Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters
(09-MAR-07, GAO-07-395T).
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
stipulates major changes to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
improve the agency's preparedness for and response to
catastrophic disasters. For example, the act establishes a new
mission for and new leadership positions within FEMA. As GAO has
reported, DHS faces continued challenges, including clearly
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing
necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing
accountability systems to provide effective response while also
protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony
discusses the extent to which DHS has taken steps to overcome
these challenges This testimony summarizes earlier GAO work on:
(1) leadership, response capabilities, and accountability
controls; (2) organizational changes provided for in the
Post-Katrina Reform Act; and (3) disaster management issues for
continued Congressional attention.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-395T
ACCNO: A66676
TITLE: Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to
Disasters
DATE: 03/09/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Disaster relief aid
Emergency management
Emergency preparedness
Emergency response
Federal agency reorganization
Federal/state relations
Homeland security
Hurricane Katrina
Internal controls
Regional planning
Risk management
Strategic planning
Waste, fraud, and abuse
National Response Plan
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GAO-07-395T
* [1]Summary
* [2]Background
* [3]Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Contro
* [4]Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recov
* [5]Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery
* [6]Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ens
* [7]GAO Recommendations Stress Changes in Leadership, Capabiliti
* [8]Post-Katrina Reform Act Changes
* [9]DHS Reports Planned Changes Consistent with the Legislation
* [10]Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Pr
* [11]FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems
* [12]Post-Katrina Reform Act Provisions Also Respond to Accountab
* [13]Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Con
* [14]The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disast
* [15]The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza
Pande
* [16]Our Knowledge of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Ca
* [17]Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be R
* [18]Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture
* [19]DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or
* [20]Concluding Observations
* [21]Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
* [22]GAO's Mission
* [23]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [24]Order by Mail or Phone
* [25]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [26]Congressional Relations
* [27]Public Affairs
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST
Friday, March 9, 2007
HOMELAND SECURITY
Preparing for and Responding to Disasters
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
GAO-07-395T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on disaster preparation
and response. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to
state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows:
To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to disasters
of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective
actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set the stage for
a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in
particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre- and
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as knowing
evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a family
and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
GAO has identified disaster preparedness and response as a major challenge
for the 21st century. In 2005, GAO issued a special report examining the
federal government's long-term fiscal outlook, the nation's ability to
respond to emerging forces reshaping American society, and the future role
of the federal government. Among the issues discussed was homeland
security.^1 In our report we identified the following illustrative
challenges and questions for examining emergency preparedness and
response:
o What is an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints)
level of risk? The nation can never be completely safe; total
security is an unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes
what is an acceptable level of risk to guide homeland security
strategies and investments, particularly federal funding. What
criteria should be used to target federal and state funding for
homeland security in order to maximize results and mitigate risk
within available resource levels?
o What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments
in identifying risks--from nature or man--in individual states and
localities and establishing standards for the equipment, skills,
and capacities that first responders need?
o Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector
protection of critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and
what changes might be necessary?
o What is the most viable way to approach homeland security
results management and accountability? What are the appropriate
goals and who is accountable for the many components of homeland
security when many partners and functions and disciplines are
involved? How can these actors be held accountable and by whom?
What costs should be borne by federal, state, and local
governments or the private sector in preparing for, responding to,
and recovering from disasters large and small--whether the acts of
nature or the deliberate or accidental acts of man?
o To what extent and how should the federal government encourage
and foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency
planning and response?
^1GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [28]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels of
government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to major
disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and
capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response to
major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple
actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and
levels of government as well as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism
must be put aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an
emergency event. The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is
important to tackle these difficult issues.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006^2 (Post-Katrina
Reform Act) requires major changes designed to increase the effectiveness
of preparedness and response. The act has established new leadership
positions and position requirements within the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), establishes new missions for FEMA, requires the
transfer of preparedness functions to it, and requires the FEMA
Administrator to undertake a broad range of activities before and after
disasters occur. However, as the Comptroller General testified last month
on DHS's high-risk status and specifically disaster preparedness and
response, DHS must overcome continued challenges, including those related
to clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing
necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability
systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste,
fraud, and abuse.
^2Pub. L. 109-295.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings regarding leadership,
response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2) discusses the
organizational changes provided for the in the Post-Katrina Reform Act;
and (3) highlights several disaster management issues for continued
congressional attention. My comments today are based on our Hurricane
Katrina work on disaster and emergency management and our review of recent
emergency management reform legislative changes. We conducted our audit
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I contains a selected list of GAO reports related to my
statement.
Summary
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of an
overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and define what
needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how well it should
be done--that is, according to what standards. The principal national
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the
National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and the
National Preparedness Goal.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we reported that DHS needs to
coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts more
effectively.^3 FEMA officials have acknowledged that FEMA was unprepared
for a disaster of Katrina's geographic scope and destruction, including an
unprecedented number of displaced households. Our analysis showed
improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities,
development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability
systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response
against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Legal authorities,
roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of
government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well
understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. We found
improved capabilities for catastrophic disasters were needed
--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness;
(2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5)
logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. Implementing controls and
accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are used
appropriately. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of
these areas, but their operational impact in a major disaster has not yet
been tested.
^3GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [29]GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
In line with a similar recommendation following Hurricane Andrew, the
nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended that
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We
also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and exercise its
recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of
authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to
remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the NRP base plan
and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust
and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and
direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises
to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and
recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take
a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their
responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal;
and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to
invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic
disaster. The Post-Katrina Reform Act requires major changes within DHS,
and at FEMA particularly, designed to increase the effectiveness of
preparedness and response. Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina
Reform Act's organizational changes, related roles and responsibilities
and capabilities should address many of our emergency management
observations and recommendations.
In his November 2006 letter to Congress on oversight issues, the
Comptroller General suggested that one area for fundamental reform and
oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for,
respond to, recover from, and rebuild after catastrophic events. Congress
may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These
include (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National
Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; (2)
assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to
enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multistate planning
and preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and
(5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
Background
Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation
for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)^4 primarily
establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to
provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and
tribal governments, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit
organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the
provisions of the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic
disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge
capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources, such as personnel
and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One way
of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the use
of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate compact that
provides a legal and administrative framework for managing such emergency
requests. The compact includes all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
We have ongoing work examining how the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact has been used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be
enhanced and expect to report within a few months.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002^5 required the newly established DHS to
develop a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS
is intended to provide a consistent framework for incident management at
all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of
the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of federal,
state, and local governments, and various first responder disciplines at
each level during an emergency event. It also prescribes interoperable
communications systems and preparedness before an incident happens,
including planning, training, and exercises. The act required DHS to
consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into a
single, integrated and coordinated national response plan. DHS issued the
National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline,
all-hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the
management of domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary.
The NRP, operating within the framework of NIMS, provides the structure
and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for
domestic incident management. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic
Incident Annex, which describes an accelerated, proactive national
response to catastrophic incidents.
^4Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. S5121 et seq.).
^5Pub. L. No. 107-296, S502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2212 (2002) (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. S314.
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of an
overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and define what
needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how well it should
be done--that is, according to what standards. The principal national
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the
National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and the
National Preparedness Goal. The interim National Preparedness Goal,
required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, is particularly
important for determining what capabilities are needed, especially for a
catastrophic disaster. All states and urban areas are to align existing
preparedness strategies within the National Preparedness Goal's eight
national priorities.^6 The December 2005 draft National Preparedness Goal
defines both the 37 major capabilities that first responders should
possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from a wide
range of incidents and the most critical tasks associated with these
capabilities. An inability to effectively perform these critical tasks
would, by definition, have a detrimental affect on effective protection,
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. A final National
Preparedness Goal is expected to be released soon.
As the subcommittee is aware, beginning in February 2006, reports by the
House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina,^7 the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee,^8 the White House Homeland Security
Council,^9 the DHS Inspector General,^10 and DHS and FEMA^11 all
identified a variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations
for, response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina.
Collectively, these reports, along with GAO's various reports and
testimonies, offered a number of specific recommendations for improving
the nation's ability to effectively prepare for and respond to
catastrophic disasters. Table 1 contains the resulting reports and a brief
description of their findings.
^6Those priorities are (1) implement the National Incident Management
System and National Response Plan; (2) expand regional collaboration; (3)
implement the interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; (4)
strengthen information-sharing and collaboration capabilities; (5)
strengthen interoperable communications capabilities; (6) strengthen
chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive detection,
response, and decontamination capabilities; (7) strengthen medical surge
and mass prophylaxis capabilities; and (8) review emergency operations
plans and the status of catastrophic planning.
^7House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
^8U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
^9White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
^10Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to
Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
^11Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash:
Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Feb.
13, 2006).
Table 1: Findings in Reports by Congress and the Administration
Title and author Major findings
DHS/FEMA Initial Response Found improvements needed in areas of
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in communications and interoperability; FEMA
Louisiana (February 13, 2006) staffing, unified command, logistics and
staging, and operating procedures.
Source: FEMA Recommendations for FEMA included: work to
strengthen emergency management capability
at state and local levels; review emergency
management architecture for response and
recovery operations; train, equip, and staff
response teams; improve the financial
management of disasters; improve leadership
and management; establish command authority
in the Joint Field Office (JFO); and
continue catastrophic planning with federal,
state, and local governments.
A Failure of Initiative: Identified 14 major findings including the
Final Report of the House following: critical elements of the NRP were
Select Bipartisan Committee executed late, ineffectively, or not at all;
to Investigate the there was massive communications damage;
Preparation for and Response command and control was impaired at all
to Hurricane Katrina levels, delaying relief; and the military
(February 15, 2006) played an invaluable role but coordination
was lacking, among others. No
Source: House of recommendations provided.
Representatives
House Select Bipartisan
Committee
The Federal Response to Identified 17 critical challenges including
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons national preparedness, integrated use of
Learned (February 23, 2006) military capabilities, communications,
logistics and evacuation, search and rescue,
Source: White House Homeland public safety and security, public health
Security Council and medical support, human services, mass
care and housing, public communications,
critical infrastructure and impact
assessment, environmental hazards and debris
removal, foreign assistance,
non-governmental aid, training, exercises,
and lessons learned, professional
development and education, citizen and
community preparedness. Identified 125
recommendations for DHS, Department of
Defense, and other federal departments and
agencies, including 44 that were to be
implemented by June 1, 2006.
A Performance Review of Found FEMA adapted to new response plans
FEMA's Disaster Management with difficulty; FEMA provided record levels
Activities in Response to of support but needs to improve delivery
Hurricane Katrina (March 31, structure; and FEMA needs to improve
2006) readiness. Identified 38 recommendations.
Source: Department of
Homeland Security's Office of
Inspector General
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Found differing roles at different levels of
Still Unprepared: Report of government affected the response; long-term
the Committee on Homeland and short-term warnings went unheeded;
Security and Governmental preparation proved insufficient; response at
Affairs (May 2006) all levels of government was unacceptable;
long-term factors contributed to poor
Source: U.S. Senate Committee response; and waste, fraud, and abuses were
on Homeland Security and identified. Report identified seven
Governmental Affairs foundational recommendations based on
identified systematic weaknesses and
challenges.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch and congressional reports.
Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve
Emergency Management
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were
over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS as
it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, whose
details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster
management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses
in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from
any catastrophic disaster. Based on work done during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more
effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery
efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response
capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately
overwhelmed.^12 Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and
understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of
the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic
Disasters
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of
authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively
communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective
decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership
at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic disaster.
For example, there were problems with roles and responsibilities under the
NRP and ambiguities about both what constituted an incident of national
significance to trigger the NRP and what constituted a catastrophic
incident to trigger the proactive response of the NRP's Catastrophic
Incident Annex. On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding
leadership issues, such as which situations require secretarial
leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national significance;
and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident Annex. The revised
NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who reports
directly to the President, is responsible for declaring and managing
incidents of national significance, including catastrophic ones. At the
time of Katrina, the supplement to the catastrophic incident annex, which
provides more detail on implementing the annex, was still in draft.
Subsequent to Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the
Catastrophic Incident Annex, dated August 2006.
^12GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [30]GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
The White House Homeland Security Council report included 44
recommendations that were intended for quick implementation, of which 18
were focused on improving and clarifying the legal authorities, roles and
responsibilities, and lines of authority. DHS has provided limited
information on the status of its implementation of the White House
recommendations, although it has reported actions taken on some issues
raised in the White House Homeland Security Council report and in other
reports. For example, DHS has pre-designated Principal Federal Officials
and Federal Coordinating Officers for regions and states at risk of
hurricanes and described their respective roles in coordinating disaster
response--which was a source of some confusion in the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina. However, the changes may not have fully resolved the
leadership issues regarding the roles of the principal federal officer and
federal coordinating officer. While the Secretary of Homeland Security may
avoid conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both
positions in nonterrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the
Secretary of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so.
Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents, and
the revised NRP does not specifically provide a rationale for this
limitation.
Congress also raised concerns in 2006 that FEMA's performance problems
during the response to Hurricane Katrina may have stemmed from its
organizational placement and its budgetary relationship within DHS. In May
2006, we noted that organizational changes alone, while potentially
important, were not likely to adequately address the underlying systemic
conditions that resulted in FEMA's performance problems.^13 We noted that
a number of factors other than organizational placement may be more
important to FEMA's success in responding to and recovering from future
disasters, including catastrophic ones. Conditions underlying FEMA's
performance during Hurricane Katrina involved the experience and training
of DHS or FEMA leadership; the clarity of FEMA's mission and related
responsibilities and authorities to achieve mission performance
expectations; the adequacy of it human, financial, and technological
resources; and the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related
partnerships. The Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions that address
each of these issues.
^13GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success
and Issue to Consider for Organizational Placement, [31]GAO-06-746T
(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006)
Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery Are Needed
Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial resources
and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and
nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate
challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number of
victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the capabilities
needed for catastrophic disasters should be part of an overall national
preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to
be done and where, how it should be done, and how well it should be
done--that is, according to what standards. The principal national
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the
National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and the
National Preparedness Goal. The nation's experience with Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy
of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in
the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency
communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and
(6) mass care and sheltering.
Capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, skills,
processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are available
requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with training
and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested and
problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other
federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA management
of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting resources caused
by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the agency's
management of existing resources compounded these problems.^14 FEMA lacks
some of the basic management tools that help an agency respond to changing
circumstances. Most notably, FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and
related human capital strategies--such as succession planning or a
coordinated training effort. Such tools are integral to managing
resources, as they enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify
the critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or
mitigate gaps between current and future skills and competencies. FEMA
officials have said they are beginning to address these and other basic
organizational management issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned
studies of 18 areas, whose final reports and recommendations are due later
this spring.^15
14GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, [32]GAO-07-139
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
In identifying available capabilities, FEMA needs to identify and assess
the capabilities that exist across the federal government and outside the
federal government. For example, in a recent report on housing assistance,
we found that the National Response Plan's annex covering temporary
shelter and housing (Emergency Support Function--6) clearly described the
overall responsibilities of the two primary responsible agencies--FEMA and
the Red Cross.^16 However, the responsibilities described for the support
agencies--the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs--did not, and still do not, fully
reflect their capabilities. Further, these support agencies had not, at
the time of our work, developed fact sheets describing their roles and
responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and
agency-specific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures.
We recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that
fully reflect each respective support agency's capabilities for providing
temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the needed fact sheets, and develop
operational plans that provide details on how their respective agencies
will meet their temporary housing responsibilities. The Departments of
Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration, and Agriculture,
concurred with our recommendations. The Red Cross did not comment on our
report or recommendations. As part of a housing task force, FEMA is
currently exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by
private sector organizations.
^15The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance contract,
(2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4) payment process for
contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6) capital planning and
investment control, (7) security, (8) human resources, (9) logistics, (10)
acquisition, (11) disaster emergency communications, (12) decision support
systems (data resource management), (13) disaster workforce, (14)
information technology, (15) federal coordinating officer cadre, (16)
financial systems, (17) budget process, and (18) disaster relief fund.
^16GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters, [33]GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007).
Further, recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the
responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially for
those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state and
local governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate
transportation-disadvantaged populations (ie. planning, training, and
conducting exercises), but some states and localities have begun to
address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006 DHS reported
that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the urban
area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these
populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include
collaboration with social service and transportation providers and
transportation planning organizations--some of which are Department of
Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders--to determine
transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of drivers
and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance to
state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered
many of these governments' ability to sufficiently prepare for
evacuations. This includes the lack of any specific requirement to plan,
train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of
transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in the usefulness
of DHS's guidance. We recommended that DHS should clarify federal
agencies' roles and responsibilities for providing evacuation assistance
when state and local governments are overwhelmed. DHS should require state
and local evacuation preparedness for transportation-disadvantaged
populations and improve information to assist these governments. DOT
should encourage its grant recipients to share information to assist in
evacuation preparedness for these populations. DOT and DHS agreed to
consider our recommendations, and DHS stated it has partly implemented
some of them.
Finally, the use of a risk management methodology--integrating systematic
concern for risk into the normal cycle of agency decision making and
implementation--should be central to assessing the risk for catastrophic
disasters, guiding the development of national capabilities and the
expertise that can be used to respond effectively to catastrophic
disasters. As I stated in my testimony to this subcommittee on applying
risk management principles to guide federal investments, risk management
should be viewed strategically, that is, with a view that goes beyond
assessing what the risks are, to the integration of risk into annual
budget and program review cycles.^17
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability
to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are
used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision
makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and
accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and recovery
assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples where quick
action could not occur due to procedures that required extensive,
time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital supplies and
other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples where FEMA's
processes assisting disaster victims left the federal government
vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited assistance payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million to
$1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants
who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash assistance. DHS
and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to be in effect for
the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery programs will have more
capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident but also provide
accountability. Examples include significantly increasing the quantity of
prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water; placing global
positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location and better
manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for
victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per
day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying the
eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of
these and other planned improvements will be critical to achieving their
intended outcomes.
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of
capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require
more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a catastrophe,
streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly
replace "business as usual" and unquestioned adherence to long-standing
policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing
relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability
mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for
expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have been
used legally and for the purposes intended. The federal government also
will be a major partner in the longer-term recovery and rebuilding of
communities along the Gulf Coast. Among the areas requiring federal
attention are (1) assessing the environmental hazards created by the
storms; (2) rebuilding and strengthening the levees; (3) providing
assistance to school districts that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee
children; and (4) building the capacity to address demand in multiple
victims assistance programs such as financial assistance or loans for
repair and replacement of housing and the rebuilding of businesses.
^17GAO, Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide
Federal Investments, [34]GAO-07-386T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
GAO Recommendations Stress Changes in Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the
nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended that
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We
also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and exercise its
recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of
authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to
remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the NRP base plan
and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust
and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and
direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises
to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and
recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take
a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their
responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal;
and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to
invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic
disaster.
As I mentioned earlier, DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released the
final Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex--both designed to
further clarify federal roles and responsibilities and relationships among
federal, state and local governments and responders. However, these
revisions have not been tested in a major disaster. FEMA and DHS have also
announced a number of actions intended to improve readiness and response
based on our work and the work of congressional committees and the
Administration. DHS is also currently reorganizing FEMA as required by the
Post-Katrina Reform Act. However, there is little information available on
the extent to which these changes are operational and they also have not
yet been tested in a major disaster.
Originally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following
Hurricane Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of needs
to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or ensure
that there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services
to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We recommended that DHS
create accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast
and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement
practices (precontracting) and procedures for those federal agencies with
roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could
then better manage disaster-related procurement and establish an
assessment process to monitor agencies' continuous planning efforts for
their disaster-related procurement needs and the maintenance of
capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency response
practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how
the federal government can better manage its disaster-related
procurements. These practices include developing knowledge of contractor
capabilities and prices, and establishing vendor relationships prior to
the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the
level of capacity to match the response with the need.^18
Post-Katrina Reform Act Changes
The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and recommendations
in the various reports examining the preparation for and response to
Hurricane Katrina. Most of the Act's provisions become effective as of
March 31, 2007, while others became effective upon the Act's enactment on
October 4, 2006. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act enhances FEMA's
responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. Under the act, for example,
FEMA's mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the
nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
and other man-made disasters. To accomplish this mission, FEMA is to lead
and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management
system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.
Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of
DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within DHS; and the Secretary of DHS
can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the authorities,
responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to perform them
unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA will absorb the
functions of DHS's Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The
statute establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities.
The statute also establishes a National Integration Center responsible for
the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The
Post-Katrina Reform Act also includes provisions for other areas, such as
evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals
with disabilities, In addition, the act includes several provisions to
strengthen the management and capability of FEMA's workforce. For example,
the statute calls for a strategic human capital plan to shape and improve
FEMA's workforce, authorizes recruitment and retention bonuses, and
establishes a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the organizational changes
become effective as of March 31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in
organizational autonomy for FEMA and establishment of the National
Integration Center, became effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina
Reform Act on October 4, 2006.
^18GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing
the Department of Homeland Security, [35]GAO-07-452T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 7, 2007).
DHS Reports Planned Changes Consistent with the Legislation
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation of
the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional
organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All
of the changes, according to DHS, will become effective on March 31, 2007.
According to DHS, the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA's
internal structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina
and integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities
within FEMA. The department's core structural conclusions are described in
the letter.
DHS will transfer the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:
o United States Fire Administration,
o Office of Grants and Training,
o Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,
o Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,
o Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,
o Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials say that they will carefully manage all financial,
organizational, and personnel actions necessary to transfer these
organizations by March 31, 2007. They also said they will establish
several other organizational elements, such as a logistics management
division, a disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations
division. In addition, FEMA will expand its regional office structure with
each region in part by establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at
least one Regional Strike Team. With the recent appointment of the
director for region III, FEMA officials noted that for the first time in
recent memory there will be no acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA
regional offices will be headed by experienced professionals, according to
FEMA officials.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from existing
FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate programs. The
National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions related to
preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also will
include DHS's exercise coordination and evaluation program, emergency
management training, and hazard mitigation associated with the chemical
stockpile and radiological emergency preparedness programs.
Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Provisions Should
Respond to Many Concerns
Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's organizational
changes and related roles and responsibilities, in addition to those
changes already undertaken by DHS, should address many of our emergency
management observations and recommendations. As noted earlier, our
analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the need for (1)
clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2)
the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3)
accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and responsibilities.
For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA Administrator is to act
as the principal emergency management adviser to the President, the
Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS and to provide
recommendations directly to Congress after informing the Secretary of DHS.
The incident management responsibilities and roles of the National
Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that
the NRP provides for a clear chain of command to lead and coordinate the
federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other
man-made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that appointees
must meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must have a demonstrated
ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security and
5 years of executive leadership and management experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For
example, the statute requires the President to establish a national
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities,
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program to
test and evaluate the National Preparedness Goal, NIMS, NRP, and other
related plans and strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in order
to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes
must be developed in consultation with local officials, including regional
commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development of
mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a memorandum of
understanding with certain non-federal entities to collaborate on
developing standards for deployment capabilities, including credentialing
of personnel and typing of resources, must be developed. In addition, FEMA
must implement several other capabilities, such as (1) developing a
logistics system providing real-time visibility of items at each point
throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a prepositioned
equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support and response
teams.
FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA's performance in the logistics area
came under harsh criticism; within days, FEMA became overwhelmed and
essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics
mission.^19 In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to make
its logistics system more flexible and responsive. Since the legislation,
FEMA has been working to address its provisions, but it is too early to
evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking
a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an effective
logistics system. Below, we describe these five areas along with FEMA's
ongoing actions to address each.
^19GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [36]GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
o Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place
to address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed
information on states' capabilities and resources. As a result,
FEMA does not have information from these sources to define what
and how much it needs to stock. However, FEMA is developing a
concept of operations to underpin its logistics program and told
us that it is working to develop detailed plans and the associated
stockage requirements. However, until FEMA has solid requirements
based on detailed plans, the agency will be unable to assess its
true preparedness.
o Inventory management: FEMA's system accounts for the location,
quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies
in-transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to
improve transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment,
such as expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from
the two test regions to all FEMA regions.
o Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of
smaller storage facilities across the country. However, it has
little assurance that these are the right number of facilities
located in the right places. FEMA officials told us they are in
the process of determining the number of storage facilities it
needs and where they should be located.
o Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA's distribution system,
including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors,
and lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described
initiatives under way that should mitigate some of the problems
with contractors, and has been working with Department of Defense
and Department of Transportation to improve the access to
transportation when needed.
o People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including
the logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent
staff, supplemented with contract and temporary disaster
assistance staff. However, FEMA's recent retirements and losses of
staff, and its difficulty in hiring permanent staff and
contractors, have created staffing shortfalls and a lack of
capability. According to a January 2007 study commissioned by
FEMA, there are significant shortfalls in staffing and skill sets
of full-time employees, particularly in the planning, advanced
contracting, and relationship management skills needed to fulfill
the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently hired a
logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort to hire
qualified staff for the entire agency, including logistics.
In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics program
to be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other
initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics capabilities, it
will be years before they are fully implemented and operational.
Post-Katrina Reform Act Provisions Also Respond to Accountability Issues
Statutory changes establish more controls and accountability mechanisms.
For example, the Post-Katrina Reform Act requires FEMA to develop and
implement a contracting system that maximizes the use of advance
contracting to the extent practical and cost-effective. The Secretary of
DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive
use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is
also required to promulgate regulations that limit certain noncompetitive
contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Oversight
funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate up to one percent of funding for
agency mission assignments as oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator must
develop and maintain internal management controls of FEMA disaster
assistance programs and develop and implement a training program to
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds in response to or
recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must be developed to
identify eligible recipients of disaster relief assistance.
Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional
Attention
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional
leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.^20 He suggested
that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for,
responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic events.
Recent events--notably Hurricane Katrina and the threat of an influenza
pandemic--have illustrated the importance of ensuring a strategic and
integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management. Disaster
preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated can save
lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning insurance market
can substantially reduce the government's exposure to post-catastrophe
payouts. Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an
opportunity for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the
effects of potential catastrophic events. Similarly, the Comptroller
General suggested that Congress could also consider how the federal
government can work with other nations, other levels of government, and
nonprofit and private sector organizations, such as the Red Cross and
private insurers, to help ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers
effectively. Given the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for,
responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic
disasters, congressional oversight is critical.
^20GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress.
[37]GAO-07-235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006.
A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term
efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for
immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and implementation
of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an
influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use
of federal grants in building and sustaining those capabilities, (3)
examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation, (4)
determining the status of preparedness exercises, and (5) examining DHS
polices regarding oversight assistance.
The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster Capabilities
More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the
construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, which
is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to coordinate
the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal "to
establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately
balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks and large
scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources required to
prevent, respond to, and recover from them." The goal was also to include
readiness metrics and standards for preparedness assessments and
strategies and a system for assessing the nation's overall preparedness to
respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness Goal
using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist related,
with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major earthquake, and
an influenza pandemic. According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance,
the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude
of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs
to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying the capabilities
needed to respond to a wide range of large scale emergency events. The
scenarios focused on the consequences that first responders would have to
address. Some state and local officials and experts have questioned
whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning,
particularly in terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist
scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local
emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600
discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then
identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state,
and local first responders on the capabilities they need to develop and
maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised
draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single
jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task, possession
of a target capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local
resources, ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some
combination of the two. However, DHS is still in the process of developing
goals, requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the National
Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in the
Post-Katrina Reform Act--the National Preparedness Goal, target
capabilities and preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment
systems--should be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had
established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder
preparedness, including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS;
strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and
strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those
seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 homeland
security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority
that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching
priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on
risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized
regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize
regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching
priorities, the guidance also identified several others. These include (1)
measuring progress in achieving the National Preparedness Goal, (2)
integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3)
developing and sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key resource
protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5)
enhancing statewide communications interoperability, (6) strengthening
preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7)
enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan review results.
Under the guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required
to submit an investment justification that provides background
information, strategic objectives and priorities addressed, their
funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each proposed investment
(project) is anticipated to have.
The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic
The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat
to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of
if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the
preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are similar to those for
any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles and responsibilities,
authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic planning,
training, and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to
effectively respond and recover; effective information sharing and
communication; and accountability for the effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, earthquakes,
explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short period of time,
perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can have long-term
effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following Hurricane Katrina.
The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to affect specific
locations or areas within the nation; the immediate damage is not
nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue in
waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide
areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the
severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2
million. Seasonal influenza in the United States results in about 36,000
deaths annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to
require international coordination of detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a severe
pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an affected
community because individuals are ill, caring for family members, or fear
infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's economy, as
businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing to provide
essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. In addition,
our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes or other major
disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders,
health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to
perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are
potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a
disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of
government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as
well as international cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services' National
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for pandemic
influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of Agriculture's
preparedness efforts and plans, public health and hospital preparedness,
and U.S. efforts to improve global disease surveillance. We expect most of
these reports to be issued by late summer 2007.
Our Knowledge of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities Is
Limited
Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on
state and local capabilities. As I testified before this subcommittee last
month on applying risk management principles to guide federal investments,
over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal
funding to states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants.
Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and localities
finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and are
assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and
act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency
preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what are our
priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments,
performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and sustain success? On
what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available
for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better
information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of
major emergency events than for others. For some natural disasters, such
as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore
a better basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and
identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with
earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has
experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a
major city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related
experience, there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to
thousands of people across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant guidance
for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that eligible
recipients must provide an "investment justification" with their grant
application. States were to use this justification to outline the
implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to
achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability
Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program management
plans for the entire state homeland security program that look beyond
federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The justifications
must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland security grant
program. In the guidance DHS noted that it would use a peer review process
to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the effectiveness of a
state's plan to address the priorities it has outlined and thereby reduce
its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate
the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments.
For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk and effectiveness
assessments to inform final funding decisions, although changes have been
made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more easily
understood. DHS officials have said that they cannot yet assess how
effective the actual investments from grant funds are in enhancing
preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the metrics
to do so.
Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust
Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate
planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been
focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors.
However, well-documented problems with the abilities of first responders
from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and
the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have
generated a debate on the extent to which first responders should be
focusing their planning and preparation on a regional and
multigovernmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the National
Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to building,
sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP
applications are to reflect regional coordination and show an investment
strategy that institutionalizes regional security strategy integration.
However, it is not known to what extent regional and multi-state planning
has progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our
early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination
(ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported that
the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing federal
funds in a way that maximizes the increase in first responder capacities
and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication
of expenditures.^21 One of these challenges included a coordinated
regionwide plan for establishing first responder performance goals, needs,
and priorities, and assessing the benefits of expenditures in enhancing
first responder capabilities. In subsequent work on National Capital
Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that needed strengthening
in the Region's planning, specifically improving the substance of the
strategic plan to guide decision makers.^22 For example, additional
information could have been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or
timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance
expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives to meet
regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative
implementation; resources and investments; and operational commitment.
Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons Learned
Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina
highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine
assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the
strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments
of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a national exercise
program, and training and exercises are also included as a component of
the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill and capability,
experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first responders,
exercises--especially of the type or magnitude of events for which there
is little actual experience--are essential for developing skills and
identifying what works well and what needs further improvement. Major
emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition require
the coordinated actions of personnel from many first responder disciplines
and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and the private
sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in
developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response.
^21GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the
National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and
Performance Goals, [38]GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004);
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region,
[39]GAO-04-904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security:
Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness,
[40]GAO-04-1009 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security:
Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the
National Capital Region, [41]GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2005); and Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the
National Capital Region, [42]GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29,
2006).
^22GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region
Strategic Plan, [43]GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved
in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic
assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition
to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include,
depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors,
and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for such
things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation or ask
for federal assistance.
DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational
Decisions
Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's policies
regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that
DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management
areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to be
guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive toward
oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with access to various
documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS
has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, DHS
has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough so
that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and economically
using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually, and is
providing the levels of security called for in numerous legislative
requirements and presidential directives.
Concluding Observations
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of
dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to assist
in strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has developed
several key policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and the National
Preparedness Goal to guide federal, state, and local efforts. The
aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a reassessment of the
federal role in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. The
studies and reports of the past year--by Congress, the White House
Homeland Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, and others--have
provided a number of insights into the strengths and limitations of the
nation's capacity to respond to catastrophic disasters and resulted in a
number of recommendations for strengthening that capacity. Collectively,
these studies and reports paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that
the nation--federal, state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental
entities; the private sector; and individual citizens--faces in preparing
for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The
Post-Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy
changes to respond to these findings and challenges.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that
requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no "silver bullet,"
no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires
continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances
change and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to
do.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you and subcommittee members may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
For further information about this statement, please contact William O.
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202)
512-8777 or [email protected] .
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors to
this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino,
Analyst-in-Charge; and Richard Ascarate, Communications Analyst. The
following individuals from GAO's Defense Capabilities and Management Team
also made major contributors to this testimony: John Pendelton, Director;
Ann Borseth, Assistant Director.
Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters. [45]GAO-07-88 . Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. [46]GAO-07-452T . Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. [47]GAO-07-418T.
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. [48]GAO-07-386T . Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively
Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. [49]GAO-07-139 . Washington,
D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. [50]GAO-07-44
. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. [51]GAO-07-235R .
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse. [52]GAO-07-252T . Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to
Reduce Such Problems in Future. [53]GAO-06-1013 . Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [54]GAO-06-618 . Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for the
2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. [55]GAO-06-834 . Washington, D.C.: September
6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross
Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. [56]GAO-06-712 .
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues
to Consider for Organizational Placement. [57]GAO-06-746T . Washington,
D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery. [58]GAO-06-442T . Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated
with Major Emergency Incidents. [59]GAO-06-467T . Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards
Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [60]GAO-05-652 . Washington, D.C.: July
11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better Oversight
Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. [61]GAO-05-577 .
Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
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Highlights of [69]GAO-07-395T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
March 7, 2007
HOMELAND SECURITY
Preparing for and Responding to Disasters
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 stipulates major
changes to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the agency's preparedness
for and response to catastrophic disasters. For example, the act
establishes a new mission for and new leadership positions within FEMA
As GAO has reported, DHS faces continued challenges, including clearly
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary
disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to
provide effective response while also protecting against waste, fraud, and
abuse. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has taken steps to
overcome these challenges
This testimony summarizes earlier
GAO work on: (1) leadership, response capabilities, and accountability
controls; (2) organizational changes provided for in the Post-Katrina
Reform Act; and (3) disaster management issues for continued Congressional
attention.
[70]What GAO Recommends
This testimony contains no new recommendations but does identify issues
that Congress and DHS may wish to give continued attention to so that FEMA
may more effectively fulfill the requirements of the Post-Katrina Reform
Act.
GAO reported in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that DHS needs to more
effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery
efforts. GAO analysis showed improvements were needed in leadership roles
and responsibilities, development of necessary disaster capabilities, and
accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response
with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and
effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities,
and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined,
effectively communicated, and well understood. Improved capabilities were
needed for catastrophic disasters--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3)
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and
sheltering. Effectively implementing the provisions of the Post-Katrina
Reform Act will address many of these issues, and FEMA has initiated
reviews and some actions in each of these areas. But their operational
impact in a major disaster has not yet been tested.
As a result of its body of work, GAO's recommendations included that DHS
(1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of
the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of
leadership; (2) direct that more robust and detailed operational
implementation plans support the National Response Plan (NRP); (3) provide
guidance and direction for all planning, training, and exercises to ensure
such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery
responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead
in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their
responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal;
and (5) use a risk management approach in making its investment decisions.
We also recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority
to take action to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when
there is warning.
In his oversight letter to Congress, the Comptroller General suggested
that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a
strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and
rebuild from catastrophic events. Congress may wish to consider several
specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating
development and implementation of the National Preparedness System,
including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and
local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those
capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and
preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and (5)
examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
References
Visible links
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-325SP
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-746T
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-139
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-88
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-386T
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-452T
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-643
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-235R
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-433
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-904T
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1009
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-889T
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-559T
43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1096T
45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-88
46. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-452T
47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-418T
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-386T
49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-139
50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-44
51. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-235R
52. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-252T
53. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1013
54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618
55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-834
56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712
57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-746T
58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T
59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T
60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652
61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-577
69. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T
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