Foreign Assistance: USAID Signature Tsunami Reconstruction
Efforts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka Exceed Initial Cost and
Schedule Estimates, and Face Further Risks (28-FEB-07,
GAO-07-357).
In December 2004, an earthquake caused a tsunami that devastated
several countries in the Indian Ocean region. In May 2005,
Congress appropriated $908 million in aid, of which the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) is implementing $482
million in recovery projects in many affected countries,
including Indonesia and Sri Lanka. This report examines (1) the
progress of USAID's program; (2) USAID's financial and technical
oversight of its efforts, and risks it faces; and (3) actions
taken by the Secretary of State in response to an April 2006 GAO
recommendation. Specifically, GAO recommended that State, in its
required reports to Congress, provide updated cost estimates and
schedules and show the need for additional funding sources, if
necessary. GAO examined USAID's signature projects in both
countries; reviewed project documents and periodic reports,
interviewed USAID officials, and visited project sites in August
and October 2006.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-357
ACCNO: A66346
TITLE: Foreign Assistance: USAID Signature Tsunami
Reconstruction Efforts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka Exceed Initial
Cost and Schedule Estimates, and Face Further Risks
DATE: 02/28/2007
SUBJECT: Budgeting
Construction contracts
Construction costs
Cost analysis
Disaster recovery
Disaster relief aid
Federal aid to foreign countries
Financial management
Foreign aid programs
Foreign governments
Fund audits
International relations
Program evaluation
Reporting requirements
Risk assessment
Road construction
Schedule slippages
Tsunamis
Cost estimates
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
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GAO-07-357
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Signature Project Cost Estimates Have Risen, Schedules May B
* [4]Indonesia Signature Project Cost Estimates Have Increased, S
* [5]Indonesia Signature Project Is Under Way, but Contract
for M
* [6]Indonesia Signature Project's Estimated Costs and Budget
All
* [7]Several Factors, Including Postdisaster Environment, Led
to
* [8]USAID May Extend Completion Date for Indonesia Signature
Pro
* [9]USAID Raised Cost Estimates, and May Extend Completion Date
* [10]Sri Lanka Signature Project Is Largely Under Way
* [11]Rising Construction Costs, Deteriorating Security, and
Other
* [12]USAID May Extend the Sri Lanka Signature Project
Completion
* [13]USAID Acquired Financial and Technical Oversight, but Lacked
* [14]USAID Provided for Financial Audits and Is Helping Indonesia
* [15]USAID's Financial Controls Include External and Internal
Aud
* [16]USAID Is Supporting Efforts to Strengthen Indonesian and Sri
* [17]USAID Has Acquired Needed Technical Oversight for Tsunami Re
* [18]USAID Lacked Guidance and Faces Risks in Completing Signatur
* [19]Required Reports to Congress Do Not Clearly Show USAID's Pro
* [20]Conclusions
* [21]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [22]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [23]GAO Comment
* [24]GAO Contact
* [25]Staff Acknowledgments
* [26]GAO's Mission
* [27]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [28]Order by Mail or Phone
* [29]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [30]Congressional Relations
* [31]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
February 2007
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
USAID Signature Tsunami Reconstruction Efforts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
Exceed Initial Cost and Schedule Estimates, and Face Further Risks
GAO-07-357
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 7
Signature Project Cost Estimates Have Risen, Schedules May Be Extended,
and Further Risks May Affect Current Plans 11
USAID Acquired Financial and Technical Oversight, but Lacked Guidance for
Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction and Faces Further Risks 24
Required Reports to Congress Do Not Clearly Show USAID's Progress or
Address Risks to Signature Project Schedules and Cost Estimates 29
Conclusions 31
Recommendations for Executive Action 31
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 34
Appendix II USAID's Signature Projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka 36
Appendix III USAID's Nonsignature Activities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka 39
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 41
Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 43
GAO Comment 46
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 47
Tables
Table 1: Funds Allocated to Tsunami Emergency Relief and Postemergency
Reconstruction and Other Activities, as of December 31, 2006 8
Table 2: Scope and Status of Indonesia Signature Road Construction Project
36
Table 3: Description and Status of USAID's Signature Project in Sri Lanka
38
Table 4: Project Sectors, Amounts of Funds Budgeted, and Descriptions of
Selected Activities for USAID's Nonsignature Projects in Indonesia 39
Table 5: Project Sectors, Amounts of Funds Budgeted, and Descriptions of
Selected Activities for USAID's Nonsignature Projects in Sri Lanka 40
Figures
Figure 1: Financial Information on USAID Tsunami Reconstruction Funds, as
of December 31, 2006 9
Figure 2: Initial and Revised Estimated Costs Per Mile and Length of Road
for USAID Indonesia Signature Project 14
Figure 3: Initial and Revised Plans for Indonesia Signature Road
Construction Project 15
Figure 4: Initial and Revised Timelines for USAID's Signature Project
Activities in Indonesia, as of February 2007 18
Figure 5: Temporary Bridge Currently Spanning Arugam Bay near Site of
Planned USAID-Funded Bridge in Sri Lanka 20
Figure 6: Locations of Selected Signature Project Components and Recent
Terrorist Incidents 22
Figure 7: Initial and Revised Plans for USAID's Signature Project
Activities in Sri Lanka 23
Figure 8: USAID Signature Project Funding Information Included and Not
Included in Department of State Reports 30
Abbreviations
A-TARP Aceh Technical Assistance Recovery Project DCAA Defense Contract
Audit Agency IG USAID Office of the Inspector General LTTE Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam NGO nongovernmental organization USACE U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
February 28, 2007
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Judd Gregg
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Chairwoman
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The tsunami of December 2004, caused by an earthquake in the Indian Ocean
near Indonesia, widely devastated 12 Asian and East African countries,
leaving more than 200,000 dead and 40,000 reported missing. In May 2005,
Congress appropriated approximately $908 million in assistance for tsunami
relief, reconstruction, and related programs.^1 The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) tsunami reconstruction programs in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka--the two affected countries with the greatest
estimated needs--began later in 2005. USAID's programs in the two
countries include signature projects, intended to generate greater
visibility for overall U.S. assistance. In Indonesia, USAID initially
planned to construct a 150-mile coastal road, budgeted at $245 million
(about 70 percent of its funds) and scheduled for completion in September
2009; in Sri Lanka, USAID planned to construct a bridge and other
infrastructure, among other project components, budgeted at $35 million
(over 40 percent of its funds) and scheduled for completion in March
2008.^2
1Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. 109-13. In addition to $327
million budgeted for survivors' immediate needs for medicine, food, and
shelter, approximately $482 million is currently budgeted for longer-term
reconstruction and related programs to be directed by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). This amount includes $351 million for
Indonesia, $83 million for Sri Lanka, and $48 million for other countries
and regional programs. The remaining $99 million is budgeted to other U.S.
agencies.
We began monitoring the delivery of U.S. assistance to the
tsunami-affected countries in May 2005.^3 In April 2006, we reported that
USAID had begun its reconstruction programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka but
that costs and schedules for some projects might exceed initial estimates;
that the agency had established financial and technical oversight of the
assistance but had not filled some technical oversight positions; and that
several significant challenges, including civil conflict, confronted its
reconstruction efforts in both countries.^4 To help ensure the public
availability of current information on the assistance costs and schedules,
our April 2006 report recommended that the Secretary of State provide
updated cost and schedule estimates in the Department of State's
semiannual report to Congress, required by Section 4102 of the act
authorizing the assistance (Section 4102 report).^5
Updating our April 2006 findings, this report examines (1) the status of
USAID's signature projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, including its
obligations^6 and expenditures of funds for reconstruction assistance in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka; (2) USAID's financial and technical oversight of
the programs, and the extent to which it had guidance for operating in
postdisaster situations, including lessons learned from prior disasters;
and (3) actions taken by the Secretary of State in response to our April
2006 recommendation. Appendix III presents information about USAID's
nonsignature tsunami reconstruction projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
^2USAID also initiated "nonsignature" projects that it initially planned
to complete by September 2007.
^3In March 2005, the House Appropriations Committee requested that we
review U.S. assistance for reconstruction efforts in response to the
December 2004 earthquake and tsunami (H.Rept. 109-16, p. 49).
^4GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but Key Projects May Exceed Initial Cost and
Schedule Estimates, [32]GAO-06-488 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2006).
^5Section 4102 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L.
109-13, required that the Secretary of State report to Congress in June
2005, on a project-by-project basis, on the proposed uses of all
appropriated funds for which State anticipated obligating funds and every
6 months thereafter on the expenditure of the funds, on a project-by
project basis, until all funds are fully expended.
To address these issues, we reviewed USAID data, including funding
obligations and expenditures, through December 2006, the agency's progress
in achieving program objectives for its signature projects, and its
oversight of the programs. These data included monthly progress reports on
project activities, monthly and quarterly expenditures, and interviews
with USAID officials. In Washington, D.C., Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, we
met with representatives from State, USAID, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE), nongovernmental organizations, private firms, and
governments of tsunami-affected countries. During our visits to Indonesia
and Sri Lanka, we visited numerous signature project sites in the
tsunami-affected areas and monitored the progress of USAID's projects. We
determined that USAID's funding and expenditure data were sufficiently
reliable for our analysis. We also considered previous GAO work on U.S.
disaster assistance efforts. We conducted our work from June 2006 through
February 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. (App. I contains a more detailed description of our scope and
methodology.)
Results in Brief
Although USAID's signature projects and other activities in Indonesia and
Sri Lanka are under way, various difficulties have led the agency to
increase initial cost estimates; reduce or cancel some activities in
Indonesia; and consider extending project completion dates of signature
projects in both countries. In addition, as of February 2007, USAID had
not awarded the contract for major signature road construction work in
Indonesia. USAID has taken steps to address some of these difficulties,
such as revising the length of road to be built in Indonesia and assisting
the government in acquiring land and property needed to implement project
activities. However, USAID continues to face risks that it may not
complete the signature projects within cost and schedule estimates and
without further reducing the scope of the work, as currently planned.
^6Generally, an obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal
liability of the U.S. government for the payment of goods and services
ordered or received ( [33]GAO-06-382SP , vol. II, 7-3). Consistent with 31
U.S.C. 1501, which defines when an agency can record an obligation, USAID
treats as an obligation the bilateral agreements it makes with other
countries to deliver assistance. However, except where denoted by
quotation marks ("obligations"), this report defines obligations as
amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and
similar transactions during a given period that will require payments
during the same or future period. USAID labels these actions
subobligations. Expenditures are defined as the issuance of checks,
disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of funds to liquidate a
federal obligation.
o Indonesia. As of December 2006, USAID had obligated $186 million
(53 percent) and expended $58 million (17 percent) of its $351
million budget for tsunami reconstruction in Indonesia. USAID had
obligated $105 million (41 percent) and expended $15 million (6
percent) of its $254 million budget for the signature road
construction project. USAID contractors completed the design work
for the signature road construction project in Aceh Province and
began construction work on some badly damaged road sections.
However, in June 2006, because of significant increases in
estimated construction costs per mile, USAID reduced the project's
scope by over one third--from 150 miles to 91 miles of road
construction--and reallocated approximately $9 million from other
USAID and State tsunami supplemental appropriations to the road,
resulting in a budget that has risen from the original $245
million to $254 million.^7 Based on GAO's analysis, the estimated
per-mile costs as of June 2006 had risen to approximately $2.7
million--a 68 percent increase from USAID's March 2005 projection
of $1.6 million per mile--reflecting both higher-than-expected
labor and material costs and the availability of more accurate
information than in March 2005.^8 For example, the June 2006
estimate indicates that 2.2 million cubic meters of excavation
would be required, compared with the March 2005 estimate of 1.5
million cubic meters. Moreover, despite reducing the length of
road to be constructed, USAID may extend the project's completion
date from September 2009 to February 2010, in part because it did
not award a contract for the major road construction work in
September 2006, as planned; USAID expects to award the
construction contract in May 2007.^9 Further, although USAID is
currently assisting the Indonesian government in its land
acquisition efforts, the project's completion date may be extended
and estimated costs may increase because of ongoing delays by the
Indonesian government in acquiring land for the road.^10 For
example, as of December 31, 2006, the Indonesian government had
acquired only 899 of the needed 3,679 parcels along the road's
planned route.^11 In addition, several challenges increase the
risk that USAID may not successfully complete the project at
planned cost and on schedule. Specifically, delays by the
government of Indonesia in acquiring land in a timely manner and
community unrest increase USAID's risk of not meeting its
schedule, and increasing costs for materials and labor, as well as
slippages in the schedule, increase USAID's risk of not meeting
its projected costs because longer projects generally cost more.
o Sri Lanka. As of December 2006, USAID had obligated $70 million
(84 percent) and expended $15 million (18 percent) of its $83
million budget for tsunami reconstruction. USAID had obligated $35
million (73 percent) and expended $5 million (11 percent) of its
$48 million budget for the signature project components. The
contract completion date for the Sri Lanka signature project,
which includes building a bridge and other infrastructure,
constructing vocational education facilities, and addressing
coastal management issues, is March 2008. However, USAID may
extend the signature project completion date. In addition, the
projected cost has increased from $35 million to $48
million--about 37 percent--due to increases in the costs of labor
and materials. To make up for this shortfall, USAID reallocated
approximately $13 million from nonsignature project activities. As
in Indonesia, several challenges increase the risk that USAID may
not successfully complete all the project components at planned
cost and on schedule. Specifically, other factors such as delays
in selecting the sites, determining what would be taught, and
designing the vocational educational facilities and water
treatment facilities, as well as increasing incidents of
terrorist-related violence increase USAID's risk of additional
costs and slippages in the schedule.
USAID is carrying out measures that it previously established for
financial oversight of its reconstruction programs in Indonesia
and Sri Lanka, and it has taken steps to enhance its technical
oversight capacity. In addition to USAID's standard requiring
financial oversight mechanisms, USAID has contracted with the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) for concurrent audits of its
signature road construction project in Aceh Province, Indonesia.
Also, USAID's Office of the Inspector General (IG), using funding
that was included in the supplemental appropriation, has completed
audits showing, among other things, that USAID had not met certain
interim milestone dates and was not adequately accounting for
funding; other IG audits are ongoing. To ensure technical
oversight of its reconstruction projects in both countries, USAID
has added experienced staff, including engineers in both Sri Lanka
and Indonesia, and enhanced its engineering services through
agreements with USACE. However, when USAID began its tsunami
reconstruction program in early 2005, the agency did not have
disaster reconstruction program guidance, including lessons
learned from its prior programs, such as the importance of setting
appropriate time frames, conducting thorough cost assessments, and
understanding local land tenure systems. In our July 2002 report
focusing on USAID's reconstruction efforts in Central America,
several USAID missions reported learning numerous lessons, such as
the importance of establishing longer implementation periods to
complete projects.^12 In response to our May 2006 report, USAID
issued guidance, including lessons learned, on implementing
disaster recovery activities following hurricanes and tropical
storms that struck several Caribbean countries in 2004.^13
Further, as USAID moves forward, the agency faces risks that may
affect its ability to complete its signature project activities as
planned.
In response to our April 2006 recommendation, the Secretary of
State, with information obtained from USAID, has provided some
updated cost estimates and schedules in its required reports to
Congress. Data in both the June and December 2006 reports included
amounts of funds obligated to the affected countries but did not
include the amounts of funds signed in agreements with
implementing organizations (in USAID's terminology,
"subobligated"). Also, the reports do not include USAID's risk
information and mitigation strategy for addressing the risks. As a
result, Congress lacks funding information that would more clearly
reflect the agency's progress; currently, State's required
semiannual reports to Congress do not include this information.
Therefore, to ensure that Congress has access to information that
clearly reflects both USAID's progress in its tsunami
reconstruction programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and factors
that may slow its progress, we make the following two
recommendations regarding the Secretary of State's required
semiannual reports to Congress:
o To clearly show USAID's progress in using the appropriated funds
for tsunami reconstruction, the reports should include the amounts
that USAID obligated to recipient countries for tsunami
reconstruction and the amounts that it "subobligated" in
transactions with implementing organizations, such as contracts,
grants, and cooperative agreements, for specific reconstruction
projects.
o To indicate risk of potential changes to the costs, schedules,
and scopes of work of USAID's signature projects in Indonesia and
Sri Lanka, the reports should identify factors that may impact the
agency's implementation of the projects and provide strategies for
mitigating any impact.
At our request, USAID and the Department of State provided written
comments and technical suggestions and clarifications on a draft
of this report. (See app. IV for State's written comments and app.
V for USAID's written comments.) In commenting on a draft of this
report, the Department of State and USAID fully agreed with our
recommendation to include cost data on "subobligated" funds in
State's required reports to Congress. USAID also agreed to
separately identify risk and mitigation strategies in State's
reports. We have also incorporated technical suggestions and
clarifications from State and USAID, as appropriate.
Background
Of the $908 million that the United States appropriated for
tsunami relief and reconstruction, $327 million (36 percent) was
allocated to the Department of Defense and USAID for emergency
relief activities that have largely been completed. The remaining
$581 million (64 percent) was budgeted for reconstruction and
other postemergency activities. Of this amount, $482 million
(about 83 percent) is currently allocated to USAID.^14 Table 1
shows the amounts of funds allocated to emergency relief and
reconstruction and other postemergency activities.
Table 1: Funds Allocated to Tsunami Emergency Relief and
Postemergency Reconstruction and Other Activities, as of December
31, 2006
Dollars in millions
Type of tsunami assistance activity Funds allocated
Emergency relief activities $327
Postemergency reconstruction and other activities
USAID 482
Other U.S. departments and agencies 99
Subtotal $581
Total $908
Sources: USAID and Department of State.
As of December 31, 2006, USAID had signed bilateral agreements
with many tsunami-affected countries for the entire $482 million
(100 percent); USAID considers these funds obligated. USAID had
expended $96 million (20 percent) of the funds (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Financial Information on USAID Tsunami Reconstruction
Funds, as of December 31, 2006
Note: Generally, an obligation is a definite commitment that
creates a legal liability of the U.S. government for the payment
of goods and services ordered or received ( [34]GAO-05-734SP ,
70). Consistent with 31 U.S.C. 1501, which defines when an agency
can record an obligation, USAID treats as an obligation the
bilateral agreements it makes with other countries to deliver
assistance. However, except where denoted by quotation marks
("obligations"), this report defines obligations as amounts of
orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and similar
transactions during a given period that will require payments
during the same or future period. USAID labels these actions
"subobligations." Expenditures are defined as the issuance of
checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of funds to
liquidate a federal obligation.
As we reported in April 2006, USAID's signature project in
Indonesia initially consisted of 150 miles of coastal road
construction in western Aceh Province at an estimated cost of $245
million. The road--parts of which were badly damaged or destroyed
by the tsunami--was considered vital to restoring the economic
strength of the area and promoting redevelopment of the affected
communities. USAID planned to implement the project under three
separate contracts:
o a priority contract, awarded in August 2005, to temporarily
maintain an existing coastal road and to design and construct
priority sections of the new road;
o a design and construction management contract, awarded in
November 2005, to design the signature road and supervise its
construction; and
o a large-scale construction contract, to be awarded in September
2006, to construct major segments of the new road.
The contract for USAID's Sri Lanka signature project, awarded in
September 2005, and initially estimated to cost $35 million, has
five components:^15
o construction of a bridge,
o construction of water treatment facilities,
o rehabilitation of three commercial harbors,
o construction or rehabilitation of vocational education
facilities, and
o provision of training in coastal management.^16
We reported in April 2006 that USAID might be unable to complete
its Indonesia signature project and some components of its Sri
Lanka signature project within initial cost estimates and time
frames, owing in part to factors such as limited site information,
rising material and labor costs, and delays in the acquisition of
land. We also found that although the agency had taken steps to
ensure financial and technical oversight for the Indonesia and Sri
Lanka reconstruction programs, it had not filled some needed
technical oversight positions. Finally, we noted that several
challenges confronted USAID's tsunami reconstruction programs,
including long-standing conflicts between the countries'
governments and separatist groups in Aceh, Indonesia, and in
several areas of Sri Lanka. Our April 2006 report recommended that
State's semiannual Section 4102 report to Congress, due in June
2006, provide updated cost estimates and schedules for the
programs. We also recommended that if the updated estimates
differed substantially from the initial estimates, State's report
should include alternative cost estimates, schedules, and project
scopes and identify the need for additional sources of funding, if
necessary. State agreed with both of the recommendations.
Signature Project Cost Estimates Have Risen, Schedules May Be
Extended, and Further Risks May Affect Current Plans
USAID's signature projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka are under
way, but respective projects' estimated costs have risen and the
completion dates may be extended. In addition, the scope has been
reduced for the signature road project in Indonesia. To cover the
higher costs in both countries, USAID revised its budget
allocations for the signature projects. Also, as of February 2007,
USAID had not awarded the contract for major road construction
work in Indonesia. Factors typically related to the difficulty of
operating in postdisaster environments, such as increased
construction costs and delays in land acquisition, have
contributed to the higher cost estimates, reductions in project
scope, and the possible extension of completion dates. In both
countries, ongoing uncertainties have led to risks, such as
increase in costs that may further affect whether the signature
projects will be completed as planned.
Indonesia Signature Project Cost Estimates Have Increased,
Scope of Work Has Been Reduced, and Completion Date May Be Extended
USAID's plans for its signature road construction include awarding
and implementing three separate contracts. Although the agency has
made some progress under two of the contracts, based on GAO's
analysis, the road's estimated cost per mile has increased, the
scope of work has been reduced, and the completion date may be
extended. In addition, as of February 2007, USAID has not awarded
a contract for large-scale road construction. (See app. II for
more details on the status of the contracts.) However, USAID took
some actions in response to the difficulties that arose. In
addition, while cost increases have reduced the length of road
that USAID can build, it entered into an agreement with the
Japanese and Indonesian governments under which a coastal road
from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh will be jointly built by USAID and the
government of Japan. A number of factors, including several
relating to operating in a postdisaster environment--such as
limited initial site information, rising construction costs, and
delayed land acquisition--have contributed to the project's higher
estimated costs and slower-than-expected progress. As a result,
USAID may extend the project's completion date from September 2009
to February 2010.
Indonesia Signature Project Is Under Way, but Contract for Major
Road Construction Work Has Not Been Awarded
As of February 2007, the agency had not yet awarded its
large-scale construction contract, as planned. The status of the
contacts by which USAID is planning to complete its signature road
project in Indonesia are as follows:
o Priority contract. Construction work on certain priority
sections of the road began in October 2006, and as of December
2006, bridge construction and related work at one location had
begun.^17 Priority construction work was initially expected to
take place between August 2005 and August 2006, but sufficient
land was not available for construction to begin. USAID modified
the priority contract to increase the length of road to be built,
from 3 miles to 26 miles, and extend the completion date to
December 2007.
o Design and construction management contract. In June 2006, the
contractor completed a detailed design and cost estimate for the
coastal road, replacing USAID's initial cost estimate completed in
March 2005.^18 The new design reflects more detailed knowledge of
the project site and contains more technical details than were
available in the initial estimate. According to USAID officials,
although the initial estimate provided by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) was based on the best information available at
the time, it was lacking in specificity because the route of the
planned road had not been determined and on-the-ground access to
most areas was limited.
o Large-scale construction contract. Although USAID had expected
to award the contract for major segments of the coastal road in
September 2006, it did not receive a qualifying proposal in August
2006. The June 2006 solicitation, restricted to U.S. firms,
resulted in a single proposal, which the agency was unable to
negotiate to an acceptable price. In October 2006, USAID began a
new solicitation process, open to international firms, that agency
officials say has attracted interest from prospective offerors.
The agency now expects to award the contract in May 2007 and,
according to USAID officials, estimates that the road may not be
completed until February 2010, 5 months later than originally
planned.
Indonesia Signature Project�s Estimated Costs and Budget
Allocation Have Increased and the Project�s Scope Has Been
Reduced
Based on GAO's analysis, the road's estimated cost per mile as of
June 2006 is $2.7 million, a 68 percent increase over the cost
estimated by USAID in March 2005--$1.6 million per mile. As we
reported in April 2006, the initial estimate was based on limited
site information because the route of the planned road had not yet
been determined and most areas were not accessible for ground
surveys to be performed. Also, according to construction industry
studies, in projects that are not well defined, such as this one,
actual costs are likely to vary by a range of 50 percent less to
100 percent more than estimated costs. Based on GAO's analysis,
estimated costs as of June 2006 are currently 68 percent more than
initial projections.
To account for future contingencies, USAID increased its budget
allocation for the signature project by $9 million (4 percent),
from $245 million to $254 million.^19 At the same time, through an
agreement between USAID and the governments of Indonesia and
Japan, the Japanese government assumed responsibility for building
about 69 miles of the southern section of the road, from Calang to
Meulaboh, reducing USAID's responsibility from building 150 miles
to building approximately 91 miles of the road.^20 As a result,
despite potential estimated cost increases, USAID was able to meet
its commitment for the road while staying within budget
constraints. (See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Initial and Revised Estimated Costs Per Mile and Length
of Road for USAID Indonesia Signature Project
USAID also has tentative plans to construct two bypasses, totaling
approximately 12 miles, at points along the Japanese-funded
portion of the road. In October 2006, the U.S. Ambassador to
Indonesia asked State to request additional funds from the Office
of Management and Budget to cover the costs of building the
bypasses; USAID officials stated that a decision on funding the
construction of the bypasses will be made after the large-scale
construction contract is awarded and the project's budget is
reassessed. Figure 3 shows the initial and revised road
construction plan; appendix II provides further details of USAID's
revised project scope.
^7The government of Japan has agreed to build a 69-mile road that will
connect to the U.S. road (91 miles). The total length of the road, 160
miles, differs from the 150-mile road initially planned by USAID because
the Japanese road follows a different alignment than the U.S. road would
have followed.
^8Based on GAO's analysis, the current $2.7 million cost per-mile estimate
does not account for certain administrative and support costs and certain
activities performed previously that are not directly related to the costs
for constructing 91 miles of road. As such, the $2.7 million per-mile
estimate does not directly correlate with the $254 million currently
budgeted to the signature road.
^9Also, in October 2006, the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia requested that
the Department of State ask for additional funds from the Office of
Management and Budget to cover anticipated excess costs of constructing
two bypasses not included in the revised 86-mile project. The bypasses,
totaling approximately 12 miles, are along the section of road being
constructed by the government of Japan.
^10According to the National Research Council, a private, nonprofit
institution chartered by Congress that provides science, technology, and
health policy advice, extending the completion date for construction
projects is likely to increase costs.
^11The 3,679 parcels account for privately owned land along approximately
65 miles of the 91-mile route between Banda Aceh and Calang. The 899
parcels of privately owned land that have been acquired by the Indonesian
government are noncontiguous and account for approximately 16 miles of the
road's route. Twenty-six miles along the 91-mile route are owned by the
Indonesian government, and 22 miles of this land had been released to
USAID as of December 31, 2006.
^12GAO, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended
Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response
Capability, [35]GAO-02-787 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002).
^13GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID Completed Many Caribbean Disaster
Recovery Activities, but Several Challenges Hampered Efforts,
[36]GAO-06-645 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006).
^14Other U.S. departments and agencies are currently allocated $99 million
for other posttsunami-related activities. For example, components of the
Departments of Commerce and the Interior are supporting development of
regional early warning systems and disaster preparation plans and the
Department of the Treasury was involved in providing debt relief to some
affected countries. USAID's current allocation of $482 million is $14
million less than we reported in April 2006 due to transfers of funds to
other agencies.
^15In April 2006, we reported that the signature project had three
components (construction of a bridge and other infrastructure, provision
of coastal management training, and construction of vocational educational
facilities). (See [37]GAO-06-488 ). The project has since been redefined
as having five components.
16See appendix II for specific information on USAID's signature project in
Sri Lanka.
17In August 2005, USAID signed a contract with PT Wijaya Karya, an
Indonesian firm, to perform this work.
18In November 2005, USAID signed a contract with Parsons Global Services,
Inc., a U.S. firm, to perform this work.
19At the revised estimated cost of $2.7 million per mile, approximately
$405 million would be required to construct the 150-mile road that was
initially planned. The current $2.7 million cost per-mile estimate does
not account for certain administrative and support costs and certain
activities performed previously that are not directly related to the costs
for constructing 91 miles of road. As such, the total cost of building 91
miles based on a $2.7 million per-mile estimate (approximately $246
million) differs from the $254 million currently budgeted.
20Before the cooperative agreement was reached, the government of Japan
had intended to rebuild the road between Calang and Meulaboh that was
roughly parallel to the road planned by USAID between these two locations.
According to USAID officials, Indonesian government officials indicated
that, in April 2006, the Indonesian government decided that one
Japanese-built road, rather than two parallel roads, could be built, to
reduce the costs of maintenance. The USAID officials said that the
Indonesian government's agreement formed the basis for the revised road
construction plan. The Japanese road (69 miles) follows a different
alignment than the U.S. road would have followed. So the combined length
of the de-scoped U.S. road (91 miles) and the Japanese road, 160 miles,
differs from the 150 mile road initially planned by USAID.
Figure 3: Initial and Revised Plans for Indonesia Signature Road
Construction Project
Several Factors, Including Postdisaster Environment, Led to Higher Cost
Estimates and Delayed Progress of the Indonesia Signature Project
Based on GAO's analysis, a number of factors contributed to the signature
road's increased estimated cost per mile for the signature road and may
lead USAID to extend the Indonesia signature project's completion date.
These factors include the delay in USAID's awarding of the large-scale
construction contract; inclusion of elements in the June 2006 project
design that were absent from the original estimate; and several factors
related to Indonesia's postdisaster environment--namely, limited initial
site information, rising construction costs, and delays in land
acquisition.
o Delayed award of contract. Because USAID did not award the
large-scale construction contract in September 2006 as it
intended, it was not able to begin construction under the contract
as planned. Although specific costs associated with this delay
have not yet been quantified, construction industry research shows
that longer projects are almost always associated with higher
costs.^21
o Additional design elements. The June 2006 project design for the
road comprised several technical elements not included in the
March 2005 cost estimate, raising the project's estimated cost per
mile. For example, the June 2006 design included new
specifications for building eight cofferdams--watertight
enclosures that permit underwater construction of bridge supports
that were not factored into the March 2005 estimate.
o Postdisaster environment. Limited initial site information,
rising construction costs, and delays in acquiring land--factors
commonly encountered by reconstruction efforts in a postdisaster
environment^22 contributed to the project's increased estimated
costs per mile and to its potentially late completion date. Our
April 2006 report noted these factors as likely to raise costs and
make it difficult to complete the road within the intended time
frame.
o Limited initial information. As our April 2006
report noted, USAID's March 2005 cost estimate was
based on limited knowledge of site conditions, owing
to difficulty in accessing sections of the road's
planned coastal route.^23 The revised estimate
provides a more detailed assessment of the project's
requirements. For example, USAID's initial estimate
showed that 1.5 million cubic meters of excavation
would be required to build 150 miles of road, while
the revised estimate shows that 2.2 million cubic
meters of excavation will be required to build 91
miles of road.
o Rising construction costs. Our April 2006 report noted rapid
growth in the number of construction projects after the disaster
and cost inflation resulting from the greater demands for
construction materials and labor.^24 Posttsunami construction
spending was expected to increase fortyfold from pretsunami
levels, from $50 million to $2 billion per year. World Bank data
provided by USAID show that construction costs increased as a
result. For example, between October 2004 and October 2005, the
average wage for bricklayers, plumbers, and construction
supervisors in Aceh increased 55 percent, 72 percent, and 81
percent, respectively. USAID expects that ongoing demands for
materials and labor will continue to create inflationary
pressures.
o Delays in land acquisition. As our April 2006 report further
noted, USAID's ability to complete its project within the intended
time frame depended in part on the Indonesian government's
progress in acquiring privately owned land along the road's
planned route.^25 Subsequent delays in the land acquisition
process contributed to USAID's changing the expected completion
date of the signature project's priority contract from August 2006
to December 2007. As of January 1, 2007, the Indonesian government
had obtained 899 of the estimated 3,679 needed parcels. According
to USAID officials, the Indonesian government expects to complete
the land acquisition in March 2007.
USAID May Extend Completion Date for Indonesia Signature Project
Owing to the delays affecting its signature road project, USAID
may extend the project's completion date by 5 months, from
September 2009 to February 2010. Figure 4 shows USAID's initial
and, as of February 2007, revised timelines for its Indonesia
signature project.
21National Research Council of the National Academies, "The Owner's Role
in Project Risk Management" (Washington, D.C.; 2005).
22 [38]GAO-06-645 , appendix II.
23 [39]GAO-06-488 , 19.
24 [40]GAO-06-488 , 20.
25 [41]GAO-06-488 , 21.
Figure 4: Initial and Revised Timelines for USAID's Signature Project
Activities in Indonesia, as of February 2007
USAID Raised Cost Estimates, and May Extend Completion Date for Sri Lanka
Signature Project
USAID has made progress in several components of its Sri Lanka signature
project. However, the agency raised its cost estimates and increased its
budget by approximately 37 percent since 2005 to meet rising costs for
materials, labor, and additional security protection. USAID may extend its
estimated completion date for the signature project because of other
factors and increasing violence in some areas of the country.
Sri Lanka Signature Project Is Largely Under Way
USAID has made progress on several of the signature project's five
components:
o Construction of a bridge. In August 2006, USAID awarded the
contract for construction of a bridge over Arugam Bay, in eastern
Sri Lanka. As of December 2006, the work was on schedule to be
completed by February 2008 as initially planned. Figure 5 shows a
temporary bridge spanning Arugam Bay in Sri Lanka, near the site
of the planned USAID-funded bridge.
o Construction of a water treatment facility. USAID has not
awarded a contract for the water treatment facility; however, it
expects to do so in May 2007. USAID had planned to use surface
water from a nearby lake for the water source but opted to use
groundwater because it is less costly to operate, build, and
maintain.
o Rehabilitation of three commercial harbors. USAID has largely
completed the first of two planned phases in rehabilitating three
commercial harbors in southern Sri Lanka. The first phase included
smaller project activities, such as removing debris, repairing
damaged plumbing, and replacing damaged roofs. USAID awarded a
contract for the second phase in December 2006; these larger
activities will include dredging the harbors and rebuilding quay
walls.^26
o Construction of vocational education facilities. USAID initially
planned to rehabilitate 10 vocational educational facilities but
later reduced the number to 9, four of which are in eastern Sri
Lanka and five in southern Sri Lanka.^27 Plans for two of the nine
facilities call for the use of renewable energy and materials^28
As of January 2007, USAID had not awarded a contract for the
facilities; however, it plans to do so in April 2007.
o Provision of coastal management training. A management
organization is providing USAID-funded training in coastal
construction and tourism-related skills that USAID considers
essential to rebuilding and reactivating the economy in the Arugam
Bay area. The training is expected to be completed in June 2007.
Figure 5: Temporary Bridge Currently Spanning Arugam Bay near Site
of Planned USAID-Funded Bridge in Sri Lanka
Rising Construction Costs, Deteriorating Security, and Other
Factors Led to Increased Cost Estimate and Project Delays
Since its 2005 budget allocation, USAID raised its cost estimate
and increased the budget allocation for its signature project by
more than 37 percent. The budget allocation increased from $35
million to $48 million, based largely on a revised cost estimate
that showed rising costs for construction labor and materials. In
addition, other factors such as delays in design of two signature
project components have delayed the progress of the signature
project.
o Rising construction costs. As in Indonesia, labor and material
costs in Sri Lanka have increased since the tsunami. For example,
salaries for certain types of skilled laborers, such as masons,
have risen substantially since early 2005. These costs increased
primarily because of shortages of skilled labor and increased
demand for construction materials owing to the large number of
reconstruction efforts in tsunami-affected areas.
Worsening security. Conflict between the government of Sri Lanka
and a separatist group, which began in 1983, has intensified in
the 2 years since the tsunami.^29 The violence, previously
confined largely to northern and northeastern areas controlled by
the separatists, has spread to other areas of the country,
including some areas where USAID's reconstruction activities are
planned or ongoing. For the 15-month period ending December 2006,
CH2MHill officials told us that USAID's additional security costs
were approximately $104,000, and total additional security through
2008 is projected to cost about $237,000 unless the security
situation changes significantly. Although the projected additional
security costs are small--less than 1 percent of the overall
program budget--terrorist-related violence could enhance the risk
that USAID may not be able to complete its efforts as planned.
Figure 6 shows the locations of recent terrorist incidents
relative to USAID's Sri Lanka signature project areas.
26A quay is a structure built parallel to the bank of a waterway for use
as a landing place.
27USAID plans to provide an additional school in the east with educational
supplies as needed.
28Use of renewable energy and materials will qualify the facilities for
certification by Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, an
internationally recognized organization.
29Since the 1980s, some areas of Northern and Northeastern Sri Lanka have
been under the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
According to the U.S. Department of State, the LTTE is a terrorist
organization that has advocated secession of these areas to form a
separate ethnic Tamil state.
Figure 6: Locations of Selected Signature Project Components and Recent
Terrorist Incidents
Other factors. Specifically, delays in selecting the sites, determining
what would be taught, and designing the vocational educational facilities
and water treatment facility have led to slippages in the schedule for the
signature project.
USAID May Extend the Sri Lanka Signature Project Completion Date
The completion date for the Sri Lanka signature project is March 2008.
However this date may be extended.^30 The possible extension of the
completion date resulted from other factors such as design related delays
and the upsurge of violent incidents. Figure 7 shows USAID's initial and
revised plans for signature project activities in Sri Lanka.
Figure 7: Initial and Revised Plans for USAID's Signature Project
Activities in Sri Lanka
30Several signature project components have experienced delays of longer
than one month. For example, the minor works at three harbors, expected to
be completed by September 2006 and formally extended to November 2006, was
substantially completed by January 31, 2007.
USAID Acquired Financial and Technical Oversight, but Lacked Guidance for
Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction and Faces Further Risks
To ensure financial oversight of its reconstruction programs in Indonesia
and Sri Lanka, USAID augmented its standard financial controls with
external and internal audits. USAID is also implementing project
activities to strengthen the audit capabilities of government entities in
tsunami-affected countries. To strengthen its technical oversight, USAID
reassigned and hired needed staff and extended its interagency agreement
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for engineering services.
However, when beginning its tsunami reconstruction program in early 2005,
USAID did not have comprehensive guidance and did not consider some
lessons learned from prior disaster reconstruction efforts. Further, USAID
faces additional risks that may affect its ability to complete its
signature projects as planned.
USAID Provided for Financial Audits and Is Helping Indonesia and Sri Lanka to
Strengthen Audit Capabilities
USAID has augmented its standard financial controls through external and
internal audits of its tsunami reconstruction activities in Indonesia and
Sri Lanka. USAID has also strengthened the audit capability of the
Indonesian and Sri Lankan governments through funding for technical
assistance.
USAID's Financial Controls Include External and Internal Audits
In addition to providing for required financial controls, such as preaward
surveys of prospective award recipients and financial audits,^31 USAID has
provided for external and internal audits of its reconstruction program
activities.
o External audits. USAID signed an agreement with the Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to concurrently audit material and
labor controls for its signature road construction project in
Aceh, Indonesia. According to USAID officials, the audits are
being undertaken because of the additional risk inherent in large
construction projects. The initial DCAA audit began in December
2006 and, according to USAID officials, is expected to be
completed by April 2007.
o Internal audits. USAID's Office of the Inspector General (IG)
completed three audits of USAID's tsunami reconstruction projects
in Indonesia and Sri Lanka) in fiscal year 2006. The completed
audit reports identified some deficiencies in USAID's
reconstruction programs in the two countries.
USAID Is Supporting Efforts to Strengthen Indonesian and
Sri Lankan Audit Capabilities
USAID is funding several efforts to provide technical assistance
and training in fraud awareness, financial planning, and other
activities, aimed at increasing the audit capacities of the local
Indonesian government and Sri Lankan government audit
organization.
o Indonesia. The IG completed two of the three audits
it had planned for Indonesia, finding that USAID
could not account separately for some project
expenditures, as required. To correct this weakness,
the IG recommended that USAID (1) include clear and
specific language requiring separate tracking,
recording, and reporting of expenditures in its
implementing agreements; and (2) develop and
implement procedures to ensure that funds are charged
to the correct tsunami appropriations. USAID
generally agreed with both recommendations.
o Sri Lanka. The IG found that USAID was generally on
schedule in its Sri Lanka signature project, having
met 25 of 46 interim milestones dates. However,
because of some uncertainties, the IG recommended
that USAID develop procedures, with time frames, for
achieving specific tasks. USAID generally agreed with
the recommendations.^32
o Indonesia. USAID is providing technical assistance to help local
government entities increase their capacity to plan and manage
public services and finances; be transparent and accountable in
legislative and administrative processes; respond to citizen
priorities; include opportunities for citizens to participate in
local government decision making; and work with local service
providers to deliver services. For example, the USAID-funded Aceh
Technical Assistance Recovery Project (A-TARP) is providing
technical support to the Indonesian Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction Agency and the Office of the Governor of Aceh
Province. One of the aims of A-TARP is to assist Indonesian
officials in better planning, coordinating, managing, and
overseeing tsunami reconstruction efforts.
o Sri Lanka. USAID is providing support to the Sri Lanka
Anti-Corruption Program, to assist key government agencies and
selected civil society organizations in strengthening measures to
combat corruption and monitor the disbursement of tsunami-related
assistance. Some of the program's core government partners include
the Auditor General's Department, the Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, and various civil society
organizations. The program goals include improving the delivery of
technical services in multiethnic communities, especially those
affected by the long-standing conflict and tsunami.
USAID Has Acquired Needed Technical Oversight for Tsunami
Reconstruction Programs
In April 2006, we reported that USAID had not filled some needed
technical positions in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. To establish
technical oversight, USAID has filled the positions with
experienced staff, such as engineers, and acquired additional
technical expertise through interagency agreements.
o Indonesia. As of October 2006, USAID had filled needed technical
positions with qualified and experienced staff, including a senior
engineer who is currently the team leader for the signature road
project. In addition to filling these internal technical
positions, USAID extended its interagency agreement with USACE to
March 2007. Under the agreement, USACE will assist in reviewing
the technical design to provide environmental protections
involving the signature road construction project.
o Sri Lanka. Our prior report noted that USAID had hired two of
the three engineers needed to oversee infrastructure construction
activities in Sri Lanka. In June 2006, USAID filled the third
engineering position needed for technical engineering services on
the Sri Lanka signature project.
USAID Lacked Guidance and Faces Risks in Completing Signature
Projects as Planned
Since beginning its tsunami reconstruction program in 2005, USAID
has taken actions to address various problems, such as rising
costs and delays in acquiring land. However, when it began the
tsunami reconstruction program in early 2005, USAID missions in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka did not have disaster reconstruction
program guidance--including lessons learned from its prior
programs, such as the importance of setting appropriate time
frames, conducting thorough cost assessments, and understanding
local land tenure systems. As USAID moves forward in its efforts
to implement the signature projects in both countries, a variety
of risks will continue to present challenges that USAID must be
prepared to address.
When faced with cost, schedule, and external difficulties in both
countries, USAID took some actions. For example, in Indonesia,
when USAID found that costs for building the signature road had
escalated, the agency (in cooperation with the Indonesian and
Japanese governments) reduced the length of road it planned to
build, while still preserving the original concept of building the
entire 150-mile road. Also, to facilitate progress in land
acquisition in Indonesia, the U.S. Ambassador and USAID Mission
Director have engaged senior Indonesian government officials and
stressed the importance of acquiring land more quickly. Further,
in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, USAID reallocated funds from
other sources to cover estimated cost increases to its signature
projects.
Although USAID took actions to address difficulties in its
signature projects, the agency did not have guidance, including
lessons learned from its prior disaster reconstruction efforts, in
its planning process. During recent years in which USAID has been
involved in postdisaster recovery situations, such as responding
to hurricanes and earthquakes, the agency has faced similar or
nearly identical circumstances that have shown the likelihood of
cost increases, schedule extensions, land acquisition delays, and
other potential problems. However, USAID's lack of guidance and
lessons learned created challenges that sometimes resulted in an
ad-hoc approach to planning its activities. For example, we
reported in May 2006 that, if USAID had had access to lessons
learned regarding likely increases in demand for construction
materials and labor, it might have helped USAID establish more
realistic expectations for what could be achieved within a 1-year
time frame.^33
As the reconstruction progresses, USAID signature construction
projects continue to face risks that may further increase costs,
extend schedules, and threaten successful completion. As we
reported in May 2006, numerous risk factors are commonly
experienced when carrying out postdisaster activities.^34 Also,
during our current review, we identified at least three of these
risk factors that are particularly relevant to USAID's ongoing
tsunami reconstruction program:
o Schedule factors. The Indonesia signature road project schedule
may continue to slip, depending on the governments' pace in
acquiring land and property, and the current pace of acquisition
may not be sufficient to enable timely completion of construction.
In addition, if USAID experiences further delays in awarding its
large-scale construction contract, the project completion date may
be later than February 2010, as currently projected. In Sri Lanka,
other factors, such as delays for designs of the signature project
components have affected the schedule.
o Cost factors. As discussed earlier, uncertainties regarding the
projects' schedules increase cost risks, because longer projects
generally cost more. Additionally, continued price inflation
increases the risk that the project may cost more than USAID's
budgets. As we reported in April 2006, posttsunami construction
spending in Aceh Province, Indonesia, was expected to increase
fortyfold from pretsunami levels, from $50 million to $2 billion
per year, creating inflationary pressure. However, in its March
2005 cost estimate, USAID included a 20 percent contingency--less
than the 41 percent annual inflation rate that was later reported
by the government of Indonesia's Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Agency.^35 Although the annual rate had declined considerably to 6
percent, as of September 2006, USAID expects that continuing cost
increases in Indonesia are likely to affect reconstruction
efforts. In Sri Lanka, although USAID has already increased its
cost estimate for the signature project by over 37 percent because
of rising costs for materials and labor, price uncertainties may
continue to affect overall costs.
o External factors. Community unrest related to the road in
Indonesia and the increasing threat of violence in Sri Lanka may
limit USAID's ability to continue the signature projects and
complete them as planned. In Indonesia, work under the priority
construction contract was hindered in late 2006 by Acehnese
protesters demonstrating against the Indonesian army's
unreimbursed seizure of property to build a temporary road
immediately after the tsunami. The demonstrations were not aimed
directly at USAID. In January 2007, USAID reported that no
demonstrations had occurred since December 2006 and that, even if
they were to reoccur, they were not likely to cause delays in
construction of the new road. In Sri Lanka, the rising number of
violent incidents related to the long-running secessionist
movement has had some impact on USAID's progress to date. However,
USAID officials acknowledged that additional
incidents, particularly in or near project sites, could increase
the uncertainty of whether USAID's efforts continue at the planned
pace.
Required Reports to Congress Do Not Clearly Show USAID�s Progress
or Address Risks to Signature Project Schedules and Cost Estimates
In response to our April 2006 recommendation,^36 the Secretary of
State provided updated cost estimates and schedules in its
required semiannual report. However, the reports that State has
submitted to Congress since April 2006 have not clearly depicted
the agency's progress in its tsunami reconstruction program.
Further, the reports do not address the ongoing risks to its cost
estimates and schedules for the Indonesia and Sri Lanka signature
projects or provide plans for mitigating the effects of these
risks.
State's two most recent semi-annual reports to Congress (June and
December 2006) show USAID's obligations to recipient governments
rather than amounts it committed to organizations implementing
project activities. The reports show as "obligations" the overall
funding that USAID agreed to provide to recipient countries for
tsunami reconstruction. The obligations shown also include funds
that have not yet been committed to specific USAID transactions,
such as contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with
implementing organizations. USAID treats funds included in these
agreements as "subobligations"; however, the Department of State
does not include subobligations in the reports. As a result, the
data as reported to Congress do not clearly reflect USAID's actual
progress in funding of its tsunami reconstruction programs. For
example, State's December 2006 report to Congress states that all
of the $254 million budgeted for the signature road construction
project in Indonesia had been "obligated." However, this figure
does not reflect that USAID had signed agreements with
implementing organizations for only $105 million--slightly more
than 40 percent of the amount budgeted for the work. (See fig. 8.)
Moreover, the reported obligations for the Indonesia signature
road project do not reflect that USAID has not yet awarded the
major contract for large-scale construction.
31USAID requires an annual audit of foreign nonprofit organizations
expending $300,000 or more of USAID funds and a preaward survey or audit
before negotiating a contract of $500,000 or more.
32USAID Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Indonesia's Tsunami Recovery and
Reconstruction Program Activities Implemented by Development Alternatives,
Inc., Audit Report No. 5-497-06-009P (Manila, Philippines; Sept. 15,
2006); and Audit of USAID/Sri Lanka's Large-Scale Infrastructure
Rebuilding Activities Under Its Sri Lanka Tsunami Reconstruction Program,
No. 5-383-07-001P (Manila, Philippines; Nov. 30, 2006).
33 [44]GAO-06-645 , 20-21.
34A May 2006 GAO report ( [45]GAO-06-645 ) summarized common lessons and
examples of USAID's efforts to address disaster recovery challenges. Prior
to the issuance of this report, USAID's planning efforts for posttsunami
reconstruction did not provide adequate contingencies and allowances for
cost, schedule, and scope changes. In response to our recommendation in
the report, USAID issued guidance that is now available for staff involved
in disaster recovery activities.
35Overall annual inflation rate in Aceh Province, as of December 2005.
36Our April 2006 report recommended that the Secretary of State, in the
department's required semiannual report to Congress in June 2006, provide
updated cost estimates and schedules obtained from USAID. We also
recommended that if the updated information differed substantially from
initial projections, the report should include alternative cost estimates,
schedules, and project scopes and the need for additional sources of
funding, if necessary.
Figure 8: USAID Signature Project Funding Information Included and
Not Included in Department of State Reports
Note: The amounts are as of December 31, 2006.
Generally, an obligation is a definite commitment that creates a
legal liability of the U.S. government for the payment of goods
and services ordered or received ( [42]GAO-05-734SP , 70).
Consistent with 31 U.S.C. 1501, which defines when an agency can
record an obligation, USAID treats as an obligation the bilateral
agreements it makes with other countries to deliver assistance.
However, except where denoted by quotation marks ("obligations"),
this report defines obligations as amounts of orders placed,
contracts awarded, services received, and similar transactions
during a given period that will require payments during the same
or future period. USAID labels these actions subobligations.
Expenditures are defined as the issuance of checks, disbursement
of cash, or electronic transfer of funds to liquidate a federal
obligation.
USAID's required semiannual reports to Congress do not include
information on cost and schedule risks to the Indonesia and Sri
Lanka signature projects or provide mitigation strategies for
addressing the risks. For example, the reports omit information on
the government of Indonesia's slow progress in acquiring land
parcels and how this challenge may affect the successful
completion of the Indonesia signature road project. Similarly, the
report does not present USAID's strategy for completing the Sri
Lanka signature project in the face of rising conflict and an
upsurge in violence.
Conclusions
USAID has assisted numerous countries, including Indonesia and Sri
Lanka, in recovering from the December 2004 tsunami. A variety of
USAID tsunami reconstruction projects have made progress toward
restoring the lives of the survivors. However, some key project
activities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka--particularly its signature
projects intended to generate increased visibility for U.S.
assistance--have experienced increased estimated costs, are behind
initial schedules, and in the case of Indonesia have been reduced
in scope. In both countries, USAID has taken some measures to
adjust the scope, budget, and schedule of the projects in an
attempt to account for conditions that have affected the projects'
progress, while preserving the initial project goals.
Although the Department of State has included updated information
in its reports to Congress on the progress of the tsunami
reconstruction program, the reports do not clearly reflect USAID's
progress in the programs or risks that could affect its progress.
The reports show as obligations the amounts that USAID intends to
use for specific activities rather than
amounts--"subobligations"--that it has agreed to in transactions
with implementing agreements, such as contracts for specific
projects. In addition, the reports do not indicate ongoing risks
in both countries that may impact signature projects' costs,
schedules, and scopes of work. As a result, Congress lacks some
information that it needs to oversee USAID.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that Congress has access to information that clearly
reflects both USAID's progress in its tsunami reconstruction
programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and factors that may slow its
progress, we are making the following two recommendations
regarding the Secretary of State's required semiannual reports to
Congress:
o To clearly show USAID's progress in using the appropriated funds
for tsunami reconstruction, the reports should include the amounts
that USAID obligated to recipient countries for tsunami
reconstruction and the amounts that it "subobligated" in
transactions with implementing organizations, such as contracts,
grants, and cooperative agreements, for specific reconstruction
projects.
o To indicate risk of potential changes to the costs, schedules,
and scopes of work of USAID's signature projects in Indonesia and
Sri Lanka, the reports should identify factors that may impact the
agency's implementation of the projects and provide strategies for
mitigating any impact.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
At our request, the Department of State and USAID provided written
comments and technical suggestions and clarifications on a draft
of this report. (See app. IV for State's written comments and app.
V for USAID's written comments.) The Department of State and USAID
agreed to fully implement our recommendation to include
"subobligation" cost data in State's required reports to Congress.
USAID also stated that it has regularly provided risk information
and mitigation strategies in various sections of State's required
reports to Congress, but agreed to separately identify such data
in future reports. We have incorporated technical suggestions and
clarifications from USAID and State, as appropriate.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers declined our request to provide
written comments on a draft of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees as well as the Administrator, USAID; Commander, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers; and the Secretary of State. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3149, or [email protected]. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Individuals making key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
David Gootnick, Director
International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were directed^1 by Congress to monitor the delivery of U.S.
reconstruction assistance to the tsunami-affected countries
through periodic visits. In this report, we review (1) the status
of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID)
signature projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, including its
obligations and expenditures of funds for reconstruction
assistance in Indonesia and Sri Lanka; (2) USAID's financial and
technical oversight of the programs, and the extent to which the
agency had issued guidance that includes lessons learned from
prior disasters in order to identify and address project
uncertainties; and (3) actions taken by the Secretary of State in
response to our April 2006 recommendation regarding its provision
of updated costs estimates and schedules to Congress.
To determine the progress of USAID's reconstruction programs in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka, we met with officials of USAID's Bureau
for Asia and the Near East and with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE). We traveled to Sri Lanka in July 2006 and to
Indonesia in October 2006. In Jakarta and Banda Aceh, Indonesia,
and in Colombo, Sri Lanka, we reviewed USAID's status reports,
applicable contracts, and cooperative agreements and discussed
with USAID and other U.S. officials how their respective programs
addressed reconstruction needs.
During our visit to Indonesia, we reviewed USAID's activities in
tsunami-affected areas, including the signature road construction
project in Aceh Province. During 2 days in Aceh, we visited and
photographed 2 locations consisting of several building
construction projects which were in various stages of completion.
We also visited a 36-mile section of road where USAID-funded road
maintenance work was ongoing or where USAID-funded construction
had begun. During our visit to Sri Lanka, we reviewed and
photographed USAID's activities in tsunami-affected areas,
including the signature project components in the eastern and
southern part of Sri Lanka. During these trips, we interviewed
representatives of contractors, nongovernmental organizations
(NGO), government ministries, and other entities responsible for
day-to-day project implementation. We also interviewed many of the
intended recipients of U.S. assistance, asking about the tsunami's
impact on their homes, livelihoods, and communities and about the
effectiveness of U.S.-funded projects in helping them rebuild
infrastructure, restore their livelihoods, and obtain basic
services. Finally, we reviewed prior GAO reports on USAID disaster
assistance efforts.
1H. Rept. 109-16, p. 49.
To assess USAID's financial and technical oversight, we reviewed
USAID's financial procedures and discussed the procedures with
cognizant USAID officials. In Indonesia, a licensed GAO
professional engineer met with USAID and USACE engineers and other
technical staff to discuss the level of technical oversight and
planning. To determine the challenges that USAID faces in
implementing its program, we discussed oversight procedures and
financial systems with officials of host governments, multilateral
and bilateral donors, and NGOs involved in reconstruction efforts.
We also met with host government officials, including national and
local officials, to discuss their procedures for ensuring that
donor activities did not conflict or overlap and their views on
donor coordination.
We assessed the reliability of funding and expenditure data
compiled and generated by USAID's Office of the Controller in
Washington, D.C., and by the USAID missions in Indonesia and Sri
Lanka. We met with USAID officials to review the internal controls
for the collection of data, comparing the consolidated reports
with mission-specific reports, and discussed relevant data
reliability issues with cognizant agency officials. In addition,
we interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials about the systems and
methodology they use to verify the completeness and accuracy of
the data. Finally, we reviewed relevant reports from the USAID
Office of the Inspector General and several GAO reports of USAID
disaster reconstruction program funding since 1999. None of these
sources noted any significant discrepancies or concerns about the
reliability of USAID's data. Based on our comparison of data
generated from different USAID sources at USAID headquarters and
mission, we found that the sources generally corroborated each
other, increasing our confidence that the data were reliable. We
determined that USAID's funding and expenditure data were
sufficiently reliable for our analysis.
Appendix II: USAID's Signature Projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
Table 2: Scope and Status of Indonesia Signature Road Construction Project
Status (December Status (February
Contract Scope (December 2005) 2005) 2007)
Priority Repair and maintain Contract awarded to Contract
segment existing 50-mile an Indonesian firm modified to
segment from Banda Aceh (PT Wijaya Karya) on construct
to Lamno. August 23, 2005. segments
totaling 26
Design and construct a Contract cost is miles between
short priority (3-mile) $12.8 million. Banda Aceh and
segment between Banda Calang.^a
Aceh and Lamno. Maintenance and
repair work is Contract cost
Perform the design work ongoing; route is increased to
on a passable. $81.4 million.
cost-plus-fixed-fee
basis. Design of the new Construction
3-mile road segment work began
Perform the maintenance is under way. October 2006 and
and construction work is expected to
on a fixed-price basis. Construction of new be complete in
3-mile road segment December 2007.
is expected to be
completed by August
2006.
Design and Design the new road Contract awarded to Design of new
construction (except for the 3-mile U.S. firm (Parsons 91-mile road
management priority segment). Global Services between Banda
Inc.) on November Aceh and Calang
Supervise construction. 10, 2005. is complete.^b
Perform services on a Estimated contract Management of
cost-plus-fixed-fee cost up to $34.9 priority
basis. million; amount construction
obligated is $20 work is ongoing.
million.
Management of
Design work ongoing large-scale
and planned to be construction
completed in June expected to
2006. begin when
contract is
Contractor required awarded in May
to prepare an 2007.
updated estimate of
construction costs. Estimated
contract cost up
Construction to $35.1
management services million.
being provided on
the priority road
segment and will
continue in
September 2006, when
the contract for
construction of
Banda Aceh to
Meulaboh road is
awarded.
Large-scale Placement of new road Construction Scope reduced to
construction along a 150-mile route contract is expected construct 65
from Banda Aceh to to be awarded in miles of road
Meulaboh (except for September 2006, and between Banda
the portion covered construction is to Aceh and Calang;
under the priority be completed by 26 additional
segment). September 2009. miles of road
between these 2
Construction will be cities to be
done on a fixed-price built under the
basis according to the priority
plans and contract.
specifications of the
design prepared under Contract was not
separate contract. awarded in
September 2006,
as planned, due
to inability to
reach agreement
on price with
prospective
contractor.
New contract
solicitation
process is
ongoing with
planned award in
May 2007 and
estimated
completion in
February 2010.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
^aDesign for approximately 23 of the 26 miles of road to be constructed
will be provided by the design and construction management contractor. The
priority contractor will complete the design for the remaining 3 miles.
^bThe contractor is also completing design for two separate bypasses,
totaling 12 miles, along the segment of road between Calang and Meulaboh.
According to USAID officials, construction of the bypasses is contingent
on availability of funds.
Table 3: Description and Status of USAID's Signature Project in Sri Lanka
Project component description Status
Construct a bridge over Arugam Bay in USAID through CH2M HILL
eastern Sri Lanka. awarded the contract in
August 2006 to a private
contractor based in India.
Construction began in
September 2006.
Drill wells for a water treatment facility USAID funds are being used
to provide water for the town of Pottuvil for drilling wells for a
and nearby communities near Arugam Bay. water treatment facility.
Cost estimates for
construction and maintenance
were reduced after USAID
decided not to use surface
water from a nearby lake.
Rehabilitate three commercial harbors in The minor works, scheduled to
southern Sri Lanka, including be completed in December
2006, were substantially
o Minor works: construct/repair toilets, completed on January 31,
repair roofs, clean up debris, etc. 2007. Work to complete punch
o Major works: dredge harbors, repair list items is ongoing.
quay walls, etc.
The contract for major works
was awarded and construction
began in December 2006.
Construct nine vocational education As of February 2007,
facilities (four are located in eastern Sri construction is expected to
Lanka and five in southern Sri Lanka). USAID begin by April 2007.
plans to make two of the facilities "green"
(i.e., they will be built using renewable
energy and materials whenever possible), and
USAID also plans to obtain Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design
certification for these two.
Provide coastal management training. A Coastal management training
USAID-funded firm is providing training in is continuing and projected
construction and tourism-related skills, to be completed by June 2007.
which USAID considers essential to
rebuilding and reactivating the economy in
the Arugam Bay area.
Source: USAID.
Appendix III: USAID's Nonsignature Activities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
As of December 31, 2006, USAID's tsunami reconstruction programs in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka include nonsignature projects budgeted at $97
million and $35 million, respectively. Tables 4 and 5 show the project
sectors, amounts of funds budgeted, and descriptions of selected
activities in each country.
Table 4: Project Sectors, Amounts of Funds Budgeted, and Descriptions of
Selected Activities for USAID's Nonsignature Projects in Indonesia
Dollars in millions
Funds budgeted,
as of December Descriptions of selected
Project sectors 31, 2006 activities
Small-scale $23 USAID funds have been used to
infrastructure reconstruct community meeting
(construction of centers and village offices,
community buildings and rehabilitate irrigation canals,
sewage systems, clear agricultural land for
reconstruction of re-planting, and construct and
schools, etc.) repair water systems.
Technical assistance and $12 The USAID-funded Aceh Technical
good governance Assistance Recovery Project
(training and technical (A-TARP) activity is providing
support to various technical assistance to national
Indonesian government and sub-national government
entities) ministries in planning,
coordinating, managing, and
overseeing reconstruction
efforts.
The USAID-funded Local Governance
Support Program supports local
governments' efforts to increase
their capacity to plan and manage
public services and finances;
improve transparency and
accountability in legislative and
administrative processes; respond
to citizen priorities; include
opportunities for citizens to
participate in local government
decisionmaking; and work with
local service providers to
deliver services.
Transition assistance $62 The USAID-funded Support for
(rebuilding shelters and Peaceful Democratization program
helping to restore supports projects targeted at
livelihoods through conflict prevention, mitigation,
microenterprise support) and resolution in selected areas
of Indonesia. Local and
international NGOs are provided
with grants for building local
and national constituencies for
peace, promoting cooperation
among diverse groups, increasing
community-level participation in
local governance, improving
livelihoods, and increasing
economic opportunities.
Source: USAID.
Note: Dollars are rounded to the nearest number.
Table 5: Project Sectors, Amounts of Funds Budgeted, and Descriptions of
Selected Activities for USAID's Nonsignature Projects in Sri Lanka
Dollars in millions
Funds budgeted,
as of December Descriptions of selected
Project sectors 31, 2006 activities
Small-scale $15 USAID funds are being used to
infrastructure evaluate the environmental
(evaluating impacts of building an
environmental impacts of agricultural reservoir, community
building public health centers, and others
facilities, improving facilities.
access for disabled
persons, building A USAID-funded NGO is
playgrounds in areas implementing construction
where many children are projects to provide or improve
tsunami survivors, etc.) access for disabled persons in at
least seven facilities, such as
hospitals and schools.
USAID plans to construct
approximately 85 playgrounds in
Sri Lanka, with about half to be
built in eastern Sri Lanka.
Increasing security issues may
affect USAID's progress and may
ultimately impact its ability to
achieve the goal of building all
85 playgrounds. As of February
2007, 18 playgrounds had been
completed.
Technical assistance and $10 The USAID-funded Sri Lanka
good governance Anti-Corruption Program is
(providing training and intended to assist key government
technical assistance to agencies and selected civil
Sri Lankan government society organizations in
agencies and civil strengthening measures to combat
society organizations) corruption and monitor the uses
and disbursements of
tsunami-related assistance. Key
government agencies include the
Auditor General's Department, the
Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Bribery or
Corruption (also known as the
Bribery Commission), and various
civil society organizations. This
activity also includes plans to
improve transparency and
relationships in multi-ethnic
communities, especially those
affected by the long-standing
conflict and the tsunami.
Transition assistance $10 USAID's efforts are focused on
(helping local three main activities: (1)
organizations promote building small scale
peace and democracy, infrastructure projects; (2)
through short-term improving communication between
assistance targeted at local governments and affected
key political transition community members, and; (3)
and stabilization needs) improving and restoring
livelihoods of those affected by
the tsunami.
Source: USAID.
Note: Dollars are rounded to the nearest number.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment.
The following is GAO's comment on the U.S. Agency for International
Development letter dated February 21, 2007.
GAO Comment
Although USAID has provided some information, the required reports have
generally contained limited information that has not fully identified
risks and included mitigation strategies.
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or [email protected] .
Staff Acknowledgments
In additional to the contact named above, Michael Armes, Mark Dowling,
Emil Friberg, Phillip Herr, Dorian Herring, Reid Lowe, George Taylor, and
Wilda Wong made key contributions to this report.
(320423)
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Highlights of [54]GAO-07-357 , a report to congressional committees
February 2007
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
USAID Signature Tsunami Reconstruction Efforts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
Exceed Initial Cost and Schedule Estimates, and Face Further Risks
In December 2004, an earthquake caused a tsunami that devastated several
countries in the Indian Ocean region. In May 2005, Congress appropriated
$908 million in aid, of which the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) is implementing $482 million in recovery projects in
many affected countries, including Indonesia and Sri Lanka. This report
examines (1) the progress of USAID's program; (2) USAID's financial and
technical oversight of its efforts, and risks it faces; and (3) actions
taken by the Secretary of State in response to an April 2006 GAO
recommendation. Specifically, GAO recommended that State, in its required
reports to Congress, provide updated cost estimates and schedules and show
the need for additional funding sources, if necessary. GAO examined
USAID's signature projects in both countries; reviewed project documents
and periodic reports, interviewed USAID officials, and visited project
sites in August and October 2006.
[55]What GAO Recommends
To show progress, potential future risks, and enhance Congress's
oversight, GAO recommends that the Secretary of State include, in State's
reports to Congress, (1) the amount of funds obligated (in USAID's terms,
"subobligated") in implementing agreements and (2) risk information and
mitigation strategies.
Although both of its signature projects--one in Indonesia and one in Sri
Lanka--are under way, USAID has increased initial cost estimates, reduced
or canceled some project activities, and may extend completion dates. As
of December 31, 2006, USAID had obligated $140 million (46 percent) and
expended $20 million (7 percent) of the $302 million it budgeted for the
two signature projects, which consist of the construction of a major road
in Indonesia and construction of a bridge and other infrastructure in Sri
Lanka. In Indonesia, based on GAO's analysis, estimated construction cost
per mile increased by 75 percent--from $1.6 million to $2.7 million; USAID
reduced the length of road to be built by over one third--from 150 miles
to 91 miles; and the agency may extend the planned completion date to
February 2010--5 months later than initially planned. As of January 2007,
construction had begun to build 26 miles of road, but USAID had not
awarded a contract for construction of the remainder of the road and the
government of Indonesia had acquired less than one-fourth of the nearly
3,700 parcels of land needed. In Sri Lanka, USAID increased the estimated
costs for its signature project by nearly 40 percent--from $35 million to
$48 million. USAID has taken steps to address some difficulties in both
countries but continues to face risks that it may not complete the
signature projects within cost and schedule estimates, and without
reducing the projects' scope, as planned.
USAID is carrying out measures that it previously established for
financial oversight of reconstruction in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and has
taken steps to enhance its technical oversight capacity. For example,
USAID is conducting additional concurrent audits of its signature road
construction project in Aceh Province, Indonesia, to address concerns
about corruption, potential misuse of funds, and completing projects on
schedule. To ensure technical oversight, USAID added experienced staff in
both countries and acquired additional engineering services through the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. However, when it began its tsunami
assistance programs in early 2005, USAID lacked disaster recovery
guidance, including lessons learned from prior disaster reconstruction
efforts. These lessons include setting appropriate time frames, conducting
thorough cost assessments, and understanding local land tenure systems.
USAID continues to face several risks, such as rising costs and delays in
land acquisition, that could affect its successful completion of signature
projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka as planned.
In response to GAO's April 2006 recommendation, the Secretary of State
agreed to provide updated cost estimates and schedules in its required
semiannual report. However, State's two reports submitted since GAO made
its recommendation show USAID obligations to recipient countries rather
than amounts obligated to organizations implementing project activities
(in USAID's terminology, "subobligations"). The current reported
obligations do not clearly reflect USAID's progress and the reports do not
include some risk information and a mitigation strategy for addressing the
risks.
References
Visible links
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-488
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-382SP
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-734SP
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-787
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-645
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-488
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-645
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-488
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-488
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-488
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-734SP
44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-645
45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-645
54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-357
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