Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger 
Prescreening are Under Way, but Planning and Implementation	 
Issues Remain (16-MAY-07, GAO-07-346).				 
                                                                 
Passenger prescreening--a process that includes matching	 
passengers' identifying information against records extracted	 
from the U.S. government terrorist watch list--is one of several 
security measures in place to help ensure the safety of 	 
commercial flights traveling to or from the United States. DHS	 
has several efforts underway to strengthen international aviation
passenger prescreening. This report focuses on certain elements  
of the passenger prescreening process as well as some of the	 
actions that DHS is taking or has planned to strengthen 	 
prescreening procedures. This report is a limited version of the 
original November 2006 report as various agencies that we	 
reviewed deemed some of the information in the original report to
be security sensitive. GAO's work included interviewing officials
and assessing relevant documentation from federal agencies, U.S. 
and foreign air carriers, industry groups, and several foreign	 
countries.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-346 					        
    ACCNO:   A69709						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International   
Passenger Prescreening are Under Way, but Planning and		 
Implementation Issues Remain					 
     DATE:   05/16/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Aviation security					 
	     High risk passengers				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Passenger screening				 
	     Passenger screening systems			 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Security threats					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     TSA Secure Flight Program				 

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GAO-07-346

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Current International Passenger Prescreening Process Relies
          * [4]Air Carriers Use Passenger Data Obtained during Reservation
          * [5]CBP Uses Passenger Data Obtained during Passenger Check-in t
          * [6]CBP Identifies Passengers Not on the No Fly and Selectee Lis
          * [7]Air Carriers and CBP Evaluate the Authenticity of Passenger
          * [8]Federal Law Mandated That CBP Publish a Plan to Alter Its Pr
          * [9]Prescreening Passengers on Domestic Flights Involves a Diffe

     * [10]DHS is Taking Steps to Strengthen the Current International

          * [11]Immigration Advisory Program Developed to Increase Review of

               * [12]Perceived Successes of IAP Led CBP to Expand the Program
               * [13]CBP's IAP Is Similar to Programs in Other Countries
               * [14]CBP Could More Fully Incorporate Risk Management
                 Principles

          * [15]DHS Intends to Align International and Domestic Prescreening

     * [16]CBP Has Not Fully Disclosed its Use of Personal Information
     * [17]Conclusions
     * [18]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [19]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

          * [20]First Prescreening Option: Transmitting APIS Data 60 Minutes
          * [21]Second Prescreening Option: Transmitting APIS Data as Each P

     * [22]GAO Contacts
     * [23]Staff Acknowledgments
     * [24]GAO's Mission
     * [25]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [26]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [27]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [28]Congressional Relations
     * [29]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

May 2007

AVIATION SECURITY

Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening are Under Way,
but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain

GAO-07-346

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 6
DHS is Taking Steps to Strengthen the Current International Passenger
Prescreening Process 13
CBP Has Not Fully Disclosed its Use of Personal Information during the
Prescreening Process 20
Conclusions 24
Recommendations for Executive Action 25
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 31
Appendix II Airline Liaison Officer Programs Implemented In Other
Countries 35
Appendix III APIS Quick Query (AQQ) and APIS Minus 60 Minutes (APIS-60) 38
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 42
Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 45
GAO Related Products 46

Table

Table 1: The Characteristics of Selected ALO Programs 36

Figures

Figure 1: Overview of Current Prescreening Activities for International
Flights 8
Figure 2: Overview of Current Differences between the Domestic and
International Prescreening Process 13
Figure 3: Immigration Advisory Program Process 15
Figure 4: The interaction between CBP Prescreening Systems and Data Usage
22

Abbreviations

AEA Association of European Airlines
ALO Airline Liaison Officer
APIS Advanced Passenger Information System
APP Advanced Passenger Processing
AQQ APIS Quick Query
ATA Air Transport Association of America
ATS Automated Targeting System
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CSI Container Security Initiative
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIMIA Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
ETA Electronic Travel Authority
EU European Union
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
IAP Immigration Advisory Program
IATA International Air Transport Association
ISI Immigration Security Initiative
MIO Migration Integrity Officer
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTC National Targeting Center
PNR Passenger Name Record
TDY Temporary Duty
TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSC Terrorist Screening Center
TSDB Terrorist Screening Database
TSOC Transportation Security Operations Center
VWP Visa Waiver Program

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

May 16, 2007

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Vice-Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
House of Representatives

During 2005, a number of passengers that the U.S. government identified as
a security risk were identified onboard international flights traveling to
or from the United States.^1 In certain cases, the resulting security risk
was deemed high enough that the U.S. government diverted the flight from
its intended destination, resulting in delays for passengers, costs to the
air carriers, and government intervention.

Preventing such high-risk passengers from boarding international flights
traveling to or from the United States is the goal of the nation's
international aviation passenger prescreening process.^2 These efforts
include, among other things:

           o Identity matching: comparing passengers' identifying
           information, such as name and date of birth, against records
           extracted from the U.S. government terrorist watch list containing
           the names of known or suspected terrorists.^3

           o Travel document review: evaluating the authenticity and
           completeness of passengers' passports and other travel documents.

           o Risk targeting: comparing passenger information against a set of
           targeting rules that are indicators of elevated passenger risk in
           an attempt to identify possible high-risk passengers who may not
           be on the terrorist watch list.

^1 The specific number of passengers identified by the U.S. government as
a security risk is sensitive security information.

^2 A separate process exists for prescreening passengers on U.S. domestic
flights.

The identity matching component of the international passenger
prescreening process currently involves separate matching activities
conducted by air carriers (prior to a flight's departure) and the federal
government (both before and after a flight's departure). In 2004, Congress
mandated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issue a proposed
plan for completing the U.S. government's identity matching process before
the departure of all international flights. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the DHS agency charged with responsibility for conducting
international aviation passenger prescreening, published its proposed plan
to strengthen passenger prescreening in July 2006 in a notice of proposed
rulemaking.^4 Appendix III provides more detail on the notice of proposed
rulemaking and the two prescreening options that CBP provides to air
carriers in the proposed rulemaking.

This report is a limited version of the original report that we provided
to you on November 20, 2006. The various agencies we reviewed deemed some
of the information in that report as Sensitive Security Information or Law
Enforcement Sensitive. Therefore, this report omits our findings
associated with vulnerabilities we identified in the existing passenger
prescreening process and measures that could be taken to address those
vulnerabilities. This report also omits key details regarding certain
procedures, timeframes and locations associated with the passenger
prescreening process. The objectives of the original report addressed:

^3 The U.S. government maintains a single consolidated terrorist watch
list. Records are extracted from this consolidated list to conduct various
screening activities including aviation passenger prescreening. Additional
information about the watch list can be found on pages 7 and 9.

^4 71 Fed. Reg. 40035, July 14, 2006. A notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) is an announcement published in the Federal Register of proposed
new regulations or modifications to existing regulations, the first stage
in the process of creating or modifying regulations. A notice of proposed
rulemaking is intended to give the public an opportunity to comment on a
proposed rule.

           o the main factors affecting the international passenger
           prescreening process, and the potential impact of these factors,
           and

           o the status of efforts to address these factors, and the issues,
           if any, that could affect efforts to strengthen the international
           passenger prescreening process.

This version of the report focuses on certain elements of the current
international aviation passenger prescreening process as well as some of
the actions that DHS is taking or has planned to strengthen prescreening
procedures. More specifically this report's content addresses:

           o the implementation of the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), a
           CBP program that assesses risk levels for certain passengers in
           limited overseas locations;

           o the alignment of international and domestic passenger
           prescreening processes; and

           o compliance with privacy laws with respect to information
           collected to conduct international passenger prescreening.

Although the information provided in this version of the report is more
limited in scope, the overall methodology used for our initial report is
relevant to this report as well because the information contained in this
report was derived from the initial sensitive report. To address the
objectives of our initial report we interviewed officials and obtained and
analyzed relevant documents from CBP, including the National Targeting
Center (NTC); the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), including
the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC); and the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC). To obtain a cross section of both domestic and
foreign air carriers' views about the international passenger prescreening
process, including the impact of current U.S. prescreening requirements
and the potential impact of future requirements, we interviewed officials
from 13 air carriers that fly passengers to and from the United States.^5
We also interviewed officials from two domestic air carrier and passenger
travel associations and three international air carrier associations that
represent the interests of air carriers and travelers to discuss the
impact of current and potential future U.S. international prescreening
requirements on their members. We met with foreign government officials in
the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand to
discuss the impact of current and potential future U.S. international
prescreening requirements and obtain information about aviation
prescreening programs in place in these countries. We also met with
officials from the European Union to discuss the impact of U.S.
prescreening requirements on air carriers with operations in Europe.
Additionally, we interviewed and obtained documents from private sector
companies that facilitate the electronic transmission of passenger data
between air carriers and government agencies to determine their role, if
any, in future international aviation passenger prescreening initiatives.
We conducted our work, which took place from April 2005 through October
2006, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I contains more detail about our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief

DHS has several efforts underway to strengthen international aviation
passenger prescreening. Two of these efforts include:

           o Conducting overseas review of some high-risk passengers' travel
           documents. One prescreening effort that CBP has under way is
           designed to increase the level of scrutiny given to the travel
           documents of certain high-risk passengers before they board
           international flights traveling to the United States. Under this
           pilot program, called the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), CBP
           assigns officers to selected foreign airports where they utilize
           an automated risk-targeting system that identifies passengers as
           potentially high-risk--including passengers who do not need a visa
           to travel to the United States. CBP officers then personally
           interview some of these passengers and evaluate the authenticity
           and completeness of these passengers' travel documents. Successful
           implementation of the IAP rests, in part, on CBP clearly defining
           the goals and objectives of the program.

           o Aligning international and domestic prescreening programs. A
           second prescreening effort under way is designed to align
           international passenger prescreening with a similar program under
           development for prescreening passengers on domestic flights. The
           Transportation Security Administration--a separate agency within
           DHS--is developing a domestic passenger prescreening program
           called Secure Flight. Once Secure Flight is operational, TSA will
           be operating a domestic passenger prescreening system, and CBP
           will be operating an international passenger prescreening system.
           As currently envisioned, both programs will screen passengers
           whose itinerary includes both an international flight and a
           domestic connection within the United States. If the two programs
           are not effectively aligned, each program could result in separate
           implementation requirements for air carriers. This could result in
           additional costs to the air carriers and the U.S. government, and
           cause confusion and inconvenience to passengers. CBP and TSA
           officials stated that they are taking some steps to coordinate
           their prescreening efforts, but they have not yet made all key
           policy decisions.

^5 To help ensure the information we obtained was representative of air
carriers that fly different volumes of passengers to the United States, we
selected seven carriers that fly more than 1 million passengers annually
into the United States, four carriers that fly between 500,000 and 1
million passengers annually into the United States, and two carriers that
fly less than 500,000 passengers annually into the United States.

In addition to these efforts to strengthen certain international passenger
prescreening procedures, one other issue, while not aimed at strengthening
the capabilities of international aviation passenger prescreening,
nonetheless requires consideration in the context of these efforts. This
issue is:

           o Providing assurances of privacy protection as required by
           federal privacy law. Federal privacy law requires agencies to
           inform the public about how the government uses their personal
           information. Although CBP officials have stated that they have
           taken and are continuing to take steps to comply with these
           requirements, the current prescreening process allows passenger
           information to be used in multiple prescreening procedures and
           transferred among various CBP prescreening systems in ways that
           are not fully explained in CBP's privacy disclosures. Although CBP
           recently published additional privacy disclosures related to its
           use of passenger data during the prescreening process, CBP's
           current public disclosures do not fully explain its uses of
           personal information during the entire prescreening process. If
           CBP does not issue all appropriate disclosures, the traveling
           public will not be fully aware of how their personal information
           is being used during the passenger prescreening process.

To help DHS ensure progress on efforts to strengthen the international
passenger prescreening process, we recommended in our November 2006 report
that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection take the following steps:
(1) complete a strategic plan and develop an evaluation strategy for the
Immigration Advisory Program pilot, (2) further align domestic and
international passenger prescreening processes and coordinate prescreening
efforts, and (3) ensure that international passenger prescreening programs
are in full compliance with federal privacy laws. We provided a draft of
this report to DHS and DOJ for their review and comment. DHS, in its
written comments, generally concurred with the recommendations in the
report. DHS and DOJ both provided technical comments that we incorporated
as appropriate. In its written comments, DHS outlined the status of
various efforts that it has in progress or planned to address the
recommendations. For example, DHS stated that CBP has efforts under way to
capture additional data in order to properly evaluate the IAP's
performance, and that there are ongoing efforts by CBP and TSA to align
procedures, systems and functional requirements for their respective
passenger prescreening programs. DHS also noted in its comments the recent
and planned efforts to publish new privacy disclosure documents, such as
the November 2006 system of records for its automated targeting system,
which would supplement its other existing public disclosure documents. The
full text of DHS's comments is provided in appendix IV.

Background

Passenger prescreening is one security measure among many implemented both
before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11 designed to
strengthen the security of U.S. commercial aviation. Together, these
various measures combine to form a multi-layered aviation security
approach. Although the prescreening of passengers on international flights
traveling to or from the United States predated the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, this process was strengthened after the attacks.

Current International Passenger Prescreening Process Relies on Two Different
Sets of Passenger Data and Involves Multiple Steps

The current international passenger prescreening process relies on two
different sets of passenger data and involves multiple prescreening steps
carried out by air carriers and CBP. The two sets of passenger data
include:

Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, such as name, address, and billing
information that passengers provide to air carriers, travel agents, or
online travel companies when making a flight reservation.

Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) data, such as name, date and
location of birth, and country of citizenship, which is derived from
passports and other government-issued documents, such as visas, that most
passengers must present to air carriers when checking in for international
flights.

A central prescreening activity involves matching identifying information
about passengers--including name and date of birth--against the No Fly and
Selectee Lists that are extracted from the TSC's Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB) to identify potential security threats in a process often
called identity matching. The identity matching step is conducted by both
air carriers and the U.S. government. Federal requirements state that air
carriers must transmit APIS data to CBP no later than 15 minutes before
flight departure for international flights originating in the United
States and no later than 15 minutes after flight departure for
international flights bound for the United States. In addition to these
data, CBP occasionally uses commercial data or data from other government
databases during this process to help confirm a passenger's identity.

A second prescreening activity, separate from identity matching, involves
using risk assessment tools to analyze passenger data to assess the
security risk that a passenger might pose. This constitutes an effort to
identify high-risk passengers that may not be on the No Fly or Selectee
Lists. Specifically, CBP uses an automated system, called the Automated
Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P), that uses available passenger data to
apply a set of CBP-generated targeting "rules" that CBP has determined are
associated with increased passenger risk. CBP uses both PNR and APIS data
to apply the ATS-P rules. This comparison results in a risk assessment for
each passenger indicating the passenger's relative security risk.

A third prescreening activity involves the review of passengers' travel
documents for evidence of forgery or fraudulent use. Depending on the
passenger, this document review can occur at three separate time frames
during the process of flying internationally, as follows: (1) the State
Department reviews the travel documents in advance of travel for
passengers who are required to obtain a visa in advance of their travel,
(2) air carrier personnel review passengers' travel documents for
authenticity upon check-in for flights, and (3) CBP officers review
passenger travel documents either upon the passengers' arrival in the
United States or, in some cases, prior to their departure for the United
States. Figure 1 provides an overview of the current passenger
prescreening activities as set against the basic steps typically taken to
fly internationally--including obtaining a flight reservation and ticket,
checking in for a flight, departing from one country, and arriving in
another.

Figure 1: Overview of Current Prescreening Activities for International
Flights

a An additional prescreening step occurs for those passengers traveling to
the United States from non-visa waiver program countries. For these
passengers this additional step involves State Department officers
reviewing the authenticity of their passports prior to issuing a travel
visa.

^b In several overseas locations, CBP also reviews the travel documents of
selected high-risk passengers through a pilot program. See page 14 for
more details on the pilot program.

Air Carriers Use Passenger Data Obtained during Reservation Process to Conduct a
Comparison against the No Fly and Selectee Lists

Before a passenger receives a boarding pass, the air carriers conduct an
initial identity match, which (along with CBP's identity matching process)
constitutes the first step of the international passenger prescreening
process. To complete this prescreening step, air carriers compare PNR data
(information that is self-reported by passengers when they make a flight
reservation) against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to determine if there
are any identity matches. This prescreening step is required to occur
prior to flight departure. The No Fly and Selectee Lists are extracted
from the TSC's TSDB, the consolidated federal government terrorist watch
list (which contains the names of known or suspected terrorists). Persons
on the No Fly List are deemed to be a threat to civil aviation and are
therefore to be precluded from boarding an aircraft traveling to, from, or
within the United States. Being on the Selectee List does not mean that
the person will not be allowed to board an aircraft or enter the United
States. Instead, persons on this list receive additional security
screening prior to being permitted to board an aircraft--this screening
may involve a physical inspection of the person and a hand-search of their
luggage.

Examples of PNR data that may be collected at the time a reservation is
made include a passenger's name, home address, telephone number, frequent
flyer information, and e-mail address. If an air carrier determines that a
passenger's identity matches an identity on the No Fly List, TSA requires
the carrier to contact the TSA Office of Intelligence so U.S. authorities
can further verify whether the passenger's identity matches the
watch-listed identity.^6

^6 For example, in some cases a passenger may have the same name as a
person listed on the No Fly or Selectee Lists, and an air carrier may
require assistance from TSA to verify whether the person is, in fact, the
same person.

CBP Uses Passenger Data Obtained during Passenger Check-in to Conduct an
Identity-matching Procedure

CBP also conducts an identity matching process after air carriers conduct
their identity matching, but CBP's process utilizes APIS data. These data
are generally gathered from the passenger's passport--a document required
of almost all passengers flying into and out of the United States.^7 In
most instances, these data are recorded electronically from the traveler's
machine-readable passport. This process records information from the
passport directly into the air carrier's computer systems, thereby
avoiding potential errors that could occur by key-stroking the data. CBP
uses the APIS data to conduct identity matching using its automated
systems including its law enforcement databases and the No Fly and
Selectee Lists, which CBP transfers to its Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (TECS).^8 If this review produces a positive match
to the No Fly List, the TSA Office of Intelligence is contacted to confirm
the match.

CBP Identifies Passengers Not on the No Fly and Selectee Lists Who May Present
Security Risks

While the above prescreening activities focus on determining whether any
passengers are on the No Fly and Selectee Lists, CBP also conducts a
second prescreening step to identify other passengers, not on the No Fly
and Selectee Lists, but who may nonetheless present a potential security
risk. This step is a risk targeting process that occurs for international
flights traveling to or from the United States. CBP conducts this
risk-targeting using a computer-based system called the Automated
Targeting System-Passenger. This system compares passenger data (both PNR
and APIS data), along with data from government databases (including the
TSDB), against a set of targeting rules. According to CBP officials, this
risk-targeting process reflects CBP's experience with indicators of
possible illegal or other activities that CBP is responsible for
monitoring. This comparison results in a risk assessment for each
passenger that CBP uses to determine if the passenger requires additional
CBP contact--either before the passenger boards a U.S.-bound aircraft or
upon the passenger's arrival in the United States. If a passenger's risk
assessment indicates an elevated security risk, CBP may decide to take
additional security actions to gather more information about the
passenger. Additionally, CBP can also decide that a passenger's risk level
is sufficiently elevated that the passenger should be prevented from
boarding a flight. If the flight is abroad, CBP officials stated that they
can coordinate with State Department Officers to contact U.S. Embassy
Legal Attache officials assigned abroad at foreign embassies and consular
offices. These Legal Attache officers coordinate with foreign law
enforcement personnel to identify, interview, or inspect the passenger
before allowing the passenger to board the flight.

^7Prior to January 23, 2007, an exception to this rule existed for
citizens of the United States, and visiting citizens of Canada, Mexico,
and Bermuda when entering the United States from most countries in the
Western Hemisphere. However, under a plan required by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, all U.S.
citizens, and citizens of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico traveling to the
United States as nonimmigrant visitors, generally must present a valid
passport at air ports-of-entry.

^8 TECS is the principal law enforcement system supporting CBP's
counter-terrorism and regulatory compliance missions. TECS consists of
multiple databases that maintain investigative case information,
border-crossing information, passenger information, and other information
provided by other government agencies related to the inspection of persons
crossing the border. CBP uses automated systems to screen large amounts of
data against information in the TSDB, including names on the No Fly and
Selectee Lists.

Air Carriers and CBP Evaluate the Authenticity of Passenger Travel Documents

A third prescreening step involves air carriers and CBP determining the
authenticity of passenger travel documents. Before issuing boarding passes
on flights departing from or arriving in the United States, air carriers
are required to review each passenger's travel documents, including
passports and visas, to verify that the passenger is properly documented
for the intended destination. For U.S.-bound passengers, air carriers are
also required to validate that the passenger's passport information
matches the APIS data that the air carriers electronically submit to CBP.
CBP provides periodic training to air carrier personnel to help them
determine the authenticity and completeness of passenger travel documents.
CBP's review of passenger documentation can occur in multiple locations.
For example, CBP is always required to inspect travel documents for
passengers on international flights arriving in the United States.
However, in some overseas locations, CBP officials also review passenger
documents prior to the passenger boarding a U.S.-bound international
flight.

Federal Law Mandated That CBP Publish a Plan to Alter Its Prescreening Process

The current prescreening process is under revision and under a proposed
plan, the U.S. government will take over the process of identity matching
passengers against the No Fly and Selectee Lists from the air carriers
prior to flight departures. As part of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,^9 Congress mandated that DHS issue a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) by February 16, 2005, that would
allow CBP to conduct its comparison of passenger information against the
No Fly and Selectee Lists before the departure of all international
flights traveling to or from the United States. CBP issued its NPRM on
July 14, 2006, and provided for a public comment period.^10

^9 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Section 4012.

Prescreening Passengers on Domestic Flights Involves a Different Process

Concurrent to the changes that are being considered for conducting
international passenger prescreening, TSA, the agency charged with
ensuring the security of all modes of transportation, is in the process of
modifying domestic passenger prescreening procedures. TSA is required, by
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, to develop a
prescreening program through which TSA would assume the domestic watch
list matching function currently conducted by air carriers prior to
domestic flight departures. TSA has named this prospective prescreening
program Secure Flight.

As we have reported in our prior work on Secure Flight, currently only air
carriers--and not the U.S. government--match passenger information against
the No Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers on domestic flights.
^11 We have also reported that TSA has faced significant management
challenges in the past in developing the Secure Flight program, and that
key policy decisions that would affect the effectiveness of the program
had not yet been made. In 2006, TSA announced that it was delaying the
development of Secure Flight in order to reassess the program's goals,
requirements, and capabilities. The current domestic prescreening process
also requires that air carriers operate the Computer- Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS), which identifies passengers for secondary
screening based on certain travel behaviors reflected in their reservation
information that are associated with threats to aviation security, as well
as through a random selection of passengers.^12 Figure 2 highlights the
main steps of, and differences between, the prescreening of passengers on
domestic and international flights.

^10 71 Fed. Reg. 40035, July 14, 2006. CBP granted an extension to the
comment period in response to a request by the aviation industry. As a
result of the extension, comments on the proposed rule were due by October
12, 2006.

^11 GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May
Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security
Administration's Secure Flight Program,  [30]GAO-06-374T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006). GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and
Testing Under Way, but Risk Should Be Managed as System Is Further
Developed, [31]GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005).

^12 Although the air carriers currently conduct the watch list matching
and CAPPS prescreening functions, these processes are required and
overseen by TSA.

Figure 2: Overview of Current Differences between the Domestic and
International Prescreening Process

^a International flights departing from the United States that are
operated by U.S. air carriers are required to also operate CAPPS to
identify passengers for secondary screening. This occurs in addition to
the risk assessments being conducted by CBP.

DHS is Taking Steps to Strengthen the Current International Passenger
Prescreening Process

CBP has several efforts under way to strengthen certain international
passenger prescreening processes. One such effort involves the placement
of CBP personnel overseas to interview some high-risk passengers and
inspect their travel documents in advance of their departure to the United
States. This program also incorporates a mechanism to provide air carrier
personnel with additional training on identifying fraudulent travel
documents. As it revises the international passenger prescreening process,
CBP is also attempting to align its process with the prospective program
to prescreen passengers on domestic flights, which will be administered by
the TSA.

Immigration Advisory Program Developed to Increase Review of Travel Documents
for Some High-Risk Passengers at Foreign Airports

One program, currently in place but supplemental to the primary
international passenger prescreening processes, is a program that provides
additional scrutiny to passengers and their travel documents at foreign
airports prior to their departure for the United States. This program,
called the IAP,^13 is a pilot program that began in 2004 and was designed
to identify and target potential high-risk passengers. Under the IAP
pilot, CBP has assigned trained officers to foreign airports where they
personally interview pre-identified high-risk passengers, conduct
behavioral assessments, and evaluate the authenticity of travel documents
prior to the passenger's departure to the United States. The pilot program
has been tested in several foreign airports, and CBP is negotiating with
other countries to expand it elsewhere and to make certain IAP sites
permanent.

The IAP pilot serves both national security and immigration functions.
According to CBP, the purpose of the IAP is to (1) prevent passengers
identified as security threats from boarding international flights bound
for the United States, (2) provide no board recommendations to the air
carriers for passengers who are not properly documented for entry into the
United States, (3) provide training to air carrier personnel on how to
detect fraudulent travel documents, (4) provide advance notice to U.S.
authorities of passengers that warrant closer inspection upon their
arrival in the United States, (5) collect law enforcement information on
known or suspected criminal aliens and smugglers, and (6) share
information with foreign government and law enforcement officials
regarding trends in illegal travel. CBP officials and others have also
stated that a secondary benefit of the IAP pilot is to help facilitate the
legitimate travel of passengers, particularly U.S. citizens. Figure 3
depicts how the IAP works at international airports.

^13 IAP, or the Immigration Advisory Program, was initially referred to as
the Immigration Security Initiative (ISI). Prior to the development of
IAP, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service operated the
Immigration Control Officers program, which was similar to IAP in that it
stationed U.S. immigration officers abroad to screen U.S.-bound passengers
in order to validate travel documents.

Figure 3: Immigration Advisory Program Process

  Perceived Successes of IAP Led CBP to Expand the Program

The IAP pilot began at several sites in 2004. Each site consists of a
group of IAP officers and a team leader. Team leaders are typically
assigned to longer posts as compared to other IAP officers. Expansion of
the pilot program to other locations has already begun. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires that CBP identify 50
foreign airports for further expansion of the IAP, and CBP has
subsequently completed this list.^14

CBP has reported several successes through the IAP pilot. According to CBP
documents, from the start of the IAP pilot in June 2004 through February
2006, IAP teams made more than 700 no-board recommendations for
inadmissible passengers and intercepted approximately 70 fraudulent travel
documents. CBP estimated that these accomplishments equate to about $1.1
million in cost avoidance for the U.S. government associated with
detaining and removing passengers who would have been turned away after
their flights landed, and $1.5 million in air carrier savings in avoided
fines and passenger return costs.^15 According to CBP, these monetary
savings have defrayed the costs of implementing the program. However, it
is not yet clear whether CBP anticipates, or expects, that the IAP will
pay for itself through its government and air carrier cost savings, as it
previously asserted.^16

CBP officials said that they have also expanded a related program for
training air carrier staff to better identify fraudulent identity
documents and placed this program within IAP. This program, known as the
Carrier Liaison Program, officially began in February 2006. According to
CBP officials, CLP's purpose is to enhance border security by providing
technical assistance and training to air carrier staff on the
identification of improperly documented passengers destined for the United
States.

To continue to strengthen and successfully expand the IAP, CBP is faced
with concerns expressed by host government and IAP officials about the
duration of its IAP officer rotations. CBP officials said that they were
aware of these concerns and are taking steps to address the matter.

  CBP's IAP Is Similar to Programs in Other Countries

Several other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand, also operate programs similar to IAP. Known as airline
liaison officer (ALO) programs, these programs have in some cases been
operating since the late 1980s. Like IAP, these countries also generally
post officers overseas at airports in an attempt to intercept improperly
documented passengers from traveling to their country. CBP officials are
aware of these programs but believe that the IAP is different in some key
respects. Most notably, CBP officials stated that IAP's focus is on
terrorism, while ALO programs focus primarily on illegal immigration.
However, valuable lessons can be gained from the experiences of these
other countries in implementing similar programs as CBP continues to
develop its IAP pilot. For example, officials from one ALO program stated
that their country incorporated a Web-based system that allows its ALO
officers to record improperly documented and other suspect travelers.
These data can then be instantly accessed and analyzed at headquarters so
that the information can be used to make changes to improve all of the
country's ALO locations. Another ALO program utilizes PNR data to identify
trends in document fraud, allowing its ALO network to quickly transmit
alert information into its passenger screening system so that identified
passengers can be screened further at check in prior to boarding an
aircraft. CBP, however, relies upon each IAP site to send aggregate
reporting statistics to CBP headquarters--potentially limiting the
program's ability to rapidly analyze and act on trends in document fraud
since there is a time delay in CBP headquarters receiving the data.
Additionally, a United Kingdom official stated that their ALO program
benefited from expanding the program slowly during the initial stages of
the program to allow the United Kingdom government to learn important
lessons from its early ALO sites. Appendix II contains a summary of
information and potential lessons to be learned from the ALO programs of
other countries.

^14 CBP was directed in the Conference Report accompanying its FY 2007
Appropriations Act to report to the Congress on the performance of the IAP
no later than January 23, 2007. According to CBP, they submitted the
report to Congress prior to this deadline.

^15 We did not independently assess these costs estimates or other
reported program benefits.

^16 IAP cost savings are derived from a CBP estimate based on the average
costs to detain and remove an individual from the United States who is
found not eligible to be admitted.

  CBP Could More Fully Incorporate Risk Management Principles in the IAP Pilot

CBP has not taken all of the steps necessary to fully learn from its pilot
sites in order to determine whether the program should be made permanent
and the number of sites that should exist. These steps are part of a risk
management approach to developing and evaluating homeland security
programs. Risk management is a continuous process of assessing risks,
determining the best available actions to mitigate these risks,
implementing actions to reduce risks, and evaluating these actions to
determine their level of benefit. Managing homeland security efforts on
the basis of risk has received widespread support from Congress, the
President, and others as a way to help set priorities effectively and to
allocate limited resources. A risk management framework includes such
elements as formally outlining the goals of the program, setting
measurable performance measures, and evaluating program effectiveness.^17

Although CBP is currently taking steps to make its IAP sites permanent and
to expand the program to other foreign locations, CBP has not finalized a
strategic plan for the program that delineates program goals, objectives,
constraints, and evaluative criteria. We have reported in the past that
high-performing organizations have a focus on achieving results and
outcomes and foster a results-oriented organizational culture to reinforce
this focus. Key to developing this focus is strategic planning, which
involves having a mission that employees, clients, customers, partners,
and other stakeholders understand and find compelling; setting goals to
achieve the mission; and aligning the organization's activities, core
processes, and resources with those goals.^18 CBP officials told us that
they have drafted a strategic plan for the IAP, which contains program
goals and performance measures, but CBP stated that the plan has not yet
been finalized.

DHS Intends to Align International and Domestic Prescreening Programs, but DHS
Has Not Yet Made All Key Policy Decisions

A second effort that CBP has under way to strengthen the international
passenger prescreening process involves the alignment of the U.S.
government's international and domestic aviation prescreening programs,
which are being developed separately by CBP and TSA, respectively.
Aligning these two programs is particularly important because many
passengers in the United States who are traveling to or from foreign
destinations have a domestic flight in addition to their international
flight. Passengers traveling on these types of flights are currently
subjected to two different prescreening processes.

^17These steps are part of an overall risk management framework for
developing and evaluating homeland security programs. In 2004, we
developed a risk management framework that brought together recognized
risk management practices from public and private sector reports, as well
as through interviews with terrorism experts. This framework was reviewed
by academic experts in risk management, field-tested on several GAO
reviews, and applied in analyzing a variety of homeland security
applications. For further discussion of this risk management framework,
see GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure,
[32]GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).

^18GAO, Forum on High Performing Organizations: Metrics, Means, and
Mechanisms for Achieving High Performance in the 21st Century Public
Management Environment, [33]GAO-04-343SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
2004).

The air carrier community has asked CBP and TSA to coordinate their
efforts to ensure that the programs are compatible and are developed as a
single approach to avoid the need for air carriers to implement two
separate screening systems to meet CBP and TSA requirements. Without such
coordination, air carriers might have to implement different information
connections, communications, and programming for each prescreening
program, as well as ensure that their data are compatible with each
program. In a joint letter to the Secretary of DHS, the Air Transport
Association of America (ATA) and the Association of European Airlines
(AEA) urged DHS to coordinate international and domestic aviation
passenger prescreening programs so that air carriers are not unduly
burdened by the costs and inefficiencies posed by working with two
different prescreening programs. The letter also stated that ATA and AEA
believed that there had been a lack of full coordination between CBP and
TSA in aligning their respective passenger prescreening programs. Further,
as we have previously reported, since both agencies are developing and
implementing passenger prescreening programs, CBP and TSA could mutually
benefit from the sharing of technical testing results and the coordination
of other developmental efforts.^19 Coordination and planning in the
development of these two programs would also enhance program integration
and interoperability and potentially limit redundancies.

In 2004, CBP and TSA officials stated that they recognized the
similarities between the international passenger prescreening and the
proposed domestic prescreening programs, and acknowledged the need to
coordinate the two programs. According to CBP officials, DHS has expressed
its intention to align international and domestic passenger prescreening
efforts, and decided to develop one "portal" through which carriers will
transmit passenger data to the government for domestic and international
flights. CBP officials further stated that interagency discussions with
TSA have resulted in a decision to create a single communication point for
the submission of the passenger data for both domestic and international
flights, one of the main concerns of air carriers.

Despite these coordination efforts and DHS's commitment to align the
processes, CBP and TSA have not yet made all of the policy decisions to
complete the alignment between the CBP international prescreening program
and the prospective Secure Flight program, including the use of different
data elements, documentation, and identity matching technologies to
conduct prescreening.^20 CBP officials stated that many of these policy
and technical decisions have not been made because TSA is in a process of
"rebaselining" its Secure Flight program, which involves TSA reassessing
program goals, requirements, and capabilities. In discussions with us, CBP
and TSA officials stated that these coordination efforts were continuing,
but they did not provide any documentation of how such matters were being
resolved or when they planned for the programs to be aligned.

^19 [34]GAO-06-374T and [35]GAO-05-356 .

CBP Has Not Fully Disclosed its Use of Personal Information during the
Prescreening Process

One additional issue requires consideration, as well, in the context of
DHS's efforts to strengthen the passenger prescreening process. Despite
recent efforts by CBP to provide more detailed information to the public
about its use of passenger data during the international passenger
prescreening process, CBP has not fully disclosed or assessed the privacy
impacts of its use of personal information during international passenger
prescreening as required by law. The Privacy Act of 1974 and the
E-Government Act of 2002 require federal agencies to protect personal
privacy by, among other things, limiting the disclosure of personal
information and informing the public about how personal data are being
used and protected. Federal agencies inform the public of their use of
personal information by issuing two types of documents:

System of records notices: The Privacy Act requires that agencies publish
a notification in the Federal Register that informs the public when they
establish or make changes to a system of records.

Privacy impact assessment: The E-Government Act requires that agencies
analyze how information is handled to (1) ensure handling conforms to
applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy;
(2) determine the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining, and
disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic
information system; and (3) examine and evaluate protections and
alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential
privacy risks.^21

20 [36]GAO-06-374T .

Although CBP has taken certain actions to meet the requirements of the
Privacy and E-Government Acts, including the recent publication of
additional privacy disclosures, these actions have not fully informed the
public about how personal information is being used, as required by law.
Specifically, CBP has published public notices and reports that describe
certain elements of its international prescreening process, but these
documents do not fully or accurately describe CBP's use of personal data
throughout the passenger prescreening process. It is important for CBP's
documentation to describe all of the steps of the prescreening process
because the interrelationship of various steps of the process allows data
to be transferred and used in ways that have not been fully disclosed.

CBP's international prescreening process involves a wide range of
procedures and data sources that CBP utilizes to determine passenger risk
levels. According to a CBP official, to help make these prescreening
decisions, CBP collects personal data from multiple sources (including
passengers and government databases), and uses the data for several
purposes, including identity matching against the government watch list,
risk targeting, and passenger document validation. According to CBP, its
officers also use commercial data, to a limited degree, to assist them in
confirming a passenger's identity when needed. CBP's public disclosures
about APIS and ATS do not describe all of the data inputs or the extent to
which the data are combined and used in making prescreening decisions.^22
As shown in Figure 4, CBP's passenger prescreening involves more data
inputs and uses of data than are described in CBP's current privacy
disclosures.

^21 The Privacy Act places limitations on agencies' collection, use, and
disclosure of personal information maintained in systems of records, which
are groups of personal information that are maintained by an agency from
which personal information is retrieved by an individual's name or
identifier. Among the act's provisions are requirements for agencies to
give notice to the public about the use of their personal information.
Also, when agencies establish or make changes to a system of records, they
must notify the public by a notice in the Federal Register about the type
of data collected; the types of individuals about whom information is
collected; the intended "routine" uses of the data; the policies and
practices regarding data storage, retrievability, access controls,
retention, and disposal; and procedures that individuals can use to review
and correct personal information. The E-Government Act of 2002 requires
agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment when using information
technology to process personal information.

^22 The degree to which an agency must disclose its use of personal
information may be limited by exemptions permitted by the Privacy Act. To
claim such exemptions, an agency must issue a rule, with an opportunity
for public comment, identifying their exemptions and the reasons for
taking the exemptions. 69 Fed. Reg. 41543, July 9, 2004 and 68 Fed. Reg.
69412, 69413, Dec. 12, 2003.

Figure 4: The interaction between CBP Prescreening Systems and Data Usage

^a CBP officers can utilize TECS and ATS-P databases to enter "lookout"
alert flags. Not all CBP officers have access to all of the databases
listed.

^b In the APIS privacy impact assessment, CBP defined APIS as a system.
However, CBP officials later stated that APIS is not a system but rather
data that are sent to the TECS to conduct identity matching.

^c CBP officials stated that commercial data are only used in rare
situations when a passenger's identity cannot be verified against other
information.

^d CBP officers use data from the TSC as needed to help confirm a
passenger's identity.

CBP has stated that its public reporting on its use of APIS data complies
with the Privacy Act through references to previously published Privacy
Act notices about systems used during the prescreening process. However,
these references are not sufficient because they do not fully disclose
CBP's use of personal information during the prescreening process.
Specifically, CBP stated that because APIS is a system within the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System, it is described in the TECS system of
records notice, which was published in October 2001. CBP also referenced a
2003 system of records notice for the DHS Arrival and Departure
Information System (ADIS), which interfaces with TECS, but which CBP
officials stated separately is not used by CBP in the passenger
prescreening process. However, neither of these notices specifically
describes CBP's passenger prescreening or the use of APIS or PNR data.

Although CBP has stated that its previous privacy disclosures sufficiently
complied with federal privacy law, on November 2, 2006, DHS published a
Privacy Act system of records notice for ATS. In addition, on November 22,
2006, DHS published a privacy impact assessment for ATS. Both of these
documents refer to the ATS-P system used in CBP's aviation passenger
prescreening process. These disclosures --released after CBP received an
earlier version of this report--provide much more detailed information on
ATS-P as compared with prior privacy disclosures. Nevertheless, CBP has
still not published a system of records notice or a privacy impact
assessment that comprehensively describes the entire prescreening process.
For example, although CBP has published a privacy impact assessment for
APIS and ATS, neither disclosure describes the combined use of APIS and
PNR data in passenger prescreening decision-making. The disclosures also
do not describe that during the prescreening process CBP officers are able
to access personal data obtained from commercial providers.

Because CBP's development and operation of its international passenger
prescreening process has not been accompanied by the publication of
Privacy Act notices or E-Government Act privacy impact assessments that
fully describe the use of personal data and the steps taken to protect
privacy, the public may not be aware of the different ways that their
information is being used or protected, as required by law. Although
maintaining that their prior privacy disclosures were fully compliant with
federal privacy law, CBP stated in May 2006, and DHS reiterated in its
official comments to this report in January 2007, that CBP plans to revise
the APIS privacy impact assessment and issue a system of records notice
for APIS. However, no deadline has been given for when these steps will be
completed. As CBP moves forward with future modifications to its
prescreening process, it will be important for CBP to fully assess and
disclose data privacy protections used in these prescreening programs as
well.

Conclusions

Since the terrorist hijackings of aircraft on September 11, the United
States and the rest of the world have uncovered new attempts to threaten
the security of the commercial aviation system. These threats underscore
the importance of continually reassessing the numerous security measures
put into place to secure commercial aviation. One key security measure is
the prescreening of passengers on international flights--an important step
to ensure that high-risk passengers do not board international flights
traveling to or from the United States. Another important effort involves
ensuring that international and domestic prescreening programs are fully
aligned to maximize their effectiveness and cost efficiency for the
government, airline industry and passengers. In conjunction with
conducting these important prescreening activities, DHS must also be
vigilant about ensuring that it is in full compliance with public privacy
requirements.

CBP is currently taking various and important steps to strengthen the
international aviation passenger prescreening process. CBP's recent
publication of a proposed rule for changing the procedures and timing for
conducting passenger identity matching is an important step. Another
important effort to strengthen the international aviation passenger
prescreening process is aligning the process with TSA's new domestic
prescreening program. Efforts to significantly expand the IAP may also
strengthen the prescreening process, although CBP will need to ensure that
sufficient data are collected to allow for appropriate risk assessments
and evaluations.

While CBP recognizes and is taking steps to address many of the challenges
it faces in implementing its various planned prescreening programs, there
are three areas, in particular, that require further planning and
monitoring. These areas include:

           o More fully incorporating risk management principles in the IAP
           pilot. CBP is not benefiting from all of the information that
           could be learned from the pilot program and remains at risk of
           expanding the program or making IAP sites permanent without
           establishing a clear vision of what the program is intended to
           accomplish and how its success will be evaluated and measured.
           Without completing a strategic plan for the IAP, the program may
           not realize its full potential security benefits and could require
           substantial revisions after implementation.

           o Aligning international and domestic passenger prescreening
           programs. If these two prescreening efforts are not effectively
           coordinated with each other, air carriers and other stakeholders
           could be unnecessarily inconvenienced and experience potentially
           avoidable costs. The U.S. government could incur avoidable costs
           as well, if the programs are not properly coordinated and aligned.
           So far, CBP and TSA have taken some steps to coordinate their
           efforts--for example, they have announced their intention to
           develop a single portal for prescreening passengers on domestic
           and international flights. However, CBP and TSA have not yet made
           all of the key decisions necessary to align the two processes nor
           have they completed a timetable for completing this process.

           o Attaining full compliance with privacy laws. It is important
           that CBP completes reports that fully describe the agency's use
           and protection of personal data during the international passenger
           prescreening process to ensure that it is complying with all
           applicable privacy laws. CBP's current disclosures do not fully
           inform the public about all of its systems for prescreening
           aviation passenger information nor do they explain how CBP
           combines data in the prescreening process, as required by law. As
           a result, passengers are not assured that their privacy is
           protected during the international passenger prescreening process.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen CBP's international aviation passenger prescreening process,
in our November 2006 report we recommended that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security take or direct the Commissioner of Customs
and Border Protection to take the following three actions:

           o To more fully incorporate risk management principles into the
           planning, implementation, and evaluation of the IAP pilot, CBP
           should (1) prepare a strategic plan that identifies the risks,
           goals, objectives, and performance measures for the IAP pilot, and
           (2) conduct program evaluations that measure the performance of
           the pilot IAP sites against predetermined goals and performance
           measures.

           o To more fully align CBP's international aviation passenger
           prescreening program with TSA's prospective domestic aviation
           passenger prescreening program, take additional steps necessary to
           identify the remaining impediments to alignment, make the key
           policy and technical decisions needed to more fully coordinate
           these programs (including a determination of the data and identity
           matching technologies that will be used), and set time frames for
           when these efforts will be completed.

           o To fully inform the public of possible uses of their personal
           information, ensure that all required public data privacy
           disclosures, including system of record notices and privacy impact
           assessments, are completed to adequately cover each element of the
           international passenger prescreening process. The privacy
           disclosures should fully describe the use and handling of personal
           information within the prescreening process and all of CBP's
           systems for conducting international passenger prescreening.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of the security sensitive version of this report, and
related updates, to DHS and DOJ. On January 31, 2007, we received written
comments from DHS which are reproduced in full in Appendix IV. DHS
generally concurred with the three report recommendations and provided
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. DOJ also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.

Regarding the actions DHS reported taking to address the recommendations,
DHS stated that it has completed an IAP Strategic Plan and that the plan
has been sent for Departmental review. DHS provided a copy of the draft
IAP Strategic Plan to GAO. While DHS stated that the draft strategic plan
outlines the measures that CBP intends to use to assess the IAP's
performance, it is not yet clear from the draft strategic plan how
challenges as well as successes of the program will be measured at each
IAP site. This appears to be the case since all of the performance
measures outlined in the draft strategic plan are likely to improve
following the deployment of IAP officers, without addressing program
impediments. DHS also noted that CBP is developing system enhancements
that will permit simple input, extraction, and analysis of empirical data
necessary for baseline and current data. We are encouraged by these
efforts and believe that they will help CBP to better evaluate the
effectiveness of this pilot program. Moreover, given CBP's intention to
transition this pilot program into a permanent one and expand the program
to additional locations, it is important that IAP officers and those
managing the IAP have the sufficient data necessary to make sound
decisions.

Regarding the recommendation that steps be taken to more fully align CBP's
international passenger prescreening program with TSA's domestic passenger
prescreening program, DHS stated that its Screening Coordination Office
has directed CBP and TSA to align these programs. DHS further stated that
CBP has been working with TSA to align procedures and systems and
functional requirements, and that both CBP and TSA will work with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to harmonize data requirements
and present a single face to the travel industry. DHS also noted that CBP
recognizes that air carriers have invested significant resources to
reprogram systems to comply with CBP's regulations, and that CBP will
continue to work to allow for the submission of various passenger data
through one transmission process. Given the potential costs to air
carriers and the government of having prescreening procedures and
requirements that are not aligned, we encourage DHS to complete these
efforts and make associated policy decisions in a timely manner.

Regarding the recommendation that the public be fully informed of the
possible uses of its personal information and that all required public
data privacy disclosures are completed to adequately address each element
of the international passenger prescreening process, DHS responded with
several statements. CBP stated in its comments on the draft report that it
is and has been in compliance with both the Privacy Act regarding System
of Records Notices (SORNs) and section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002
regarding Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs). CBP bases its compliance with
the Privacy Act on the 2001 publication of a SORN for the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS). To the extent that all uses of
personal information in CBP international passenger prescreening can be
associated with the statements made in that notice, we would agree that
CBP is in compliance with the law. That notice, however, states that TECS
contains "[e]very possible type of information from a variety of Federal,
state, and local sources, which contribute to effective law enforcement."
This statement does not identify the categories of records maintained in
the system, as required by the Act,
let alone APIS and ATS, which CBP now describes as separate systems. It
also does not disclose that the system includes personal information
collected directly from individuals (i.e., passport data) and indirectly
through air carriers (i.e., PNR data). The TECS SORN does not "facilitate
the exercise of the rights of individuals" under the Act, as required by
OMB's Privacy Act guidance.^23 While OMB guidance states that agencies are
granted considerable discretion in preparing SORNS, the guidance stresses
the importance of appropriately identifying the purpose(s) of a system and
ensuring that any associated notices have "information value to the
public." According to OMB, a major purpose of the Act is "the publicizing
of what those systems are and how they are used." The TECS SORN has
virtually no information value to the public and cannot be said to meet
the requirements of the Act.

CBP also stated in its comments that no PIA is required for its
prescreening process because the March 2005 APIS PIA addressed changes to
APIS, and there have been no changes to ATS since the E-Government Act
went into effect.^24 This is incorrect for at least two reasons. First,
CBP's handling of personal information was significantly altered on the
basis of its July 2004 agreement with the EU regarding handling PNR data
from flights between the US and EU member countries.^25 The DHS Privacy
Office's September 2005 report on the handling of EU PNR describes a
number of changes made to CBP systems and processes to better safeguard
such data. These changes are not addressed in any new or revised PIA or
SORN. Second, the privacy documents that CBP has published do not fully
describe the use of personal information in the CBP international
passenger prescreening
process, even accepting CBP's statutory authority to limit public
disclosures under certain circumstances.^26 Contrary to CBP's
characterization of CBP officers as merely conducting an "act of physical
inspection," the CBP international passenger prescreening process involves
decisions made by CBP officers on the basis of information obtained from
multiple sources. As described in our report, CBP officers can retrieve
identity matching information conducted with APIS data, identity matching
and risk targeting information performed by ATS with PNR and APIS data, as
well as information from other government databases. They can also access
commercial data sources, although reportedly on a limited basis for
confirming passenger identities. Finally, they can also enter information
about individuals back into a number of government systems.^27 These
multiple uses of information are not described in any CBP privacy
documents. Despite CBP's statement to the contrary, there are no legal
limitations to the Privacy Act or the E-Government Act that constrain the
agency's ability to provide the public with meaningful notice on the use
and protection of personal information.^28 Furthermore, given that the
handling of personal information in the CBP prescreening process has been
significantly changed multiple times in the last several years, including
changes to address the EU PNR agreement and changes to the collection of
passenger manifest information via APIS, the separate publication of APIS
and ATS privacy documents satisfy the requirements of neither the Privacy
Act nor the E-Government Act.

^23 40 Fed. Reg. 28948, 28952, July 9, 1975.

^24CBP states that the ATS PIA was conducted merely to satisfy a DHS
requirement that new SORNs be accompanied by PIAs, again, not because of
any change to ATS that would require a PIA under the terms of the E-Gov
Act.

^25 69 Fed. Reg. 41543, July 9, 2004.

Upon its issuance, we will provide copies of this report to the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of Customs and
Border Protection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration, and interested congressional committees.

^26The extent of an agency's public description of a system of records can
be limited by exemptions permitted by the Privacy Act, e.g., an agency can
claim an exemption from the requirement to describe the categories of
sources of records for investigative material compiled for law enforcement
purposes. 5 U.S.C. S 552a(k).

^27As noted in DHS Privacy Office's PIA guidance, privacy concerns can be
raised where technology may only collect personal information for a
moment.

^28For example, under these laws and their implementing guidance, CBP's
modification of its systems and processes to comply with the 2004 EU
agreement on the use of European PNR data should have led CBP to issue a
revised SORN and conduct a PIA.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
[email protected] or (202) 512-3404. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix V.

Cathleen A. Berrick
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The information contained in this public report is narrower in scope and
detail than the original report and examines only limited aspects of
international passenger prescreening procedures. It focuses on only
certain elements of the current international aviation passenger
prescreening process as well as only some of the actions that DHS is
taking or has planned to strengthen prescreening procedures. More
specifically the report's content is limited to certain issues related to:

           o the implementation of the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), a
           CBP program that assesses risk levels for certain passengers in
           overseas locations;

           o aligning international and domestic passenger prescreening
           programs;

           o ensuring that compliance with privacy laws is fully achieved
           with respect to information collected to conduct international
           passenger prescreening.

Although the information provided in this report is more limited in scope,
the overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this
report as well because the information contained in this report was
derived from the initial sensitive report. We addressed the following
objectives in our initial November 2006 report:

           o the main factors affecting the international passenger
           prescreening process, and the potential impact of these factors,
           and

           o the status of efforts to address these factors, and the issues,
           if any, that could affect efforts to strengthen the international
           prescreening process.

To address our first objective from the November 2006 report--the factors
that affect the international passenger prescreening process and their
potential impacts--we interviewed officials from Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), including staff at CBP's National Targeting Center
(NTC); the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to understand the current international
passenger prescreening process and the data that are used during this
process. We obtained and analyzed relevant documents from these agencies
including statistics from the Immigration Advisory Program pilot,
documentation on CBP's use of data systems to conduct international
passenger prescreening, and a CBP summary memorandum documenting the
agency's decision not to pursue the Advanced Passenger Prescreening (APP)
system that currently operates in other countries such as Australia and
New Zealand. To obtain a cross section of air carriers' views about the
process, we selected air carriers that fly large, medium, and small
numbers of passengers annually into the United States. For the purposes of
this review, we defined the transport of a large number of passengers as
more than 1 million passengers annually, we defined a medium number as
between 500,000 and 1 million passengers annually, and a small number as
less than 500,000 passengers annually. These criteria generally reflect
the distribution of the incoming passenger volume being flown into the
United States between 2000 and 2004 as shown in Department of
Transportation statistical reports. Using these criteria, we interviewed
officials from seven large air carriers, four medium air carriers, and two
small air carriers, both domestic and foreign, that conduct international
flights into and out of the United States to discuss the impact of current
U.S. international passenger prescreening requirements on their
operations. We also spoke with officials from two domestic air carrier and
passenger travel associations and three international air carrier
associations to discuss the impact on their members of current
international passenger prescreening requirements. We also reviewed
documents from an international aviation association that evaluated the
potential impact on its membership of CBP's proposed passenger
prescreening reforms. To determine the number of No Fly and improperly
prescreened Selectee passengers who traveled on flights to or from the
United States during 2005, we obtained and analyzed TSA security incident
reports from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005.^1

^1 We did not report on the details of this passenger information as it is
sensitive security information.

To address our second objective from the November 2006 report-- the status
of CBP's efforts to address these factors and the issues, if any, that
could affect efforts to strengthen the prescreening process--we
interviewed officials from CBP and reviewed relevant documents. We also
interviewed officials from the seven large air carriers, three medium air
carriers, and two small air carriers, both domestic and foreign, that
conduct international flights into and out of the United States to obtain
their views on the potential impact of future U.S. international
prescreening requirements. We also spoke with officials from two domestic
air carrier and passenger travel associations, three international air
carrier associations, and a travel association that represent the
interests of air carriers and travelers to obtain their views on the
potential impact of future U.S. international prescreening requirements
including APIS- 60 and AQQ. We visited two Immigration Advisory Program
(IAP) pilot sites and met with the IAP teams to discuss the current status
of the program and observe the prescreening process at their respective
locations. We discussed potential benefits and challenges of the program
with the IAP teams. We also reviewed and assessed CBP's evaluations of IAP
pilot sites. Furthermore, we met with government officials from the United
Kingdom and Canada to learn details about their respective airline liaison
officer (ALO) programs and to obtain their views on how the IAP pilot
compares with their ALO programs. One foreign government provided
documents that summarize the functions of its ALO program. We also met
with foreign government officials in the Netherlands, Poland, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand to discuss U.S. efforts to strengthen
international passenger prescreening and the potential impact of these
programs. Officials from Australia and New Zealand also provided documents
related to their respective APP prescreening systems. We met with
officials from the European Union to discuss the impact of U.S.
international prescreening requirements (including the advanced
transmission of passenger name record data) on air carriers originating
from Europe. Additionally, we interviewed and obtained documents from
private companies that facilitate the electronic transmission of passenger
data between air carriers and government agencies, including CBP, to
determine their role, if any, in future international aviation passenger
prescreening initiatives. To assess CBP's July 2006 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM), we obtained and analyzed documents associated with the
NPRM, including CBP's regulatory assessment for the rulemaking. To assess
whether CBP disclosed, as required by law, its use of passenger
information during the prescreening process, we reviewed CBP's published
privacy impact assessments and system of records notices. We also met with
CBP and DHS officials regarding their current and draft privacy documents
related to passenger prescreening. To determine the extent to which CBP
has utilized risk management principles to guide decisions on passenger
prescreening, we used a risk management framework developed and tested by
GAO over several years.^2 The risk management framework was developed by
GAO after a review of government and private sector documents on risk
management and interviews with recognized experts in risk management and
terrorism prevention. We used elements of the risk management framework as
criteria to analyze CBP's actions in developing and implementing its
existing international passenger prescreening process, as well as CBP's
proposed and planned actions to modify the international passenger
prescreening process. We conducted our work, which included updates to our
version of the report that contains sensitive security information, from
April 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

^2 GAO, Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting
Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection, [37]GAO-04-557T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).

GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Asses Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure,
[38]GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).

Appendix II: Airline Liaison Officer Programs Implemented In Other
Countries

Several countries have created airline liaison officer (ALO) programs and
placed officers in foreign countries to reduce the number of improperly
documented passengers traveling into their respective countries. These
officers also assist air carrier staff in establishing whether individual
passengers who may appear to be improperly documented are actually
eligible to fly without resulting in fines to the air carrier. According
to the International Air Transport Association Code of Conduct for
Immigration Liaison Officers, the liaison officers' primary
responsibilities include:

           o Establishing and maintaining a good working relationship with
           the airlines, local immigration, police, other appropriate
           authorities, and other liaison officers posted to that country and
           with consular staff of other missions. Additionally, liaison
           officers assist local immigration and police authorities in
           gathering and sharing information related to the movement of
           improperly documented passengers.

           o Training airline staff in the general principles of passport and
           visa requirements, passenger assessment, and awareness of fraud
           and forgery, and advising airline staff on whether travel
           documents and visas are genuine, forged or fraudulently obtained.

Table 1 shows a side-by-side comparison of the characteristics of ALO
programs from four countries.

Table 1: The Characteristics of Selected ALO Programs

                                                       Australian New Zealand 
                        U.K. Airline      Canadian        Airline     Airline 
                             Liaison     Migration        Liaison     Liaison 
                             Officer     Integrity        Officer     Officer 
        Characteristics      Program       Program        Program     Program 
Initiation date              1993          1989           1989        1991 
Number of locations            32            39             14           9 
Approximate number             34            45             20           9 
of staff                                                                   
Number of officers            1-2           1-2            1-2           1 
at each location                                                           
Physical location of   At nearest    At nearest     At airport  At nearest 
staff                     embassy       embassy                 embassy or 
                                                                  with an air 
                                                                      carrier 
Mission                    Reduce Reduce travel  Reduce travel      Reduce 
                              travel      document document fraud   number of 
                            document         fraud                    refugee 
                               fraud                                    cases 

Source: GAO analysis of ALO programs.

These ALO programs have incorporated various approaches regarding data
collection, program expansion, and staffing to allow for continuous
improvement and measurement of their liaison programs. For example, the
Canadian Migration Integrity Officers (MIO) program developed a system
that regularly collects data on improperly documented arrivals in Canada
and other suspect travelers and records this information in a Web database
to develop trend and other analyses. These data are also used to measure
the success of the Canadian MIO program. Canadian officials stated that
this web-based database allows Canada to immediately inform air carriers
of violations, has assisted in reducing the number of violations and
fines, and has allowed air carriers to take corrective action in a timely
manner. Similarly, officials from the United Kingdom ALO program stated
that they also collect statistics and intelligence to develop profiles and
trends on particular flights for use in their program. The New Zealand ALO
program utilizes passenger name record (PNR) data to identify the trends
of travelers utilizing fraudulent passports to travel to their country.
New Zealand officials stated that accessing and using PNR data in real
time has allowed their ALO network to immediately load alert or referral
information into its passenger-screening system so that identified
passengers can be screened further at check-in prior to boarding. New
Zealand officials also stated that they utilize data to conduct
assessments and intensive reviews of the highest risk countries and
passengers, which they then use to determine the location of airline
liaison sites. Some New Zealand ALO sites also have direct access to the
immigration application system, which allows their liaison officers to
directly input alerts as necessary. The New Zealand government is also
currently considering providing ALO officers with handheld computers to
facilitate more efficient communications. Australian officials stated that
at several of their ALO sites the liaison officers work under a particular
air carrier versus going through the typical approval process needed to
establish an overseas program, which may take a long time to complete.
According to these officials, this type of arrangement provides them with
the advantage of being able to quickly move liaison officers from location
to location when needed to keep up with trends in illegal passenger
travel. Both the United Kingdom and the Canadian ALO programs expanded
gradually. A United Kingdom ALO program official validated this approach
by suggesting that limited growth of ALO programs during the initial
stages allowed countries to fully learn from the pilot program before
expanding to other countries.

Appendix III: APIS Quick Query (AQQ) and APIS Minus 60 Minutes (APIS-60)

In July 2006, CBP released a notice of proposed rulemaking that would
require air carriers to transmit APIS data to CBP prior to the departure
of all international flights departing from or bound for the United
States. The notice of proposed rulemaking provided air carriers with two
main options for prescreening passengers on international flights prior to
departure. One option under the proposed rule would require air carriers
to send APIS data on all passengers to CBP 60 minutes before a flight's
departure. The other option would allow air carriers to transmit APIS data
on a passenger-by-passenger basis, up to 15 minutes prior to a flight's
departure. The two options are designed to accommodate air carriers with
different types of operations.^1

Under both options, CBP has broadly outlined the procedures for air
carriers to receive a "not-cleared" response which would identify that a
passenger is prohibited from boarding an aircraft. CBP would provide this
response to the air carrier prior to the passenger boarding the aircraft.
In addition to satisfying requirements under the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, both options would strengthen the prescreening
process.

First Prescreening Option: Transmitting APIS Data 60 Minutes Prior to Departure

The first option under the proposed rule would require air carriers to
transmit APIS data to CBP for all passengers on a flight 60 minutes prior
to the flight's departure. This approach is known as APIS-60. The APIS-60
option will require an air carrier to transmit a manifest to CBP with APIS
information for all passengers on the flight 60 minutes before the flight
departs. This option gives CBP staff approximately 60 minutes before
flight departures to match the APIS information against the lists and
notify the carrier if any passengers should not be allowed to travel.
Under this option, a passenger would be issued a boarding pass, but if a
"not cleared" response is later received from CBP, the air carrier would
be responsible for denying boarding, or for removing the passenger and his
or her baggage from the aircraft, if the passenger had already boarded the
aircraft. This option, according to CBP officials, is likely to be
preferred by smaller air carriers that are not dependent on having
passengers transfer from connecting flights (and therefore whose
passengers would not likely have difficulty checking in at least 60
minutes before flight departure). According to CBP officials, these air
carriers might prefer APIS-60 because it would not require technical
changes in how they transmit APIS data to CBP, although it would require
that carriers develop the technical means to receive a screening response
from CBP. In the fall of 2004, CBP initially proposed APIS-60 as the sole
approach for conducting international prescreening. However, the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Air Transport
Association of America (ATA),^2 and individual air carriers raised
concerns about the economic impacts they believed would be associated with
implementing APIS-60 across the industry. For example, they told CBP that
network flight schedules would have to change to expand the minimum
connection times between flights because all passengers would be required
to check in at the airport at least 1 hour in advance of the flight so
that information could be collected and sent to CBP on time. Air carriers
that carry passengers arriving on connecting flights, which are known to
operate on "hub-and spoke" networks,^3 said that they would be
particularly affected because their passengers could arrive on a variety
of connecting flights from many other airports, and some would not arrive
60 minutes in advance of their connecting flight, making them ineligible
to board their scheduled flights. In addition, according to some air
carriers, the trend in the air carrier industry of moving toward
self-service check-in by some passengers has shortened the time between
check-in and scheduled flight departure times, further exacerbating the
impact of this type of approach. In response to industry concerns that the
APIS-60 approach would create serious problems for some carriers'
operations, CBP offered a second option for air carriers to consider
adopting to conduct passenger prescreening in advance of flight
departures.

^1 Under the current international passenger prescreening process, CBP has
identified some air carriers whose reservation systems do not allow them
to send passenger APIS data to CBP through a batched electronic
transmission. These air carriers include seasonal charters, air taxis, and
air ambulances. CBP allows these air carriers to transmit passenger data
through other means, such as through e-mail, in a program called eAPIS. In
its NPRM, CBP noted that such air carriers are not likely to be able to
adopt either the APIS-60 or AQQ prescreening options. Consequently, these
air carriers will be permitted to continue to send passenger data through
eAPIS, but they will still be bound by the requirement to transmit APIS
data 60 minutes prior to departure and they must be able to receive CBP's
identity matching results through e-mail or telephone.

^2 IATA represents the airline industry and comprises 260 passenger and
cargo air carriers, representing 94 percent of international scheduled air
traffic. ATA is the nation's largest airline trade association and its
stated purpose is to foster a business and regulatory environment that
ensures safe and secure air transportation.

^3 With a hub-and-spoke network, air carriers can combine local passengers
(those passengers originating at or destined for the hub), with connecting
passengers (those not originating at or destined for the hub but traveling
via the hub) on the same flight. In this manner, carriers can serve more
cities and offer greater frequency of service with their fleet of aircraft
than is possible with point-to-point service, which is service from one
city to another without this connecting network.

Second Prescreening Option: Transmitting APIS Data as Each Passenger Checks In
for a Flight

The second option under the proposed rule would require air carriers to
send APIS data to CBP as each passenger checks in for a flight. CBP would
then complete its identity match against the No Fly and Selectee Lists and
send a response to the air carrier--generally within 4
seconds--identifying that the passenger is either cleared or not-cleared
for boarding. Since this approach would utilize a nearly instantaneous
data transmission between air carriers and CBP, it is known as a real-time
prescreening option.^4 For those passengers found to be eligible to board,
the response message from CBP would identify that the air carrier is
permitted to issue a boarding pass and receive checked-in luggage from the
passenger.^5 Known as APIS Quick Query (AQQ), this approach would
represent a significant change to the current prescreening process in that
CBP would complete its identity matching for each passenger separately,
instead of conducting identity matching for all passengers on a flight at
the same time.

CBP officials believe that larger carriers with hub-and-spoke operations
are the most likely to choose the AQQ option, in part because larger
carriers are more likely to have the communications infrastructure needed
to develop and install the new interactive system. Some air carriers have
expressed the desirability of receiving a real-time cleared/not cleared
response from CBP earlier in the prescreening process such as what AQQ
would provide. This timing would allow them to know almost immediately if
an identified passenger represents a potential security risk.

CBP officials are already in the process of developing the AQQ system.
Under this approach, the federal government would bear the costs
associated with the actual prescreening of passengers. However, air
carriers would be responsible for any changes needed to their internal
information technology systems and the transmission of APIS data. This
type of real-time interactive prescreening approach is currently in use in
several countries, including Australia, New Zealand, and Bahrain, through
a system called Advance Passenger Processing (APP). The APP system was
initially used by Australia's Customs Service and Department of
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, and was first
implemented in 1995.

^4 It is also known as an interactive approach, because CBP transmits a
response message back to air carriers informing them whether a passenger
can board or not board.

^5 Passengers whose identities matched the No Fly List from this initial
screening would not be issued a boarding pass by the air carrier until CBP
and other agencies completed their identity vetting procedures and
returned a message to the air carrier identifying that it was okay to
board the passenger. If this identity verification process is not
completed prior to the flight's departure, the passenger would not be
permitted to travel on the flight.

AQQ and APP are both real-time interactive concepts but are different
systems. CBP officials stated that they considered APP when determining
which prescreening options to pursue but, in an August 2005 memorandum,
identified a number of reasons for not adopting it.^6 Nonetheless, the
experience of these other countries with APP may be of value to CBP as it
continues to develop the AQQ program. For example, Australian government
officials told us that the successful deployment of the APP program was
dependent upon working closely with air carriers to ensure system
functionality upon implementation. This will be particularly important
with regard to the AQQ given that almost 200 air carriers fly
international routes into and out of the United States, assuming that a
number of these air carriers decide to participate in AQQ.^7 Officials
from Australia and New Zealand said that they were willing to continue to
share relevant lessons learned as CBP works to develop its AQQ program.

^6Some of the reasons CBP cited for not adopting APP included high
infrastructure and transaction costs to both air carriers and government,
and the system's inability to adjudicate possible matches and allow for
human intervention and response. Although CBP's memo refers to an
evaluation of APP conducted by its Office of Field Operations and Office
of Information Technology, CBP did not provide us with the supporting
documentation of this evaluation despite a request for relevant
documentation in its considerations of implementing APP.

^7 CBP estimated that 1,280 foreign and domestic air carriers will be
affected by its proposed rulemaking related to AQQ and APIS-60.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, (202)
512-3404

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to the report
include Mark Abraham, Charles Bausell, Dawn Hoff, David Hooper, Michele
Fejfar, James Madar, Jan Montgomery, Hugh Paquette, David Plocher, Neetha
Rao, Brian Sklar, and Stan Stenersen.

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(440403)

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Highlights of GAO-07-346, a report to congressional requesters

May 2007

AVIATION SECURITY

Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening are Under Way,
but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain

Passenger prescreening--a process that includes matching passengers'
identifying information against records extracted from the U.S. government
terrorist watch list--is one of several security measures in place to help
ensure the safety of commercial flights traveling to or from the United
States. DHS has several efforts underway to strengthen international
aviation passenger prescreening. This report focuses on certain elements
of the passenger prescreening process as well as some of the actions that
DHS is taking or has planned to strengthen prescreening procedures. This
report is a limited version of the original November 2006 report as
various agencies that we reviewed deemed some of the information in the
original report to be security sensitive. GAO's work included interviewing
officials and assessing relevant documentation from federal agencies, U.S.
and foreign air carriers, industry groups, and several foreign countries.

[71]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommended in November 2006 that the Department of Homeland Security
(1) complete a strategic plan and develop an evaluation strategy for one
of its prescreening programs, (2) take steps to ensure that international
and domestic prescreening programs are aligned, and (3) ensure full
compliance with applicable privacy laws. DHS generally concurred with
these recommendations.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) agency responsible for international passenger prescreening, has
planned or is taking several actions designed to strengthen the aviation
passenger prescreening process. One such effort involves CBP stationing
U.S. personnel overseas to evaluate the authenticity of the travel
documents of certain high-risk passengers prior to boarding U.S.-bound
flights. Under this pilot program, called the Immigration Advisory Program
(IAP), CBP officers personally interview some passengers deemed to be
high-risk and evaluate the authenticity and completeness of these
passengers' travel documents. IAP officers also provide technical
assistance and training to air carrier staff on the identification of
improperly documented passengers destined for the United States. The IAP
has been tested at several foreign airports and CBP is negotiating with
other countries to expand it elsewhere and to make certain IAP sites
permanent. Successful implementation of the IAP rests, in part, on CBP
clearly defining the goals and objectives of the program through the
development of a strategic plan.

A second aviation passenger prescreening effort designed to strengthen the
passenger prescreening process is intended to align international
passenger prescreening with a similar program (currently under
development) for prescreening passengers on domestic flights. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)--a separate agency within
DHS--is developing a domestic passenger prescreening program called Secure
Flight. If CBP's international prescreening program and TSA's Secure
Flight program are not effectively aligned once Secure Flight becomes
operational, this could result in separate implementation requirements for
air carriers and increased costs for both air carriers and the government.
CBP and TSA officials stated that they are taking steps to coordinate
their prescreening efforts, but they have not yet made all key policy
decisions.

In addition to these efforts to strengthen certain international aviation
passenger prescreening procedures, one other issue requires consideration
in the context of these efforts. This issue involves DHS providing the
traveling public with assurances of privacy protection as required by
federal privacy law. Federal privacy law requires agencies to inform the
public about how the government uses their personal information. Although
CBP officials have stated that they have taken and are continuing to take
steps to comply with these requirements, the current prescreening process
allows passenger information to be used in multiple prescreening
procedures and transferred among various CBP prescreening systems in ways
that are not fully explained in CBP's privacy disclosures. If CBP does not
issue all appropriate disclosures, the traveling public will not be fully
aware of how their personal information is being used during the passenger
prescreening process.

References

Visible links
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  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-356
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-91
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