Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of  
the National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal	 
Monitors in Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program	 
(09-MAR-07, GAO-07-347R).					 
                                                                 
Preventing a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device (a  
"dirty bomb") from being smuggled into the United States is a key
national security priority. The Department of Homeland Security  
(DHS), through its Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), has 
lead responsibility for conducting the research, development,	 
testing, and evaluation of radiation detection equipment that can
be used to detect smuggled nuclear or radiological materials.	 
Much of DNDO's work on radiation detection equipment to date has 
focused on the development and use of radiation detection portal 
monitors, which are larger-scale equipment that can screen	 
vehicles, people, and cargo entering the United States. Current  
portal monitors, made of polyvinyl toluene (plastic) and known as
"PVTs," detect the presence of radiation but cannot distinguish  
between benign, naturally occurring radiological materials (NORM)
such as ceramic tile, and dangerous materials such as highly	 
enriched uranium (HEU). DNDO hopes that the next generation of	 
portal monitors, known as "Advanced Spectroscopic Portals" (ASP),
will be able to detect and more specifically identify		 
radiological and nuclear materials within a shipping container.  
Given DNDO's goal of replacing PVT portal monitors with much more
expensive ASPs, it is important for DNDO to fully understand the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of PVTs and ASPs before	 
making the multibillion dollar investment that would be necessary
to implement its current plan. Further, in light of the important
role that DNDO foresees for state and local governments in	 
radiation detection, it is also important that DNDO communicate  
this understanding to its state and local partners. Our October  
2006 report concluded that DNDO's assessment of ASPs did not	 
fully support DNDO's decision to purchase and deploy them. This  
report examines whether DNDO has fully collected and maintained  
all existing tests on PVTs in order to fully assess their	 
advantages and limitations. To that end, we agreed with your	 
offices to examine the extent to which DNDO has (1) compiled	 
previous test results from the national laboratories on 	 
commercially available portal monitors, and (2) provided state	 
and local authorities with information on the technical 	 
performance characteristics and operation of radiation detection 
equipment.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-347R					        
    ACCNO:   A66664						        
  TITLE:     Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected  
Most of the National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation	 
Portal Monitors in Support of DNDO's Testing and Development	 
Program 							 
     DATE:   03/09/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Nuclear materials					 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Radiation monitoring				 
	     Radiation safety					 
	     Research and development				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Testing						 

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GAO-07-347R

   

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March 9, 2007

Congressional Requesters

Subject: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of
the National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in
Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program

Preventing a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device (a "dirty
bomb") from being smuggled into the United States is a key national
security priority. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), has lead responsibility for
conducting the research, development, testing, and evaluation of radiation
detection equipment that can be used to detect smuggled nuclear or
radiological materials. National Security Presidential Directive- 43
/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14 established DNDO in 2005 and
made DNDO responsible for, among other things, choosing and purchasing the
radiation detection equipment that will be used by DHS's Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) at the nation's seaports and other points of
entry, as well as for coordinating with state and local governments on
their radiation detection efforts and providing information and assistance
to these governments when necessary.1

Much of DNDO's work on radiation detection equipment to date has focused
on the development and use of radiation detection portal monitors, which
are larger-scale equipment that can screen vehicles, people, and cargo
entering the United States. Beginning in 2005, DNDO has tested both the
portal monitors that CBP uses today and advanced technology portal
monitors. Current portal monitors, made of polyvinyl toluene (plastic) and
known as "PVTs," detect the presence of radiation but cannot distinguish
between benign, naturally occurring radiological materials (NORM) such as
ceramic tile, and dangerous materials such as highly enriched uranium
(HEU). DNDO hopes that the next generation of portal monitors, known as
"Advanced Spectroscopic Portals" (ASP), will be able to detect and more
specifically identify radiological and nuclear materials within a shipping
container. DNDO has stated that it will begin conducting tests of ASPs in
February 2007 and begin fielding ASPs in spring 2007.

1 Although DNDO was originally created in April 2005 by National Security
Presidential Directive-43/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14,
the office was formally established in October 2006 by Section 501 of the
SAFE Port Act.

DNDO has conducted tests on PVTs and ASPs at the Nevada Test Site (NTS).
According to DNDO officials, the advantage of using the NTS for testing
radiation detection equipment is that it provides the necessary facilities
to test detection system capabilities with special nuclear materials,
which consist of specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium. In addition, several of the Department of Energy's (DOE) national
laboratories have performed work related to the development, testing, or
deployment of radiation detection portal monitors. In particular,
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have extensive
expertise in radiation detection technology and have tested numerous
commercial models of PVTs on behalf of DHS and DOE.

According to radiation detection experts, portal monitor tests are
important because they help determine how well the monitors work in
real-life situations and provide information for making the monitors
better. In addition, DNDO and radiation detection experts agree that
portal monitors should be tested both in a laboratory-controlled setting,
to learn about their performance capabilities, and under an assortment of
real-life conditions, such as at seaports, to learn how well they perform
under various environmental conditions in the field. In particular,
testing should examine how well a portal monitor performs when screening
various types of NORM, either in the local environment or in the cargo of
a shipping container. In a February 2006 report to the Committees on
Appropriations of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, DNDO
presented its Expenditure Plan for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. This
plan echoed the need for testing, stating that to fulfill its missions it
would, among other things,

           o describe and analyze the performance of different types of
           radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors, before
           deploying them;
           o develop and use sound, quantitative assessments of different
           types of radiation detection equipment that it deploys;
           o stress the use of both laboratory-controlled testing and
           operational field testing of portal monitors and other radiation
           detection equipment; and
           o develop a comprehensive database that describes currently
           deployed radiation detection equipment as well as equipment
           planned for deployment in the near future.2

DNDO's Expenditure Plan also stated that the office would begin developing
and purchasing ASPs in order to replace the PVT portal monitors currently
used by CBP. DNDO contends that the intended ability of ASPs to detect and
identify smuggled radiological or nuclear materials would represent an
increase in capability over PVTs. To implement this plan, in May 2006,
DNDO completed a cost-benefit analysis that supported its decision to
begin deploying ASPs at domestic seaports with high
volumes of cargo and traffic. In July 2006, DHS announced that it had
awarded 5-year contracts, totaling $1.2 billion, to three companies to
produce ASPs. In October 2006, we reported that DNDO's cost-benefit
analysis suffered from several methodological flaws and did not provide a
sound basis for DNDO's decision to purchase ASPs.3 Among other things, we
reported that DNDO did not use actual test data on ASP performance but
instead assumed that ASPs in the future will be able to meet DNDO's
long-range goal of being able to detect highly enriched uranium 95 percent
of the time. In addition, although DNDO also tested PVTs at the same time
it tested ASPs, it did not analyze the data gathered from these tests.

^2 See DNDO, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: FY 2006--2010 Expenditure
Plan (Washington, D.C., February 2006), p. 27. The task of developing the
performance database was part of DNDO's competitively-awarded Systems
Engineering Support Program contract that DNDO awarded in August 2005.
DNDO identified other tasks within this contract, including the
development of requirements for its Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography
System (CAARS) and modeling of different portal monitor deployment
scenarios. In September 2006, DNDO awarded a $1.3 billion contract for the
procurement of CAARS.

Furthermore, according to DNDO's Expenditure Plan, DNDO expects to rely
heavily on the participation of state and local agencies to help protect
the interior of the nation from a radiological or nuclear attack. In this
regard, DNDO plans to support these agencies' efforts to develop radiation
detection and interdiction capabilities. For example, DNDO plans include
working with state and local agencies to, among other things, deploy fixed
and mobile radiation detection systems to help defend major, high-risk
cities. As part of DNDO's Securing the Cities Initiative, it plans to
identify a limited number of high-risk regions, then provide these regions
with federally owned radiation detection equipment along with related
training and other support packages. DNDO expects that state and local
agencies will eventually purchase their own equipment and assume
increasingly greater responsibilities in radiation detection efforts
within their borders.

Given DNDO's goal of replacing PVT portal monitors with much more
expensive ASPs, it is important for DNDO to fully understand the relative
advantages and disadvantages of PVTs and ASPs before making the
multibillion dollar investment that would be necessary to implement its
current plan. Further, in light of the important role that DNDO foresees
for state and local governments in radiation detection, it is also
important that DNDO communicate this understanding to its state and local
partners. Our October 2006 report concluded that DNDO's assessment of ASPs
did not fully support DNDO's decision to purchase and deploy them. This
report examines whether DNDO has fully collected and maintained all
existing tests on PVTs in order to fully assess their advantages and
limitations. To that end, we agreed with your offices to examine the
extent to which DNDO has (1) compiled previous test results from the
national laboratories on commercially available portal monitors, and (2)
provided state and local authorities with information on the technical
performance characteristics and operation of radiation detection
equipment.

To conduct our review, we gathered data on DNDO's testing efforts, and
visited existing testing facilities. To assess the extent to which DNDO
has collected previous test results from national laboratories on portal
monitors, we began by obtaining a list, originally provided to GAO by DHS
and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), of 14 commercial, off-the-shelf,
radiation portal monitors that were available for purchase as of January
2006. We then submitted this list to the national laboratories and asked
each laboratory to identify, among other things, which of these portal
monitors they had tested, when the testing occurred, and what agency
sponsored the test.4 During this process, the laboratories noted 15
additional commercially available models of PVT portal monitors that we
later included on our list.5 We also reviewed test reports for portal
monitors produced by the National Institute of Science and Technology
(NIST). In addition, we had discussions with officials from DNDO; the
Department of Defense; CBP; NIST; the National Nuclear Security
Administration; and several DOE national laboratories, including BNL,
LANL, ORNL, SNL, and PNNL. 6

^3 See GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to
Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not
Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the
Monitors' Costs and Benefits, GAO-07-133R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17,
2006).

To gain the perspectives of state governments that have participated in
DNDO's nuclear detection working groups, we obtained a list from DNDO of
the states attending one of these working group meetings, then we
contacted officials from each of the 17 states and the District of
Columbia that attended one of DNDO's working group meetings.7 We also
visited DHS' NTS in Nevada, the Radiation Detector Test and Evaluation
Center (RADTEC) testing facility at BNL, PNNL's testing facilities in
Washington State, SNL's testing facilities in New Mexico, and DOD's
Technical Evaluation Assessment Monitor Site (TEAMS) in New Mexico. We
conducted our review from November 2005 through January 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

DNDO has not yet collected a comprehensive inventory of testing
information on commercially available PVT portal monitors. Such
information--if collected and used--could improve DNDO's understanding of
how well portal monitors detect different radiological and nuclear
materials under varying conditions. In turn, this understanding would
assist DNDO's future testing, development, deployment, and purchases of
portal monitors. In response to our request for information, DNDO provided
us with test reports from only 11 of at least 54 tests on commercially
available portal monitors completed by DOE's national laboratories since
September 11, 2001.8 However, when we later presented DNDO with our
initial findings, DNDO's Director of Assessments told us that she
personally has access to the vast majority of test reports completed by
the national laboratories. She added that DNDO is in the process of
planning how to develop a database with this type of information so that
the information will be more widely available to others in DNDO. Radiation
detection experts with the national laboratories and industry told us
that, in their view, DNDO should collect and maintain all the national
laboratory test reports on commercially available portal monitors because
these reports provide a comprehensive inventory of how well portal
monitors detect a wide variety of radiological and nuclear materials and
how environmental conditions and other factors may affect performance.

^4 Because several of the portal monitors were tested by more than one
laboratory, the number of tests exceeds the number of portal monitors on
our list.

^5 One of the commercially available portal monitors on our list was an
ASP, not a PVT. However, for ease of discussion, we use the term
commercially available portal monitors to mean PVT portal monitors.

^6 The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately organized
agency within DOE that was created by the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2000 with responsibility for the nation's nuclear
weapons, nonproliferatrion, and naval reactors programs. Pub. L. No.
106-65 (1999).

^7 The stakeholders we contacted include representatives from the following
state and local entities: California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.

DNDO is improving its efforts to provide technical and operational
information about radiation portal monitors to state and local
authorities. For example, DNDO recently helped to establish a Web site
that, among other things, includes information for state and local
officials on radiation detection equipment products and performance
requirements. However, some state representatives with whom we spoke,
particularly those from states with less experience conducting radiation
detection programs, would like to see DNDO provide more prescriptive
advice on what types of radiation detection equipment to deploy and how to
use it.

Background

As of October 2006, which is the most recent date for which complete data
are available, DNDO and CBP had installed 912 portal monitors at the
nation's points of entry. All of the portal monitors are PVTs. According
to senior DNDO officials, DHS plans to deploy at ports of entry this year
60 of the 80 ASPs that it has purchased with fiscal year 2006 funds. DNDO
plans to use the remaining 20 ASPs for further testing or refurbishment
after it has completed its tests on ASPs this year. Ultimately, DHS plans
to deploy about 3,000 portal monitors at the nation's points of entry by
September 2009. However, as we reported in March 2006, CBP's deployment of
portal monitors is behind schedule, and it appears unlikely that CBP will
be able to reach its deployment goal on schedule.9

DHS Has Not Yet Collected Most of the Test Data Available from the
National Laboratories on the Performance Capabilities of Radiation
Detection Portal Monitors

DNDO does not systematically collect the test results produced by the
national laboratories on radiation detection portal monitors in support of
DNDO's testing and development program. In response to our request for
data, DNDO could provide us with only 11 of at least 54 test reports
completed by the national laboratories on PVT portal monitors since
September 11, 2001. These 54 test reports contain information that, in our
view, could help DNDO fully evaluate PVT's capabilities and thus help
guide its future testing, development, deployment, and acquisitions of
portal monitors. DNDO could not provide us with the test reports other
than those provided to them by BNL despite the fact that the majority of
the tests were sponsored by offices within DHS.10 Our findings are
consistent with those of the DOE Office of Inspector General, which
reported in February 2006 that neither DHS nor DOE could provide it with a
complete inventory of the national laboratories' relevant research on
nuclear and radiation detection.11 It is important to note that DNDO's
fiscal years 2006--2010 Expenditure Plan states that DNDO will develop a
"comprehensive database" of current and future portal monitors.12

^8 Our estimate of 54 test reports is conservative. In cases in which a
laboratory tested two models of PVTs that were manufactured by the same
company and had virtually the same model number (e.g., 4550-V and 4550-R),
we counted this as one test rather than two tests. We did this because,
according to a manufacturer with whom we spoke, similar model numbers for
two PVTs indicate that the two PVTs are virtually the same.

^9 See GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying
Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain,
GAO-06-389 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).

During the course of our review, DNDO officials told us that prior results
on commercially available portal monitors do not remain relevant over time
because the technology, in particular the software that converts the
information detected by the portal monitor into meaningful data, changes
often and significantly. However, officials with six private companies
that manufacture commercially available portal monitors told us that, when
they change the name or model number of their portal monitors, it
typically does not mean that the software has significantly changed. For
example, an official from one company told us that its model numbers
represent different settings at which the portal monitor would sound an
alarm when it detects the presence of radiation, as suggested by DNDO.
However, the devices themselves were the same. The manufacturer had not
changed either the portal monitor's hardware or software.

However, after a meeting on January 24, 2006, when we presented DNDO with
our initial findings, DNDO's Director of Assessments told us that she has
access to the vast majority of the national laboratories' test results on
commercially available portal monitors. She added that DNDO was in the
process of planning how to develop a database that would contain this type
of information. DNDO told us it was planning to build this database
because there is currently no central repository of test results that can
be used by other analysts within DNDO on a need-to-know basis. According
to senior DNDO officials, DNDO hired a new branch chief in November 2006
who will be responsible for, among other things, leading DNDO's
establishment of a test data and report archive.

Radiation detection experts with the national laboratories told us that,
in their view, DNDO should collect and maintain data on previous testing
performed on portal monitors. In this way, DNDO could have a baseline
inventory of how PVTs perform on a multitude of factors such as
environmental conditions, the type of radiological or nuclear material to
be detected, the best alarm setting for the PVT, the background level of
radiation, and the quantity of benign radiological materials such as kitty
litter or ceramic tiles that can be used to "mask" the presence of more
dangerous radiological or nuclear materials in a container.

^10 DHS offices sponsoring the research were CBP, DNDO, and the Science &
Technology Directorate.

^11See DOE Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Nuclear Detection
Devices, DOE/IG-0720 (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).

^12 In response to our findings, a DNDO official told us that the
"comprehensive database describing currently deployed radiation detection
systems and those planned for near-term domestic deployment" mentioned in
DNDO's Expenditure Plan referred to operational data culled from the
portal monitors that CBP has already deployed, not test data. However,
DNDO's Expenditure Plan never makes this distinction.

In addition, by maintaining test results, DNDO would have a full record to
determine how much and in what ways portal monitor technology has improved
over time, which can be critical to selecting what type of portal monitor
to further develop or purchase. Even if the results from a series of tests
show that no portal monitor yet meets DNDO's performance standards,
maintaining previous test results can show what portal monitors are making
the most progress towards those standards. Further, tests on portal
monitors should differ depending on how the portal monitor will be used.
For example, if CBP decided to deploy a particular portal monitor for use
in primary cargo screenings, some of the relevant tests would be different
than if CBP wanted to use the same portal monitors for secondary
screenings (additional scans after the primary screening has sounded an
alarm). Maintaining a full record of previous test results would help
ensure that CBP and DNDO, before choosing or deploying a particular portal
monitor, would have the correct type of tests corresponding to the
specific way in which the portal monitor will be used. Finally, the DOE's
Inspector General noted in February 2006 that maintaining a central
inventory of testing information would assist DHS and DOE in coordinating
radiation detection research across national laboratories and, among other
things, reducing the chances for unnecessarily duplicative efforts.13

DNDO Has Improved Its Efforts to Provide State Authorities with Basic
Performance Information and Other Forms of Assistance about Radiation
Portal Monitors, but Some States Need Further Support

DNDO has started a number of initiatives to provide state and local
governments with technical and operational information, training, and
financial assistance on radiation portal monitors. For example, DNDO, in
cooperation with DHS's Office of Grants and Training, recently unveiled
the Responder Knowledge Base. This is a Web-based database that contains
information on commercially available radiation detection equipment
products, performance standards, and test results. According to DNDO
officials, the main purpose of the Responder Knowledge Base is to provide
state and local officials with information to help them evaluate radiation
detection equipment and also help guide their purchases of this equipment.
In addition, last year DNDO created a working group comprised of federal,
state, and local radiation detection program officials. These officials
meet periodically to exchange information and develop protocols on their
radiation detection programs. According to DNDO and state officials, this
group met in January, June, and October 2006.

^13 See DOE Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Nuclear Detection
Devices, DOE/IG-0720 (Washington, D.C.: February 2006). In addition, it is
important to note that, in some instances, DHS may want separate national
laboratories to perform duplicative tests as a method to confirm the
accuracy of test results.

To further assist states and localities in their radiation detection
efforts, DNDO has begun training state and local officials on how to
operate radiation detection equipment. For example, state officials may
attend 2-day training courses for law enforcement officials at DHS's
Counter Terrorism Operation Support facility at NTS. Moreover, DNDO has
worked to get DHS to provide grants to state and local governments to,
among other things, fund their radiation detection efforts. For instance,
in September 2006 DHS issued grants totaling $3.2 million to states such
as Kentucky and South Carolina to invest in fixed, mobile, and handheld
radiation detection equipment at interstate truck weigh stations. While
DHS provides some information to states and localities on radiation
detection equipment, officials from some states told us that DHS has not
sought much input from them on what types of information they find most
useful or valuable.

We contacted all 18 state and local entities that participated in one of
DNDO's sponsored meetings. Of these 18 entities, 15 responded to our
requests for information. Although our discussions with officials from all
15 entities indicated they supported DNDO's initiatives and 4 of the 15
entities were interested in getting additional training from DNDO,
officials from 8 states and the District of Columbia told us they would
benefit from having more direct guidance to assist them in making
purchasing decisions. According to officials from these 9 entities, they
could use DNDO's input to help overcome their lack of experience and
technical expertise. For example, one state official told us that her
state has been purchasing older radiation detection equipment specifically
because it had limited knowledge about new, commercially available
equipment and it could not obtain recommendations from DNDO on which
devices to use.

In response, DNDO maintains that federal regulation prohibits it from
recommending to state and local officials portal monitors that are made
and sold by specific manufacturers.14 According to senior DNDO officials,
DNDO's goal for the Responder Knowledge Base is to provide state and local
officials with available performance information on radiation detection
systems that they have tested without recommending specific products,
which could be construed as an inappropriate endorsement. Despite this
limitation, DNDO officials told us that they are readily available to
answer specific technical and performance questions involving equipment
tested by DNDO.

Conclusions

DNDO told us that it is in the process of planning how to develop a
comprehensive database on commercially available PVT portal monitors. We
believe this is a step in the right direction. In our view, until DNDO
compiles these data, it will be missing a significant tool that adds to
the nation's efforts to thwart nuclear smuggling. Until DNDO develops and
completes this database--one that includes both test results and data
derived from operations in the field--it is losing opportunities to better
understand how these portal monitors perform. We agree with several
radiation detection experts who told us that these data will provide DNDO
with guidance on how portal monitors vary in performance under different
conditions and according to how they are used. This, in turn, will help
DNDO develop better systems and make smarter procurement and deployment
decisions. Furthermore, as pointed out by DOE's Inspector General, these
data would assist DHS's and DOE's efforts to reduce duplicative testing.
Finally, if DNDO maintains more comprehensive data on PVTs, state and
local governments could use this information to make more informed
purchases of portal monitors. We believe that, if DNDO develops and
maintains close working relationships with its state partners, it may be
able to tailor these data to meet state needs and capabilities.

^14 See 5 C.F.R. S 2635.702.

Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to ensure that the nation maintains a comprehensive source of
information on the characteristics and performance of PVT portal monitors
and to further the ability of state and local governments to make informed
judgments about their radiation detection needs and future equipment
purchases, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working
with the Director, DNDO, take the following three actions:

           o collect and maintain reports concerning all of the testing
           performed by the U.S. national laboratories,
           o review the test reports in order to develop an information
           database on how PVTs perform in both laboratory and field tests on
           a variety of indicators such as their ability to detect specific
           radiological and nuclear materials or how they are affected by
           different levels of background environmental radiation, and
           o confer with state and local officials on what information they
           would find useful and how that information could be best presented
           to them.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided DHS with a draft of this report for its review and comment.
Its written comments are presented in enclosure 1. The department
generally concurred with the recommendations presented. In addition, DHS
offered some clarifications regarding its ability to obtain portal monitor
testing results from other agencies, its archive of portal monitor test
reports, and its efforts to help assist states and localities developing
in their radiation detection capabilities.

DHS concurred with our recommendation to collect and maintain reports from
all portal monitor testing performed by the national laboratories, but
noted that it has no direct authority to obtain test reports and data for
programs that were not sponsored by DHS. However, as we explain in our
report, over half of the national laboratory tests we identified were
sponsored by parts of DHS, specifically CBP, DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate, or DNDO. We support DNDO's future efforts to collect
information from the national laboratories as part of its cooperative
information sharing with the Department of Energy.

DHS also stated that we misinterpreted the comments of DNDO officials
concerning the 11 test reports--specifically, that the 11 test reports
represented all the reports DNDO had in its collection. In response, we
believe that there was no misinterpretation and that we described the
situation accurately. During the course of our review, we asked DNDO to
provide us with the results it had compiled from tests performed by the
national laboratories on commercially available portal monitors. In
response, DNDO provided us with the 11 test reports. We subsequently asked
DNDO if it had additional test reports in its collection that it could
provide to us. However, DNDO did not provide us any additional reports.

DHS also concurred with our recommendation that it confer with state and
local officials regarding their information needs, pointing out a number
of ongoing efforts to disseminate information. These include: meeting with
its stakeholder group comprised of representatives from 22 states,
offering help at establishing standards, providing test reports,
developing response protocols, providing detection training, and
facilitating access to federal experts for alarm adjudication, analysis,
and nuclear detection-related information and intelligence. DNDO also
identified efforts at establishing a qualified equipment list,
threat-based standards in response to the SAFE Port Act, and a
fee-for-service test process to widen the available market for testing
detection systems.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees and members, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available
to others on request. In addition, this correspondence will be available
at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202)
512-3841 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Contact points for our Office of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this correspondence. Key contributors to this report include Julie
Chamberlain, Leland Cogliani, Eugene Gray, Diane Raynes, Jim Shafer, Daren
Sweeney, and Eugene Wisnoski.

Gene Aloise
Director, Natural Resources
and Environment

List of Requesters

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable Norm Coleman
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives

The Honorable James R. Langevin
Chairman
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable John Linder
House of Representatives

          Enclosure: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

      Enclosure: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security (cont.)

(360641)

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