Information Security: FBI Needs to Address Weaknesses in Critical
Network (30-APR-07, GAO-07-368).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies on a critical
network to electronically communicate, capture, exchange, and
access law enforcement and investigative information. Misuse or
interruption of this critical network, or disclosure of the
information traversing it, would impair FBI's ability to fulfill
its missions. Effective information security controls are
essential for ensuring that information technology resources and
information are adequately protected from inadvertent or
deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, disclosure, modification, or
destruction. GAO was asked to assess information security
controls for one of FBI's critical networks. To assess controls,
GAO conducted a vulnerability assessment of the internal network
and evaluated the bureau's information security program
associated with the network operating environment. This report
summarizes weaknesses in information security controls in one of
FBI's critical networks.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-368
ACCNO: A68867
TITLE: Information Security: FBI Needs to Address Weaknesses in
Critical Network
DATE: 04/30/2007
SUBJECT: Computer networks
Computer security
Information security
Internal controls
Law enforcement agencies
Law enforcement information systems
Systems evaluation
Unauthorized access
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GAO-07-368
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]FBI Operations
* [4]Previously Reported Information Security Weaknesses
* [5]Objective, Scope, and Methodology
* [6]Certain Controls over FBI's Network Were Ineffective
* [7]Access Controls
* [8]Network Devices and Services
* [9]User Identification and Authentication
* [10]Authorization
* [11]Cryptography
* [12]Audit and Monitoring of Security Relevant Events
* [13]Physical Security
* [14]Other Information Security Controls
* [15]Patch Management
* [16]Background Investigations
* [17]Information Security Program
* [18]Risk Assessments
* [19]Policies and Procedures
* [20]Security Plans
* [21]Security Awareness Training
* [22]Tests and Evaluations of Control Effectiveness
* [23]Remedial Actions
* [24]Continuity of Operations
* [25]Conclusions
* [26]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [27]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [28]GAO Contacts
* [29]Staff Acknowledgments
* [30]GAO's Mission
* [31]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [32]Order by Mail or Phone
* [33]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [34]Congressional Relations
* [35]Public Affairs
Report to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., House of
Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
April 2007
INFORMATION SECURITY
FBI Needs to Address Weaknesses in Critical Network
GAO-07-368
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 1
Background 3
Objective, Scope, and Methodology 6
Certain Controls over FBI's Network Were Ineffective 7
Conclusions 19
Recommendations for Executive Action 19
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20
Appendix I Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 23
Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 26
Abbreviations
C&A certification and accreditation
DOJ Department of Justice
ESOC Enterprise Security Operations Center
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OIG Office of Inspector General
OMB Office of Management and Budget
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
April 30, 2007
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner Jr.
House of Representatives
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner Jr.
House of Representatives
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies on automated systems and
networks to electronically communicate, capture, exchange, and access law
enforcement and investigative information. As part of its ongoing efforts
to improve information technology capabilities, the bureau deployed and
began operating a network in April 2004 as part of its Trilogy
modernization effort. Misuse or interruption of this network, or
disclosure of the information traversing it, would impair FBI's ability to
fulfill its missions. Prior to this network's deployment, misuse was
illustrated by former agent Robert Hanssen, who exploited information
security weaknesses at the bureau to track the FBI's most sensitive
espionage investigations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies
on automated systems and networks to electronically communicate, capture,
exchange, and access law enforcement and investigative information. As
part of its ongoing efforts to improve information technology
capabilities, the bureau deployed and began operating a network in April
2004 as part of its Trilogy modernization effort. Misuse or interruption
of this network, or disclosure of the information traversing it, would
impair FBI's ability to fulfill its missions. Prior to this network's
deployment, misuse was illustrated by former agent Robert Hanssen, who
exploited information security weaknesses at the bureau to track the FBI's
most sensitive espionage investigations.
In response to your request as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
for the 109th Congress, we assessed whether FBI has effectively
implemented appropriate information security controls on a critical
internal network, deployed as part of the Trilogy modernization effort, to
protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its law
enforcement and investigative information. Such controls are essential for
ensuring that information technology resources and information are
adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent
use, disclosure, modification, or destruction. In response to your request
as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee for the 109th Congress, we
assessed whether FBI has effectively implemented appropriate information
security controls on a critical internal network, deployed as part of the
Trilogy modernization effort, to protect the confidentiality, integrity
and availability of its law enforcement and investigative information.
Such controls are essential for ensuring that information technology
resources and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or
deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, disclosure, modification, or
destruction.
This report summarizes shortcomings identified in information security
controls on this critical internal network. It does not always contain
specific examples of the weaknesses identified due to the sensitive nature
of the information discussed. This report summarizes shortcomings
identified in information security controls on this critical internal
network. It does not always contain specific examples of the weaknesses
identified due to the sensitive nature of the information discussed.
Results in Brief
Certain information security controls over the critical internal network
were ineffective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of law enforcement and investigative information.
Specifically, FBI did not consistently (1) configure network devices and
services securely to prevent unauthorized insider access; (2) identify and
authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access; (3) enforce the
principle of least privilege to ensure that authorized access was
necessary and appropriate; (4) apply Certain information security controls
over the critical internal network were ineffective in protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of law enforcement and
investigative information. Specifically, FBI did not consistently (1)
configure network devices and services securely to prevent unauthorized
insider access; (2) identify and authenticate users to prevent
unauthorized access; (3) enforce the principle of least privilege to
ensure that authorized access was necessary and appropriate; (4) apply
strong encryption techniques to protect sensitive data on its networks;
(5) log, audit, or monitor security-related events; (6) protect the
physical security of its network; and (7) patch key servers and
workstations in a timely manner. Taken collectively, these weaknesses
place sensitive information transmitted on the network at increased risk
of unauthorized disclosure or modification, and could result in a
disruption of service.
These weaknesses existed, in part, because FBI had not fully implemented
key information security program activities for the network reviewed. FBI
has developed an agencywide information security program, which includes
an organization to monitor and protect the bureau's information systems
from external attacks and insider misuse and to serve as the central focal
point of contact for near-real-time security monitoring. However,
shortcomings exist with certain program elements for the network,
including an outdated risk assessment, incomplete security plan,
incomplete specialized security training, insufficient testing, untimely
remediation of weaknesses, and inadequate service continuity planning.
Also, although the bureau had documented information security policies and
procedures, it lacked detailed standards that addressed some of the
weaknesses identified. Without a fully implemented program, security
controls will likely remain inadequate or inconsistently applied.
We are making recommendations to the FBI Director to take several steps to
fully implement key activities of the bureau's information security
program for the network. These activities include updating assessments and
plans to reflect the bureau's current operating environment, providing
more comprehensive coverage of system tests and correcting weaknesses in a
timely manner. In a separate classified report, we are making
recommendations to address the specific control weaknesses identified.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI Chief Information Officer
concurred with many of our recommendations, but did not believe that the
bureau had placed sensitive information at an unacceptable risk for
unauthorized disclosure, modification, or insider threat exploitation. He
cited significant strides in reducing risk since the Robert Hanssen
espionage investigation. However, we believe that until weaknesses
identified in network devices and services, identification and
authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring,
physical security, and patch management are addressed, increased risk to
FBI's critical network remains. Further, until the bureau fully and
effectively implements certain information security program activities for
the network, security controls will likely remain inadequate or
inconsistently applied.
Background
Information security is critical for any organization that depends on
information systems and computer networks to carry out its mission or
business. It is especially important for government agencies, where the
public's trust is essential. The dramatic expansion in computer
interconnectivity and the rapid increase in the use of the Internet are
changing the way our government, the nation, and much of the world
communicate and conduct business. Without proper safeguards, systems are
vulnerable to individuals and groups with malicious intent who can intrude
and use their access to obtain sensitive information, commit fraud,
disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other computer systems and
networks. These concerns are well founded for a number of reasons,
including a dramatic increase in reports of security incidents, ease of
obtaining and using hacking tools, a steady advance in the sophistication
and effectiveness of attack technology, and dire warnings of new and more
destructive attacks to come.
Computer-supported federal operations are similarly at risk. Our previous
reports, and those of agency inspectors general, describe persistent
information security weaknesses that place a variety of federal operations
at risk of disruption, fraud, or inappropriate disclosure of sensitive
data. We have designated information security as a governmentwide
high-risk area since 19971--a designation that remains today.2
Recognizing the importance of securing federal agencies' information
systems, Congress enacted the Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA)3 in December 2002 to strengthen the security of information and
systems within federal agencies. FISMA requires each agency, using a
risk-based approach to information security management, to develop,
document, and implement an agency-wide information security program to
provide information security for the information and systems that support
the operations and assets of the agency--including those operated or
maintained by contractors or others on behalf of the agency.
1GAO, High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology,
[36]GAO/HR-97-9 (Washington, D.C.: February 1997).
2GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [37]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
3Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, P.L. 107-347 (Dec. 17, 2002).
FBI Operations
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is a component of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), has mission responsibilities that include
investigating serious federal crimes, protecting the nation from foreign
intelligence and terrorist threats, and assisting other law enforcement
agencies. Over 12,000 special agents and 16,000 analysts and mission
support personnel are located in the bureau's Washington, D.C.,
headquarters and in more than 70 offices in the United States and 50
offices in foreign countries.
Mission responsibilities at the bureau are divided among the following
five major organizational components.
o Administration: manages the bureau's personnel programs,
budgetary and financial services, records, information resources,
and information security.
o National Security: integrates investigative and intelligence
activities against current and emerging national security threats,
and provides information and analysis for the national security
and law enforcement communities.
o Criminal Investigations: investigates serious federal crimes and
probes federal statutory violations involving exploitation of the
Internet and computer systems.
o Law Enforcement Services: provides law enforcement information
and forensic services to federal, state, local, and international
agencies.
o Office of the Chief Information Officer: develops the bureau's
information technology strategic plan and operating budget and
develops and maintains technology assets.
The organizational components are further organized into
subcomponents, such as divisions, offices, and other groups.
The FBI Security Division, within the Administration component,
and the Office of the Chief Information Officer collaborated to
establish information security initiatives. One initiative
included the establishment of the Enterprise Security Operations
Center (ESOC), which monitors and protects FBI's systems from
external attacks and insider misuse and ensures the availability,
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation of FBI information. A second
initiative was the deployment of a Public Key Infrastructure,
which provided strong authentication of users' identification to
applications.
To execute its mission responsibilities, FBI relies extensively on
information technology. The bureau operates and maintains hundreds
of computerized systems, networks, databases, and applications.
Recognizing the need to modernize its computer systems and
networks, FBI proposed a major technology upgrade plan to Congress
in September 2000. The Information Technology Upgrade Project,
which FBI subsequently renamed Trilogy, was FBI's largest
automated information systems modernization initiative to date.
Trilogy consisted of three parts: (1) the information presentation
component to upgrade computer hardware and software, (2) the
transportation network component to upgrade the communication
network, and (3) the user application component to upgrade and
consolidate the most important investigative applications.
FBI completed the first two components--the information
presentation and the transportation network--in April 2004,
upgrading its information technology infrastructure with new
desktop computers and deploying a wide area network to enhance
electronic communication among offices and with other law
enforcement organizations. The data traversing the network
includes privacy act and sensitive investigative information.
Previously Reported Information Security Weaknesses
FBI information system security weaknesses have been exploited by
insiders in the past. The U.S. Secret Service, along with CERT(R)
Coordination Center,4 studied insider threats, and stated in a May
2005 report that "insiders pose a substantial threat by virtue of
their knowledge of, and access to, employer systems and/or
databases." The espionage of Robert Hanssen, a former FBI agent,
illustrated how an insider can take advantage of inadequacies in
the bureau's information system security controls. After discovery
of Hanssen's espionage, in 2001, the Attorney General commissioned
an outside review of FBI's security program. The commission found
significant deficiencies in bureau information security policies
and practices, in areas such as certification and accreditation
(C&A),5 physical security, security awareness training, access
control, and auditing. The report stated that those deficiencies
flow from a pervasive inattention to security, which had been at
best a low priority. Additionally, shortly after Hanssen's arrest
in 2001, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Attorney General requested that the DOJ Office of Inspector
General (OIG) review FBI's performance in deterring, detecting,
and investigating the espionage activities. The report pointed out
that the agent exploited serious weaknesses in FBI's information
security and made a specific recommendation on detecting improper
computer usage and enforcing "need to know"--granting access only
when it is an operational necessity. According to agency
officials, the bureau is addressing this and other
recommendations.
4CERT Coordination Center is a center of Internet security expertise
located at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research
and development center operated by Carnegie Mellon University.
5Certification is the comprehensive evaluation of the management,
operational, and technical security controls in an information system to
determine the effectiveness of these controls and identify existing
vulnerabilities. Accreditation is the official management decision to
authorize operation of an information system. Authorization explicitly
accepts the risk remaining after the implementation of an agreed-upon set
of security controls.
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine whether the FBI has
effectively implemented appropriate information security controls
on a critical internal network, deployed as part of the Trilogy
modernization effort, to protect the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of its law enforcement and investigative
information.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the security controls over this
critical network, we examined routers, network management servers,
switches, firewalls, and controlled interfaces at FBI
headquarters. Our evaluation was based on (1) our Federal
Information System Controls Audit Manual,6 which provides guidance
for reviewing information system controls that affect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computerized data;
(2) previous reports from the DOJ OIG; and (3) the Federal
Information Security Management Act, which establishes key
elements that are required for an effective information security
program.
Specifically, we evaluated information system controls that are
intended to
o limit, detect, and monitor access to sensitive network computing
resources, thereby safeguarding them from misuse and protecting
them from unauthorized disclosure and modification;
6GAO, Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual, Volume I-Financial
Statements Audits, GAO/AIMD-12.19.6 (Washington, D.C.: January 1999).
o encrypt sensitive data on the network;
o prevent the introduction of unauthorized changes to application
or system software;
o protect physical access to network resources; and
o ensure completion of appropriate background investigations of
bureau personnel with privileged access on the network.
In addition, we evaluated FBI's information security program as it
related to the network operating environment. Such a program
includes key activities such as assessing risk; developing and
implementing policies, procedures, and security plans; providing
security awareness and training; testing and evaluating control
effectiveness; planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting
remedial actions to address information security deficiencies; and
ensuring continuity of operations.
To evaluate these controls and activities, we identified and
examined pertinent DOJ and FBI security policies and procedures.
In addition, to determine whether network security controls were
in place, adequately designed, and operating effectively, we
conducted vulnerability assessments of the network's key servers,
routers, and switches. These assessments included discussions with
agency staff to gain an understanding of FBI's processes and
controls. In order to take advantage of prior work in this area,
we also held discussions with OIG staff and reviewed information
security reports pertaining to FBI networks and information
systems.
We performed our review at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
from March 2006 through December 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Certain Controls over FBI's Network Were Ineffective
Weaknesses existed in certain access controls and other controls
intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the law enforcement and investigative information
transmitted by a critical internal network. Our review of the
network revealed weaknesses in access controls and patch
management. A key reason for these weaknesses was that, although
FBI had developed an information security program, it had not
effectively or fully implemented key activities of this program
for the network. As a result, sensitive data traversing this
network were vulnerable to unauthorized access, disclosure, and
modification and these weaknesses could lead to disruptions in FBI
operations.
Access Controls
A basic management objective for any organization is to protect
the resources that support its critical operations from
unauthorized access. Organizations accomplish this objective by
designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent,
limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources,
programs, and information. Access controls include those related
to network devices and services, user identification and
authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring
of security-related events, and physical access to information
resources. Inadequate controls diminish the reliability of
computerized information and increase the risk of unauthorized
disclosure, modification, and destruction of sensitive
information, and of disruption of service.
Specific examples associated with the weaknesses reported below
are described in more detail in a classified version of this
report.
Network Devices and Services
Networks are collections of interconnected computer systems and
devices that allow individuals to share resources, such as
computer programs and information. Because sensitive programs and
information are stored on or transmitted along networks,
effectively securing networks is essential to protecting computing
resources and data from unauthorized access, manipulation, and
use. Organizations secure their networks, in part, by installing
and configuring network devices that permit authorized network
service requests, deny unauthorized requests, and limit the
services that are available on the network. Devices used to secure
networks include (1) firewalls that prevent unauthorized access to
the network, (2) routers that filter and forward data along the
network, (3) switches that forward information among segments of a
network, and (4) servers that host applications and data. Network
services consist of protocols for transmitting data between
network devices. The National Security Agency (NSA) offers
guidance for securely configuring devices and services. Insecurely
configured network devices and services can make a system
vulnerable to internal or external threats. Because networks often
include both external and internal access points for electronic
information assets, failure to secure these assets increases the
risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information and systems,
or disruption of service.
FBI used various devices to secure its network; however, it did
not consistently configure network devices and services to prevent
unauthorized access to, and ensure the integrity of, the network.
User Identification and Authentication
A computer system must be able to identify and authenticate
different users so that activities on the system can be linked to
specific individuals. When an organization assigns unique user
accounts to specific users, the system needs to be able to
distinguish one user from another--a process called
identification. The system must also establish the validity of a
user's claimed identity by requesting some kind of information,
such as a password, that is known only by the user--a process
known as authentication. DOJ policy requires that systems control
and limit user access based on identification and authentication
of the user, and that each user is authenticated before access is
permitted. FBI policy addresses identification and authentication
as the foundation for information system access control and for
user accountability, with passwords being a means of
authentication.
FBI did not adequately control user identification and
authentication to ensure that only authorized individuals were
granted access to its network devices. As a result, increased risk
of unauthorized access to servers and other network devices
exists, particularly by insiders.
Authorization
Authorization is the process of granting or denying access rights
and privileges to a protected resource, such as a network, system,
application, function, or file. A key component of granting or
denying access rights is the concept of "least privilege." Least
privilege is a basic principle for securing computer resources and
data. It means that users are granted only those access rights and
permissions that they need to perform their official duties. To
restrict legitimate users' access to only those programs and files
that they need in order to do their work, organizations establish
access rights and permissions. "User rights" are allowable actions
that can be assigned to users or to groups of users. File and
directory permissions are rules that are associated with a
particular file or directory and regulate which users can access
it--and the extent of that access. To avoid unintentionally giving
users unnecessary access to sensitive files and directories, an
organization must give careful consideration to its assignment of
rights and permissions. DOJ policy requires that each individual
be granted access to information only when such access is an
operational necessity, sometimes referred to as "need to know."
Also, the policy requires that system security features have the
technical ability to restrict the user's access to only that
information which is necessary for operations. Further, FBI policy
defines least privilege as determining the minimum set of
privileges required to perform job functions, and restricting the
user to those privileges and nothing more.
FBI granted rights and permissions to network devices that allowed
more access to these devices than users needed to perform their
jobs. As a result, increased risk exists that users could perform
inappropriate activities.
Cryptography
Cryptography underlies many of the mechanisms used to enforce the
confidentiality and integrity of critical and sensitive
information. Encryption--one type of cryptography--is the process
of converting readable or plaintext information into unreadable or
ciphertext information using a special value known as a key and a
mathematical process known as an algorithm. The strength of a key
and an algorithm is determined by their length and complexity--the
longer and more complex they are, the stronger they are. FBI
policy requires that passwords be encrypted before being
transmitted over the network. It also requires that sensitive and
classified information be safeguarded such that it is accessible
to only those individuals with a "need to know."
FBI did not always safeguard sensitive data using encryption. As a
result, sensitive information may be disclosed to unauthorized
individuals who do not have a legitimate need for the information.
Audit and Monitoring of Security Relevant Events
To establish individual accountability, monitor compliance with
security policies, and investigate security violations, it is
crucial to determine what, when, and by whom specific actions have
been taken on a system. Organizations accomplish this by
implementing system or security software that provides an audit
trail that they can use to determine the source of a transaction
or attempted transaction and to monitor users' activities. The way
in which organizations configure system or security software
determines the nature and extent of information that the audit
trails can provide. DOJ policy requires that audit records,
including all system transactions, be subject to recording and
routine review for inappropriate or illegal activity, and that
audit trails should be sufficient in detail to facilitate
reconstruction of events if compromise or malfunction occurs.
Further, FBI policy requires that audit trails be monitored and
reviewed for suspicious activity.
FBI established the Enterprise Security Operations Center (ESOC)
to monitor and protect the bureau's information systems from
external attacks and insider misuse, and to serve as the central
point of contact for near real-time security monitoring.
Although ESOC had established audit and monitoring capabilities,
it did not always effectively audit and monitor security-relevant
system activity on the network reviewed. As a result, increased
risk exists that suspicious activities may not be detected.
Physical Security
Physical security controls are important for protecting computer
facilities and resources from espionage, sabotage, damage, and
theft. These controls restrict physical access to computer
resources, usually by limiting access to the buildings and rooms
in which the resources are housed and by periodically reviewing
the access granted, in order to ensure that access continues to be
appropriate. DOJ physical security policy requires that physical
access to facilities where information is stored, processed, or
transmitted be restricted to cleared and authorized personnel.
FBI did not always effectively implement physical controls. For
example, in some instances, personnel did not follow physical
security policies and procedures for areas containing sensitive
information, creating the potential for unauthorized individuals
gaining access to these resources and data.
Other Information Security Controls
In addition to access controls, other important security controls
should be in place to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of an organization's information and systems. These
controls include techniques designed to ensure the implementation
of secure configurations on network devices and the timely
completion of background investigations for personnel with access
to information systems.
Patch Management
To protect an organization's information, it is important to
ensure that only authorized applications and programs are placed
in operation. This process consists of instituting policies,
procedures, and techniques to help ensure that all programs and
program modifications are properly authorized, tested, and
approved. Patch management is an important element in mitigating
the risks associated with software vulnerabilities. Up-to-date
patch installation could help mitigate vulnerabilities associated
with flaws in software code that could be exploited to cause
significant damage--including the loss of control of entire
systems--thereby enabling malicious individuals to read, modify,
or delete sensitive information or disrupt operations. FBI policy
recognizes the need to establish management controls to ensure
timely and effective implementation of security patches and
software upgrades. It also specifies that critical patches be
evaluated within 24 hours and installed immediately after being
tested, with moderate level of criticality considered within 10
days and installed immediately after testing, and with low level
of criticality considered within 10 days and installed with the
next standard build of the system.
The bureau's patch management for the network was ineffective.
ESOC evaluated and provided patches to operations staff for
installation on systems; however, patches were not installed in a
timely manner and legacy devices contained obsolete software.
FBI has recognized deficiencies in its patch management process
and has identified missing elements needed to implement a more
effective patch management process. Also, according to agency
officials, the bureau plans to eventually remove legacy devices
containing obsolete software from the network. However, until FBI
implements an effective patch management program, it is unable to
assure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of devices
on its network.
Background Investigations
According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
A-130,7 it has long been recognized that the greatest harm to
computing resources has been done by authorized individuals
engaged in improper activities--whether intentionally or
accidentally. Personnel controls (such as screening individuals in
positions of trust) supplement technical, operational, and
management controls, particularly where the risk and magnitude of
potential harm is high. Background screenings (or investigations)
help an organization to determine whether a particular individual
is suitable for a given position by attempting to ascertain the
person's trustworthiness and appropriateness for the position. The
exact type and rigor of screening that takes place depends on the
sensitivity of the position and applicable regulations by which
the agency is bound. FBI policy requires that employees and
contractors with access to the network have a top secret
clearance, and that individuals with a top secret clearance
undergo periodic reinvestigation every 5 years.
FBI generally complied with background investigation requirements.
Of the 44 individuals reviewed, 41 had current background
investigations that had been completed within the last 5 years.
Three individuals' investigations were more than 5 years old by a
few months, and re-investigations were in process at the time of
our review.
7Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security
of Federal Automated Information Resources (Nov. 28, 2000).
Information Security Program
Weaknesses in access controls and patch management existed, in
part, because FBI had not yet effectively or fully implemented key
security activities associated with its agencywide information
security program for the critical internal network reviewed.
Although FBI has developed an information security program,
shortcomings exist with certain key elements.
FISMA8 requires agencies to implement an agencywide information
security program that includes
o periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that
could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction of information and
information systems;
o policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments,
(2) cost-effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information
security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system,
and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements;
o plans for providing adequate information security for networks,
facilities, and systems;
o security awareness training to inform personnel--including
contractors and other users of information systems--of information
security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with
agency policies and procedures;
o at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of
information security policies, procedures, and practices relating
to management, operational, and technical controls of every major
information system that is identified in the agencies'
inventories;
o a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and
documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in their
information security policies, procedures, or practices; and
o plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for
information systems that support the operations and assets of the
agency.
8FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an
agencywide information security program to provide information security
for the information and systems that support the operations and assets of
the agency, using a risk-based approach to information security
management.
However, FBI did not fully or effectively implement many of these
activities for the critical internal network reviewed.
Risk Assessments
Identifying and assessing information security risks are essential
steps in determining what controls are required. Moreover, by
increasing awareness of risks, these assessments can generate
support for the policies and controls that are adopted in order to
help ensure that these policies and controls operate as intended.
Further, OMB Circular A-130, appendix III, prescribes, as does FBI
policy, that risk be reassessed when significant changes are made
to computerized systems--or at least every 3 years. The bureau's
Certification & Accreditation Handbook incorporates a risk
management process by requiring documentation in a risk management
matrix throughout the lifecycle of a system. This matrix is to
address such topics as threats, vulnerabilities, impact of a
particular threat exploiting a particular vulnerability, existing
or recommended countermeasures to mitigate the risk, business
impact of implementing the countermeasures, and a schedule for
implementing the recommended countermeasures.
The risk assessment for the network was outdated and incomplete.
In 2004, as part of its C&A process, FBI assessed risk for the
network and documented threats and vulnerabilities in a risk
management matrix, which addressed many of the weaknesses
described in this report. However, the bureau had not updated the
matrix to reflect significant changes, such as additional
connectivity, in the network operating environment. In addition,
FBI did not have a comprehensive inventory--an enterprisewide
view--that reflected the current operating environment, including
new connections as well as interfaces with legacy systems; as
such, although individual risk assessments may have existed for
these connections or legacy systems, the bureau may not be able to
determine how any risks associated with them affect the overall
network. Further, the existing matrix did not address business
impact or schedule. Inadequately assessing risk can lead to
implementing inadequate or inappropriate security controls that
might not address the system's true risk; it also can lead to
costly efforts to subsequently implement effective controls. Also,
other organizations connected to the bureau depended on a risk
assessment that was outdated and incomplete.9
9In an Interconnection Security Agreement, documenting whenever a direct
connection is made between two or more information systems that are owned
and operated by other authorities/organizations, each organization is
required to provide and update the C&A approval for the interface systems.
Reciprocal acceptance of these documents is expected and any questions or
concerns documented and addressed.
Policies and Procedures
Another key task in developing an effective information security
program is to establish and implement risk-based policies,
procedures, and technical standards that govern security over an
agency's computing environment. If properly implemented, policies
and procedures should help reduce the risk that could come from
unauthorized access or disruption of services. Technical
configuration standards provide consistent implementing guidance
for each computing environment. Because security policies and
procedures are the primary mechanisms by which management
communicates its views and requirements, it is important that
policies and procedures be established and documented.
FBI has developed and documented high-level information security
guidance, but specific guidance did not always exist for the
network environment. The bureau's Security Policy Manual and
Certification & Accreditation Handbook provided guidance on topics
such as security officer roles and responsibilities, personnel
security, badges, identification and authentication, and system
certification requirements. However, although technical
configuration standards existed for topics such as Windows
configuration, other detailed standards did not always exist.
Without effectively developing, documenting, and implementing
policies, procedures and standards, the bureau has less assurance
that its systems and information are protected from unauthorized
access.
Security Plans
The objective of system security planning is to improve the
protection of information technology resources. A system security
plan is intended to provide a complete and up-to-date overview of
a system's security requirements and describe the controls that
are in place or planned to meet those requirements. FISMA requires
that agency information security programs include subordinate
plans for providing adequate information security for networks,
facilities, and systems or groups of information systems, as
appropriate. OMB Circular A-130 specifies that agencies develop
and implement system security plans for major applications and for
general support systems and that these plans address policies and
procedures for providing management, operational, and technical
controls. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) recommends that security plans include, among other topics,
existing or planned security controls, the individual responsible
for the security of the system, description of the system and its
interconnected environment, and rules of behavior. FBI policy
requires that system security plans be developed as part of its
C&A process.
FBI had documented a system security plan for the network, but it
was incomplete and not up to date. The network security plan
included many elements required by NIST, such as the description
of individuals responsible for security and rules of behavior.
Although the plan addressed management, operational, and certain
technical controls, other specific technical controls, such as for
communication protection, were not included. Further, the plan did
not reflect the current operating environment because it did not
completely address system interconnectivity. As a result, FBI and
other agencies that connect to the network cannot ensure that
appropriate controls are in place to protect their systems and
critical information.
Security Awareness Training
Another FISMA requirement for an information security program is
that it promote awareness and provide required training for users
so that they can understand the system security risks and their
role in implementing related policies and controls to mitigate
those risks. Computer intrusions and security breakdowns often
occur because computer users fail to take appropriate security
measures. For this reason, it is vital that employees and
contractors who use computer resources in their day-to-day
operations be made aware of the importance and sensitivity of the
information they handle, as well as their roles and
responsibilities, and what they need to do to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of that information.
FISMA mandates that all federal employees and contractors who use
agency information systems be provided with periodic training in
information security awareness and accepted information security
practice. DOJ policy requires all personnel who manage, operate,
develop, or use automated data processing and telecommunications
to take security training and refresher training at least
annually. Additionally, FISMA requires agency chief information
officers to ensure that personnel with significant information
security responsibilities receive specialized training.
FBI provided security awareness to most, but not all, employees
and contractors; however, not all individuals with security
responsibilities completed the specialized training. The bureau
had implemented a security awareness training program that
included computer-based training and a database to track
completion. In fiscal year 2006, 41 of 44 individuals reviewed
completed the training. Additionally, FBI had implemented a
specialized security training program that identified a number of
roles with significant security responsibilities. Each role had a
required computer-based specialized training curriculum, and FBI
tracked users' progress and completion of courses. However, for
fiscal year 2006, only 17 of 44 individuals reviewed had completed
the required specialized training for their role; 11 of 44
individuals had not completed any specialized training; the
remainder had completed some but not all of the training. FBI
officials explained that the specialized training program was new
in fiscal year 2006 and that they had initial problems identifying
individuals with significant information security responsibilities
along with obtaining an appropriate number of licenses for the
training. Until FBI fully implements an effective security
awareness and training program, it is at increased risk that
individuals could accidentally or intentionally allow unauthorized
access to sensitive information.
Tests and Evaluations of Control Effectiveness
Another key element of an information security program is testing
and evaluating system controls to ensure they are appropriate,
effective, and comply with policies. An effective program of
ongoing tests and evaluations can be used to identify and correct
information security weaknesses. This type of oversight
demonstrates management's commitment to the security program,
reminds employees of their roles and responsibilities, and
identifies and mitigates areas of noncompliance and
ineffectiveness. Although control tests may encourage compliance
with security policies, the full benefits of testing are not
achieved unless the test results are analyzed by security
specialists and business managers and used as a means of
identifying new problem areas, reassessing the appropriateness of
existing controls, and identifying the need for new controls.
FISMA requires that agencies test and evaluate the information
security controls of their systems and that the frequency of such
tests be based on risk, but occur no less than annually.
Similarly, the FBI Certification & Accreditation Handbook requires
periodic testing to ensure that the accredited system has
maintained its documented configuration baseline and to identify
new vulnerabilities that may be inherent in the system and not
previously identified.
Although FBI had various initiatives under way to test and
evaluate its network, the tests were not comprehensive. The
network had undergone certification testing as part of FBI's C&A
process, and ESOC conducts periodic system scans to detect
vulnerabilities on its network. However, the bureau, as noted
earlier, did not appropriately consider risks associated with the
current operating environment. Further, the scans conducted by the
monitoring group were limited in capabilities since the group had
not been given administrative access to conduct these tests. As a
result, certain vulnerabilities were not detected. Without
appropriate tests and evaluations, the agency has limited
assurance that policies and controls are appropriate and working
as intended. Additionally, increased risk exists that undetected
vulnerabilities could be exploited to allow unauthorized access to
sensitive information.
Remedial Actions
Remedial action plans, also known as plans of actions and
milestones, can assist agencies in identifying, assessing,
prioritizing, and monitoring progress in correcting security
weaknesses in information systems. According to OMB Circular
A-123, agencies should take timely and effective action to correct
deficiencies that they have identified through a variety of
information sources. To accomplish this, remedial action plans
should be developed and progress tracked for each deficiency.
FBI's Certification & Accreditation Handbook requires that plans
of actions and milestones serve as a management tool to address
corrective actions associated with system deficiencies and any new
vulnerabilities.
FBI did not address remedial actions in a timely manner. For
example, the plan of actions and milestones for the network
included 15 unresolved weaknesses that were over 2 years old.
Eight of these outstanding weaknesses were categorized as "high
vulnerability" or "very high vulnerability" weaknesses. Without an
effective remediation program, identified vulnerabilities may not
be resolved in a timely manner, thereby allowing continuing
opportunities for unauthorized individuals to exploit these
weaknesses to gain access to sensitive information and systems.
Continuity of Operations
Service continuity controls can enable systems to be recovered
quickly and effectively following a service disruption or
disaster. Such controls include plans and procedures designed to
protect information resources and minimize the risk of unplanned
interruptions, along with a plan to recover critical operations
should interruptions occur. These controls should be designed to
ensure that when unexpected events occur, key operations continue
without interruption or are promptly resumed, and critical and
sensitive data are protected. They should also be tested annually
or as significant changes are made. It is important that these
plans be clearly documented, communicated to potentially affected
staff, tested, and updated to reflect current operations. FBI
policy requires documented procedures to ensure the continuity of
essential functions under all circumstances. In addition, the
policy requires regularly scheduled testing of contingency plans.
FBI had not implemented comprehensive continuity of operations
plans and procedures for the internal network. Although the bureau
had a 2004 contingency plan that reflected the planned Trilogy
network environment, the plan did not reflect the current internal
network operating environment. FBI also had a contingency plan for
its data center, but this plan did not cover the network. Further,
there were neither documented test plans nor test results
indicating continuity of operations testing had been performed
specifically for the network. According to FBI officials,
redundancy has been implemented in the internal network to ensure
high availability. Officials also stated that recovery of the
internal network has already been exercised in many real-life
situations. However, until the bureau completes actions to address
these weaknesses, it is at risk of not being able to recover from
certain service disruptions to the internal network in a timely
manner.
Conclusions
Ineffective controls threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the sensitive law enforcement and investigative
information transmitted by the critical internal network. Certain
information security control weaknesses existed in network devices
and services, identification and authentication, authorization,
cryptography, audit and monitoring, physical security, and patch
management. The bureau's lack of a comprehensive inventory of the
current network operating environment--an enterprisewide
view--compounds the effect of these weaknesses. FBI developed an
agency-wide information security program; however, key activities
associated with this program had not been fully implemented for
the network. Until FBI ensures that the information security
program associated with the network is fully implemented, there is
limited assurance that its sensitive data will be adequately
protected against unauthorized disclosure or modification or that
network services will not be interrupted. These weaknesses leave
the bureau vulnerable to insider threats.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the FBI Director take the following eight
actions to fully implement information security program activities
for the critical internal network reviewed.
o Develop a comprehensive inventory of the current network
operating environment.
o Update the network's risk assessment to reflect the current
operating environment and ensure that the assessment includes
elements required by the FBI Certification & Accreditation
Handbook.
o Develop technical standards that include guidance for addressing
the access control weaknesses identified.
o Update the network security plan to ensure that it reflects the
current operating environment and includes sections required by
the FBI Certification & Accreditation Handbook.
o Ensure that all network users receive security awareness
training and that all users with significant security
responsibilities receive specialized training as defined by their
role.
o Provide comprehensive coverage of system testing and scans.
o Correct identified weaknesses in a timely manner.
o Develop a continuity of operations plan that addresses the
current network environment, and periodically test the plan.
To help strengthen information security controls over the network,
we are recommending in a separate classified report that the FBI
Director take action to address specific weaknesses associated
with network devices and services, identification and
authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring,
physical security, and patch management.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In providing written comments (reprinted in app. I) on a draft of
the report, the FBI Chief Information Officer concurred with many
of our recommendations to address the weaknesses identified, and
noted some instances where weaknesses have already been addressed.
However, he took exception to the report's assertion that the
collective result of the weaknesses presents an increased risk to
FBI information. The bureau does not believe that it has placed
sensitive information at an unacceptable risk for unauthorized
disclosure, modification, or insider threat exploitation. We
believe that until weaknesses identified in network devices and
services, identification and authentication, authorization,
cryptography, audit and monitoring, physical security and patch
management are addressed, increased risk to FBI's critical network
remains. Further, as noted in our conclusion, the lack of a
comprehensive inventory of the current network operating
environment--an enterprisewide view--compounds the effect of these
weaknesses.
He also stated that FBI has made significant strides in reducing
risk since the Robert Hanssen espionage investigation. For
example, according to the Chief Information Officer, since its
inception in 2002, the bureau's Information Assurance section has
taken FBI from an agency wherein only 8 percent of information
systems were accredited to maintaining 100 percent accreditation
of its major systems. Further, he stated that the bureau has
increased its monitoring capabilities and established a
comprehensive vulnerability assessment program. As stated in our
report, we acknowledged that FBI has developed an agencywide
information security program. However, shortcomings existed in how
the bureau implemented certain elements of the program for the
network. For example, the network risk assessment associated with
the accreditation process was outdated and incomplete. Other
shortcomings included an incomplete security plan, incomplete
specialized training, insufficient testing, untimely remediation
of weaknesses and inadequate service continuity planning. Although
positive efforts have been made, until FBI fully and effectively
implements key activities of the information security program
associated with its network, security controls will likely remain
inadequate or inconsistently applied, and the bureau will have
limited assurance that sensitive data will be adequately protected
against unauthorized disclosure or modification, or that network
services will not be interrupted.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send
copies to congressional committees with jurisdiction over FBI and
executive branch agencies' information security programs, the
Attorney General, the FBI Director, the DOJ Inspector General, and
other interested parties. We also will make copies available to
others on request. In addition, this report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
please contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or
[email protected] or Keith A. Rhodes at (202) 512-6412 or
[email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Sincerely yours,
Gregory C. Wilshusen
Director, Information Security Issues
Keith A. Rhodes
Chief Technologist
Appendix I: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Gregory C. Wilshusen, (202) 512-6244 or [email protected]
Keith A. Rhodes, (202) 512-6412 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the persons named above, Edward Alexander Jr.,
Michael Derr, Steve Gosewehr, Jeffrey Knott, Duc Ngo, Eugene
Stevens, and William Thompson made key contributions to this
report.
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Highlights of [48]GAO-07-368 , a report to F. James Sensenbrenner Jr.,
House of Representatives
April 2007
INFORMATION SECURITY
FBI Needs to Address Weaknesses in Critical Network
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies on a critical network to
electronically communicate, capture, exchange, and access law enforcement
and investigative information. Misuse or interruption of this critical
network, or disclosure of the information traversing it, would impair
FBI's ability to fulfill its missions. Effective information security
controls are essential for ensuring that information technology resources
and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate
misuse, fraudulent use, disclosure, modification, or destruction.
GAO was asked to assess information security controls for one of FBI's
critical networks. To assess controls, GAO conducted a vulnerability
assessment of the internal network and evaluated the bureau's information
security program associated with the network operating environment. This
report summarizes weaknesses in information security controls in one of
FBI's critical networks.
[49]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends several actions to fully implement an information security
program. In a separate classified report, GAO makes recommendations to
correct specific weaknesses. FBI agreed with many of the recommendations
but disagreed with the characterization of risk to its information and
noted that it has made significant strides in reducing risks. GAO believes
that increased risk remains.
Certain information security controls over the critical internal network
reviewed were ineffective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information and information resources. Specifically,
FBI did not consistently (1) configure network devices and services to
prevent unauthorized insider access and ensure system integrity; (2)
identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access; (3)
enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that authorized access
was necessary and appropriate; (4) apply strong encryption techniques to
protect sensitive data on its networks; (5) log, audit, or monitor
security-related events; (6) protect the physical security of its network;
and (7) patch key servers and workstations in a timely manner. Taken
collectively, these weaknesses place sensitive information transmitted on
the network at risk of unauthorized disclosure or modification, and could
result in a disruption of service, increasing the bureau's vulnerability
to insider threats.
These weaknesses existed, in part, because FBI had not fully implemented
key information security program activities for the critical network
reviewed. FBI has developed an agencywide information security program,
which includes an organization to monitor and protect the bureau's
information systems from external attacks and insider misuse and to serve
as the central focal point of contact for near-real-time security
monitoring. However, shortcomings exist with certain program elements for
the network, including an outdated risk assessment, incomplete security
plan, incomplete specialized security training, insufficient testing,
untimely remediation of weaknesses, and inadequate service continuity
planning. Without a fully implemented program, certain security controls
will likely remain inadequate or inconsistently applied.
References
Visible links
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/HR-97-9
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-310
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-368
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