Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat
Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the
Highest Priority Radiological Sources (31-JAN-07, GAO-07-282).
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological
sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security
threat to the United States and the international community.
Radioactive material is encapsulated or sealed in metal to
prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed
radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used
worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such as medical,
industrial, and agricultural applications. However, the total
number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many
countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated
that thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or
abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain
types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be
used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous,
weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb.
In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of
its fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the
threat posed by dirty bombs. In response to the congressional
requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to
identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological
sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year
2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the
countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials
determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable
sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy,
DOE expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources
worldwide, ultimately establishing the International Radiological
Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The program's primary objective
is to protect U.S. national security interests by (1)
implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites
containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and
consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources;
and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure
necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting
regulatory controls, including the development of regional
partnerships to leverage international resources. In addition,
DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources produced
and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction program. Part of this program's
mission is to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis
that were supplied by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for
Peace program. The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with
support from multiple national laboratories. The national
laboratories' responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical
security requirements of countries participating in the program,
(2) recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological
source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are
properly installed. In 2003, we issued a report at Congress'
request focusing on U.S. and international efforts to secure
sealed radiological sources. We recommended, among other things,
that the Secretary of Energy take the lead in developing a
comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other countries'
sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress the
Department of Energy (DOE) has made in implementing its program
to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources,
(2) identifies DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3)
describes DOE's coordination with other U.S. agencies and
international organizations to secure radiological sources in
other countries.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-282
ACCNO: A65433
TITLE: Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International
Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future
Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources
DATE: 01/31/2007
SUBJECT: Cost analysis
Foreign aid programs
Foreign governments
Interagency relations
International organizations
International relations
Nuclear facilities
Nuclear facility security
Nuclear proliferation
Program evaluation
Program management
Radioactive materials
Atoms for Peace Program
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GAO-07-282
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwi
* [4]DOE Has Secured over 300 Sites Worldwide, but Many High-Prio
* [5]A Majority of Sites Secured by DOE Are Hospitals and
Oncolog
* [6]Hundreds of RTGs Remain Unsecured in Russia
* [7]Waste Storage Facilities Need to Be Secured in Russia and
Uk
* [8]Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in
DOE
* [9]DOE Has Revised Its Criteria for Site Selection and Increase
* [10]Numerous Problems and Challenges Impeded DOE's Efforts to Se
* [11]DOE Has Not Developed a Plan to Ensure the Long-Term Sustain
* [12]DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiologi
* [13]DOE Expenditures Have Focused Primarily on Physical Security
* [14]DOE Has Consistently Carried Over Large Balances of Unspent
* [15]DOE's Budget for Radioactive Source Security Has Been Reduce
* [16]Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still
* [17]DOE Has Improved Efforts to Coordinate Its Program Activitie
* [18]DOE's Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Depa
* [19]Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps
* [20]Conclusions
* [21]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [22]Matters for Congressional Consideration
* [23]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [24]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* [25]Appendix II: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by R
* [26]Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy
* [27]Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
* [28]Order by Mail or Phone
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
January 2007
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus
Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources
GAO-07-282
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 5
Background 8
Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has Not
Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many Dangerous
Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured 9
DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources
Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an Increased
Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials 33
Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces
Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide 43
Conclusions 55
Recommendations for Executive Action 57
Matters for Congressional Consideration 59
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 59
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 64
Appendix II DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as of
August 31, 2006 68
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Energy 70
Appendix IV Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 75
Tables
Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of
September 30, 2006 13
Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia 16
Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August 31,
2006 34
Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006 40
Figures
Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades 12
Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia 16
Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE 19
Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological Sources
23
Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator with
Holes in the Roof 29
Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic 30
Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations 39
Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and
Unsecured Spent Fuel 51
Abbreviations
ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization
DOE Department of Energy
EC European Commission
EU European Union
EWGPP Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program
FSU Former Soviet Union
GSSP Global Search and Secure Program
GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IRSRA Iraq Radiological Source Regulatory Authority
IRTR International Radiological Threat Reduction Program
NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
SNRCU State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
January 31, 2007
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States
Senate
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources
were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the
United States and the international community. Radioactive material, such
as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90, is encapsulated or sealed in
metal--such as stainless steel, titanium, or platinum--to prevent its
dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed
radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such
as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. These applications
include radiation treatment for cancer patients, food and blood
irradiation, and oil drilling. However, the total number of these sources
in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically
account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these sources have
been lost, stolen, or abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources.
If certain types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could
be used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous,
weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb.
The amount of radiation emitted by these sources varies based on the size
and type of the source. For example, teletherapy machines, which are used
to treat cancer patients and are found in hospitals and oncology clinics,
contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from about 1,000 to 10,000
curies.1 DOE officials have estimated that there are approximately 2,000
teletherapy sources located primarily in developing nations around the
world. Additionally, strontium-90 sources contained in large devices known
as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG), designed to provide
electric power to navigational facilities such as lighthouses and weather
stations, contain between 25,000 and 250,000 curies. U.S. and Russian
officials have estimated that there were more than 1,050 RTGs produced and
distributed throughout the former Soviet Union. These devices present a
particularly high security risk because of their high levels of
radioactivity and inadequate protection. The Department of Energy (DOE)
has reported that the RTGs likely represent the largest unsecured quantity
of radioactivity in the world. Waste storage facilities also pose a
considerable threat if left unsecured because any one of these facilities
can store, at any given time, up to 3 million curies of material.
1A curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear
physics, it is defined as the amount of substance in which 37 billion
atoms per second undergo radiological disintegration. In the international
system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of radioactivity. One
curie equals 3.7 x 1010 becquerels.
In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its
fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by
dirty bombs.2 In response to the congressional requirement, the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)3 established the Radiological
Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable,
high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in
fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the
countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials
determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In
2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope
of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing
the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The
program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests
by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites
containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and
consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3)
supporting the development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain
security enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the
development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources.
In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources
produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction program.4 Part of this program's mission is
to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied
by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program.5
2H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350, at 431 (2001).
3NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-65 (2000), with responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons,
nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple
national laboratories, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL), Sandia National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Remote Sensing Laboratory, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos
National Laboratory.6 The national laboratories' responsibilities include
(1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries
participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to
strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended
upgrades are properly installed.
IRTR is one of eight programs within DOE's Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI). These programs are responsible for identifying,
securing, and removing and/or facilitating the disposition of high-risk,
vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the
world that pose a potential threat to the United States and the
international community.7 In September 2006, DOE reorganized GTRI to
consolidate its nuclear and radiological threat reduction programs. As a
result, the IRTR program was integrated into a newly combined nuclear and
radiological threat reduction effort that focuses on three major
geographic areas--North and South America, Europe and Africa, and Asia and
countries of the former Soviet Union.8 As part of this restructuring, DOE
issued new program guidance assigning priority rankings to the types of
sites and radiological sources that will be secured in the future.
4GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded
Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources, [29]GAO-05-967 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 22, 2005).
5The Atoms for Peace Program was established in the 1950s for the purpose
of promoting peaceful domestic and international exploration, development,
and advancement of nuclear energy. Under the auspices of the program, DOE
and its predecessor agencies provided many countries with sealed
radiological sources.
6DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. The
mission of DOE's 22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to design
and build atomic weapons, these laboratories have since expanded to
conduct research in many disciplines--from high-energy physics to advanced
computing.
7In addition to the IRTR program, GTRI consists of the U.S. Radiological
Threat Reduction, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors,
the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return, the U.S. Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance, Emerging Threats and Gap Materials,
Global Research Reactor Security, and BN-350 programs.
The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other countries,
though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State provides overall policy
direction for U.S. government international radiological source security
efforts and has broadened international support for the International
Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Code of Conduct, as well as guidance on the
import and export of radiological sources.9 State also provides IAEA with
funds to, among other things, conduct training, workshops, and advisory
missions to improve member states' security practices and procedures. NRC
has advised and provided guidance on the development of programs in
Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan to improve nuclear regulatory controls
over radiological sources, including establishing radiological source
inventories and promoting the development of laws, rules, and regulations
governing controls over this material.
In addition to IAEA, the European Commission (EC) also provides assistance
to countries--primarily those that are candidates or potential candidates
for joining the European Union (EU)--to improve the security of sites
containing radiological sources.10 EC activities in this area are a
component of its efforts to combat nuclear terrorism.
8The countries of the former Soviet Union include Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
9The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
serves as a guide in developing policies, laws, and regulations on
maintaining the safety and security of radiological sources. It is not,
however, legally binding. The code, which was revised in 2003, includes,
among other things, enhanced requirements for the security of sources. As
of December 2006, 88 countries, including the United States, had committed
to implement the code. Further, in September 2004, IAEA's Board of
Governors approved new guidance on the import and export of sources, which
is designed to help countries ensure that high-risk sources are supplied
only to authorized end-users. As of December 2006, 37 countries, including
the United States, had committed to implement the import/export guidance.
10The EC manages foreign assistance programs for its 27 EU member states.
In 2003, we issued a report at your request focusing on U.S. and
international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources.11 We
recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the
lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other
countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress DOE has
made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their
sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE's current and planned
program costs, and (3) describes DOE's coordination with other U.S.
agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in
other countries. To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation on
the IRTR program from DOE and its national laboratories and conducted
interviews with key program officials. We also visited four countries that
are major recipients of DOE assistance to improve radiological source
security--Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia--to observe how equipment
and training were being utilized and to discuss the implementation of the
program with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and
budgetary information, conducted a data reliability assessment of the data
we received, and interviewed knowledgeable program officials on the
reliability of the data. We determined that these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. More details about the scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from
November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's
inception in 2002. These achievements include the removal of cesium and
cobalt sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya and providing
security upgrades to vulnerable sites in Greece prior to the 2004
Olympics. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources
still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. Specifically, 16 of 20
waste storage sites across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while more
than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are vulnerable
to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the
program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types
of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September
2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities,
which generally contain one radiological source. Several DOE and national
laboratory officials with whom we spoke questioned the benefit of
upgrading such a large number of medical facilities, while higher priority
sites--such as waste storage facilities and RTGs--remained unsecured. In
addition, DOE's program does not address the transportation of
radiological sources from one location to another, a security measure that
DOE and international officials have identified as the most vulnerable
link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous
problems and challenges implementing its program to secure radiological
sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and
access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk
countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades at
all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries
receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long
term. This is particularly problematic, given the number of problems we
identified during our site visits with the maintenance of security
equipment and storage facilities funded by DOE. For example in Georgia we
found that a facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which has
thousands of curies of cesium-137--had several large openings in the roof.
In Lithuania, we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the security
cable, which is used to secure a teletherapy machine's cobalt-60 source,
had been broken for almost a month. A DOE physical security specialist
told us that the cable was the most important security feature installed
by DOE because it triggered an alarm that was connected to the source.
11GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts
to Control Sealed Radiological Sources Need Strengthening, [30]GAO-03-638
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).
From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent
approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure radiological
sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68 million--was to (1)
conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing
radiological sources; (2) install physical security upgrades at these
sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and surveillance
cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase
security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5
million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over
radiological sources in IAEA member states. The remainder, or $26.5
million, paid for program planning activities such as developing program
guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies.
Russia received almost one-third of total DOE funding, which focused
primarily on orphan source recovery, RTG removal and disposal, and
physical security upgrades at waste storage facilities. DOE officials told
us that securing radiological sources in other countries is a lower
priority than securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium
and highly enriched uranium. As a result, recent budget allotments for
radiological security activities were reduced, and future funding for the
program is uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE may be
unable to meet outstanding contractual commitments in the countries where
it has installed more than $40 million in security upgrades. To offset
anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to obtain international
contributions from other countries but efforts to date have produced
limited results.
DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological
sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has
involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction
activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the
agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led interagency
effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority and
develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. However, DOE has
not always integrated its nuclear regulatory development efforts
efficiently. For example, DOE and NRC disagreed about whether, as directed
by the Senate Appropriations Committee, DOE should have transferred $5
million from its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for the purpose of
strengthening international regulatory controls over radiological sources.
Ultimately, the funds were not transferred, causing friction between the
agencies. In addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities
of multiple programs within the agency responsible for securing
radiological and nuclear materials in other countries. For example, in
Poland we found that radiological sources were secured at a storage
facility by DOE's radiological program while spent nuclear fuel--located
next to the sources in the same storage facility--had not been secured by
DOE's nuclear security upgrades program. Polish officials told us they
could not understand why the separate DOE programs had not coordinated
their efforts to ensure that all of the material was secured at the same
time. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen
controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed
bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve
their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in
information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded
DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security
improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts.
To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest priority
radiological sources, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy and
the Administrator of the NNSA, among other things, (1) limit the number of
hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive
security upgrades to only those deemed the highest risk; (2) accelerate
efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as practicable; and (3) develop a
long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that includes, among
other things, future resources required to implement such a plan.
Furthermore, if the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure
development is the key to the long-term sustainability of radiological
source security efforts, it should consider providing NRC with authority
and a direct appropriation to conduct these activities. The appropriation
would be provided to NRC in lieu of providing the funds to DOE or another
agency to reimburse NRC for their activities.
Background
The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological
sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft.
According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in
radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004,
about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of
which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the
development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a
dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could, however,
have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type, amount, and
form, the dispersed radiological material could cause radiation sickness
for people nearby and produce serious economic, psychological and social
disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the
contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the
mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in
a Moscow park. While the device was not detonated and no radiological
material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have the
capability and willingness to use radiological sources as weapons of
terror.
A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic
impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is
likely to equal, and perhaps exceed, that of the September 11, 2001,
attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another study,
the economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs at U.S.
ports, for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in losses to
the U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb attack could also
produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the Federation of
American Scientists concluded that an americium radiological source
combined with one pound of explosives would result in medical supervision
and monitoring required for the entire population of an area 10 times
larger than the initial blast.
The consequences resulting from the improper use of radiological sources
are not theoretical. Some actual incidents involving sources can provide a
measure of understanding of what could happen in case of a dirty bomb
attack. In 1987, an accident involving a teletherapy machine containing
about 1,400 curies of cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a
powder similar to talc and highly dispersible, killed four people in
Brazil and injured many more. The accident and its aftermath caused about
$36 million in damages to the region (Goiania) where the accident
occurred, according to an official from Brazil's Nuclear Energy
Commission. In addition to the deaths and economic impact, the accident
created environmental and medical problems. For example, 85 houses were
significantly contaminated and 41 of these had to be evacuated. The
decontamination process required the demolition of homes and other
buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive waste. Over
8,000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to obtain
certificates stating they were not contaminated.
Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has Not
Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many Dangerous
Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured
DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's
inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as removing
dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya, many of the
high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in
Russia. DOE officials told us that the program has barely "scratched the
surface" in terms of securing the most dangerous sources in the former
Soviet Union. Specifically, removing dangerous sources from 16 of 20 waste
storage facilities across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while more
than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are vulnerable
to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the
program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types
of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September
2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities,
which generally contain one radiological source. In addition, DOE's
program does not address the transportation of radiological sources from
one location to another, a security measure that DOE and international
officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological
supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges
implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide,
including a lack of cooperation from host country officials. Finally, DOE
has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries receiving
security upgrades will be able to sustain them once installed.
DOE Has Secured over 300 Sites Worldwide, but Many High-Priority Radiological
Sources Remain Unsecured
Since DOE began its program in 2002, it has taken steps to secure
radiological sources in more than 40 countries and has achieved some
noteworthy accomplishments. For example, DOE told us that it has (1)
facilitated the removal of 5,500 curies of cobalt-60 and cesium-137
sources from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya, the
location of continuing political unrest in southeastern Russia; (2)
constructed storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan and
Georgia so that sources can be consolidated at one site to strengthen
their long-term protection; and (3) increased security at 21 sites in
Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics, including providing 110 hand-held
radiation detection devices for first responders.12 DOE secured, among
other things, facilities with blood irradiators containing cesium chloride
and a large industrial sterilization facility.
According to DOE, it has neither the resources nor staff to
comprehensively address and secure the tens of thousands of vulnerable
radiological sources worldwide on its own. As a result, it has enlisted
the support of regional partners and IAEA to implement programs to help
other countries find, characterize and secure their most dangerous
sources. DOE works with partner countries to identify sites where
high-risk sources may be located and provides the equipment and training
to conduct searches. Once the sources have been located, DOE enlists the
support of IAEA or partner countries to transfer them to a secure
facility. For example, DOE established a regional partnership with
Lithuania to facilitate orphan source recovery efforts both in Lithuania
and in neighboring countries. DOE purchased radiation detection equipment
and trained Lithuanian specialists to initiate orphan source recovery
efforts. Lithuania was able to identify 41 former Soviet military and
industrial sites that potentially held high-risk radiological sources.
Subsequently, Lithuania assisted DOE in initiating search and secure
efforts in Estonia and Latvia, which resulted in the discovery and
disposition of orphan sources.
12The hand-held radiation detection equipment was provided under DOE's
Cooperative Radiological Instrument Threat Reduction program. This program
is designed to help DOE's international radiological threat reduction
program to ensure that other countries' law enforcement officials are
provided with the necessary equipment and training to detect and mitigate
radiological security threats.
Despite these achievements, DOE's program has not adequately addressed
many high-priority sources. In 2003, the Secretary of Energy directed NNSA
to expand its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, which
increased both the number of countries targeted to receive DOE assistance
and the types of sites to be secured. Expanding the program into many
countries outside of the former Soviet Union--the initial focus and
attention of DOE's program--resulted in the addition of many medical
facilities that contained lower priority sources that were now being
targeted for physical security upgrades.
A Majority of Sites Secured by DOE Are Hospitals and Oncology Clinics
As of September 30, 2006, DOE's program had completed the installation of
physical security upgrades at 368 sites in over 40 countries. However, a
majority of sites secured do not represent the highest-risk or the most
vulnerable sources. Of the total sites completed, 256--or about 70
percent--were hospitals and oncology clinics operating teletherapy
machines used to provide radiation treatment to cancer patients. These
machines generally contain a single cobalt-60 radiological source ranging
from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. In 38 of the 41 countries--or 93
percent--DOE had upgraded at least one hospital or oncology clinic.
According to DOE, many of the countries that are included in its global
program have medical facilities with radiological sources. As a result,
these facilities were targeted for upgrades. In addition to the medical
facilities, DOE has completed security upgrades at 47 research institutes,
35 commercial and industrial sites, and 30 waste storage facilities.
Figure 1 depicts the countries receiving security upgrades, and table 1
provides a breakdown of the total number and types of facilities upgraded
by DOE, as of September 30, 2006.
Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades
Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of
September 30, 2006
Percent of
Number of total number
sites of sites Number of countries where
completed by completed by this type of site has been
Site type DOE DOE completeda
Medical 256 70% 38
Research institutes 47 13 19
Commercial/Industrial 35 10 17
Waste storage
facilities(Radons)b 30 8 22
Total 368 100%c 41
Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data.
Note: According to DOE, there are about 2,249 sites worldwide that would
be likely candidates for physical security upgrades. As of September 2006,
DOE had completed upgrades at about 16 percent of these sites.
aMany of the countries received physical security upgrades for more than
one type of facility.
bWaste storage facilities are specifically identified as Radons in the
FSU.
cPercentage does not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Six national laboratory officials and security specialists responsible for
implementing the program told us that although progress had been made in
securing radiological sources, DOE had focused too much attention on
securing medical facilities at the expense of other higher-priority sites,
such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In their view, DOE installed
security upgrades at so many of these facilities primarily because the
upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost. For example, a typical
suite of security upgrades at a medical facility costs between $10,000 to
$20,000, depending on the size of the site, whereas the average cost to
remove and replace an RTG in the Far East region of Russia is about
$72,000 based on 2006 dollars.
Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited also
raised concerns about DOE's focus on securing radiological sources at so
many medical facilities. For example, staff responsible for operating the
teletherapy machines in hospitals in Lithuania and Poland told us that the
cobalt-60 sources contained in the teletherapy machine did not pose a
significant security risk. In their view, it was highly unlikely that the
sources could be easily removed from these machines and that it would take
more than one highly skilled and determined intruder to remove the source
and transport it out of the facility without being detected or dangerously
exposed to radiation.13 In fact, while emphasizing the importance of
securing medical facilities, DOE officials stated that getting medical and
security staff to buy into the need for improved security has been a
consistent challenge for the program. Further, Russian officials told us
that radiological sources in hospitals did not pose a comparable risk to
RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. DOE has not offered to fund any
security upgrades of Russian medical facilities since its funds are
focused on securing RTGs, Radons, and orphan sources.
According to five national laboratory officials and security specialists,
completing upgrades at medical facilities also served to demonstrate rapid
program progress because the upgrades are completed relatively quickly.
DOE has relied upon an indicator that focuses on the number of sites that
have been upgraded, or "sites secured." While sites completed is the
primary metric used by DOE, the program does compile and track several
additional activities, including the amount of curies secured, countries
that receive regulatory assistance, and orphan sources recovered.
In measuring program performance, the Director of IRTR said that the
number of sites completed demonstrated conclusively that work has been
completed and represents the best available measurement. In discussions
with other high-level DOE officials about the program, they consistently
identified the number of sites upgraded as evidence that the program had
been achieving results and reducing the threat posed by radiological
sources overseas. However, PNNL and Sandia National Laboratory officials
told us that the measurement used by DOE does not demonstrate how the
program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national security interests. In
their view, this measurement is one-dimensional and does not adequately
distinguish lower-priority sites from higher-priority sites.
Hundreds of RTGs Remain Unsecured in Russia
DOE has made limited progress removing hundreds of RTGs containing
high-priority sources which, according to DOE, likely represent the
largest unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. These devices
were designed to provide electric power and are suited for remote
locations to power navigational facilities such as lighthouses and
meteorological stations. Each has activity levels ranging from 25,000 to
250,000 curies of strontium-90--similar to the amount of strontium-90
released from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 1986. As of
September 30, 2006, DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of all
RTGs located in Russia's inventory. Until early 2000, approximately 1,049
RTGs were in Russia. Of those, approximately 317 RTGs have been removed
over the past several years, according to DOE and Russian officials. DOE
funded about 40 percent of those removed (132 RTGs) and Norway, France,
and Russia funded the removal of the remaining 185.14 However, an
estimated 732 RTGs, representing several million curies of radioactivity,
remain unsecured.
13Sandia National Labatories determined that a source could be easily
removed from a teletherapy machine using basic tools and drawings.
A majority of RTGs are located along coastlines in three major
regions--the Baltic, Artic and Far East. To date, DOE has focused the
majority of its efforts on removing RTGs along the Arctic coast. However,
more than 90 RTGs remain operational along the Baltic coast under control
of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which DOE does not plan to remove. DOE
officials said that the program will now focus its efforts almost
exclusively in the Far East because DOE expects other countries to remove
RTGs from the Baltic region. Figure 2 shows the location of the remaining
RTGs in Russia, and table 2 summarizes DOE's efforts, along with other
countries, to remove RTGs in Russia.
14Norway has committed to securing an additional 77 RTGs along the Arctic
coast, including the Kola Peninsula. Specifically, Norway agreed to remove
30 RTGs in 2006, 30 in 2007 and 17 in 2008.
Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia
Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia
Region Baltic Far East Arctic Totala
Total estimated RTG inventory in Russia 96 233 720 1049b
DOE removal in fiscal year 2004 0 0 63 63
DOE removal in fiscal year 2005 3 25 24 52
DOE removal in fiscal year 2006 0 0 17 17
Total DOE removals to date 3 25 104 132c
Estimated DOE-partner countries removal d d 185d 185d
Estimated remaining RTGs in Russia 93 208 431 732d
Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data.
Note: For the purpose of our analysis, we are combining the Northern Sea
route and White Sea route and labeling them the Arctic region.
aBecause Russia has not comprehensively tracked the existing number of
RTGs, DOE and Russian figures for the total number of RTGs differ, as do
the number of RTGs recovered. Russian officials have cited varying figures
regarding the total number of RTGs that exist in Russia. Russia has
documented that at least 670 RTGs exist throughout the Russian Federation
territory. However, other Russian sources estimated that the number of
RTGs in Russia ranges from 605 to 700.
bThe total does not include the 16 RTGs removed in other former Soviet
Union countries (13 in the Ukraine and 3 in Georgia).
cDOE is now engaged in the removal of an additional 27 RTGs in the Far
East.
dAn additional 185 RTGs were removed by DOE partner countries, including
Russia, Norway, and France. However, the exact breakdown by region for
these RTG removals was not known by DOE. DOE assumed that these 185 RTGs
were removed from the Arctic region.
DOE officials told us that the Far East region is now a priority for RTG
removal because Russian Ministry of Defense officials have specifically
requested DOE's assistance for the Far East and provided DOE with a
prioritized list of RTGs to be removed. In addition, other countries have
expressed a willingness to support future RTG removal in the Baltic
region. For example, according to DOE, in February 2005 Denmark announced
that it had reached an agreement with Russia to replace and remove all
RTGs in the Baltic region. Other European nations, including Germany, have
also offered assistance. However, Russian officials told us that
assistance from Germany has not materialized and that Denmark had
rescinded its offer to provide assistance. Moreover, these officials
expressed concern regarding DOE's decision to fund the removal of RTGs
exclusively from the Far East region. In their view, the RTGs in the
Baltic are more vulnerable and should be removed as soon as possible
because of their accessibility and proximity to large population centers.
According to DOE officials, if international funding for removal of these
vulnerable RTGs does not materialize, IRTR will likely have to fund the
Baltic effort.
According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and future
efforts will face a number of challenges. No comprehensive inventory of
RTGs exists and, as a result, the actual number of these devices is
unknown. RTGs were originally manufactured in Estonia, but the company
dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all the records were
lost. The Russian organization that originally designed them is currently
developing a database of known RTGs in Russia--with U.S. funding and
support--to reconstruct records and develop a reliable accounting of the
total number of devices produced. However, this effort has been ongoing
for years and remains incomplete. Officials from the Russian organization
told us that they lack confidence that the precise number and location of
RTGs, both in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, will
ever be known.
RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, and their removal
requires specialized containers for their transport and adequate storage
capacity to securely house them once removed. Russian officials reported
that RTG removal had been slowed due to a lack of both. To address the
need for containers and space, DOE has enlisted Canada's support to
provide funds to Russia for constructing an additional 17 containers for
transporting RTGs, bringing the total to 36. However, this effort is not
scheduled to be completed until early to mid-2007.15 DOE is also
supporting the construction of storage facilities at two locations in the
Russian Far East, Vladivostok and Kamchatka. When completed, the
Vladivostok facility is expected to house 150 to 200 RTGs. Moreover, a
smaller storage building is under construction at Kamchatka, which will
store RTGs until they can be shipped to Vladivostok for permanent storage.
According to DOE, the Vladivostok facility houses 25 RTGs that were
recovered from the Russian Far East. By the end of 2006, Vladivostok is
scheduled to house 33 additional recovered RTGs.
Finally, Russian officials told us that future RTG removal efforts will
depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace power
supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has initiated a
project to provide alternative power sources, including wind and
solar-powered energy panels to accelerate RTG removal. However these
replacements are not always viable. For example, navigational lighthouses
located in northern Russia experience severe weather and limited daylight
4 to 5 months per year and cannot rely on solar power during the winter
months. Russian Ministry of Defense officials have stated that the
navigational devices are critical and that they will not approve removal
of any additional RTGs without a viable energy source to replace them.
Figure 3 shows a navigational beacon with a solar-powered replacement
energy source funded by DOE that we observed during our fieldwork.
15According to DOE, this is part of a larger funding commitment by Canada
for $2 million to support radiological source security in Russia.
Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE
DOE also noted that RTG removal and replacement has been slowed by
challenges in project negotiation with Russian officials. For example,
costs of RTG removal and transport have consistently risen as a result of
increased Russian price demands and the failure of the Russian government
to contribute funds to the effort. DOE has also experienced long delays
while waiting for the Russian Ministry of Defense to approve the release
of information regarding certain RTGs. Inadequate funding to support RTG
removal has extended the deadline for completion from 2014 to 2021.
As an interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs that have not
yet been removed, DOE has equipped a select number of RTGs with alarm
systems that are remotely monitored via satellite as part of a pilot
project. Specifically the alarm consists of sensors that monitor, among
other things, vibrations of the device and the source's movement. Because
the source is inside the RTG, the alarms on both the device and its source
emit regular, electronic signals to a regional base station. If the
signals are interrupted, then the alarm is triggered. As of September
2006, DOE had funded the installation of these security systems for 24
RTGs in the Baltic region and 20 RTGs in the Far East region. According to
DOE, the cost of the alarm system is about $5,000, and about $8,000 to
establish the regional base station. DOE officials said they will continue
to install security upgrades to RTGs as an interim measure, as long as the
costs remain at those levels.
Waste Storage Facilities Need to Be Secured in Russia and Ukraine
In addition to RTGs, DOE also has made limited progress securing
radiological sources stored at waste storage facilities in Russia and
Ukraine. DOE has determined that the storage facilities in Russia and
Ukraine are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a significant risk,
due to the very large quantities of radioactive sources currently housed
at each site. According to DOE, waste storage facilities can store up to 3
million curies of radioactive waste. However, upgrades at a majority of
these facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly in
Russia and Ukraine, remain incomplete. To date, upgrades at 4 of 15 Radons
in Russia have been completed since DOE began work in 2002. According to
DOE, upgrades are under way at seven additional Radons. However, work has
been delayed at several of these facilities. According to DOE, delays in
upgrades to Radons were due in large part to delays in the Russian
certification process of physical equipment for upgrades at these types of
facilities. In addition, reorganization and managerial changes at the
primary Russian agency with oversight authority over construction at Radon
facilities presented challenges for DOE officials trying to gain access to
Radons for physical security assessments. Furthermore, DOE officials noted
that progress has been slowed because several Radon managers were
unwilling to participate in the program until they received assurances
from DOE that their Radon would receive a level of funding comparable to
larger Radons.
DOE has not completed upgrades at any of Ukraine's five Radon sites, one
of which contains all 13 RTGs recovered in Ukraine. According to DOE
officials, initiating work at the Radons has been problematic because
Ukrainian officials have designated some sites as "sensitive" and thus
denied DOE access to them. As a result, security upgrades have been
delayed for at least 2 years. In May 2005, Ukraine agreed to provide DOE
access to two of the five sites, and security upgrades at those facilities
are under way. DOE plans to complete the remaining three Radons by 2010
but have found that Ukraine is impeding access to these additional sites.
In addition, DOE has identified 49 vulnerable waste storage facilities
worldwide for assistance and has completed work at 26 of these sites in
several countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. DOE is also undertaking
upgrades at 23 additional sites. However, DOE has not addressed sites in
the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Peru, Serbia, and South
Africa. It was unclear, based on our discussions with DOE officials, when,
if ever, security upgrades would be completed in these countries.
Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in DOE's Program
Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk
radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and
radiological supply chain, DOE determined that source transport is
generally outside the scope of the program. Some DOE officials have
expressed concern about the lack of security during the transport of
radiological sources and questioned whether transportation should be a
component of DOE's program. For example, a May 2005 DOE analysis concluded
that DOE was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc basis, and
the existing method of providing transportation security had serious
limitations. The analysis also noted that DOE's current approach is
resource limited and lacked a commitment to integrate transport security
into all countries participating in the program. According to DOE's 2003
program guidelines, DOE will fund transportation security upgrades only in
Russia and Uzbekistan because the United States had international
agreements with these countries to provide liability coverage when
transporting radiological sources. As a result, DOE security specialists
were not pursuing transportation security-related projects with the
majority of countries participating in the program. However, DOE noted
that its national laboratories were working with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor states to strengthen
transportation security regulations and procedures to reduce the risks of
theft or diversion of nuclear and other radioactive materials in transit.
In every country we visited, host country officials identified the
transportation of sources as a critical vulnerability and a priority for
security upgrades. Moscow Radon officials told us that transportation
security had emerged as one of their top priorities. DOE has, in fact,
provided a fleet of transport vehicles for the Moscow Radon, including
guard vehicles, escort vehicles, and cargo trucks for transporting both
liquid and solid waste. However, Radon officials told us that they also
needed a reliable communication system to ensure the security of sources
in transit. Consequently, the Moscow Radon funded a satellite-linked cell
phone to facilitate communication and to monitor vehicles that transport
radiological sources. However, at another Radon site we visited in Russia,
a similar communications system did not exist. Moreover, officials from
this site told us that their fleet of transportation vehicles was about 30
years old and needed to be replaced. These officials stated that they
requested funds from DOE for the vehicle replacement but were told that no
funds were available.
Another aspect of transportation security concerns equipment containing
small, easily transportable sources--typically weighing less than 25
pounds with an average radioactivity level of several curies. DOE
estimates that about 10,000 of these smaller sources exist in several
different countries. Specifically these sources, such as americium and
beryllium, are used in the oil and gas industry for exploration purposes.
According to DOE, these sources routinely move from one base camp to
another with limited security, making them vulnerable to theft and
potential misuse. We saw first-hand how vulnerable these sources were
during our visit to one industrial facility where we observed a truck used
to transport a cesium-137 source to a remote gas exploration site. Host
country officials showed us how easy it would be to remove the sources
from the truck as they were being secured with a simple lock. In addition,
country officials told us that although some trucks are equipped with
mobile phones, many areas along transportation routes are remote, and the
phones often have no signal. Figure 4 shows an unsecured truck used to
transport radiological sources.
Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological Sources
DOE has taken some steps to address this problem, but agency officials
said that securing mobile sources is too costly and should be the
responsibility of private industry. In this regard, DOE initiated efforts
with U.S. industry partners to identify better ways to secure sources that
have industrial applications and are frequently in transit. In February
2006, DOE attended a forum with NRC and the Society for Petroleum
Engineers to discuss security issues and develop best practices within the
industry to better control radiological sources used overseas for
industrial purposes.16
16DOE identified the Society for Petroleum Engineers, which is an
organization that represents petroleum companies' engineers and
petro-physicists. Its membership includes both service operators, like
Chevron and British Petroleum, and service providers, like Halliburton.
DOE Has Revised Its Criteria for Site Selection and Increased the Level of
Upgrades Required to Secure Certain Sites and Sources
In September 2006, as part of the broader reorganization of its Global
Threat Reduction Initiative, DOE established new guidance for selecting
sites to receive physical security upgrades. Under the new guidance, DOE
has combined its radiological and nuclear material security efforts to
develop a single threat reduction strategy. This integrated strategy
prioritizes security efforts, based most importantly on the attractiveness
of the different types of radiological and nuclear material and (1) their
proximity to U.S. strategic interests, such as military bases overseas or
commercial ports; (2) external threat environment within the country; and
(3) internal site vulnerability, which measures existing physical
protection on site. This new criteria also increased the level of the
design basis threat required to secure each type of material. For example,
sources having a curie level exceeding 1,000 could have the same priority
for security upgrades as certain amounts of plutonium or highly enriched
uranium. As a result, RTG security remains a high priority, while in DOE's
view, some medical radiological sources could also be considered a high
priority. However, when we asked DOE officials in September 2006 about the
relative priority of medical sites, they said all of the sites that were
upgraded under the old guidance would still be considered high priority
under the new criteria.
DOE's previous guidance, developed in 2003, based site selection on a
minimum threshold level--measured in curies--of radiological sources
present at a particular location.17 In addition, the guidance factored in
other conditions such as the location of the site, the security conditions
of the site, and evidence of illicit trafficking in the country. According
to DOE, in a presentation made to us in September 2006, this guidance gave
equal treatment to all sites within countries receiving security upgrades.
This guidance did not clearly discriminate between the different types of
sites secured and whether they were considered to be the highest priority.
For example, securing a waste storage facility, which can contain up to
three million curies, was given the same weight as securing an oncology
clinic with one source containing 1,000 curies. Security measures
recommended for radiological sources were based on a threat scenario of
one outsider penetrating the facility, equipped with a handgun while
working with one complicit insider. However, the new guidance
significantly increases the threat by advancing a more intense scenario,
including six outsiders with automatic weapons and 10 kilograms of
explosives working with one complicit insider. As a result, DOE officials
said that future upgrades to secure radiological sources will have to be
strengthened to meet the new protection levels. Additional enhancements at
some sites are now being considered to address a more robust design-basis
scenario.
17DOE identified 10 radioisotopes of concern: americium-241,
californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60, curium-234, iridium-192,
plutonium-238, plutonium-239, radium-226, and strontium-90.
Numerous Problems and Challenges Impeded DOE's Efforts to Secure High-Priority
Radiological Sources at High-Risk Radiological Sites
DOE experienced numerous problems and challenges during program
implementation that impeded its efforts to secure radiological sources. As
a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE was
unable to implement its program at all. DOE said it was limited in its
ability to enhance physical protection in several countries because IRTR
is a voluntary program. For example, high-risk countries such as Nigeria
and Turkey were unwilling to cooperate to implement security upgrades. In
addition, Mexico declined DOE upgrades, although DOE had identified
several vulnerable sites. While Mexico has continued to decline physical
security assistance, Mexican officials have since agreed to accept
regulatory infrastructure development assistance.
In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE developed a
prioritization model that ranked countries as high, medium, and low
risk.18 To date, DOE has initiated work in 49 of the countries identified
as priorities for assistance. Our analysis showed that DOE attempted to
initiate efforts to secure radiological sources in 31 high-priority, 17
medium-priority and one low-priority country. Consequently, about 40
percent of countries receiving assistance do not represent the
highest-priority countries. According to DOE officials, medium and
low-priority countries---more than one-third of the total in DOE's
program--were selected because these countries had expressed a willingness
to receive assistance.
We found a variety of problems and challenges that affected DOE's ability
to implement its program in several of the countries targeted for
assistance. These included, among other things, problems with foreign
contractor performance and lack of adequate physical infrastructure to
support security upgrades. DOE officials said that various combinations of
these and other impediments resulted in delays implementing security
upgrades in about 75 percent of all countries participating in the
program. DOE also stated that many of these problems were identified and
corrected during quality assurance visits by DOE inspection teams.
18In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE first assessed the
vulnerability of radiological sources in 191 countries. Based on this
assessment, DOE determined that 100 of these countries were a high
priority and were targeted for assistance. Within the 100 countries, DOE
further refined the priority list and ranked countries as either high,
medium, or low priority.
Contractor performance emerged as a key challenge. Six DOE officials told
us that contractor performance and selection of reputable, reliable
in-country contractors was critical to successful project implementation.
DOE asserted that it has to maintain flexibility in selecting foreign
contractors because most of the countries do not follow normal Western
business practices. In DOE's view, problems arising from contractor
performance resulted from "security culture" and language barriers, which
caused miscommunication. Some problems we found with reliable in-country
contractors included the following:
o In Bulgaria, a contractor installed steel security doors--which
protected radiological sources--with the hinges on the outside of
the door. As a result, a potential transgressor could have
unhinged the door and accessed the sources;
o In Kazakhstan, a contractor provided security manuals and
procedures for newly installed equipment in English instead of the
native language. As a result, DOE officials found that the
hospital staff had not changed the security codes and were not
well versed in proper security procedures; and
o In Georgia, hospital staff told us that the contractor did not
train them on operating the alarm systems.
DOE did, however, report working with competent contractors in
Poland, Lithuania, and Egypt that resulted in timely project
implementation. DOE project managers for these countries told us
that contractors conducted adequate training and followed up with
security upgrades maintenance.
Several DOE officials told us that implementing security upgrades
also presented challenges due to inadequate physical
infrastructure. In these countries, the types of challenges
included lack of reliable electricity, a backup power source, and
telecommunications at sites containing radiological sources. For
example, in both Nicaragua and Tanzania, DOE officials said that
frequent power outages diminished the detection capability of
security alarms installed and that neither country had a backup
source of power to operate the security alarms and security
lighting provided by DOE.
DOE Has Not Developed a Plan to Ensure the Long-Term Sustainability
of Physical Security Upgrades
DOE has not developed an adequate comprehensive strategy to better
ensure that physical security upgrades that have been installed,
and the security training that has been provided, will be
effectively sustained over the long term. DOE's current guidance
states that DOE will sustain upgrades by providing countries with
a 3-year warranty on newly installed security equipment and
preventative maintenance contracts, as well as providing training
on newly installed equipment for operational staff at the sites.
However, DOE has not formulated a long-term sustainability plan
that identifies expected completion dates for each country,
including an exit strategy, and approaches for sustaining
upgrades, including how host countries will financially continue
maintenance of upgrades following DOE warranty expiration. In
fact, a senior DOE official told us that responsibility for
drafting and implementing long-term sustainability should be that
of the host country. Furthermore, DOE has not adequately addressed
the lack of regulatory infrastructure to provide oversight of
source security in a majority of countries to receive DOE
assistance.
DOE officials responsible for program implementation said that
they were uncertain that security upgrades installed would be
sustained by countries once DOE assistance was no longer
available. In fact, our analysis showed that these officials had
confidence that the security upgrades would be sustained in only
25 percent of the countries. Specifically, officials pointed out
that countries, such as Bangladesh or Tajikistan, would be
unlikely to sustain upgrades because they do not have the
resources to maintain the equipment and have not identified or
allocated funding to maintain them beyond the 3-year warranty
period. In addition, several host-country officials with whom we
met expressed similar concerns. For example, hospital
administrators in three countries told us that hospital budgets
were already strained and that they could not be certain that
funding would be available once the warranties expired. Moreover,
hospital administrators told us it was difficult to estimate the
level of resources needed to sustain the upgrades because DOE had
not provided them with future maintenance costs.
Several sites that received DOE upgrades have already experienced
maintenance problems. For example, in Georgia, we found that a
storage facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which has
thousands of curies of a cesium-137 source--had several large
openings in the roof. When we asked host government officials
about the cause of the openings, they stated that a recent storm
had shifted the metal sheets covering the storage facility's roof.
The officials did not state when the roof would be fixed or how
funds would be allocated for the repair. In addition, we found
that surveillance monitors were not being used at a medical
facility. In fact, according to the hospital staff, the monitors,
which were not broken, had been turned off for several days.
In Lithuania we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the
security cable, used to secure a teletherapy machine's cobalt-60
source, had been broken for almost a month. According to a DOE
physical protection specialist, the cable was the most important
security feature because it triggered an alarm directly connected
to the teletherapy machine's "head," which contains the
radiological source. According to DOE, this was subsequently
corrected as part of program assurance procedures. In addition, in
Poland, we visited a research facility containing a 22,000 curie
irradiator. We observed that the motion detection device in the
room housing the irradiator was not working because of the high
level of radioactivity present. According to the in-country
contractor, the device had been disabled at least three times
since the equipment was installed about a year earlier. Figure 5
shows the temporary storage facility with large openings in the
roof, and figure 6 shows the broken cable at the oncology clinic.
Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator
with Holes in the Roof
Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic
In addition to maintenance problems, we also found that a lack of
adequate training on newly installed equipment further raised
questions about the long-term success of the program. According to
the hospital staff at a facility in Georgia, they had not received
adequate training from the in-country contractor on how to operate
the installed alarm systems. We found similar problems in other
countries we visited. For example, at some of the hospitals,
security codes allowing entry into rooms where sources were
located had not been changed on a regular basis. Also, at one
medical site, more than 50 staff had access to the security code
for a room storing a radiological source of about 1,250 curies. A
DOE physical security specialist reported that the security code
had not been changed from the default settings in at least three
FSU countries. Furthermore, this specialist noted that staff in
charge of protecting the equipment had copied security access
codes onto checklists that were readily accessible to unauthorized
staff in about 15 countries.
According to DOE, another key element of sustaining security of
sources is having an organized, competent guard force. In general,
the guard force serves as a critical communications link between
the facility staff and the response force. We found that several
of the 49 countries did not possess adequate guard or response
forces, and in several cases, the guard forces in these countries
were untrained and unarmed. Specifically, at one site that DOE
upgraded, the guard with whom we spoke was unarmed and had no
viable form of communication in the case of an emergency. At the
same site, the guard told us that he shared responsibility for
site security with an individual who served as a guard on a
part-time basis in exchange for being able to live at the site.
Moreover, we found that the absence of a reliable source of
electricity made it difficult to complete and ensure the
sustainability of alarms and motion detection devices in some of
the countries receiving upgrades. For example, both Ecuador and El
Salvador have limited telephone line access. As a result,
according to DOE, the local guard forces could not be contacted
immediately after an alarm was triggered at a site containing
radiological sources. Consequently, security alarms installed in
lesser developed countries may have marginal long-term impact.
At some of the facilities we visited, there appeared to be a well
trained guard force equipped with flashlights, radios,
walkie-talkies, or cell phones. However, we also found that even
at locations where improved security systems were in place, only a
single guard was present and had no reliable method of contacting
a response force. In these types of situations, according to DOE,
the site is very vulnerable to theft. At one facility in
Lithuania, we were told that the police were located about 30
minutes from the site. At that facility, we observed that the
guards were not equipped with guns, and officials were not sure
they were always present. However, DOE did fund remote monitoring
equipment, which allowed the local police force to view the site
24 hours per day from the police station.
According to IAEA experts and at least five DOE and NRC senior
level officials, a strong and independent nuclear regulatory
authority that is able to provide effective radiological source
oversight is critical to program sustainability. A key function of
a nuclear regulatory body is to establish procedures for the
control of radiological sources, including the development of a
basic registry of sources. The absence of reliable registries in
many countries impeded DOE's ability to identify a comprehensive
list of sites to upgrade. Also, the absence of such a list
complicates DOE's ability to determine when it has completed its
program in a particular country. More specifically, DOE physical
security specialists told us that sources that had been identified
and inventoried at various hospitals were subsequently moved to
another location within the facility or are no longer being used.
Consequently, some of the upgrades that DOE installed had limited
security impact, or DOE has had to fund additional upgrades for
the same source.
We previously reported that DOE was focusing its source security
program too narrowly on physical security upgrades and not taking
into account respective countries' long-term needs to develop
better nuclear regulatory infrastructures.19 DOE recognized the
critical role of regulatory infrastructure development midway
through the program and subsequently added a small regulatory
infrastructure development component that is designed to support
the creation and strengthening of effective and sustainable
national regulatory infrastructures. DOE officials told us that
the department's regulatory infrastructure development efforts are
meant to complement the more comprehensive efforts of IAEA. In
1994, IAEA established a "model project" program to enhance
countries' regulatory capacity, and the program was available to
any member state upon request. IAEA continues to provide a variety
of regulatory infrastructure support services and training to both
member and nonmember states to support radiological source
security and safety.
The director of the IRTR program said that the long-term impact of
DOE's program would likely have been enhanced had there been a
stronger regulatory infrastructure in place to support the
recommended security upgrades efforts in many of the countries.
However, many countries participating in the IRTR
program--specifically lesser developed countries--lack an
independent regulator. According to IAEA, as many as 110 countries
worldwide lacked the regulatory infrastructure to adequately
protect or control sealed sources as of 2003.
DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological
Sources Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because
of an Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials
As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to
implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other
things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites
containing radiological sources and to install physical security
upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors,
motion sensors and surveillance cameras. Russia received almost
one-third of total DOE funding--about $33 million--which focused
primarily on orphan source recovery, RTG removal and disposal and
physical security upgrades at waste storage facilities. However,
one-fourth of total expenditures--about $26.5 million--paid for
program planning activities such as development of program
guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting
studies. The program has also carried over large balances of
unspent, unobligated funds each fiscal year since its inception in
2002, because of, among other things, large supplemental
appropriations at the onset of the program and systemic delays in
project implementation. DOE officials told us that securing
radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority than
securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and
highly enriched uranium. As a result, DOE reduced funding for
radiological security activities and future funding for the
program is uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE
may be unable to meet outstanding contractual commitments to
maintain the more than $40 million in upgrades already installed.
DOE Expenditures Have Focused Primarily on Physical Security
Upgrades and Recovering Lost or Abandoned Sources; However, About
$26.5 Million Has Been Spent on Program Planning Activities
As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to
implement the IRTR program. A majority of this money--$68
million--was spent to (1) physically secure sites containing
radiological sources; (2) locate, recover, and dispose of lost or
abandoned sources; and (3) help countries draft laws and
regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In
addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities
to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member
states. However, one-fourth of the total budget--about $26.5
million--was spent on program planning activities not directly
attributed to a specific country, such as hiring private
consultants, and building a database for international law
enforcement officials. Table 3 provides a breakdown of DOE program
expenditures.
19 [31]GAO-03-638 .
Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August 31,
2006
Dollars in
thousands
FY 2006
(through Total (and
August 31, percentage
FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 2006) of total)
Physical security $42,895
upgrades $0 $4,348 $10,497 $15,210 $12,840 (40%)
Orphan source
recoverya 0 878 8,069 9,633 4,342 22,922 (21)
Regulatory
infrastructure
support 0 0 375 757 913 2,045 (2)
IAEA 3,000 684 4,170 5,098 460 13,412 (13)
Strategic
development 3,821 3,524 5,436 5,466 3,702 21,949 (20)
All other program
activitiesb 0 0 2,582 1,327 596 4,505 (4)
Total $6,821 $9,434 $31,129 $37,491 $22,853 $107,728
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.
aIncludes Russia Orphan Source Recovery and Global Search and Secure
programs (GSSP).
bIncludes DOE-funded consultant reports and development of program
protocol, guidelines, and standards.
Physical security upgrades to secure sites containing radiological sources
accounted for the largest program expenditure--almost $43 million. The
majority of DOE-funded upgrades were at hospitals and oncology clinics.
DOE also funded upgrades at other types of facilities that utilize or
store radiological sources and materials, including waste storage
facilities, commercial and industrial facilities, and other research
institutes. While DOE estimates that costs for each facility type range
from $15,000 to secure a medical facility to $50,000 to secure a waste
storage facility, actual expenditures for securing sites varied based on
factors such as regional labor rates, conditions of existing
infrastructure, and remoteness of location.
DOE officials stated that cost estimates of upgrade projects included
vulnerability assessments, equipment costs and installation, and warranty
contracts covering equipment maintenance for three years. DOE physical
security specialists conducted vulnerability assessments to identify
security weaknesses at facilities, including adequacy of the local guard
force, exposed windows and doors, and access to sources. In some
instances, mostly at lower-risk sites, DOE authorized contractors
responsible for equipment installation to conduct these assessments with
direction from DOE. The contractors provided DOE with reports and
photographs that summarized findings and proposed recommended upgrades.
Types of upgrades installed varied based on assessment findings and host
country laws and policies, but standard equipment packages consisted
mostly of hardened windows and doors; motion sensors and alarms; access
control systems, such as coded keypads or swipe card entry; security
cameras; and video monitoring. At some sites, DOE also provided guard
forces with enhanced communication equipment, including radios and mobile
panic buttons that send emergency signals to local police or security
companies. Installation costs also included training for on-site personnel
that would be responsible for operating the equipment.
Costs of physical security upgrades also included 3-year warranty
contracts that cover maintenance costs, such as the cost of remote
monitoring and spare parts. DOE officials told us that contracts are
negotiated with contractors responsible for equipment installation and
require that countries receiving assistance assume the costs of sustaining
the equipment no later than three years after the upgrades have been
installed. For the duration of the warranty period, DOE estimated that, on
average, it would cost $40,000 per country, per year to maintain
equipment.20 This estimate includes sending one DOE team per country, per
year to conduct assurance visits, any equipment contractors have to
replace, and costs of remote monitoring systems.
DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation detection
equipment and training to locate and recover lost or abandoned
radiological sources and secure them in interim or permanent storage
facilities. DOE has two programs to support orphan source recovery
efforts--the Russian Orphan Source Recovery program, which is focused
solely in Russia, and the Global Search and Secure Program, which includes
search and recovery efforts in other countries receiving DOE assistance.
More than 80 percent of orphan source recovery expenditures were spent in
Russia--about $19 million. To support GSSP, DOE spent $4 million in 11
countries--Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Philippines, Romania, Tajikistan, and Tanzania. These
funds were spent primarily to provide countries with (1) standard packages
of equipment such as hand-held radiation detection monitors and
characterization instruments to properly identify recovered sources; (2)
training workshops on the appropriate use of the equipment; and (3)
physical security upgrades at some facilities storing recovered or
disposed sources.
20Number of sites and types of upgrades installed vary per country, and
warranty costs may vary accordingly.
In addition, DOE spent about $2 million in ten countries (Bulgaria,
Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam) to help develop national standards and regulations
for the control and accounting of radiological sources. A majority of
these funds were spent in the United States--$1.8 million--to develop a
set of security-based regulations to be utilized by countries with limited
resources and inadequate radiological source inventories. Once countries
drafted an initial set of regulations, DOE experts reviewed drafts and
provided feedback and proposals for improvement. DOE also provided
training workshops and seminars on appropriate regulatory inspection
practices for radiological source controls and accounting. In particular,
DOE has been working with regional partners, such as the Australian
Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO), to implement many of
its regulatory development activities.21 For example, DOE and ANSTO have
conducted regulatory development training workshops for countries located
in East Asia and the Pacific region.
DOE also provided about $13.5 million to IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund to
support efforts to strengthen controls over sources with IAEA member
states, including technical training on fundamental principles and
objectives of radiological source security. IAEA established the fund,
which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries,
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.22 The fund is designed
to improve nuclear security in IAEA member states by helping countries to
protect their nuclear and radiological materials and facilities.
Specifically, DOE funded IAEA missions that carried out safety and
security assessments at sites identified by member states containing
vulnerable radiological sources. Additionally, DOE contributions to IAEA
supported training conferences and other advisory services. DOE funds also
enabled IAEA to transport several high-risk sources to secure storage
facilities and provide conditioning equipment to prepare recovered sources
for disposal.
21ANSTO operates Australia's nuclear facilities and conducts nuclear
research for the Australian government.
22For more information on IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, see Nuclear
Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear
Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, [32]GAO-06-93
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005).
Finally, DOE spent one-fourth of total program expenditures--about $26.5
million--on activities not directly attributed to a specific country.
Specifically, these costs included, among other things, program planning
activities such as the development of program guidance documents. For
example, DOE hired an outside contractor to conduct a review of the
radiological source security program and to help DOE develop a plan to
guide future efforts. The contractor spent several months interviewing
agency officials and program staff to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of the program and the level of DOE coordination with State, NRC, and
IAEA. The final report provided recommendations to improve coordination
with other U.S. agencies and within DOE. In addition, DOE spent $1.5
million of these funds to facilitate an information exchange with
Interpol, an international agency that coordinates the law enforcement
activities of the national police bureaus in each of its member states, in
order to obtain information about international arrests involving theft or
smuggling of radiological materials. DOE's intent was to provide Interpol
the capacity to contribute law-enforcement data into DOE's database, which
contains country-specific information regarding, among other things,
criminal activity. Funds provided to Interpol paid for computers and
software and the salaries for two staff located at Interpol headquarters
in Lyon, France, to set up and operate the database for two years. A DOE
program manager expressed concern about whether providing funds to
Interpol would provide tangible results or increase the effectiveness of
the radiological sources program. This program manager questioned whether
the Interpol project contributed to the program's core objectives of
securing the highest risk, highest priority sources in other countries.
A senior DOE official told us that these funds--identified by DOE as
strategic development and program integration funds--were established at
the onset of the program and were intended to carry out activities not
directly related to country-specific physical security upgrade projects
and initiatives. This official added that in the early stages of the
program, expenditures of this type focused primarily on strategic
planning, developing program technical documents and processes, conducting
studies, and developing a database of regional country information to
support program objectives.
While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia received the
largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of total program
expenditures. DOE's cost manager for the IRTR program reported that
expenditures in Russia supported three primary program components: (1)
orphan source recovery efforts ($18.5 million); (2) RTG removal and
disposal, including alternative energy source development ($7 million);
and (3) physical security upgrade projects, including waste repository
sites ($7.5 million). The 13 other FSU countries received a total of about
$11 million, with Ukraine being the largest recipient, receiving about
$3.5 million. In addition, about 65 percent of DOE expenditures in FSU
countries was spent in these countries for services, equipment, and
materials that were used to improve physical security.
By comparison, DOE spent significantly less outside the FSU, and
expenditures in these countries were both modest by comparison and
disproportionately spent in the United States by DOE's national
laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead costs.23 For
example, the 35 non-FSU countries received a total of about $17 million,
or just 28 percent of total country-specific expenditures.24 Two-thirds of
funds spent for non-FSU countries were spent in the United States.
Furthermore, five countries in Africa received no in-country expenditures.
Although many countries in Africa have been defined as high-risk by DOE,
countries in this region received a total of about $1.3 million, about
two-thirds the amount spent in one European country--Poland. While
expenditures in South America were more evenly divided between in-country
costs and funds spent in the United States, the region received only about
$3.5 million spread among 12 countries.25 Figure 7 provides a regional
breakout of these expenditures. Additionally, see appendix II for more
details about regional and individual country expenditures for fiscal
years 2002 through 2006.
23DOE noted that some of the FSU countries that received DOE assistance
had comparatively larger infrastructure problems than that of several
non-FSU countries and, in some cases, higher labor rates; and therefore,
project implementation costs in the FSU countries were proportionally
higher.
24Of the $107.7 million in total program expenditures, $61.7 million could
be traced to specific country-related expenditures.
25DOE also has funds budgeted to be spent in Mexico, but to date, no funds
have been expended.
Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations
DOE Has Consistently Carried Over Large Balances of Unspent and Unobligated
Funds
As of August 31, 2006, DOE had carried over almost $23 million in unspent
or unobligated funds for the IRTR program from previous years. Moreover,
the program consistently carried over a substantial uncosted balance each
fiscal year throughout the life of the program. For example, for fiscal
years 2003 through 2005, the program carried over uncosted funds totaling
$27.4 million, $34.1 million, and $22.4 million, respectively. According
to the program's director, a majority of carryover balances were due to,
among other things, large supplemental appropriations at the onset of the
program and delays in implementing security upgrade projects. As we
reported in 2004, large carryover balances are not uncommon in DOE nuclear
nonproliferation programs--especially in Russia--because of, among other
things, difficulties in negotiating and executing contracts and the
multiyear nature of programs.26 Table 4 shows DOE total budget and
uncosted balances for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.27
Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006
Dollars
in
thousands
Uncosted
Fiscal Appropriated Funds Total Uncosted balance
year funds Fundsobligated unobligated expenditures obligations forwarda
2002 $20,555 $11,799 $11,756 $6,821 $4,978 $16,733
2003 38,000 15,463 21,359 9,433 6,030 27,389
2004 36,000 48,020 17,235 31,128 16,892 34,127
2005 24,800 49,681 10,219 37,492 12,189 22,407
2006
(through
Aug. 31,
2006) 24,078 33,977 11,832 22,853 11,125 22,957
Total $143,433 $107,727
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
aUncosted balance forward is equal to funds unobligated plus uncosted
obligations.
26GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's Plutonium
Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain,
[33]GAO-04-662 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004).
27In December 2006, DOE provided GAO with cost data updated as of the end
of fiscal year 2006 reflecting total program expenditures as $113.8
million and total carryover as $17.7 million.
DOE's Budget for Radioactive Source Security Has Been Reduced, and Future
Program Funding Is Uncertain
DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding since 2003, and DOE
officials expect further reductions over the next several years.
Specifically, DOE's internal budget allotments for the IRTR program have
gone from a high of $38 million in fiscal year 2003 to $24 million in
fiscal year 2006. According to a senior DOE official, priorities within
GTRI, which funds DOE's nuclear and radiological threat reduction efforts,
have shifted, and future funding will be redirected to, among other
things, securing special nuclear material, such as plutonium and highly
enriched uranium (HEU). In particular, DOE has assigned the highest budget
priority to three specific GTRI elements that address the threats posed by
an attack using an improvised nuclear device: the (1) Reduced Enrichment
for Research and Test Reactors program, (2) Russia Research Reactor Fuel
Return program, and (3) Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
program. The goal of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
program is to get research reactors around the world to convert from HEU
to low enriched uranium with conversion of all U.S. civilian research
reactors to be completed by 2014. The Russia Research Reactor Fuel Return
and Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programs are designed
specifically for returning HEU to the United States or Russia and are
expected to be completed by 2013 and 2019, respectively.28
In contrast, other GTRI elements, including the IRTR program, do not have
presidential commitment dates for completion and, as a result, are lower
priorities for funding. DOE's Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, told us that DOE initially placed a high
priority on securing radiological material and the Secretary of Energy
made a personal commitment to this activity. More recently, because of
budget reductions affecting the entire agency, DOE has had to review and
evaluate program priorities. This official noted that while the likelihood
of a dirty bomb attack is much greater than a nuclear attack, the
consequences in terms of loss of life and the overall catastrophic impact
of the latter would be much greater. He also noted that, if given a
choice, he would place more emphasis on securing radiological sources in
the United States than in other countries. In his view, there is still a
significant amount of work to be done to secure radiological sources in
the United States.
28For more information on these programs, see GAO, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of
Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, [34]GAO-04-807
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004), and GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE
Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable
Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia,
[35]GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004).
Future anticipated reductions in funding for the IRTR program will have
significant implications for the amount of sources that can be secured in
other countries. DOE's initial target for program completion was to secure
1,500 high-priority sites in 100 countries by 2014. This goal assumed that
the program would receive $25 million per year over the life of the
program. DOE officials told us that currently projected budget reductions
may jeopardize the program's ability to fund even the existing warranty
contracts applied to physical security upgrades already installed.
Moreover, DOE has not determined the extent to which the program will fund
warranties for future upgrade projects meaning countries will need to
assume greater financial responsibility for sustaining upgrades. However,
DOE officials who are responsible for project implementation told us they
lacked confidence that a majority of countries would be able to maintain
upgrades without further DOE assistance, mostly because many recipients do
not have adequate resources. For example, DOE officials responsible for
project implementation said that neither Ukraine nor Tajikistan, where DOE
has spent a total of about $3.5 million, has identified resources for
radiological source security once DOE warranties expire.
In addition, DOE has not fully addressed the cost implications of the
increased levels of physical security required by the new design basis
threat assigned to radiological sources under GTRI's reorganization.
Although DOE's new program guidance says that the radiological security
upgrades strategy will continue to focus on inherently sustainable,
low-cost upgrades, it specifically states that the revised threat scenario
significantly increases the threat that physical security upgrades must
withstand. As a result, the new guidance states that upgrades will need to
be significantly enhanced to meet the new threat level. DOE officials have
raised concerns regarding DOE's ability to sustain low-cost upgrades
already installed. In light of the program's ongoing budget reductions,
the new guidance raises further concern regarding DOE's ability to sustain
the increased cost of enhanced upgrades for future projects.
To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek
international contributions to secure radiological sources in other
countries. DOE officials said that several countries, including, Canada,
Japan and Norway, have inquired about contributing funds directly to GTRI
but that, until recently, DOE had no authority to accept direct financial
support from international partners for GTRI activities or to use funds
received outside of the normal appropriations process. In October 2006,
Congress authorized DOE to enter into agreements, with the concurrence of
State, to receive contributions from foreign countries and international
organizations for IRTR and other GTRI programs, and to use those
contributed funds without fiscal year limitation.29 Additionally, Russian
officials told us that because of the importance of the IRTR program, they
are interested in providing increased financial commitments to secure
radiological sources. In particular, the Deputy Head of the Russian Radon
waste storage facilities, known officially as the Federal Agency for
Construction and Utilities, told us that the organization would be willing
to make a sizeable contribution to Radon upgrades. DOE officials stated
that international source security is not the sole responsibility of the
United States government and that increased foreign cooperation will be
necessary to complete program objectives.
Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces Coordination
Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide
DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological
sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has
involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction
activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the
agencies.30 However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently
and coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent.
Moreover, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple
programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and
nuclear materials in other countries and, at times, this has resulted in
conflicting or overlapping efforts. DOE has improved coordination with
IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological sources and
has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member
states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. DOE funding to IAEA
has supported, among other things, IAEA missions to assess the safety and
security of sites containing radiological sources and IAEA-sponsored
training programs and regional workshops focusing on radiological source
security. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and
IAEA, and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE's ability to
target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid
possible duplication of efforts.
29John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, S 3113 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
S 2569). Contributions from foreign countries to DOE's nuclear
nonproliferation programs are not without precedent. Section 3135 of the
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
authorized the Secretary of Energy to accept international contributions
for the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP).
Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 2170 (2004). Since fiscal year 2005, the
EWGPP has received $25.5 million from the United Kingdom, Canada,
Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea to support the closure of Russian
plutonium production reactors by building or refurbishing replacement
fossil fuel plants.
30 [36]GAO-03-638 .
DOE Has Improved Efforts to Coordinate Its Program Activities, but
Governmentwide Coordination Is Inconsistent
In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC and has
taken steps to work more collaboratively with U.S. agencies to secure
radiological sources in other countries. An example of improved U.S.
coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological source
regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support of DOE and
NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source
Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a radiological regulatory
infrastructure in Iraq. State and DOE provided IRSRA with equipment,
training, technical assistance, and funding to help the new agency assume
increased responsibility for establishing radiological source regulations
and procedures consistent with international standards.31 Specifically,
with funding and logistical support from DOE, State coordinated several
meetings in Amman, Jordan, in 2004 and 2005 to provide IRSRA personnel
training by IAEA staff. These meetings resulted in the development of new
Iraqi laws and regulations for the regulation, transport, import and
export of radiological sources, including physical security requirements.
DOE experts reviewed draft Iraqi laws and regulations for their relevance
to the security of radiological sources, and NRC provided guidance for
developing import and export controls for radiological sources. State also
funded procurement of mobile radiation detection equipment so that Iraqi
regulatory personnel can survey various cities to search for orphaned
radiological sources. This equipment, provided by DOD's Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, included radiological handling, measurement, and
protective equipment, such as radiation meters, respirators, and
protective clothing. Hand-held radiation equipment from DOE has also been
transferred to Iraqi agencies for border monitoring. DOE experts also
trained IRSRA officials and personnel on how to conduct vulnerability
assessments.
31For more information on U.S. efforts to secure radiological sources in
Iraq, see Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source
Recovery Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions,
[37]GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).
Finally, to financially support IRSRA's efforts, State provided a portion
of $1.25 million in funding from its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
(NDF),32 to IAEA for training and other assistance to IRSRA, including an
IAEA review of Iraq's draft laws and regulations.33 State also used a
portion of this funding to purchase a specially equipped vehicle that can
be driven through neighborhoods to detect unsecured radiological sources.
DOE and State officials told us that although the Iraq project is a unique
circumstance, it is an example of improved U.S. government coordination to
strengthen controls over radiological sources and could provide a model
for future efforts.
Although coordination among the agencies has improved, these efforts have
been inconsistent and there is no comprehensive governmentwide approach to
securing radiological sources overseas. We reported in 2003 that DOE's
efforts to secure sources in other countries had not been well coordinated
with those of other U.S. agencies. Specifically, DOE had not fully
coordinated with State and NRC to leverage program resources, maximize
available expertise, avoid potential duplication of efforts, and help
ensure the program's long-term success. We also recommended that DOE take
the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to strengthen
controls over sources in other countries. In response to our report, DOE
hired a consultant to determine, among other things, whether gaps exist in
agency program activities with respect to securing radiological sources
worldwide and what role and responsibilities DOE should assume in
coordinating U.S. government efforts.
In December 2004, the consultant reported that although DOE had addressed
many of its issues with State and NRC, more effective coordination was
needed. Moreover, the consultant stated that the lack of effective
coordination among these agencies posed the greatest potential for
conflict, as a result of differing mandates and conflicting philosophical
approaches to radiological source security. Specifically, effective and
systematic coordination between U.S. agencies has been impeded at times
because individual agency missions differ and, as a result, agency efforts
have been, at times, at odds with one another. For example, the consultant
reported that NRC had expressed concern that DOE's regulatory
infrastructure development activities infringed on a decades-long NRC
function. Furthermore, DOE is primarily concerned with security of sources
while NRC has traditionally focused more on safety issues related to the
use of sources. The report also concluded that the debate between DOE and
NRC over the importance of the safety versus the security of radiological
sources had negatively impacted effective coordination between the two
agencies.
32According to senior State officials, NDF is designed to permit rapid
response to unanticipated or unusually difficult, high-priority
requirements such as efforts to (1) halt the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, related
technologies, and other weapons; (2) destroy or neutralize existing
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional
weapons; and (3) prevent the diversion of weapons-related scientific and
technical expertise of the former Soviet Union.
33In 2005, State also provided DOE $1.24 million from NDF to support DOE's
search and secure program. These funds paid for the deployment of
radiological detection and characterization equipment to several countries
to search, locate, and consolidate high-risk radiological sources.
DOE, State, and NRC have differed on, among other things, funding and
implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities in
other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC's Office of International
Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to assist its regulatory
counterparts in the FSU and countries of central and eastern Europe to
enhance (1) existing laws, rules, and regulations governing use of
radiological sources; (2) mechanisms used to track radiological sources,
such as databases and registries; and (3) day-to-day regulatory oversight
of sources. NRC stated in its request that DOE's physical security
enhancements would not likely be sustained in the medium to long-term
absent clear, enforceable regulatory requirements. Moreover, NRC sought to
assist DOE by providing assistance to regulatory authorities in the FSU,
where a majority of DOE's efforts were focused at the time.
NRC officials noted that the biggest challenge they have faced has been
identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding to support
international assistance activities. NRC, unlike other U.S. government
agencies, has largely relied upon other agencies--Departments of State,
Energy and Defense--to support its international programs and is required
by law to recover about 90 percent of its annual budget authority through
licensing and inspection fees assessed on the U.S. nuclear industry.
Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear industry has raised concerns about using NRC
funds to support international assistance. Despite these funding
limitations, NRC has a long history of supporting regulatory strengthening
efforts in the countries of central and eastern Europe and the FSU. These
efforts have included training other countries' regulators in all aspects
of licensing and inspection procedures and developing a control and
accounting system for nuclear materials.
In July 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed that $5 million
out of certain amounts appropriated to NNSA be made available to NRC for
bilateral and international efforts to strengthen regulatory controls over
radioactive sources that are at the greatest risk of being used in a dirty
bomb attack.34 In September 2003, according to the Director of the NRC
Office of International Programs, NRC and the Director of DOE's
International Materials Protection, Control and Cooperation program
reached an initial agreement in principle, whereby DOE would provide NRC
with $1 million per year for 5 years to conduct regulatory activities in
countries outside of Russia.
According to DOE officials, the funds were never transferred because the
Senate withdrew the direction to allocate the funds to NRC during
conference negotiations because the House did not provide comparable
language in its report. DOE officials added that the provision directing
the transfer to NRC did not appear in the final conference report and was
not included in the appropriation legislation. Furthermore, these
officials added that DOE was directed by guidance received from House
Energy and Water Development Subcommittee staff to not transfer the funds.
According to a senior NRC official in the Office of International
Programs, the conference report included a joint explanatory statement,
which directed that allocations set forth in the House and Senate reports
"should be complied with unless specifically addressed to the contrary in
the conference report and statement of the managers."35 NRC asserts that
this reinforced the intent of the original Senate report, and that without
language to further clarify or to state otherwise, NRC should have
received the funding as originally directed by the Senate Appropriations
Committee. The conference report does not specifically address this
funding issue.36
In addition, in 2003, NRC requested $1 million from State to support
radiological source-related regulatory strengthening activities in
Ukraine. Specifically, NRC proposed to develop a national registry of
radiological sources and strengthen Ukraine's overall radiological
source-related laws, rules, and regulations. NRC chose Ukraine because of
its relatively large inventory of high-risk radioactive sources; the
stability of its existing nuclear regulatory infrastructure; and NRC's
long-standing history of assisting Ukraine's nuclear regulatory authority,
the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU). NRC requested
funding for the Ukraine project from State's Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund. The total cost of the project was estimated at $2.2
million.
34See S. Rep. No. 108-105, at 117 (July 17, 2003), accompanying S. 1424,
the Senate version of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 2004.
35See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-357, at 45 (Nov. 7, 2003).
36Although a committee report is not legally binding, it is viewed as
expressing the will and intent of the relevant congressional committees.
The original proposal, as approved by State, stated that the project's aim
was to establish key elements of a national system to provide long-term
security of high-risk radioactive sources in Ukraine by utilizing NRC's
overall expertise and experienced contractor personnel. Furthermore, the
proposal stated that because NRC and its contractors had been involved in
an identical program in Armenia for the previous 2 years the effort in
Ukraine would capitalize on those experiences, utilizing much of that
background data and materials. However, managers for NDF projects
ultimately decided that State would not use NRC resources and would
undertake and manage the project itself, even though the agency had no
prior experience in directly supporting regulatory infrastructure
development in Ukraine. According to a State official, the agency made
this decision because, among other things, NRC planned to hire a
contractor--the Ukrainian State Scientific and Technical Center--to manage
the project, which would have increased the project's overall cost by
about 20 percent.37
State officials said that their approach departed from that which was
originally envisioned by NRC in the original proposal in many respects.
However, the NDF has always reserved the right to implement its projects
as it deems appropriate. These officials added that State chose to work
directly with the Ukrainian regulator instead of the State Scientific and
Technical Center because, among other things, the approach streamlined
oversight and accountability for project performance and reduced overhead
expenses. According to the NDF manager of the Ukraine project through
October 2005, the Ukraine project experienced significant delays. However,
State officials told us the project is currently on track. Following a
November 30, 2006 meeting with State officials to discuss our draft
report, State provided us a letter from the Deputy Chairperson for SNRCU
dated December 4, 2006. The letter states that SNRCU views the Ukraine
project as one of the most successful and efficient international
assistance projects between the United States and Ukraine and that the
project was implemented in the shortest possible time period.
37NRC officials told us that for projects in Ukraine, NRC typically
provides the regulatory expertise and contracts directly with the State
Scientific and Technical Center to manage the completion of project tasks.
Finally, State and NRC raised concerns when DOE with IAEA developed a set
of draft regulations on the physical security of radiological sources.
Although the draft regulations had not been through a formal IAEA review
process, DOE had intended to distribute them during IAEA-sponsored
training workshops to assist member states to strengthen regulatory
controls over their sources. Specifically, NRC officials expressed
significant concerns that DOE was planning to distribute unofficial
guidance to countries that was in conflict with U.S. regulations. In a
December 2004 memorandum to the Deputy Director General of Nuclear Safety
and Security at IAEA, NRC stated that publishing interim guidance that had
not been reviewed in advance, and as a result may need to be substantially
modified, was neither efficient nor effective. State officials told us
that their chief concern was the manner in which any such guidance would
be construed abroad. These officials added that many of the specific
problems associated with the original DOE draft guidance lie with internal
issues regarding the process for reviewing security documents at IAEA. In
addition, they said that concerns over the development of IAEA guidance on
security of radioactive sources, which preceded development of the draft
regulations, are long standing and that State has worked consistently with
IAEA to develop and implement a consistent process for preparation and
review of security guidance similar to the established process used by
IAEA to develop safety guidance.
Following informal discussions with State and NRC, DOE did work with the
agencies to ensure that draft guidance was consistent with established
domestic and international guidance and protocols. IAEA has since proposed
a new Nuclear Security Series and review process, and the DOE draft
regulations will now support a new IAEA Security Series document entitled
"Security of Radioactive Sources," which was coordinated with State and
NRC.
Our 2003 report concluded that DOE has the primary responsibility for
helping other countries to strengthen controls over their radiological
sources. We recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a
comprehensive governmentwide plan to accomplish this goal. In addition,
DOE's consultant report stated that DOE, in its view, is the only U.S.
government agency with the resources to focus solely on international
source security. Similar to our recommendation, the consultant report
recommended that DOE take the lead in adopting an interagency,
site-specific approach to international radiological source security,
including development of a long-term strategy that leveraged resources and
leadership of other agencies. DOE officials said the department has not
implemented these recommendations to initiate and lead a governmentwide
plan for the security of radiological sources in other countries because
it does not have the mandate to instruct other U.S. agencies on how to
conduct their efforts, and other agencies' programs are not within DOE's
control. However, DOE is currently taking steps, as part of the GTRI
reorganization, to address several coordination issues within the
department, including establishing regional points of contact to interface
with other U.S. agencies to coordinate interagency efforts.
DOE's Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Department, and Program
Overlap Has Led to Inefficiencies
The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately
coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are
responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other
countries. As a result, these programs often worked at cross-purposes. For
example, we visited a site in Poland that housed several nuclear
facilities including a radiation waste management plant and Poland's
nuclear research reactor. Country officials managing the site told us that
DOE had conducted vulnerability assessments of each of the facilities, one
of which stored several high-risk radiological sources as well as spent
fuel from the research reactor. Although the material was collocated in
the same storage facility, we observed that the sources had been secured
in a locked cage by the IRTR program, but the spent fuel had no security
and was being stored unprotected in underground canisters. Figure 8 shows
secured radiological sources collocated with unsecured spent fuel
contained in underground storage.
Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and
Unsecured Spent Fuel
Polish officials told us that installation of DOE physical security
upgrades at the site had been inconsistent and not adequately coordinated
by DOE. Furthermore, security officials that had installed the physical
security upgrades told us that the overall security in the facility was
inadequate, given the types of nuclear and radioactive material being
housed there. The director of the site said that he expressed concern to
DOE about the lack of security of the spent nuclear fuel and requested
similar upgrade improvements. However, he said that it was his
understanding that DOE's radiological program was only authorized to fund
radiological source security upgrades and not the security of spent
nuclear fuel, which was the responsibility of DOE's nuclear security
upgrades program.
The director of the facility, and his staff, said that it was unclear to
them why DOE could not concurrently secure nuclear and radiological
material stored at the same site and what can and cannot be secured by
different DOE entities. The director added that it sends the wrong signal
to host country officials when DOE programs have such different security
approaches and time frames for implementing security upgrades. Subsequent
to our visit, DOE sent a letter to Polish government officials in March
2006 offering to return to Poland and provide further DOE technical and
financial support to protect the nuclear material stored at the facility.
Within the IRTR program, different components of the program are led
primarily out of two DOE national laboratories, and we found that the
laboratories, at times, applied different approaches to securing
radiological sources. For example, according to a senior DOE program
manager, each laboratory employs its own physical security specialists and
in turn, applies its own approach to conducting vulnerability assessments
and selecting physical security upgrades. During our site visits, we
observed that similar types of facilities varied in terms of the types of
upgrades installed and that security measures were not standardized. For
example, we toured numerous oncology clinics and found that, although they
housed the same equipment and radiological sources, they had received
different upgrades as a result of assessments conducted by different
laboratory security specialists. Specifically, teletherapy units in
certain countries had fiber optic cables attached to the sources that sent
alarm signals if the device was tampered with. Security specialists
traveling with us at those sites told us that the cable was the key
security feature for this type of device. However, during a meeting with a
senior security specialist from a different laboratory, we were told that
his teams do not install fiber optic cables as part of security upgrades
to the same devices because the cables can break.
We also found that DOE's IRTR program components are not well-coordinated.
For example, more than one program manager told us that DOE had not
consistently coordinated its orphan source recovery efforts or regulatory
infrastructure development assistance with physical security upgrades.
According to officials responsible for managing the majority of the
program's physical security upgrade projects, IRTR program managers did
not coordinate efforts that resulted in multiple visits to the same
country. In their view, this caused confusion within the recipient
countries because country officials had difficulty understanding why some
parts of the same DOE program were being addressed separately. Officials
from Sandia National Laboratories, the lead for GSSP, told us that
projects were often implemented independently from physical security
upgrade projects and that Sandia did not routinely coordinate its efforts
with those of PNNL prior to initiating search and secure activities. PNNL
officials, who brought this matter to our attention, concurred and stated
that GSSP officials did not routinely consult with their physical security
specialists prior to visiting countries with which PNNL had already
established relationships.
Furthermore, according to PNNL officials, DOE's regulatory infrastructure
development team had visited several countries without coordinating with
the physical security upgrade teams. According to a DOE program manager,
host country officials were frequently uncertain whether these two
components were part of the same program. According to PNNL, this
fragmented approach created confusion and required them to explain to
country officials that the program components were meant to complement one
another. The lead official for regulatory infrastructure development
activities told us that future visits would be better planned to ensure
that an integrated approach to source security was undertaken.
Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible for
domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.-origin
radiological sources in other countries. U.S. Radiological Threat
Reduction program officials said there have been limited opportunities to
share information or to assess the potential to coordinate international
source recovery activities so as to leverage DOE resources. For example,
the domestic program recently discovered a large quantity of unsecured
radiological sources in South America. The sources were no longer in use
and were inadequately secured. Officials managing DOE's domestic program
informed IRTR mangers of the finding and the location of the sources.
However, IRTR officials declined to immediately secure the sources because
the country where they were discovered, which is considered high risk, is
not scheduled for IRTR upgrades until 2011. As a result, the sources will
remain unsecured until the international program completes upgrades in
this country.
In our discussions, DOE officials recognized that coordination within the
department needed to be improved and that a comprehensive and consistent
approach to threat reduction efforts between its nuclear and radiological
programs should be established. They acknowledged that it was inefficient
for multiple DOE teams to visit the same sites as part of different
programs to address multiple threat reduction activities. To that end,
DOE's recent reorganization of GTRI is designed to create a more
streamlined structure that is organized geographically to address all
threat reduction activities more effectively. Specifically, DOE plans to
increase efficiency and improve coordination by (1) integrating multiple
GTRI programs working in the same country or at the same sites; (2)
redistributing workloads across the radiological and nuclear programs; and
(3) improving relationships with host country officials by tailoring
comprehensive strategies and incentives to more effectively meet unique
country-specific conditions.
Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps between DOE and
IAEA Have Impeded DOE's Efforts to Target the Highest Priority Sites for
Security Upgrades
DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen
controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed
several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries
around the world to support and share the agency's international efforts.
IRTR's director told us that these partnerships have helped to foster
increased awareness of the security of sources through country-specific
training and regional workshops. For example, with the assistance of IAEA,
DOE has established a partnership with the Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organization through which DOE has increased opportunities to
conduct physical security assessments and strengthen regulatory
inventories of radiological sources in Southeast Asia. Specifically, ANSTO
has identified and facilitated communication with several high-risk
countries, which has helped DOE gain access to countries that DOE had
difficulty initiating contact with, like Vietnam. DOE has also provided
funding to support, among other things, IAEA-sponsored training programs
and regional workshops focusing on radiological source security.
DOE also coordinated with Russia and IAEA as part of the Tripartite
Initiative to conduct physical security assessments and install upgrades
at 102 sites in 13 FSU countries--Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The objective of the Tripartite Initiative was to
improve the security of dangerous radioactive sources in the FSU. We noted
in our 2003 report that, in its early stages, the Tripartite Initiative
was not well planned, that initial efforts were ad hoc, and a more
systematic approach to program activities was needed.38 However, an IAEA
official recently told us that coordination with DOE has improved
significantly as the program evolved.
Despite the success of the Tripartite Initiative, critical information
gaps exist between DOE and IAEA that impede DOE's ability to target the
most vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. First,
according to DOE, IAEA has not shared with them, the countries that IAEA
considers the most in need of security assistance. Second, although DOE
funds IAEA appraisal missions--known as Radiation Safety and Security
Infrastructure Appraisals--to assess the weaknesses in radioactive source
security in IAEA member states, IAEA does not provide DOE with the
findings of these missions because member state information is considered
country-sensitive and confidential. The objective of these missions is to
evaluate, among other things, the quality of regulatory controls countries
exercise over their radiological sources. Results of the appraisals are
formalized into action plans that provide the framework for subsequent
IAEA assistance to improve the security of sources. Because IAEA does not
provide DOE with the results of the missions, DOE is unable to effectively
prioritize those sites that the missions identified to be most vulnerable.
DOE officials told us that the lack of country-specific information has
been an ongoing problem that limits DOE's ability to effectively leverage
its resources to maximize program impact and effectiveness.
38 [38]GAO-03-638 .
We also found that little coordination exits between DOE and the European
Commission, which has resulted in the potential for overlap in assistance
and duplication of efforts. Specifically, the EC provides financial
support through IAEA, and on a bilateral basis, to secure radioactive
sources in countries that are candidates for EU membership. EC officials
told us that no formal communication exists with the United States on
matters related to radioactive source security assistance, and as a
result, each is largely unaware of the specific sites and locations the
other is securing, or whether recipient countries are receiving too little
or too much assistance. DOE officials told us that coordination with the
EC has been conducted primarily at IAEA donor meetings.
The EC has coordinated with IAEA to provide assistance to its member
states to improve control over radiological sources. Specifically, the EC
works jointly with IAEA on several action projects to strengthen the
security of radiological materials used for nuclear and non-nuclear
purposes, including upgrading regulatory infrastructures, installing
physical security upgrades and, as appropriate, disposing of vulnerable
radiological sources. As a result of these efforts, the EC has worked with
IAEA in several regions, but has focused primarily on the Caucasus,
Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Mediterranean countries.
Conclusions
DOE has achieved noteworthy accomplishments in improving the security of
radiological sources at hundreds of sites in more than 40 countries. We
recognize that DOE faces a considerable challenge in securing other
countries' most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these
sources and their widespread dispersal. However, when DOE decided to
expand its program beyond securing sites in Russia and the FSU, it
diverted a significant portion of its limited program funding away from
securing the highest priority and most dangerous radiological sources.
Instead of focusing increased attention on these highest priority threats,
such as RTGs, DOE allocated significant program funding resources to
securing medical facilities that, in our view--as well as several DOE
officials associated with the program--pose considerably less threat to
U.S. security interests. While many of the RTGs cannot be removed until
alternate energy sources are developed to replace them, removing as many
RTGs as possible, or securing them until they can be removed, should be a
critical component of DOE's radiological threat reduction efforts.
We believe that DOE's current reorganization of its nuclear and
radiological threat reduction efforts is a step in the right direction
toward improving the management of the program. However, there are still
many significant management issues that need to be addressed and resolved.
DOE has not paid adequate attention to the long-term sustainability of the
equipment, which could jeopardize the significant investment made to
improve the security of radiological sources in many countries. The
security equipment and upgraded storage facilities funded by DOE will
require a long-term commitment by the countries to help ensure their
continued use and operation, and it is not clear to us that a sustained
stream of funding will be made available by DOE or by recipient countries
to maintain and/or replace aging or defective equipment. Moreover, there
are continuing concerns that many of the countries do not have adequate
nuclear regulatory infrastructures in place to promote sustainability.
Without a comprehensive sustainability plan that adequately addresses a
country's ability to reliably install and maintain upgrades and provide
adequate oversight for source security, DOE risks losing a significant
portion of its investment to improve the security of radiological sources
in many countries. Furthermore, DOE's decision to increase physical
security requirements for sites selected for upgrades, based on revised
threat protection criteria, may have significant cost implications for a
program that is already facing severe budget reductions. This raises
concerns because DOE has not adequately evaluated the increased costs
associated with its elevated threat protection criteria.
This may also be an opportune time for DOE to streamline the program,
particularly in light of budget reductions. We question, for example, how
certain program activities, such as the development of the Interpol
database, directly contribute to the program's core mission of securing
radiological sources in other countries. There are other management issues
that require DOE's attention. First, DOE has not developed meaningful
performance measurements to demonstrate the extent to which the
radiological threat has been reduced as a direct result of its efforts,
including measuring the impact of training and distinguishing between the
types of sources secured. Second, we recognize the pool of reliable
contractors to implement security projects and provide adequate training
may be limited in some countries. However, many project delays could be
avoided in the future if DOE developed specific selection criteria or a
set minimum standard for foreign contractor qualifications.
Improving radiological source security is a shared responsibility. DOE's
investment has been significant and reflects a commitment to addressing
the problem. However, DOE should not underwrite the majority of the costs
on behalf of the international community. Specifically, certain EU
accession candidates and FSU countries, most prominently Russia, should be
willing to contribute more resources to improve the security of dangerous
and vulnerable sources in their own countries. In addition, DOE now has
the authority to accept foreign contributions for GTRI programs from other
interested countries, such as Canada, Japan, and Norway. However, gaps in
communication between DOE and international partners, such as IAEA and the
EC, significantly impede effective global radiological threat reduction.
Finally, developing foreign countries' nuclear regulatory organizations is
a well recognized and critical component in strengthening radiological
source security worldwide. NRC has a long-standing history of promoting
regulatory controls in the FSU and should, in our view, play a more
prominent role in this regard. DOE's refusal to transfer $5 million from
its appropriations to NRC to conduct regulatory development activities,
despite the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, underscores
NRC's limited ability to provide international assistance, while reliant
on funding from other agencies. Most of the coordination problems we
identified between NRC and other agencies could have been avoided if NRC
had its own stream of predictable and reliable funding for international
regulatory development, rather than having to rely on DOE or State for
funds. However, without a direct appropriation, NRC will continue to
depend on other agencies for funds, thus increasing the likelihood that
similar problems will occur in the future.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest priority
radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy
and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take
the following two actions:
o Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing
radiological sources that receive security upgrades to only those
deemed as the highest-risk, and
o To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many
RTGs in Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of
those remaining until they can be removed from service.
Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take
the following seven actions to improve program management:
o Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades
that includes, among other things, future resources required to
implement such a plan;
o Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not
directly contribute to securing the highest priority radiological
sources in other countries;
o Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated
with increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat
protection criteria and limit the number sites to receive
increased security upgrades until such an analysis has been
completed;
o Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate
real risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the
number countries and sites that have received physical security
upgrades;
o Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection
to help reduce potential project delays in the future;
o Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place
to maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by
the United States; and
o Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient
countries, including Russia and EU accession countries.
Finally, in an effort to improve coordination, the Secretary of
Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, should work
with IAEA and European Commission officials to consider ways to
systematically improve information sharing to maximize and
leverage resources and institutional expertise.
Matters for Congressional Consideration
If the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure
development is the key to the long-term sustainability of
radiological source security efforts, it should consider providing
NRC with authority and a direct appropriation to conduct these
activities. The appropriation would be provided to NRC in lieu of
providing the funds to DOE or another agency to reimburse NRC for
its activities. Should the Congress decide to do so, NRC's efforts
need to be fully coordinated with those of State, DOE, and IAEA.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided DOE and NRC with draft copies of this report for their
review and comment. DOE provided written comments, which are
presented as appendix III. NRC's written comments are presented as
appendix IV. NRC also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated in the report. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with
our matter for congressional consideration, which would provide
NRC with the legal authority and a direct appropriation to conduct
international regulatory activities for radiological source
security. However, NRC stated that if Congress acts upon our
matter for consideration, NRC would work closely with State,
relevant executive branch agencies, and IAEA to implement the
program.
In its written comments, DOE agreed with our conclusion that the
department faced a considerable challenge in securing other
countries' most dangerous radiological sources, given the number
of these sources and how widely dispersed they are. Furthermore,
DOE stated that enormous amounts of dangerous material have not
been secured, although the IRTR program has achieved a great deal
of threat reduction in a short period of time. DOE stated that the
recommendations were very helpful and would further strengthen its
program.
DOE also noted that it had measures in place--as a result of its
reorganization of GTRI--to address program challenges and concerns
that we raised, such as site prioritization; quality
assurance/sustainability; coordination; and transportation. We
recognized in the report that the reorganization of the program
was a step in the right direction toward improving program
management. However, as we noted in our report, many significant
management issues still need to be addressed and resolved despite
the reorganization. That is why we believe it was important to
offer recommendations to improve program management and source
prioritization efforts.
In other comments, DOE stated that the IRTR program uses a number
of factors to determine priority levels for the sites it selects
to upgrade in addition to the amount of radioactivity contained in
radiological sources. These other factors include (1) known
terrorist threat in the country/region; (2) current level of
security at the site; and (3) the proximity of the site in
relationship to potential strategic targets of U.S. interest. In
our report, we stated that site selection was based on a number of
factors, including those specifically noted by DOE in its written
comments. We also pointed out in our report that DOE's guidance on
site selection has not clearly discriminated between the different
sites secured and which sites were to be considered the highest
priority. We are encouraged that DOE is explicitly linking its
prioritization guidelines to a site's proximity to potential
strategic targets of U.S. interest. However, it remains to be seen
how consistently DOE will apply this criteria to its site
selection process in the future. In a related comment, DOE stated
that it will continue to accelerate RTG recoveries but must also
address high priority medical and other sources. In our view, this
action by DOE would be consistent with the key conclusions and
recommendations in our report. Our recommendations specifically
state that DOE should, to the extent possible, remove as many RTGs
in Russia and limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing
radiological sources that receive security upgrades to only those
deemed to be the highest risk.
With regard to quality assurance and program sustainability
issues, DOE stated that it employs a standard process that ensures
quality assurance for the security equipment that it installs.
This process includes, among other things, conducting
post-installation visits by technical experts for the purpose of
assuring that all equipment and systems are installed as agreed
upon. DOE also noted that despite these measures, it would further
investigate its process to identify and implement additional
improvements. We think DOE should take these steps because, as
discussed in our report, we identified several problems with
malfunctioning equipment and other maintenance problems at sites
containing radiological sources. DOE also noted that it has a
short-term sustainability program for every site that it upgrades
that includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative
maintenance contracts and training for operational staff. DOE
believes that we should revise the report to indicate the
existence of the 3-year warranty. Our report recognizes that DOE's
program guidance calls for preventative maintenance contracts and
training. We also noted that DOE provides a 3-year warranty, and
we gave DOE credit for providing this coverage. Our main point
remains--which DOE explicitly agreed with--that DOE has not
developed a long-term sustainability plan for the equipment it has
installed. Nevertheless, we clarified our report language, as
appropriate, to state that DOE does have a short-term
sustainability plan but has not developed a long-term plan to
maintain the security upgrades completed.
Regarding coordination, DOE cited numerous examples in its written
comments of close cooperation with other U.S. government agencies,
other DOE elements, and international partners on matters
pertaining to international radiological source security. We
believe the report fairly characterized DOE's coordination efforts
in each of these areas. Specifically, we noted that DOE had
improved coordination with State and NRC since we reported on this
matter in 2003 and has increased information-sharing with the
agencies. In addition, we believe our characterization of
coordination problems within the department is correct. Our
evaluation was based on information provided by an independent
consultant's report as well as our own analysis of conditions we
found within the department pertaining to inconsistent and, at
times, inadequately coordinated efforts by different DOE programs
responsible for threat reduction activities in the same country.
As we noted in the report, DOE officials recognized that
coordination within the agency needs to be improved and that a
comprehensive and consistent approach to threat reduction efforts
between nuclear and radiological threat reduction activities
should be established. We also noted in the report that DOE's
September 2006 reorganization of its GTRI efforts is designed to
create a more streamlined structure that is organized along three
geographic regions, which could improve program coordination.
On a related matter, DOE stated that we should have given IAEA an
opportunity to review and address some of the issues raised in our
report about limited information sharing, which impeded DOE's
ability to target the most vulnerable sites and countries for
security improvements. Since this information was provided to us
by DOE officials, it is unclear to us what benefit would have been
achieved by providing a draft of this report to IAEA for review
and comment of DOE's views. Our report notes that DOE has, despite
some information-sharing problems with IAEA, improved coordination
with the agency in recent years to strengthen controls over other
countries' radiological sources.
Finally, with regard to transportation of sources, DOE commented
that, among other things, it had been working with the U.S.
Department of Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor countries
to strengthen transport security regulations. We added this
information to our report based on DOE's comments. DOE also stated
that it was working with Russia to enhance the security of
radioactive materials, including providing cargo trucks and escort
vehicles for the Moscow waste storage facility. We had already
recognized this fact in the report. More broadly, however, we
believe that the report accurately and fairly depicts the
limitations of DOE efforts regarding transportation security. A
primary source of information for our observation came directly
from a DOE analysis--cited in the report--which concluded that the
department was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc
basis and that the existing method of providing transportation
security had serious limitations and lacked a commitment to
integrate transport security into all countries participating in
the IRTR program.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
until 30 days from the report date. We will then send copies of
this report to the Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of State;
the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the
Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be made available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report include Erika D. Carter, Glen Levis,
Mehrunisa Qayyum, Keith Rhodes (GAO's Chief Technologist), and Jim
Shafer.
Sincerely yours,
Gene Aloise
Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We focused our review primarily on the Department of Energy (DOE),
since it is the lead federal agency for improving the security of
radiological sources worldwide and provides significant funds for
that purpose. We also performed work at the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and Department of State (State) in Washington,
D.C., which also provide assistance to help other countries secure
their sealed radiological sources. In addition, we reviewed
program-related activities and interviewed program officials from
Argonne National Laboratory in Argonne, Illinois; the Los Alamos
National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory in Richland, Washington; Sandia National
Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico; the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria; and the European
Commission (EC) in Brussels, Belgium. We also met with
nongovernmental organizations, including, the Council on Foreign
Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In
November 2005, we attended the Trilateral Commission meeting held
in the United Kingdom, which discussed international approaches to
securing radiological sources against terrorism.
We visited four countries to determine how DOE has implemented its
program to secure radiological sources overseas. We selected these
countries based on several criteria, including where DOE has spent
the most funds since 2002. Overall, these four countries
represented about $37.4 million, or about 35 percent, of overall
program expenditures. We selected Lithuania and Poland since,
among other reasons, DOE officials told us that these were model
countries in securing radiological sources and implementing
effective physical security upgrades. Also, we selected Russia and
Georgia because they received significant program funds, totaling
about $34.2 million of the $107.7 million. In addition, thousands
of radiological sources are located in these two countries. In the
case of Russia, it contains the majority of RTGs worldwide and
operates 44 percent of all Radons in the former Soviet Union.
During our review, we observed physical security upgrades at all
types of sites: medical, industrial, research, storage facilities,
and RTGs. For instance, we visited numerous medical and industrial
sites throughout Lithuania and Poland. Specifically in Lithuania,
we visited the Radiation Protection Center, Vilnius Oncology
Institute Clinic, Klaipeda City Hospital, the Kaunas Oncology
Clinic, and Saiuliu Oncology Hospital, as well as the Lithuanian
Institute of Physics and the Maisiagala Repository. In Poland, we
visited the Regionaine Centreem Kriwodawstwa I Krwiolecznictwa
(Children's Hospital) as well as the Glowny Urzad Miar (Main
Measurement Office), Polytechnic Institute of Lodz, Radioisotope
Center (Polatom), Geofizyka Krakow, Radioisotope Waste Management
Plant in Swierk, Technical University Institute of Applied
Radiation Chemistry, and the Technical Institute of Applied
Physics. At each location, we interviewed facility staff who were
responsible for implementing radiological source security
procedures and using the monitoring equipment funded by DOE.
Facility staff included--but was not limited to--doctors, clinical
technicians, and other medical support staff. At each site, we met
with local guards to determine how well they were trained and
equipped. We also interviewed host country contractors who were
responsible for installing and maintaining physical security
upgrades.
We also met with host government officials in both countries. In
Lithuania we met with officials from the Ministry of Economy; RATA
(Lithuanian Radioactive Waste Management Agency); the Radiation
Protection Center (nuclear regulatory organization); and the
Ministry of Environment. In Poland, we interviewed officials from
the National Atomic Energy Agency (Poland's nuclear regulator),
the Department of Environmental Hygiene, and the Ministry of
Health.
We also visited Russia and Georgia to obtain a first-hand look at
waste facilities that contain radiological sources. Specifically,
we visited the Moscow Radon site at Sergiev Posad, located about
90 kilometers from Moscow and the St. Petersburg Radon site,
located about 80 kilometers from St. Petersburg. While in Russia
we also met with the key federal agencies responsible for
radiological source management and oversight. Specifically, we met
with several high-level officials from Rostechnadzor, Russia's
nuclear regulator (the Federal Environmental, Industrial and
Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia); the Federal Agency for
Construction and Utilities; and the Department for Nuclear and
Radiation Safety at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency.
Additionally, we interviewed directors of both the Moscow and St.
Petersburg Radon facilities; officials of the IBRAE Institute
(Russian National Academy of Sciences); and directors of VNIITFA
(Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research
Institute), the designer of RTGs. Moreover, after meeting with
officials from the Kurchatov Institute, which is primarily
responsible for the RTG removal, we visited three sites where RTGs
had been removed and replaced with alternative energy sources.
In Georgia, we visited the Mtsheta national repository located at
the Institute of Physics near Tbilisi, Georgia, as well as
Georgia's temporary national storage facility that stores many
high-risk radiological sources, including six RTGs and a seed
irradiator. Regarding Georgia's medical sites, we also visited the
National Cancer Center of Georgia and the Kutaisi Oncological
Center and interviewed staff and guards who were responsible for
source security. We met with officials from the Nuclear and
Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and Natural Resources (Georgia's nuclear regulator),
the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department, the Institute of
Radiobiology, and the Chamber of Control.
To assess the progress of DOE's efforts to help other countries
secure their sealed radiological sources, we obtained and analyzed
documentation on DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction
Program (IRTR), including project work plans for each country and
program activity; strategic planning documents; and internal
briefings. For example, we reviewed DOE's Action Plan to Secure
and Control Foreign-Origin Source Materials for Radiological
Dispersal Devices (April 2003), and Programmatic Guidelines for
Site Prioritization and Protection Implementation (September
2006). We supplemented the documentation with interviews with
senior level DOE officials responsible for implementing the IRTR
program.
To specifically determine the status of efforts across the 49
countries receiving DOE's assistance, we reviewed DOE's Project
Management Information System database to construct a summary
table that included factors, among other things, the number of
sites completed; host country agencies and international
organizations involved in radiological source security; and
program accomplishments and challenges. To identify challenges DOE
faces in securing sources in other countries and to assess
sustainability efforts, we collected and analyzed (1) IRTR program
trip reports for all countries participating in the program, and
(2) testimonial evidence obtained from project managers, security
specialists, and contracting officers to identify all programmatic
and management challenges. Furthermore, we performed a
comprehensive review and analysis of trip reports from fiscal year
2004 through fiscal year 2006.
To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that
provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other
countries, we reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing
program expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year
2006. We obtained responses from key agency database officials to
a number of questions focused on data reliability, covering issues
such as data-entry access and the accuracy and completeness of the
data. For DOE specifically, to determine how much DOE had budgeted
and spent through August 31, 2006, to secure radiological sources
in other countries, we reviewed element of cost reports detailing
program expenditures by country, national laboratory, and program
objective per fiscal year to determine the amount spent in-country
and the overall carryover of unspent and unobligated funds.
Furthermore, to determine planned program costs for DOE, we
reviewed DOE's congressional budget request for fiscal year 2007
and met with senior DOE officials to learn about DOE's plans for
addressing reduced program funding. Follow-up questions were added
whenever necessary. Caveats and limitations to the data were noted
in the documentation, where necessary. We determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, based
on work we performed to ensure the data's reliability.
To assess the extent to which coordination has occurred within DOE
as well as on an interagency basis, we obtained and analyzed
documents from DOE, NRC, and State regarding their radiological
threat reduction and nonproliferation activities. We interviewed
several senior officials at NRC, including the Senior Advisor for
Nuclear Security, a senior foreign policy advisor for the Office
of International Programs, and a Senior Engineer. At State, we
interviewed several high-level officials, including the Senior
Coordinator for Nuclear Safety from the Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation. We also reviewed State, NRC, and
DOE documents regarding Iraq work to highlight interagency
coordination. To address the level of coordination with
international organizations, we met with senior officials at the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Commission,
including the Director of Nuclear Safety, and a senior official
from the External Relations Directorate, respectively. Finally, we
met with the Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Centre
from the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority to learn about
NRC's role in providing regulatory assistance to Armenia.
We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other locations,
from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: DOE�s IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region,
as of August 31, 2006
Dollars in thousands
Recipient Country U.S. Costs In-country costs Total spent
Former Soviet Union
Russia $10,451 $22,721 $33,172
Ukraine 1,490 2,000 3,490
Lithuania 736 588 1,324
Georgia Republic 359 662 1,022
Kazakhstan 327 519 846
Uzbekistan 282 490 772
Moldova 344 441 785
Azerbaijan 214 557 771
Kyrgyzstan 329 282 611
Tajikistan 321 204 525
Latvia 223 28 251
Armenia 172 26 198
Estonia 114 44 158
Belarus 247 223 470
Subtotal $15,609 $28,785 $44,395
Africa
Ethiopia $91 $0 $91
South Africa 69 0 69
Kenya 15 0 15
Nigeria 104 0 104
Morocco 306 322 628
Tanzania 237 131 368
Libya 2 0 2
Subtotal $824 $453 $1,277
Europe
Poland $538 $1,387 $1,925
Bulgaria 442 419 861
Greece 397 259 656
Serbia 138 177 315
Albania 332 6 338
Subtotal $1,847 $2,248 $4,095
Dollars in thousands
Recipient Country U.S. Costs In-country costs Total spent
Latin America
Colombia $401 $913 $1,314
Panama 114 100 214
Peru 210 176 386
Nicaragua 72 45 117
El Salvador 82 67 149
Chile 201 110 311
Ecuador 158 152 310
Argentina 124 9 133
Brazil 90 15 105
Honduras 122 20 142
Guatemala 104 42 146
Bolivia 101 66 167
Mexico 0 0 0
Subtotal $1,779 $1,715 $3,494
Asia-Pacific
Indonesia $244 $359 $603
Philippines 235 196 431
Vietnam 112 2 114
Bangladesh 161 43 204
Subtotal $752 $600 $1,352
Middle East
Iraq $4,250 $206 $4,456
Afghanistan 607 0 607
Yemen 68 48 116
Jordan 188 56 244
Egypt 955 526 1,481
Turkey 146 1 147
Subtotal $6,214 $837 $7,051
Total $27,025 $34,638 $61,664
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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(360642)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected].
Highlights of [48]GAO-07-282 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate
January 2007
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus
Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources,
such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, were vulnerable to theft and could be
used to make a dirty bomb. In response, DOE established the International
Radiological Threat Reduction program to secure high-risk sources in other
countries. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE's progress in helping other
countries secure their high-risk sources, (2) identify DOE's current and
planned program costs, and (3) describe coordination between DOE and U.S.
and international agencies to secure sources in other countries.
[49]What GAO Recommends
GAO is making several recommendations to DOE to better prioritize sites to
be selected for security upgrades and strengthen program management
practices, including developing a long-term sustainability plan to protect
DOE's investment in security upgrades. In addition, GAO is asking Congress
to consider providing NRC with authority and a direct appropriation to
conduct regulatory development activities to help improve other countries'
security over sources. DOE said that our recommendations were helpful and
would further strengthen its program. NRC said it would work closely with
relevant executive branch agencies and IAEA if Congress acts upon our
matter for consideration.
Since 2002, the Department of Energy (DOE) has upgraded the security of
hundreds of sites in other countries that contain radiological sources and
has achieved noteworthy accomplishments, including removing radioactive
material in Chechnya. However, DOE has made limited progress securing many
of the most dangerous sources located in waste storage facilities and
hundreds of sources across Russia contained in radioisotope thermoelectric
generators (RTG). When DOE expanded the program from the former Soviet
Union to a global effort, it also expanded the types of sites that
required upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of
all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one
radiological source. Furthermore, DOE has not developed a long-term plan
to ensure that security upgrades will be adequately sustained once
installed.
From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent
approximately $108 million to improve the security of sources in other
countries. However, funding for the program has steadily declined in
recent years, and future funding is uncertain because the agency places a
higher priority on securing special nuclear material such as plutonium and
highly enriched uranium.
DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure sources in other countries. DOE,
however, has not always integrated its efforts efficiently. For example,
DOE did not transfer $5 million from its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to
NRC for strengthening international regulatory controls over radiological
sources, despite a Senate Appropriations Committee report directing DOE to
do so. In addition, gaps in information sharing between DOE and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have impeded DOE's ability to
target the most vulnerable sites in IAEA member states for security
improvements.
Recovered RTG Containing Large Amounts of Strontium-90
References
Visible links
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-967
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-93
33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-662
34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-807
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-57
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282
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