    Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat
    Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the
    Highest Priority Radiological Sources (31-JAN-07, GAO-07-282).

    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
    international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological
    sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security
    threat to the United States and the international community.
    Radioactive material is encapsulated or sealed in metal to
    prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed
    radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used
    worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such as medical,
    industrial, and agricultural applications. However, the total
    number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many
    countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated
    that thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or
    abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain
    types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be
    used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous,
    weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb.
    In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of
    its fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the
    threat posed by dirty bombs. In response to the congressional
    requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to
    identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological
    sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year
    2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the
    countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials
    determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable
    sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy,
    DOE expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources
    worldwide, ultimately establishing the International Radiological
    Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The program's primary objective
    is to protect U.S. national security interests by (1)
    implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites
    containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and
    consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources;
    and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure
    necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting
    regulatory controls, including the development of regional
    partnerships to leverage international resources. In addition,
    DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources produced
    and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S.
    Radiological Threat Reduction program. Part of this program's
    mission is to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis
    that were supplied by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for
    Peace program. The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with
    support from multiple national laboratories. The national
    laboratories' responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical
    security requirements of countries participating in the program,
    (2) recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological
    source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are
    properly installed. In 2003, we issued a report at Congress'
    request focusing on U.S. and international efforts to secure
    sealed radiological sources. We recommended, among other things,
    that the Secretary of Energy take the lead in developing a
    comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other countries'
    sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress the
    Department of Energy (DOE) has made in implementing its program
    to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources,
    (2) identifies DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3)
    describes DOE's coordination with other U.S. agencies and
    international organizations to secure radiological sources in
    other countries.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-282
        ACCNO:   A65433
      TITLE:     Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International
    Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future
    Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources
         DATE:   01/31/2007
      SUBJECT:   Cost analysis
    	     Foreign aid programs
    	     Foreign governments
    	     Interagency relations
    	     International organizations
    	     International relations
    	     Nuclear facilities
    	     Nuclear facility security
    	     Nuclear proliferation
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Radioactive materials
    	     Atoms for Peace Program

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    GAO-07-282

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background
         * [3]Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwi

              * [4]DOE Has Secured over 300 Sites Worldwide, but Many High-Prio

                   * [5]A Majority of Sites Secured by DOE Are Hospitals and
                     Oncolog
                   * [6]Hundreds of RTGs Remain Unsecured in Russia
                   * [7]Waste Storage Facilities Need to Be Secured in Russia and
                     Uk
                   * [8]Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in
                     DOE

              * [9]DOE Has Revised Its Criteria for Site Selection and Increase
              * [10]Numerous Problems and Challenges Impeded DOE's Efforts to Se
              * [11]DOE Has Not Developed a Plan to Ensure the Long-Term Sustain

         * [12]DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiologi

              * [13]DOE Expenditures Have Focused Primarily on Physical Security
              * [14]DOE Has Consistently Carried Over Large Balances of Unspent
              * [15]DOE's Budget for Radioactive Source Security Has Been Reduce

         * [16]Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still

              * [17]DOE Has Improved Efforts to Coordinate Its Program Activitie
              * [18]DOE's Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Depa
              * [19]Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps

         * [20]Conclusions
         * [21]Recommendations for Executive Action
         * [22]Matters for Congressional Consideration
         * [23]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * [24]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
         * [25]Appendix II: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by R
         * [26]Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy
         * [27]Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

              * [28]Order by Mail or Phone

    Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
    Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee
    on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    January 2007

    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus
    Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources

    GAO-07-282

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 5
    Background 8
    Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has Not
    Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many Dangerous
    Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured 9
    DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources
    Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an Increased
    Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials 33
    Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces
    Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide 43
    Conclusions 55
    Recommendations for Executive Action 57
    Matters for Congressional Consideration 59
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 59
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 64
    Appendix II DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as of
    August 31, 2006 68
    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Energy 70
    Appendix IV Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 75

    Tables

    Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of
    September 30, 2006 13
    Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia 16
    Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August 31,
    2006 34
    Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006 40

    Figures

    Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades 12
    Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia 16
    Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE 19
    Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological Sources
    23
    Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator with
    Holes in the Roof 29
    Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic 30
    Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations 39
    Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and
    Unsecured Spent Fuel 51

    Abbreviations

    ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization
    DOE Department of Energy
    EC European Commission
    EU European Union
    EWGPP Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program
    FSU Former Soviet Union
    GSSP Global Search and Secure Program
    GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative
    HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
    IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
    IRSRA Iraq Radiological Source Regulatory Authority
    IRTR International Radiological Threat Reduction Program
    NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
    NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
    NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
    RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
    SNRCU State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
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    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    January 31, 2007

    The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of
    Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States
    Senate

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
    international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources
    were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the
    United States and the international community. Radioactive material, such
    as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90, is encapsulated or sealed in
    metal--such as stainless steel, titanium, or platinum--to prevent its
    dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed
    radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such
    as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. These applications
    include radiation treatment for cancer patients, food and blood
    irradiation, and oil drilling. However, the total number of these sources
    in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically
    account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these sources have
    been lost, stolen, or abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources.
    If certain types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could
    be used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous,
    weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb.

    The amount of radiation emitted by these sources varies based on the size
    and type of the source. For example, teletherapy machines, which are used
    to treat cancer patients and are found in hospitals and oncology clinics,
    contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from about 1,000 to 10,000
    curies.1 DOE officials have estimated that there are approximately 2,000
    teletherapy sources located primarily in developing nations around the
    world. Additionally, strontium-90 sources contained in large devices known
    as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG), designed to provide
    electric power to navigational facilities such as lighthouses and weather
    stations, contain between 25,000 and 250,000 curies. U.S. and Russian
    officials have estimated that there were more than 1,050 RTGs produced and
    distributed throughout the former Soviet Union. These devices present a
    particularly high security risk because of their high levels of
    radioactivity and inadequate protection. The Department of Energy (DOE)
    has reported that the RTGs likely represent the largest unsecured quantity
    of radioactivity in the world. Waste storage facilities also pose a
    considerable threat if left unsecured because any one of these facilities
    can store, at any given time, up to 3 million curies of material.

    1A curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear
    physics, it is defined as the amount of substance in which 37 billion
    atoms per second undergo radiological disintegration. In the international
    system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of radioactivity. One
    curie equals 3.7 x 1010 becquerels.

    In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its
    fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by
    dirty bombs.2 In response to the congressional requirement, the National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)3 established the Radiological
    Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable,
    high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in
    fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the
    countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials
    determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In
    2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope
    of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing
    the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The
    program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests
    by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites
    containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and
    consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3)
    supporting the development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain
    security enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the
    development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources.
    In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources
    produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S.
    Radiological Threat Reduction program.4 Part of this program's mission is
    to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied
    by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program.5

    2H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350, at 431 (2001).

    3NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created by the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No.
    106-65 (2000), with responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons,
    nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.

    The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple
    national laboratories, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
    (PNNL), Sandia National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge
    National Laboratory, Remote Sensing Laboratory, Brookhaven National
    Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos
    National Laboratory.6 The national laboratories' responsibilities include
    (1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries
    participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to
    strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended
    upgrades are properly installed.

    IRTR is one of eight programs within DOE's Global Threat Reduction
    Initiative (GTRI). These programs are responsible for identifying,
    securing, and removing and/or facilitating the disposition of high-risk,
    vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the
    world that pose a potential threat to the United States and the
    international community.7 In September 2006, DOE reorganized GTRI to
    consolidate its nuclear and radiological threat reduction programs. As a
    result, the IRTR program was integrated into a newly combined nuclear and
    radiological threat reduction effort that focuses on three major
    geographic areas--North and South America, Europe and Africa, and Asia and
    countries of the former Soviet Union.8 As part of this restructuring, DOE
    issued new program guidance assigning priority rankings to the types of
    sites and radiological sources that will be secured in the future.

    4GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded
    Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources, [29]GAO-05-967 (Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 22, 2005).

    5The Atoms for Peace Program was established in the 1950s for the purpose
    of promoting peaceful domestic and international exploration, development,
    and advancement of nuclear energy. Under the auspices of the program, DOE
    and its predecessor agencies provided many countries with sealed
    radiological sources.

    6DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. The
    mission of DOE's 22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to design
    and build atomic weapons, these laboratories have since expanded to
    conduct research in many disciplines--from high-energy physics to advanced
    computing.

    7In addition to the IRTR program, GTRI consists of the U.S. Radiological
    Threat Reduction, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors,
    the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return, the U.S. Foreign Research
    Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance, Emerging Threats and Gap Materials,
    Global Research Reactor Security, and BN-350 programs.

    The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other countries,
    though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State provides overall policy
    direction for U.S. government international radiological source security
    efforts and has broadened international support for the International
    Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Code of Conduct, as well as guidance on the
    import and export of radiological sources.9 State also provides IAEA with
    funds to, among other things, conduct training, workshops, and advisory
    missions to improve member states' security practices and procedures. NRC
    has advised and provided guidance on the development of programs in
    Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan to improve nuclear regulatory controls
    over radiological sources, including establishing radiological source
    inventories and promoting the development of laws, rules, and regulations
    governing controls over this material.

    In addition to IAEA, the European Commission (EC) also provides assistance
    to countries--primarily those that are candidates or potential candidates
    for joining the European Union (EU)--to improve the security of sites
    containing radiological sources.10 EC activities in this area are a
    component of its efforts to combat nuclear terrorism.

    8The countries of the former Soviet Union include Armenia, Azerbaijan,
    Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
    Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

    9The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
    serves as a guide in developing policies, laws, and regulations on
    maintaining the safety and security of radiological sources. It is not,
    however, legally binding. The code, which was revised in 2003, includes,
    among other things, enhanced requirements for the security of sources. As
    of December 2006, 88 countries, including the United States, had committed
    to implement the code. Further, in September 2004, IAEA's Board of
    Governors approved new guidance on the import and export of sources, which
    is designed to help countries ensure that high-risk sources are supplied
    only to authorized end-users. As of December 2006, 37 countries, including
    the United States, had committed to implement the import/export guidance.

    10The EC manages foreign assistance programs for its 27 EU member states.

    In 2003, we issued a report at your request focusing on U.S. and
    international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources.11 We
    recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the
    lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other
    countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress DOE has
    made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their
    sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE's current and planned
    program costs, and (3) describes DOE's coordination with other U.S.
    agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in
    other countries. To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation on
    the IRTR program from DOE and its national laboratories and conducted
    interviews with key program officials. We also visited four countries that
    are major recipients of DOE assistance to improve radiological source
    security--Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia--to observe how equipment
    and training were being utilized and to discuss the implementation of the
    program with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and
    budgetary information, conducted a data reliability assessment of the data
    we received, and interviewed knowledgeable program officials on the
    reliability of the data. We determined that these data were sufficiently
    reliable for the purposes of this report. More details about the scope and
    methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from
    November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
    radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's
    inception in 2002. These achievements include the removal of cesium and
    cobalt sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya and providing
    security upgrades to vulnerable sites in Greece prior to the 2004
    Olympics. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources
    still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. Specifically, 16 of 20
    waste storage sites across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while more
    than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are vulnerable
    to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the
    program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types
    of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September
    2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities,
    which generally contain one radiological source. Several DOE and national
    laboratory officials with whom we spoke questioned the benefit of
    upgrading such a large number of medical facilities, while higher priority
    sites--such as waste storage facilities and RTGs--remained unsecured. In
    addition, DOE's program does not address the transportation of
    radiological sources from one location to another, a security measure that
    DOE and international officials have identified as the most vulnerable
    link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous
    problems and challenges implementing its program to secure radiological
    sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and
    access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk
    countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades at
    all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries
    receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long
    term. This is particularly problematic, given the number of problems we
    identified during our site visits with the maintenance of security
    equipment and storage facilities funded by DOE. For example in Georgia we
    found that a facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which has
    thousands of curies of cesium-137--had several large openings in the roof.
    In Lithuania, we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the security
    cable, which is used to secure a teletherapy machine's cobalt-60 source,
    had been broken for almost a month. A DOE physical security specialist
    told us that the cable was the most important security feature installed
    by DOE because it triggered an alarm that was connected to the source.

    11GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts
    to Control Sealed Radiological Sources Need Strengthening, [30]GAO-03-638
    (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).

    From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent
    approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure radiological
    sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68 million--was to (1)
    conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing
    radiological sources; (2) install physical security upgrades at these
    sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and surveillance
    cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase
    security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5
    million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over
    radiological sources in IAEA member states. The remainder, or $26.5
    million, paid for program planning activities such as developing program
    guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies.
    Russia received almost one-third of total DOE funding, which focused
    primarily on orphan source recovery, RTG removal and disposal, and
    physical security upgrades at waste storage facilities. DOE officials told
    us that securing radiological sources in other countries is a lower
    priority than securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium
    and highly enriched uranium. As a result, recent budget allotments for
    radiological security activities were reduced, and future funding for the
    program is uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE may be
    unable to meet outstanding contractual commitments in the countries where
    it has installed more than $40 million in security upgrades. To offset
    anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to obtain international
    contributions from other countries but efforts to date have produced
    limited results.

    DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological
    sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has
    involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction
    activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the
    agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led interagency
    effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority and
    develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. However, DOE has
    not always integrated its nuclear regulatory development efforts
    efficiently. For example, DOE and NRC disagreed about whether, as directed
    by the Senate Appropriations Committee, DOE should have transferred $5
    million from its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for the purpose of
    strengthening international regulatory controls over radiological sources.
    Ultimately, the funds were not transferred, causing friction between the
    agencies. In addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities
    of multiple programs within the agency responsible for securing
    radiological and nuclear materials in other countries. For example, in
    Poland we found that radiological sources were secured at a storage
    facility by DOE's radiological program while spent nuclear fuel--located
    next to the sources in the same storage facility--had not been secured by
    DOE's nuclear security upgrades program. Polish officials told us they
    could not understand why the separate DOE programs had not coordinated
    their efforts to ensure that all of the material was secured at the same
    time. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen
    controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed
    bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve
    their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in
    information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded
    DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security
    improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts.

    To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest priority
    radiological sources, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy and
    the Administrator of the NNSA, among other things, (1) limit the number of
    hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive
    security upgrades to only those deemed the highest risk; (2) accelerate
    efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as practicable; and (3) develop a
    long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that includes, among
    other things, future resources required to implement such a plan.

    Furthermore, if the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure
    development is the key to the long-term sustainability of radiological
    source security efforts, it should consider providing NRC with authority
    and a direct appropriation to conduct these activities. The appropriation
    would be provided to NRC in lieu of providing the funds to DOE or another
    agency to reimburse NRC for their activities.

    Background

    The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological
    sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft.
    According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in
    radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004,
    about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of
    which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the
    development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a
    dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could, however,
    have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type, amount, and
    form, the dispersed radiological material could cause radiation sickness
    for people nearby and produce serious economic, psychological and social
    disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the
    contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the
    mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in
    a Moscow park. While the device was not detonated and no radiological
    material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have the
    capability and willingness to use radiological sources as weapons of
    terror.

    A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic
    impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is
    likely to equal, and perhaps exceed, that of the September 11, 2001,
    attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another study,
    the economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs at U.S.
    ports, for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in losses to
    the U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb attack could also
    produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the Federation of
    American Scientists concluded that an americium radiological source
    combined with one pound of explosives would result in medical supervision
    and monitoring required for the entire population of an area 10 times
    larger than the initial blast.

    The consequences resulting from the improper use of radiological sources
    are not theoretical. Some actual incidents involving sources can provide a
    measure of understanding of what could happen in case of a dirty bomb
    attack. In 1987, an accident involving a teletherapy machine containing
    about 1,400 curies of cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a
    powder similar to talc and highly dispersible, killed four people in
    Brazil and injured many more. The accident and its aftermath caused about
    $36 million in damages to the region (Goiania) where the accident
    occurred, according to an official from Brazil's Nuclear Energy
    Commission. In addition to the deaths and economic impact, the accident
    created environmental and medical problems. For example, 85 houses were
    significantly contaminated and 41 of these had to be evacuated. The
    decontamination process required the demolition of homes and other
    buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive waste. Over
    8,000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to obtain
    certificates stating they were not contaminated.

    Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has Not
    Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many Dangerous
    Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured

    DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain
    radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's
    inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as removing
    dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya, many of the
    high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in
    Russia. DOE officials told us that the program has barely "scratched the
    surface" in terms of securing the most dangerous sources in the former
    Soviet Union. Specifically, removing dangerous sources from 16 of 20 waste
    storage facilities across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while more
    than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are vulnerable
    to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the
    program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types
    of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September
    2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities,
    which generally contain one radiological source. In addition, DOE's
    program does not address the transportation of radiological sources from
    one location to another, a security measure that DOE and international
    officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological
    supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges
    implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide,
    including a lack of cooperation from host country officials. Finally, DOE
    has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries receiving
    security upgrades will be able to sustain them once installed.

    DOE Has Secured over 300 Sites Worldwide, but Many High-Priority Radiological
    Sources Remain Unsecured

    Since DOE began its program in 2002, it has taken steps to secure
    radiological sources in more than 40 countries and has achieved some
    noteworthy accomplishments. For example, DOE told us that it has (1)
    facilitated the removal of 5,500 curies of cobalt-60 and cesium-137
    sources from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya, the
    location of continuing political unrest in southeastern Russia; (2)
    constructed storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan and
    Georgia so that sources can be consolidated at one site to strengthen
    their long-term protection; and (3) increased security at 21 sites in
    Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics, including providing 110 hand-held
    radiation detection devices for first responders.12 DOE secured, among
    other things, facilities with blood irradiators containing cesium chloride
    and a large industrial sterilization facility.

    According to DOE, it has neither the resources nor staff to
    comprehensively address and secure the tens of thousands of vulnerable
    radiological sources worldwide on its own. As a result, it has enlisted
    the support of regional partners and IAEA to implement programs to help
    other countries find, characterize and secure their most dangerous
    sources. DOE works with partner countries to identify sites where
    high-risk sources may be located and provides the equipment and training
    to conduct searches. Once the sources have been located, DOE enlists the
    support of IAEA or partner countries to transfer them to a secure
    facility. For example, DOE established a regional partnership with
    Lithuania to facilitate orphan source recovery efforts both in Lithuania
    and in neighboring countries. DOE purchased radiation detection equipment
    and trained Lithuanian specialists to initiate orphan source recovery
    efforts. Lithuania was able to identify 41 former Soviet military and
    industrial sites that potentially held high-risk radiological sources.
    Subsequently, Lithuania assisted DOE in initiating search and secure
    efforts in Estonia and Latvia, which resulted in the discovery and
    disposition of orphan sources.

    12The hand-held radiation detection equipment was provided under DOE's
    Cooperative Radiological Instrument Threat Reduction program. This program
    is designed to help DOE's international radiological threat reduction
    program to ensure that other countries' law enforcement officials are
    provided with the necessary equipment and training to detect and mitigate
    radiological security threats.

    Despite these achievements, DOE's program has not adequately addressed
    many high-priority sources. In 2003, the Secretary of Energy directed NNSA
    to expand its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, which
    increased both the number of countries targeted to receive DOE assistance
    and the types of sites to be secured. Expanding the program into many
    countries outside of the former Soviet Union--the initial focus and
    attention of DOE's program--resulted in the addition of many medical
    facilities that contained lower priority sources that were now being
    targeted for physical security upgrades.

      A Majority of Sites Secured by DOE Are Hospitals and Oncology Clinics

    As of September 30, 2006, DOE's program had completed the installation of
    physical security upgrades at 368 sites in over 40 countries. However, a
    majority of sites secured do not represent the highest-risk or the most
    vulnerable sources. Of the total sites completed, 256--or about 70
    percent--were hospitals and oncology clinics operating teletherapy
    machines used to provide radiation treatment to cancer patients. These
    machines generally contain a single cobalt-60 radiological source ranging
    from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. In 38 of the 41 countries--or 93
    percent--DOE had upgraded at least one hospital or oncology clinic.
    According to DOE, many of the countries that are included in its global
    program have medical facilities with radiological sources. As a result,
    these facilities were targeted for upgrades. In addition to the medical
    facilities, DOE has completed security upgrades at 47 research institutes,
    35 commercial and industrial sites, and 30 waste storage facilities.
    Figure 1 depicts the countries receiving security upgrades, and table 1
    provides a breakdown of the total number and types of facilities upgraded
    by DOE, as of September 30, 2006.

    Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades

    Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of
    September 30, 2006

                                            Percent of
                                Number of total number
                                    sites     of sites  Number of countries where
                             completed by completed by this type of site has been
    Site type                      DOE          DOE                 completeda
    Medical                        256          70%                         38
    Research institutes             47           13                         19
    Commercial/Industrial           35           10                         17
    Waste storage
    facilities(Radons)b             30            8                         22
    Total                          368        100%c                         41

    Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data.

    Note: According to DOE, there are about 2,249 sites worldwide that would
    be likely candidates for physical security upgrades. As of September 2006,
    DOE had completed upgrades at about 16 percent of these sites.

    aMany of the countries received physical security upgrades for more than
    one type of facility.

    bWaste storage facilities are specifically identified as Radons in the
    FSU.

    cPercentage does not add up to 100 due to rounding.

    Six national laboratory officials and security specialists responsible for
    implementing the program told us that although progress had been made in
    securing radiological sources, DOE had focused too much attention on
    securing medical facilities at the expense of other higher-priority sites,
    such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In their view, DOE installed
    security upgrades at so many of these facilities primarily because the
    upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost. For example, a typical
    suite of security upgrades at a medical facility costs between $10,000 to
    $20,000, depending on the size of the site, whereas the average cost to
    remove and replace an RTG in the Far East region of Russia is about
    $72,000 based on 2006 dollars.

    Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited also
    raised concerns about DOE's focus on securing radiological sources at so
    many medical facilities. For example, staff responsible for operating the
    teletherapy machines in hospitals in Lithuania and Poland told us that the
    cobalt-60 sources contained in the teletherapy machine did not pose a
    significant security risk. In their view, it was highly unlikely that the
    sources could be easily removed from these machines and that it would take
    more than one highly skilled and determined intruder to remove the source
    and transport it out of the facility without being detected or dangerously
    exposed to radiation.13 In fact, while emphasizing the importance of
    securing medical facilities, DOE officials stated that getting medical and
    security staff to buy into the need for improved security has been a
    consistent challenge for the program. Further, Russian officials told us
    that radiological sources in hospitals did not pose a comparable risk to
    RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. DOE has not offered to fund any
    security upgrades of Russian medical facilities since its funds are
    focused on securing RTGs, Radons, and orphan sources.

    According to five national laboratory officials and security specialists,
    completing upgrades at medical facilities also served to demonstrate rapid
    program progress because the upgrades are completed relatively quickly.
    DOE has relied upon an indicator that focuses on the number of sites that
    have been upgraded, or "sites secured." While sites completed is the
    primary metric used by DOE, the program does compile and track several
    additional activities, including the amount of curies secured, countries
    that receive regulatory assistance, and orphan sources recovered.

    In measuring program performance, the Director of IRTR said that the
    number of sites completed demonstrated conclusively that work has been
    completed and represents the best available measurement. In discussions
    with other high-level DOE officials about the program, they consistently
    identified the number of sites upgraded as evidence that the program had
    been achieving results and reducing the threat posed by radiological
    sources overseas. However, PNNL and Sandia National Laboratory officials
    told us that the measurement used by DOE does not demonstrate how the
    program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national security interests. In
    their view, this measurement is one-dimensional and does not adequately
    distinguish lower-priority sites from higher-priority sites.

      Hundreds of RTGs Remain Unsecured in Russia

    DOE has made limited progress removing hundreds of RTGs containing
    high-priority sources which, according to DOE, likely represent the
    largest unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. These devices
    were designed to provide electric power and are suited for remote
    locations to power navigational facilities such as lighthouses and
    meteorological stations. Each has activity levels ranging from 25,000 to
    250,000 curies of strontium-90--similar to the amount of strontium-90
    released from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 1986. As of
    September 30, 2006, DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of all
    RTGs located in Russia's inventory. Until early 2000, approximately 1,049
    RTGs were in Russia. Of those, approximately 317 RTGs have been removed
    over the past several years, according to DOE and Russian officials. DOE
    funded about 40 percent of those removed (132 RTGs) and Norway, France,
    and Russia funded the removal of the remaining 185.14 However, an
    estimated 732 RTGs, representing several million curies of radioactivity,
    remain unsecured.

    13Sandia National Labatories determined that a source could be easily
    removed from a teletherapy machine using basic tools and drawings.

    A majority of RTGs are located along coastlines in three major
    regions--the Baltic, Artic and Far East. To date, DOE has focused the
    majority of its efforts on removing RTGs along the Arctic coast. However,
    more than 90 RTGs remain operational along the Baltic coast under control
    of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which DOE does not plan to remove. DOE
    officials said that the program will now focus its efforts almost
    exclusively in the Far East because DOE expects other countries to remove
    RTGs from the Baltic region. Figure 2 shows the location of the remaining
    RTGs in Russia, and table 2 summarizes DOE's efforts, along with other
    countries, to remove RTGs in Russia.

    14Norway has committed to securing an additional 77 RTGs along the Arctic
    coast, including the Kola Peninsula. Specifically, Norway agreed to remove
    30 RTGs in 2006, 30 in 2007 and 17 in 2008.

    Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia

    Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia

    Region                                  Baltic Far East Arctic Totala
    Total estimated RTG inventory in Russia     96      233    720  1049b
    DOE removal in fiscal year 2004              0        0     63     63
    DOE removal in fiscal year 2005              3       25     24     52
    DOE removal in fiscal year 2006              0        0     17     17
    Total DOE removals to date                   3       25    104   132c
    Estimated DOE-partner countries removal      d        d   185d   185d
    Estimated remaining RTGs in Russia          93      208    431   732d

    Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data.

    Note: For the purpose of our analysis, we are combining the Northern Sea
    route and White Sea route and labeling them the Arctic region.

    aBecause Russia has not comprehensively tracked the existing number of
    RTGs, DOE and Russian figures for the total number of RTGs differ, as do
    the number of RTGs recovered. Russian officials have cited varying figures
    regarding the total number of RTGs that exist in Russia. Russia has
    documented that at least 670 RTGs exist throughout the Russian Federation
    territory. However, other Russian sources estimated that the number of
    RTGs in Russia ranges from 605 to 700.

    bThe total does not include the 16 RTGs removed in other former Soviet
    Union countries (13 in the Ukraine and 3 in Georgia).

    cDOE is now engaged in the removal of an additional 27 RTGs in the Far
    East.

    dAn additional 185 RTGs were removed by DOE partner countries, including
    Russia, Norway, and France. However, the exact breakdown by region for
    these RTG removals was not known by DOE. DOE assumed that these 185 RTGs
    were removed from the Arctic region.

    DOE officials told us that the Far East region is now a priority for RTG
    removal because Russian Ministry of Defense officials have specifically
    requested DOE's assistance for the Far East and provided DOE with a
    prioritized list of RTGs to be removed. In addition, other countries have
    expressed a willingness to support future RTG removal in the Baltic
    region. For example, according to DOE, in February 2005 Denmark announced
    that it had reached an agreement with Russia to replace and remove all
    RTGs in the Baltic region. Other European nations, including Germany, have
    also offered assistance. However, Russian officials told us that
    assistance from Germany has not materialized and that Denmark had
    rescinded its offer to provide assistance. Moreover, these officials
    expressed concern regarding DOE's decision to fund the removal of RTGs
    exclusively from the Far East region. In their view, the RTGs in the
    Baltic are more vulnerable and should be removed as soon as possible
    because of their accessibility and proximity to large population centers.
    According to DOE officials, if international funding for removal of these
    vulnerable RTGs does not materialize, IRTR will likely have to fund the
    Baltic effort.

    According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and future
    efforts will face a number of challenges. No comprehensive inventory of
    RTGs exists and, as a result, the actual number of these devices is
    unknown. RTGs were originally manufactured in Estonia, but the company
    dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all the records were
    lost. The Russian organization that originally designed them is currently
    developing a database of known RTGs in Russia--with U.S. funding and
    support--to reconstruct records and develop a reliable accounting of the
    total number of devices produced. However, this effort has been ongoing
    for years and remains incomplete. Officials from the Russian organization
    told us that they lack confidence that the precise number and location of
    RTGs, both in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, will
    ever be known.

    RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, and their removal
    requires specialized containers for their transport and adequate storage
    capacity to securely house them once removed. Russian officials reported
    that RTG removal had been slowed due to a lack of both. To address the
    need for containers and space, DOE has enlisted Canada's support to
    provide funds to Russia for constructing an additional 17 containers for
    transporting RTGs, bringing the total to 36. However, this effort is not
    scheduled to be completed until early to mid-2007.15 DOE is also
    supporting the construction of storage facilities at two locations in the
    Russian Far East, Vladivostok and Kamchatka. When completed, the
    Vladivostok facility is expected to house 150 to 200 RTGs. Moreover, a
    smaller storage building is under construction at Kamchatka, which will
    store RTGs until they can be shipped to Vladivostok for permanent storage.
    According to DOE, the Vladivostok facility houses 25 RTGs that were
    recovered from the Russian Far East. By the end of 2006, Vladivostok is
    scheduled to house 33 additional recovered RTGs.

    Finally, Russian officials told us that future RTG removal efforts will
    depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace power
    supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has initiated a
    project to provide alternative power sources, including wind and
    solar-powered energy panels to accelerate RTG removal. However these
    replacements are not always viable. For example, navigational lighthouses
    located in northern Russia experience severe weather and limited daylight
    4 to 5 months per year and cannot rely on solar power during the winter
    months. Russian Ministry of Defense officials have stated that the
    navigational devices are critical and that they will not approve removal
    of any additional RTGs without a viable energy source to replace them.
    Figure 3 shows a navigational beacon with a solar-powered replacement
    energy source funded by DOE that we observed during our fieldwork.

    15According to DOE, this is part of a larger funding commitment by Canada
    for $2 million to support radiological source security in Russia.

    Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE

    DOE also noted that RTG removal and replacement has been slowed by
    challenges in project negotiation with Russian officials. For example,
    costs of RTG removal and transport have consistently risen as a result of
    increased Russian price demands and the failure of the Russian government
    to contribute funds to the effort. DOE has also experienced long delays
    while waiting for the Russian Ministry of Defense to approve the release
    of information regarding certain RTGs. Inadequate funding to support RTG
    removal has extended the deadline for completion from 2014 to 2021.

    As an interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs that have not
    yet been removed, DOE has equipped a select number of RTGs with alarm
    systems that are remotely monitored via satellite as part of a pilot
    project. Specifically the alarm consists of sensors that monitor, among
    other things, vibrations of the device and the source's movement. Because
    the source is inside the RTG, the alarms on both the device and its source
    emit regular, electronic signals to a regional base station. If the
    signals are interrupted, then the alarm is triggered. As of September
    2006, DOE had funded the installation of these security systems for 24
    RTGs in the Baltic region and 20 RTGs in the Far East region. According to
    DOE, the cost of the alarm system is about $5,000, and about $8,000 to
    establish the regional base station. DOE officials said they will continue
    to install security upgrades to RTGs as an interim measure, as long as the
    costs remain at those levels.

      Waste Storage Facilities Need to Be Secured in Russia and Ukraine

    In addition to RTGs, DOE also has made limited progress securing
    radiological sources stored at waste storage facilities in Russia and
    Ukraine. DOE has determined that the storage facilities in Russia and
    Ukraine are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a significant risk,
    due to the very large quantities of radioactive sources currently housed
    at each site. According to DOE, waste storage facilities can store up to 3
    million curies of radioactive waste. However, upgrades at a majority of
    these facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly in
    Russia and Ukraine, remain incomplete. To date, upgrades at 4 of 15 Radons
    in Russia have been completed since DOE began work in 2002. According to
    DOE, upgrades are under way at seven additional Radons. However, work has
    been delayed at several of these facilities. According to DOE, delays in
    upgrades to Radons were due in large part to delays in the Russian
    certification process of physical equipment for upgrades at these types of
    facilities. In addition, reorganization and managerial changes at the
    primary Russian agency with oversight authority over construction at Radon
    facilities presented challenges for DOE officials trying to gain access to
    Radons for physical security assessments. Furthermore, DOE officials noted
    that progress has been slowed because several Radon managers were
    unwilling to participate in the program until they received assurances
    from DOE that their Radon would receive a level of funding comparable to
    larger Radons.

    DOE has not completed upgrades at any of Ukraine's five Radon sites, one
    of which contains all 13 RTGs recovered in Ukraine. According to DOE
    officials, initiating work at the Radons has been problematic because
    Ukrainian officials have designated some sites as "sensitive" and thus
    denied DOE access to them. As a result, security upgrades have been
    delayed for at least 2 years. In May 2005, Ukraine agreed to provide DOE
    access to two of the five sites, and security upgrades at those facilities
    are under way. DOE plans to complete the remaining three Radons by 2010
    but have found that Ukraine is impeding access to these additional sites.

    In addition, DOE has identified 49 vulnerable waste storage facilities
    worldwide for assistance and has completed work at 26 of these sites in
    several countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
    Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. DOE is also undertaking
    upgrades at 23 additional sites. However, DOE has not addressed sites in
    the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil,
    Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Peru, Serbia, and South
    Africa. It was unclear, based on our discussions with DOE officials, when,
    if ever, security upgrades would be completed in these countries.

      Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in DOE's Program

    Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk
    radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and
    radiological supply chain, DOE determined that source transport is
    generally outside the scope of the program. Some DOE officials have
    expressed concern about the lack of security during the transport of
    radiological sources and questioned whether transportation should be a
    component of DOE's program. For example, a May 2005 DOE analysis concluded
    that DOE was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc basis, and
    the existing method of providing transportation security had serious
    limitations. The analysis also noted that DOE's current approach is
    resource limited and lacked a commitment to integrate transport security
    into all countries participating in the program. According to DOE's 2003
    program guidelines, DOE will fund transportation security upgrades only in
    Russia and Uzbekistan because the United States had international
    agreements with these countries to provide liability coverage when
    transporting radiological sources. As a result, DOE security specialists
    were not pursuing transportation security-related projects with the
    majority of countries participating in the program. However, DOE noted
    that its national laboratories were working with the U.S. Department of
    Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor states to strengthen
    transportation security regulations and procedures to reduce the risks of
    theft or diversion of nuclear and other radioactive materials in transit.

    In every country we visited, host country officials identified the
    transportation of sources as a critical vulnerability and a priority for
    security upgrades. Moscow Radon officials told us that transportation
    security had emerged as one of their top priorities. DOE has, in fact,
    provided a fleet of transport vehicles for the Moscow Radon, including
    guard vehicles, escort vehicles, and cargo trucks for transporting both
    liquid and solid waste. However, Radon officials told us that they also
    needed a reliable communication system to ensure the security of sources
    in transit. Consequently, the Moscow Radon funded a satellite-linked cell
    phone to facilitate communication and to monitor vehicles that transport
    radiological sources. However, at another Radon site we visited in Russia,
    a similar communications system did not exist. Moreover, officials from
    this site told us that their fleet of transportation vehicles was about 30
    years old and needed to be replaced. These officials stated that they
    requested funds from DOE for the vehicle replacement but were told that no
    funds were available.

    Another aspect of transportation security concerns equipment containing
    small, easily transportable sources--typically weighing less than 25
    pounds with an average radioactivity level of several curies. DOE
    estimates that about 10,000 of these smaller sources exist in several
    different countries. Specifically these sources, such as americium and
    beryllium, are used in the oil and gas industry for exploration purposes.
    According to DOE, these sources routinely move from one base camp to
    another with limited security, making them vulnerable to theft and
    potential misuse. We saw first-hand how vulnerable these sources were
    during our visit to one industrial facility where we observed a truck used
    to transport a cesium-137 source to a remote gas exploration site. Host
    country officials showed us how easy it would be to remove the sources
    from the truck as they were being secured with a simple lock. In addition,
    country officials told us that although some trucks are equipped with
    mobile phones, many areas along transportation routes are remote, and the
    phones often have no signal. Figure 4 shows an unsecured truck used to
    transport radiological sources.

    Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological Sources

    DOE has taken some steps to address this problem, but agency officials
    said that securing mobile sources is too costly and should be the
    responsibility of private industry. In this regard, DOE initiated efforts
    with U.S. industry partners to identify better ways to secure sources that
    have industrial applications and are frequently in transit. In February
    2006, DOE attended a forum with NRC and the Society for Petroleum
    Engineers to discuss security issues and develop best practices within the
    industry to better control radiological sources used overseas for
    industrial purposes.16

    16DOE identified the Society for Petroleum Engineers, which is an
    organization that represents petroleum companies' engineers and
    petro-physicists. Its membership includes both service operators, like
    Chevron and British Petroleum, and service providers, like Halliburton.

    DOE Has Revised Its Criteria for Site Selection and Increased the Level of
    Upgrades Required to Secure Certain Sites and Sources

    In September 2006, as part of the broader reorganization of its Global
    Threat Reduction Initiative, DOE established new guidance for selecting
    sites to receive physical security upgrades. Under the new guidance, DOE
    has combined its radiological and nuclear material security efforts to
    develop a single threat reduction strategy. This integrated strategy
    prioritizes security efforts, based most importantly on the attractiveness
    of the different types of radiological and nuclear material and (1) their
    proximity to U.S. strategic interests, such as military bases overseas or
    commercial ports; (2) external threat environment within the country; and
    (3) internal site vulnerability, which measures existing physical
    protection on site. This new criteria also increased the level of the
    design basis threat required to secure each type of material. For example,
    sources having a curie level exceeding 1,000 could have the same priority
    for security upgrades as certain amounts of plutonium or highly enriched
    uranium. As a result, RTG security remains a high priority, while in DOE's
    view, some medical radiological sources could also be considered a high
    priority. However, when we asked DOE officials in September 2006 about the
    relative priority of medical sites, they said all of the sites that were
    upgraded under the old guidance would still be considered high priority
    under the new criteria.

    DOE's previous guidance, developed in 2003, based site selection on a
    minimum threshold level--measured in curies--of radiological sources
    present at a particular location.17 In addition, the guidance factored in
    other conditions such as the location of the site, the security conditions
    of the site, and evidence of illicit trafficking in the country. According
    to DOE, in a presentation made to us in September 2006, this guidance gave
    equal treatment to all sites within countries receiving security upgrades.
    This guidance did not clearly discriminate between the different types of
    sites secured and whether they were considered to be the highest priority.
    For example, securing a waste storage facility, which can contain up to
    three million curies, was given the same weight as securing an oncology
    clinic with one source containing 1,000 curies. Security measures
    recommended for radiological sources were based on a threat scenario of
    one outsider penetrating the facility, equipped with a handgun while
    working with one complicit insider. However, the new guidance
    significantly increases the threat by advancing a more intense scenario,
    including six outsiders with automatic weapons and 10 kilograms of
    explosives working with one complicit insider. As a result, DOE officials
    said that future upgrades to secure radiological sources will have to be
    strengthened to meet the new protection levels. Additional enhancements at
    some sites are now being considered to address a more robust design-basis
    scenario.

    17DOE identified 10 radioisotopes of concern: americium-241,
    californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60, curium-234, iridium-192,
    plutonium-238, plutonium-239, radium-226, and strontium-90.

    Numerous Problems and Challenges Impeded DOE's Efforts to Secure High-Priority
    Radiological Sources at High-Risk Radiological Sites

    DOE experienced numerous problems and challenges during program
    implementation that impeded its efforts to secure radiological sources. As
    a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE was
    unable to implement its program at all. DOE said it was limited in its
    ability to enhance physical protection in several countries because IRTR
    is a voluntary program. For example, high-risk countries such as Nigeria
    and Turkey were unwilling to cooperate to implement security upgrades. In
    addition, Mexico declined DOE upgrades, although DOE had identified
    several vulnerable sites. While Mexico has continued to decline physical
    security assistance, Mexican officials have since agreed to accept
    regulatory infrastructure development assistance.

    In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE developed a
    prioritization model that ranked countries as high, medium, and low
    risk.18 To date, DOE has initiated work in 49 of the countries identified
    as priorities for assistance. Our analysis showed that DOE attempted to
    initiate efforts to secure radiological sources in 31 high-priority, 17
    medium-priority and one low-priority country. Consequently, about 40
    percent of countries receiving assistance do not represent the
    highest-priority countries. According to DOE officials, medium and
    low-priority countries---more than one-third of the total in DOE's
    program--were selected because these countries had expressed a willingness
    to receive assistance.

    We found a variety of problems and challenges that affected DOE's ability
    to implement its program in several of the countries targeted for
    assistance. These included, among other things, problems with foreign
    contractor performance and lack of adequate physical infrastructure to
    support security upgrades. DOE officials said that various combinations of
    these and other impediments resulted in delays implementing security
    upgrades in about 75 percent of all countries participating in the
    program. DOE also stated that many of these problems were identified and
    corrected during quality assurance visits by DOE inspection teams.

    18In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE first assessed the
    vulnerability of radiological sources in 191 countries. Based on this
    assessment, DOE determined that 100 of these countries were a high
    priority and were targeted for assistance. Within the 100 countries, DOE
    further refined the priority list and ranked countries as either high,
    medium, or low priority.

    Contractor performance emerged as a key challenge. Six DOE officials told
    us that contractor performance and selection of reputable, reliable
    in-country contractors was critical to successful project implementation.
    DOE asserted that it has to maintain flexibility in selecting foreign
    contractors because most of the countries do not follow normal Western
    business practices. In DOE's view, problems arising from contractor
    performance resulted from "security culture" and language barriers, which
    caused miscommunication. Some problems we found with reliable in-country
    contractors included the following:

               o In Bulgaria, a contractor installed steel security doors--which
               protected radiological sources--with the hinges on the outside of
               the door. As a result, a potential transgressor could have
               unhinged the door and accessed the sources;
               o In Kazakhstan, a contractor provided security manuals and
               procedures for newly installed equipment in English instead of the
               native language. As a result, DOE officials found that the
               hospital staff had not changed the security codes and were not
               well versed in proper security procedures; and
               o In Georgia, hospital staff told us that the contractor did not
               train them on operating the alarm systems.

               DOE did, however, report working with competent contractors in
               Poland, Lithuania, and Egypt that resulted in timely project
               implementation. DOE project managers for these countries told us
               that contractors conducted adequate training and followed up with
               security upgrades maintenance.

               Several DOE officials told us that implementing security upgrades
               also presented challenges due to inadequate physical
               infrastructure. In these countries, the types of challenges
               included lack of reliable electricity, a backup power source, and
               telecommunications at sites containing radiological sources. For
               example, in both Nicaragua and Tanzania, DOE officials said that
               frequent power outages diminished the detection capability of
               security alarms installed and that neither country had a backup
               source of power to operate the security alarms and security
               lighting provided by DOE.

    			  DOE Has Not Developed a Plan to Ensure the Long-Term Sustainability
    			  of Physical Security Upgrades

               DOE has not developed an adequate comprehensive strategy to better
               ensure that physical security upgrades that have been installed,
               and the security training that has been provided, will be
               effectively sustained over the long term. DOE's current guidance
               states that DOE will sustain upgrades by providing countries with
               a 3-year warranty on newly installed security equipment and
               preventative maintenance contracts, as well as providing training
               on newly installed equipment for operational staff at the sites.
               However, DOE has not formulated a long-term sustainability plan
               that identifies expected completion dates for each country,
               including an exit strategy, and approaches for sustaining
               upgrades, including how host countries will financially continue
               maintenance of upgrades following DOE warranty expiration. In
               fact, a senior DOE official told us that responsibility for
               drafting and implementing long-term sustainability should be that
               of the host country. Furthermore, DOE has not adequately addressed
               the lack of regulatory infrastructure to provide oversight of
               source security in a majority of countries to receive DOE
               assistance.

               DOE officials responsible for program implementation said that
               they were uncertain that security upgrades installed would be
               sustained by countries once DOE assistance was no longer
               available. In fact, our analysis showed that these officials had
               confidence that the security upgrades would be sustained in only
               25 percent of the countries. Specifically, officials pointed out
               that countries, such as Bangladesh or Tajikistan, would be
               unlikely to sustain upgrades because they do not have the
               resources to maintain the equipment and have not identified or
               allocated funding to maintain them beyond the 3-year warranty
               period. In addition, several host-country officials with whom we
               met expressed similar concerns. For example, hospital
               administrators in three countries told us that hospital budgets
               were already strained and that they could not be certain that
               funding would be available once the warranties expired. Moreover,
               hospital administrators told us it was difficult to estimate the
               level of resources needed to sustain the upgrades because DOE had
               not provided them with future maintenance costs.

               Several sites that received DOE upgrades have already experienced
               maintenance problems. For example, in Georgia, we found that a
               storage facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which has
               thousands of curies of a cesium-137 source--had several large
               openings in the roof. When we asked host government officials
               about the cause of the openings, they stated that a recent storm
               had shifted the metal sheets covering the storage facility's roof.
               The officials did not state when the roof would be fixed or how
               funds would be allocated for the repair. In addition, we found
               that surveillance monitors were not being used at a medical
               facility. In fact, according to the hospital staff, the monitors,
               which were not broken, had been turned off for several days.

               In Lithuania we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the
               security cable, used to secure a teletherapy machine's cobalt-60
               source, had been broken for almost a month. According to a DOE
               physical protection specialist, the cable was the most important
               security feature because it triggered an alarm directly connected
               to the teletherapy machine's "head," which contains the
               radiological source. According to DOE, this was subsequently
               corrected as part of program assurance procedures. In addition, in
               Poland, we visited a research facility containing a 22,000 curie
               irradiator. We observed that the motion detection device in the
               room housing the irradiator was not working because of the high
               level of radioactivity present. According to the in-country
               contractor, the device had been disabled at least three times
               since the equipment was installed about a year earlier. Figure 5
               shows the temporary storage facility with large openings in the
               roof, and figure 6 shows the broken cable at the oncology clinic.

               Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator
               with Holes in the Roof

               Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic

               In addition to maintenance problems, we also found that a lack of
               adequate training on newly installed equipment further raised
               questions about the long-term success of the program. According to
               the hospital staff at a facility in Georgia, they had not received
               adequate training from the in-country contractor on how to operate
               the installed alarm systems. We found similar problems in other
               countries we visited. For example, at some of the hospitals,
               security codes allowing entry into rooms where sources were
               located had not been changed on a regular basis. Also, at one
               medical site, more than 50 staff had access to the security code
               for a room storing a radiological source of about 1,250 curies. A
               DOE physical security specialist reported that the security code
               had not been changed from the default settings in at least three
               FSU countries. Furthermore, this specialist noted that staff in
               charge of protecting the equipment had copied security access
               codes onto checklists that were readily accessible to unauthorized
               staff in about 15 countries.

               According to DOE, another key element of sustaining security of
               sources is having an organized, competent guard force. In general,
               the guard force serves as a critical communications link between
               the facility staff and the response force. We found that several
               of the 49 countries did not possess adequate guard or response
               forces, and in several cases, the guard forces in these countries
               were untrained and unarmed. Specifically, at one site that DOE
               upgraded, the guard with whom we spoke was unarmed and had no
               viable form of communication in the case of an emergency. At the
               same site, the guard told us that he shared responsibility for
               site security with an individual who served as a guard on a
               part-time basis in exchange for being able to live at the site.
               Moreover, we found that the absence of a reliable source of
               electricity made it difficult to complete and ensure the
               sustainability of alarms and motion detection devices in some of
               the countries receiving upgrades. For example, both Ecuador and El
               Salvador have limited telephone line access. As a result,
               according to DOE, the local guard forces could not be contacted
               immediately after an alarm was triggered at a site containing
               radiological sources. Consequently, security alarms installed in
               lesser developed countries may have marginal long-term impact.

               At some of the facilities we visited, there appeared to be a well
               trained guard force equipped with flashlights, radios,
               walkie-talkies, or cell phones. However, we also found that even
               at locations where improved security systems were in place, only a
               single guard was present and had no reliable method of contacting
               a response force. In these types of situations, according to DOE,
               the site is very vulnerable to theft. At one facility in
               Lithuania, we were told that the police were located about 30
               minutes from the site. At that facility, we observed that the
               guards were not equipped with guns, and officials were not sure
               they were always present. However, DOE did fund remote monitoring
               equipment, which allowed the local police force to view the site
               24 hours per day from the police station.

               According to IAEA experts and at least five DOE and NRC senior
               level officials, a strong and independent nuclear regulatory
               authority that is able to provide effective radiological source
               oversight is critical to program sustainability. A key function of
               a nuclear regulatory body is to establish procedures for the
               control of radiological sources, including the development of a
               basic registry of sources. The absence of reliable registries in
               many countries impeded DOE's ability to identify a comprehensive
               list of sites to upgrade. Also, the absence of such a list
               complicates DOE's ability to determine when it has completed its
               program in a particular country. More specifically, DOE physical
               security specialists told us that sources that had been identified
               and inventoried at various hospitals were subsequently moved to
               another location within the facility or are no longer being used.
               Consequently, some of the upgrades that DOE installed had limited
               security impact, or DOE has had to fund additional upgrades for
               the same source.

               We previously reported that DOE was focusing its source security
               program too narrowly on physical security upgrades and not taking
               into account respective countries' long-term needs to develop
               better nuclear regulatory infrastructures.19 DOE recognized the
               critical role of regulatory infrastructure development midway
               through the program and subsequently added a small regulatory
               infrastructure development component that is designed to support
               the creation and strengthening of effective and sustainable
               national regulatory infrastructures. DOE officials told us that
               the department's regulatory infrastructure development efforts are
               meant to complement the more comprehensive efforts of IAEA. In
               1994, IAEA established a "model project" program to enhance
               countries' regulatory capacity, and the program was available to
               any member state upon request. IAEA continues to provide a variety
               of regulatory infrastructure support services and training to both
               member and nonmember states to support radiological source
               security and safety.

               The director of the IRTR program said that the long-term impact of
               DOE's program would likely have been enhanced had there been a
               stronger regulatory infrastructure in place to support the
               recommended security upgrades efforts in many of the countries.
               However, many countries participating in the IRTR
               program--specifically lesser developed countries--lack an
               independent regulator. According to IAEA, as many as 110 countries
               worldwide lacked the regulatory infrastructure to adequately
               protect or control sealed sources as of 2003.

    			  DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological
    			  Sources Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because
    			  of an Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials

               As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to
               implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other
               things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites
               containing radiological sources and to install physical security
               upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors,
               motion sensors and surveillance cameras. Russia received almost
               one-third of total DOE funding--about $33 million--which focused
               primarily on orphan source recovery, RTG removal and disposal and
               physical security upgrades at waste storage facilities. However,
               one-fourth of total expenditures--about $26.5 million--paid for
               program planning activities such as development of program
               guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting
               studies. The program has also carried over large balances of
               unspent, unobligated funds each fiscal year since its inception in
               2002, because of, among other things, large supplemental
               appropriations at the onset of the program and systemic delays in
               project implementation. DOE officials told us that securing
               radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority than
               securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and
               highly enriched uranium. As a result, DOE reduced funding for
               radiological security activities and future funding for the
               program is uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE
               may be unable to meet outstanding contractual commitments to
               maintain the more than $40 million in upgrades already installed.

    			  DOE Expenditures Have Focused Primarily on Physical Security
    			  Upgrades and Recovering Lost or Abandoned Sources; However, About
    			  $26.5 Million Has Been Spent on Program Planning Activities

               As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to
               implement the IRTR program. A majority of this money--$68
               million--was spent to (1) physically secure sites containing
               radiological sources; (2) locate, recover, and dispose of lost or
               abandoned sources; and (3) help countries draft laws and
               regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In
               addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities
               to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member
               states. However, one-fourth of the total budget--about $26.5
               million--was spent on program planning activities not directly
               attributed to a specific country, such as hiring private
               consultants, and building a database for international law
               enforcement officials. Table 3 provides a breakdown of DOE program
               expenditures.

    19 [31]GAO-03-638 .

    Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August 31,
    2006

    Dollars in
    thousands
                                                              FY 2006
                                                             (through  Total (and
                                                           August 31,  percentage
                          FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005       2006)   of total)
    Physical security                                                  $42,895
    upgrades                $0  $4,348 $10,497 $15,210     $12,840       (40%)
    Orphan source
    recoverya                0     878   8,069   9,633       4,342 22,922 (21)
    Regulatory
    infrastructure
    support                  0       0     375     757         913   2,045 (2)
    IAEA                 3,000     684   4,170   5,098         460 13,412 (13)
    Strategic
    development          3,821   3,524   5,436   5,466       3,702 21,949 (20)
    All other program
    activitiesb              0       0   2,582   1,327         596   4,505 (4)
    Total               $6,821  $9,434 $31,129 $37,491     $22,853    $107,728

    Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.

    aIncludes Russia Orphan Source Recovery and Global Search and Secure
    programs (GSSP).

    bIncludes DOE-funded consultant reports and development of program
    protocol, guidelines, and standards.

    Physical security upgrades to secure sites containing radiological sources
    accounted for the largest program expenditure--almost $43 million. The
    majority of DOE-funded upgrades were at hospitals and oncology clinics.
    DOE also funded upgrades at other types of facilities that utilize or
    store radiological sources and materials, including waste storage
    facilities, commercial and industrial facilities, and other research
    institutes. While DOE estimates that costs for each facility type range
    from $15,000 to secure a medical facility to $50,000 to secure a waste
    storage facility, actual expenditures for securing sites varied based on
    factors such as regional labor rates, conditions of existing
    infrastructure, and remoteness of location.

    DOE officials stated that cost estimates of upgrade projects included
    vulnerability assessments, equipment costs and installation, and warranty
    contracts covering equipment maintenance for three years. DOE physical
    security specialists conducted vulnerability assessments to identify
    security weaknesses at facilities, including adequacy of the local guard
    force, exposed windows and doors, and access to sources. In some
    instances, mostly at lower-risk sites, DOE authorized contractors
    responsible for equipment installation to conduct these assessments with
    direction from DOE. The contractors provided DOE with reports and
    photographs that summarized findings and proposed recommended upgrades.
    Types of upgrades installed varied based on assessment findings and host
    country laws and policies, but standard equipment packages consisted
    mostly of hardened windows and doors; motion sensors and alarms; access
    control systems, such as coded keypads or swipe card entry; security
    cameras; and video monitoring. At some sites, DOE also provided guard
    forces with enhanced communication equipment, including radios and mobile
    panic buttons that send emergency signals to local police or security
    companies. Installation costs also included training for on-site personnel
    that would be responsible for operating the equipment.

    Costs of physical security upgrades also included 3-year warranty
    contracts that cover maintenance costs, such as the cost of remote
    monitoring and spare parts. DOE officials told us that contracts are
    negotiated with contractors responsible for equipment installation and
    require that countries receiving assistance assume the costs of sustaining
    the equipment no later than three years after the upgrades have been
    installed. For the duration of the warranty period, DOE estimated that, on
    average, it would cost $40,000 per country, per year to maintain
    equipment.20 This estimate includes sending one DOE team per country, per
    year to conduct assurance visits, any equipment contractors have to
    replace, and costs of remote monitoring systems.

    DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation detection
    equipment and training to locate and recover lost or abandoned
    radiological sources and secure them in interim or permanent storage
    facilities. DOE has two programs to support orphan source recovery
    efforts--the Russian Orphan Source Recovery program, which is focused
    solely in Russia, and the Global Search and Secure Program, which includes
    search and recovery efforts in other countries receiving DOE assistance.
    More than 80 percent of orphan source recovery expenditures were spent in
    Russia--about $19 million. To support GSSP, DOE spent $4 million in 11
    countries--Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
    Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Philippines, Romania, Tajikistan, and Tanzania. These
    funds were spent primarily to provide countries with (1) standard packages
    of equipment such as hand-held radiation detection monitors and
    characterization instruments to properly identify recovered sources; (2)
    training workshops on the appropriate use of the equipment; and (3)
    physical security upgrades at some facilities storing recovered or
    disposed sources.

    20Number of sites and types of upgrades installed vary per country, and
    warranty costs may vary accordingly.

    In addition, DOE spent about $2 million in ten countries (Bulgaria,
    Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Philippines,
    Thailand, and Vietnam) to help develop national standards and regulations
    for the control and accounting of radiological sources. A majority of
    these funds were spent in the United States--$1.8 million--to develop a
    set of security-based regulations to be utilized by countries with limited
    resources and inadequate radiological source inventories. Once countries
    drafted an initial set of regulations, DOE experts reviewed drafts and
    provided feedback and proposals for improvement. DOE also provided
    training workshops and seminars on appropriate regulatory inspection
    practices for radiological source controls and accounting. In particular,
    DOE has been working with regional partners, such as the Australian
    Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO), to implement many of
    its regulatory development activities.21 For example, DOE and ANSTO have
    conducted regulatory development training workshops for countries located
    in East Asia and the Pacific region.

    DOE also provided about $13.5 million to IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund to
    support efforts to strengthen controls over sources with IAEA member
    states, including technical training on fundamental principles and
    objectives of radiological source security. IAEA established the fund,
    which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries,
    after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.22 The fund is designed
    to improve nuclear security in IAEA member states by helping countries to
    protect their nuclear and radiological materials and facilities.
    Specifically, DOE funded IAEA missions that carried out safety and
    security assessments at sites identified by member states containing
    vulnerable radiological sources. Additionally, DOE contributions to IAEA
    supported training conferences and other advisory services. DOE funds also
    enabled IAEA to transport several high-risk sources to secure storage
    facilities and provide conditioning equipment to prepare recovered sources
    for disposal.

    21ANSTO operates Australia's nuclear facilities and conducts nuclear
    research for the Australian government.

    22For more information on IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, see Nuclear
    Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear
    Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, [32]GAO-06-93
    (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005).

    Finally, DOE spent one-fourth of total program expenditures--about $26.5
    million--on activities not directly attributed to a specific country.
    Specifically, these costs included, among other things, program planning
    activities such as the development of program guidance documents. For
    example, DOE hired an outside contractor to conduct a review of the
    radiological source security program and to help DOE develop a plan to
    guide future efforts. The contractor spent several months interviewing
    agency officials and program staff to assess the strengths and weaknesses
    of the program and the level of DOE coordination with State, NRC, and
    IAEA. The final report provided recommendations to improve coordination
    with other U.S. agencies and within DOE. In addition, DOE spent $1.5
    million of these funds to facilitate an information exchange with
    Interpol, an international agency that coordinates the law enforcement
    activities of the national police bureaus in each of its member states, in
    order to obtain information about international arrests involving theft or
    smuggling of radiological materials. DOE's intent was to provide Interpol
    the capacity to contribute law-enforcement data into DOE's database, which
    contains country-specific information regarding, among other things,
    criminal activity. Funds provided to Interpol paid for computers and
    software and the salaries for two staff located at Interpol headquarters
    in Lyon, France, to set up and operate the database for two years. A DOE
    program manager expressed concern about whether providing funds to
    Interpol would provide tangible results or increase the effectiveness of
    the radiological sources program. This program manager questioned whether
    the Interpol project contributed to the program's core objectives of
    securing the highest risk, highest priority sources in other countries.

    A senior DOE official told us that these funds--identified by DOE as
    strategic development and program integration funds--were established at
    the onset of the program and were intended to carry out activities not
    directly related to country-specific physical security upgrade projects
    and initiatives. This official added that in the early stages of the
    program, expenditures of this type focused primarily on strategic
    planning, developing program technical documents and processes, conducting
    studies, and developing a database of regional country information to
    support program objectives.

    While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia received the
    largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of total program
    expenditures. DOE's cost manager for the IRTR program reported that
    expenditures in Russia supported three primary program components: (1)
    orphan source recovery efforts ($18.5 million); (2) RTG removal and
    disposal, including alternative energy source development ($7 million);
    and (3) physical security upgrade projects, including waste repository
    sites ($7.5 million). The 13 other FSU countries received a total of about
    $11 million, with Ukraine being the largest recipient, receiving about
    $3.5 million. In addition, about 65 percent of DOE expenditures in FSU
    countries was spent in these countries for services, equipment, and
    materials that were used to improve physical security.

    By comparison, DOE spent significantly less outside the FSU, and
    expenditures in these countries were both modest by comparison and
    disproportionately spent in the United States by DOE's national
    laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead costs.23 For
    example, the 35 non-FSU countries received a total of about $17 million,
    or just 28 percent of total country-specific expenditures.24 Two-thirds of
    funds spent for non-FSU countries were spent in the United States.
    Furthermore, five countries in Africa received no in-country expenditures.
    Although many countries in Africa have been defined as high-risk by DOE,
    countries in this region received a total of about $1.3 million, about
    two-thirds the amount spent in one European country--Poland. While
    expenditures in South America were more evenly divided between in-country
    costs and funds spent in the United States, the region received only about
    $3.5 million spread among 12 countries.25 Figure 7 provides a regional
    breakout of these expenditures. Additionally, see appendix II for more
    details about regional and individual country expenditures for fiscal
    years 2002 through 2006.

    23DOE noted that some of the FSU countries that received DOE assistance
    had comparatively larger infrastructure problems than that of several
    non-FSU countries and, in some cases, higher labor rates; and therefore,
    project implementation costs in the FSU countries were proportionally
    higher.

    24Of the $107.7 million in total program expenditures, $61.7 million could
    be traced to specific country-related expenditures.

    25DOE also has funds budgeted to be spent in Mexico, but to date, no funds
    have been expended.

    Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations

    DOE Has Consistently Carried Over Large Balances of Unspent and Unobligated
    Funds

    As of August 31, 2006, DOE had carried over almost $23 million in unspent
    or unobligated funds for the IRTR program from previous years. Moreover,
    the program consistently carried over a substantial uncosted balance each
    fiscal year throughout the life of the program. For example, for fiscal
    years 2003 through 2005, the program carried over uncosted funds totaling
    $27.4 million, $34.1 million, and $22.4 million, respectively. According
    to the program's director, a majority of carryover balances were due to,
    among other things, large supplemental appropriations at the onset of the
    program and delays in implementing security upgrade projects. As we
    reported in 2004, large carryover balances are not uncommon in DOE nuclear
    nonproliferation programs--especially in Russia--because of, among other
    things, difficulties in negotiating and executing contracts and the
    multiyear nature of programs.26 Table 4 shows DOE total budget and
    uncosted balances for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.27

    Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006

    Dollars
    in
    thousands
                                                                               Uncosted
    Fiscal    Appropriated                      Funds        Total    Uncosted  balance
    year             funds Fundsobligated unobligated expenditures obligations forwarda
    2002           $20,555        $11,799     $11,756       $6,821      $4,978  $16,733
    2003            38,000         15,463      21,359        9,433       6,030   27,389
    2004            36,000         48,020      17,235       31,128      16,892   34,127
    2005            24,800         49,681      10,219       37,492      12,189   22,407
    2006
    (through
    Aug. 31,
    2006)           24,078         33,977      11,832       22,853      11,125   22,957
    Total         $143,433       $107,727

    Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.

    Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

    aUncosted balance forward is equal to funds unobligated plus uncosted
    obligations.

    26GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's Plutonium
    Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain,
    [33]GAO-04-662 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004).

    27In December 2006, DOE provided GAO with cost data updated as of the end
    of fiscal year 2006 reflecting total program expenditures as $113.8
    million and total carryover as $17.7 million.

    DOE's Budget for Radioactive Source Security Has Been Reduced, and Future
    Program Funding Is Uncertain

    DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding since 2003, and DOE
    officials expect further reductions over the next several years.
    Specifically, DOE's internal budget allotments for the IRTR program have
    gone from a high of $38 million in fiscal year 2003 to $24 million in
    fiscal year 2006. According to a senior DOE official, priorities within
    GTRI, which funds DOE's nuclear and radiological threat reduction efforts,
    have shifted, and future funding will be redirected to, among other
    things, securing special nuclear material, such as plutonium and highly
    enriched uranium (HEU). In particular, DOE has assigned the highest budget
    priority to three specific GTRI elements that address the threats posed by
    an attack using an improvised nuclear device: the (1) Reduced Enrichment
    for Research and Test Reactors program, (2) Russia Research Reactor Fuel
    Return program, and (3) Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
    program. The goal of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
    program is to get research reactors around the world to convert from HEU
    to low enriched uranium with conversion of all U.S. civilian research
    reactors to be completed by 2014. The Russia Research Reactor Fuel Return
    and Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programs are designed
    specifically for returning HEU to the United States or Russia and are
    expected to be completed by 2013 and 2019, respectively.28

    In contrast, other GTRI elements, including the IRTR program, do not have
    presidential commitment dates for completion and, as a result, are lower
    priorities for funding. DOE's Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, told us that DOE initially placed a high
    priority on securing radiological material and the Secretary of Energy
    made a personal commitment to this activity. More recently, because of
    budget reductions affecting the entire agency, DOE has had to review and
    evaluate program priorities. This official noted that while the likelihood
    of a dirty bomb attack is much greater than a nuclear attack, the
    consequences in terms of loss of life and the overall catastrophic impact
    of the latter would be much greater. He also noted that, if given a
    choice, he would place more emphasis on securing radiological sources in
    the United States than in other countries. In his view, there is still a
    significant amount of work to be done to secure radiological sources in
    the United States.

    28For more information on these programs, see GAO, Nuclear
    Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of
    Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, [34]GAO-04-807
    (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004), and GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE
    Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable
    Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia,
    [35]GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004).

    Future anticipated reductions in funding for the IRTR program will have
    significant implications for the amount of sources that can be secured in
    other countries. DOE's initial target for program completion was to secure
    1,500 high-priority sites in 100 countries by 2014. This goal assumed that
    the program would receive $25 million per year over the life of the
    program. DOE officials told us that currently projected budget reductions
    may jeopardize the program's ability to fund even the existing warranty
    contracts applied to physical security upgrades already installed.
    Moreover, DOE has not determined the extent to which the program will fund
    warranties for future upgrade projects meaning countries will need to
    assume greater financial responsibility for sustaining upgrades. However,
    DOE officials who are responsible for project implementation told us they
    lacked confidence that a majority of countries would be able to maintain
    upgrades without further DOE assistance, mostly because many recipients do
    not have adequate resources. For example, DOE officials responsible for
    project implementation said that neither Ukraine nor Tajikistan, where DOE
    has spent a total of about $3.5 million, has identified resources for
    radiological source security once DOE warranties expire.

    In addition, DOE has not fully addressed the cost implications of the
    increased levels of physical security required by the new design basis
    threat assigned to radiological sources under GTRI's reorganization.
    Although DOE's new program guidance says that the radiological security
    upgrades strategy will continue to focus on inherently sustainable,
    low-cost upgrades, it specifically states that the revised threat scenario
    significantly increases the threat that physical security upgrades must
    withstand. As a result, the new guidance states that upgrades will need to
    be significantly enhanced to meet the new threat level. DOE officials have
    raised concerns regarding DOE's ability to sustain low-cost upgrades
    already installed. In light of the program's ongoing budget reductions,
    the new guidance raises further concern regarding DOE's ability to sustain
    the increased cost of enhanced upgrades for future projects.

    To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek
    international contributions to secure radiological sources in other
    countries. DOE officials said that several countries, including, Canada,
    Japan and Norway, have inquired about contributing funds directly to GTRI
    but that, until recently, DOE had no authority to accept direct financial
    support from international partners for GTRI activities or to use funds
    received outside of the normal appropriations process. In October 2006,
    Congress authorized DOE to enter into agreements, with the concurrence of
    State, to receive contributions from foreign countries and international
    organizations for IRTR and other GTRI programs, and to use those
    contributed funds without fiscal year limitation.29 Additionally, Russian
    officials told us that because of the importance of the IRTR program, they
    are interested in providing increased financial commitments to secure
    radiological sources. In particular, the Deputy Head of the Russian Radon
    waste storage facilities, known officially as the Federal Agency for
    Construction and Utilities, told us that the organization would be willing
    to make a sizeable contribution to Radon upgrades. DOE officials stated
    that international source security is not the sole responsibility of the
    United States government and that increased foreign cooperation will be
    necessary to complete program objectives.

    Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces Coordination
    Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide

    DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological
    sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has
    involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction
    activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the
    agencies.30 However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently
    and coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent.
    Moreover, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple
    programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and
    nuclear materials in other countries and, at times, this has resulted in
    conflicting or overlapping efforts. DOE has improved coordination with
    IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological sources and
    has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member
    states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. DOE funding to IAEA
    has supported, among other things, IAEA missions to assess the safety and
    security of sites containing radiological sources and IAEA-sponsored
    training programs and regional workshops focusing on radiological source
    security. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and
    IAEA, and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE's ability to
    target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid
    possible duplication of efforts.

    29John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
    Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, S 3113 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
    S 2569). Contributions from foreign countries to DOE's nuclear
    nonproliferation programs are not without precedent. Section 3135 of the
    Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
    authorized the Secretary of Energy to accept international contributions
    for the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP).
    Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 2170 (2004). Since fiscal year 2005, the
    EWGPP has received $25.5 million from the United Kingdom, Canada,
    Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea to support the closure of Russian
    plutonium production reactors by building or refurbishing replacement
    fossil fuel plants.

    30 [36]GAO-03-638 .

    DOE Has Improved Efforts to Coordinate Its Program Activities, but
    Governmentwide Coordination Is Inconsistent

    In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC and has
    taken steps to work more collaboratively with U.S. agencies to secure
    radiological sources in other countries. An example of improved U.S.
    coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological source
    regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support of DOE and
    NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source
    Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a radiological regulatory
    infrastructure in Iraq. State and DOE provided IRSRA with equipment,
    training, technical assistance, and funding to help the new agency assume
    increased responsibility for establishing radiological source regulations
    and procedures consistent with international standards.31 Specifically,
    with funding and logistical support from DOE, State coordinated several
    meetings in Amman, Jordan, in 2004 and 2005 to provide IRSRA personnel
    training by IAEA staff. These meetings resulted in the development of new
    Iraqi laws and regulations for the regulation, transport, import and
    export of radiological sources, including physical security requirements.
    DOE experts reviewed draft Iraqi laws and regulations for their relevance
    to the security of radiological sources, and NRC provided guidance for
    developing import and export controls for radiological sources. State also
    funded procurement of mobile radiation detection equipment so that Iraqi
    regulatory personnel can survey various cities to search for orphaned
    radiological sources. This equipment, provided by DOD's Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency, included radiological handling, measurement, and
    protective equipment, such as radiation meters, respirators, and
    protective clothing. Hand-held radiation equipment from DOE has also been
    transferred to Iraqi agencies for border monitoring. DOE experts also
    trained IRSRA officials and personnel on how to conduct vulnerability
    assessments.

    31For more information on U.S. efforts to secure radiological sources in
    Iraq, see Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source
    Recovery Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions,
    [37]GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).

    Finally, to financially support IRSRA's efforts, State provided a portion
    of $1.25 million in funding from its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
    (NDF),32 to IAEA for training and other assistance to IRSRA, including an
    IAEA review of Iraq's draft laws and regulations.33 State also used a
    portion of this funding to purchase a specially equipped vehicle that can
    be driven through neighborhoods to detect unsecured radiological sources.
    DOE and State officials told us that although the Iraq project is a unique
    circumstance, it is an example of improved U.S. government coordination to
    strengthen controls over radiological sources and could provide a model
    for future efforts.

    Although coordination among the agencies has improved, these efforts have
    been inconsistent and there is no comprehensive governmentwide approach to
    securing radiological sources overseas. We reported in 2003 that DOE's
    efforts to secure sources in other countries had not been well coordinated
    with those of other U.S. agencies. Specifically, DOE had not fully
    coordinated with State and NRC to leverage program resources, maximize
    available expertise, avoid potential duplication of efforts, and help
    ensure the program's long-term success. We also recommended that DOE take
    the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to strengthen
    controls over sources in other countries. In response to our report, DOE
    hired a consultant to determine, among other things, whether gaps exist in
    agency program activities with respect to securing radiological sources
    worldwide and what role and responsibilities DOE should assume in
    coordinating U.S. government efforts.

    In December 2004, the consultant reported that although DOE had addressed
    many of its issues with State and NRC, more effective coordination was
    needed. Moreover, the consultant stated that the lack of effective
    coordination among these agencies posed the greatest potential for
    conflict, as a result of differing mandates and conflicting philosophical
    approaches to radiological source security. Specifically, effective and
    systematic coordination between U.S. agencies has been impeded at times
    because individual agency missions differ and, as a result, agency efforts
    have been, at times, at odds with one another. For example, the consultant
    reported that NRC had expressed concern that DOE's regulatory
    infrastructure development activities infringed on a decades-long NRC
    function. Furthermore, DOE is primarily concerned with security of sources
    while NRC has traditionally focused more on safety issues related to the
    use of sources. The report also concluded that the debate between DOE and
    NRC over the importance of the safety versus the security of radiological
    sources had negatively impacted effective coordination between the two
    agencies.

    32According to senior State officials, NDF is designed to permit rapid
    response to unanticipated or unusually difficult, high-priority
    requirements such as efforts to (1) halt the proliferation of nuclear,
    biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, related
    technologies, and other weapons; (2) destroy or neutralize existing
    weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional
    weapons; and (3) prevent the diversion of weapons-related scientific and
    technical expertise of the former Soviet Union.

    33In 2005, State also provided DOE $1.24 million from NDF to support DOE's
    search and secure program. These funds paid for the deployment of
    radiological detection and characterization equipment to several countries
    to search, locate, and consolidate high-risk radiological sources.

    DOE, State, and NRC have differed on, among other things, funding and
    implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities in
    other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC's Office of International
    Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to assist its regulatory
    counterparts in the FSU and countries of central and eastern Europe to
    enhance (1) existing laws, rules, and regulations governing use of
    radiological sources; (2) mechanisms used to track radiological sources,
    such as databases and registries; and (3) day-to-day regulatory oversight
    of sources. NRC stated in its request that DOE's physical security
    enhancements would not likely be sustained in the medium to long-term
    absent clear, enforceable regulatory requirements. Moreover, NRC sought to
    assist DOE by providing assistance to regulatory authorities in the FSU,
    where a majority of DOE's efforts were focused at the time.

    NRC officials noted that the biggest challenge they have faced has been
    identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding to support
    international assistance activities. NRC, unlike other U.S. government
    agencies, has largely relied upon other agencies--Departments of State,
    Energy and Defense--to support its international programs and is required
    by law to recover about 90 percent of its annual budget authority through
    licensing and inspection fees assessed on the U.S. nuclear industry.
    Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear industry has raised concerns about using NRC
    funds to support international assistance. Despite these funding
    limitations, NRC has a long history of supporting regulatory strengthening
    efforts in the countries of central and eastern Europe and the FSU. These
    efforts have included training other countries' regulators in all aspects
    of licensing and inspection procedures and developing a control and
    accounting system for nuclear materials.

    In July 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed that $5 million
    out of certain amounts appropriated to NNSA be made available to NRC for
    bilateral and international efforts to strengthen regulatory controls over
    radioactive sources that are at the greatest risk of being used in a dirty
    bomb attack.34 In September 2003, according to the Director of the NRC
    Office of International Programs, NRC and the Director of DOE's
    International Materials Protection, Control and Cooperation program
    reached an initial agreement in principle, whereby DOE would provide NRC
    with $1 million per year for 5 years to conduct regulatory activities in
    countries outside of Russia.

    According to DOE officials, the funds were never transferred because the
    Senate withdrew the direction to allocate the funds to NRC during
    conference negotiations because the House did not provide comparable
    language in its report. DOE officials added that the provision directing
    the transfer to NRC did not appear in the final conference report and was
    not included in the appropriation legislation. Furthermore, these
    officials added that DOE was directed by guidance received from House
    Energy and Water Development Subcommittee staff to not transfer the funds.
    According to a senior NRC official in the Office of International
    Programs, the conference report included a joint explanatory statement,
    which directed that allocations set forth in the House and Senate reports
    "should be complied with unless specifically addressed to the contrary in
    the conference report and statement of the managers."35 NRC asserts that
    this reinforced the intent of the original Senate report, and that without
    language to further clarify or to state otherwise, NRC should have
    received the funding as originally directed by the Senate Appropriations
    Committee. The conference report does not specifically address this
    funding issue.36

    In addition, in 2003, NRC requested $1 million from State to support
    radiological source-related regulatory strengthening activities in
    Ukraine. Specifically, NRC proposed to develop a national registry of
    radiological sources and strengthen Ukraine's overall radiological
    source-related laws, rules, and regulations. NRC chose Ukraine because of
    its relatively large inventory of high-risk radioactive sources; the
    stability of its existing nuclear regulatory infrastructure; and NRC's
    long-standing history of assisting Ukraine's nuclear regulatory authority,
    the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU). NRC requested
    funding for the Ukraine project from State's Nonproliferation and
    Disarmament Fund. The total cost of the project was estimated at $2.2
    million.

    34See S. Rep. No. 108-105, at 117 (July 17, 2003), accompanying S. 1424,
    the Senate version of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act
    for Fiscal Year 2004.

    35See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-357, at 45 (Nov. 7, 2003).

    36Although a committee report is not legally binding, it is viewed as
    expressing the will and intent of the relevant congressional committees.

    The original proposal, as approved by State, stated that the project's aim
    was to establish key elements of a national system to provide long-term
    security of high-risk radioactive sources in Ukraine by utilizing NRC's
    overall expertise and experienced contractor personnel. Furthermore, the
    proposal stated that because NRC and its contractors had been involved in
    an identical program in Armenia for the previous 2 years the effort in
    Ukraine would capitalize on those experiences, utilizing much of that
    background data and materials. However, managers for NDF projects
    ultimately decided that State would not use NRC resources and would
    undertake and manage the project itself, even though the agency had no
    prior experience in directly supporting regulatory infrastructure
    development in Ukraine. According to a State official, the agency made
    this decision because, among other things, NRC planned to hire a
    contractor--the Ukrainian State Scientific and Technical Center--to manage
    the project, which would have increased the project's overall cost by
    about 20 percent.37

    State officials said that their approach departed from that which was
    originally envisioned by NRC in the original proposal in many respects.
    However, the NDF has always reserved the right to implement its projects
    as it deems appropriate. These officials added that State chose to work
    directly with the Ukrainian regulator instead of the State Scientific and
    Technical Center because, among other things, the approach streamlined
    oversight and accountability for project performance and reduced overhead
    expenses. According to the NDF manager of the Ukraine project through
    October 2005, the Ukraine project experienced significant delays. However,
    State officials told us the project is currently on track. Following a
    November 30, 2006 meeting with State officials to discuss our draft
    report, State provided us a letter from the Deputy Chairperson for SNRCU
    dated December 4, 2006. The letter states that SNRCU views the Ukraine
    project as one of the most successful and efficient international
    assistance projects between the United States and Ukraine and that the
    project was implemented in the shortest possible time period.

    37NRC officials told us that for projects in Ukraine, NRC typically
    provides the regulatory expertise and contracts directly with the State
    Scientific and Technical Center to manage the completion of project tasks.

    Finally, State and NRC raised concerns when DOE with IAEA developed a set
    of draft regulations on the physical security of radiological sources.
    Although the draft regulations had not been through a formal IAEA review
    process, DOE had intended to distribute them during IAEA-sponsored
    training workshops to assist member states to strengthen regulatory
    controls over their sources. Specifically, NRC officials expressed
    significant concerns that DOE was planning to distribute unofficial
    guidance to countries that was in conflict with U.S. regulations. In a
    December 2004 memorandum to the Deputy Director General of Nuclear Safety
    and Security at IAEA, NRC stated that publishing interim guidance that had
    not been reviewed in advance, and as a result may need to be substantially
    modified, was neither efficient nor effective. State officials told us
    that their chief concern was the manner in which any such guidance would
    be construed abroad. These officials added that many of the specific
    problems associated with the original DOE draft guidance lie with internal
    issues regarding the process for reviewing security documents at IAEA. In
    addition, they said that concerns over the development of IAEA guidance on
    security of radioactive sources, which preceded development of the draft
    regulations, are long standing and that State has worked consistently with
    IAEA to develop and implement a consistent process for preparation and
    review of security guidance similar to the established process used by
    IAEA to develop safety guidance.

    Following informal discussions with State and NRC, DOE did work with the
    agencies to ensure that draft guidance was consistent with established
    domestic and international guidance and protocols. IAEA has since proposed
    a new Nuclear Security Series and review process, and the DOE draft
    regulations will now support a new IAEA Security Series document entitled
    "Security of Radioactive Sources," which was coordinated with State and
    NRC.

    Our 2003 report concluded that DOE has the primary responsibility for
    helping other countries to strengthen controls over their radiological
    sources. We recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a
    comprehensive governmentwide plan to accomplish this goal. In addition,
    DOE's consultant report stated that DOE, in its view, is the only U.S.
    government agency with the resources to focus solely on international
    source security. Similar to our recommendation, the consultant report
    recommended that DOE take the lead in adopting an interagency,
    site-specific approach to international radiological source security,
    including development of a long-term strategy that leveraged resources and
    leadership of other agencies. DOE officials said the department has not
    implemented these recommendations to initiate and lead a governmentwide
    plan for the security of radiological sources in other countries because
    it does not have the mandate to instruct other U.S. agencies on how to
    conduct their efforts, and other agencies' programs are not within DOE's
    control. However, DOE is currently taking steps, as part of the GTRI
    reorganization, to address several coordination issues within the
    department, including establishing regional points of contact to interface
    with other U.S. agencies to coordinate interagency efforts.

    DOE's Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Department, and Program
    Overlap Has Led to Inefficiencies

    The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately
    coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are
    responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other
    countries. As a result, these programs often worked at cross-purposes. For
    example, we visited a site in Poland that housed several nuclear
    facilities including a radiation waste management plant and Poland's
    nuclear research reactor. Country officials managing the site told us that
    DOE had conducted vulnerability assessments of each of the facilities, one
    of which stored several high-risk radiological sources as well as spent
    fuel from the research reactor. Although the material was collocated in
    the same storage facility, we observed that the sources had been secured
    in a locked cage by the IRTR program, but the spent fuel had no security
    and was being stored unprotected in underground canisters. Figure 8 shows
    secured radiological sources collocated with unsecured spent fuel
    contained in underground storage.

    Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and
    Unsecured Spent Fuel

    Polish officials told us that installation of DOE physical security
    upgrades at the site had been inconsistent and not adequately coordinated
    by DOE. Furthermore, security officials that had installed the physical
    security upgrades told us that the overall security in the facility was
    inadequate, given the types of nuclear and radioactive material being
    housed there. The director of the site said that he expressed concern to
    DOE about the lack of security of the spent nuclear fuel and requested
    similar upgrade improvements. However, he said that it was his
    understanding that DOE's radiological program was only authorized to fund
    radiological source security upgrades and not the security of spent
    nuclear fuel, which was the responsibility of DOE's nuclear security
    upgrades program.

    The director of the facility, and his staff, said that it was unclear to
    them why DOE could not concurrently secure nuclear and radiological
    material stored at the same site and what can and cannot be secured by
    different DOE entities. The director added that it sends the wrong signal
    to host country officials when DOE programs have such different security
    approaches and time frames for implementing security upgrades. Subsequent
    to our visit, DOE sent a letter to Polish government officials in March
    2006 offering to return to Poland and provide further DOE technical and
    financial support to protect the nuclear material stored at the facility.

    Within the IRTR program, different components of the program are led
    primarily out of two DOE national laboratories, and we found that the
    laboratories, at times, applied different approaches to securing
    radiological sources. For example, according to a senior DOE program
    manager, each laboratory employs its own physical security specialists and
    in turn, applies its own approach to conducting vulnerability assessments
    and selecting physical security upgrades. During our site visits, we
    observed that similar types of facilities varied in terms of the types of
    upgrades installed and that security measures were not standardized. For
    example, we toured numerous oncology clinics and found that, although they
    housed the same equipment and radiological sources, they had received
    different upgrades as a result of assessments conducted by different
    laboratory security specialists. Specifically, teletherapy units in
    certain countries had fiber optic cables attached to the sources that sent
    alarm signals if the device was tampered with. Security specialists
    traveling with us at those sites told us that the cable was the key
    security feature for this type of device. However, during a meeting with a
    senior security specialist from a different laboratory, we were told that
    his teams do not install fiber optic cables as part of security upgrades
    to the same devices because the cables can break.

    We also found that DOE's IRTR program components are not well-coordinated.
    For example, more than one program manager told us that DOE had not
    consistently coordinated its orphan source recovery efforts or regulatory
    infrastructure development assistance with physical security upgrades.
    According to officials responsible for managing the majority of the
    program's physical security upgrade projects, IRTR program managers did
    not coordinate efforts that resulted in multiple visits to the same
    country. In their view, this caused confusion within the recipient
    countries because country officials had difficulty understanding why some
    parts of the same DOE program were being addressed separately. Officials
    from Sandia National Laboratories, the lead for GSSP, told us that
    projects were often implemented independently from physical security
    upgrade projects and that Sandia did not routinely coordinate its efforts
    with those of PNNL prior to initiating search and secure activities. PNNL
    officials, who brought this matter to our attention, concurred and stated
    that GSSP officials did not routinely consult with their physical security
    specialists prior to visiting countries with which PNNL had already
    established relationships.

    Furthermore, according to PNNL officials, DOE's regulatory infrastructure
    development team had visited several countries without coordinating with
    the physical security upgrade teams. According to a DOE program manager,
    host country officials were frequently uncertain whether these two
    components were part of the same program. According to PNNL, this
    fragmented approach created confusion and required them to explain to
    country officials that the program components were meant to complement one
    another. The lead official for regulatory infrastructure development
    activities told us that future visits would be better planned to ensure
    that an integrated approach to source security was undertaken.

    Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S.
    Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible for
    domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.-origin
    radiological sources in other countries. U.S. Radiological Threat
    Reduction program officials said there have been limited opportunities to
    share information or to assess the potential to coordinate international
    source recovery activities so as to leverage DOE resources. For example,
    the domestic program recently discovered a large quantity of unsecured
    radiological sources in South America. The sources were no longer in use
    and were inadequately secured. Officials managing DOE's domestic program
    informed IRTR mangers of the finding and the location of the sources.
    However, IRTR officials declined to immediately secure the sources because
    the country where they were discovered, which is considered high risk, is
    not scheduled for IRTR upgrades until 2011. As a result, the sources will
    remain unsecured until the international program completes upgrades in
    this country.

    In our discussions, DOE officials recognized that coordination within the
    department needed to be improved and that a comprehensive and consistent
    approach to threat reduction efforts between its nuclear and radiological
    programs should be established. They acknowledged that it was inefficient
    for multiple DOE teams to visit the same sites as part of different
    programs to address multiple threat reduction activities. To that end,
    DOE's recent reorganization of GTRI is designed to create a more
    streamlined structure that is organized geographically to address all
    threat reduction activities more effectively. Specifically, DOE plans to
    increase efficiency and improve coordination by (1) integrating multiple
    GTRI programs working in the same country or at the same sites; (2)
    redistributing workloads across the radiological and nuclear programs; and
    (3) improving relationships with host country officials by tailoring
    comprehensive strategies and incentives to more effectively meet unique
    country-specific conditions.

    Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps between DOE and
    IAEA Have Impeded DOE's Efforts to Target the Highest Priority Sites for
    Security Upgrades

    DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen
    controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed
    several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries
    around the world to support and share the agency's international efforts.
    IRTR's director told us that these partnerships have helped to foster
    increased awareness of the security of sources through country-specific
    training and regional workshops. For example, with the assistance of IAEA,
    DOE has established a partnership with the Australian Nuclear Science and
    Technology Organization through which DOE has increased opportunities to
    conduct physical security assessments and strengthen regulatory
    inventories of radiological sources in Southeast Asia. Specifically, ANSTO
    has identified and facilitated communication with several high-risk
    countries, which has helped DOE gain access to countries that DOE had
    difficulty initiating contact with, like Vietnam. DOE has also provided
    funding to support, among other things, IAEA-sponsored training programs
    and regional workshops focusing on radiological source security.

    DOE also coordinated with Russia and IAEA as part of the Tripartite
    Initiative to conduct physical security assessments and install upgrades
    at 102 sites in 13 FSU countries--Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
    Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan,
    Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The objective of the Tripartite Initiative was to
    improve the security of dangerous radioactive sources in the FSU. We noted
    in our 2003 report that, in its early stages, the Tripartite Initiative
    was not well planned, that initial efforts were ad hoc, and a more
    systematic approach to program activities was needed.38 However, an IAEA
    official recently told us that coordination with DOE has improved
    significantly as the program evolved.

    Despite the success of the Tripartite Initiative, critical information
    gaps exist between DOE and IAEA that impede DOE's ability to target the
    most vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. First,
    according to DOE, IAEA has not shared with them, the countries that IAEA
    considers the most in need of security assistance. Second, although DOE
    funds IAEA appraisal missions--known as Radiation Safety and Security
    Infrastructure Appraisals--to assess the weaknesses in radioactive source
    security in IAEA member states, IAEA does not provide DOE with the
    findings of these missions because member state information is considered
    country-sensitive and confidential. The objective of these missions is to
    evaluate, among other things, the quality of regulatory controls countries
    exercise over their radiological sources. Results of the appraisals are
    formalized into action plans that provide the framework for subsequent
    IAEA assistance to improve the security of sources. Because IAEA does not
    provide DOE with the results of the missions, DOE is unable to effectively
    prioritize those sites that the missions identified to be most vulnerable.
    DOE officials told us that the lack of country-specific information has
    been an ongoing problem that limits DOE's ability to effectively leverage
    its resources to maximize program impact and effectiveness.

    38 [38]GAO-03-638 .

    We also found that little coordination exits between DOE and the European
    Commission, which has resulted in the potential for overlap in assistance
    and duplication of efforts. Specifically, the EC provides financial
    support through IAEA, and on a bilateral basis, to secure radioactive
    sources in countries that are candidates for EU membership. EC officials
    told us that no formal communication exists with the United States on
    matters related to radioactive source security assistance, and as a
    result, each is largely unaware of the specific sites and locations the
    other is securing, or whether recipient countries are receiving too little
    or too much assistance. DOE officials told us that coordination with the
    EC has been conducted primarily at IAEA donor meetings.

    The EC has coordinated with IAEA to provide assistance to its member
    states to improve control over radiological sources. Specifically, the EC
    works jointly with IAEA on several action projects to strengthen the
    security of radiological materials used for nuclear and non-nuclear
    purposes, including upgrading regulatory infrastructures, installing
    physical security upgrades and, as appropriate, disposing of vulnerable
    radiological sources. As a result of these efforts, the EC has worked with
    IAEA in several regions, but has focused primarily on the Caucasus,
    Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Mediterranean countries.

    Conclusions

    DOE has achieved noteworthy accomplishments in improving the security of
    radiological sources at hundreds of sites in more than 40 countries. We
    recognize that DOE faces a considerable challenge in securing other
    countries' most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these
    sources and their widespread dispersal. However, when DOE decided to
    expand its program beyond securing sites in Russia and the FSU, it
    diverted a significant portion of its limited program funding away from
    securing the highest priority and most dangerous radiological sources.
    Instead of focusing increased attention on these highest priority threats,
    such as RTGs, DOE allocated significant program funding resources to
    securing medical facilities that, in our view--as well as several DOE
    officials associated with the program--pose considerably less threat to
    U.S. security interests. While many of the RTGs cannot be removed until
    alternate energy sources are developed to replace them, removing as many
    RTGs as possible, or securing them until they can be removed, should be a
    critical component of DOE's radiological threat reduction efforts.

    We believe that DOE's current reorganization of its nuclear and
    radiological threat reduction efforts is a step in the right direction
    toward improving the management of the program. However, there are still
    many significant management issues that need to be addressed and resolved.
    DOE has not paid adequate attention to the long-term sustainability of the
    equipment, which could jeopardize the significant investment made to
    improve the security of radiological sources in many countries. The
    security equipment and upgraded storage facilities funded by DOE will
    require a long-term commitment by the countries to help ensure their
    continued use and operation, and it is not clear to us that a sustained
    stream of funding will be made available by DOE or by recipient countries
    to maintain and/or replace aging or defective equipment. Moreover, there
    are continuing concerns that many of the countries do not have adequate
    nuclear regulatory infrastructures in place to promote sustainability.
    Without a comprehensive sustainability plan that adequately addresses a
    country's ability to reliably install and maintain upgrades and provide
    adequate oversight for source security, DOE risks losing a significant
    portion of its investment to improve the security of radiological sources
    in many countries. Furthermore, DOE's decision to increase physical
    security requirements for sites selected for upgrades, based on revised
    threat protection criteria, may have significant cost implications for a
    program that is already facing severe budget reductions. This raises
    concerns because DOE has not adequately evaluated the increased costs
    associated with its elevated threat protection criteria.

    This may also be an opportune time for DOE to streamline the program,
    particularly in light of budget reductions. We question, for example, how
    certain program activities, such as the development of the Interpol
    database, directly contribute to the program's core mission of securing
    radiological sources in other countries. There are other management issues
    that require DOE's attention. First, DOE has not developed meaningful
    performance measurements to demonstrate the extent to which the
    radiological threat has been reduced as a direct result of its efforts,
    including measuring the impact of training and distinguishing between the
    types of sources secured. Second, we recognize the pool of reliable
    contractors to implement security projects and provide adequate training
    may be limited in some countries. However, many project delays could be
    avoided in the future if DOE developed specific selection criteria or a
    set minimum standard for foreign contractor qualifications.

    Improving radiological source security is a shared responsibility. DOE's
    investment has been significant and reflects a commitment to addressing
    the problem. However, DOE should not underwrite the majority of the costs
    on behalf of the international community. Specifically, certain EU
    accession candidates and FSU countries, most prominently Russia, should be
    willing to contribute more resources to improve the security of dangerous
    and vulnerable sources in their own countries. In addition, DOE now has
    the authority to accept foreign contributions for GTRI programs from other
    interested countries, such as Canada, Japan, and Norway. However, gaps in
    communication between DOE and international partners, such as IAEA and the
    EC, significantly impede effective global radiological threat reduction.

    Finally, developing foreign countries' nuclear regulatory organizations is
    a well recognized and critical component in strengthening radiological
    source security worldwide. NRC has a long-standing history of promoting
    regulatory controls in the FSU and should, in our view, play a more
    prominent role in this regard. DOE's refusal to transfer $5 million from
    its appropriations to NRC to conduct regulatory development activities,
    despite the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, underscores
    NRC's limited ability to provide international assistance, while reliant
    on funding from other agencies. Most of the coordination problems we
    identified between NRC and other agencies could have been avoided if NRC
    had its own stream of predictable and reliable funding for international
    regulatory development, rather than having to rely on DOE or State for
    funds. However, without a direct appropriation, NRC will continue to
    depend on other agencies for funds, thus increasing the likelihood that
    similar problems will occur in the future.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest priority
    radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy
    and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take
    the following two actions:

               o Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing
               radiological sources that receive security upgrades to only those
               deemed as the highest-risk, and
               o To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many
               RTGs in Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of
               those remaining until they can be removed from service.

               Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the
               Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take
               the following seven actions to improve program management:

               o Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades
               that includes, among other things, future resources required to
               implement such a plan;
               o Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not
               directly contribute to securing the highest priority radiological
               sources in other countries;
               o Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated
               with increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat
               protection criteria and limit the number sites to receive
               increased security upgrades until such an analysis has been
               completed;
               o Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate
               real risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the
               number countries and sites that have received physical security
               upgrades;
               o Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection
               to help reduce potential project delays in the future;
               o Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place
               to maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by
               the United States; and
               o Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient
               countries, including Russia and EU accession countries.

               Finally, in an effort to improve coordination, the Secretary of
               Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
               Administration, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
               the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, should work
               with IAEA and European Commission officials to consider ways to
               systematically improve information sharing to maximize and
               leverage resources and institutional expertise.

    			  Matters for Congressional Consideration

               If the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure
               development is the key to the long-term sustainability of
               radiological source security efforts, it should consider providing
               NRC with authority and a direct appropriation to conduct these
               activities. The appropriation would be provided to NRC in lieu of
               providing the funds to DOE or another agency to reimburse NRC for
               its activities. Should the Congress decide to do so, NRC's efforts
               need to be fully coordinated with those of State, DOE, and IAEA.

    			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

               We provided DOE and NRC with draft copies of this report for their
               review and comment. DOE provided written comments, which are
               presented as appendix III. NRC's written comments are presented as
               appendix IV. NRC also provided technical comments, which we
               incorporated in the report. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with
               our matter for congressional consideration, which would provide
               NRC with the legal authority and a direct appropriation to conduct
               international regulatory activities for radiological source
               security. However, NRC stated that if Congress acts upon our
               matter for consideration, NRC would work closely with State,
               relevant executive branch agencies, and IAEA to implement the
               program.

               In its written comments, DOE agreed with our conclusion that the
               department faced a considerable challenge in securing other
               countries' most dangerous radiological sources, given the number
               of these sources and how widely dispersed they are. Furthermore,
               DOE stated that enormous amounts of dangerous material have not
               been secured, although the IRTR program has achieved a great deal
               of threat reduction in a short period of time. DOE stated that the
               recommendations were very helpful and would further strengthen its
               program.

               DOE also noted that it had measures in place--as a result of its
               reorganization of GTRI--to address program challenges and concerns
               that we raised, such as site prioritization; quality
               assurance/sustainability; coordination; and transportation. We
               recognized in the report that the reorganization of the program
               was a step in the right direction toward improving program
               management. However, as we noted in our report, many significant
               management issues still need to be addressed and resolved despite
               the reorganization. That is why we believe it was important to
               offer recommendations to improve program management and source
               prioritization efforts.

               In other comments, DOE stated that the IRTR program uses a number
               of factors to determine priority levels for the sites it selects
               to upgrade in addition to the amount of radioactivity contained in
               radiological sources. These other factors include (1) known
               terrorist threat in the country/region; (2) current level of
               security at the site; and (3) the proximity of the site in
               relationship to potential strategic targets of U.S. interest. In
               our report, we stated that site selection was based on a number of
               factors, including those specifically noted by DOE in its written
               comments. We also pointed out in our report that DOE's guidance on
               site selection has not clearly discriminated between the different
               sites secured and which sites were to be considered the highest
               priority. We are encouraged that DOE is explicitly linking its
               prioritization guidelines to a site's proximity to potential
               strategic targets of U.S. interest. However, it remains to be seen
               how consistently DOE will apply this criteria to its site
               selection process in the future. In a related comment, DOE stated
               that it will continue to accelerate RTG recoveries but must also
               address high priority medical and other sources. In our view, this
               action by DOE would be consistent with the key conclusions and
               recommendations in our report. Our recommendations specifically
               state that DOE should, to the extent possible, remove as many RTGs
               in Russia and limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing
               radiological sources that receive security upgrades to only those
               deemed to be the highest risk.

               With regard to quality assurance and program sustainability
               issues, DOE stated that it employs a standard process that ensures
               quality assurance for the security equipment that it installs.
               This process includes, among other things, conducting
               post-installation visits by technical experts for the purpose of
               assuring that all equipment and systems are installed as agreed
               upon. DOE also noted that despite these measures, it would further
               investigate its process to identify and implement additional
               improvements. We think DOE should take these steps because, as
               discussed in our report, we identified several problems with
               malfunctioning equipment and other maintenance problems at sites
               containing radiological sources. DOE also noted that it has a
               short-term sustainability program for every site that it upgrades
               that includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative
               maintenance contracts and training for operational staff. DOE
               believes that we should revise the report to indicate the
               existence of the 3-year warranty. Our report recognizes that DOE's
               program guidance calls for preventative maintenance contracts and
               training. We also noted that DOE provides a 3-year warranty, and
               we gave DOE credit for providing this coverage. Our main point
               remains--which DOE explicitly agreed with--that DOE has not
               developed a long-term sustainability plan for the equipment it has
               installed. Nevertheless, we clarified our report language, as
               appropriate, to state that DOE does have a short-term
               sustainability plan but has not developed a long-term plan to
               maintain the security upgrades completed.

               Regarding coordination, DOE cited numerous examples in its written
               comments of close cooperation with other U.S. government agencies,
               other DOE elements, and international partners on matters
               pertaining to international radiological source security. We
               believe the report fairly characterized DOE's coordination efforts
               in each of these areas. Specifically, we noted that DOE had
               improved coordination with State and NRC since we reported on this
               matter in 2003 and has increased information-sharing with the
               agencies. In addition, we believe our characterization of
               coordination problems within the department is correct. Our
               evaluation was based on information provided by an independent
               consultant's report as well as our own analysis of conditions we
               found within the department pertaining to inconsistent and, at
               times, inadequately coordinated efforts by different DOE programs
               responsible for threat reduction activities in the same country.
               As we noted in the report, DOE officials recognized that
               coordination within the agency needs to be improved and that a
               comprehensive and consistent approach to threat reduction efforts
               between nuclear and radiological threat reduction activities
               should be established. We also noted in the report that DOE's
               September 2006 reorganization of its GTRI efforts is designed to
               create a more streamlined structure that is organized along three
               geographic regions, which could improve program coordination.

               On a related matter, DOE stated that we should have given IAEA an
               opportunity to review and address some of the issues raised in our
               report about limited information sharing, which impeded DOE's
               ability to target the most vulnerable sites and countries for
               security improvements. Since this information was provided to us
               by DOE officials, it is unclear to us what benefit would have been
               achieved by providing a draft of this report to IAEA for review
               and comment of DOE's views. Our report notes that DOE has, despite
               some information-sharing problems with IAEA, improved coordination
               with the agency in recent years to strengthen controls over other
               countries' radiological sources.

               Finally, with regard to transportation of sources, DOE commented
               that, among other things, it had been working with the U.S.
               Department of Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor countries
               to strengthen transport security regulations. We added this
               information to our report based on DOE's comments. DOE also stated
               that it was working with Russia to enhance the security of
               radioactive materials, including providing cargo trucks and escort
               vehicles for the Moscow waste storage facility. We had already
               recognized this fact in the report. More broadly, however, we
               believe that the report accurately and fairly depicts the
               limitations of DOE efforts regarding transportation security. A
               primary source of information for our observation came directly
               from a DOE analysis--cited in the report--which concluded that the
               department was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc
               basis and that the existing method of providing transportation
               security had serious limitations and lacked a commitment to
               integrate transport security into all countries participating in
               the IRTR program.

               As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
               contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
               until 30 days from the report date. We will then send copies of
               this report to the Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of State;
               the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the
               Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Director, Office of
               Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We
               will also make copies available to others upon request. In
               addition, the report will be made available at no charge on the
               GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

               If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please
               contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov . Contact
               points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
               Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. Key
               contributors to this report include Erika D. Carter, Glen Levis,
               Mehrunisa Qayyum, Keith Rhodes (GAO's Chief Technologist), and Jim
               Shafer.

               Sincerely yours,

               Gene Aloise
    			  Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

               We focused our review primarily on the Department of Energy (DOE),
               since it is the lead federal agency for improving the security of
               radiological sources worldwide and provides significant funds for
               that purpose. We also performed work at the Nuclear Regulatory
               Commission (NRC) and Department of State (State) in Washington,
               D.C., which also provide assistance to help other countries secure
               their sealed radiological sources. In addition, we reviewed
               program-related activities and interviewed program officials from
               Argonne National Laboratory in Argonne, Illinois; the Los Alamos
               National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; Pacific Northwest
               National Laboratory in Richland, Washington; Sandia National
               Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico; the International Atomic
               Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria; and the European
               Commission (EC) in Brussels, Belgium. We also met with
               nongovernmental organizations, including, the Council on Foreign
               Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In
               November 2005, we attended the Trilateral Commission meeting held
               in the United Kingdom, which discussed international approaches to
               securing radiological sources against terrorism.

               We visited four countries to determine how DOE has implemented its
               program to secure radiological sources overseas. We selected these
               countries based on several criteria, including where DOE has spent
               the most funds since 2002. Overall, these four countries
               represented about $37.4 million, or about 35 percent, of overall
               program expenditures. We selected Lithuania and Poland since,
               among other reasons, DOE officials told us that these were model
               countries in securing radiological sources and implementing
               effective physical security upgrades. Also, we selected Russia and
               Georgia because they received significant program funds, totaling
               about $34.2 million of the $107.7 million. In addition, thousands
               of radiological sources are located in these two countries. In the
               case of Russia, it contains the majority of RTGs worldwide and
               operates 44 percent of all Radons in the former Soviet Union.

               During our review, we observed physical security upgrades at all
               types of sites: medical, industrial, research, storage facilities,
               and RTGs. For instance, we visited numerous medical and industrial
               sites throughout Lithuania and Poland. Specifically in Lithuania,
               we visited the Radiation Protection Center, Vilnius Oncology
               Institute Clinic, Klaipeda City Hospital, the Kaunas Oncology
               Clinic, and Saiuliu Oncology Hospital, as well as the Lithuanian
               Institute of Physics and the Maisiagala Repository. In Poland, we
               visited the Regionaine Centreem Kriwodawstwa I Krwiolecznictwa
               (Children's Hospital) as well as the Glowny Urzad Miar (Main
               Measurement Office), Polytechnic Institute of Lodz, Radioisotope
               Center (Polatom), Geofizyka Krakow, Radioisotope Waste Management
               Plant in Swierk, Technical University Institute of Applied
               Radiation Chemistry, and the Technical Institute of Applied
               Physics. At each location, we interviewed facility staff who were
               responsible for implementing radiological source security
               procedures and using the monitoring equipment funded by DOE.
               Facility staff included--but was not limited to--doctors, clinical
               technicians, and other medical support staff. At each site, we met
               with local guards to determine how well they were trained and
               equipped. We also interviewed host country contractors who were
               responsible for installing and maintaining physical security
               upgrades.

               We also met with host government officials in both countries. In
               Lithuania we met with officials from the Ministry of Economy; RATA
               (Lithuanian Radioactive Waste Management Agency); the Radiation
               Protection Center (nuclear regulatory organization); and the
               Ministry of Environment. In Poland, we interviewed officials from
               the National Atomic Energy Agency (Poland's nuclear regulator),
               the Department of Environmental Hygiene, and the Ministry of
               Health.

               We also visited Russia and Georgia to obtain a first-hand look at
               waste facilities that contain radiological sources. Specifically,
               we visited the Moscow Radon site at Sergiev Posad, located about
               90 kilometers from Moscow and the St. Petersburg Radon site,
               located about 80 kilometers from St. Petersburg. While in Russia
               we also met with the key federal agencies responsible for
               radiological source management and oversight. Specifically, we met
               with several high-level officials from Rostechnadzor, Russia's
               nuclear regulator (the Federal Environmental, Industrial and
               Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia); the Federal Agency for
               Construction and Utilities; and the Department for Nuclear and
               Radiation Safety at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency.
               Additionally, we interviewed directors of both the Moscow and St.
               Petersburg Radon facilities; officials of the IBRAE Institute
               (Russian National Academy of Sciences); and directors of VNIITFA
               (Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research
               Institute), the designer of RTGs. Moreover, after meeting with
               officials from the Kurchatov Institute, which is primarily
               responsible for the RTG removal, we visited three sites where RTGs
               had been removed and replaced with alternative energy sources.

               In Georgia, we visited the Mtsheta national repository located at
               the Institute of Physics near Tbilisi, Georgia, as well as
               Georgia's temporary national storage facility that stores many
               high-risk radiological sources, including six RTGs and a seed
               irradiator. Regarding Georgia's medical sites, we also visited the
               National Cancer Center of Georgia and the Kutaisi Oncological
               Center and interviewed staff and guards who were responsible for
               source security. We met with officials from the Nuclear and
               Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry of Environmental
               Protection and Natural Resources (Georgia's nuclear regulator),
               the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department, the Institute of
               Radiobiology, and the Chamber of Control.

               To assess the progress of DOE's efforts to help other countries
               secure their sealed radiological sources, we obtained and analyzed
               documentation on DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction
               Program (IRTR), including project work plans for each country and
               program activity; strategic planning documents; and internal
               briefings. For example, we reviewed DOE's Action Plan to Secure
               and Control Foreign-Origin Source Materials for Radiological
               Dispersal Devices (April 2003), and Programmatic Guidelines for
               Site Prioritization and Protection Implementation (September
               2006). We supplemented the documentation with interviews with
               senior level DOE officials responsible for implementing the IRTR
               program.

               To specifically determine the status of efforts across the 49
               countries receiving DOE's assistance, we reviewed DOE's Project
               Management Information System database to construct a summary
               table that included factors, among other things, the number of
               sites completed; host country agencies and international
               organizations involved in radiological source security; and
               program accomplishments and challenges. To identify challenges DOE
               faces in securing sources in other countries and to assess
               sustainability efforts, we collected and analyzed (1) IRTR program
               trip reports for all countries participating in the program, and
               (2) testimonial evidence obtained from project managers, security
               specialists, and contracting officers to identify all programmatic
               and management challenges. Furthermore, we performed a
               comprehensive review and analysis of trip reports from fiscal year
               2004 through fiscal year 2006.

               To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that
               provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other
               countries, we reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing
               program expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year
               2006. We obtained responses from key agency database officials to
               a number of questions focused on data reliability, covering issues
               such as data-entry access and the accuracy and completeness of the
               data. For DOE specifically, to determine how much DOE had budgeted
               and spent through August 31, 2006, to secure radiological sources
               in other countries, we reviewed element of cost reports detailing
               program expenditures by country, national laboratory, and program
               objective per fiscal year to determine the amount spent in-country
               and the overall carryover of unspent and unobligated funds.
               Furthermore, to determine planned program costs for DOE, we
               reviewed DOE's congressional budget request for fiscal year 2007
               and met with senior DOE officials to learn about DOE's plans for
               addressing reduced program funding. Follow-up questions were added
               whenever necessary. Caveats and limitations to the data were noted
               in the documentation, where necessary. We determined that the data
               were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, based
               on work we performed to ensure the data's reliability.

               To assess the extent to which coordination has occurred within DOE
               as well as on an interagency basis, we obtained and analyzed
               documents from DOE, NRC, and State regarding their radiological
               threat reduction and nonproliferation activities. We interviewed
               several senior officials at NRC, including the Senior Advisor for
               Nuclear Security, a senior foreign policy advisor for the Office
               of International Programs, and a Senior Engineer. At State, we
               interviewed several high-level officials, including the Senior
               Coordinator for Nuclear Safety from the Bureau of International
               Security and Nonproliferation. We also reviewed State, NRC, and
               DOE documents regarding Iraq work to highlight interagency
               coordination. To address the level of coordination with
               international organizations, we met with senior officials at the
               International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Commission,
               including the Director of Nuclear Safety, and a senior official
               from the External Relations Directorate, respectively. Finally, we
               met with the Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Centre
               from the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority to learn about
               NRC's role in providing regulatory assistance to Armenia.

               We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other locations,
               from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally
               accepted government auditing standards.

    			  Appendix II: DOE�s IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region,
    			  as of August 31, 2006

    Dollars in thousands
    Recipient Country    U.S. Costs In-country costs Total spent
    Former Soviet Union
    Russia                  $10,451          $22,721     $33,172
    Ukraine                   1,490            2,000       3,490
    Lithuania                   736              588       1,324
    Georgia Republic            359              662       1,022
    Kazakhstan                  327              519         846
    Uzbekistan                  282              490         772
    Moldova                     344              441         785
    Azerbaijan                  214              557         771
    Kyrgyzstan                  329              282         611
    Tajikistan                  321              204         525
    Latvia                      223               28         251
    Armenia                     172               26         198
    Estonia                     114               44         158
    Belarus                     247              223         470
    Subtotal                $15,609          $28,785     $44,395
    Africa
    Ethiopia                    $91               $0         $91
    South Africa                 69                0          69
    Kenya                        15                0          15
    Nigeria                     104                0         104
    Morocco                     306              322         628
    Tanzania                    237              131         368
    Libya                         2                0           2
    Subtotal                   $824             $453      $1,277
    Europe
    Poland                     $538           $1,387      $1,925
    Bulgaria                    442              419         861
    Greece                      397              259         656
    Serbia                      138              177         315
    Albania                     332                6         338
    Subtotal                 $1,847           $2,248      $4,095

    Dollars in thousands
    Recipient Country    U.S. Costs In-country costs Total spent
    Latin America
    Colombia                   $401             $913      $1,314
    Panama                      114              100         214
    Peru                        210              176         386
    Nicaragua                    72               45         117
    El Salvador                  82               67         149
    Chile                       201              110         311
    Ecuador                     158              152         310
    Argentina                   124                9         133
    Brazil                       90               15         105
    Honduras                    122               20         142
    Guatemala                   104               42         146
    Bolivia                     101               66         167
    Mexico                        0                0           0
    Subtotal                 $1,779           $1,715      $3,494
    Asia-Pacific
    Indonesia                  $244             $359        $603
    Philippines                 235              196         431
    Vietnam                     112                2         114
    Bangladesh                  161               43         204
    Subtotal                   $752             $600      $1,352
    Middle East
    Iraq                     $4,250             $206      $4,456
    Afghanistan                 607                0         607
    Yemen                        68               48         116
    Jordan                      188               56         244
    Egypt                       955              526       1,481
    Turkey                      146                1         147
    Subtotal                 $6,214             $837      $7,051
    Total                   $27,025          $34,638     $61,664

               Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE.

               Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

    			  Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy

    			  Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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    			  Congressional Relations

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    			  Public Affairs

               Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202)
               512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
               Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

    (360642)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282 .

    To view the full product, including the scope
    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
    aloisee@gao.gov.

    Highlights of [48]GAO-07-282 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
    Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
    District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
    Affairs, U.S. Senate

    January 2007

    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus
    Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources

    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and
    international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources,
    such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, were vulnerable to theft and could be
    used to make a dirty bomb. In response, DOE established the International
    Radiological Threat Reduction program to secure high-risk sources in other
    countries. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE's progress in helping other
    countries secure their high-risk sources, (2) identify DOE's current and
    planned program costs, and (3) describe coordination between DOE and U.S.
    and international agencies to secure sources in other countries.

    [49]What GAO Recommends

    GAO is making several recommendations to DOE to better prioritize sites to
    be selected for security upgrades and strengthen program management
    practices, including developing a long-term sustainability plan to protect
    DOE's investment in security upgrades. In addition, GAO is asking Congress
    to consider providing NRC with authority and a direct appropriation to
    conduct regulatory development activities to help improve other countries'
    security over sources. DOE said that our recommendations were helpful and
    would further strengthen its program. NRC said it would work closely with
    relevant executive branch agencies and IAEA if Congress acts upon our
    matter for consideration.

    Since 2002, the Department of Energy (DOE) has upgraded the security of
    hundreds of sites in other countries that contain radiological sources and
    has achieved noteworthy accomplishments, including removing radioactive
    material in Chechnya. However, DOE has made limited progress securing many
    of the most dangerous sources located in waste storage facilities and
    hundreds of sources across Russia contained in radioisotope thermoelectric
    generators (RTG). When DOE expanded the program from the former Soviet
    Union to a global effort, it also expanded the types of sites that
    required upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of
    all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one
    radiological source. Furthermore, DOE has not developed a long-term plan
    to ensure that security upgrades will be adequately sustained once
    installed.

    From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent
    approximately $108 million to improve the security of sources in other
    countries. However, funding for the program has steadily declined in
    recent years, and future funding is uncertain because the agency places a
    higher priority on securing special nuclear material such as plutonium and
    highly enriched uranium.

    DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State and the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure sources in other countries. DOE,
    however, has not always integrated its efforts efficiently. For example,
    DOE did not transfer $5 million from its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to
    NRC for strengthening international regulatory controls over radiological
    sources, despite a Senate Appropriations Committee report directing DOE to
    do so. In addition, gaps in information sharing between DOE and the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have impeded DOE's ability to
    target the most vulnerable sites in IAEA member states for security
    improvements.

    Recovered RTG Containing Large Amounts of Strontium-90

    References

    Visible links
      29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-967
      30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
      31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
      32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-93
      33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-662
      34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-807
      35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-57
      36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
      37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-672
      38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
      48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282
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