Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
Airspace System (13-NOV-06, GAO-07-25).
In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate, with federal and
nonfederal stakeholders, a transformation from the current air
traffic control system to the "next generation air transportation
system" (NGATS) by 2025. Housed within the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven partner agencies: the
Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland
Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy. FAA will have primary responsibility for implementing
NGATS. This report addresses (1) the status of JPDO's efforts to
plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges facing JPDO, and (3) the
key challenges facing FAA as it implements the transformation. To
address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant documents,
interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, and conducted an
expert panel.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-25
ACCNO: A63244
TITLE: Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
Airspace System
DATE: 11/13/2006
SUBJECT: Air traffic control systems
Air traffic controllers
Air transportation
Commercial aviation
Concept of operations
Enterprise architecture
Future budget projections
Program evaluation
Program management
Strategic planning
Systems conversions
Policies and procedures
Program implementation
Next Generation Air Transportation
System
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GAO-07-25
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS
* [4]As Required by Vision 100, JPDO Developed an Integrated Plan
* [5]JPDO Developed an Organization for Involving Federal and Non
* [6]JPDO Has Begun to Leverage the Resources of Its Partner Agen
* [7]Consistent with Vision 100, JPDO Is Developing an Enterprise
* [8]The Existing Cost Estimate for NGATS Is Incomplete
* [9]JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization and H
* [10]JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and I
* [11]Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Challen
* [12]JPDO Faces Challenges in Addressing Planning and Expertise G
* [13]Technology Development and Technology Transfer
* [14]Human Factors Research
* [15]Absence of Key Stakeholder Involvement
* [16]Establishing Credibility with Stakeholders That the Governme
* [17]JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization, but
* [18]FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully
* [19]Institutionalizing Recent Improvements in Management and Acq
* [20]Finding Resources to Implement NGATS and Operate the ATC Sys
* [21]FAA Faces Challenges in Obtaining the Expertise Needed to Im
* [22]Conclusions
* [23]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [24]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [25]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* [26]Appendix II: Results of Expert Panel Voting
* [27]Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges
* [28]Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges
* [29]Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation
* [30]Appendix III: SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization
* [31]Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Spac
* [32]Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [33]GAO Contact
* [34]Staff Acknowledgments
* [35]Order by Mail or Phone
NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
Airspace System
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
November 2006
GAO-07-25
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 6
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS 7
JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and
Interoperability Challenges as It Moves Forward with NGATS 18
FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully Implement
NGATS 26
Conclusions 31
Recommendations for Executive Action 32
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
Appendix II Results of Expert Panel Voting 39
Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges 41
Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges 44
Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation 47
Appendix III SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization Initiative 51
Appendix IV Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration 54
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56
Tables
Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agency 11
Table 2: Names and Affiliations of Expert Panelists 39
Table 3: Expert Panel Votes on Top Achievements of JPDO 41
Table 4: Expert Panel Votes on Top Challenges Facing JPDO 42
Table 5: Short-term Strategies for JPDO 44
Table 6: Midterm Strategies for JPDO 46
Table 7: Long-term Strategies for JPDO 47
Table 8: Importance of JPDO Involvement in Harmonization Efforts 48
Table 9: Level of Coordination between Europe and the United States 48
Table 10: Preparation for Success 49
Figures
Figure 1: Organization of JPDO 10
Figure 2: REDAC's Funding Estimates for FAA under Status Quo and NGATS
Scenarios, 2006-2025 16
Abbreviations
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast ATC air traffic control
ATO Air Traffic Organization DHS Department of Homeland Security DOC
Department of Commerce DOD Department of Defense DOT Department of
Transportation FAA Federal Aviation Administration ICAO International
Civil Aviation Organization IPT integrated product team JPDO Joint
Planning and Development Office LSI lead systems integrator MOU memorandum
of understanding NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATCA
National Air Traffic Controllers Association NGATS Next Generation Air
Transportation System OMB Office of Management and Budget OSTP White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy REDAC Research, Engineering and
Development Advisory Committee SESAR Single European Sky Air Traffic
Management Research Programme SWIM System Wide Information Management
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
November 13, 2006
The Honorable Sherwood Boehlert Chairman The Honorable Bart Gordon Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Science House of Representatives
The Honorable Ken Calvert Chairman The Honorable Mark Udall Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science
House of Representatives
While the health of the nation's air transportation system is critical to
the economy, the current approach to managing air transportation is
becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete. In 2003,
Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate a transition from the nation's
current air traffic control system to the "next generation air
transportation system" (NGATS)--a system intended to safely accommodate a
possible tripling of air traffic by 2025. NGATS is envisioned as a major
redesign of the air transportation system that will entail precision
satellite navigation; digital, networked communications; an integrated
weather system; layered, adaptive security; and more. Vision 100,1 the
legislation that authorized JPDO, requires the office to operate in
conjunction with multiple government agencies, including the Departments
of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA); the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy. Although JPDO is responsible for planning the
transformation to NGATS and coordinating the related efforts of its
partner agencies, FAA will be largely responsible for implementing the
policies and systems necessary for NGATS, while safely operating the
current air traffic control system 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
1Pub. L. No. 108-176, Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,
December 12, 2003.
In light of the difficulty and importance of the tasks before JPDO and
FAA, you asked us to review the efforts to organize and plan for NGATS.
Accordingly, we addressed the following questions: (1) What is the status
of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS? (2) What key challenges does JPDO
face in moving forward with its planning efforts? (3) What key challenges
does FAA face as it moves toward implementing NGATS?
To address the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS and the
challenges that the office faces, we reviewed documents provided by JPDO
and its partner agencies, including JPDO's December 2004 Integrated Plan,
its 2005 Progress Report, and July 2006 draft Concept of Operations. We
interviewed agency officials and stakeholders and convened a panel of
experts to gather information and perspectives about the efforts of JPDO.
We assessed the status and challenges of JPDO's framework for facilitating
coordination among its partner agencies by comparing JPDO's efforts to
date against selected key practices that we have reported can enhance and
sustain federal collaborative efforts.2 We selected five of eight
practices as criteria for this review because they are significant to
building the framework needed for any collaboration and are particularly
important to JPDO at this early juncture in its collaborative efforts. The
key practices used for this assessment include defining and articulating a
common outcome, establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies,
identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources, agreeing on
roles and responsibilities, and reinforcing agency accountability for
collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.3 We assessed
JPDO's efforts to obtain the participation of nonfederal stakeholders by
obtaining the perspectives of nonfederal stakeholders involved with JPDO
and drawing on our body of work on stakeholder involvement. We assessed
JPDO's technical planning efforts for NGATS by comparing JPDO's practices
with those that we have found to be effective in developing enterprise
architectures.4 One of our senior-level technologists also reviewed JPDO's
draft Concept of Operations. We also obtained information on an estimate
of FAA's future costs under NGATS but did not review in detail the
methodology or assumptions used to develop this estimate. To understand
JPDO's and FAA's efforts to date on global harmonization, we met with
European officials and reviewed documents related to Europe's concurrent
air transportation modernization effort, known as the Single European Sky
Air Traffic Management Research Programme (SESAR). To determine the
challenges that FAA faces in implementing NGATS, we met with agency
officials, reviewed documentation related to FAA's modernization efforts,
and drew upon our prior work examining FAA's program to modernize the
National Airspace System. We conducted our work between July 2005 and
September 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. See appendix I for a more detailed explanation of our scope and
methodology. A detailed discussion of the results of our expert panel is
contained in appendix II.
2GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [36]GAO-06-15 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
3The remaining three practices include establishing compatible policies,
procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries;
developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and
reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through
performance management systems.
Results in Brief
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its
partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with the
requirements of Vision 100 and with several practices that our previous
work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration and
enterprise architecture development. JPDO and its partner agencies have
developed an Integrated Plan and reported on the progress of that plan as
called for in Vision 100. In working to develop the Integrated Plan, the
partner agencies agreed on a vision for NGATS and on eight strategies that
broadly address the goals and objectives of NGATS--actions consistent with
effective collaborative practices that we have identified. JPDO has also
established an organizational structure that involves federal and
nonfederal stakeholders throughout the organization. To leverage human
resources, JPDO has staffed the various levels of its organization with
partner agency employees, many of whom work part time for JPDO. To
leverage technological resources, JPDO has sought to coordinate
NGATS-related programs across the partner agencies. JPDO identified early
opportunities that could be pursued during fiscal year 2007 to minimize
the duplication of research programs across agencies and to produce
tangible results for NGATS. JPDO has been developing an enterprise
architecture (or blueprint)--one of the most critical planning documents
in the NGATS effort--and has taken several steps consistent with effective
practices that we have identified for enterprise architecture development.
JPDO expects the enterprise architecture to provide more clarity regarding
its expectations for NGATS, thereby facilitating coordination among the
partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, alignment of relevant
research and development activities, and integration of equipment. The
enterprise architecture is also critical to the development of realistic
cost estimates for NGATS. Without such realistic cost estimates, Congress
is handicapped in its planning for the funding needs of NGATS. To this
end, JPDO has also begun working with its stakeholders to develop initial
cost information through a series of investment analysis workshops.
Finally, JPDO recognizes the importance of global harmonization of air
transportation technologies and systems and has begun work to ensure that
the NGATS effort is harmonized with the European SESAR effort and with the
efforts of other regions.
4An enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for understanding and
planning complex systems. JPDO anticipates that the NGATS enterprise
architecture will provide the means for coordinating among the partner
agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
development activities, and integrating equipment. See GAO, Federal
Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed to Guide
Systems Modernization Efforts, [37]GAO-05-266 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29,
2005).
JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative effort,
addressing planning and expertise gaps, establishing credibility with
stakeholders, and harmonizing its work with other countries' efforts to
modernize their own air traffic management systems. JPDO is fundamentally
a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
and technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system
requirements for NGATS. To date, JPDO has not established some practices
significant to institutionalizing the collaborative process. For example,
JPDO does not have formal, long-term agreements among the partner agencies
on their roles and responsibilities in creating NGATS. JPDO has been
working to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with its partner
agencies since at least August 2005, but the MOU had not been signed as of
September 2006. JPDO also currently lacks explicit policies and procedures
for decision making and dispute resolution and has not yet completed
mechanisms for leveraging partner agency resources. To its credit, JPDO
has been working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop
a means to consider NGATS-related funding, dispersed across JPDO's partner
agency budget requests, as a unified federal program. Nonetheless, given
JPDO's limited authority, the office could face challenges in sustaining
the lengthy and elaborate federal collaborative effort set forth by Vision
100 without full development of procedures and mechanisms for dispute
resolution and leveraging of resources. JPDO also faces challenges with
some planning and expertise gaps. For example, NASA is moving toward a
focus on fundamental research and away from demonstration projects. Many
experts told us that this creates a gap in technology development. This
raises the question of what entity will do the developmental work that
will be important to NGATS. According to JPDO officials, they are
conducting a gap analysis on the impact of NASA's actions on NGATS
planning. Also important to NGATS is the involvement of all key
stakeholders in the planning process, yet some stakeholders, such as
active air traffic controllers, are not currently involved with JPDO. Our
work on past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a
lack of stakeholder involvement early and throughout a project has been a
key factor that leads to cost increases and delays. As noted by our expert
panel, JPDO also faces challenges in establishing credibility among
stakeholders. For example, some members of our expert panel told us that,
although JPDO has produced much activity, they did not feel the effort had
demonstrated sufficient progress; some stakeholders told us that both the
2004 Integrated Plan and the 2005 Progress Report lacked sufficient
detail, such as definition of research needs. Finally, JPDO faces
challenges in achieving global harmonization for NGATS. While FAA and the
European Commission recently signed an MOU to ensure cooperation between
the aviation modernization programs in the United States and Europe, much
work remains in carrying out that agreement and in addressing
harmonization throughout other regions of the world.
FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to NGATS, faces challenges
both in institutionalizing the management reforms that it has made in
recent years, which have contributed to its ability to meet its goals for
ATC acquisitions, and in obtaining the financial and technical resources
needed to implement NGATS. Since 1995, we have designated FAA's air
traffic control modernization program as high risk because of systemic
management and acquisition problems. FAA has recently taken a number of
actions aimed at improving its management practices, including a focus on
implementing more businesslike management and acquisition processes. FAA
has also taken steps to institutionalize these improvements by ensuring
that the reforms are fully integrated into the agency's structure and
processes at all levels and have become part of its organizational
culture. However, transforming organizational cultures requires
substantial management attention, as it can take several years for such
initiatives to be fully implemented and cultures transformed in a
sustainable manner. FAA also faces challenges in finding ways to reduce
costs or realize savings to help fund the costs of transitioning to NGATS
while continuing to operate and maintain the current system. FAA is
working to reduce costs by streamlining its operations and could realize
savings in operating costs from the implementation of some NGATS
technologies. Finally, FAA faces challenges in obtaining the expertise
needed to implement a system as complex as NGATS. Recognizing the
complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the possibility that FAA
may not have the in-house expertise to manage it without assistance, we
have identified potential approaches for supplementing FAA's capabilities.
Approaches include contracting with a lead systems integrator or obtaining
technical advice from a federally funded research and development
corporation. FAA has not yet formally explored its strengths and
weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract management
expertise that will be required of it to define, implement, and integrate
the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the transition to
NGATS.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct JPDO to
take actions to institutionalize the partner agencies' collaboration in
supporting NGATS, including action on an MOU among the partner agencies,
actions to finalize procedures to leverage partner agency resources, and
actions to develop procedures for dispute resolution. We are also
recommending that the Secretary direct JPDO to determine whether key
stakeholders and expertise are not currently represented in JPDO planning
efforts. Finally, we are recommending that the Secretary direct FAA to
undertake a formal exploration of the technical expertise and contract
management expertise that will be required by FAA to implement NGATS.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; JPDO; NASA; and the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for their review and
comment. NASA's written comments are included as appendix IV. NASA agreed
with the majority of the report's content, but highlighted specific points
about (1) the impact of its recent emphasis on fundamental aeronautics,
(2) NASA's role in developing NGATS, and (3) NASA's fiscal year 2007
request for aeronautics research funding. Transportation, FAA, JPDO,
Homeland Security, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy
provided technical clarifications and additional information, which we
incorporated into this report as appropriate. FAA and JPDO neither agreed
nor disagreed with our recommendations, but said they would consider them.
Commerce and Defense had no comments on the draft report.
Background
JPDO began operating in early 2004 and is housed within FAA. JPDO's
Director reports to the FAA Administrator and to the FAA Chief Operating
Officer (head of FAA's Air Traffic Organization [ATO]). The scope of
JPDO's effort is broader than that of traditional air traffic control
modernization in that it is "airport curb to airport curb," encompassing
such issues as security screening and environmental concerns.
Additionally, JPDO's approach will require unprecedented collaboration and
consensus among many stakeholders--federal and nonfederal--about necessary
system capabilities, equipment, procedures, and regulations. JPDO has
identified roles for each of its partner agencies in the transformation to
NGATS. For example, the Department of Defense has deployed "network
centric" systems,5 originally developed for the battlefield, that are
being considered as a conceptual framework to provide all users of the
National Airspace System--FAA and the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security--with a common view of that system.
Since its inception, JPDO has focused on establishing an organizational
framework to carry out the interagency planning mandate contained in
Vision 100, while ensuring participation of nonfederal stakeholders and
the general public. JPDO has also reviewed the research projects of its
partner agencies to identify work that aligns with NGATS' needs and has
issued budget guidance to these agencies to highlight the areas where each
agency could contribute to implementing NGATS. JPDO currently has several
key NGATS planning documents in various stages of development.
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS
Many of JPDO's actions are consistent with practices that our work has
shown facilitate interagency collaboration--a key factor in the future
success of NGATS. JPDO is also developing an enterprise architecture--a
key document for NGATS planning--using a phased approach that is similar
to a process we have advocated for FAA's major systems acquisition
programs and anticipates having a first draft in by the end of 2006.
Although a preliminary estimate exists of FAA's costs to implement NGATS,
further work is needed to develop a comprehensive understanding of NGATS
costs.
5Network centric systems aim to exploit technical advances in information
technology and telecommunications to improve situational awareness and the
speed of decision making.
As Required by Vision 100, JPDO Developed an Integrated Plan and Reported on the
Progress of That Plan
Vision 100 calls for JPDO to develop an integrated plan for NGATS and
provide annual updates on the progress of that plan. JPDO, with its
partner agencies, developed an NGATS Integrated Plan and submitted it to
Congress on December 12, 2004. The plan includes a vision statement for a
system capable of handling a threefold increase in demand for air
transportation by 2025. The vision entails providing services tailored to
individual customer needs, allowing all communities to participate in the
global economy, and seamlessly integrating civil and military operations.
The partner agencies also agreed on eight strategies that broadly address
the goals and objectives for NGATS. In March 2006, JPDO published its
first report to Congress on the progress made in carrying out the NGATS
Integrated Plan.
In addition to complying with Vision 100's mandate, developing an
integrated plan is consistent with effective collaborative practices we
have identified.6 According to our research on federal interagency
collaborations, agencies must have a clear and compelling rationale for
working together to overcome significant differences in their missions,
cultures, and established ways of doing business. JPDO's partner agencies
have a diverse set of missions, ranging from national defense to the
promotion of commerce. Yet each has some involvement in the air
transportation system and can make a contribution to NGATS. In working
together to develop JPDO's Integrated Plan, the partner agencies agreed on
a vision statement to transform the air transportation system and on broad
statements of future system goals, performance characteristics, and
operational concepts.
JPDO Developed an Organization for Involving Federal and Nonfederal Stakeholders
Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult with
its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public. JPDO's
approach has been to establish an organizational structure that involves
federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the organization. This
structure includes a federal interagency senior policy committee, an
institute for nonfederal stakeholders, and eight integrated product teams
(IPT) that bring together federal and nonfederal experts to plan for and
coordinate the development of technologies that will address JPDO's eight
broad strategies.
6 [38]GAO-06-15 .
JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the Secretary of
Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes senior-level
officials from JPDO's partner agencies. It has met three times since its
inception. The NGATS Institute (the Institute) was created by an agreement
between the National Center for Advanced Technologies7 and FAA to
incorporate the expertise and views of stakeholders from private industry,
state and local governments, and academia. The NGATS Institute Management
Council, composed of top officials and representatives from the aviation
community, oversees the policy, recommendations, and products of the
Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus positions on
critical NGATS issues. To meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO
coordinate and consult with the public, the Institute held its first
public meeting in March 2006. The IPTs are headed by representatives of
JPDO's partner agencies and include more than 200 nonfederal stakeholders
from over 100 organizations, whose participation was arranged through the
Institute. Figure 1 illustrates JPDO's position within FAA and the JPDO
structures that bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders,
including the Institute and the IPTs.
7The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit within
the Aerospace Industries Association.
Figure 1: Organization of JPDO
Note: Department of Commerce = DOC; Department of Defense = DOD;
Department of Homeland Security = DHS.
JPDO's organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we
have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations. For
example, our work has shown that mutually reinforcing or joint strategies
can help align partner agencies' activities, core processes, and resources
to accomplish a common outcome. Each of the eight IPTs is aligned with one
of the eight strategies outlined in JPDO's Integrated Plan, and each is
headed by a partner agency that has taken the lead on a specific strategy
(see table 1). Our research has also found that collaborating agencies
should identify the resources needed to initiate or sustain their
collaborative effort. To leverage human resources, JPDO has staffed the
various levels of its organization--including JPDO's board, the IPTs, and
technical divisions--with partner agency employees, many of whom work part
time for JPDO. Finally, our work has shown that involving stakeholders
can, among other things, increase their support for a collaborative
effort. The Institute provides a method for involving nonfederal
stakeholders, including the public, in planning NGATS.
Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agencies
Strategy Related IPT Lead Agency
Develop airport infrastructure to meet Federal Aviation Administration
future demand
Establish an effective security system Department of Homeland Security
without limiting mobility or civil
liberties
Establish an agile air traffic system that National Aeronautics and Space
quickly responds to shifts in demand Administrationa
Establish shared situational Department of Defense
awareness--where all users share the same
information
Establish a comprehensive and proactive Federal Aviation Administration
approach to safety
Develop environmental protection that Federal Aviation Administration
allows sustained aviation growth
Develop a systemwide capability to reduce Department of Commerce
weather impacts
Harmonize equipage and operations globally Federal Aviation Administration
Sources: GAO and JPDO.
aNASA leads this IPT because it has primary responsibility for conducting
the necessary research; implementation of the agile air traffic system is
the responsibility of FAA.
JPDO Has Begun to Leverage the Resources of Its Partner Agencies
Vision 100 requires JPDO to coordinate NGATS-related programs across the
partner agencies. To address this requirement, JPDO conducted an initial
review of its partner agencies' research and development programs during
July 2005 to identify work that could support NGATS. Through this process,
JPDO identified early opportunities that could be pursued during fiscal
year 2007 to coordinate and minimize the duplication of research programs
across the partner agencies and produce tangible results for NGATS. For
example, one such opportunity involves aligning aviation weather research
across FAA, NASA, and the Departments of Commerce and Defense, developing
a common weather capability, and integrating weather information into
NGATS decision systems. In addition, FAA's Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)8 and System Wide Information Management
(SWIM)9 programs were identified as opportunities to receive accelerated
funding to begin producing tangible results for NGATS.
JPDO's efforts to leverage its partner agencies' resources for NGATS
demonstrates another practice important to sustaining collaborations. Our
work on collaborations has found that collaborating agencies, by assessing
their relative strengths and limitations, can identify opportunities for
leveraging each others' resources and thus obtain benefits that would not
be available if they were working separately. JPDO's first interagency
review of its partner agencies' research and development programs was a
step toward leveraging technological resources for NGATS.
Consistent with Vision 100, JPDO Is Developing an Enterprise Architecture
Vision 100 requires JPDO to create "a multiagency research and development
roadmap" for the transition to NGATS. To comply with this requirement,
JPDO has been developing an enterprise architecture--one of the most
critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. An enterprise
architecture is akin to blueprints for a building. It is meant to provide
a common tool for planning and understanding the complex, interrelated
systems that will make up NGATS. JPDO intends for the enterprise
architecture to describe FAA's operation of the current National Airspace
System, JPDO's plans for NGATS, and the sequence of steps needed for the
transformation to NGATS. JPDO expects the enterprise architecture to
provide more clarity regarding its expectations for NGATS, thereby
facilitating coordination among the partner agencies and private sector
manufacturers, the alignment of relevant research and development
activities, and the integration of equipment. Many of JPDO's future
activities will depend on the robustness and timeliness of this
architecture development.
8ADS-B is a surveillance technology that transmits an aircraft's identity,
position, velocity, and intent to other aircraft and to ATC systems on the
ground, thereby enabling pilots and controllers to have a common picture
of airspace and traffic. By providing pilots with a display that shows the
location of nearby aircraft, the system enables pilots to collaborate in
decision making with controllers, safely allowing reduced aircraft
separation and thereby increasing capacity within the National Airspace
System.
9SWIM is expected to help in the transition to network centric operations
by providing the infrastructure and associated policies and standards to
enable information sharing among all authorized system users, such as the
airlines, civilian government agencies, and the military.
JPDO has taken several important steps to work toward the development of a
mature enterprise architecture.10 For example, JPDO has drafted a Concept
of Operations--a higher-level document that describes how NGATS will
operate in 2025.11 JPDO has used this document to identify key research
and policy issues for NGATS, such as those associated with automating the
air traffic control (ATC) system, including the need for a backup plan in
case automation fails, the responsibilities and liabilities of different
stakeholders during an automation failure, and the level of monitoring
needed by pilots when automation is ensuring safe separation between
aircraft. JPDO officials are currently incorporating stakeholders'
comments into the Concept of Operations.
Another step that JPDO has taken to develop the enterprise architecture is
to form an Enterprise Architecture and Engineering Division. JPDO has
established and filled a chief architect position and established an NGATS
Architecture Council composed of representatives from each partner
agency's chief architect office. This type of organizational structure is
consistent with effective practices that we have identified in enterprise
architecture development. Similarly, JPDO has established an Evaluation
and Analysis Division that is assembling a suite of models to help JPDO
refine its plans for NGATS and iteratively narrow the range of potential
solutions. For example, the division has used modeling to begin studying
how possible changes in the duties of some key personnel could affect the
workload and performance of others.
10We have developed an Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity
Framework. This framework outlines steps toward achieving a stable and
mature process for managing the development, maintenance, and
implementation of enterprise architectures. See GAO, Information
Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise
Architecture Management (Version 1.1), [39]GAO-03-584G (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 1, 2003).
11According to standards of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc. (IEEE), a Concept of Operations is a user-oriented
document that describes the characteristics of a proposed system from the
user's viewpoint. Among other things, the key elements that should be
included in a Concept of Operations are major system components,
interfaces to external systems, and performance characteristics such as
speed and capacity.
To develop and refine the enterprise architecture for NGATS, JPDO plans to
follow a phased, "build a little, test a little" approach. This approach
is similar to a process we have advocated for FAA's major system
acquisition programs. While JPDO expects the first draft of its enterprise
architecture to be issued by the end of this calendar year, officials
anticipate that it will be further refined based on stakeholder comments.
This phased approach will also allow JPDO to incorporate evolving market
forces and technologies into its architecture and thus better manage
change.
The Existing Cost Estimate for NGATS Is Incomplete
Understanding the costs involved in the transition to NGATS is critical to
the NGATS planning effort, yet no comprehensive estimation of these costs
has been developed. This cost information is particularly important to
Congress, which will have the authority to make NGATS funding decisions.
To begin estimating NGATS costs, JPDO is holding a series of investment
analysis workshops with stakeholders. Representatives from commercial and
business aviation, equipment manufacturers, and ATC systems developers
attended the first workshop, held in April 2006. The second workshop, held
in August 2006, was for those involved with general aviation and public
safety operations. JPDO plans to invite representatives from airports and
regional, state, and local planning bodies to the third workshop.
According to JPDO, participants in these workshops are asked to discuss
and comment on the appropriateness of JPDO's current assumptions about
factors that drive private sector costs.
Although JPDO expects that these workshops will provide information to be
used in developing a range of potential costs for NGATS, an enterprise
architecture is needed to further define and better understand how a
number of factors will drive NGATS costs. One of these drivers is the
decision about which technologies to include in NGATS. Some of these
technologies are more complex and thus more expensive to implement than
others. A second driver is the sequence for replacing current technologies
with NGATS technologies. A third driver is the length of time required for
the transformation to NGATS, since, according to JPDO, a longer period
would impose higher costs. JPDO's first draft of its enterprise
architecture could reduce some of these variables, thereby allowing
improved estimates of NGATS' costs.
While JPDO is beginning to explore the issue of cost estimates for NGATS,
an advisory committee to FAA--the Research, Engineering and Development
Advisory Committee (REDAC)--has developed a limited, preliminary cost
estimate, which officials have emphasized is not yet endorsed by any
agency.12 REDAC estimated that FAA's budget under an NGATS scenario would
average about $15 billion per year through 2025, or about $1 billion more
annually (in today's dollars) than FAA's fiscal year 2006 appropriation.
REDAC estimated that the cost for a status quo scenario (i.e., no NGATS)
would also be about $15 billion per year through 2025.13 These estimates
came out roughly equal, on average, because future FAA spending would be
higher under NGATS than the status quo scenario in the early years but
lower than under the status quo toward 2025 (see fig. 2). This
relationship is due primarily to the expectation that, under the NGATS
scenario, capital expenditures would be higher than under the status quo
scenario in the near term, but operations costs would be lower because of
productivity improvements in the longer term. Moreover, the NGATS cost
estimate assumes that capital costs decrease sharply toward 2025.
Officials who developed this estimate explained that the estimate treats
NGATS as an isolated event. In reality, these officials acknowledge that
planning for the subsequent "next generation" system will likely be under
way as 2025 approaches, and the actual modernization costs could,
therefore, be higher in this time frame than the estimate indicates.
12In developing its estimate, REDAC used FAA's projected facilities and
equipment costs under an NGATS scenario, as well as REDAC's own estimates
for the costs of operations; research, engineering, and development; and
airport improvements--the remaining three components of FAA's
appropriation.
13In this report, we describe REDAC's "base case" scenarios, which assumed
that FAA's operations costs would increase between 2006 and 2010 but then
remain constant through 2025 (except for inflation), as productivity
increases offset the higher cost of increased demand. REDAC also developed
estimates for lower-cost "best case" and higher-cost "worst case"
scenarios using differing assumptions of productivity gains.
Figure 2: REDAC's Funding Estimates for FAA under Status Quo and NGATS
Scenarios, 2006-2025
Note: Estimated costs shown in constant 2005 dollars.
In addition, this estimate should be viewed within the context of a number
of factors. First, REDAC does not believe that maintaining the status quo
is a viable option because it would provide insufficient capacity to meet
projected future demand. REDAC stated that it presented the status quo
option "for analytical purposes only since the current approach to air
traffic control and management in use in the United States cannot be
scaled up to handle the projected growth in traffic." In fact, JPDO has
estimated the annual economic cost of not meeting future demand; by 2020,
JPDO estimates this cost at $40 billion per year. Second, the REDAC
estimate does not include the costs of the intermediate technology
development work, performed to date by NASA. As discussed later in this
report, it is currently unclear which entities will perform this work.
Last, and most important, this estimate was developed before JPDO
completed important planning documents and does not include estimates of
the other partner agencies' costs of implementing NGATS. An early version
of JPDO's Concept of Operations for NGATS was released for stakeholder
comment only this past July, and the initial draft of the enterprise
architecture has yet to be released. Both of these documents will have to
be synchronized with JPDO's Operational Improvement Roadmaps, which will
describe the timing of the implementation of various NGATS systems. The
draft Concept of Operations states that several topics, including safety
management and regulation, will be addressed in later iterations of the
document. Similarly, JPDO plans to first release a version of the
enterprise architecture that addresses only the "block to block"--that is,
the air traffic management--aspects of NGATS. A "curb to curb" enterprise
architecture, which would include security, is not expected until around
the middle of 2007. Thus, REDAC's estimate does not include the other
partner agencies' costs to implement NGATS, such as those that the
Department of Homeland Security might incur to develop and implement new
security technologies. In addition to including partner agency costs in
the estimate, other costs, such as those for training of personnel in new
technologies, must be further explored.
JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization and Has Begun
Harmonization Activities
Concurrent with JPDO's efforts, the European Commission is conducting a
project, known as SESAR, to harmonize and modernize the European air
traffic management system. The project is overseen by the European
Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol). Eurocontrol
has contracted out the work of SESAR to a 30-member consortium of
airlines, air navigation service providers, airports, manufacturers, and
others. See appendix III for a more detailed description of SESAR.
American and European aviation officials have recognized the importance of
harmonization--that is, of adopting equivalent performance standards and
technologies that will make their equipment interoperable. Vision 100
calls for NGATS to enable seamless global operations, and JPDO officials
have acknowledged that different and incompatible standards and
technologies, if implemented, could have a major adverse impact on
airlines that serve international markets. In working toward
harmonization, personnel exchanges between Europe and the United States
have begun, and FAA is a member of a group that advises the industry
consortium that manages SESAR under a preexisting MOU between Eurocontrol
and FAA. In addition, FAA and the European Commission signed another MOU
in July 2006 to establish a framework for ensuring cooperation in working
toward a more common global air traffic management system.
JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and Interoperability
Challenges as It Moves Forward with NGATS
JPDO faces a challenge in institutionalizing the interagency collaborative
process with its partner agencies. Some planning and expertise gaps exist,
including technology development, human factors research, and the
participation of key stakeholders. JPDO faces challenges in convincing
stakeholders of the credibility of its effort and of the government's
commitment to the NGATS effort. JPDO also faces challenges related to
harmonizing NGATS with modernization efforts taking place in other
countries.
Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Challenge for JPDO
Although JPDO's legislation, Integrated Plan, and established governance
structure provide the framework for collaborating among multiple federal
agencies, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that
lacks authority over the key human and technological resources needed to
continue developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. Consequently,
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
will be critical to JPDO's ability to leverage the necessary funding for
developing NGATS. Institutionalizing the collaborative process means that,
as administrations and staffing within JPDO change over the years, those
coming into JPDO will have a clear understanding of what is expected of
them and of the time and resource commitments entailed.
To date, JPDO has not established practices significant to
institutionalizing the collaborative process. For example, our work on
effective collaboration practices has shown that collaborating agencies
should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and
responsibilities. At a fundamental level, JPDO does not have formal,
long-term agreements among the partner agencies on their roles and
responsibilities in creating NGATS. Additionally, some stakeholders with
whom we spoke noted that several IPTs are still struggling to define their
roles and responsibilities in developing NGATS. Presently, there is no
mechanism that assures that the partner agencies' commitment will continue
over the 20-year time frame of NGATS or that ensures accountability to
JPDO. According to JPDO officials, they are working to establish an MOU,
signed by the Secretary or other high-ranking official from each partner
agency, which will broadly define the partner agencies' roles and
responsibilities. However, JPDO first informed us of the development of
the MOU in August 2005 and, as of September 2006, the MOU had not been
finalized.
Defining roles and responsibilities is particularly important between JPDO
and FAA's ATO, since both organizations have responsibilities related to
planning national airspace system modernization. ATO has primary
responsibility for the ATC system's current and near-term modernization,
while JPDO has responsibility for planning and coordinating a
transformation to NGATS over the next 20 years. Some stakeholders have
expressed concern that the relationship between JPDO's and ATO's efforts
is not clear. Some of our expert panelists felt that a "gap" plan should
be developed to identify areas that might fall between ATO's efforts to
maintain the current system and JPDO's plans for the future. According to
JPDO and ATO officials, the roles and responsibilities of each office are
currently being worked out.14 ATO now plans to expand its Operational
Evolution Plan--to be renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--so
that it applies FAA-wide and represents FAA's piece of JPDO's overall
NGATS plan.15 In essence, ATO intends for the Operational Evolution
Partnership to become FAA's implementation plan for NGATS. Without
continued focus on clarifying and institutionalizing the relationship
between ATO and JPDO, it is more difficult to ensure continued progress
toward NGATS, particularly with the FAA Administrator's and ATO Chief
Operating Officer's terms ending within the next 2 years.
In addition to not having clearly defined the roles and responsibilities
of the various federal and nonfederal participants, JPDO also currently
lacks explicit policies and procedures for decision making and dispute
resolution. Our collaboration work shows that in defining and agreeing on
roles and responsibilities, the collaborating agencies should also
establish how the collaborative effort will be led; this establishment of
leadership facilitates decision making for the collaboration. According to
JPDO officials, the senior policy committee makes decisions through
consensus of the members. If there are any issues that the committee
cannot resolve among themselves, JPDO officials said that they would
expect that the Secretary of Transportation would elevate those issues to
the appropriate White House-level policy council, such as the Domestic
Policy Council. However, without documented policies or procedures on the
decision making and dispute resolution processes for the senior policy
committee and the JPDO board, there is no clear understanding of the
process and no institutionalized approach to carry forward as members of
the senior policy committee and board change over time.
14The FAA order establishing JPDO directs JPDO to, among other things,
report to ATO's Chief Operating Officer for day-to-day management
oversight and integration into the National Airspace System.
15Currently, FAA's Operational Evolution Plan monitors how NAS capacity
will change over a rolling 10-year planning horizon depending on numerous
variables, such as the demand for air travel, the completion of new
runways, and the availability of new ATC systems. It has also focused on
the building capacity at 35 large hub airports.
Another mechanism for institutionalizing the collaborative process is to
use the agencies' strategic and annual performance plans as tools to
establish complementary goals and strategies for achieving results. Based
on our assessment of the partner agencies' strategic plans, we found that
only the Department of Transportation, NASA, and FAA have incorporated
NGATS goals into their strategic plans. Thus, more opportunities may exist
for integrating NGATS goals into the partner agencies' plans and budgets.
One example of such integration is NASA's current reauthorization act,
which requires the agency to align its aviation research projects to
directly support NGATS goals. NASA has now focused one of its research
programs specifically on the needs of NGATS and JPDO.
Finally, JPDO has not completed mechanisms for leveraging partner agency
resources--an important practice for sustaining collaborations and an
issue that JPDO officials view as one of their greatest challenges. JPDO
has been working with OMB to develop a process for identifying
"NGATS-related projects" across the various agencies. This process would
allow OMB to consider NGATS-related projects as a unified program going
forward and to make funding decisions accordingly. According to JPDO
officials, leveraging efforts have worked well so far, but JPDO's need for
resources and expertise will increase with the development of NGATS. One
expert with whom we spoke noted that the real heavy lifting for JPDO was
still ahead because developing a step-by-step, detailed implementation
plan will be much more resource intensive than the development of the
vision for NGATS has been to date. Also, JPDO could face difficulties in
securing needed agency resources if the priorities of the partner agencies
change over time, as all of the JPDO partner agencies have a variety of
missions and priorities in addition to NGATS. For example, according to
the President's proposed fiscal year 2007 budget and NASA's current plans,
space exploration activities, including research and development, will
continue to be the largest part of NASA's budget in the future. This trend
will be driven by the development of a replacement vehicle for the space
shuttle, manned lunar exploration, and robotic and manned Mars exploration
missions. In contrast, funding for aeronautics research within NASA is
projected to decline through at least fiscal year 2011.
JPDO Faces Challenges in Addressing Planning and Expertise Gaps
In the early stages of JPDO's efforts, gaps in planning and expertise have
emerged. JPDO may face challenges in addressing these gaps because of its
lack of authority over partner agencies' resources and expertise.
Technology Development and Technology Transfer
Our analysis of NASA's aeronautics research budget shows a 30 percent
decline, in constant 2005 dollars, from 2005 to 2011. To its credit, given
the reduced resources available for aeronautics, NASA plans to address the
research and development needs of NGATS. However, NASA is also moving
toward a focus on fundamental aeronautical research16 and away from
demonstration projects.17 Many experts told us that NASA's new focus on
fundamental research creates a gap in the technology development
continuum.18 As we have reported, NASA's current plans might leave
technologies too underdeveloped for easy transfer to industry and raises
the question of what entity will do this developmental work.19 Some
believe that FAA has neither the research and development infrastructure
nor the funding to do this work. According to a draft report by REDAC, FAA
would need at least $100 million annually in increased funding to perform
this research and development work, and establishing the necessary
infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NGATS by 5
years. According to JPDO officials, they are conducting a gap analysis on
the impact of NASA's actions on NGATS planning. We believe that such an
analysis, as well as finding a solution if needed, are critically
important steps.
Human Factors Research
Addressing human factors issues is another key challenge for JPDO. For
example, NGATS Concept of Operations envisions an increased reliance on
automation, which raises questions about the role of the air traffic
controller in such an automated system. Similarly, the Concept of
Operations envisions that pilots will take on a greater share of the
responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other tasks currently
performed by controllers. This raises human factors questions about
whether pilots can safely perform these additional duties. Although JPDO
has begun to model how shifts in air traffic controllers' workloads would
affect their performance, it has not yet begun to model the effect of how
this shift in workload to pilots would affect pilot performance. According
to a JPDO official, modeling the effect of changes in pilot workload has
not yet begun because JPDO has not yet identified a suitable model for
incorporation into its suite of modeling tools. According to JPDO, the
change in the roles of pilots and controllers is the most important human
factors issue involved in creating NGATS but will be difficult to research
because data on pilot behavior are not readily available for use in
creating models. In addition to the study of changing roles, JPDO has not
yet studied the training implications of various systems or solutions
proposed for NGATS. For example, JPDO officials said they will be able to
study the extent to which new air traffic controllers will have to be
trained to operate both the old and the new equipment as the Concept of
Operations and enterprise architecture mature.
16NASA defines fundamental research as that research that includes
continued, long-term scientific study in areas such as physics, chemistry,
materials, experimental techniques, and computational techniques that
leads to a furthering of understanding of the underlying principles that
form the foundation of the core aeronautics disciplines, as well as that
research that integrates the knowledge gained in these core areas to
significantly enhance capabilities, tools, and technologies at the
disciplinary (e.g., aerodynamics, combustion, dynamics and control,
acoustics) and multidisciplinary (e.g., engine design, airframe design)
level.
17NASA noted that it will still conduct flight test experiments across
most of the projects in its portfolio.
18In focusing on fundamental research, NASA does not plan to develop new
technologies to the same level of maturity as in the past.
19GAO, U.S. Aerospace Industry: Progress in Implementing Aerospace
Commission Recommendations, and Remaining Challenges, [40]GAO-06-920
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006).
Absence of Key Stakeholder Involvement
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers, will play key
roles in NGATS but are not currently involved in the NGATS planning
effort. JPDO officials believe that they have sufficient expertise
involved in the NGATS effort at this time because some participants have
prior experience as air traffic controllers. However, one stakeholder with
whom we spoke said that controllers need to be part of the NGATS effort
now because their expertise extends beyond equipment configuration to
issues involving the NGATS vision and Concept of Operations. Similarly, a
member of our expert panel expressed concern that planning for NGATS would
be unsuccessful without controller participation. The input of current air
traffic controllers who have recent experience controlling aircraft is
important in considering human factors and safety issues because of the
controllers' familiarity with existing operating conditions. Our work on
past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack of
stakeholder or expert involvement early and throughout a project can lead
to cost increases and delays.
The air traffic controllers' labor union, the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association (NATCA), has not participated in NGATS since June
2005 when FAA terminated a labor liaison program that assigned air traffic
controllers to major system acquisition program offices and to JPDO. FAA
had determined that the benefits of the program were not great enough to
justify its cost. Nonetheless, several stakeholders who serve on the
Institute Management Council and the IPTs said they were concerned about
the lack of air traffic controller involvement with JPDO. The NGATS
Institute Management Council includes a seat for the union, but a NATCA
official told us that the union's head had been unable to attend the
council's meetings. According to JPDO officials, the council has left a
seat open in hopes that the controllers will participate in NGATS as the
new labor-management agreement between NATCA and FAA is implemented.
Additionally, an official with the Institute noted that the council plans
to reach out to the air traffic controllers in an attempt to obtain their
future participation.
Establishing Credibility with Stakeholders That the Government Is Fully
Committed to NGATS Presents a Challenge
Establishing credibility was viewed by the majority of our expert
panelists as the primary challenge facing JPDO. This view partially stems
from past experiences where the government has stopped some modernization
efforts after industry invested in supporting technologies. For example,
FAA developed a datalink communications system that transmitted scripted
e-mail-like messages between controllers and pilots. One airline invested
in this technology by equipping some of its aircraft, but because of
funding cuts, among other things, FAA canceled the program. We have also
reported that some aviation stakeholders have expressed concern that FAA
may not follow through with its airspace redesign efforts and are hesitant
to invest in equipment unless they are sure that FAA will remain committed
to its efforts.20 One expert suggested that the government might mitigate
this issue by making an initial investment in a specific technology before
requesting that airlines or other industry stakeholders purchase
equipment.
Stakeholders' belief that the government is fully committed to NGATS will
be important as efforts to implement NGATS technologies move forward.
Achieving many of the benefits of NGATS will require actions by FAA as
well as by users of the system--airlines and general aviation. For
example, JPDO has identified ADS-B as a new air traffic surveillance
system that will be critical to NGATS. ADS-B would replace many existing
radars that track aircraft location and speed with less costly
ground-based transceivers. FAA views ADS-B as a cornerstone technology for
NGATS that will increase NAS capacity, efficiency, and safety. However, to
achieve the full benefits of ADS-B, FAA must develop policies and
regulations and install the ground infrastructure to support ADS-B, while
users of the system must install ADS-B-compatible equipment on their
aircraft.
20GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural
Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management
Tools, [41]GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).
FAA has developed plans for implementing ADS-B over the next 15 to 20
years. FAA plans to award a contract for acquiring the ground
infrastructure for ADS-B in July 2007 and is developing an ADS-B
rulemaking, scheduled for issuance in 2009. FAA's initial deployment plans
focus on areas of the nation that do not have radar surveillance, such as
the Gulf of Mexico. During this initial deployment, FAA plans to further
develop ADS-B interfaces with its existing ATC systems. According to FAA,
the agency is also working with national and international organizations
to ensure that the concerns of the aviation community are recognized and
addressed. FAA plans to deploy ADS-B nationwide by 2013.
However, full utilization of ADS-B depends not only on government efforts,
but also involves decisions by nonfederal stakeholders about what
equipment to purchase and the timing of such purchases. With ADS-B for
example, an official of RTCA's ADS-B working group noted that the cost and
expected benefits of equipping aircraft to take full advantage of ADS-B is
a key issue for users of the system.21 On the cost side, the expert said
that equipping existing aircraft to communicate with the ground stations
may not be cost prohibitive for regional and large commercial airlines,
but equipping these aircraft to be able to utilize ADS-B's full
capabilities could require cost prohibitive modifications. Consequently,
the expert noted that carriers plan to install equipment to utilize
ADS-B's full capabilities only as they order new aircraft. He also said
that carriers could have full-capability ADS-B installed on new aircraft
that they are ordering now, except that specifications do not yet exist.
Concerning the benefits of equipping aircraft to fully utilize ADS-B, the
expert noted that the extent of some of these benefits are dependent on
FAA decisions that have not yet been made, such as whether FAA will grant
responsibility to pilots for maintaining safe separation distances and
what technologies will provide a backup system for ADS-B. The expert
believed that some air carriers were hesitant on ADS-B due to concerns
that FAA might not follow through with deployment of full ADS-B
capabilities.
21Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics, RTCA is today known just by its acronym. RTCA is a private,
not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based performance
standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee,
and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA's policy,
program, and regulatory decisions. RTCA includes an ADS-B working group
within its air traffic management advisory committee. The ADS-B Working
Group includes representatives of air transport, avionics manufacturers,
business aviation, Department of Defense, and general aviation.
Credibility of JPDO's efforts could also be impacted by perceptions
regarding the progress of NGATS planning efforts. For example, some
members of our expert panel told us that, although JPDO has produced much
activity, they did not feel the effort had demonstrated sufficient
progress. Some stakeholders we spoke with felt the Integrated Plan and
Progress Report have not contained detailed implementation plans or
interim milestones. According to one stakeholder, JPDO's 2005 Progress
Report lacked information related to the evolution of an implementation
plan, definition of research needs, and some discussion of relative costs
and funding for NGATS, or a definitive plan to produce these vital pieces
of information. While JPDO officials recognize that some stakeholders have
been critical of JPDO's progress to date, these officials believe that
given JPDO's mission--to involve partner agencies and nonfederal
stakeholders--progress will happen at a more measured pace.
Our own technical expert in enterprise architecture examined JPDO's draft
Concept of Operations and determined that it does not yet include key
elements such as scenarios illustrating NGATS operations; a summary of
NGATS' operational impact on users and other stakeholders; and an analysis
of the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for
NGATS.22 According to our technical expert, the draft Concept of
Operations lacks an overall description that ties together the five
areas--air navigation service operations, flight operations, network
centric infrastructure services, shared situational awareness services,
and security management services--that the draft document covers. Our
expert believes that the five areas are currently disjointed and that the
document only provides some details for one area--the air navigation
service operations. As noted earlier, JPDO officials are currently
incorporating stakeholder comments into the draft Concept of Operations
and will release another version.
22Our senior level technologist reviewed JPDO's Concept of Operations for
the Next Generation Air Transportation System, version 0.2, dated July 24,
2006, by comparing it with the IEEE Standard 1362-1998 for concept of
operations documents.
JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization, but Challenges Remain
Vision 100 calls for harmonization activities and some progress has been
made in facilitating harmonization, although challenges remain in creating
modernized systems that are globally interoperable. FAA and the European
Commission signed an MOU in July 2006 to ensure coordination between the
aviation modernization programs in Europe and the United States. According
to the MOU, FAA and the European Commission intend to explore and discuss
opportunities for implementing common or interoperable technologies and
synchronizing time lines in the development of regulations, standards,
procedures, research and development, and other activities to be agreed
upon later. The MOU provides broadly for these activities to be
accomplished through information exchanges, coordination of studies, and
participation in working groups and consultative bodies. JPDO is currently
working with the European Commission to plan regular technical interchange
meetings to conduct peer reviews of NGATS and SESAR developments. Two of
these meetings are tentatively planned for fiscal year 2007, according to
JPDO officials.
JPDO's Global Harmonization IPT (led by FAA) is planning cooperative
activities and has made some progress, although the IPT is still early in
its planning activity. The Global Harmonization IPT, whose mission is to
harmonize equipment and operations globally and to advocate the adoption
of U.S.-preferred transformation concepts, technologies, procedures, and
standards, is led by managers from ATO's Operations Planning Services
International and FAA's Office of International Aviation. The IPT
finalized its charter in March 2006 and is working to develop an
international strategy and outreach plan. As part of this effort, JPDO and
FAA officials have met with officials from various parts of the
world--including Europe, Canada, China, Japan, and Mexico--to assess the
potential for cooperative NGATS demonstrations. JPDO officials noted that
there are working visits and ongoing negotiations with China and Japan on
MOUs, and ADS-B activities in Australia and East Africa. Internally, the
Global Harmonization IPT also plans to raise awareness of harmonization
issues within the other IPTs as they consider performance requirements for
NGATS.
FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully Implement NGATS
Institutionalizing ATO's recent improvements in management and acquisition
processes will be critical to the successful implementation of NGATS. FAA
will be challenged to fund operation of the current air traffic control
system while simultaneously funding the implementation of and transition
to NGATS technologies and systems. FAA will also be challenged to obtain
the expertise needed to implement a system as complex as NGATS.
Institutionalizing Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition Processes
Will Be Critical to the Successful Implementation of NGATS
As the primary entity responsible for implementing NGATS, FAA will need to
ensure that the management reforms it has recently instituted continue.
Since 1995, we have designated FAA's ATC modernization program as high
risk because of systemic management and acquisition problems. Realization
of NGATS's goals could be severely compromised if these problems carry
over into FAA's implementation of NGATS, which is an even more complex and
ambitious undertaking than past ATC modernization efforts.
FAA has recently taken a number of actions aimed at improving its
management practices. FAA hired a Chief Operating Officer in 2003 and
established the performance-based ATO in early 2004 to operate and
modernize the air traffic control system. Since the establishment of ATO,
the Chief Operating Officer has been focusing on implementing more
businesslike management and acquisition processes to address the cost,
schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued ATC modernization
over the years. Under the new structure, FAA is a flatter organization,
with fewer management layers, and managers are in closer contact with the
services they deliver. FAA has also taken some steps to break down the
vertical lines of authority, or organizational stovepipes, that we found
hindered communication and coordination across FAA. To increase
accountability, FAA has established a cost accounting system and made the
units that deliver services within each department responsible for
managing their own costs. In addition, managers are evaluated and rewarded
according to how well they hold their costs within established targets.23
Finally, FAA is revising its acquisition processes, as we recommended,24
and is taking steps to improve oversight, operational efficiency, and cost
control. To ensure executive-level oversight of all key decisions, FAA has
revised its Acquisition Management System to incorporate key decision
points in a knowledge-based product development process. Moreover, as we
have reported,25 an executive council now reviews major acquisitions
before they are sent to FAA's Joint Resources Council.26 To better manage
cost growth, this executive council also reviews breaches of 5 percent or
more in a project's cost, schedule, or performance. FAA has also issued
guidelines for disclosing the levels of uncertainty and imprecision that
are inherent in cost estimates for major ATC systems and has begun to base
funding decisions for system acquisitions on a system's expected
contribution to controlling operating costs.
23Our work has shown that it is important, when implementing
organizational transformations, to use a performance management system to
assure accountability for change. See [42]GAO-03-669 .
24GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has Improved, but
Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure Results,
[43]GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).
25 [44]GAO-05-23 .
To its credit, FAA has taken steps to institutionalize these
improvements--that is, provide for their duration beyond the current
administration at FAA and ATO by ensuring that the reforms are fully
integrated into the agency's structure and processes at all levels and
have become part of its organizational culture. FAA's strategic plan,
titled "Flight Plan 2006-2010," contains a strategy to implement corporate
systems, policies, programs, and tools to build a results-oriented,
high-performance workforce. FAA's Human Capital Plan includes a goal to
create a results-oriented culture and strategies for implementing
performance management and compensation systems that focus on achieving
results.
FAA has also established a performance goal and begun tracking metrics for
acquisitions. The goal for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 was to have 80
percent of its system acquisitions on schedule and within 10 percent of
budget. The goal gradually increases to 90 percent by fiscal year 2008.
The increase will make FAA's acquisition performance goal consistent with
targets set in the Department of Transportation's strategic plan and will
comply with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.27 To date,
FAA reports that it has been meeting its performance goal.
Our past work identified FAA's lack of a constructive acquisition
workforce culture as a key factor contributing to problems in its ATC
modernization program. We view FAA's changes as important steps toward
institutionalizing a results-oriented culture. Using a performance
management system to define responsibility and ensure accountability for
change is a key practice that can help agencies transform their cultures
so that they can be more results oriented, customer focused, and
collaborative. However, transforming organizational cultures requires
substantial management attention. The experiences of successful
transformations and change management initiatives in large public and
private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or more until
such initiatives are fully implemented, and cultures are transformed in a
sustainable manner.
26The Joint Resources Council is an executive body consisting of associate
and assistant administrators, acquisition executives, the Chief Financial
Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and legal counsel. The council
makes corporate-level decisions, including those that determine whether an
acquisition meets a mission need and should proceed. The council also
approves changes to a program's baseline, budget submissions, and the
National Airspace System's architecture baseline.
27Pub. L. No. 103-355.
Finding Resources to Implement NGATS and Operate the ATC System Poses a
Challenge
The cost of operating and maintaining the current ATC system while
implementing NGATS will be another important challenge in transitioning to
NGATS--a system that, as noted, is broader in scope than the current ATC
system and will require funding for security technologies and
environmental activities, as well as ATC technologies. Finding
opportunities to reduce costs or realize savings could mitigate this
challenge. Implementing the new technologies envisioned in the operational
concept for NGATS could provide opportunities for reducing costs. For
example, NGATS envisions more use of satellites for surveillance and
navigation, which could allow FAA to decommission some of its ground-based
navigational aids, such as compass locators, outer markers, and
nondirectional radio beacons. FAA also is working to reduce costs by
consolidating its administrative activities, currently decentralized
across its nine regions, into three regions, and anticipates an annual
savings of up to $460 million over the next 10 years.
Until FAA has completed its estimates of both NGATS costs and cost savings
that it will be able to achieve between now and 2025, it will not be able
to determine how far these cost savings will go toward financing NGATS.
Nonetheless, one expert has preliminarily estimated that FAA's current
expected savings through infrastructure and operational efficiencies will
be well below the amount needed to support NGATS capital funding.28 While
more information is needed to estimate the amount of any shortfall with
greater confidence, even the preliminary estimate signals the extent of
the resource challenge.
28Aviation Management Associates, Inc., The "No New Money" Scenario for
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (Alexandria, VA: Oct. 1,
2005).
FAA Faces Challenges in Obtaining the Expertise Needed to Implement a System as
Complex as NGATS
A lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA's past management of
ATC modernization projects. Although the personnel flexibilities that
Congress authorized in 1995 allowed FAA to establish criteria for
outstanding performance and match industry pay scales for needed
expertise, industry experts continue to question whether FAA will have the
technical expertise needed to implement NGATS--a task of unprecedented
complexity, according to JPDO, FAA, and other aviation experts. A panel of
experts that we convened in 2004 to discuss FAA's ATC modernization
program noted that a shortfall in technical expertise was the key
technical factor affecting modernization.29 The panelists said that FAA
sometimes lacked the technical proficiency to "scrub" project proposals
early on for potential problems and to oversee the contractors who
implemented its modernization projects.
The need for expertise also extends to the tasks of contract
administration. According to a 2005 study by the Merit Systems Protection
Board,30 at least 50 percent of the government's contracting officer
representatives--the government's technical experts who are responsible
for developing and managing the technical aspects of contracts--reported
needing training in areas such as contract law, developing requirements,
requesting bids, developing bid selection criteria and price
determinations, and monitoring contractor performance.
Recognizing the complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the
possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it
without assistance, we have identified potential approaches for
supplementing FAA's capabilities. One of these approaches is for FAA to
contract with a lead systems integrator (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a
prime contractor that would help to ensure that the discrete systems used
in NGATS will operate together and whose responsibilities may include
designing system solutions, developing requirements, and selecting major
system and subsystem contractors. The government has used LSIs before for
programs that require the integration of multiple complex systems. Our
research indicates that, although LSIs have certain advantages, such as
the knowledge, understanding, skills, and ability to integrate functions
across various systems, their use also entails certain risks. For example,
because an LSI may have significantly more responsibility than a prime
contractor usually does, careful oversight is necessary to ensure that the
government's interests are protected and that conflicts of interest are
avoided. Consequently, selecting, assigning responsibilities to, and
managing an LSI could pose significant challenges for JPDO and FAA.
29GAO, National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air
Traffic Control Modernization Program, [45]GAO-05-333SP (Washington, D.C.:
April 2005).
30U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Contracting Officer
Representatives: Managing the Government's Technical Experts to Achieve
Positive Contract Outcomes (Washington, D.C.: December 2005).
Another approach that we have identified involves obtaining technical
advice from federally funded research and development corporations to help
the agency oversee and manage prime contractors. These nonprofit
corporations are chartered to provide long-term technical advice to
government agencies in accordance with various statutory and regulatory
rules to ensure independence and prevent conflicts of interest. FAA
officials indicated that they are considering these two approaches to help
address any possible gaps the agency may have in its technical expertise.
However, FAA has not yet formally explored its strengths and weaknesses
with regard to the technical expertise and contract management expertise
that will be required of it to define, implement, and integrate the
numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the transition to NGATS.
Conclusions
Transforming the National Airspace System to accommodate what could be
three times the current demand for air transportation services by 2025,
providing appropriate security and environmental safeguards, and doing
these things seamlessly while the current system continues to operate will
be an enormously complex undertaking. As JPDO notes in its Integrated
Plan, there has never been a transformation effort similar to this one
with as many stakeholders and as broad a scope. As JPDO nears the end of
its third year of operation, it has done a significant amount of work to
create an organizational structure that facilitates the federal
interagency collaboration and stakeholder participation that must occur
for the office to be successful in its mission. JPDO has made significant
strides in meeting its planning and coordination role as set forth by
Congress.
However, there are some practices important to institutionalizing the
collaborative process that JPDO has not yet established. These practices
could improve the office's chances for long-term success. Clearly defining
roles and responsibilities of all the parties at all the organizational
levels is fundamental to such a large and complex collaborative effort. To
date, JPDO has established its basic organizational structure but has not
yet refined the roles and responsibilities within those structures.
Particularly important will be the ability of JPDO and ATO to define their
roles and responsibilities and form a collaborative environment for
planning and implementing the next generation system. Also important to
JPDO's success are establishing mechanisms for dispute resolution,
leveraging resources, and ensuring the involvement of all crucial
stakeholders in the planning for NGATS. While JPDO has incorporated
numerous stakeholders from industry, academia, and state and local
governments into the IPTs, current air traffic controllers represent one
important group of stakeholders who are not participating at this time.
Other areas important to NGATS need to evolve further. JPDO has begun the
process of developing cost estimates with the series of workshops that it
is holding, and these workshops should be very helpful to JPDO in
obtaining crucial stakeholder input on cost issues. However, much work
remains before any type of reliable and comprehensive estimates for NGATS
costs can be expected. Without cost information, Congress is handicapped
in its efforts to plan accordingly for NGATS. It will be important, as the
enterprise architecture takes shape, that JPDO expedite its efforts to
provide Congress with credible cost estimates that include costs for all
of the JPDO partner agencies, as well as costs related to training,
technology development, and demonstration projects.
Another important area is ensuring global harmonization on systems and
procedures so that international travel and commerce are not harmed by
incompatible modernization efforts. The establishment of JPDO's Global
Harmonization IPT and the recent signing of the MOU between FAA and the
European Commission should begin to address the many issues involved with
harmonization, but it is not yet clear what specifically will be done to
further international cooperation. Finally, as noted, the complexity of
the effort to transform the nation's air transportation system is
staggering. FAA will be challenged to have in place the technical and
contracting expertise needed to manage the transition to NGATS.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Because of the importance of the successful planning and implementation of
NGATS and the need for effective collaboration between diverse
organizations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation
direct JPDO to take the following five actions:
o To better institutionalize its practices and expectations for
interagency collaboration and stakeholder involvement, JPDO should
finalize and present to the Senior Policy Committee for its
consideration and action the MOU among the partner agencies to
define their roles and responsibilities related to NGATS planning
and development.
o Clarify the roles and responsibilities between JPDO and ATO in
the planning, development, and transition from JPDO to FAA for
implementation of NGATS.
o Develop written procedures that formalize agreements with OMB
regarding the leveraging of partner agency resources and the
identification of NGATS-related programs within agency budgets.
o Develop written procedures for dispute resolution at all levels
of the JPDO organization.
o To better ensure the involvement of all key stakeholders in the
NGATS planning process, determine whether key stakeholders and
expertise are not represented on JPDO's integrated product teams,
divisions, or elsewhere within its organization. For example, JPDO
should consider the addition of active, subject matter expert air
traffic controllers to its integrated product teams.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct
FAA to take the following action:
o Given the technical complexity of the implementation of NGATS
and FAA's past experiences, undertake a formal exploration of
FAA's strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical
expertise and contract management expertise that will be required
to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs
and systems inherent in the transition to NGATS. For example, FAA
should work to determine whether it will need to contract with an
LSI, federally-funded not-for-profit corporation, or other
technical or managerial entity to assist in the implementation of
NGATS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; JPDO; NASA;
and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for
their review and comment. NASA provided written comments, which
are reprinted in appendix IV. Transportation, FAA, JPDO, Homeland
Security, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy provided
technical clarifications and additional information, which we
incorporated into this report as appropriate. FAA and JPDO neither
agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but said they would
consider them. Commerce and Defense had no comments on the draft
report.
NASA generally agreed with the report's contents, but highlighted
three items that the agency felt were important. First, NASA
believes that its return to fundamental aeronautics research will
be critical to the success of NGATS and is uniquely suited to
NASA's core expertise. NASA stated that until the enterprise
architecture, operational improvement road maps, and integrated
capability work plans are developed, any assertion of a technology
development gap is highly speculative and cannot be factually
substantiated. As our report points out, NASA plans, to its
credit, to address the research and development needs of NGATS.
However, as our report also points out, numerous experts and
stakeholders with whom we spoke believed that NASA's move toward
fundamental research does create a technology development gap and
that it is unclear at this time what entity will do the
developmental work for NGATS technologies prior to transitioning
these technologies to an acquisition program. Our work has shown
that developing technology to higher levels of maturity help avoid
cost, schedule, and performance problems later, as systems are
acquired. For example, we have reported that cost overruns,
schedule delays, and performance shortfalls occurred in the
Department of Defense's weapons acquisitions, in part because the
technologies were transitioned to acquisitions before they were
fully developed. Second, NASA noted that, while it leads the Agile
Air Traffic System IPT, implementation of the system will be the
responsibility of FAA. We agree and do not intend to suggest in
our report that an agency's leadership of an IPT implies that an
agency is necessarily responsible for implementation of related
systems. We modified the text accordingly. Finally, NASA notes
that the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget Request and run out
for NASA aeronautics research projects a relatively flat, not
declining, funding profile. However, as we have noted in a recent
report, when converted into 2005 dollars, NASA's proposed
aeronautics research budget will decrease by nearly 30 percent
from $906 million in 2005 to $647 million (in 2005 dollars) in
2011.31
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to interested congressional committees and
the members of the JPDO Senior Policy Committee, JPDO Board, and
the JPDO Executive Director. We also will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me on 202-512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues
31GAO-06-920.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined (1) the status of the Joint Planning and Development
Office's (JPDO) efforts to plan for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NGATS), (2) the key challenges facing JPDO
as it moves forward with its planning efforts, and (3) the key
challenges facing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as it
implements the transformation while continuing its current
operations.
To determine the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS and
the challenges that the office faces, we discussed JPDO's plans
and products with the office's Director, Deputy Director, division
heads, and the leaders of each JPDO integrated product team (IPT).
We reviewed relevant literature and JPDO publications, including
JPDO's December 2004 Integrated Plan, 2005 Progress Report, and
draft NGATS Concept of Operations. We reviewed previous GAO
reports on the National Airspace System, air traffic control
modernization, and federal interagency collaboration. We reviewed
the National Academy of Sciences' 2005 report on JPDO entitled
"Technology Pathways: Assessing the Integrated Plan for a Next
Generation Air Transportation System." We assessed the status and
challenges of JPDO's framework for facilitating coordination among
its partner agencies by comparing JPDO's efforts to date against
selected key practices that we have reported can enhance and
sustain federal collaborative efforts.1 We selected five of eight
practices as criteria for this review because they are significant
to building the framework needed for any collaboration and are
particularly important to JPDO at this early juncture in its
collaborative efforts. The key practices used for this assessment
include defining and articulating a common outcome, establishing
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, identifying and
addressing needs by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and
responsibilities, and reinforcing agency accountability for
collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.2 We
assessed JPDO's efforts to obtain the participation of nonfederal
stakeholders by obtaining the perspectives of nonfederal
stakeholders involved with JPDO and drawing on our body of work on
stakeholder involvement. We assessed JPDO's technical planning
efforts for NGATS by comparing JPDO's practices with those that we
have found to be effective in developing enterprise
architectures.3 We also obtained the perspectives of nonfederal
stakeholders whose organizations are represented on the Institute
Management Council of the NGATS Institute, and interviewed
nonfederal stakeholders who represent the aviation industry on
various IPTs. We met with FAA's Chief Architect to discuss how
FAA's enterprise architecture for the National Airspace System
would be integrated into that for NGATS, as well as cost estimates
for NGATS. We also discussed NGATS cost estimates with a member of
FAA's Research, Development and Engineering Advisory Committee
(REDAC) and obtained information on REDAC's estimate of future FAA
costs under NGATS. We did not review in detail the methodology or
assumptions that REDAC used to develop this estimate.
Additionally, we observed two NGATS Investment Analysis
Workshops--one held with commercial and business aviation
stakeholders and one held with general aviation stakeholders. One
of our senior level technologists from our Applied Research and
Methods team, who has been involved in our past work on enterprise
architectures and has contributed to our federal guide on
enterprise architecture, reviewed JPDO's draft Concept of
Operations by comparing it with the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Standard 1362-1998 for concept
of operations documents.4 We also conducted a one-day panel of
aviation experts during which we sought their perspectives on the
status of JPDO's planning efforts and the challenges that it faces
in planning for NGATS. For more detailed information on the expert
panel, see appendix II.
Because international harmonization is a key element of NGATS and
the European Union has embarked on a concurrent venture known as
the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme
(SESAR), we obtained information on the plans for SESAR and
discussed harmonization issues with officials in France, Belgium,
and the Netherlands.
To determine the challenges that FAA faces in implementing NGATS,
we met with the agency's Chief Operating Officer to discuss how
FAA would integrate the many expected components of NGATS into
FAA's modernization plans. We also discussed FAA's implementation
plans for System Wide Information Management and Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, two key elements of NGATS, with
these programs' respective program management officials and drew
upon our work examining FAA's program to modernize the National
Airspace System.
We conducted our work between July 2005 and September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1 [47]GAO-06-15 .
2The remaining three practices include establishing compatible policies,
procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries;
developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and
reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through
performance management systems.
3An enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for understanding and
planning complex systems. JPDO anticipates that the NGATS enterprise
architecture will provide the means for coordinating among the partner
agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
development activities, and integrating equipment. See [48]GAO-05-266 .
4IEEE is a nonprofit, technical professional association that develops
standards for a broad range of global industries, including the
information technology and information assurance industries and is a
leading source for defining best practices.
Appendix II: Results of Expert Panel Voting
We contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a
panel of experts and stakeholders. Our panel was held on March 2,
2006, at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. The
panel consisted of 14 experts from the aviation industry and
academia, one of whom served as the panel's moderator. (See table
2.) We worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify
and select panelists who were knowledgeable about the efforts of
the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and could respond
to our questions about JPDO's achievements and challenges. The
panelists were asked to provide their views during several
sessions held during the day.
Table 2: Names and Affiliations of Expert Panelists
Name Affiliation
Ronald R. Fogleman Principal, Durango Aerospace, Inc.; Chief of Staff,
(moderator) U.S. Air Force (retired)
Langhorne Bond President, International Loran Association; Federal
Aviation Adminiatration (FAA) Administrator (retired)
Carol Carmody Director of Transportation Initiatives, The National
Academy of Public Administration
Jerald M. Davis President, Foxfire Inc.; FAA (retired)
Soeren Fischer Vice President Strategy & Communication, Air Traffic
Alliance
Mark Hansen Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, University of California-Berkeley
John B. Hayhurst Senior Vice President, The Boeing Company (retired)
Richard E. Heinrich Director, Strategic Initiatives, Commercial Systems,
Rockwell Collins, Inc.
Bill Jeffers Senior Director, FAA Programs, ARINC; FAA (retired)
Richard Marchi Senior Advisor, Airports Council International-North
America
Amy R. Pritchett David S. Lewis Associate Professor of Cognitive
Engineering, School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia
Institute of Technology
Dorothy Robyn The Brattle Group, Inc.
William F. Wangerien Vice President, Operations, Planning, and Reliability
Control, Delta Airlines, Inc. (retired)
Christopher Wickens Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Sources: GAO and National Academy of Sciences.
Following a welcome and introductions, the panel moved into the four
sessions, as follows:
o Session One: Overview of JPDO. In this session, the Chief
Operating Officer of FAA and the Acting Deputy Director of JPDO
each gave a presentation and answered questions from the
panelists. The Chief Operating Officer discussed the challenges of
running a complex air traffic organization. The Acting Deputy of
JPDO explained how the office is organized to attract public and
private sector expertise. These officials departed prior to the
second session.
o Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges. The
panelists were asked to identify what they considered to be JPDO's
major achievements of the past 2 years and why. Following that
discussion, they were asked to identify the major challenges ahead
for JPDO and how those challenges might hinder JPDO's ability to
move forward with planning and developing the next generation air
transportation system (NGATS).
o Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges. The
panelists were asked to identify strategies that JPDO could use to
address the challenges identified in session two.
o Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation. Panelists
were asked to discuss how the different accountability and
authority mechanisms of the JPDO and Single European Sky Air
Traffic Management Research Programme (SESAR) could affect the
success of each effort. They were also asked to what extent
harmonization is important and why. Finally, they were asked what
lessons were learned from other collaborative efforts between
nations or cabinet-level departments.
At the end of the last three sessions, panelists were asked to
respond to questions that summarized the issues discussed. For
example, at the end of the second session, panelists were asked to
select what they considered to be the top achievements from the
full list of the achievements that they generated during the
discussion.1 For another session, panelists were asked about their
level of concern on issues related to the level of coordination
between Europe and the United States. In an attempt to provide
context for the achievements and challenges as well as the other
voting results, we examined the transcript to obtain statements in
support of the most widely held views for each question. The views
expressed by the panelists were their own and do not necessarily
represent the views of GAO or the National Academy of Sciences.
Session Two: Identifying JPDO�s Achievements and Challenges
During the second session, panelists discussed what they
considered to be JPDO's major achievements over the past 2 years.
At the end of the discussion, the panelists generated a list of
what they considered to the JPDO's most significant achievements,
in no particular order. To differentiate the relative significance
of the achievements, each panelist was asked, in a series of three
questions, to vote for the achievement he or she believed was the
first, second, and third most significant. To produce a rank order
of items on the list, achievements identified as the first most
significant were assigned three points, the second most
significant achievements were assigned two points, and the third
most significant were assigned one point. The weighted values for
each achievement were summed and then ordered from the
achievements with the highest number of points to the lowest. (See
table 3.)
Table 3: Expert Panel Votes on Top Achievements of JPDO
Expert panel votes--achievements Rank
Established process (IPTs, NGATS Institute) 1
Senior-level interest 2
Established products (plans, organization) 3
Provided vision 4
Agency coordination, common dialogue 5
Began efforts to integrate budgets 6
Jump start: looking backward for continuity 7
Involvement of private sector 8
Source: GAO.
Note: When weighted rankings resulted in a tie, the tie was broken
by determining which category had the highest number of votes in
the first round, and, if necessary, the second round.
Panelists identified JPDO's top achievement as establishing a
process for conducting work related to the planning of NGATS. This
included setting up the integrated product teams (IPT) and the
NGATS Institute. One panel member said that JPDO had established a
process. Another panelist stated that JPDO had taken "a
significant step forward" by developing a process that brought
people from different groups together in the same room to talk
about building the aviation system of the future. Another panelist
credited JPDO with establishing the NGATS Institute.
Panelists felt that senior-level interest was the second most
significant achievement. For example, JPDO's Senior Policy
Committee includes cabinet-level representation. During the
discussion, one panelist said he believed that the level of
interest shown by people within different cabinet departments and
other agencies was good.
Finally, panelists identified the development of products,
including plans and organizational structures, as the third most
significant achievement. For example, one panelist said that
having JPDO produce a product (i.e., the Integrated Plan) that
Congress asked for, and delivering it on time, was a major
achievement. Another panelist felt that JPDO provided continuity
when it decided to incorporate Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information
Management (SWIM) into its future plans. Too often, the panelist
said, plans do not take into account past research and lessons
learned.
During the second session, panelists also identified what they
thought were the top three challenges facing JPDO. To produce a
list of challenges, we followed the same general procedure used to
identify JPDO's major achievements as described above. That is,
the panelists were asked a series of three questions and the
answers were weighted to generate a single ranking. (See table 4.)
Table 4: Expert Panel Votes on Top Challenges Facing JPDO
Expert panel votes--challenges Rank
Credibility (roadmap, detailed plan) 1
Lack of national priority 2
Collaborate with rest of the world 3
Lack of comprehensive plan 4
Responsibility without authority 5
Clarify relationship of JPDO/ATOa 6
Tension between mission and politics 7
Enterprise architecture accomplishments 8
Impact of annual budget process (Tie) 9
Unclear mandate (Tie) 9
Source: GAO.
aATO is FAA's Air Traffic Organization.
Note: When weighted rankings resulted in a tie, the tie was broken
by determining which category had the highest number of votes in
the first round, and, if necessary, the second round.
Panelists identified establishing credibility as the top challenge
facing JPDO, due to FAA's past track record in air traffic control
modernization, the lack of detail in the Integrated Plan, and a
lack of air traffic controller and/or union involvement. For
example, one panelist noted that early investors in previous
modernization attempts did not always get the payback from their
investment in new technology because of a lack of follow-through
on programs that would use that technology. Some panelists were
worried that the NGATS effort will simply be another failed effort
at modernization. Second, some panelists felt that the Integrated
Plan's lack of meaningful details directly impinged on JPDO's
credibility. For example, one cited the National Research
Council's evaluation of the Integrated Plan and said the plan was
more "an aspirational vision than an integrated plan."2 A second
panelist said the only thing new in the JPDO vision was that it
contained some information about security. Another said, "We're
not convinced they're looking at the personnel issues, the
aircraft issues, the economic issues, [or] the way to motivate
people." Third, panelists also cited a lack of air traffic
controllers' or union involvement in JPDO's process as a problem.
Controllers have to be brought on board as equal partners or
JPDO's efforts are "not going to work," said one panelist.
Panelists cited the second biggest challenge facing JPDO as the
fact that NGATS is not viewed as a national priority; the
panelists devoted a considerable amount of discussion to this
topic. One panelist stated that "changing the airspace" needs to
be made a presidential priority in order to get enough interest to
align budgets and resources and to execute the program. In the
words of another panelist, "...until there is some clear national
priority given to this whole idea of the next generation airspace
or plan or concept...it's going to be a series of band-aids and
stops and starts."
The need to collaborate with the rest of the world was considered
the third most significant challenge facing JPDO because the
office will have to work with both the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and SESAR, the panelists said.3
Collaboration is necessary to harmonize as many aviation
procedures as possible, panelists said. One panelist noted that
because of ICAO's international role, it was really crucial that
JPDO, FAA's ATO, and FAA keep ICAO informed. For example, the
panelist said, "talk to them, brief them, collaborate with them,
so that when there is a solution or a decision made about how to
go forward, that it's not sprung on the rest of the world, but the
rest of the world has some awareness of how we got there."
Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO�s Challenges
In the third session, panelists were asked to discuss strategies
that they felt JPDO could use to address the challenges that the
panelists had identified in session two. At the end of the
discussion, panelists generated a list of what they considered to
be the most significant strategies, in no particular order.
Panelists were asked in a series of questions to identify which
strategies, in their opinion, should be implemented within the
next 1-2 years, the next 3-5 years, and beyond 5 years. The
results for each question below were ranked by the number of
votes. (See tables 5-7.)
Table 5: Short-term Strategies for JPDO
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the
short term (within the next 1-2 years)? Number of votes
Outsource the development of the plan 5
Appoint, support, and sustain strong leadership 4
Restructure the plan (stakeholder, requirements, metrics)
and gap analysis 3
Presidential directive 1
Formalize collaborative structure with SESAR 1
Define stakeholders (European model, other analyses) 0
Better explain the economic consequences of doing nothing 0
Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-ATO relationship
and address legislative responsibilities 0
Total 14
Source: GAO.
Five of the 14 panelists identified outsourcing the development of
the NGATS plan as critical to JPDO's efforts in the short term
(i.e., the next 1 to 2 years). According to the panelists,
outsourcing to a contractor or group of contractors would have
several benefits, including a more businesslike approach, more
rapid completion of the planning, and more opportunity for a range
of aviation companies to be involved (including some companies
from other countries). One panelist felt that JPDO's bureaucracy
and political constraints impaired its ability to develop the
business and technical plan needed for the future. Another
panelist believed that without outsourcing, JPDO may not succeed,
something that could delay development of the system by three to
five years. "And this is not a time that we can afford that," the
panelist said.
The second critical short-term strategy for JPDO, according to the
panelists, is appointing, supporting, and sustaining strong
leadership. Panelists said they were concerned about the turnover
in leadership at JPDO. One panelist stated, "They haven't had
sustained, strong leadership," noting JPDO had had three
directors, while another negatively remarked about JPDO's
"revolving door structure." One panelist also noted that, unlike
Europe, the United States has no highly placed public official who
acts as an advocate for the plan. In Europe, for example, the Vice
President of the European Commission spent time advocating in
addition to her regular duties. The panelist said that the
leadership of this official is one of the single biggest
differences that explain where the United States is versus where
the European Union is today.
The third short-term strategy that panelists believed was critical
to JPDO is restructuring the parts of the plan that relate to
stakeholders, requirements and metrics, and performing a gap
analysis. JPDO "ought to at least look at the European model as a
place to start defining stakeholders," one panelist said.
Panelists also urged that the NGATS plan be restructured to
incorporate metrics. The plan, one panelist said, is a large
design problem that should be approached by figuring out what the
metrics are, as well as the core issues and requirements. The plan
should describe work being done and provide a clear statement of
the metrics that should be achieved by 2025, as well as the
interim milestones. Panelists additionally stated that a "gap"
plan should be developed to identify areas that might fall between
the ATO's and JPDO's efforts. The gap plan would need to be
comprehensive, understandable, and explain who will do what and
when it will be mandated.
Table 6: Midterm Strategies for JPDO
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the
midterm (within the next 3-5 years)? Number of votes
Restructure the plan (stakeholder, requirements, metrics)
and gap analysis 3
Outsource the development of the plan 3
Formalize collaborative structure with SESAR 3
Appoint, support, and sustain strong leadership 2
Better explain the economic consequences of doing nothing 2
Presidential directive 1
Define stakeholders (European model, other analyses) 0
Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-ATO relationship
and address legislative responsibilities 0
Total 14
Source: GAO.
Panelists again identified restructuring the plan and conducting a
gap analysis, as well as outsourcing the development of the plan,
as two of the key midterm (3-5 years) strategies for JPDO. The
panelists also identified establishing a structure that formalizes
collaboration with SESAR as a third midterm strategy. One panelist
said that JPDO should work with ICAO to come up with a structural
framework for a full exchange between JPDO and SESAR--one that
extends beyond the exchange of a few experts.4 Collaboration is
important not only between JPDO and SESAR but also for the
companies involved, the panelist said. For example, because Boeing
and Rockwell Collins are working with SESAR, they contribute their
views about technology, which will then become incorporated to
ensure interoperability. In addition, panelists noted the
importance of a collaborative structure is to help define a common
set of performance requirements, especially for the airlines.
"They want one set of procedures to be able to fly from A to B.
And this is not only Europe, but worldwide," one panelist said.
Table 7: Long-term Strategies for JPDO
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the
long term (more than 5 years)? Number of votes
Formalize collaborative structure with SESAR 5
Restructure the plan (stakeholder, requirements, metrics)
and gap analysis 3
Appoint, support, and sustain strong leadership 2
Outsource the development of the plan 2
Better explain the economic consequences of doing nothing 1
Presidential directive 1
Define stakeholders (European model, other analyses) 0
Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-ATO relationship
and address legislative responsibilities 0
Total 14
Source: GAO.
Panelists identified the four most important long-term (more than
5 years) strategies for JPDO as (1) formalizing a collaborative
structure with SESAR; (2) restructuring the plan; (3) appointing,
supporting, and sustaining strong leadership; and (4) outsourcing
the development of the plan, as discussed above.
Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation
The fourth session focused on global harmonization and
cooperation. Panelists were asked to discuss how the different
accountability and authority mechanisms of JPDO and SESAR could
affect the success of each effort. They were also asked to what
extent harmonization is important and why. Finally, they were
asked what lessons were learned from other collaborative efforts
between nations or other cabinet-level departments. The panelists
were then asked to vote on the questions below. In this case, the
possible answers were generated by GAO prior to the expert panel.
(See table 8.)
Table 8: Importance of JPDO Involvement in Harmonization Efforts
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an
essential component for the success of NGATS. Do you: Number of votes
Strongly agree 10
Agree 2
Strongly disagree 0
Neither agree nor disagree 0
Disagree 2
Don't know 0
Total 14
Source: GAO.
Panelists overwhelmingly agreed that JPDO's involvement in global
harmonization is essential for the success of NGATS. Panelists
said that involvement in global harmonization efforts results in
information sharing that benefits all member countries, largely
through ICAO. One panelist noted that ICAO has a fairly good track
record in helping member states reach agreement on harmonized
standards. Panelists also noted that such collaborative efforts
can result in sharing of best practices, as well as a working
relationship with the European Union's SESAR effort. For example,
one item for collaboration between JPDO and SESAR is resolving
time frames for completion. JPDO has 2025 deadline, while SESAR's
is 2020. "Gaps in things like that could be closed with
cooperation and collaboration," one panelist said.
Table 9: Level of Coordination between Europe and the United
States
Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe
and the United States, we should be: Number of votes
Very greatly concerned 7
Greatly concerned 4
Moderately concerned 1
Somewhat concerned 1
Not concerned 1
Total 14
Source: GAO.
Most panelists said that they were very greatly concerned, or
greatly concerned, about the current level of coordination between
the United States and Europe regarding global harmonization. (See
table 9.) One panelist stated that the existing concept of
operations was developed with considerable coordination with other
countries and thought that JPDO's credibility would be harmed if
it unilaterally developed a concept of operations. Another
panelist added that the United States had worked closely with
Europe to develop Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures,
which helps increase international travel capacity. In less than
10 years, this project went from an idea to a system that a number
of people and countries supported, the panelist said. That
achievement was done with very close coordination among the FAA,
the U.S. aviation industry, and the European authorities and
experts, the panelist said.
Table 10: Preparation for Success
Which initiative is better organized for success? Number of votes
Europe 12
Too early to tell 2
United States 0
Don't know 0
Total 14
Source: GAO.
Panelists overwhelmingly said Europe's SESAR initiative was better
organized than JPDO for success. (See table 10.) They cited
several reasons, including SESAR's public-private partnership that
focuses on letting industry develop the European plan. They also
raised concerns that there was a lack of leadership with the U.S.
effort, that there had been much activity but little progress, and
that the sheer size of JPDO's bureaucracy would hinder progress.
In discussing the area of public-private partnerships, one
panelist noted that SESAR's organization was industry-centric, as
opposed to the U.S. effort, which involves a service provider or
political-centric activity. One panelist stated that "[W]e have
two different models. I think one is headed toward success and one
is going to be fraught with the problems of the past. So a
solution-oriented answer is a more deeply focused industry set of
implementations as opposed to an advisory role." Another panelist
expressed concern that FAA has a tendency to pick a project de
jour and that project is now JPDO. Noting JPDO's complex
organizational chart, the panelist said, "[It] is nothing compared
to the complexity that's been built into the processes down at the
IPT level." The panelist said that people are being asked to make
very large commitments of time to participate in multiple
subgroups on each of eight IPTs, plus the NGATS institute. "I'm
just concerned that there's an awful lot of process here and not
much substance," said the panelist.
1Panelists voted electronically at the end of the last three sessions
using voting equipment provided by GAO.
2National Research Council of National Academies Technology Pathways:
Assessing the Integrated Plan for a Next Generation Air Transportation
System (Washington, D.C.: 2005).
3ICAO was established in 1944 by 52 nations whose aim was to assure the
safe, orderly and economic development of international air transport.
ICAO serves as the global forum for civil aviation.
4It should be noted that on July 18, 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) was signed between FAA and the European Commission. This MOU
establishes a framework for cooperation between the FAA and the European
Commission.
Appendix III: SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization Initiative
The Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme
(SESAR) is in some ways the European equivalent of next generation
air transportation system (NGATS). While both initiatives are
designed to increase the capacity of their respective air traffic
management systems to meet expected increases in demand, SESAR is
also intended to address Europe's historically fragmented
airspace. Europe's patchwork of national systems has led to
inefficiencies, capacity constraints, and delays. European
countries have individually developed their air traffic management
systems, but this uncoordinated development risks duplication of
effort, significant additional cost, and unnecessary delays in the
introduction of new equipment. The European Organisation for the
Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), ATM 2000+ Strategy, and
other initiatives had attempted to address these issues by
obtaining collaboration among the numerous stakeholders. However,
these efforts did not always include all stakeholders, and
progress was impeded because consensus could not be reached.
Hence, the delays continue and problems are expected to worsen
with the expectation of at least a doubling of demand by 2020.
To more forcefully address these issues, the European Parliament
and member states agreed on regulations that were entered into
force in April 2004 creating a "Single European Sky." In contrast
to past efforts by Eurocontrol, the Single European Sky
legislation provides more authority to unify and harmonize air
traffic management equipment and procedures throughout Europe and
establishes various mechanisms to help ensure the participation of
stakeholders. To carry out the Single European Sky vision, the
European Commission and Eurocontrol created the SESAR project,
which is divided in two major phases: definition and
implementation, and is expected to last until 2020.
The definition phase of SESAR started in March 2006 and will last
2 years. Planning done under the definition phase is being handled
by a 29-member SESAR Consortium that includes airlines, air
navigation service providers, airports, and suppliers. The SESAR
Consortium is performing the planning under a contractual
arrangement with Eurocontrol that calls for specific time lines
and deliverables. The SESAR Consortium has formed a 10-member
executive committee to make decisions on deliverables, to make
other key decisions, and resolve disputes. To ensure that the
future users of the new system--the airlines--have a major say in
the outcome of the definition phase, four of the executive
committee members are representatives of airlines. The remainder
of the committee is composed of three members representing air
navigation service providers, two members representing airports,
and one member representing suppliers.
The day-to-day management of the definition phase is run by the
Air Traffic Alliance--a consortium of Airbus, EADS, and
Thales--following a call for tender for a project manager by
Eurocontrol. The Air Traffic Alliance answered the call and won
the contract, which calls for the delivery of a Master Plan that
will lay out a mission for the future Single European Sky and a
roadmap for implementation. The European Commission and
Eurocontrol have provided 60 million euros ($76 million) to fund
the project definition phase with half provided by each
organization.1
The SESAR Consortium is a bottom-up organization, meaning that the
aviation industry is essentially developing the ATM roadmap for
final approval by Eurocontrol and the European Commission. The
definition phase has been organized into six sequential
deliverables and 20 work packages. A mixture of consortium members
will work on each package, to ensure the appropriate use of
expertise and consideration of viewpoints. For example, airlines,
air navigation service providers, suppliers, and Eurocontrol, will
work on the Master Plan. The first deliverable, a report
describing the current air transport situation, identifying
critical issues, and recommending ways to address these issues was
published in July 2006.2
In addition to the SESAR members, several associations are project
associates, such as the International Air Transport Association,
which represents commercial airlines, and the European Cockpit
Association, which represents pilots. Project associates,
including U.S. companies Boeing, Rockwell Collins, and Honeywell,
are also involved in this phase of the project.
The second phase of SESAR--implementation (2007-2013)--will focus
on systems design and producing the key systems components. The
commission has proposed using a joint undertaking to implement the
Single European Sky. A joint undertaking is a legal entity that
permits a mixture of public and private funding and was also used
to implement Europe's Galileo satellite navigation system. The
plan for the joint undertaking, however, has not yet been
finalized under the European Union's procedures. Tentative plans
to fund the development phase (2008-2013) call for $381 million
annually.3 One-third of the funding would come from the
commission, one-third from Eurocontrol, and one-third from
industry.
1To convert euros to U.S. dollars, we used 1.26855, the foreign exchange
rate for September 19, 2006, as published in The Washington Post.
2SESAR Consortium, Air Transport Framework: The Current Situation,
DLM-0602-001-03-00 (July 2006).
3To convert euros to U.S. dollars, we used 1.26855, the foreign exchange
rate for September 19, 2006, as published in The Washington Post.
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Gerald Dillingham, (202) 512-2834, or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to
this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Jay Cherlow, Kevin Egan,
Colin Fallon, Brandon Haller, David Hooper, Heather Krause,
Elizabeth Marchak, Edmond Menoche, Faye Morrison, Taylor Reeves,
Richard Scott, and Sarah Veale.
Staff Acknowledgments
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Highlights of [57]GAO-07-25 , a report to congressional requesters
November 2006
NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
Airspace System
In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)
to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a
transformation from the current air traffic control system to the "next
generation air transportation system" (NGATS) by 2025. Housed within the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven partner agencies:
the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland
Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA);
and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. FAA will have
primary responsibility for implementing NGATS. This report addresses (1)
the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges
facing JPDO, and (3) the key challenges facing FAA as it implements the
transformation. To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant documents,
interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, and conducted an expert
panel.
[58]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that JPDO institutionalize its practices for interagency
collaboration and assess stakeholder involvement, and that FAA assess its
needs for technical expertise. JPDO and FAA commented that they plan to
consider GAO's recommendations. NASA highlighted the impact of its
refocused aeronautics research. GAO incorporated the other agencies'
technical comments as appropriate.
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordinating with its
partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with its
authorizing legislation and with several practices that GAO's previous
work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration. JPDO's
partner agencies have agreed on a vision for NGATS and on eight strategies
that broadly address the goals and objectives of NGATS. JPDO has been
developing an enterprise architecture (or blueprint) for NGATS and plans
to use the enterprise architecture and stakeholder input from investment
analysis workshops to develop a realistic cost estimate for NGATS.
JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative effort,
addressing planning and expertise gaps, establishing credibility with
stakeholders, and harmonizing its work with other countries' efforts to
modernize their own air traffic management systems. To date, JPDO has not
established some practices significant to institutionalizing its
collaborative process, such as formalizing roles and responsibilities.
Such practices are important because JPDO is fundamentally a planning and
coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and financial
resources needed to continue developing plans and system requirements for
NGATS.
FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to NGATS, faces challenges
both in institutionalizing the management reforms that it has made in
recent years that have contributed to its ability to meet its goals for
air traffic control system acquisitions and in obtaining the financial and
technical resources needed to implement NGATS. FAA also faces challenges
in finding ways to reduce costs or realize savings to help fund the costs
of transitioning to NGATS while continuing to operate and maintain the
current system. Finally, FAA faces challenges in obtaining the technical
and contract management expertise needed to define, implement, and
integrate the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the
transition to NGATS.
Seven Partner Agencies Form the Joint Planning and Development Office
References
Visible links
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-266
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-584G
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-920
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-154
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-23
44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-23
45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-333SP
47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-266
57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25
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