High Risk Series: An Update (31-JAN-07, GAO-07-310).
GAO's audits and evaluations identify federal programs and
operations that, in some cases, are high risk due to their
greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement. In recent years, GAO also has identified high-risk
areas to focus on the need for broad-based transformations to
address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on government
operations it has designated as high risk. In this 2007 update
for the 110th Congress, GAO presents the status of high-risk
areas identified in 2005 and new high-risk areas warranting
attention by Congress and the executive branch. Lasting solutions
to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of
dollars, dramatically improve service to the public, strengthen
confidence and trust in the performance and accountability of the
U.S. government, and ensure the ability of government to deliver
on its promises.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-310
ACCNO: A65424
TITLE: High Risk Series: An Update
DATE: 01/31/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Contracts
Counterterrorism
Defense procurement
Federal procurement
Federal property management
Financial management systems
Homeland security
Housing programs
Interagency relations
Intergovernmental relations
Internal controls
Personnel management
Program management
Transportation
Business planning
High Risk Series 2003
High Risk Series 2005
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GAO-07-310
* [1]Historical Perspective
* [2]High-Risk Designations Removed
* [3]U.S. Postal Service Transformation Efforts and Long-Term Out
* [4]HUD Single-Family Mortgage Insurance and Rental Housing Assi
* [5]New High-Risk Areas
* [6]Financing the Nation's Transportation System
* [7]Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical t
* [8]Transforming Federal Oversight of Food Safety
* [9]Progress Being Made in Other High-Risk Areas
* [10]Highlights for Each High-Risk Area
* [11]Order by Mail or Phone
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
January 2007
HIGH-RISK SERIES
An Update
GAO-07-310
Contents
Letter 1
Historical Perspective 4
High-Risk Designations Removed 9
U.S. Postal Service's Transformation Efforts and Long-Term Outlook 9
HUD's Single-Family Mortgage Insurance and Rental Housing Assistance
Programs 11
New High-Risk Areas 16
Financing the Nation's Transportation System 16
Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to U.S.
National Security Interests 20
Transforming Federal Oversight of Food Safety 26
Progress Being Made in Other High-Risk Areas 32
Highlights for Each High-Risk Area 38
Tables
Table 1: Changes to GAO's High-Risk List, 1990 to 2007 4
Table 2: Areas Removed from GAO's High-Risk List, 1990-2007 5
Table 3: Year That Areas on GAO's 2007 High-Risk List Were Designated as
High Risk 6
Table 4: U.S. Government Programs for the Identification and Protection of
Critical Technologies 21
Figure
Figure 1: Current Highway Trust Fund Year-End Balance Forecasts 17
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
Comptroller General
of the United States
January 2007
The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives
Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on government programs and
operations that it identifies as "high risk." This effort, which is
supported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, has
brought a much needed focus to a targeted list of major challenges that
are impeding effective government and costing the government billions of
dollars each year. To help improve these high-risk operations, GAO has
made hundreds of recommendations. Moreover, GAO's focus on high-risk
problems contributed to Congress enacting a series of governmentwide
reforms to address critical human capital challenges, strengthen financial
management, improve information technology practices, and instill a more
effective, credible, and results-oriented government.
GAO's high-risk status reports are provided at the start of each new
Congress to help in setting congressional oversight agendas. These reports
also help Congress and the executive branch carry out their
responsibilities while improving the government's performance and
enhancing its accountability for the benefit of the American people. In
this regard, I recently provided congressional leadership with a set of
recommendations based on GAO's work, including work on areas we have
designated as high risk, for its consideration in developing the oversight
agenda of the 110th Congress. Together, the high-risk update and the
recommendations for oversight can help congressional decision makers focus
on the key management challenges facing the nation.
The nation also continues to face broader policy challenges associated
with the current long-term fiscal imbalance and other key sustainability
challenges, as well as the need to ensure the federal government is
transparent, economical, efficient, effective, ethical, and equitable.
Addressing these challenges will require Congress to make tough choices
that fundamentally re-examine and transform the government to be more
effective in the 21st century. The infrastructure to support these
decisions is not fully in place, and focused attention by the legislative
and executive branches is needed to make progress. In this regard, in the
coming months, I plan to highlight the set of tools needed to support more
strategic decision making related to these broader challenges facing our
nation. These tools will center on expanding the governmentwide focus on
results; improving transparency through better financial and performance
management reporting; building structures and processes that facilitate
more strategic, systemic, and integrated solutions; and transforming
federal organizations, functions, and operations.
This report summarizes progress made in correcting high-risk problems,
actions under way, and further actions that GAO believes are needed. In
addition, GAO has determined that sufficient progress has been made to
remove the high-risk designation from two areas: the U.S. Postal Service's
transformation efforts and long-term outlook, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's single-family mortgage insurance and
rental housing assistance programs. GAO has also designated three new
areas as high risk: financing the nation's transportation system, ensuring
the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national
security interests, and transforming federal oversight of food safety.
Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to dominate the
high-risk list. Specifically, DOD has eight of its own high-risk areas and
shares responsibility for seven governmentwide high-risk areas.
In recent years, GAO's high-risk program has increasingly focused on those
major programs and operations that need urgent attention and
transformation in order to ensure that our national government functions
in the most economical, efficient, and effective manner possible. Further,
the administration has looked to GAO's program in shaping governmentwide
initiatives such as the President's Management Agenda; and more recently,
the administration undertook an effort to encourage agencies to develop
corrective action plans for high-risk areas. As in prior GAO high-risk
update reports, federal programs and operations are also emphasized when
they are at high risk because of their greater vulnerabilities to fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In addition, some of these high-risk
agencies, programs, or policies are in need of transformation, and several
items will require action by both the executive branch and Congress. Our
objective for the high-risk list is to bring visibility and urgency to
these areas in order to prompt needed actions sooner rather than later.
Copies of this update are being sent to the President, the congressional
leadership, other Members of Congress, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and the heads of major departments and agencies.
David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
Historical Perspective
In 1990, GAO began a program to report on government operations that we
identified as "high risk." Since then, generally coinciding with the start
of each new Congress, we have periodically reported on the status of
progress to address high-risk areas and updated our high-risk list. Our
most recent high-risk update was in January 2005.^1
Overall, our high-risk program has served to identify and help resolve
serious weaknesses in areas that involve substantial resources and provide
critical services to the public. Since our program began, the government
has taken high-risk problems seriously and has made long-needed progress
toward correcting them. In some cases, progress has been sufficient for us
to remove the high-risk designation. A summary of changes to our high-risk
list over the past 17 years are shown in table 1. Areas removed from the
high-risk list over that same period are shown in table 2. The areas on
GAO's 2007 high-risk list, and the year each was designated as high risk,
are shown in table 3.
Table 1: Changes to GAO's High-Risk List, 1990 to 2007
Number of areas
Original high-risk list in 1990 14
High-risk areas added since 1990 33
High-risk areas removed since 1990 18
High-risk areas consolidated since 1990 2
High-risk list in 2007 27
Source: GAO.
^1GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [12]GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
Table 2: Areas Removed from GAO's High-Risk List, 1990-2007
Year designated high
Area Year removed risk
Federal Transit Administration Grant 1995 1990
Management
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 1995 1990
Resolution Trust Corporation 1995 1990
State Department Management of Overseas 1995 1990
Real Property
Bank Insurance Fund 1995 1991
Customs Service Financial Management 1999 1991
Farm Loan Programs 2001 1990
Superfund Program 2001 1990
National Weather Service Modernization 2001 1995
The 2000 Census 2001 1997
The Year 2000 Computing Challenge 2001 1997
Asset Forfeiture Programs 2003 1990
Supplemental Security Income 2003 1997
Student Financial Aid Programs 2005 1990
Federal Aviation Administration 2005 1999
Financial Management
Forest Service Financial Management 2005 1999
HUD Single-Family Mortgage Insurance and 2007 1994
Rental Housing Assistance Programs
U.S. Postal Service Transformation 2007 2001
Efforts and Long-Term Outlook
Source: GAO.
Table 3: Year That Areas on GAO's 2007 High-Risk List Were Designated as
High Risk
Year designated high
Area risk
Medicare Program 1990
DOD Supply Chain Management 1990
DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition 1990
DOE Contract Management 1990
NASA Contract Management 1990
Enforcement of Tax Laws 1990
DOD Contract Management 1992
DOD Financial Management 1995
DOD Business Systems Modernization 1995
IRS Business Systems Modernization 1995
FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization 1995
Protecting the Federal Government's Information 1997
Systems and the Nation's Critical Infrastructures
DOD Support Infrastructure Management 1997
Strategic Human Capital Management 2001
Medicaid Program 2003
Managing Federal Real Property 2003
Modernizing Federal Disability Programs 2003
Implementing and Transforming the Department of 2003
Homeland Security
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Single-Employer 2003
Pension Insurance Program
Establishing Appropriate and Effective 2005
Information-Sharing Mechanisms to Improve Homeland
Security
DOD Approach to Business Transformation 2005
DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program 2005
Management of Interagency Contracting 2005
National Flood Insurance Program 2006
Financing the Nation's Transportation System 2007
Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies 2007
Critical to U.S. National Security Interests
Transforming Federal Oversight of Food Safety 2007
Source: GAO.
Over the years, 18 areas have been removed from the high-risk list. Eight
of these were among the 14 programs and operations we determined to be
high risk at the outset of our efforts to monitor such programs. These
results demonstrate that the sustained attention and commitment by
Congress and agencies to resolve serious, long-standing high-risk problems
have paid off, as root causes of the government's exposure for more than
half of our original high-risk list have been successfully addressed.
Historically, high-risk areas have been so designated because of
traditional vulnerabilities related to their greater susceptibility to
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. As our high-risk program has
evolved, we have increasingly used the high-risk designation to draw
attention to areas associated with broad-based transformations needed to
achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and
sustainability of selected key government programs and operations.
Perseverance by the executive branch is needed in implementing our
recommended solutions for addressing these high-risk areas. Continued
congressional oversight and, in some cases, additional legislative action
will also be key to achieving progress, particularly in addressing
challenges in broad-based transformations.
To determine which federal government programs and functions should be
designated high risk, we use our guidance document, Determining
Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.^2 In determining
whether a government program or operation is high risk, we consider
whether it involves national significance or a management function that is
key to performance and accountability. We also consider whether the risk
is:
o an inherent problem, such as may arise when the nature of a
program creates susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse, or
o a systemic problem, such as may arise when the programmatic;
management support; or financial systems, policies, and procedures
established by an agency to carry out a program are ineffective,
creating a material weakness.
Further, we consider qualitative factors, such as whether the risk
o involves public health or safety, service delivery, national
security, national defense, economic growth, or privacy or
citizens' rights, or
o could result in significantly impaired service; program failure;
injury or loss of life; or significantly reduced economy,
efficiency, or effectiveness.
In addition, we also consider the exposure to loss in monetary or
other quantitative terms. At a minimum, $1 billion must be at risk
in areas such as the value of major assets being impaired; revenue
sources not being realized; major agency assets being lost,
stolen, damaged, wasted, or underutilized; improper payments; and
contingencies or potential liabilities.
Before making a high-risk designation, we also consider corrective
measures planned or under way to resolve a material control
weakness and the status and effectiveness of these actions.
When legislative and agency actions, including those in response
to our recommendations, result in significant and sustainable
progress toward resolving a high-risk problem, we remove the
high-risk designation. Key determinants here include a
demonstrated strong commitment to and top leadership support for
addressing problems, the capacity to do so, a corrective action
plan, and demonstrated progress in implementing corrective
measures.
The next section discusses how we applied our criteria in
determining what high-risk designations to remove and what to add
for our 2007 update.
High-Risk Designations Removed
For our 2007 high-risk update, we determined that sufficient
progress has been made to warrant removing two areas from the
high-risk list: the U.S. Postal Service's transformation efforts
and long-term outlook and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's (HUD) single-family mortgage insurance and rental
housing assistance programs. As we have with areas previously
removed from the high-risk list, we will continue to monitor these
programs, as appropriate, to ensure that the improvements we have
noted are sustained.
U.S. Postal Service Transformation Efforts and Long-Term Outlook
In 2001, we designated the Postal Service's (Service)
transformation efforts and long-term outlook as high risk because
the Service's financial outlook had deteriorated significantly.
The Service had a projected deficit of $2 billion to $3 billion,
severe cash flow pressures, its debt was approaching the statutory
borrowing limit; cost growth was outpacing revenue increases; and
productivity gains were limited. Other challenges the Service
faced included liabilities that exceeded assets by $3 billion at
the end of fiscal year 2002; major liabilities and obligations
estimated at close to $100 billion; a restructuring of the
workforce due to impending retirements and operational changes;
and long-standing labor-management relations problems. We were
also concerned that the Service had no comprehensive plan to
address its financial, operational, or human capital challenges,
including how it planned to reduce its debt, and it did not have
adequate financial reporting and transparency that would allow the
public to understand changes in its financial situation. Thus, we
recommended that the Service develop a comprehensive plan, in
conjunction with other stakeholders, that would identify the
actions needed to address its challenges and provide publicly
available quarterly financial reports with sufficient information
to understand the Service's current and projected financial
condition. As the Service's financial difficulties continued in
2002, we concluded that the need for a comprehensive
transformation of the Service was more urgent than ever. The
Service's basic business model, which assumed that rising mail
volume would cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases, was
outmoded as mail volumes stagnated or deteriorated in an
increasingly competitive environment. We called for Congress to
act on comprehensive postal reform legislation.
In our January 2003 high-risk report, we noted that the Service
had made progress by issuing a Transformation Plan in April 2002
and was beginning to implement the plan. However, no consensus had
been reached on the Service's future, and we continued to have
concerns about its financial outlook. Subsequently, the Service
gained some financial breathing room primarily because legislation
enacted in April 2003 reduced the Service's payments for its
pension obligations, which allowed the Service to achieve record
net income, repay debt, and delay rate increases until January
2006. In addition, a presidential commission issued a report in
July 2003 with a proposed future vision for the Service and
recommendations to ensure the viability of postal services, and
Congress considered proposed postal reform legislation.
Since 2003, the Service has continued to make progress in
addressing its financial and human capital challenges, it improved
its financial reporting by instituting quarterly financial
reports, and it updated its Transformation Plan in September 2005.
At the end of fiscal year 2005, the Service had paid off its debt.
In addition, as of the end of fiscal year 2006, it had achieved 7
consecutive years of productivity gains, positive net income for
fiscal years 2003 through 2006, more than $5 billion in cost
savings since 2001, and it reduced its complement by 95,000 since
2001. Also, in December 2006, the Service reached tentative
compensation contract agreements, subject to ratification by union
members, with three of its four major unions. Very importantly,
significant progress was also made when Congress enacted
comprehensive postal reform legislation in December 2006, which
provides a framework for modernizing the Service's rate-setting
processes and addresses the Service's long-term financial
obligations by returning responsibility for employees' military
pension benefits to the U.S. Treasury and establishing a mechanism
for prefunding retiree health benefits.
The Postal Service's management has demonstrated a commitment to
implementing the Transformation Plan and addressing many of the
financial and human capital challenges it faces. Also, the new
postal reform legislation gives the Service additional pricing
flexibility and allows it to retain earnings, which provide
additional mechanisms to address continuing challenges related to
the Service's increasingly competitive environment, given new and
emerging technologies. These continuing challenges include (1)
generating sufficient revenues as First-Class Mail volume declines
and the changing mail mix provides less revenue contribution than
First-Class Mail, (2) controlling costs as compensation and
benefit costs rise, (3) continuing work-hour reductions while
maintaining service, (4) optimizing its infrastructure and
workforce to reduce costs and improve operational efficiency, and
(5) providing reliable data to assess performance.
Some of the Service's challenges relate to governmentwide
challenges that remain on our high-risk list, such as strategic
human capital management and managing federal real property. In
the human capital area, the Service continues to faces challenges
related to managing workforce changes due to retirements and
network consolidations and implementing performance-based
compensation systems. In the real property area, significant
challenges remain related to how the Service is planning and
implementing infrastructure realignment to reduce excess capacity
as well as reflect changes in operations. Further challenges
persist related to the Service's identification and disposal of
excess property. We plan to closely monitor these challenges to
ensure that they are addressed. We will also monitor the
implementation of the postal reform legislation to determine how
the results and impacts compare with legislative intentions.
HUD Single-Family Mortgage Insurance and Rental Housing
Assistance Programs
In 1994, we designated the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) as high risk because of fundamental management
and organizational problems that put billions of dollars in
insured mortgages and housing and community development assistance
at risk. In 2001, we narrowed the high-risk designation to HUD's
single-family mortgage insurance and rental housing assistance
programs because progress was made overall, but significant and
persistent problems in these two program areas remained.
Consistent with this designation, four of the five material
weaknesses cited in the audit report on HUD's fiscal year 2001
financial statements related to these programs. Under these
programs, HUD manages more than $400 billion in insured mortgages
and annually spends about $30 billion to subsidize rents for
lower-income households. To accomplish this, HUD relies on
thousands of intermediaries, including lenders, appraisers,
property management contractors, public housing agencies, and
multifamily property owners. Historically, weaknesses in HUD's
oversight of these entities have made the programs vulnerable to
fraud, waste, and abuse. For example, in prior high-risk updates
we noted that deficiencies in HUD's approval, monitoring, and
enforcement efforts for lenders and appraisers increased the risk
of insurance losses. In the rental assistance program area, we
reported that problems with HUD's monitoring of public housing
agencies and multifamily property owners contributed to billions
of dollars in improper rent subsidy payments (i.e., payments that
were too high or too low).
In our January 2005 high-risk update, we reported that HUD had
demonstrated commitment to and progress in addressing weaknesses
in the two high-risk program areas but that some of HUD's
corrective actions were in the early stages of implementation and
additional steps were needed to resolve ongoing problems. For
example, in the single-family mortgage insurance area, we reported
that HUD had improved its oversight of lenders and appraisers and
issued or proposed regulations to strengthen lender accountability
and combat predatory lending practices. However, we also noted
that HUD continued to grant loan underwriting authority to lenders
that had not met the agency's performance standards, and that
weaknesses in HUD's process for paying single-family property
management contractors made the agency vulnerable to questionable
and potentially fraudulent payments. In the rental housing
assistance program area, we reported that HUD made progress in
reducing improper rental assistance payments. However, we also
noted that HUD had not fully implemented a critical part of its
efforts to reduce improper rental assistance payments--the
verification of tenant incomes using a Web-based data system--and
it was uncertain whether the agency would be able to sustain the
reductions it had already achieved. HUD had also made progress in
ensuring that HUD-assisted housing met the agency's physical
condition standards.
Since 2005, HUD has continued to demonstrate a commitment to and
capacity for resolving risks, develop corrective action plans,
institute programs to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of
corrective measures, and demonstrate progress in implementing
corrective measures. For example, HUD has continued to take
actions to address long-standing problems in its single-family
mortgage insurance programs, and has addressed more recently
identified problems. More specifically:
o In accordance with our recommendations, HUD has made progress in
implementing its corrective action plan for improving oversight of
lenders. Specifically, HUD has developed and implemented new and
clearer guidance for granting lenders underwriting authority. HUD
has hired a contractor to review the implementation of the new
guidance and plans to conduct additional monitoring through
periodic internal reviews. Additionally, in 2005, HUD modified its
system for rating the underwriting quality of loans in a way
intended to focus more on underwriting errors that are likely to
affect HUD's insurance risk.^3
o HUD made substantial progress in implementing its corrective
action plan to address weaknesses we identified in its process for
paying single-family property management contractors.^4 For
example, in response to our recommendations, HUD has developed a
financial control manual that contains internal control procedures
and policies, including strict documentation requirements, for HUD
field staff to use in reviewing and approving payments. To ensure
the effectiveness of these corrective measures, HUD retained an
independent public accountant to periodically review the
performance of the property managers and test HUD field offices
for compliance with the internal control policies and procedures.
o In September 2005, we reported that HUD consistently
underestimated the subsidy costs for its single-family mortgage
insurance program.^5 To more reliably estimate program costs, we
recommended that HUD study and report in the annual actuarial
review of its insurance fund the impact of variables not in the
agency's loan performance models that have been found in other
studies to influence credit risk. Consistent with our
recommendation, a HUD contractor incorporated variables for
down-payment assistance and borrower credit history into the
actuarial review. According to HUD, the contractor will continue
to improve the forecasting ability of the models as necessary
using research and development funds provided for in the contract.
The audit report on HUD's fiscal year 2006 financial statements
eliminated the agency's only two outstanding material weaknesses
because of the improvements HUD made to its process for estimating
subsidy costs.
o In an April 2006 report, we cited factors limiting the
effectiveness of HUD's mortgage scorecard (an automated tool that
evaluates the default risk of borrowers).^6 In response to our
recommendations, HUD developed a policy and procedures manual that
calls for annual (1) monitoring of the scorecard's ability to
predict loan default, (2) testing of additional predictive
variables to include in the scorecard, and (3) updating the
scorecard with recent loan performance data.
HUD has also taken actions to address the remaining problems in
its rental housing assistance programs. For example:
o HUD continued to reduce the amount of improper rent subsidies
and exceeded goals set in The President's Management Agenda,
Fiscal Year 2002. HUD's goal for fiscal year 2005 was to reduce
improper rent subsidies by 50 percent, compared with fiscal year
2000, when HUD paid an estimated $2.2 billion in improper
subsidies. HUD exceeded this goal by reducing estimated improper
subsidies to $925 million in fiscal year 2005, a decline of 58
percent. Although the amount of improper subsidies is still
sizable, because of this progress the audit report on HUD's fiscal
year 2005 financial statements eliminated a long-standing material
weakness related to oversight and monitoring of subsidy
calculations. In accordance with the Improper Payments Information
Act of 2002, HUD plans to continue monitoring the effectiveness of
its corrective actions by making annual estimates of improper
payments.
o In 2006, HUD executed an important part of its plan for reducing
improper rental assistance payments by implementing a Web-based
system that provides public housing agencies with an efficient
method for validating the incomes of families receiving
assistance. This system, which HUD also plans to implement for
multifamily property owners, utilizes a database containing wage,
unemployment, and new hire information compiled by the Department
of Health and Human Services. HUD expects that the system will
avoid an estimated $6 billion in improper rent subsidies over 10
years.
o In response to our recommendations, HUD made on-site reviews of
public housing agencies' compliance with policies for determining
rent subsidies a permanent part of its oversight activities.^7
Beginning in fiscal year 2006, HUD committed resources to review
275 public housing agencies annually. HUD also developed and
implemented a system designed to collect complete and consistent
information from these reviews to help focus corrective actions
where needed.
o HUD has continued to monitor the physical condition of
HUD-assisted housing, and its assessments indicate a substantial
level of compliance with the agency's physical standards. HUD
physical inspections showed that in fiscal years 2005 and 2006,
about 94 percent of HUD-assisted properties had satisfactory
inspection scores.
In addition, HUD has made progress on human capital, acquisition
management, and information technology issues that in previous
years we cited as major management challenges contributing to
HUD's high-risk designation. For example, consistent with our
recommendations, in 2005 HUD finalized guidance for implementing a
comprehensive strategic workforce plan that identifies the
knowledge, skills, and abilities HUD needs and the actions that it
plans to take to build its workforce for the future.^8 HUD also
developed a new succession management plan to help ensure that the
large number of staff expected to retire over the next several
years are replaced with qualified employees. In the acquisition
management area, HUD responded to our recommendations by
developing guidance emphasizing the use of contract administration
plans and a risk-based approach for overseeing the work of
contractors.^9 Finally, HUD has made progress in its information
technology by reducing the number of noncompliant financial
management systems from 17 in 2003 to 2 in 2006.
We are removing the high-risk designation from HUD's single-family
mortgage insurance and rental housing assistance programs because
of the agency's progress in addressing problems in these areas.
However, it will be important for HUD to continue to place a high
priority on efficient and effective management of these programs.
Proposed program changes could introduce new risks and oversight
challenges. More specifically, HUD has proposed changes to its
single-family mortgage insurance program that would increase the
size of the mortgages the agency could insure, give the agency
flexibility to set insurance premiums based on the credit risk of
borrowers, and reduce down-payment requirements from the current 3
percent to potentially zero. However, to implement this
legislative proposal, HUD would have to manage new risks and
accurately estimate the costs of program changes. The
administration has also made legislative proposals to replace
HUD's largest rental housing assistance program (the Housing
Choice Voucher program) with a broader-purpose grant program.
While such proposals could help control rental subsidy costs and
increase administrative flexibility for public housing agencies,
they also could complicate HUD's oversight efforts by eliminating
the uniformity of the current program.
New High-Risk Areas
GAO's use of the high-risk designation to draw attention to the
challenges associated with the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness of government programs and operations in need of
broad-based transformation has led to important progress. We will
also continue to identify high-risk areas based on the more
traditional focus on fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Our
focus will continue to be on identifying the root causes behind
vulnerabilities, as well as actions needed on the part of the
agencies involved and, if appropriate, Congress.
For 2007, we have designated the following three new areas as high
risk: financing the nation's transportation system, ensuring the
effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national
security interests, and transforming federal oversight of food
safety.
Financing the Nation�s Transportation System
The nation's economic vitality and its citizens' quality of life
depend significantly on the efficiency of its transportation
infrastructure. This efficiency is threatened by increasing
congestion. For example, travel on roads is expected to increase
by about 25 percent from 2000 to 2010, freight traffic is expected
to increase by 43 percent from 1998 to 2010, and air traffic is
expected to triple by 2025. As congestion increases, the federal
government faces the challenge of providing funds to help maintain
and expand the nation's transportation system and ensuring that
these funds are used efficiently. However, revenues from
traditional funding mechanisms may not keep pace with demand.
Furthermore, the nation's long-term fiscal challenges limit the
ability of decision makers to look to other revenue sources that
are currently funding security and other vital needs, raising
questions about the ability of federal programs to provide the
robust growth that many transportation advocates believe is
required to meet the nation's mobility needs. Compounding these
funding constraints is the absence of a link between federal grant
funding levels and specific performance-related goals and
outcomes, resulting in little assurance that federal funding is
being channeled to the nation's most critical mobility needs. In
addition, federal funding is often tied to a single transportation
mode, which may limit the use of federal funds to finance the
greatest improvements in mobility.
Revenues to support the Highway Trust Fund--the major source of
federal highway and transit funding--are eroding. Receipts for the
Highway Trust Fund, which are derived from motor fuel and
truck-related taxes (on truck and trailer sales, truck tires, and
heavy-vehicle use) are continuing to grow. However, the federal
motor fuel tax rate of 18.4 cents per gallon has not been
increased since 1993, and thus the purchasing power of fuel tax
revenues has eroded with inflation. Furthermore, that erosion will
continue with the introduction of more fuel-efficient vehicles and
alternative-fueled vehicles in the coming years, raising the
question of whether fuel taxes are a sustainable source for
financing transportation. In addition, funding authorized in the
recently enacted highway and transit program legislation is
expected to outstrip the growth in trust fund receipts. As a
result, the Department of the Treasury and the Congressional
Budget Office are forecasting that the trust fund balance will
steadily decline and reach a negative balance by the end of fiscal
year 2011. (See fig. 1.) On a positive note, the 2005
reauthorization of the trust fund and its related programs
established a commission--chaired by the Secretary of
Transportation and which will report later this year--to recommend
approaches for placing the trust fund on a sustainable path.
Figure 1: Current Highway Trust Fund Year-End Balance Forecasts
In the face of these constraints, state and local governments are
pursuing alternative mechanisms that have the potential to meet
mobility and financing needs and help decision makers carry out
and grow their surface transportation programs. For example, many
states are pursuing tolling projects that have the promise to
raise revenues, improve capital investment decisions by better
targeting spending for new capacity, and enhance private-sector
investment in public infrastructure. Tolls that vary according to
the level of congestion (called congestion or value pricing) can
maintain a predetermined level of service, create incentives for
drivers to avoid driving alone in congested conditions, and
encourage drivers to use public transportation or travel at less
congested times. One state, Oregon, is studying the technical
feasibility of replacing its motor fuel tax with a per-mile user
fee.
Intercity passenger rail service is also at a critical juncture.
The existing intercity passenger rail system is in poor financial
condition, and the federal funds provided for it are not targeted
to the greatest public benefits, such as transportation congestion
relief. The current service provider (Amtrak) continues to rely
heavily on federal subsidies--over $1 billion annually in recent
years--and will require billions more to address deferred
maintenance and achieve a "state of good repair."^10 This current
crisis is not unusual; Amtrak has struggled to become financially
solvent since its inception. We have recommended that Congress
consider restructuring the nation's intercity passenger rail
system, which would entail establishing clear goals for the
system, defining the roles of key stakeholders (including the
federal government), and developing funding mechanisms that
include cost sharing between the federal government and other
beneficiaries.
The freight railroad industry is projected to grow substantially
with expected increases in freight traffic, but the industry's
ability to fund this projected growth is largely uncertain. For
private companies seeking to maximize returns for shareholders,
railroad investment poses a substantial risk. But railroad
investment is critical to freight mobility and economic growth,
and investments in rail projects can produce public benefits, such
as reducing highway congestion, strengthening intermodal
connections and the efficiency of the publicly owned
transportation system, and enhancing public safety and the
environment. As a result, the federal and state governments have
increasingly invested public funds in freight rail projects, such
as the $100 million that Congress provided in 2005 for rail
infrastructure improvements in the Chicago area. In the years
ahead, Congress is likely to receive further requests for funding
and face additional decisions about potential federal policy
responses and the federal role in the nation's freight railroad
infrastructure. In the highly constrained federal funding
environment, such policy responses need to recognize that the
freight transportation system functions in a competitive
marketplace, calling for a mode-neutral approach. Currently, as we
have reported, the trucking and barge industries have a
competitive price advantage over railroads because trucks and
barges use infrastructure that is owned and maintained by the
government, whereas rail companies use infrastructure that they
pay to own and maintain.^11 In addition, decision makers will be
challenged to make investment decisions that reflect public
priorities and are designed to achieve demonstrable, wide-ranging
public benefits that warrant the commitment of scarce federal
funds.
Federal aviation programs are also facing growing infrastructure
demands and constrained resources. To meet the anticipated
increases in commercial aviation travel, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and aviation stakeholders are developing the
"next-generation air transportation system" (NGATS) to modernize
the nation's air traffic control (ATC) infrastructure and increase
capacity. This effort is complex and costly: Under one scenario
that includes a limited, preliminary cost estimate for NGATS,
FAA's budget would, on average, exceed FAA's fiscal year 2006
appropriation level by about $1 billion a year (in today's
dollars) through 2025. FAA and some stakeholders have raised
doubts about the ability of the current funding system--the
Aviation Trust Fund--to generate revenues to meet these budgetary
needs equitably and efficiently over time. Specifically, FAA and
some stakeholders are concerned that as FAA's workload (and,
therefore, costs) rises, there will be no corresponding increase
in its revenues because of the greater use of smaller aircraft and
a decline in inflation-adjusted airfares. Trends in these data
provide support for these concerns. While FAA has a history of
cost control problems associated with ATC modernization, it has
made a number of important management improvements. However,
questions remain about FAA's ability to manage the transition to
NGATS cost-effectively. However, failing to meet these
infrastructure challenges in aviation may have significant
consequences, since aviation is an integral part of the economy.
FAA is expected to release its proposal to reform the current
funding system within the next few months.
Given the common challenges spanning the nation's transportation
infrastructure, Congress and, for some issues, the Department of
Transportation should reassess the following issues for all
transportation modes to better position the federal government to
address these challenges:
Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to
U.S. National Security Interests
U.S. military strategy is premised on technological superiority on
the battlefield. The Department of Defense spends billions of
dollars each year for the development and production of high
technology weaponry to maintain superiority. These weapons and
militarily useful technologies are sold overseas by U.S. companies
for economic reasons and by the U.S. government for foreign
policy, security, and economic reasons. Yet, the technologies that
underpin U.S. military and economic strength continue to be
targets for theft, espionage, reverse engineering, and illegal
export. At the same time, the programs the U.S. government has in
place to protect critical technologies by weighing competing and
sometimes conflicting national security, foreign policy, and
economic interests have long been criticized by industry and
allies for their inability to adapt to a changing world
environment and their lack of efficiency.
The U.S. government has a myriad of laws, regulations, policies,
and processes intended to identify and protect critical
technologies so they can be transferred to foreign parties in a
manner consistent with U.S. interests. The government's technology
protection programs include those that regulate U.S.
defense-related exports and investigate proposed foreign
acquisitions of U.S. national security-related companies. (See
table 4.) Responsibility for administering or overseeing the
different programs is divided among multiple federal agencies and
several congressional committees. However, in the decades since
these programs were put in place, significant forces have
heightened the U.S. government's challenge of weighing security
concerns with the desire to reap economic benefits. Most notably,
in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the
threats facing the nation have been redefined. In addition, the
economy has become increasingly globalized as countries open their
markets and the pace of technological innovation has quickened
worldwide. Government programs established decades ago to protect
critical technologies are ill-equipped to weigh competing U.S.
interests as these forces continue to evolve in the 21st century.
Accordingly, we are designating the effective identification and
protection of critical technologies as a governmentwide high-risk
area, which warrants a strategic re-examination of existing
programs to identify needed changes and ensure the advancement of
U.S. interests.
1. the appropriate federal role and strategy in
funding, selecting, and evaluating transportation
investments;
2. mechanisms to seek alternative sources of revenues
and, where appropriate, to increase revenues for
infrastructure improvements, including user fees and
alternatives to stimulate private investment, while
considering their impact on the federal budget; and
3. funding allocation and monitoring methods to
ensure the equity, efficiency, accountability, and
performance of transportation investments.
^2GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High
Risks, [13]GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: November 2000).
^3GAO, Single-Family Housing: Progress Made, but Opportunities Exist to
Improve HUD's Oversight of FHA Lenders, [14]GAO-05-13 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 12, 2004).
^4GAO, HUD Single-Family and Multifamily Property Programs: Inadequate
Controls Resulted in Questionable Payments and Potential Fraud,
[15]GAO-04-390 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2004).
^5GAO, Mortgage Financing: FHA's $7 Billion Reestimate Reflects Higher
Claims and Changing Loan Performance Estimates, [16]GAO-05-875
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2, 2005).
^6GAO, Mortgage Financing: HUD Could Realize Additional Benefits from Its
Mortgage Scorecard, [17]GAO-06-435 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2006).
^7GAO, HUD Rental Assistance: Progress and Challenges in Measuring and
Reducing Improper Rent Subsidies, [18]GAO-05-224 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
18, 2005).
^8GAO, HUD Human Capital Management: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce
Planning Needed, [19]GAO-02-839 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002).
^9GAO, HUD Management: Actions Needed to Improve Acquisition Management,
[20]GAO-03-157 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
^10"State of good repair" is the outcome expected from the capital
investment needed to restore Amtrak's right-of-way (track, signals, and
auxiliary structures), other infrastructure (e.g., stations), and
equipment to a condition that requires only routine maintenance.
^11As we have reported, the trucking and barge industries pay fees and
taxes to use this government-funded infrastructure, but their payments
generally do not cover the costs they impose on highways and waterways.
Table 4: U.S. Government Programs for the Identification and Protection of
Critical Technologies
Program Agencies Program's purpose Legal authority
Dual-Use Export Commerce (lead), Regulate export of Export
Control System State, Central dual-use items by Administration
Intelligence U.S. companies after Act of 1979
Agency, Defense, weighing economic,
Energy, Homeland national security,
Security, and and foreign policy
Justice interests
Arms Export State (lead), Regulate export of Arms Export
Control System Defense, Homeland arms by U.S. Control Act of
Security, and companies, giving 1976
Justice primacy to national
security and foreign
policy concerns
Foreign Military State and Defense Provide foreign Arms Export
Sales Program (leads), Homeland governments with U.S. Control Act of
Security defense articles and 1976
services to help
promote
interoperability
while lowering the
unit costs of weapon
systems
National State, Defense, Determine the National Security
Disclosure and intelligence releasibility of Decision
Policy Process community classified military Memorandum 119 of
information, 1971
including classified
weapons and military
technologies, to
foreign governments
Committee on Treasury (lead), Investigate the Exon-Florio
Foreign Commerce, impact of foreign Amendment of 1988
Investment in Defense, Homeland acquisitions on to the Defense
the United Security, national security and Production Act of
States (CFIUS) Justice, State, to suspend or 1950
and six offices prohibit acquisitions
from the that might threaten
Executive Office national security
of the President
National Defense (lead), Ensure that Executive Order
Industrial applicable to contractors No. 12829 of 1993
Security Program other departments (including those
and agencies under foreign
influence, control,
or ownership)
appropriately
safeguard classified
information in their
possession
Anti-Tamper Defense Establish anti-tamper Defense Policy
Policy techniques on weapons Memorandum, 1999
systems when
warranted as a method
to protect critical
technologies on these
systems
Militarily Defense Identify and assess Export
Critical technologies that are Administration
Technologies critical for Act of 1979
Program retaining U.S.
military dominance
Sources: GAO (analysis); cited legal authorities (data).
Over the years, we have identified weaknesses in the effectiveness and
efficiency of government programs designed to protect critical
technologies while advancing U.S. interests. While each program has its
own set of challenges, we found that these weaknesses are largely
attributable to poor coordination within complex interagency processes,
inefficiencies in program operations, and a lack of systematic evaluations
for assessing program effectiveness and identifying corrective actions.
The impacts of these weaknesses are not always visible or immediate but,
as we have reported, increase the risk of military gains by entities with
interests contrary to those of the United States and of financial harm to
U.S. companies. Others, including the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, congressional committees, and inspectors
general, have also reported on vulnerabilities in these programs and the
resulting harm--both actual and potential--to U.S. security and economic
interests.
Several of the programs designed to protect critical technologies are
inherently complex. Multiple departments and agencies representing various
interests, which at times can be competing and even divergent, participate
in decisions about the control and protection of critical U.S.
technologies. However, as exemplified below, poor coordination and
fundamental disagreements among the departments have had unintended
consequences for both national security and economic interests.
o Commerce and State have yet to clearly determine which
department controls the export of certain missile technology
items, which increases the risk that these items will fall into
the wrong hands or creates an unlevel playing field for U.S.
companies.^12 Since Commerce and State have different restrictions
on these items, it is important that they define who controls the
items. Otherwise, the exporter--not the government--is left to
determine which restrictions apply and the type of governmental
review.
o The departments participating in the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) lack a coordinated
approach for defining what constitutes a threat to national
security and what warrants an investigation to ensure that the
risk of foreign ownership is mitigated.^13 This lack of agreement
among the members, which limits CFIUS's analyses of proposed and
completed foreign acquisitions, has been intensified by continued
economic globalization and by increasingly diffuse threats. Some
CFIUS members have argued that taking a more traditional and
narrow view of what constitutes a national security threat can
limit the protection of critical infrastructure or the
preservation of technological superiority in the defense arena.
Recently, member agencies indicated a need for changes to the
process and some are currently under way.
o Within Defense, the military services and programs have
different interpretations of what constitutes military critical
technologies, which can result in different conclusions about what
technologies need protection through the application of
anti-tamper techniques.^14 Defense does not coordinate or oversee
how the services and programs identify critical technologies
needing anti-tamper protection. This creates the vulnerability of
having the same technology protected on one weapon system but not
on another, thereby exposing both systems to exploitation and
compromise.
While government officials responsible for administering the
programs designed to protect critical technologies may
appropriately take time to make decisions as they consider the
multiple interests involved, inefficiencies in the various
programs have created unnecessary delays in sharing critical
technologies with allies.
o Although State has implemented a series of initiatives primarily
designed to expedite the processing of arms export licenses, we
found that these initiatives have generally not been
successful.^15 Most notably, the department designated the
processing of license applications in support of Operations Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom its top priority and established an
expedited process for reviewing those applications. However, only
19 percent of the applications submitted through the expedited
process for these operations were processed within the goals set
by the department.^16 These included applications for protective
body armor for U.S. and coalition forces and aircraft defensive
systems.
The departments charged with protecting critical technologies have
not systematically evaluated their respective programs to
determine whether they are fulfilling their missions in a changing
environment and whether corrective actions are needed.
o Given its lack of systematic evaluations, Commerce cannot
readily identify weaknesses in the dual-use export control system
or implement needed corrective measures that allow U.S. companies
to compete in the global marketplace while minimizing the risk to
other U.S. interests.^17 As we and the Office of Management and
Budget have reported, Commerce has not established performance
measures that provide a basis for assessing the effectiveness of
the dual-use export control system. Instead, Commerce relies on
narrow measures related to the efficiencies of its processes and
anecdotal indications to gauge how well the system is functioning.
o After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, State did not make
fundamental or significant changes to the arms export control
system, its objectives, or implementing regulations.^18 State
officials maintained that such changes are not needed because they
regard the system as effective in keeping U.S. defense items out
of enemy hands while ensuring that allies can obtain needed arms.
However, State's conclusions regarding the system appear without
basis because State has not provided evidence that it
systematically assessed the effectiveness of its controls or major
initiatives that were intended to facilitate sales to allies.
Further, our reports have documented weaknesses and challenges
over the years that point to vulnerabilities in the arms export
control system and its ability to protect U.S. interests.
o Defense cannot provide assurances that its oversight of foreign
owned or influenced contractors is sufficient to reduce the risk
of foreign interests gaining unauthorized access to U.S.
classified information.^19 Specifically, Defense does not
systematically collect information to know if contractors are
reporting certain business transactions, which would enable
Defense to know when a contractor has come under foreign influence
and determine what protective measures may be needed to reduce the
risk of information compromise. For example, one foreign-owned
contractor appeared to have had access to U.S. classified
information for at least 6 months before a protective measure was
implemented. Moreover, Defense neither centrally collects
information to determine the magnitude of contractors under
foreign influence nor assesses the effectiveness of its oversight
so it can identify weaknesses in its protective measures and make
necessary adjustments.
We have recommended numerous corrective actions to address these
weaknesses and inefficiencies, but the departments involved have
not implemented many of the recommendations that address the most
fundamental problems affecting the protection of critical
technologies and the advancement of U.S. interests. Legislation
has been introduced to modify or reform aspects of the programs
for protecting critical technologies. For example, legislation was
introduced in the 109th Congress to reauthorize the Export
Administration Act.^20 Also, the House of Representatives passed
legislation in 2005 to create an interagency strategic export
control board charged with conducting a comprehensive evaluation
of U.S. export controls and developing recommendations for
consolidating export control functions. In addition, the House and
Senate passed two different bills in the last Congress, and new
legislation has recently been introduced in the House to reform
CFIUS and its approach to evaluating proposed foreign
acquisitions. However, to date, legislation has not been enacted
to overhaul these programs and executive action has not resulted
in fundamental changes to these programs.
Implementation of our outstanding recommendations should be an
interim step in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of
existing government programs intended to identify and protect
critical technologies. However, further actions are needed. The
executive and legislative branches need to re-examine the current
government programs to determine whether and how they can
collectively achieve their mission and evaluate alternative
approaches. The results of these efforts should provide the basis
for establishing a comprehensive framework with clear
responsibilities and accountability for identifying and protecting
critical technologies as global forces continue to reshape U.S.
national security and economic interests.
Transforming Federal Oversight of Food Safety
This nation enjoys a plentiful and varied food supply that is
generally considered to be safe. However, the patchwork nature of
the federal oversight of food safety calls into question whether
the government can plan more strategically to inspect food
production processes, identify and react more quickly to any
outbreaks of contaminated food, and focus on achieving results to
promote the safety and integrity of the nation's food supply. This
challenge is even more urgent since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, heightened awareness of agriculture's
vulnerabilities to terrorism, such as the deliberate contamination
of food or the introduction of disease to livestock, poultry, and
crops. Over several years, we have reported on issues that suggest
that food safety could be designated as a high-risk area because
of the need for transforming the federal oversight framework to
reduce risks to public health as well as the economy.
Either an accidental or deliberate contamination of food or the
introduction of disease to livestock, poultry, and crops could
undermine consumer confidence in the government's ability to
ensure the safety of the U.S. food supply, as well as cause severe
economic consequences. Each year, about 76 million people contract
a food-borne illness in the United States; about 325,000 require
hospitalization; and about 5,000 die, according to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, agriculture, as the
largest industry and employer in the United States, generates more
than $1 trillion in economic activity annually, or about 13
percent of the gross domestic product. The value of U.S.
agricultural exports exceeded $68 billion in fiscal year 2006. An
introduction of a highly infectious foreign animal disease, such
as avian influenza or foot-and-mouth disease, would cause severe
economic disruption, including substantial losses from halted
exports. Similarly, food contamination, such as the recent E. coli
outbreaks, can have a detrimental impact on local economies. For
example, industry representatives estimate losses from the recent
California spinach E. coli outbreak to range from $37 million to
$74 million.
A challenge for the 21st century is how several federal agencies
can integrate the myriad food safety programs and strategically
manage their portfolios to promote the safety and integrity of the
nation's food supply.^21 In numerous previous reports, we have
described the fragmented federal food safety system in which 15
agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food
safety. The two primary agencies are the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), which is responsible for the safety of meat,
poultry, and processed egg products and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which is responsible for virtually all other
foods. Among other agencies with responsibilities related to food
safety, the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of
Commerce conducts voluntary, fee-for-service inspections of
seafood safety and quality; the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulates the use of pesticides and maximum allowable
residue levels on food commodities and animal feed; and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for
coordinating agencies' food security activities.
The food safety system is further complicated by the subtle
differences in food products that dictate which agency regulates a
product as well as the frequency with which inspections occur. For
example, how a packaged ham-and-cheese sandwich is regulated
depends on how the sandwich is presented. USDA inspects
manufacturers of packaged open-face meat or poultry sandwiches
(e.g., those with one slice of bread), but FDA inspects
manufacturers of packaged closed-face meat or poultry sandwiches
(e.g., those with two slices of bread). Although there are no
differences in the risks posed by these products, USDA inspects
wholesale manufacturers of open-face sandwiches sold in interstate
commerce daily, while FDA inspects closed-face sandwiches an
average of once every 5 years.
This federal regulatory system for food safety evolved piecemeal,
typically in response to particular health threats or economic
crises. During the past 30 years, we have detailed problems with
the fragmented federal food safety system and reported that the
system has caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective
coordination, and inefficient use of resources. Our most recent
work demonstrates that these challenges persist. Specifically:
o Existing statutes give agencies different regulatory and
enforcement authorities. For example, food products under FDA's
jurisdiction may be marketed without the agency's prior approval.
On the other hand, food products under USDA's jurisdiction must
generally be inspected and approved as meeting federal standards
before being sold to the public. Under current law, USDA
inspectors maintain continuous inspection at slaughter facilities
and examine each slaughtered meat and poultry carcass. They also
visit each processing facility at least once during each operating
day. For foods under FDA's jurisdiction, however, federal law does
not mandate the frequency of inspections.^22
o We reported that federal agencies are spending resources on
overlapping food safety activities.^23 USDA and FDA both inspect
shipments of imported food at 18 U.S. ports-of-entry. However,
these two agencies do not share inspection resources at these
ports. For example, USDA officials told us that all USDA-import
inspectors are assigned to and located at USDA-approved import
inspection facilities and some of these facilities handle and
store FDA-regulated products. USDA has no jurisdiction over these
FDA-regulated products. Although USDA maintains a daily presence
at these facilities, the FDA-regulated products may remain at the
facilities for some time awaiting FDA inspection. In fiscal year
2003, USDA spent almost $16 million on imported food inspections,
and FDA spent more than $115 million.
o Food recalls are voluntary and federal agencies responsible for
food safety have no authority to compel companies to carry out
recalls--with the exception of FDA's authority to require a recall
for infant formula. USDA and FDA provide guidance to companies for
carrying out voluntary recalls. We reported that USDA and FDA can
do a better job in carrying out their food recall programs so they
can quickly remove potentially unsafe food from the
marketplace.^24 These agencies do not know how promptly and
completely companies are carrying out recalls, do not promptly
verify that recalls have reached all segments of the distribution
chain, and use procedures to alert consumers to a recall that may
not be effective.
o The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have heightened
concerns about agriculture's vulnerability to terrorism. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned DHS the lead coordination
responsibility for protecting the nation against terrorist
attacks, including agroterrorism. Subsequent presidential
directives further define agencies' specific roles in protecting
agriculture and the food system against terrorist attacks. We
reported that in carrying out these new responsibilities, agencies
have taken steps to better manage the risks of agroterrorism,
including developing national plans and adopting standard
protocols.^25 However, we also found several management problems
that can reduce the effectiveness of the agencies' routine efforts
to protect against agroterrorism. For example, there are
weaknesses in the flow of critical information among key
stakeholders and shortcomings in DHS's coordination of federal
working groups and research efforts.
o In response to the nation's pressing fiscal challenges, agencies
may have to explore new approaches to achieve their missions. FDA
is responsible for ensuring the safety of seafood. More than 80
percent of the seafood that Americans consume is imported. We
reported in 2001 that FDA's seafood inspection program did not
sufficiently protect consumers.^26 For example, FDA tested about 1
percent of imported seafood products. We subsequently found that
FDA's program has shown some improvement. More foreign firms are
inspected, and inspections show that more U.S. seafood importers
are complying with its requirements.^27 Given FDA officials'
concerns about limited inspection resources, we also identified
options, such as using personnel in the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's Seafood Inspection Program to augment
FDA's inspection capacity or state regulatory laboratories for
analyzing imported seafood. FDA agreed with these options.
o We reported that in fiscal year 2003, four agencies--USDA, FDA,
EPA, and the National Marine Fisheries Service--spent $1.7 billion
on food safety-related activities.^28 USDA and FDA together were
responsible for nearly 90 percent of federal expenditures for food
safety. However, these expenditures were not based on the volume
of foods regulated by the agencies or consumed by the public. The
majority of federal expenditures for food safety inspection were
directed toward USDA's programs for ensuring the safety of meat,
poultry, and egg products; however, USDA is responsible for
regulating about 20 percent of the food supply. In contrast, FDA,
which is responsible for regulating about 80 percent of the food
supply, accounted for only about 24 percent of expenditures.
Others have called for fundamental changes to the federal food
safety system overall. In 1998, the National Academy of Sciences
concluded that the system is not well equipped to meet emerging
challenges.^29 In response to the academy's report, the President
established a Council on Food Safety which released a Food Safety
Strategic Plan in January 2001. The plan recognized the need for a
comprehensive food safety statute and concluded "the current
organizational structure makes it more difficult to achieve future
improvements in efficiency, efficacy, and allocation of resources
based on risk."
While many of the recommendations we made have been acted upon, a
fundamental re-examination of the federal food safety system is
warranted. Taken as a whole, our work indicates that Congress and
the executive branch can and should create the environment needed
to look across the activities of individual programs within
specific agencies and toward the goals that the federal government
is trying to achieve. To that end, we have recommended, among
other things, that Congress enact comprehensive, uniform, and
risk-based food safety legislation and commission the National
Academy of Sciences or a blue ribbon panel to conduct a detailed
analysis of alternative organizational food safety structures.^30
We have also recommended that the executive branch reconvene the
President's Council on Food Safety to facilitate interagency
coordination on food safety regulation and programs.
These actions can begin to address the fragmentation in the
federal oversight of food safety. Going forward, to build a
sustained focus on the safety and the integrity of the nation's
food supply, Congress and the executive branch can integrate
various expectations for food safety with congressional oversight
and through agencies' strategic planning processes. The
development of a governmentwide performance plan that is
mission-based, has a results-orientation, and provides a
cross-agency perspective offers a framework to help ensure
agencies' goals are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
Further, with pressing fiscal challenges, this plan can assist
decision makers in balancing trade-offs and comparing performance
when resource allocation and restructuring decisions are made.
^12GAO, Export Controls: Clarification of Jurisdiction for Missile
Technology Items Needed, [307]GAO-02-120 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 9, 2001);
and Export Controls: Improvements to Commerce's Dual-Use System Needed to
Ensure Protection of U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11 Environment,
[308]GAO-06-638 (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2006).
^13GAO, Defense Trade: Enhancements to the Implementation of Exon-Florio
Could Strengthen the Law's Effectiveness, [309]GAO-05-686 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 28, 2005).
^14GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Better Support Program
Managers' Implementation of Anti-Tamper Protection, [310]GAO-04-302
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).
^15GAO, Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post-9/11
Environment, [311]GAO-05-234 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2005); and
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in
the Post-9/11 Security Environment, [312]GAO-05-468R (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 7, 2005).
^16This covers license applications processed between October 1, 2001, and
April 30, 2004.
^17GAO, Export Controls: Improvements to Commerce's Dual-Use System Needed
to Ensure Protection of U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11 Environment,
[313]GAO-06-638 (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2006).
^18GAO, Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and
Inefficiencies in the Post-9/11 Security Environment, [314]GAO-05-468R
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2005).
^19GAO, Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of
Contractors under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient, [315]GAO-05-681
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005).
^20The Export Administration Act is not permanent legislation. When the
authority granted under the act lapsed in 2001, the controls established
under the act and the implementing regulations were continued under
Executive Order 13222, which was issued under the authority provided by
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
^21GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [316]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
^22GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should Be Taken to Reduce
Overlapping Inspections and Related Activities, [317]GAO-05-549T
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
^23GAO, Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should
Pursue Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage Resources,
[318]GAO-05-213 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2005).
^24GAO, Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and
Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food, [319]GAO-05-51 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 6, 2004).
^25GAO, Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from
a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, [320]GAO-05-214
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2005).
^26GAO, Food Safety: Federal Oversight of Seafood Does Not Sufficiently
Protect Consumers, [321]GAO-01-204 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2001).
^27GAO, Food Safety: FDA's Imported Seafood Safety Program Shows Some
Progress, but Further Improvements Are Needed, [322]GAO-04-246
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).
^28GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should Be Taken to Reduce
Overlapping Inspections and Related Activities, [323]GAO-05-549T
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005).
^29Institute of Medicine, Ensuring Safe Food from Production to
Consumption, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1998.
^30GAO, Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure
Safe Food, [324]GAO-02-47T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10, 2001).
Progress Being Made in Other High-Risk Areas
For other areas that remain on our 2007 high-risk list, there has
been important but varying levels of progress, although not yet
enough progress to remove these areas from the list. Top
administration officials have expressed their commitment to
ensuring that high-risk areas receive adequate attention and
oversight. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has led an
initiative to prompt agencies to develop detailed action plans for
each area on our high-risk list. These plans are to identify
specific goals and milestones that address and reduce the risks
identified by us within each high-risk area. Further, OMB has
encouraged agencies to consult with us regarding the problems our
past work has identified, and the many recommendations for
corrective actions we have made. While progress on developing and
implementing plans has been mixed, such a concerted effort by
agencies and ongoing attention by OMB are critical; our experience
over the past 17 years has shown that perseverance is required to
fully resolve high-risk areas. Congress, too, will continue to
play an important role through its oversight and, where
appropriate, through legislative action targeting both specific
problems and the high-risk areas overall.
Examples of progress in other programs or operations that were
previously designated as high risk are discussed below and in the
highlights pages that follow this section.
o The Department of Health and Human Services and its Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have made some progress to
improve the fiscal integrity and oversight of the Medicaid
program, which was designated high risk in 2003. For example, CMS
has taken steps to improve its oversight of certain Medicaid
financial management activities, including efforts to oversee
states' financing methods. It also issued a comprehensive 5-year
plan in July 2006 that outlined initial activities planned for
implementing the Medicaid Integrity Program required by the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. However, several oversight
weaknesses previously identified by us have not yet been
addressed. For example, CMS has not incorporated the use of key
Medicaid data systems into its oversight of states' Medicaid
claims, or clarified and communicated its policies in several
high-risk areas, such as supplemental payment arrangements and
administrative costs. The results of CMS's actions will need to be
assessed to determine their effectiveness in improving the
program's fiscal integrity, and more action is needed before the
program's high-risk designation can be removed.
o Regarding the Medicare program, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) has made some progress in the last 2 years
in reforming and refining payment methods, enhancing program
integrity, improving program management, and overseeing patient
safety and care. For example, CMS is improving how it sets or
updates rates for hospital services, durable medical equipment,
and certain drugs and devices supplied in medical facilities.
Medicare's most recent estimate of its national rate of improper
payments was 4.4 percent--the lowest since measurement began in
1996. Nevertheless, Medicare's size, complexity, and vulnerability
to mismanagement and improper payments suggest that its high-risk
designation cannot be removed. For example, GAO found weaknesses
in CMS's information security controls that could make sensitive,
personally identifiable medical information vulnerable to
unauthorized access. Similarly, call centers sponsored by the
agency or private drug plans fell short in providing accurate and
complete information to callers inquiring about the new
prescription drug benefit.
o The administration and real property-holding agencies have made
progress toward strategically managing federal real property. In
response to both an executive order aimed at improving real
property management and the President's Management Agenda
initiative on real property, agencies have, among other things,
established asset management plans, standardized data reporting,
and adopted performance measures. Also, the administration has
created a Federal Real Property Council and plans to work with
Congress to provide agencies with tools to better manage real
property. These actions have addressed our prior concern that a
strategic governmentwide focus on solving the problems was
lacking, but the underlying conditions that led to the high-risk
designation continue to exist.
o Since the 2005 high-risk update, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has made progress in addressing major
transformation, management, and program challenges, which prior
GAO work has identified as key to successfully transforming 22
agencies into one department and effectively carrying out its
homeland security and other missions. DHS has produced a strategic
plan that contains most elements required by the Government
Performance and Results Act and the under secretary of management
is working to integrate some management functions. However, DHS
has not linked its goals to resource requirements in its strategic
plan and has not involved all stakeholders in its strategic
planning process. Moreover, DHS lacks not only a comprehensive
strategy with overall goals and a timeline but also a dedicated
management integration team to support its management integration
efforts. DHS and its components are developing corrective action
plans to address material weaknesses identified by the financial
statement auditor, but recent audits found its financial systems
do not conform to federal requirements, and financial statements
contain numerous material weaknesses. DHS is working to develop a
departmentwide framework for managing information but has not
implemented an effective process for informed decision making by
senior leadership about competing technology investment options or
a comprehensive information security program to protect its
information and systems. DHS has taken some actions to integrate
the legacy agency workforces that make up its components and has
made progress in establishing human capital capabilities for the
US-VISIT program, but DHS has not linked its new human capital
system to its strategic plan. DHS has made progress in enhancing
communication among its acquisition organizations through its
strategic sourcing and small business programs, but some
components remain exempted from the unified acquisition
organization, and the chief procurement officer has insufficient
staff for departmentwide oversight. In addition, DHS has continued
to form necessary partnerships and has undertaken a number of
efforts with private entities, but key partnering challenges
continue as DHS seeks to leverage resources and more effectively
carry out its homeland security responsibilities. In their program
activities, DHS and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) have taken numerous actions to strengthen commercial
aviation security, and the Coast Guard has moved to control costs
by offering incentives to contractors that attempt to foster
competition for subcontracts. However, TSA faces the difficult
task of assessing and allocating resources across all
transportation modes based on risk, while adapting to changing
threats within the commercial aviation industry. DHS agencies have
made progress in activities to refine the screening of foreign
visitors to the United States, target potentially dangerous cargo,
and provide the personnel necessary to effectively fulfill border
security and trade agency missions. However, trade and visitor
screening systems have weaknesses that must be overcome to better
ensure border and trade security. DHS has also enhanced the
efficiency of certain immigration services, reducing the size of
the backlog of immigration-benefit applications. However, DHS has
not adopted a comprehensive risk management approach when it comes
to the detection and investigation of immigration fraud. Finally,
DHS has made revisions to the National Response Plan to clarify
federal roles and responsibilities. In response to concerns raised
by us and others, Congress clarified the roles and
responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
in the DHS fiscal year 2007 appropriations act and designated the
FEMA Administrator as the "Principal Advisor" to the President on
emergency management. However, DHS has yet to develop necessary
disaster capabilities and to create accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response
against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
o During the past 2 years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
made progress in its enforcement efforts. Notably, enforcement
revenue rose from $43.1 billion in fiscal year 2004 to $48.7
billion in fiscal year 2006. Based on preliminary data, IRS
increased the overall percentage of tax returns examined between
fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2006 by about 30 percent. IRS
completed research in 2005 on individual taxpayers' compliance and
is currently using the results to better target operational
audits. IRS also set a long-term goal to increase the compliance
rate. Despite these promising developments, challenges remain.
IRS's most recent estimate of the gross tax gap (the difference
between the taxes that should have been paid voluntarily and on
time and what was actually paid) was $345 billion for tax year
2001. Although IRS estimates that it would eventually collect $55
billion of this amount, a net tax gap of $290 billion would
remain. Given the magnitude of the tax gap, even a relatively
small percentage reduction in the gap would yield billions of
dollars in additional revenue for the government. IRS needs
periodic, if not annual, measurements of compliance to gauge the
extent to which compliance is changing and to effectively target
its service and enforcement efforts. Further, IRS lacks a
data-based plan to improve compliance and reach its long-term
goal. Real progress in reducing the tax gap will require efforts
beyond enforcement. IRS will need to develop and execute multiple
strategies over a sustained period including working with Treasury
to develop new and innovative solutions to improve compliance.
Statutory changes will be needed as well to meaningfully reduce
the gap and we have presented options, such as additional
withholding for selected parties and additional information
reporting on the cost basis for securities sales, for Congress to
consider.
o We first added the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC)
single-employer pension insurance program as a high-risk area in
July 2003 because the program's financial health was threatened by
structural weaknesses in pension funding rules, the program's
premium structure, and the potential for large bankruptcies among
sponsors with underfunded plans in weak industries. Since then,
Congress passed major pension reform legislation that was signed
into law. The reforms include revisions to the defined benefit
pension funding rules, changes to the PBGC program's insurance
premium structure, and other changes aimed at limiting the risk
that underfunded plans might pose to PBGC. While some of these
reforms represent progress, their ultimate impact on the
single-employer program's deficit is unclear. Many of these
reforms will be phased in gradually, postponing their potentially
positive effect on plan funding, while other changes could have
the effect of increasing PBGC's financial exposure.
o The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has made significant
progress in addressing air traffic control modernization program
weaknesses since it was designated as high risk in 1995. For
example, FAA has established a framework for improving its system
management capabilities and addressed weakness on selected air
traffic control systems; implemented key components of a cost
accounting system and established a cost estimating methodology;
and made progress in establishing an organizational culture that
supports sound acquisitions. FAA has also developed an action plan
with the Office of Management and Budget to continue to address
these issues. Additionally, FAA has reported that it has exceeded
its targets for delivering selected system acquisitions on cost
and schedule for the past 3 years. However, FAA-improved system
management capabilities have yet to be institutionalized, the cost
estimating methodology has not yet been fully implemented, and
major systems will be coming on line in the next few years.
Moreover, FAA still faces many human capital challenges, including
obtaining the technical and contract management expertise needed
to define, implement, and integrate numerous complex programs and
systems. With FAA expecting to spend about $9.4 billion between
now and the end of fiscal year 2011 to upgrade and replace air
traffic control systems, these actions are as critical as ever.
o Since 2005, DOD has taken some positive steps toward addressing
challenges related to the supply chain management high-risk area.
For example, in collaboration with OMB, DOD developed a plan to
address some of the systemic weaknesses in supply chain
management. The plan encompasses 10 initiatives, such as war
reserve materiel improvements and the expanded use of radio
frequency identification, aimed at the three focus areas we have
identified from our prior work: requirements forecasting, asset
visibility, and materiel distribution. This plan provides a
framework for addressing systemic weaknesses and focusing
long-term efforts to improve supply support to the warfighter. DOD
has made some progress implementing these initiatives, and DOD
leadership has demonstrated a commitment to resolving supply chain
management problems. However, successful resolution of these
long-standing problems will take several years of continued
efforts, and the department faces challenges and risks in
successful implementation of proposed changes. For example, DOD's
plan generally lacks outcome-focused performance metrics for many
of its initiatives, making it difficult to track and demonstrate
progress in improving the three focus areas. Further, DOD's
ability to make coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across
the multiple organizations involved in the materiel distribution
system has been hindered by problems defining who has
accountability and authority for making such improvements.
Highlights for Each High-Risk Area
Overall, the government continues to take high-risk problems
seriously and is making long-needed progress toward correcting
them. Congress has also acted to address several individual
high-risk areas through hearings and legislation. Continued
perseverance in addressing high-risk areas will ultimately yield
significant benefits. Lasting solutions to high-risk problems
offer the potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically
improve service to the American public, strengthen public
confidence and trust in the performance and accountability of our
national government, and ensure the ability of government to
deliver on its promises.
We have prepared highlights of each of the 27 high-risk areas on
our updated list, showing (1) why the area is high risk, (2) the
actions that have been taken and that are under way to address the
problem since our last update report as well as the issues that
are yet to be resolved, and (3) what remains to be done to address
the risk. These highlights are presented on the following pages.
Related Products
Strategic Human Capital Management
Office of Personnel Management: Key Lessons Learned to Date for
Strengthening Capacity to Lead and Implement Human Capital
Reforms. [21]GAO-07-90 . Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Human Capital: Aligning Senior Executives' Performance with
Organizational Results Is an Important Step Toward Governmentwide
Transformation. [22]GAO-06-1125T . Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2006.
Office of Personnel Management: OPM Is Taking Steps to Strengthen
Its Internal Capacity for Leading Human Capital Reform.
[23]GAO-06-861T . Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2006.
Human Capital: Trends in Executive and Judicial Pay.
[24]GAO-06-708 . Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Human Capital: Agencies Are Using Buyouts and Early Outs with
Increasing Frequency to Help Reshape Their Workforces.
[25]GAO-06-324 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Human Capital: Observations on Final Regulations for DOD's
National Security Personnel System. [26]GAO-06-227T . Washington,
D.C.: November 17, 2005.
Human Capital: Designing and Managing Market-Based and More
Performance-Oriented Pay Systems. [27]GAO-05-1048T . Washington,
D.C.: September 27, 2005.
Human Capital: DOD's National Security Personnel System Faces
Implementation Challenges. [28]GAO-05-730 . Washington, D.C.: July
14, 2005.
Human Capital: Agencies Need Leadership and the Supporting
Infrastructure to Take Advantage of New Flexibilities.
[29]GAO-05-616T . Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2005.
Human Capital: Observations on Final DHS Human Capital
Regulations. [30]GAO-05-391T . Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.
Also see [31]http://www.gao.gov for numerous speeches and
presentations from the Comptroller General on human capital
challenges in general and as they apply to specific agencies.
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Managing Federal Real Property
DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve.
[32]GAO-06-913R . Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006.
Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New
Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and
Maintenance Requirements. [33]GAO-06-641 . Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2006.
Federal Real Property: Most Public Benefit Conveyances Used as
Intended, but Opportunities Exist to Enhance Federal Oversight.
[34]GAO-06-511 . Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Federal Courthouses: Rent Increases Due to New Space and Growing
Energy and Security Costs Require Better Tracking and Management.
[35]GAO-06-613 . Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006.
Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring
the Effectiveness of Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts.
[36]GAO-06-612 . Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Federal Real Property: Excess and Underutilized Property Is an
Ongoing Problem. [37]GAO-06-248T . Washington, D.C.: February 6,
2006.
Federal Real Property: Reliance on Costly Leasing to Meet New
Space Needs Is an Ongoing Problem. [38]GAO-06-136T . Washington,
D.C.: October 6, 2005.
VA Health Care: Key Challenges to Aligning Capital Assets and
Enhancing Veterans' Care. [39]GAO-05-429 . Washington, D.C.:
August 5, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. [40]GAO-05-785
. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Federal Real Property: Further Actions Needed to Address
Long-standing and Complex Problems. [41]GAO-05-848T . Washington,
D.C.: June 22, 2005.
Smithsonian Institution: Facilities Management Reorganization Is
Progressing, but Funding Remains a Challenge. [42]GAO-05-369 .
Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2005.
U.S. Postal Service: The Service's Strategy for Realigning Its
Mail Processing Infrastructure Lacks Clarity, Criteria, and
Accountability. [43]GAO-05-261 . Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2005.
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Protecting the Federal Government�s Information Systems and the
Nation�s Critical Infrastructures
Information Security: Federal Reserve Needs to Address Treasury
Auction Systems. [44]GAO-06-659 . Washington, D.C.: August 30,
2006.
Information Security: Leadership Needed to Address Weaknesses and
Privacy Issues at Veterans Affairs. [45]GAO-06-897T . Washington,
D.C.: June 20, 2006.
DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery
Plan, [46]GAO-06-672 . Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006.
Information Security: Continued Progress Needed to Strengthen
Controls at the Internal Revenue Service. [47]GAO-06-328 .
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2006.
Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive
but Unclassified Information. [48]GAO-06-385 . Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2006.
Information Security: Federal Agencies Show Mixed Progress in
Implementing Statutory Requirements. [49]GAO-06-527T . Washington,
D.C.: March 16, 2006.
Information Security: Department of Health and Human Services
Needs to Fully Implement Its Program. [50]GAO-06-267 . Washington,
D.C.: February 24, 2006.
Information Security: Progress Made, but Federal Aviation
Administration Needs to Improve Controls over Air Traffic Control
Systems. [51]GAO-05-712 . Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland
Security Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity
Responsibilities, [52]GAO-05-434 . Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Information Security: Federal Agencies Need to Improve Controls
over Wireless Networks. [53]GAO-05-383 . Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2005.
Information Security: Emerging Cybersecurity Issues Threaten
Federal Information Systems. [54]GAO-05-231 . Washington, D.C.:
May 13, 2005.
Information Security: Improving Oversight of Access to Federal
Systems and Data by Contractors Can Reduce Risk. [55]GAO-05-362 .
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2005.
Related Products
Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland
Security
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. [56]GAO-06-869 . Washington,
D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition
Organization. [57]GAO-06-1012T . Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on
Department's Management of Information Technology. [58]GAO-06-598T
. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to
Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts.
[59]GAO-06-553T . Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. [60]GAO-06-467T .
Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. [61]GAO-06-91 . Washington, D.C.: December 15,
2005.
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training
Important for Successful Transformation. [62]GAO-05-888 .
Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005.
Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning
Process Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability.
[63]GAO-05-300 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained
Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration. [64]GAO-05-139
. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
DHS Products
Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security. DHS Office of the Inspector General. OIG-07-12.
Washington, D.C.: December 2006.
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Establishing Appropriate and Effective Information-Sharing
Mechanisms to Improve Homeland Security
Managing Sensitive Information: DOJ Needs a More Complete Staffing
Strategy for Managing Classified Information and a Set of Internal
Controls for Other Sensitive Information. [65]GAO-07-83 .
Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating
Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors'
Characteristics. [66]GAO-07-39 . Washington, D.C.: October 16,
2006.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse
Effects on the Public. [67]GAO-06-1031 . Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 2006.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to
Enhance Cybersecurity. [68]GAO-06-1087T . Washington, D.C.:
September 13, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving.
[69]GAO-06-933T . Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Managing Sensitive Information: Actions Needed to Ensure Recent
Changes in DOE Oversight Do Not Weaken an Effective Classification
System. [70]GAO-06-785 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Managing Sensitive Information: DOD Can More Effectively Reduce
the Risk of Classification Errors. [71]GAO-06-706 . Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More
Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical
Infrastructure Information. [72]GAO-06-383 . Washington, D.C.:
April 17, 2006.
Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive
but Unclassified Information. [73]GAO-06-385 . Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2006.
Related Products
Department of Defense Approach to Business Transformation
Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan, Integrated
Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Ensure Success.
[74]GAO-07-229T . Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2006.
Defense Transformation: Accountability Challenges.
[75]GAO-06-1083CG . Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006.
Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to
Effective Financial and Business Management Transformation.
[76]GAO-06-1006T . Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2006.
Business Systems Modernization: DOD Continues to Improve
Institutional Approach, but Further Steps Needed. [77]GAO-06-658 .
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
GAO High-Risk Program. [78]GAO-06-497T . Washington, D.C.: March
15, 2006.
Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's
Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. [79]GAO-06-13 .
Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Defense Management: Foundational Steps Being Taken to Manage DOD
Business Systems Modernization, but Much Remains to Be
Accomplished to Effect True Business Transformation.
[80]GAO-06-234T . Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
21st Century Challenges: Transforming Government to Meet Current
and Emerging Challenges. [81]GAO-05-830T . Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005.
DOD Business Transformation: Sustained Leadership Needed to
Address Long-standing Financial and Business Management Problems.
[82]GAO-05-723T . Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2005.
Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform
DOD Business Operations. [83]GAO-05-629T . Washington, D.C.: April
28, 2005.
Transformation Challenges. presentation to the Defense Business
Transformation Forum. Queenstown, MD: April 17, 2005.
Defense Management: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. [84]GAO-05-520T
. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
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Department of Defense Business Systems Modernization
Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to
Effective Financial and Business Management Transformation.
[85]GAO-06-1006T . Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2006.
Business Systems Modernization: DOD Continues to Improve
Institutional Approach, but Further Steps Needed. [86]GAO-06-658 .
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
DOD Business Transformation: Defense Travel System Continues to
Face Implementation Challenges. [87]GAO-06-18 . Washington, D.C.:
January 18, 2006.
DOD Systems Modernization: Uncertain Joint Use and Marginal
Expected Value of Military Asset Deployment System Warrant
Reassessment of Planned Investment. [88]GAO-06-171 . Washington,
D.C.: December 15, 2005.
DOD Systems Modernization: Planned Investment in the Naval
Tactical Command Support System Needs to Be Reassessed.
[89]GAO-06-215 . Washington, D.C.: December 5, 2005.
DOD Business Systems Modernization: Important Progress Made in
Establishing Foundational Architecture Products and Investment
Management Practices, but Much Work Remains. [90]GAO-06-219 .
Washington, D.C.: November 23, 2005.
Defense Management: Foundational Steps Being Taken to Manage DOD
Business Systems Modernization, but Much Remains to Be
Accomplished to Effect True Business Transformation.
[91]GAO-06-234T . Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Business Systems Modernization: Long-standing Weaknesses in
Enterprise Architecture Development Need to Be Addressed.
[92]GAO-05-702 . Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Army Depot Maintenance: Ineffective Oversight of Depot Maintenance
Operations and System Implementation Efforts. [93]GAO-05-441 .
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
DOD Business Transformation: Sustained Leadership Needed to
Address Long-standing Financial and Business Management Problems.
[94]GAO-05-723T . Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2005.
DOD Systems Modernization: Management of Integrated Military Human
Capital Program Needs Additional Improvements. [95]GAO-05-189 .
Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2005.
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Department of Defense Personnel Security Clearance Program
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to
Improve the Security Clearance Process. [96]GAO-06-1070 .
Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record
Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the
Security Clearance Process. [97]GAO-06-693R . Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of
Clearances for Industry Personnel. [98]GAO-06-748T . Washington,
D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments
Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. [99]GAO-06-747T .
Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security
Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the
Clearance Process. [100]GAO-06-323R . Washington, D.C.: January
17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some
Long-standing Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain.
[101]GAO-06-233T . Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security
Clearance Program. [102]GAO-05-988R . Washington, D.C.: August 19,
2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. [103]GAO-05-842T . Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
Related Products
Department of Defense Support Infrastructure Management
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting
Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring. [104]GAO-06-852 . Washington, D.C.: September 13,
2006.
Defense Infrastructure: Actions Taken to Improve the Management of
Utility Privatization, but Some Concerns Remain. [105]GAO-06-914 .
Washington, D.C.: September 5, 2006.
DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve.
[106]GAO-06-913R . Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006.
Limitations in the Air Force's Proposed Housing Plan for
Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. [107]GAO-06-736R . Washington,
D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Military Housing: Management Issues Require Attention as the
Privatization Program Matures. [108]GAO-06-438 . Washington, D.C.:
April 28, 2006.
Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations
Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and
Requirements. [109]GAO-06-193 . Washington, D.C.: December 8,
2005.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and
Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. [110]GAO-05-905 .
Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments.
[111]GAO-05-785 . Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing
and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support.
[112]GAO-05-556 . Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to
Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges. [113]GAO-05-534 .
Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Management Issue Requiring Attention in
Utility Privatization. [114]GAO-05-433 . Washington, D.C.: May 12,
2005.
Related Products
Department of Defense Financial Management
Defense Travel System: Reported Savings Questionable and
Implementation Challenges Remain. [115]GAO-06-980 . Washington,
D.C.: September 26, 2006.
Financial Management: Improvements Under Way but Serious Financial
Systems Problems Persist. [116]GAO-06-970 . Washington, D.C.:
September 26, 2006.
Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to
Effective Financial and Business Management Transformation.
[117]GAO-06-1006T . Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2006.
Defense Working Capital Fund: Military Services Did Not Calculate
and Report Carryover Amounts Correctly. [118]GAO-06-530 .
Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2006.
Military Pay: Hundreds of Battle-Injured GWOT Soldiers Have
Struggled to Resolve Military Debts. [119]GAO-06-494 . Washington,
D.C.: April 27, 2006.
Environmental Liabilities: Long-Term Fiscal Planning Hampered by
Control Weaknesses and Uncertainties in the Federal Government's
Estimates. [120]GAO-06-427 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Fiscal Year 2005 U.S. Government Financial Statements: Sustained
Improvement in Federal Financial Management Is Crucial to
Addressing Our Nation's Financial Condition and Long-Term Fiscal
Imbalance. [121]GAO-06-406T . Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2006.
DOD Business Transformation: Defense Travel System Continues to
Face Implementation Challenges. [122]GAO-06-18 . Washington, D.C.:
January 18, 2006.
Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability of
Cost Data and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Costs.
[123]GAO-05-882 . Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2005.
Army Corps of Engineers: Improved Planning and Financial
Management Should Replace Reliance on Reprogramming Actions to
Manage Project Funds. [124]GAO-05-946 . Washington, D.C.:
September 16, 2005.
DOD Problem Disbursements: Long-standing Accounting Weaknesses
Result in Inaccurate Records and Substantial Write-offs.
[125]GAO-05-521 . Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2005.
Related Products
Department of Defense Supply Chain Management
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Progress Made Implementing Supply Chain
Management Recommendations, but Full Extent of Improvement
Unknown. [126]GAO-07-234 . Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2007.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Challenges Remain to Achieving and
Demonstrating Progress in Supply Chain Management.
[127]GAO-06-983T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2006.
Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the
Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and
Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor. GAO-06-274. Washington,
D.C.: June 22, 2006.
Defense Management: Attention Is Needed to Improve Oversight of
DLA Prime Vendor Program. [128]GAO-06-739R. Washington, D.C.: June
19, 2006.
Defense Inventory: Actions Needed to Improve Inventory Retention
Management. GAO-06-512. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and
Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime
Operations. GAO-06-160. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed
for DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed. [129]GAO-06-113T.
Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2005.
Defense Logistics: Better Strategic Planning Can Help Ensure DOD's
Successful Implementation of Passive Radio Frequency
Identification. [130]GAO-05-345. Washington, D.C.: September 12,
2005.
Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution
Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These
Efforts. [131]GAO-05-775. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 2005.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of
Critical Items during Current and Future Operations.
[132]GAO-05-275. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2005.
Related Products
Department of Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on
Weapon Systems Investments. [133]GAO-06-585T . Washington, D.C.:
April 5, 2006.
Best Practices
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD
Technology Transition Processes. [134]GAO-06-883 . Washington,
D.C.: September 14, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience
Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy.
[135]GAO-06-368 . Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems
Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them. [136]GAO-06-626T .
Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs. [137]GAO-06-391 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers
Needed to Improve Outcomes. [138]GAO-06-110 . Washington, D.C.:
November 30, 2005.
Weapon System Reviews
Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but
Significant Challenges Remain. [139]GAO-06-955 . Washington, D.C.:
September 11, 2006.
Tactical Aircraft: Questions Concerning the F-22A's Business Case.
[140]GAO-06-991T . Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs Additional Knowledge as It Embarks
on a New Approach for Transformational Satellite Communications
System. [141]GAO-06-537 . Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2006.
Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could
Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G. [142]GAO-06-446 .
Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2006.
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing
Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. [143]GAO-06-356 . Washington,
D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial
Capability but Falls Short of Original Goals. [144]GAO-06-327 .
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future
Combat System's Successful Outcome. [145]GAO-06-367 . Washington,
D.C.: March 14, 2006.
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace
System. [146]GAO-07-25 . Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006.
Related Products
Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control Modernization
National Airspace System Modernization: Observations on Potential
Funding Options for FAA and the Next Generation Airspace System.
[147]GAO-06-1114T . Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Preliminary Analysis of
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the
National Airspace System. [148]GAO-06-915T . Washington, D.C.:
July 25, 2006.
Air Traffic Control Modernization: Status of the Current Program
and Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System.
[149]GAO-06-653T . Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Air Traffic Control: Status of the Current Modernization Program
and Planning for the Next Generation System. [150]GAO-06-738T .
Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2006.
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Preliminary Analysis of
the Joint Planning and Development Office's Planning, Progress,
and Challenges. [151]GAO-06-574T . Washington, D.C.: March 29,
2006.
National Airspace System: Transformation Will Require Cultural
Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available
Management Tools. [152]GAO-06-154 . Washington, D.C.: October 14,
2005.
Air Traffic Operations: The Federal Aviation Administration Needs
to Address Major Air Traffic Operating Cost Control Changes.
[153]GAO-05-724 . Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2005.
National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to
Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems.
[154]GAO-05-331 . Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005.
Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program
Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts. [155]GAO-05-266 .
Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2005.
Related Products
Financing the Nation�s Transportation System
Intercity Passenger Rail: National Policy and Strategies Needed to
Maximize Public Benefits from Federal Expenditures. [156]GAO-07-15
. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006.
Freight Railroads: Industry Health Has Improved, but Concerns
about Competition and Capacity Should be Addressed. [157]GAO-07-94
. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2006.
Aviation Finance: Observations on Potential FAA Funding Options.
[158]GAO-06-973 . Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
National Airspace System Modernization: Observations on Potential
Funding Options for FAA and the Next Generation Airspace System.
[159]GAO-06-1114T . Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Highway Finance: States' Expanding Use of Tolling Illustrates
Diverse Challenges and Strategies. [160]GAO-06-554 . Washington,
D.C.: June 28, 2006.
Highway Trust Fund: Overview of Highway Trust Fund Estimates.
[161]GAO-06-572T . Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Freight Transportation: Short Sea Shipping Option Shows Importance
of Systematic Approach to Public Investment Decisions.
[162]GAO-05-768 . Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Highlights of an Expert Panel: The Benefits and Costs of Highway
and Transit Investments. [163]GAO-05-423SP . Washington, D.C.: May
6, 2005.
Highway And Transit Investments: Options for Improving Information
on Projects' Benefits and Costs and Increasing Accountability for
Results. [164]GAO-05-172 . Washington, D.C.: January 24, 2005.
Federal-Aid Highways: Trends, Effect on State Spending, and
Options for Future Program Design. [165]GAO-04-802 . Washington,
D.C.: August 31, 2004.
Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment Decisions.
[166]GAO-04-744 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Related Products
Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to
U.S. National Security Interests
Export Controls: Challenges Exist in Enforcement of an Inherently
Complex System. [167]GAO-07-265 . Washington, D.C.: December 20,
2006.
Defense Technologies: DOD's Critical Technologies Lists Rarely
Inform Export Control and Other Policy Decisions. [168]GAO-06-793
. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
DOD Excess Property: Control Breakdowns Present Significant
Security Risk and Continuing Waste and Inefficiency. [169]
GAO-06-943 . Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2006.
President's Justification of the High Performance Computer Control
Threshold Does Not Fully Address National Defense Authorization
Act of 1998 Requirements. [170]GAO-06-754R . Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2006.
Export Controls: Improvements to Commerce's Dual-Use System Needed
to Ensure Protection of U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11
Environment. [171]GAO-06-638 . Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2006.
Defense Trade: Enhancements to the Implementation of Exon-Florio
Could Strengthen the Law's Effectiveness. [172]GAO-05-686 .
Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of
Contractors under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. [173]GAO-05-681
. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and
Inefficiencies in the Post-9/11 Security Environment.
[174]GAO-05-468R . Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post-9/11
Environment. [175]GAO-05-234 . Washington, D.C.: February 16,
2005.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Better Support Program
Managers' Implementation of Anti-Tamper Protection.
[176]GAO-04-302 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Defense Trade: Better Information Needed to Support Decisions
Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers. [177]GAO-03-694 .
Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Export Controls: Clarification of Jurisdiction for Missile
Technology Items Needed. [178]GAO-02-120 . Washington, D.C.:
October 9, 2001.
Related Products
Transforming Federal Oversight of Food Safety
Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase
the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and
Disease. [179]GAO-06-644 . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should
Pursue Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage
Resources. [180]GAO-05-213 . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2005.
Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries in Consolidating Their
Food Safety Systems. [181]GAO-05-212 . Washington, D.C.: February
22, 2005.
Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and
Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. [182]GAO-05-51 .
Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2004.
Antibiotic Resistance: Federal Agencies Need to Better Focus
Efforts to Address Risk to Humans from Antibiotic Use in Animals.
[183]GAO-04-490 . Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
School Meal Program: Few Instances of Foodborne Outbreaks
Reported, but Opportunities Exist to Enhance Outbreak Data and
Food Safety Practices. [184]GAO-03-530 . Washington, D.C.: May 9,
2003.
Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, but
Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation.
[185]GAO-03-342 . Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2003.
Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety
Rules Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses.
[186]GAO-02-902 . Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.
Genetically Modified Foods: Experts View Regimen of Safety Tests
as Adequate, but FDA's Evaluation Process Could Be Enhanced.
[187]GAO-02-566 . Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2002.
Food Safety: Improvements Needed in Overseeing the Safety of
Dietary Supplements and "Functional Foods." [188]GAO/RCED-00-156 .
Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2000.
Related Products
Department of Defense Contract Management
Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service
Acquisition Outcomes. [189]GAO-07-20 . Washington, D.C.: November
9, 2006.
DOD Contracting: Efforts Needed to Address Commercial Air Force
Acquisition Risk. [190]GAO-06-995 . Washington, D.C.: September
29, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract
Management Challenges. [191]GAO-06-1130T . Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2006.
Iraq Contract Costs: DOD Consideration of Defense Contract Audit
Agency's Findings. [192]GAO-06-1132 . Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2006.
Contract Management: Service Contract Approach to Aircraft
Simulator Training Has Room for Improvement. [193]GAO-06-830 .
Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.
DOD Acquisitions: Contracting for Better Outcomes.
[194]GAO-06-800T . Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2006.
Contract Management: DOD Vulnerabilities to Contracting Fraud,
Waste, and Abuse. [195]GAO-06-838R . Washington, D.C.: July 7,
2006.
Defense Management: Attention Is Needed to Improve Oversight of
DLA Prime Vendor Program. [196]GAO-06-739R . Washington, D.C.:
June 19, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Army Corps of Engineers Contract for
Mississippi Classrooms. [197]GAO-06-454 . Washington, D.C.: May 1,
2006.
Contract Security Guards: Army's Guard Program Requires Greater
Oversight and Reassessment of Acquisition Approach.
[198]GAO-06-284 . Washington, D.C.: April 3, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive
Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes. [199]GAO-06-66 .
Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2005.
Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on
Department of Defense Service Contracts. [200]GAO-05-274 .
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Related Products
Department of Energy Contract Management
Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to
Improve Oversight of Other Sites' Cleanup Activities.
[201]GAO-06-352 . Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
DOE Contracting: Better Performance Measures and Management Needed
to Address Delays in Awarding Contracts. [202]GAO-06-722 .
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
DOE Contracting: Improved Program Management Could Help Achieve
Small Business Goal. [203]GAO-06-501 . Washington, D.C.: April 7,
2006.
Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: Contractor and DOE Management
Problems Have Led to Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety
Concerns. [204]GAO-06-602T . Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Yucca Mountain: Quality Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear Waste
Repository Needs Increased Management Attention. [205]GAO-06-313 .
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2006.
Stand-Down of Los Alamos National Laboratory: Total Costs
Uncertain; Almost All Mission-Critical Programs Were Affected but
Have Recovered. [206]GAO-06-83 . Washington, D.C.: November 18,
2005.
Department of Energy: Improved Guidance, Oversight, and Planning
Are Needed to Better Identify Cost-Saving Alternatives for
Managing Low-Level Radioactive Waste. [207]GAO-06-94 . Washington,
D.C.: October 31, 2005.
Department of Energy: Additional Opportunities Exist for Reducing
Laboratory Contractors' Support Costs. [208]GAO-05-897 .
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2005.
Department of Energy: Improved Oversight Could Better Ensure
Opportunities for Small Business Subcontracting. [209]GAO-05-459 .
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2005.
Department of Energy: Further Actions Are Needed to Strengthen
Contract Management for Major Projects. [210]GAO-05-123 .
Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2005.
Related Products
Mational Aeronautics and Space Administration Contract
Management
NASA: Sound Management and Oversight Key to Addressing Crew
Exploration Vehicle Project Risks. [211]GAO-06-1127T . September
28, 2006.
Enterprise Architecture: Leadership Remains Key to Establishing
and Leveraging Architectures for Organizational Transformation.
[212]GAO-06-831 . Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2006.
NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space Exploration
Program Requires More Knowledge. [213]GAO-06-817R . Washington,
D.C.: July 17, 2006.
NASA's James Webb Space Telescope: Knowledge-Based Acquisition
Approach Key to Addressing Program Challenges. [214]GAO-06-634 .
Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2006.
Financial Management Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to Address
Key Causes of Modernization Failures. GAO-06-184. Washington,
D.C.: March 15, 2006.
NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could
Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes.
[215]GAO-06-218 . Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2005.
NASA: Long-standing Financial Management Challenges Threaten the
Agency's Ability to Manage Its Programs. [216]GAO-06-216T .
Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2005.
Business Modernization: Some Progress Made toward Implementing GAO
Recommendations Related to NASA's Integrated Financial Management
Program. [217]GAO-05-799R . Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2005.
Related Products
Management of Interagency Contracting
Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and
Oversight Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to
Address Risks. [218]GAO-06-996 . Washington, D.C.: September 27,
2006.
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor
and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened.
[219]GAO-06-404 . Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.
Department of Energy, Office of Worker Advocacy: Deficient
Controls Led to Millions of Dollars in Improper and Questionable
Payments to Contractors. [220]GAO-06-547 . Washington, D.C.: May
31, 2006.
Federal Bureau of Investigation: Weak Controls over Trilogy
Project Led to Payment of Questionable Contractor Costs and
Missing Assets. [221]GAO-06-306 . Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2006.
U.S. Office of Special Counsel: Selected Contracting and Human
Capital Issues. [222]GAO-06-16 . Washington, D.C.: November 17,
2005.
Improvements Needed to the Federal Procurement Data System--Next
Generation. [223]GAO-05-960R . Washington, D.C.: September 27,
2005.
Interagency Contracting: Franchise Funds Provide Convenience, but
Value to DOD Is Not Demonstrated. [224]GAO-05-456 . Washington,
D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders
to Support Military Operations. [225]GAO-05-201 . Washington,
D.C.: April 29, 2005.
Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to
Create an Effective Acquisition Organization. [226]GAO-05-179 .
Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2005.
Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Pricing of GSA
Multiple Award Schedules Contracts. [227]GAO-05-229 . February 11,
2005.
Related Products
Enforcement of Tax Laws
Tax Debt Collection: IRS Needs to Complete Steps to Help Ensure
Contracting Out Achieves Desired Results and Best Use of Federal
Resources. [228]GAO-06-1065 . Washington, D.C.: September 29,
2006.
Business Tax Reform: Simplification and Increased Uniformity of
Taxation Would Yield Benefits. [229]GAO-06-1113T . Washington,
D.C.: September 20, 2006.
Individual Income Tax Policy: Streamlining, Simplification, and
Additional Reforms Are Desirable. [230]GAO-06-1028T . Washington,
D.C.: August 3, 2006.
Tax Compliance: Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Tax Gap Using a
Variety of Approaches. [231]GAO-06-1000T . Washington, D.C.: July
26, 2006.
Capital Gains Tax Gap: Requiring Brokers to Report Securities Cost
Basis Would Improve Compliance if Related Challenges Are
Addressed. [232]GAO-06-603 . Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Tax Compliance: Challenges to Corporate Tax Enforcement and
Options to Improve Securities Basis Reporting. [233]GAO-06-851T .
Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Business Systems Modernization: IRS Needs to Complete Recent
Efforts to Develop Policies and Procedures to Guide Requirements
Development and Management. [234]GAO-06-310 . Washington, D.C.:
March 20, 2006.
Financial Management: Thousands of GSA Contractors Abuse the
Federal Tax System. [235]GAO-06-492T . Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2006.
Tax Gap: Making Significant Progress in Improving Tax Compliance
Rests on Enhancing Current IRS Techniques and Adopting New
Legislative Actions. [236]GAO-06-453T . Washington, D.C.: February
15, 2006.
Tax Gap: Multiple Strategies, Better Compliance Data, and
Long-Term Goals Are Needed to Improve Taxpayer Compliance.
[237]GAO-06-208T . Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2005.
Financial Management: Thousands of Civilian Agency Contractors
Abuse the Federal Tax System with Little Consequence.
[238]GAO-05-637 . Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2005.
Related Products
Internal Revenue Service Business Systems Modernization
Financial Audit: IRS's Fiscal Years 2006 and 2005 Financial
Statements. [239]GAO-07-136 . Washington, D.C.: November, 9, 2006.
Internal Revenue Service: Status of Recommendations from Financial
Audits and Related Management Reports. [240]GAO-06-560 .
Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006.
Management Report: Improvements Needed in IRS's Internal Controls.
[241]GAO-06-543R . Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2006.
Internal Revenue Service: Assessment of the Interim Results of the
2006 Filing Season and Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request.
[242]GAO-06-499T . Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2006.
Internal Revenue Service: Assessment of the Interim Results of the
2006 Filing Season and Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request.
[243]GAO-06-615T . Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Business Systems Modernization: IRS Needs to Complete Recent
Efforts to Develop Policies and Procedures to Guide Requirements
Development and Management. [244]GAO-06-310 . Washington, D.C.:
March 20, 2006.
Business Systems Modernization: Internal Revenue Service's Fiscal
Year 2006 Expenditure Plan. [245]GAO-06-360 . Washington, D.C.:
February 21, 2006.
Financial Audit: IRS's Fiscal Years 2005 and 2004 Financial
Statements. [246]GAO-06-137 . Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2005.
Business Systems Modernization: Internal Revenue Service's Fiscal
Year 2005 Expenditure Plan. [247]GAO-05-774 . Washington, D.C.:
July 22, 2005.
IRS Modernization: Continued Progress Requires Addressing Resource
Management Challenges [248]. GAO-05-707T . Washington, D.C.: May
19, 2005.
Internal Revenue Service: Status of Recommendations from Financial
Audits and Related Management Reports. [249]GAO-05-393 .
Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2005.
Management Report: Improvements Needed in IRS's Internal Controls.
[250]GAO-05-247R . Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2005.
Management Report: Review of Controls over Safeguarding Taxpayer
Receipts and Information at the Brookhaven Service Center Campus.
[251]GAO-05-319R . March 10, 2005.
Opportunities to Improve Timeliness of IRS Lien Releases.
[252]GAO-05-26R . Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2005.
Related Products
Modernizing Federal Disability Programs
Social Security Disability Programs: Clearer Guidance Could Help
SSA Apply the Medical Improvement Standard More Consistently.
[253]GAO-07-8 . Washington, D.C.: October 3, 2006.
Social Security Administration: Agency Is Positioning Itself to
Implement Its New Disability Determination Process, but Key Facets
Are Still in Development. [254]GAO-06-779T . Washington, D.C.:
June 15, 2006.
Veterans' Disability Benefits: VA Should Improve Its Management of
Individual Unemployability Benefits by Strengthening Criteria,
Guidance, and Procedures. [255]GAO-06-309 . Washington, D.C.: May
30, 2006.
Social Security Administration: Administrative Review Process for
Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims. [256]GAO-06-640R .
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2006.
VA Disability Benefits: Routine Monitoring of Disability Decisions
Could Improve Consistency. [257]GAO-06-120T . Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 2005.
Computer-Based Patient Records: VA and DOD Made Progress, but Much
Work Remains to Fully Share Medical Information. [258]GAO-05-1051T
. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005.
Federal Disability Assistance: Wide Array of Programs Needs to Be
Examined in Light of 21st Century Challenges. [259]GAO-05-626 .
Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2005.
Veterans' Disability Benefits: Claims Processing Problems Persist
and Major Performance Improvements May Be Difficult.
[260]GAO-05-749T . Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
VA Disability Benefits and Health Care: Providing Certain Services
to the Seriously Injured Poses Challenges. [261]GAO-05-444T .
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Social Security Administration: Better Planning Could Make the
Ticket Program More Effective. [262]GAO-05-248 . Washington, D.C.:
March 2, 2005.
Vocational Rehabilitation: More VA and DOD Collaboration Needed to
Expedite Services for Seriously Injured Servicemembers.
[263]GAO-05-167 . Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.
Related Products
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Single-Employer Pension
Insurance Program
Private Pensions: Opportunities Exist to Further Improve the
Transparency of PBGC's Financial Disclosures. [264]GAO-06-429 .
Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2006.
Private Pensions: Information on Cash Balance Pension Plans.
[265]GAO-06-42 . Washington, D.C.: November 3, 2005.
Private Pensions: Questions Concerning the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation's Practices Regarding Single-Employer
Probable Claims. [266]GAO-05-991R . Washington, D.C.: September 9,
2005.
Private Pensions: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and
Long-Term Budgetary Challenges. [267]GAO-05-772T . Washington,
D.C.: June 9, 2005.
Private Pensions: Revision of Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding
Rules Is an Essential Component of Comprehensive Pension Reform.
[268]GAO-05-794T . Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2005.
Private Pensions: Government Actions Could Improve the Timeliness
and Content of Form 5500 Pension Information. [269]GAO-05-491 .
Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2005.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: The Future of the Defined Benefit
System and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
[270]GAO-05-578SP . Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2005.
Private Pensions: Recent Experiences of Large Defined Benefit
Plans Illustrate Weaknesses in Funding Rules. [271]GAO-05-294 .
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2005.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Structural Problems Limit
Agency's Ability to Protect Itself from Risk. [272]GAO-05-360T .
Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.
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Medicare Program
Information Security: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Needs to Improve Controls over Key Communication Network.
[273]GAO-06-750 . Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2006.
Medicare: CMS's Proposed Approach to Set Hospital Inpatient
Payments Appears Promising. [274]GAO-06-880 . Washington, D.C.:
July 28, 2006.
Medicare Physician Payments: Trends in Service Utilization,
Spending, and Fees Prompt Consideration of Alternative Payment
Approaches. [275]GAO-06-1008T . Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2006.
Medicare Part B Drugs: CMS Data Source for Setting Payments Is
Practical but Concerns Remain. [276]GAO-06-971T . Washington,
D.C.: July 13, 2006.
Medicare Part D: Prescription Drug Plan Sponsor Call Center
Responses Were Prompt, but Not Consistently Accurate and Complete.
[277]GAO-06-710 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Clinical Lab Quality: CMS and Survey Organization Oversight Should
Be Strengthened. [278]GAO-06-416 . Washington, D.C.: June 16,
2006.
Medicare: Communications to Beneficiaries on the Prescription Drug
Benefit Could Be Improved. [279]GAO-06-654 . Washington, D.C.: May
3, 2006.
Nursing Homes: Despite Increased Oversight, Challenges Remain in
Ensuring High-Quality Care and Resident Safety. [280]GAO-06-117 .
Washington, D.C.: December 28, 2005.
Medicare: Contingency Plans to Address Potential Problems with the
Transition of Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries from Medicaid to
Medicare Drug Coverage. [281]GAO-06-278R . Washington, D.C.:
December 16, 2005.
Information Technology: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Needs to Establish Critical Investment Management Capabilities.
[282]GAO-06-12 . October 28, 2005.
Medicare: More Effective Screening and Stronger Enrollment
Standards Needed for Medical Equipment Suppliers. [283]GAO-05-656
. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2005.
Medicare Contracting Reform: CMS's Plan Has Gaps and Its
Anticipated Savings Are Uncertain. [284]GAO-05-873 . Washington,
D.C.: August 17, 2005.
Related Products
Medicaid Program
Medicaid Third-Party Liability: Federal Guidance Needed to Help
States Address Continuing Problems. [285]GAO-06-862 . Washington,
D.C.: September 15, 2006.
Medicaid Financial Management: Steps Taken to Improve Federal
Oversight but Other Actions Needed to Sustain Efforts.
[286]GAO-06-705 . Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2006.
Medicaid Integrity: Implementation of New Program Provides
Opportunities for Federal Leadership to Combat Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse. [287]GAO-06-578T . Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Medicaid Financing: States' Use of Contingency-Fee Consultants to
Maximize Federal Reimbursements Highlights Need for Improved
Federal Oversight. [288]GAO-05-748 . Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2005.
Medicaid: States' Efforts to Maximize Federal Reimbursements
Highlight Need for Improved Federal Oversight. [289]GAO-05-836T .
Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
Medicaid Waivers: HHS Approvals of Pharmacy Plus Demonstrations
Continue to Raise Cost and Oversight Concerns. [290]GAO-04-480 .
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Medicaid and SCHIP: Recent HHS Approvals of Demonstration Waiver
Projects Raise Concerns. [291]GAO-02-817 . Washington, D.C.: July
12, 2002.
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National Flood Insurance Program
GAO's High-Risk Program. [292]GAO-06-497T . Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National
Flood Insurance Program. [293]GAO-06-335T . Washington, D.C.:
January 25, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to
Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance
Program. [294]GAO-06-119 . Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of
the National Flood Insurance Program. [295]GAO-06-183T .
Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the
National Flood Insurance Program. [296]GAO-06-174T . Washington,
D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Flood Map Modernization: Federal Emergency Management Agency's
Implementation of a National Strategy. [297]GAO-05-894T .
Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005.
National Flood Insurance Program: Oversight of Policy Issuance and
Claims. [298]GAO-05-532T . Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005.
Flood Map Modernization: Program Strategy Shows Promise, but
Challenges Remain. [299]GAO-04-417 . Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2004.
National Flood Insurance Program: Actions to Address Repetitive
Loss Properties. [300]GAO-04-401T . Washington, D.C.: March 25,
2004.
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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?[325]GAO-07-310 .
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Highlights of [326]GAO-07-310 , a report to Congress on GAO's High-Risk
Series
January 2007
HIGH-RISK SERIES
An Update
GAO's audits and evaluations identify federal programs and operations
that, in some cases, are high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In recent years, GAO also has
identified high-risk areas to focus on the need for broad-based
transformations to address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness
challenges. Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on government
operations it has designated as high risk. In this 2007 update for the
110th Congress, GAO presents the status of high-risk areas identified in
2005 and new high-risk areas warranting attention by Congress and the
executive branch. Lasting solutions to high-risk problems offer the
potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to the
public, strengthen confidence and trust in the performance and
accountability of the U.S. government, and ensure the ability of
government to deliver on its promises.
This report contains GAO's views on what remains to be done to bring about
lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive
branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight
and action by Congress are both essential to achieving and sustaining
progress.
In its January 2005 update, GAO identified 25 high-risk areas and, in
March 2006, added a 26th area. Since 2005, progress has been made in all
areas, although the extent varies by area. Both the executive branch and
Congress have shown a continuing commitment to addressing high-risk
challenges and taken steps to help correct several of their root causes.
High-risk areas were also among the suggested areas for oversight for the
110th Congress that GAO recently provided to congressional leadership.
Sufficient progress has been made to remove the high-risk designation from
two areas: U.S. Postal Service transformation efforts and long-term
outlook and HUD single-family mortgage insurance and rental housing
assistance programs. Other areas made significant progress, but not enough
to be removed from the list this cycle. Continued attention from the
executive branch and Congress is needed to make additional progress in
other high-risk areas.
This year, GAO is designating three new high-risk areas. The first new
area--critical to the nation's economic development--involves
transportation financing and capacity. Revenues to support federal
transportation trust funds are eroding at a time when investment is needed
to expand capacity to address congestion caused by increasing passenger
and freight travel. Given these problems, Congress and, for some issues,
the Department of Transportation should reassess the federal role, revenue
increase mechanisms, and funding allocations to better position the
federal government to address financing and capacity challenges.
The second area involves effective protection of technologies critical to
U.S. national security. Technologies that underpin U.S. economic and
military strength continue to be targets for theft, espionage, reverse
engineering, and illegal export. Government programs established decades
ago to protect critical technologies are ill-equipped to weigh competing
U.S. interests as the security environment and technological innovation
continue to evolve in the 21st century. Accordingly, we are designating
the effective identification and protection of critical technologies as a
governmentwide high-risk area that warrants a strategic re-examination of
existing programs to identify needed changes and ensure the advancement of
U.S. interests.
The third area being designated as high risk involves federal oversight of
food safety because of risks to the economy and to public health and
safety. Agriculture, as the largest industry and employer in the United
States, generates more than $1 trillion in economic activity annually. Any
food contamination could undermine consumer confidence in the government's
ability to ensure the safety of the U.S. food supply, as well as cause
severe economic consequences. The current fragmented federal system has
caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient
use of resources. GAO has recommended that Congress consider a fundamental
re-examination of the system and other improvements to help ensure the
rapid detection of and response to any accidental or deliberate
contamination of food before public health and safety is compromised.
GAO's 2007 High-Risk List
2007 High-Risk Areas
Addressing Challenges In Broad-Based Transformations
o Strategic Human Capital Management^a
o Managing Federal Real Property^a
o Protecting the Federal Government's Information Systems and the Nation's
Critical Infrastructures
o Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security
o Establishing Appropriate And Effective Information-Sharing Mechanisms to
Improve Homeland Security
o DOD Approach to Business Transformation^a
o DOD Business Systems Modernization
o DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program
o DOD Support Infrastructure Management
o DOD Financial Management
o DOD Supply Chain Management
o DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition
o FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization
o Financing the Nation's Transportation System ^a (New)
o Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to U.S.
National Security Interests^a (New)
o Transforming Federal Oversight of Food Safety ^a (New)
Managing Federal Contracting More Effectively
o DOD Contract Management
o DOE Contract Management
o NASA Contract Management
o Management of Interagency Contracting
Assessing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Tax Law Administration
o Enforcement of Tax Laws^a
o IRS Business Systems Modernization
Modernizing and Safeguarding Insurance and Benefit Programs
o Modernizing Federal Disability Programs^a
o Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Single-Employer Pension Insurance
Program
o Medicare Program^a
o Medicaid Program^a
o National Flood Insurance Program^a
Source: GAO.
aLegislation is likely to be necessary, as a supplement to actions by the
executive branch, in order to effectively address this high-risk area.
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