the Soviet Union's secret Alfa
    submarine program, had been stored at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in
    unsecured and unsafeguarded facilities without electronic means of
    accounting. Experts estimate the nuclear material was sufficient to make
    20-25 nuclear bombs. The HEU was downblended into low-enriched uranium for
    use in civilian nuclear power plants in the late 1990s.

    Ukraine

    DOE provided MPC&A assistance to four sites in Ukraine: Kharkiv Institute
    of Physics and Technology, Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research, Sevastopol
    National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, and South Ukraine
    Nuclear Power Plant. In total, DOE spent about $37.7 million from fiscal
    year 1993 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Ukraine,
    including installation of security upgrades, maintenance of installed
    MPC&A systems, and training for site personnel.

    Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology

    The Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology conducts nuclear fuel
    cycle research and has important experimental physics facilities including
    a number of electron and ion accelerators. DOE provided upgrades to one
    building at this site. Security upgrades work began in May 1995 and was
    completed in January 1999. DOE plans to continue to assist the Kharkiv
    Institute of Physics and Technology with extended warranties and training
    to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

    Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research

    The Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research was established in 1970 and is
    operated by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The institute's primary
    function is to perform research in low- and medium-energy nuclear physics.
    Security upgrades work began at one building at this site in December 1993
    and was completed in October 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the
    Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research with extended warranties and training
    to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

    Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry

    The Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry's mission
    is to support Ukraine's nuclear power industry by training nuclear power
    plant personnel. The facility operates a 200-kilowatt, light-water cooled,
    research reactor. Security upgrades work began at one building at this
    facility in May 1996 and was completed in January 1999. DOE plans to
    continue to assist the Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and
    Industry  with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A
    systems in fiscal year 2007.

    South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant

    In addition to these facilities, DOE provided MPC&A upgrades to a fourth
    site that does not possess weapons-usable nuclear material, the South
    Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. DOE began security upgrades work at this site
    in August 1994 and completed its upgrades work in January 1999. DOE
    counted this facility as secured in its progress metric for the MPC&A
    program, even though the facility never possessed such material. During
    the course of our review, we brought this to the attention of DOE
    management, and they agreed to remove the facility from their progress
    report in DOE's fiscal year 2008 budget justification document. According
    to DOE officials, no further MPC&A assistance is planned at this site.

    Uzbekistan

    In Uzbekistan, DOE's project goal is to continue to enhance capabilities
    and commitment to operating and maintaining security improvements at two
    institutes: the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent and the Foton
    facility. In total, DOE spent about $4.4 million from fiscal year 1995
    through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Uzbekistan.

    Institute of Nuclear Physics

    Founded in 1956 as part of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the
    Institute of Nuclear Physics operates a 10-megawatt research reactor.
    Often described as the largest facility of its kind in central Asia, the
    site has an ambitious program to become the primary nuclear research and
    isotope production facility for the region. The facility maintains fresh
    and irradiated nuclear fuel storage facilities to support continued
    reactor operations. Security upgrades at the site began in June 1995 and
    were provided by a joint team from the United States, Australia, Sweden,
    and the United Kingdom. Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance
    in the area of material control and accounting, while the United States
    and United Kingdom agreed to provide physical protection upgrades.
    Upgrades were provided in two phases. Phase I upgrades were completed in
    August 1996. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE began to work
    with the facility to develop a plan to further improve its security
    system. Additional upgrades focused on the facility perimeter and included
    the installation of new fencing and exterior intrusion detection sensors.
    In addition, the Department of State provided about $0.6 million in fiscal
    year 2002 through its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to supply
    cameras and lighting for the facility's perimeter. All Phase II upgrades
    were completed in September 2002. A commissioning ceremony was held in
    October 2002. In 2006, DOE announced the removal of 63 kilograms of HEU in
    the form of spent nuclear fuel from the facility. The HEU spent fuel was
    returned to Russia through DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative. DOE
    plans to continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear Physics with extended
    warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

    Foton Facility

    The Foton facility has a small research reactor containing less than 5
    kilograms of HEU. MPC&A upgrades at the site began in January 2005 and
    were completed in May 2005. Physical security upgrades at the Foton
    facility focused on the research reactor building and included such things
    as intrusion detection sensors, improved access controls, and a central
    alarm station. DOE plans to continue to assist the Foton facility with
    extended warranties to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

    Appendix IV

    Additional Information on DOE's National Infrastructure and Related
    Programs

    In addition to DOE's efforts to provide security upgrades at sites with
    weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other
    countries, the department implements other crosscutting efforts to support
    the efforts of its MPC&A program, such as assistance for transportation
    security, equipment for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and
    efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and sites.
    According to DOE officials, these efforts support DOE's goal of improving
    security of vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material by
    contributing to the overall security systems at nuclear materials sites in
    Russia and other countries. As table 4 shows, through the end of fiscal
    year 2006, DOE spent about $493.9 million on these efforts.

    Table 4: DOE Spending on Crosscutting MPC&A Assistance Efforts through the
    End of Fiscal Year 2006

                         Dollars in millions
                               Project                                   Spending
    Material consolidation and conversion                               $128.8
    Secure transportation                                                 88.1
    Training and technical support infrastructure                         63.6
    Russian Federation inspection implementation                          43.1
    Protective forces assistance                                          30.2
    Federal Information System                                            29.1
    Regulatory development                                                27.0
    Certification^a                                                       23.6
    MPC&A operations monitoring^a                                         20.5
    MPC&A operations/sustainability^a                                     13.9
    MPC&A education                                                       13.4
    Material control and accounting measurements                          10.8
    MPC&A security culture                                                 1.3
    Taxation and customs                                                   0.5
    Total                                                               $493.9

    Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

    ^aThe certification, MPC&A operations monitoring, and MPC&A
    operations/sustainability projects are discussed in the body of this
    report. Dollar amounts are rounded.

    Material Consolidation and Conversion

    DOE's Material Consolidation and Conversion project supports the transfer
    of HEU from Russian sites where it is no longer needed in order to secure
    locations within Russia for eventual conversion to low-enriched uranium.
    According to DOE, consolidation and conversion efforts significantly
    reduce the requirements and costs of securing material. For example, in
    2006, DOE announced the completion of a 2-year cooperative effort to
    remove HEU from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute, a Russian
    research facility located near St. Petersburg. DOE teams worked with their
    Russian counterparts to validate the inventory of nuclear material and
    confirm that it was securely packaged for transport. DOE paid for the HEU
    to be shipped to another facility in Russia where it will be converted
    (downblended) to low-enriched uranium, which will eliminate it as a
    proliferation concern. Through the Material Consolidation and Conversion
    project, DOE has also supported the secure storage and conversion of
    Russian-origin HEU that has been returned to Russia from countries such as
    Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. DOE reported
    in July 2006 that more than 8,000 kilograms of HEU had been downblended
    into low-enriched uranium under the project. Through the end of fiscal
    year 2006, DOE had spent about $128.8 million on the project.

    Secure Transportation

    In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE
    increased funding for its efforts to secure nuclear material during
    transit. By providing upgraded security for transport and guard railcars,
    specialized secure trucks and escort vehicles, and secure
    containers--called overpacks--DOE seeks to reduce the risks of theft and
    sabotage of nuclear material transported within and between nuclear
    facilities in Russia. The goal of the Secure Transportation project is to
    reduce the risk of theft or diversion of material or warheads during
    transportation operations in Russia by improving security for railcars and
    trucks, Russian nuclear material and warhead transport infrastructure, and
    communications interface with response forces. Through fiscal year 2006,
    DOE had spent about $88.1 million to improve the transportation security
    of nuclear material in Russia, by providing 76 cargo trucks, 86 escort
    vehicles, as well as 66 cargo railcars, 25 guard railcars, and 283
    security overpacks. This included 54 refurbished cargo railcars, 25 new
    manufactured guard railcars, 12 new manufactured cargo railcars, and
    approximately 78 cargo trucks and 89 escort trucks to support both on-site
    and off-site nuclear material shipments.

    Training and Technical Support Infrastructure

    DOE provides a variety of training and technical support to both the
    Russian Navy and Rosatom to help these entities operate and maintain
    U.S.-funded security upgrades and MPC&A systems. One of the primary
    accomplishments of the project was the construction of the Kola Technical
    Center near Murmansk. The facility was designed and constructed by DOE to
    be a central training and maintenance center to support naval nuclear fuel
    and warhead sites in the Murmansk region. DOE completed construction of
    the Kola Technical Center in June 2005 at a cost of $24 million.^1 We
    visited the facility during our trip to Russia. Russian officials told us
    that the Kola Technical Center is critical to help the Russian MOD
    transition to full financial responsibility for sustainability after U.S.
    funding ends.

    In addition, DOE provides support to Rosatom's regional training
    facilities through the Rosatom Training and Technical Support
    Infrastructure project. These facilities, such as the Interdepartmental
    Special Training Center and the Russian Methodological and Training
    Center, seek to train specialists and guard forces to safeguard materials
    at Russian nuclear sites. Additionally, these centers seek to assist
    Rosatom by providing effective and sustainable training and technical
    support infrastructures. To date, DOE has spent $42.5 million on the
    establishment of these training and technological support centers.

    Russian Federation Inspection Implementation

    The Russian Federation Inspection Implementation project seeks to enhance
    nuclear material inspections by establishing a sustainable infrastructure
    with sufficient resources to enforce MPC&A regulations through federal and
    industry oversight. Under this project, DOE provides inspection support to
    Rostekhnadzor, Rosatom, and other Russian ministries and agencies. The
    project enhances MPC&A nuclear material inspections at the ministerial,
    agency, and site-level by providing comprehensive training, inspection,
    and technical assistance, as well as sufficient information technology to
    aid inspectors in conducting systematic inspections. For example, DOE
    assists Russian organizations in developing a systematic inspection
    approach that assures the MPC&A objectives are met and assists
    organizations in defining the inspection program by benchmarking proposed
    inspection methodologies against U.S. and other inspection approaches.
    Through fiscal year 2006, DOE has sponsored 83 inspections by Rosatom and
    Rostekhnadzor, and 980 Russian personnel have attended inspection courses.
    DOE's goal for the project is to maintain a cadre of about 125 trained
    inspectors. DOE had spent about $43.1 million on this project through the
    end of fiscal year 2006.

    Protective Forces Assistance

    The objective of the Protective Force Assistance project is to ensure that
    a sufficient number of organized, equipped, and trained response forces
    are present and able to protect against threats to highly-desirable
    nuclear material at Russian and Ukrainian sites and during transit. The
    project includes efforts in Russia and Ukraine, although the bulk of the
    efforts and money are spent in Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent
    about $26.7 million to purchase a variety of equipment, such as
    bulletproof vests, helmets, response vehicles, and cold-weather uniforms
    for use by the forces that protect sites that store weapons-usable nuclear
    material in Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $3.4 million
    to purchase the same type of equipment for Ukrainian sites.

    Federal Information System

    The Federal Information System (FIS) is a computerized management
    information system designed to track the location and movement of nuclear
    material between organizations throughout Russia. The FIS provides
    information on the quantity of nuclear material located at facilities that
    report to Rosatom. The system is centralized and automated to ensure that
    information can be received, tracked, and monitored by Rosatom. The
    development of the FIS is important to the MPC&A program because, prior to
    its development, Russian nuclear facilities generally used paper-based
    systems to track nuclear material inventories. The FIS will allow the
    Russian government to maintain an accurate and complete inventory of its
    weapons-usable nuclear material. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported that
    21 organizations and facilities throughout Russia report to the FIS.
    Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $29.1 million to
    develop the FIS.

    Regulatory Development

    The purpose of the Regulatory Development project is to assist Russian
    regulatory and operating agencies and services in developing a sustainable
    MPC&A regulatory system for civilian nuclear materials site security and
    to also provide assistance to regulatory agencies in Ukraine and
    Kazakhstan. The regulatory framework establishes legal requirements for
    MPC&A activities for relevant ministries, agencies, services, operating
    organizations, and facilities. DOE works with Rosatom,
    Rostekhnadzor--Russia's civilian nuclear regulatory authority, and other
    agencies to develop consistent MPC&A requirements across ministries,
    operating organizations, and facilities. In doing so, DOE aims to create
    incentives for effective MPC&A procedures and sanctions for noncompliance
    with regulations in order to foster a strong MPC&A culture and help
    sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades. Through the end of fiscal year
    2006, the project has achieved enactment of 67 regulations, which is 35
    percent of the total planned. In addition, DOE has worked with the Russian
    MOD to develop a comprehensive regulatory base that ensures MPC&A
    practices are implemented consistently throughout all branches and
    services of the Russian MOD. DOE spent about $27 million through fiscal
    year 2006 on its regulatory development projects.

    MPC&A Education

    The MPC&A Education project supports efforts in Russia to train existing
    and future MPC&A experts. The project consists of two educational degree
    programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute and one degree
    program at Tomsk Polytechnic University. The first educational degree
    program is the MPC&A Graduate Program available only at the Moscow
    Engineering Physics Institute. DOE worked with both the Moscow Engineering
    Physics Institute and Tomsk Polytechnic University to develop an
    undergraduate engineering program, focusing on more technical, hands-on
    aspects of nuclear security. For each of these degree programs, DOE works
    with the two universities to develop curriculum; identify and acquire
    training aids; develop and publish textbooks; and strengthen instructor
    skills. In addition, DOE works with the Monterey Institute of
    International Studies^2 to support the instruction of nontechnical
    nonproliferation courses at universities and high schools located outside
    of Moscow. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $13.4
    million on the project.

    Material Control and Accounting Measurements

    The Material Control and Accounting Measurements project provides support
    to Russia for developing a national system of reference materials
    (standards), nuclear material measurement methods, instruments, and
    infrastructure to support the accurate measurement and accounting of
    weapons-usable nuclear material at Russian facilities. Reference
    materials, measurement methods, and instruments are needed to accurately
    measure the quantity and isotopic composition of nuclear material during
    inventories and transfers for input into accountability databases.
    Accurate material control and accounting measurements are key components
    to any MPC&A system. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $10.8
    million under this project and has purchased and distributed transportable
    equipment that allows for the testing of uranium and plutonium.

    MPC&A Security Culture

    The MPC&A Security Culture project supports the overall MPC&A goal of
    assisting Russia with enhancing its capabilities and strengthening its
    commitment to operating and maintaining improved nuclear security by
    fostering the development of training centers and developing an outreach
    strategy to enhance partner countries' awareness and understanding of
    MPC&A benefits, e.g., an MPC&A security "culture." The main objective of
    this project is to establish an infrastructure that emphasizes the
    importance of MPC&A and increase the commitment throughout Russia to
    operate and maintain MPC&A systems with minimal U.S. support by
    reinforcing the necessary attitudes and beliefs required to instill a
    strong MPC&A culture. Accomplishments under this project include training
    1,800 staff in security culture and initiating a pilot security culture
    coordinator project at nine sites. Through the end of fiscal year 2006,
    DOE had spent about $1.3 million on the MPC&A Security Culture project.

    In addition to its efforts to improve the security culture at Russian
    nuclear sites, DOE recently conducted a series of workshops for Russian
    officials on MPC&A best practices at U.S. nuclear sites. The workshops
    included presentations by U.S. MPC&A experts. In conducting this workshop
    series, DOE intends to further enhance the security culture at Russian
    sites by working to educate Russian site officials on the methods used at
    U.S. facilities, so that these best practices can be applied at Russian
    sites.

    Taxation and Customs

    The MPC&A Taxation and Customs project began in 1999 to meet a
    congressional mandate that U.S. nuclear safety and security programs not
    pay taxes in Russia. The MPC&A program must obtain a certified tax
    exemption when providing technical equipment and services. The Taxation
    and Customs project assists DOE project teams' understanding of taxation
    and customs issues and ensures compliance with Russian laws. The project
    stays abreast of Russian taxation and customs legislation, as well as
    guidance on bureaucracy and requirements for tax exemption, by holding
    workshops for Russian sites; tracking the tax-exemption process; and
    maintaining a taxation Web site for DOE project teams. Through the end of
    fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $0.5 million on the project.

    Appendix V

    Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix VI

    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or aloisee@gao.gov

    Staff Acknowledgments

    In addition to the individual named above, R. Stockton Butler, Jeffery
    Hartnett, Lisa Henson, and Jim Shafer made significant contributions to
    this report. Other assistance was provided by John Delicath, Jennifer
    Echard, Brandon Haller, Gregory Marchand, Keith Rhodes, and Karen Richey.

    Related GAO Products

    Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some DOE
    Projects in Russia and Other Countries. [64]GAO-05-828 . Washington, D.C.:
    August 29, 2005.

    Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal
    Controls, but Challenges Remain. [65]GAO-05-329 . Washington, D.C.: June
    30, 2005.

    Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
    Integration. [66]GAO-05-157 . Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

    Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
    Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.
    [67]GAO-03-482 . Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.

    Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving;
    Further Enhancements Needed. [68]GAO-01-312 . Washington, D.C.: February
    28, 2001.

    Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material
    Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. RCED/NSIAD-00-82.
    Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.

    Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost
    More, Achieve Less Than Planned. NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April 13,
    1999.

    Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
    Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. NSIAD/RCED-96-89.
    Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.

    Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S.
    Dismantlement Assistance. NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1993.

    (360674)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404 .

    To view the full product, including the scope
    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
    aloisee@gao.gov.

    Highlights of [70]GAO-07-404 , a report to congressional requesters

    February 2007

    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the
    Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain

    Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make
    nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United
    States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) have
    worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear
    material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE
    established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
    program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has
    made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other
    countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving security at
    Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD have undertaken
    to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. To
    address these objectives, among other things, GAO analyzed agency
    documents, conducted interviews with key program officials, and visited
    four Russian nuclear sites.

    [71]What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends that DOE (1) revise the metrics it uses to track progress
    in securing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material and (2) develop
    a management information system to track DOE's progress in providing
    Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

    DOE agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. DOD did not provide
    written comments.

    Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to provide
    security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other
    countries that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads. With
    regard to securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have "secured" 175
    buildings and plans to improve security at 35 additional buildings by the
    end of 2008. However, DOE's reported total of buildings "secured" does not
    recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some
    buildings because DOE considers a building "secured" after it has received
    only limited MPC&A upgrades, even when additional comprehensive upgrades
    are planned. Further, DOE and Russia have developed a Joint Action Plan
    that includes 20 sites and details the remaining work to be accomplished
    by 2008. However, the plan does not include two sites containing many
    buildings with vast amounts of nuclear material where Russia has denied
    DOE access.

    DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead sites
    and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. The
    departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our 2003
    report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies
    for installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead sites.
    Additionally, DOE and DOD are using similar approaches to manage large
    security upgrade contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned value
    management (EVM), which at early stages can identify cost and schedule
    shortfalls. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts, but, during
    the course of GAO's review, augmented its contract oversight to increase
    reporting frequency, which DOE officials consider a comparable alternative
    to EVM.

    DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure
    that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded
    security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S.
    assistance ends and is working with Russia to develop a joint
    sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management information system to
    track the progress made toward its goal of providing Russia with a
    sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. DOE and DOD's abilities to ensure the
    sustainability of U.S.-funded security upgrades may be hampered by access
    difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, DOE and DOD
    plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security upgrades at
    nuclear warhead sites but have not reached agreement with Russia on access
    procedures for sustainability visits to 44 sites. As a result, the
    agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are
    being properly sustained.

    References

    Visible links
      64. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-828
      65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-329
      66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-157
      67. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-482
      68. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-312
      70. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404
    *** End of document. ***