Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings  
of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (15-MAR-07, GAO-07-300).		 
                                                                 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to	 
respond to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO's previous work	 
identified suspected fraud, waste, and abuse resulting from	 
control weaknesses associated with FEMA's Individuals and	 
Households Program (IHP) and the Department of Homeland 	 
Security's (DHS) purchase card program. Congress asked GAO to	 
follow up on this previous work to determine whether potentially 
improper and/or fraudulent payments continued to be made. GAO	 
testified on the results of our audit and investigative efforts  
on December 6, 2006. This report summarizes the results of our	 
follow-up work. 						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-300 					        
    ACCNO:   A66870						        
  TITLE:     Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued   
Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse				 
     DATE:   03/15/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Agency evaluation					 
	     Aliens						 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Disaster relief aid				 
	     Erroneous payments 				 
	     Federal property management			 
	     Fraud						 
	     Housing allowances 				 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricane Rita					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Overpayments					 
	     Program abuses					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Rental housing					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Government agency oversight			 
	     Waste, fraud, and abuse				 
	     Government Purchase Card Program			 
	     Individuals and Households Program 		 

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GAO-07-300

   

     * [1]Overview of Testimony
     * [2]Conclusions
     * [3]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [4]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [5]GAO's Mission
     * [6]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [7]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [8]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [9]Congressional Relations
     * [10]Public Affairs

Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

March 2007

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF

Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

GAO-07-300

Contents

Letter 1

Overview of Testimony 2
Conclusions 5
Recommendations for Executive Action 6
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 7
Appendix I Testimony on Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse 11
Appendix II Comments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 36

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 15, 2007

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

On December 6, 2006, we testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs on the continued findings of fraud,
waste, and abuse associated with disaster relief for hurricanes Katrina
and Rita.^1 In addition to the December 6 testimony, in several prior
hearings, we testified that significant control weaknesses in the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Individuals and Households Program
(IHP) and in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card
program left the government vulnerable to significant fraud, waste, and
abuse.^2 As we previously reported, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)^3 provides the basis for IHP.
IHP is a major component of the federal disaster response efforts designed
to provide financial assistance to individuals and households that have,
as a direct result of a major disaster, necessary expenses and serious
needs that cannot be met through other means. The Stafford Act allowed
registrants to receive financial assistance up to a cap of $26,200 for
disasters occurring in 2005. In early October 2006, FEMA reported to
Congress that it had delivered approximately $7 billion in IHP aid for
hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This IHP amount included expedited
assistance, temporary housing assistance, repair and replacement of real
and personal property, and other miscellaneous categories.

^1GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, [11]GAO-07-252T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006).

^2GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse, [12]GAO-06-403T  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2006); Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Improper and Potentially Fraudulent
Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be Between $600 Million and
$1.4 Billion, [13]GAO-06-844T  (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006); and
Purchase Cards: Control Weaknesses Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to
Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity, [14]GAO-06-957T  (Washington,
D.C.: July 19, 2006). Work on [15]GAO-06-957T was performed jointly with
the DHS Office of Inspector General.

^342 U.S.C. S5121-5206.

Our December 6, 2006, testimony detailed our findings related to
additional work we had performed since June 2006. Specifically, the
testimony addressed our findings related to potentially improper and/or
fraudulent (1) rental assistance payments FEMA made to registrants at the
same time it was providing free housing via trailers and apartments; (2)
duplicate assistance payments to individuals who claimed damages to the
same property for both hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and (3) IHP payments
to nonqualified aliens who did not qualify for IHP. For purposes of the
testimony, potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments referred to
payments made by FEMA based on potentially improper and/or fraudulent
registration data submitted by IHP registrants. The testimony also
discussed (1) the importance of fraud prevention, and (2) the results of
our investigation into property bought by FEMA using DHS purchase cards,
which was subsequently lost or stolen. This report summarizes the findings
detailed in our December 6, 2006, testimony and makes specific
recommendations for corrective action. Our December 6, 2006, testimony is
reprinted in appendix I.

Overview of Testimony

In our testimony, we stated that our audit and investigative work on FEMA
disaster relief payments associated with hurricanes Katrina and Rita
identified additional indications of fraud, waste, and abuse.
Specifically, we found that FEMA made nearly $17 million in potentially
improper and/or fraudulent rental assistance payments to individuals after
they had moved into FEMA trailers. For example, after FEMA provided a
trailer to a household--in January 2006--FEMA provided rental assistance
payments to the same household in late January, February, and April of
2006 totaling approximately $5,500. In addition, FEMA provided potentially
improper and/or fraudulent rental assistance payments to individuals
living in FEMA-provided apartments. For example, FEMA made nearly $46,000
in rental assistance payments to at least 10 individuals living in
apartments at the same time that the apartments were being paid for by
FEMA through the city of Plano, Texas. Seven of 10 in this group
self-certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance, despite the
fact that they were living in rent-free housing. Because of limitations in
FEMA data, we were not able to identify the full extent of potentially
improper rental assistance payments made to individuals in FEMA-provided
apartments.

We also found that nearly $20 million in potentially improper and/or
fraudulent payments went to individuals who, using the same property,
registered for assistance for both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. With few
exceptions, FEMA officials explained that victims of both disasters are
entitled to only one set of IHP payments for the same damaged property.
However, FEMA officials told us that to increase the speed with which FEMA
could distribute disaster assistance, they turned off the system edits
that should have identified these types of duplicate payments.
Consequently, FEMA paid over 7,000 individuals IHP assistance twice for
the same property--once for Hurricane Katrina and once for Hurricane Rita.
These individuals received double payments for expedited assistance,
rental assistance, and/or housing replacement. For example, FEMA records
showed that one registrant received two housing replacement payments of
$10,500 each, despite the fact that he had only one property to replace.

Millions of dollars of improper and potentially fraudulent payments also
went to nonqualified aliens, including foreign students and temporary
workers. For example, FEMA improperly paid at least $3 million in IHP
assistance to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four
universities. Further, FEMA provided IHP payments that included expedited
assistance and personal property totaling more than $156,000 to 25
individuals who claimed to be foreign workers on temporary visas. FEMA
made these payments despite having copies of the work visas for several
individuals, which should have alerted FEMA that the temporary workers
were not eligible for financial assistance. Social Security Administration
records also showed many of the individuals used invalid Social Security
numbers, which could have alerted FEMA about the individuals'
ineligibility. In addition, several students and university officials
stated that FEMA personnel encouraged all students--including
international students who did not qualify for IHP assistance--that they
were eligible for IHP financial assistance. Because we did not obtain
information from all universities in the Gulf region and because of
unavailability of detailed data on other nonqualified legal aliens, we
were not able to determine the magnitude of improper and/or fraudulent
payments in this area.

Our findings also showed that the small amount of money that FEMA has been
able to collect from improper payments further demonstrates the need to
have adequate preventive controls. We previously reported that inadequate
preventive controls related to the IHP application process resulted in an
estimated $1 billion of potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments
through February 2006.^4 In contrast, as of November 2006, FEMA had
detected through its own processes about $290 million in overpayments.
This overpayment amount, which FEMA refers to as recoupments, represents
the improper payments that FEMA had detected and had issued letters
requesting repayments. However, through November FEMA had only collected
nearly $7 million. Collection of only $7 million of an estimated $1
billion of fraudulent and improper payments clearly supports the basic
point we have previously made^5 that fraud prevention is far more
efficient and effective than detection and collection.

With respect to findings regarding the DHS purchase card program, we found
weaknesses and breakdowns in accountability for property items bought for
hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief efforts using government purchase
cards.^6 For example, FEMA is still unable to locate 48 of the 143 missing
items (e.g., laptop computers, printers, and GPS units) identified in our
July 2006 testimony. Moreover, 37 items were missing from an additional
103 items that we investigated for the July testimony. Thus, over a year
after they were purchased, FEMA could not locate 85 of the 246 items (34
percent) that we investigated; we presume these items are now lost or
stolen. Our investigation also revealed that although FEMA was in
possession of 18 of the 20 flat-bottom boats it had purchased for
hurricane relief efforts, FEMA had not received the title to any of these
boats. FEMA could not provide any information about the location of the
remaining two boats.

In response to our December testimony, FEMA acknowledged weaknesses in the
processes and systems that resulted in ineligible individuals receiving
assistance. FEMA stated that in the 15 months since Hurricane Katrina,
FEMA has made great strides in correcting its deficiencies. Examples of
improvements FEMA has informed us that it put into service include an
upgraded registration application that FEMA expects will prevent duplicate
registrations and an identity verification process so that all
registrations for assistance are subjected to the same stringent criteria.
FEMA believes that the stringent controls it instituted this past year
improve its safeguards and will help eliminate processing errors and
fraudulent abuse. FEMA further stated that it will consider and evaluate
any new findings that can assist in improving its processes and
procedures.

^4To develop this estimate we followed a probability procedure based on
random selections. We express our confidence in the precision of our
particular sample's results as a 95 percent confidence interval. The 95
percent confidence interval surrounding the estimate of $1 billion ranges
from $600 million to $1.4 billion.

^5GAO, Individual Disaster Assistance Programs: Framework for Fraud
Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution, [16]GAO-06-954T  (Washington,
D.C.: July 12, 2006).

^6These property items were purchased by FEMA between June and November
2005.

Based on the findings in our testimony of December 6, 2006, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director
of FEMA to take a number of actions to reduce the potential for fraud and
abuse. Recommendations include developing controls to prevent duplicate
rental assistance benefits, increasing controls to prevent ineligible
nonqualified aliens from receiving payments, and enabling controls to
prevent duplicate payments to the same individual across multiple
disasters. FEMA concurred with all recommendations and responded that it
had taken, or is in the process of taking, actions to implement these
recommendations. However, in its response FEMA indicated that on two of
the recommendations it planned to perform investigations to determine the
extent of the problems identified prior to implementing the
recommendations.

Conclusions

Ineffective preventive controls for FEMA's IHP have resulted in
substantial fraudulent and improper payments. The additional examples of
potentially fraudulent and improper payments, totaling tens of millions of
dollars, that we highlighted in our December 2006 testimony further show
that our estimate of $1 billion in potentially improper and/or fraudulent
payments through February is likely understated. In addition, we did not
include in this total potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments to
individuals who received disaster assistance from FEMA even though they
also received insurance payments for damaged property. With respect to
property bought with government purchase cards, FEMA's inability to find
items 1 year after they were purchased, including laptop computers,
printers, and GPS units, shows that FEMA property accountability controls
are ineffective and possibly resulted in the loss or theft of government
property.

We have previously provided 25 recommendations to DHS and FEMA to improve
management of IHP and the purchase card program. FEMA and DHS had fully
concurred with 19 recommendations, and substantially or partially
concurred with the remaining 6 recommendations. DHS and FEMA also reported
that they have taken actions, or plan to take actions, to implement all
our recommendations. While we have not performed work to determine whether
FEMA's actions adequately address our recommendations, if properly
implemented, our recommendations from previous and current work should
allow DHS and FEMA to rapidly provide assistance to disaster victims while
at the same time providing reasonable assurance that disaster assistance
payments are accurate and properly authorized. As we have stated in prior
reports addressing IHP improper and fraudulent payments, these
recommendations only address specific weakness identified in this report
and are only part of a comprehensive fraud prevention program that should
be in place. Further, FEMA should ensure that there are adequate manual
processes in place to allow registrants who are incorrectly denied
assistance to expeditiously appeal the decision and receive aid. Also,
FEMA should fully field test all changes to provide assurance that valid
registrants are able to apply for and receive IHP payments.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director
of FEMA to take the following six actions to address weaknesses identified
in the administration of IHP.

To prevent rental assistance payments from being provided at the same time
that FEMA provides free housing (including trailers, mobile homes, and
apartments), FEMA should

           o develop processes for comparing IHP registrant data with FEMA
           direct housing assistance data to prevent IHP registrants from
           receiving payments for rental assistance covering the time they
           are living in FEMA-provided housing and
           o provide clear guidance to IHP registrants, including rental
           assistance registrants, indicating how the payments are to be
           used.

With respect to duplicate assistance payments across multiple disasters,
FEMA should implement and/or enable controls to prevent duplicate payments
to the same individual from different disasters for the same damage done
to the same address.

To prevent improper payments to nonqualified aliens, FEMA should

           o provide clear guidance and training to FEMA and contractor
           employees on the specific types of aliens eligible for financial
           disaster assistance, and identify nonqualified aliens, and
           o develop processes to identify and deny assistance to
           nonqualified aliens who register for IHP assistance using valid
           Social Security numbers through data comparisons with agencies
           that maintain data on legal aliens with Social Security numbers.

With respect to property bought with DHS purchase cards, if FEMA cannot
locate this property in a reasonable time period, it should work with DHS
to reconcile its tracking system data and declare these items lost or
stolen.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

On February 15, 2007, FEMA provided written comments on a draft of this
report in which it outlined actions it plans to take or has taken that are
designed to address each of our six recommendations. FEMA's comments are
reprinted in appendix II. FEMA provided examples of several planned
actions to address identified weaknesses. For example, concerning our
recommendation to provide clear guidance to victims receiving IHP rental
assistance on how funds should be used, FEMA stated that it is conducting
a comprehensive review of existing communications policies and is
developing a more effective strategy to ensure that registrants understand
IHP and its purpose. Additionally, in response to our recommendation to
develop processes to identify and deny assistance to nonqualified aliens
who register for IHP assistance, FEMA stated that it is reaching out to
other federal agencies and commercial vendors in order to enhance FEMA's
ability to screen out applications from nonqualified aliens. FEMA's
response indicates that it is attempting to address problems we identified
in IHP. As the federal government prepares for future disasters, it will
be important for FEMA to establish effective controls to prevent
fraudulent and improper payments before they occur.

However, in its responses to our recommendations concerning actions to
prevent duplicate housing assistance and housing damage repair assistance,
FEMA also stated it planned to perform additional investigations to
confirm that the conditions described in our draft report are in fact
representative of systemic problems before initiating appropriate
corrective actions. Nonetheless, we continue to believe, as discussed in
our testimony (see app. I), that our work amply demonstrates the systemic
nature of the problems identified and the need for the recommended
corrective actions.

Specifically, with respect to our recommendation on preventing individuals
from receiving rental assistance payments while residing in FEMA-provided
housing (apartments and trailers), we continue to believe our work
demonstrates a systemic problem exists. In fact the $17 million in
potentially duplicate rental assistance paid to thousands of IHP
registrants is conservative and may even understate the extent of the
problems. In addition, our case studies clearly showed payments that were
at least improper and potentially fraudulent. Further, our work included
steps to minimize the possibility that, as FEMA asserted, many of these
cases could be explained by the fact that rental assistance payments could
have been made retroactively to cover rental expenses prior to the date of
payment. Specifically, in arriving at our estimate of the extent of a
systemic problem in this area, we took the following steps to ensure that
our reported estimate of the extent of potentially duplicate payments in
this area did not overstate the problem.

           o We only included payments as potential duplicates when they were
           made to an IHP registrant at the same time that the registrant was
           residing in FEMA-provided housing. We did not consider payments
           made before a registrant moved in to FEMA-provided housing as
           duplicates even though FEMA often makes advance rental assistance
           payments. For example, FEMA provided more than $3 million in
           rental assistance payments to FEMA trailer registrants in the week
           before they moved into FEMA trailers. These payments averaged more
           than $1,700, which indicates they were likely for multiple months
           of rental assistance and could have been duplicate assistance
           payments because they would have covered the time the registrants
           were in FEMA trailers.
           o We conducted field investigations on case studies to ensure that
           conclusions reached were accurate.
           o We excluded from our analysis any payments made to IHP
           registrants living in FEMA-provided apartments. Those payments
           were excluded from the analysis because FEMA failed to maintain
           detailed reliable data on individuals living in FEMA-provided
           apartments. Thus there are potentially millions more in duplicate
           rental assistance payments associated with IHP registrants living
           in FEMA-provided apartments, as supported by our case study
           investigations.

As discussed in our testimony, our work also clearly demonstrates a
systemic problem and our recommended corrective action with respect to
controls to prevent duplicate payments to the same individual for the same
damage across multiple disasters. FEMA stated it was unsure whether all
payments we identified as duplicates were in fact duplicate payments to
the same individual for the same damage across multiple disasters. FEMA
stated that some payments could have resulted from damage from Hurricane
Katrina, and then future payments were made based on different damage
caused by Hurricane Rita.

However, this assertion is contrary to representations FEMA made to us
during the course of the audit. Specifically, FEMA told us during the
audit that with few exceptions, registrants would only be entitled to one
payment for each damage and/or need. We acknowledge that a registrant
could have had a house damaged by Hurricane Katrina, and could have
repaired the damage and moved back into the original house--only to have
it damaged again by Hurricane Rita. However, this it is an extremely
unlikely scenario given the severity of the damage caused by Hurricane
Katrina and the fact that Hurricane Rita occurred shortly after, leaving
very little time for inspectors to inspect and certify housing damage
between storms, especially given there were more than 7,000 registrants we
identified. According to our case studies, FEMA performed the first
inspection of the properties in question after both hurricanes affected
the area. Our case studies also showed that FEMA used two different
inspectors to look at damaged properties, once for Hurricane Katrina and
once for Hurricane Rita. Without having an inspection performed before
Hurricane Rita hit, or having the same inspector review the claim to
determine what damage was from Hurricane Rita and what damage was from
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is not in a position to know whether it paid for
the same damaged items twice. Therefore, we continue to believe our work
demonstrates a systemic problem for which FEMA should institute our
recommendation to institute controls that prevent duplicate payments to
the same individual for the same damage registered for under different
disasters.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-7455 or [email protected] ; or contact John Kelly at (202)
512-6926 or [email protected] . Other individuals who made major
contributions to this report were Gary Bianchi, Jennifer Costello, Jason
Kelly, Barbara Lewis, Jonathan Meyer, Andrew McIntosh, John Ryan, and
Tuyet-Quan Thai.

Gregory Kutz
Managing Director
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations

Appendix I: Testimony on Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

Appendix II: Comments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(192239)

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Highlights of [27]GAO-07-300 , a report to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

March 2007

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF

Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to respond to
hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO's previous work identified suspected
fraud, waste, and abuse resulting from control weaknesses associated with
FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card program. Congress asked GAO to
follow up on this previous work to determine whether potentially improper
and/or fraudulent payments continued to be made. GAO testified on the
results of our audit and investigative efforts on December 6, 2006. This
report summarizes the results of our follow-up work.

[28]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS direct FEMA to take six actions, including
establishing controls to prevent duplicate housing benefits to FEMA
trailer and apartment residents and duplicate benefit payments for the
same damages. GAO is also recommending that FEMA establish controls to
prevent benefits to nonqualified aliens. FEMA outlined actions it plans to
take or has taken that are designed to address each of our six
recommendations. However, FEMA plans to perform additional investigations
on two of the findings to determine whether problems are systemic prior to
implementing recommended changes.

In our December 6, 2006, testimony, GAO stated that FEMA made tens of
millions of dollars of potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments
associated with both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These payments include
$17 million in rental assistance paid to individuals to whom FEMA had
already provided free housing through trailers or apartments. In one case,
FEMA provided free housing to 10 individuals in apartments in Plano,
Texas, while at the same time it sent these individuals $46,000 to cover
out-of-pocket housing expenses. In addition, several of these individuals
certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance.

FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of
individuals who claimed damages to the same property from both hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. FEMA also made millions in potentially improper and/or
fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for IHP.
For example, FEMA paid at least $3 million to more than 500 ineligible
foreign students at four universities in the affected areas. This amount
likely understates the total payments to ineligible foreign students
because it does not cover all colleges and universities in the area. FEMA
also provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent IHP assistance to
other ineligible non-U.S. residents, despite having documentation
indicating their ineligibility.

Finally, FEMA's difficulties in identifying and collecting improper
payments further emphasized the importance of implementing an effective
fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system. For example, GAO previously
estimated improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to the IHP
application process to be $1 billion through February 2006. As of November
2006, FEMA identified about $290 million in overpayments and collected
about $7 million.

GAO Improper Payment Estimate and FEMA Reported Overpayments and
Collections

Finally, GAO's work on DHS purchase cards showed continuing problems with
property accountability, including items GAO investigated that could not
be located 1 year after they were purchased.

References

Visible links
  11. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-252T
  12. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-403T
  13. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-844T
  14. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-957T
  15. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-957T
  16. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-954T
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-300
*** End of document. ***