    Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
    Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
    Airspace System (13-NOV-06, GAO-07-25).

    In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development
    Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate, with federal and
    nonfederal stakeholders, a transformation from the current air
    traffic control system to the "next generation air transportation
    system" (NGATS) by 2025. Housed within the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven partner agencies: the
    Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland
    Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology
    Policy. FAA will have primary responsibility for implementing
    NGATS. This report addresses (1) the status of JPDO's efforts to
    plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges facing JPDO, and (3) the
    key challenges facing FAA as it implements the transformation. To
    address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant documents,
    interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, and conducted an
    expert panel.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-25
        ACCNO:   A63244
      TITLE:     Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
    Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
    Airspace System
         DATE:   11/13/2006
      SUBJECT:   Air traffic control systems
    	     Air traffic controllers
    	     Air transportation
    	     Commercial aviation
    	     Concept of operations
    	     Enterprise architecture
    	     Future budget projections
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Systems conversions
    	     Policies and procedures
    	     Program implementation
    	     Next Generation Air Transportation
    	     System

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    GAO-07-25

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background
         * [3]JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS

              * [4]As Required by Vision 100, JPDO Developed an Integrated Plan
              * [5]JPDO Developed an Organization for Involving Federal and Non
              * [6]JPDO Has Begun to Leverage the Resources of Its Partner Agen
              * [7]Consistent with Vision 100, JPDO Is Developing an Enterprise
              * [8]The Existing Cost Estimate for NGATS Is Incomplete
              * [9]JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization and H

         * [10]JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and I

              * [11]Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Challen
              * [12]JPDO Faces Challenges in Addressing Planning and Expertise G

                   * [13]Technology Development and Technology Transfer
                   * [14]Human Factors Research
                   * [15]Absence of Key Stakeholder Involvement

              * [16]Establishing Credibility with Stakeholders That the Governme
              * [17]JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization, but

         * [18]FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully

              * [19]Institutionalizing Recent Improvements in Management and Acq
              * [20]Finding Resources to Implement NGATS and Operate the ATC Sys
              * [21]FAA Faces Challenges in Obtaining the Expertise Needed to Im

         * [22]Conclusions
         * [23]Recommendations for Executive Action
         * [24]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * [25]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
         * [26]Appendix II: Results of Expert Panel Voting

              * [27]Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges
              * [28]Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges
              * [29]Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation

         * [30]Appendix III: SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization
         * [31]Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Spac
         * [32]Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

              * [33]GAO Contact
              * [34]Staff Acknowledgments

                   * [35]Order by Mail or Phone

    NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

    Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
    Airspace System

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    November 2006

    GAO-07-25

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 6
    JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS 7
    JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and
    Interoperability Challenges as It Moves Forward with NGATS 18
    FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully Implement
    NGATS 26
    Conclusions 31
    Recommendations for Executive Action 32
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
    Appendix II Results of Expert Panel Voting 39
    Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges 41
    Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges 44
    Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation 47
    Appendix III SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization Initiative 51
    Appendix IV Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration 54
    Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56

    Tables

    Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agency 11
    Table 2: Names and Affiliations of Expert Panelists 39
    Table 3: Expert Panel Votes on Top Achievements of JPDO 41
    Table 4: Expert Panel Votes on Top Challenges Facing JPDO 42
    Table 5: Short-term Strategies for JPDO 44
    Table 6: Midterm Strategies for JPDO 46
    Table 7: Long-term Strategies for JPDO 47
    Table 8: Importance of JPDO Involvement in Harmonization Efforts 48
    Table 9: Level of Coordination between Europe and the United States 48
    Table 10: Preparation for Success 49

    Figures

    Figure 1: Organization of JPDO 10
    Figure 2: REDAC's Funding Estimates for FAA under Status Quo and NGATS
    Scenarios, 2006-2025 16

    Abbreviations

    ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast ATC air traffic control
    ATO Air Traffic Organization DHS Department of Homeland Security DOC
    Department of Commerce DOD Department of Defense DOT Department of
    Transportation FAA Federal Aviation Administration ICAO International
    Civil Aviation Organization IPT integrated product team JPDO Joint
    Planning and Development Office LSI lead systems integrator MOU memorandum
    of understanding NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATCA
    National Air Traffic Controllers Association NGATS Next Generation Air
    Transportation System OMB Office of Management and Budget OSTP White House
    Office of Science and Technology Policy REDAC Research, Engineering and
    Development Advisory Committee SESAR Single European Sky Air Traffic
    Management Research Programme SWIM System Wide Information Management

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    November 13, 2006

    The Honorable Sherwood Boehlert Chairman The Honorable Bart Gordon Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Science House of Representatives

    The Honorable Ken Calvert Chairman The Honorable Mark Udall Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science
    House of Representatives

    While the health of the nation's air transportation system is critical to
    the economy, the current approach to managing air transportation is
    becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete. In 2003,
    Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development
    Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate a transition from the nation's
    current air traffic control system to the "next generation air
    transportation system" (NGATS)--a system intended to safely accommodate a
    possible tripling of air traffic by 2025. NGATS is envisioned as a major
    redesign of the air transportation system that will entail precision
    satellite navigation; digital, networked communications; an integrated
    weather system; layered, adaptive security; and more. Vision 100,1 the
    legislation that authorized JPDO, requires the office to operate in
    conjunction with multiple government agencies, including the Departments
    of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA); the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and
    Technology Policy. Although JPDO is responsible for planning the
    transformation to NGATS and coordinating the related efforts of its
    partner agencies, FAA will be largely responsible for implementing the
    policies and systems necessary for NGATS, while safely operating the
    current air traffic control system 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

    1Pub. L. No. 108-176, Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,
    December 12, 2003.

    In light of the difficulty and importance of the tasks before JPDO and
    FAA, you asked us to review the efforts to organize and plan for NGATS.
    Accordingly, we addressed the following questions: (1) What is the status
    of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS? (2) What key challenges does JPDO
    face in moving forward with its planning efforts? (3) What key challenges
    does FAA face as it moves toward implementing NGATS?

    To address the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS and the
    challenges that the office faces, we reviewed documents provided by JPDO
    and its partner agencies, including JPDO's December 2004 Integrated Plan,
    its 2005 Progress Report, and July 2006 draft Concept of Operations. We
    interviewed agency officials and stakeholders and convened a panel of
    experts to gather information and perspectives about the efforts of JPDO.
    We assessed the status and challenges of JPDO's framework for facilitating
    coordination among its partner agencies by comparing JPDO's efforts to
    date against selected key practices that we have reported can enhance and
    sustain federal collaborative efforts.2 We selected five of eight
    practices as criteria for this review because they are significant to
    building the framework needed for any collaboration and are particularly
    important to JPDO at this early juncture in its collaborative efforts. The
    key practices used for this assessment include defining and articulating a
    common outcome, establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies,
    identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources, agreeing on
    roles and responsibilities, and reinforcing agency accountability for
    collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.3 We assessed
    JPDO's efforts to obtain the participation of nonfederal stakeholders by
    obtaining the perspectives of nonfederal stakeholders involved with JPDO
    and drawing on our body of work on stakeholder involvement. We assessed
    JPDO's technical planning efforts for NGATS by comparing JPDO's practices
    with those that we have found to be effective in developing enterprise
    architectures.4 One of our senior-level technologists also reviewed JPDO's
    draft Concept of Operations. We also obtained information on an estimate
    of FAA's future costs under NGATS but did not review in detail the
    methodology or assumptions used to develop this estimate. To understand
    JPDO's and FAA's efforts to date on global harmonization, we met with
    European officials and reviewed documents related to Europe's concurrent
    air transportation modernization effort, known as the Single European Sky
    Air Traffic Management Research Programme (SESAR). To determine the
    challenges that FAA faces in implementing NGATS, we met with agency
    officials, reviewed documentation related to FAA's modernization efforts,
    and drew upon our prior work examining FAA's program to modernize the
    National Airspace System. We conducted our work between July 2005 and
    September 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards. See appendix I for a more detailed explanation of our scope and
    methodology. A detailed discussion of the results of our expert panel is
    contained in appendix II.

    2GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
    Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [36]GAO-06-15  (Washington,
    D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

    3The remaining three practices include establishing compatible policies,
    procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries;
    developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and
    reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through
    performance management systems.

    Results in Brief

    JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its
    partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with the
    requirements of Vision 100 and with several practices that our previous
    work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration and
    enterprise architecture development. JPDO and its partner agencies have
    developed an Integrated Plan and reported on the progress of that plan as
    called for in Vision 100. In working to develop the Integrated Plan, the
    partner agencies agreed on a vision for NGATS and on eight strategies that
    broadly address the goals and objectives of NGATS--actions consistent with
    effective collaborative practices that we have identified. JPDO has also
    established an organizational structure that involves federal and
    nonfederal stakeholders throughout the organization. To leverage human
    resources, JPDO has staffed the various levels of its organization with
    partner agency employees, many of whom work part time for JPDO. To
    leverage technological resources, JPDO has sought to coordinate
    NGATS-related programs across the partner agencies. JPDO identified early
    opportunities that could be pursued during fiscal year 2007 to minimize
    the duplication of research programs across agencies and to produce
    tangible results for NGATS. JPDO has been developing an enterprise
    architecture (or blueprint)--one of the most critical planning documents
    in the NGATS effort--and has taken several steps consistent with effective
    practices that we have identified for enterprise architecture development.
    JPDO expects the enterprise architecture to provide more clarity regarding
    its expectations for NGATS, thereby facilitating coordination among the
    partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, alignment of relevant
    research and development activities, and integration of equipment. The
    enterprise architecture is also critical to the development of realistic
    cost estimates for NGATS. Without such realistic cost estimates, Congress
    is handicapped in its planning for the funding needs of NGATS. To this
    end, JPDO has also begun working with its stakeholders to develop initial
    cost information through a series of investment analysis workshops.
    Finally, JPDO recognizes the importance of global harmonization of air
    transportation technologies and systems and has begun work to ensure that
    the NGATS effort is harmonized with the European SESAR effort and with the
    efforts of other regions.

    4An enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for understanding and
    planning complex systems. JPDO anticipates that the NGATS enterprise
    architecture will provide the means for coordinating among the partner
    agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
    development activities, and integrating equipment. See GAO, Federal
    Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed to Guide
    Systems Modernization Efforts, [37]GAO-05-266 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29,
    2005).

    JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative effort,
    addressing planning and expertise gaps, establishing credibility with
    stakeholders, and harmonizing its work with other countries' efforts to
    modernize their own air traffic management systems. JPDO is fundamentally
    a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
    and technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system
    requirements for NGATS. To date, JPDO has not established some practices
    significant to institutionalizing the collaborative process. For example,
    JPDO does not have formal, long-term agreements among the partner agencies
    on their roles and responsibilities in creating NGATS. JPDO has been
    working to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with its partner
    agencies since at least August 2005, but the MOU had not been signed as of
    September 2006. JPDO also currently lacks explicit policies and procedures
    for decision making and dispute resolution and has not yet completed
    mechanisms for leveraging partner agency resources. To its credit, JPDO
    has been working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop
    a means to consider NGATS-related funding, dispersed across JPDO's partner
    agency budget requests, as a unified federal program. Nonetheless, given
    JPDO's limited authority, the office could face challenges in sustaining
    the lengthy and elaborate federal collaborative effort set forth by Vision
    100 without full development of procedures and mechanisms for dispute
    resolution and leveraging of resources. JPDO also faces challenges with
    some planning and expertise gaps. For example, NASA is moving toward a
    focus on fundamental research and away from demonstration projects. Many
    experts told us that this creates a gap in technology development. This
    raises the question of what entity will do the developmental work that
    will be important to NGATS. According to JPDO officials, they are
    conducting a gap analysis on the impact of NASA's actions on NGATS
    planning. Also important to NGATS is the involvement of all key
    stakeholders in the planning process, yet some stakeholders, such as
    active air traffic controllers, are not currently involved with JPDO. Our
    work on past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a
    lack of stakeholder involvement early and throughout a project has been a
    key factor that leads to cost increases and delays. As noted by our expert
    panel, JPDO also faces challenges in establishing credibility among
    stakeholders. For example, some members of our expert panel told us that,
    although JPDO has produced much activity, they did not feel the effort had
    demonstrated sufficient progress; some stakeholders told us that both the
    2004 Integrated Plan and the 2005 Progress Report lacked sufficient
    detail, such as definition of research needs. Finally, JPDO faces
    challenges in achieving global harmonization for NGATS. While FAA and the
    European Commission recently signed an MOU to ensure cooperation between
    the aviation modernization programs in the United States and Europe, much
    work remains in carrying out that agreement and in addressing
    harmonization throughout other regions of the world.

    FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to NGATS, faces challenges
    both in institutionalizing the management reforms that it has made in
    recent years, which have contributed to its ability to meet its goals for
    ATC acquisitions, and in obtaining the financial and technical resources
    needed to implement NGATS. Since 1995, we have designated FAA's air
    traffic control modernization program as high risk because of systemic
    management and acquisition problems. FAA has recently taken a number of
    actions aimed at improving its management practices, including a focus on
    implementing more businesslike management and acquisition processes. FAA
    has also taken steps to institutionalize these improvements by ensuring
    that the reforms are fully integrated into the agency's structure and
    processes at all levels and have become part of its organizational
    culture. However, transforming organizational cultures requires
    substantial management attention, as it can take several years for such
    initiatives to be fully implemented and cultures transformed in a
    sustainable manner. FAA also faces challenges in finding ways to reduce
    costs or realize savings to help fund the costs of transitioning to NGATS
    while continuing to operate and maintain the current system. FAA is
    working to reduce costs by streamlining its operations and could realize
    savings in operating costs from the implementation of some NGATS
    technologies. Finally, FAA faces challenges in obtaining the expertise
    needed to implement a system as complex as NGATS. Recognizing the
    complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the possibility that FAA
    may not have the in-house expertise to manage it without assistance, we
    have identified potential approaches for supplementing FAA's capabilities.
    Approaches include contracting with a lead systems integrator or obtaining
    technical advice from a federally funded research and development
    corporation. FAA has not yet formally explored its strengths and
    weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract management
    expertise that will be required of it to define, implement, and integrate
    the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the transition to
    NGATS.

    We are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct JPDO to
    take actions to institutionalize the partner agencies' collaboration in
    supporting NGATS, including action on an MOU among the partner agencies,
    actions to finalize procedures to leverage partner agency resources, and
    actions to develop procedures for dispute resolution. We are also
    recommending that the Secretary direct JPDO to determine whether key
    stakeholders and expertise are not currently represented in JPDO planning
    efforts. Finally, we are recommending that the Secretary direct FAA to
    undertake a formal exploration of the technical expertise and contract
    management expertise that will be required by FAA to implement NGATS.

    We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce,
    Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; JPDO; NASA; and the
    White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for their review and
    comment. NASA's written comments are included as appendix IV. NASA agreed
    with the majority of the report's content, but highlighted specific points
    about (1) the impact of its recent emphasis on fundamental aeronautics,
    (2) NASA's role in developing NGATS, and (3) NASA's fiscal year 2007
    request for aeronautics research funding. Transportation, FAA, JPDO,
    Homeland Security, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy
    provided technical clarifications and additional information, which we
    incorporated into this report as appropriate. FAA and JPDO neither agreed
    nor disagreed with our recommendations, but said they would consider them.
    Commerce and Defense had no comments on the draft report.

    Background

    JPDO began operating in early 2004 and is housed within FAA. JPDO's
    Director reports to the FAA Administrator and to the FAA Chief Operating
    Officer (head of FAA's Air Traffic Organization [ATO]). The scope of
    JPDO's effort is broader than that of traditional air traffic control
    modernization in that it is "airport curb to airport curb," encompassing
    such issues as security screening and environmental concerns.
    Additionally, JPDO's approach will require unprecedented collaboration and
    consensus among many stakeholders--federal and nonfederal--about necessary
    system capabilities, equipment, procedures, and regulations. JPDO has
    identified roles for each of its partner agencies in the transformation to
    NGATS. For example, the Department of Defense has deployed "network
    centric" systems,5 originally developed for the battlefield, that are
    being considered as a conceptual framework to provide all users of the
    National Airspace System--FAA and the Departments of Defense and Homeland
    Security--with a common view of that system.

    Since its inception, JPDO has focused on establishing an organizational
    framework to carry out the interagency planning mandate contained in
    Vision 100, while ensuring participation of nonfederal stakeholders and
    the general public. JPDO has also reviewed the research projects of its
    partner agencies to identify work that aligns with NGATS' needs and has
    issued budget guidance to these agencies to highlight the areas where each
    agency could contribute to implementing NGATS. JPDO currently has several
    key NGATS planning documents in various stages of development.

    JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS

    Many of JPDO's actions are consistent with practices that our work has
    shown facilitate interagency collaboration--a key factor in the future
    success of NGATS. JPDO is also developing an enterprise architecture--a
    key document for NGATS planning--using a phased approach that is similar
    to a process we have advocated for FAA's major systems acquisition
    programs and anticipates having a first draft in by the end of 2006.
    Although a preliminary estimate exists of FAA's costs to implement NGATS,
    further work is needed to develop a comprehensive understanding of NGATS
    costs.

    5Network centric systems aim to exploit technical advances in information
    technology and telecommunications to improve situational awareness and the
    speed of decision making.

    As Required by Vision 100, JPDO Developed an Integrated Plan and Reported on the
    Progress of That Plan

    Vision 100 calls for JPDO to develop an integrated plan for NGATS and
    provide annual updates on the progress of that plan. JPDO, with its
    partner agencies, developed an NGATS Integrated Plan and submitted it to
    Congress on December 12, 2004. The plan includes a vision statement for a
    system capable of handling a threefold increase in demand for air
    transportation by 2025. The vision entails providing services tailored to
    individual customer needs, allowing all communities to participate in the
    global economy, and seamlessly integrating civil and military operations.
    The partner agencies also agreed on eight strategies that broadly address
    the goals and objectives for NGATS. In March 2006, JPDO published its
    first report to Congress on the progress made in carrying out the NGATS
    Integrated Plan.

    In addition to complying with Vision 100's mandate, developing an
    integrated plan is consistent with effective collaborative practices we
    have identified.6 According to our research on federal interagency
    collaborations, agencies must have a clear and compelling rationale for
    working together to overcome significant differences in their missions,
    cultures, and established ways of doing business. JPDO's partner agencies
    have a diverse set of missions, ranging from national defense to the
    promotion of commerce. Yet each has some involvement in the air
    transportation system and can make a contribution to NGATS. In working
    together to develop JPDO's Integrated Plan, the partner agencies agreed on
    a vision statement to transform the air transportation system and on broad
    statements of future system goals, performance characteristics, and
    operational concepts.

    JPDO Developed an Organization for Involving Federal and Nonfederal Stakeholders

    Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult with
    its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public. JPDO's
    approach has been to establish an organizational structure that involves
    federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the organization. This
    structure includes a federal interagency senior policy committee, an
    institute for nonfederal stakeholders, and eight integrated product teams
    (IPT) that bring together federal and nonfederal experts to plan for and
    coordinate the development of technologies that will address JPDO's eight
    broad strategies.

    6 [38]GAO-06-15 .

    JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the Secretary of
    Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes senior-level
    officials from JPDO's partner agencies. It has met three times since its
    inception. The NGATS Institute (the Institute) was created by an agreement
    between the National Center for Advanced Technologies7 and FAA to
    incorporate the expertise and views of stakeholders from private industry,
    state and local governments, and academia. The NGATS Institute Management
    Council, composed of top officials and representatives from the aviation
    community, oversees the policy, recommendations, and products of the
    Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus positions on
    critical NGATS issues. To meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO
    coordinate and consult with the public, the Institute held its first
    public meeting in March 2006. The IPTs are headed by representatives of
    JPDO's partner agencies and include more than 200 nonfederal stakeholders
    from over 100 organizations, whose participation was arranged through the
    Institute. Figure 1 illustrates JPDO's position within FAA and the JPDO
    structures that bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders,
    including the Institute and the IPTs.

    7The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit within
    the Aerospace Industries Association.

    Figure 1: Organization of JPDO

    Note: Department of Commerce = DOC; Department of Defense = DOD;
    Department of Homeland Security = DHS.

    JPDO's organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we
    have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations. For
    example, our work has shown that mutually reinforcing or joint strategies
    can help align partner agencies' activities, core processes, and resources
    to accomplish a common outcome. Each of the eight IPTs is aligned with one
    of the eight strategies outlined in JPDO's Integrated Plan, and each is
    headed by a partner agency that has taken the lead on a specific strategy
    (see table 1). Our research has also found that collaborating agencies
    should identify the resources needed to initiate or sustain their
    collaborative effort. To leverage human resources, JPDO has staffed the
    various levels of its organization--including JPDO's board, the IPTs, and
    technical divisions--with partner agency employees, many of whom work part
    time for JPDO. Finally, our work has shown that involving stakeholders
    can, among other things, increase their support for a collaborative
    effort. The Institute provides a method for involving nonfederal
    stakeholders, including the public, in planning NGATS.

    Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agencies

    Strategy                                   Related IPT Lead Agency
    Develop airport infrastructure to meet     Federal Aviation Administration
    future demand
    Establish an effective security system     Department of Homeland Security
    without limiting mobility or civil
    liberties
    Establish an agile air traffic system that National Aeronautics and Space
    quickly responds to shifts in demand       Administrationa
    Establish shared situational               Department of Defense
    awareness--where all users share the same
    information
    Establish a comprehensive and proactive    Federal Aviation Administration
    approach to safety
    Develop environmental protection that      Federal Aviation Administration
    allows sustained aviation growth
    Develop a systemwide capability to reduce  Department of Commerce
    weather impacts
    Harmonize equipage and operations globally Federal Aviation Administration

    Sources: GAO and JPDO.

    aNASA leads this IPT because it has primary responsibility for conducting
    the necessary research; implementation of the agile air traffic system is
    the responsibility of FAA.

    JPDO Has Begun to Leverage the Resources of Its Partner Agencies

    Vision 100 requires JPDO to coordinate NGATS-related programs across the
    partner agencies. To address this requirement, JPDO conducted an initial
    review of its partner agencies' research and development programs during
    July 2005 to identify work that could support NGATS. Through this process,
    JPDO identified early opportunities that could be pursued during fiscal
    year 2007 to coordinate and minimize the duplication of research programs
    across the partner agencies and produce tangible results for NGATS. For
    example, one such opportunity involves aligning aviation weather research
    across FAA, NASA, and the Departments of Commerce and Defense, developing
    a common weather capability, and integrating weather information into
    NGATS decision systems. In addition, FAA's Automatic Dependent
    Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)8 and System Wide Information Management
    (SWIM)9 programs were identified as opportunities to receive accelerated
    funding to begin producing tangible results for NGATS.

    JPDO's efforts to leverage its partner agencies' resources for NGATS
    demonstrates another practice important to sustaining collaborations. Our
    work on collaborations has found that collaborating agencies, by assessing
    their relative strengths and limitations, can identify opportunities for
    leveraging each others' resources and thus obtain benefits that would not
    be available if they were working separately. JPDO's first interagency
    review of its partner agencies' research and development programs was a
    step toward leveraging technological resources for NGATS.

    Consistent with Vision 100, JPDO Is Developing an Enterprise Architecture

    Vision 100 requires JPDO to create "a multiagency research and development
    roadmap" for the transition to NGATS. To comply with this requirement,
    JPDO has been developing an enterprise architecture--one of the most
    critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. An enterprise
    architecture is akin to blueprints for a building. It is meant to provide
    a common tool for planning and understanding the complex, interrelated
    systems that will make up NGATS. JPDO intends for the enterprise
    architecture to describe FAA's operation of the current National Airspace
    System, JPDO's plans for NGATS, and the sequence of steps needed for the
    transformation to NGATS. JPDO expects the enterprise architecture to
    provide more clarity regarding its expectations for NGATS, thereby
    facilitating coordination among the partner agencies and private sector
    manufacturers, the alignment of relevant research and development
    activities, and the integration of equipment. Many of JPDO's future
    activities will depend on the robustness and timeliness of this
    architecture development.

    8ADS-B is a surveillance technology that transmits an aircraft's identity,
    position, velocity, and intent to other aircraft and to ATC systems on the
    ground, thereby enabling pilots and controllers to have a common picture
    of airspace and traffic. By providing pilots with a display that shows the
    location of nearby aircraft, the system enables pilots to collaborate in
    decision making with controllers, safely allowing reduced aircraft
    separation and thereby increasing capacity within the National Airspace
    System.

    9SWIM is expected to help in the transition to network centric operations
    by providing the infrastructure and associated policies and standards to
    enable information sharing among all authorized system users, such as the
    airlines, civilian government agencies, and the military.

    JPDO has taken several important steps to work toward the development of a
    mature enterprise architecture.10 For example, JPDO has drafted a Concept
    of Operations--a higher-level document that describes how NGATS will
    operate in 2025.11 JPDO has used this document to identify key research
    and policy issues for NGATS, such as those associated with automating the
    air traffic control (ATC) system, including the need for a backup plan in
    case automation fails, the responsibilities and liabilities of different
    stakeholders during an automation failure, and the level of monitoring
    needed by pilots when automation is ensuring safe separation between
    aircraft. JPDO officials are currently incorporating stakeholders'
    comments into the Concept of Operations.

    Another step that JPDO has taken to develop the enterprise architecture is
    to form an Enterprise Architecture and Engineering Division. JPDO has
    established and filled a chief architect position and established an NGATS
    Architecture Council composed of representatives from each partner
    agency's chief architect office. This type of organizational structure is
    consistent with effective practices that we have identified in enterprise
    architecture development. Similarly, JPDO has established an Evaluation
    and Analysis Division that is assembling a suite of models to help JPDO
    refine its plans for NGATS and iteratively narrow the range of potential
    solutions. For example, the division has used modeling to begin studying
    how possible changes in the duties of some key personnel could affect the
    workload and performance of others.

    10We have developed an Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity
    Framework. This framework outlines steps toward achieving a stable and
    mature process for managing the development, maintenance, and
    implementation of enterprise architectures. See GAO, Information
    Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise
    Architecture Management (Version 1.1), [39]GAO-03-584G (Washington, D.C.:
    Apr. 1, 2003).

    11According to standards of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
    Engineers, Inc. (IEEE), a Concept of Operations is a user-oriented
    document that describes the characteristics of a proposed system from the
    user's viewpoint. Among other things, the key elements that should be
    included in a Concept of Operations are major system components,
    interfaces to external systems, and performance characteristics such as
    speed and capacity.

    To develop and refine the enterprise architecture for NGATS, JPDO plans to
    follow a phased, "build a little, test a little" approach. This approach
    is similar to a process we have advocated for FAA's major system
    acquisition programs. While JPDO expects the first draft of its enterprise
    architecture to be issued by the end of this calendar year, officials
    anticipate that it will be further refined based on stakeholder comments.
    This phased approach will also allow JPDO to incorporate evolving market
    forces and technologies into its architecture and thus better manage
    change.

    The Existing Cost Estimate for NGATS Is Incomplete

    Understanding the costs involved in the transition to NGATS is critical to
    the NGATS planning effort, yet no comprehensive estimation of these costs
    has been developed. This cost information is particularly important to
    Congress, which will have the authority to make NGATS funding decisions.
    To begin estimating NGATS costs, JPDO is holding a series of investment
    analysis workshops with stakeholders. Representatives from commercial and
    business aviation, equipment manufacturers, and ATC systems developers
    attended the first workshop, held in April 2006. The second workshop, held
    in August 2006, was for those involved with general aviation and public
    safety operations. JPDO plans to invite representatives from airports and
    regional, state, and local planning bodies to the third workshop.
    According to JPDO, participants in these workshops are asked to discuss
    and comment on the appropriateness of JPDO's current assumptions about
    factors that drive private sector costs.

    Although JPDO expects that these workshops will provide information to be
    used in developing a range of potential costs for NGATS, an enterprise
    architecture is needed to further define and better understand how a
    number of factors will drive NGATS costs. One of these drivers is the
    decision about which technologies to include in NGATS. Some of these
    technologies are more complex and thus more expensive to implement than
    others. A second driver is the sequence for replacing current technologies
    with NGATS technologies. A third driver is the length of time required for
    the transformation to NGATS, since, according to JPDO, a longer period
    would impose higher costs. JPDO's first draft of its enterprise
    architecture could reduce some of these variables, thereby allowing
    improved estimates of NGATS' costs.

    While JPDO is beginning to explore the issue of cost estimates for NGATS,
    an advisory committee to FAA--the Research, Engineering and Development
    Advisory Committee (REDAC)--has developed a limited, preliminary cost
    estimate, which officials have emphasized is not yet endorsed by any
    agency.12 REDAC estimated that FAA's budget under an NGATS scenario would
    average about $15 billion per year through 2025, or about $1 billion more
    annually (in today's dollars) than FAA's fiscal year 2006 appropriation.
    REDAC estimated that the cost for a status quo scenario (i.e., no NGATS)
    would also be about $15 billion per year through 2025.13 These estimates
    came out roughly equal, on average, because future FAA spending would be
    higher under NGATS than the status quo scenario in the early years but
    lower than under the status quo toward 2025 (see fig. 2). This
    relationship is due primarily to the expectation that, under the NGATS
    scenario, capital expenditures would be higher than under the status quo
    scenario in the near term, but operations costs would be lower because of
    productivity improvements in the longer term. Moreover, the NGATS cost
    estimate assumes that capital costs decrease sharply toward 2025.
    Officials who developed this estimate explained that the estimate treats
    NGATS as an isolated event. In reality, these officials acknowledge that
    planning for the subsequent "next generation" system will likely be under
    way as 2025 approaches, and the actual modernization costs could,
    therefore, be higher in this time frame than the estimate indicates.

    12In developing its estimate, REDAC used FAA's projected facilities and
    equipment costs under an NGATS scenario, as well as REDAC's own estimates
    for the costs of operations; research, engineering, and development; and
    airport improvements--the remaining three components of FAA's
    appropriation.

    13In this report, we describe REDAC's "base case" scenarios, which assumed
    that FAA's operations costs would increase between 2006 and 2010 but then
    remain constant through 2025 (except for inflation), as productivity
    increases offset the higher cost of increased demand. REDAC also developed
    estimates for lower-cost "best case" and higher-cost "worst case"
    scenarios using differing assumptions of productivity gains.

    Figure 2: REDAC's Funding Estimates for FAA under Status Quo and NGATS
    Scenarios, 2006-2025

    Note: Estimated costs shown in constant 2005 dollars.

    In addition, this estimate should be viewed within the context of a number
    of factors. First, REDAC does not believe that maintaining the status quo
    is a viable option because it would provide insufficient capacity to meet
    projected future demand. REDAC stated that it presented the status quo
    option "for analytical purposes only since the current approach to air
    traffic control and management in use in the United States cannot be
    scaled up to handle the projected growth in traffic." In fact, JPDO has
    estimated the annual economic cost of not meeting future demand; by 2020,
    JPDO estimates this cost at $40 billion per year. Second, the REDAC
    estimate does not include the costs of the intermediate technology
    development work, performed to date by NASA. As discussed later in this
    report, it is currently unclear which entities will perform this work.

    Last, and most important, this estimate was developed before JPDO
    completed important planning documents and does not include estimates of
    the other partner agencies' costs of implementing NGATS. An early version
    of JPDO's Concept of Operations for NGATS was released for stakeholder
    comment only this past July, and the initial draft of the enterprise
    architecture has yet to be released. Both of these documents will have to
    be synchronized with JPDO's Operational Improvement Roadmaps, which will
    describe the timing of the implementation of various NGATS systems. The
    draft Concept of Operations states that several topics, including safety
    management and regulation, will be addressed in later iterations of the
    document. Similarly, JPDO plans to first release a version of the
    enterprise architecture that addresses only the "block to block"--that is,
    the air traffic management--aspects of NGATS. A "curb to curb" enterprise
    architecture, which would include security, is not expected until around
    the middle of 2007. Thus, REDAC's estimate does not include the other
    partner agencies' costs to implement NGATS, such as those that the
    Department of Homeland Security might incur to develop and implement new
    security technologies. In addition to including partner agency costs in
    the estimate, other costs, such as those for training of personnel in new
    technologies, must be further explored.

    JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization and Has Begun
    Harmonization Activities

    Concurrent with JPDO's efforts, the European Commission is conducting a
    project, known as SESAR, to harmonize and modernize the European air
    traffic management system. The project is overseen by the European
    Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol). Eurocontrol
    has contracted out the work of SESAR to a 30-member consortium of
    airlines, air navigation service providers, airports, manufacturers, and
    others. See appendix III for a more detailed description of SESAR.

    American and European aviation officials have recognized the importance of
    harmonization--that is, of adopting equivalent performance standards and
    technologies that will make their equipment interoperable. Vision 100
    calls for NGATS to enable seamless global operations, and JPDO officials
    have acknowledged that different and incompatible standards and
    technologies, if implemented, could have a major adverse impact on
    airlines that serve international markets. In working toward
    harmonization, personnel exchanges between Europe and the United States
    have begun, and FAA is a member of a group that advises the industry
    consortium that manages SESAR under a preexisting MOU between Eurocontrol
    and FAA. In addition, FAA and the European Commission signed another MOU
    in July 2006 to establish a framework for ensuring cooperation in working
    toward a more common global air traffic management system.

    JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and Interoperability
    Challenges as It Moves Forward with NGATS

    JPDO faces a challenge in institutionalizing the interagency collaborative
    process with its partner agencies. Some planning and expertise gaps exist,
    including technology development, human factors research, and the
    participation of key stakeholders. JPDO faces challenges in convincing
    stakeholders of the credibility of its effort and of the government's
    commitment to the NGATS effort. JPDO also faces challenges related to
    harmonizing NGATS with modernization efforts taking place in other
    countries.

    Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Challenge for JPDO

    Although JPDO's legislation, Integrated Plan, and established governance
    structure provide the framework for collaborating among multiple federal
    agencies, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that
    lacks authority over the key human and technological resources needed to
    continue developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. Consequently,
    institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
    will be critical to JPDO's ability to leverage the necessary funding for
    developing NGATS. Institutionalizing the collaborative process means that,
    as administrations and staffing within JPDO change over the years, those
    coming into JPDO will have a clear understanding of what is expected of
    them and of the time and resource commitments entailed.

    To date, JPDO has not established practices significant to
    institutionalizing the collaborative process. For example, our work on
    effective collaboration practices has shown that collaborating agencies
    should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and
    responsibilities. At a fundamental level, JPDO does not have formal,
    long-term agreements among the partner agencies on their roles and
    responsibilities in creating NGATS. Additionally, some stakeholders with
    whom we spoke noted that several IPTs are still struggling to define their
    roles and responsibilities in developing NGATS. Presently, there is no
    mechanism that assures that the partner agencies' commitment will continue
    over the 20-year time frame of NGATS or that ensures accountability to
    JPDO. According to JPDO officials, they are working to establish an MOU,
    signed by the Secretary or other high-ranking official from each partner
    agency, which will broadly define the partner agencies' roles and
    responsibilities. However, JPDO first informed us of the development of
    the MOU in August 2005 and, as of September 2006, the MOU had not been
    finalized.

    Defining roles and responsibilities is particularly important between JPDO
    and FAA's ATO, since both organizations have responsibilities related to
    planning national airspace system modernization. ATO has primary
    responsibility for the ATC system's current and near-term modernization,
    while JPDO has responsibility for planning and coordinating a
    transformation to NGATS over the next 20 years. Some stakeholders have
    expressed concern that the relationship between JPDO's and ATO's efforts
    is not clear. Some of our expert panelists felt that a "gap" plan should
    be developed to identify areas that might fall between ATO's efforts to
    maintain the current system and JPDO's plans for the future. According to
    JPDO and ATO officials, the roles and responsibilities of each office are
    currently being worked out.14 ATO now plans to expand its Operational
    Evolution Plan--to be renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--so
    that it applies FAA-wide and represents FAA's piece of JPDO's overall
    NGATS plan.15 In essence, ATO intends for the Operational Evolution
    Partnership to become FAA's implementation plan for NGATS. Without
    continued focus on clarifying and institutionalizing the relationship
    between ATO and JPDO, it is more difficult to ensure continued progress
    toward NGATS, particularly with the FAA Administrator's and ATO Chief
    Operating Officer's terms ending within the next 2 years.

    In addition to not having clearly defined the roles and responsibilities
    of the various federal and nonfederal participants, JPDO also currently
    lacks explicit policies and procedures for decision making and dispute
    resolution. Our collaboration work shows that in defining and agreeing on
    roles and responsibilities, the collaborating agencies should also
    establish how the collaborative effort will be led; this establishment of
    leadership facilitates decision making for the collaboration. According to
    JPDO officials, the senior policy committee makes decisions through
    consensus of the members. If there are any issues that the committee
    cannot resolve among themselves, JPDO officials said that they would
    expect that the Secretary of Transportation would elevate those issues to
    the appropriate White House-level policy council, such as the Domestic
    Policy Council. However, without documented policies or procedures on the
    decision making and dispute resolution processes for the senior policy
    committee and the JPDO board, there is no clear understanding of the
    process and no institutionalized approach to carry forward as members of
    the senior policy committee and board change over time.

    14The FAA order establishing JPDO directs JPDO to, among other things,
    report to ATO's Chief Operating Officer for day-to-day management
    oversight and integration into the National Airspace System.

    15Currently, FAA's Operational Evolution Plan monitors how NAS capacity
    will change over a rolling 10-year planning horizon depending on numerous
    variables, such as the demand for air travel, the completion of new
    runways, and the availability of new ATC systems. It has also focused on
    the building capacity at 35 large hub airports.

    Another mechanism for institutionalizing the collaborative process is to
    use the agencies' strategic and annual performance plans as tools to
    establish complementary goals and strategies for achieving results. Based
    on our assessment of the partner agencies' strategic plans, we found that
    only the Department of Transportation, NASA, and FAA have incorporated
    NGATS goals into their strategic plans. Thus, more opportunities may exist
    for integrating NGATS goals into the partner agencies' plans and budgets.
    One example of such integration is NASA's current reauthorization act,
    which requires the agency to align its aviation research projects to
    directly support NGATS goals. NASA has now focused one of its research
    programs specifically on the needs of NGATS and JPDO.

    Finally, JPDO has not completed mechanisms for leveraging partner agency
    resources--an important practice for sustaining collaborations and an
    issue that JPDO officials view as one of their greatest challenges. JPDO
    has been working with OMB to develop a process for identifying
    "NGATS-related projects" across the various agencies. This process would
    allow OMB to consider NGATS-related projects as a unified program going
    forward and to make funding decisions accordingly. According to JPDO
    officials, leveraging efforts have worked well so far, but JPDO's need for
    resources and expertise will increase with the development of NGATS. One
    expert with whom we spoke noted that the real heavy lifting for JPDO was
    still ahead because developing a step-by-step, detailed implementation
    plan will be much more resource intensive than the development of the
    vision for NGATS has been to date. Also, JPDO could face difficulties in
    securing needed agency resources if the priorities of the partner agencies
    change over time, as all of the JPDO partner agencies have a variety of
    missions and priorities in addition to NGATS. For example, according to
    the President's proposed fiscal year 2007 budget and NASA's current plans,
    space exploration activities, including research and development, will
    continue to be the largest part of NASA's budget in the future. This trend
    will be driven by the development of a replacement vehicle for the space
    shuttle, manned lunar exploration, and robotic and manned Mars exploration
    missions. In contrast, funding for aeronautics research within NASA is
    projected to decline through at least fiscal year 2011.

    JPDO Faces Challenges in Addressing Planning and Expertise Gaps

    In the early stages of JPDO's efforts, gaps in planning and expertise have
    emerged. JPDO may face challenges in addressing these gaps because of its
    lack of authority over partner agencies' resources and expertise.

      Technology Development and Technology Transfer

    Our analysis of NASA's aeronautics research budget shows a 30 percent
    decline, in constant 2005 dollars, from 2005 to 2011. To its credit, given
    the reduced resources available for aeronautics, NASA plans to address the
    research and development needs of NGATS. However, NASA is also moving
    toward a focus on fundamental aeronautical research16 and away from
    demonstration projects.17 Many experts told us that NASA's new focus on
    fundamental research creates a gap in the technology development
    continuum.18 As we have reported, NASA's current plans might leave
    technologies too underdeveloped for easy transfer to industry and raises
    the question of what entity will do this developmental work.19 Some
    believe that FAA has neither the research and development infrastructure
    nor the funding to do this work. According to a draft report by REDAC, FAA
    would need at least $100 million annually in increased funding to perform
    this research and development work, and establishing the necessary
    infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NGATS by 5
    years. According to JPDO officials, they are conducting a gap analysis on
    the impact of NASA's actions on NGATS planning. We believe that such an
    analysis, as well as finding a solution if needed, are critically
    important steps.

      Human Factors Research

    Addressing human factors issues is another key challenge for JPDO. For
    example, NGATS Concept of Operations envisions an increased reliance on
    automation, which raises questions about the role of the air traffic
    controller in such an automated system. Similarly, the Concept of
    Operations envisions that pilots will take on a greater share of the
    responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other tasks currently
    performed by controllers. This raises human factors questions about
    whether pilots can safely perform these additional duties. Although JPDO
    has begun to model how shifts in air traffic controllers' workloads would
    affect their performance, it has not yet begun to model the effect of how
    this shift in workload to pilots would affect pilot performance. According
    to a JPDO official, modeling the effect of changes in pilot workload has
    not yet begun because JPDO has not yet identified a suitable model for
    incorporation into its suite of modeling tools. According to JPDO, the
    change in the roles of pilots and controllers is the most important human
    factors issue involved in creating NGATS but will be difficult to research
    because data on pilot behavior are not readily available for use in
    creating models. In addition to the study of changing roles, JPDO has not
    yet studied the training implications of various systems or solutions
    proposed for NGATS. For example, JPDO officials said they will be able to
    study the extent to which new air traffic controllers will have to be
    trained to operate both the old and the new equipment as the Concept of
    Operations and enterprise architecture mature.

    16NASA defines fundamental research as that research that includes
    continued, long-term scientific study in areas such as physics, chemistry,
    materials, experimental techniques, and computational techniques that
    leads to a furthering of understanding of the underlying principles that
    form the foundation of the core aeronautics disciplines, as well as that
    research that integrates the knowledge gained in these core areas to
    significantly enhance capabilities, tools, and technologies at the
    disciplinary (e.g., aerodynamics, combustion, dynamics and control,
    acoustics) and multidisciplinary (e.g., engine design, airframe design)
    level.

    17NASA noted that it will still conduct flight test experiments across
    most of the projects in its portfolio.

    18In focusing on fundamental research, NASA does not plan to develop new
    technologies to the same level of maturity as in the past.

    19GAO, U.S. Aerospace Industry: Progress in Implementing Aerospace
    Commission Recommendations, and Remaining Challenges, [40]GAO-06-920
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006).

      Absence of Key Stakeholder Involvement

    Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers, will play key
    roles in NGATS but are not currently involved in the NGATS planning
    effort. JPDO officials believe that they have sufficient expertise
    involved in the NGATS effort at this time because some participants have
    prior experience as air traffic controllers. However, one stakeholder with
    whom we spoke said that controllers need to be part of the NGATS effort
    now because their expertise extends beyond equipment configuration to
    issues involving the NGATS vision and Concept of Operations. Similarly, a
    member of our expert panel expressed concern that planning for NGATS would
    be unsuccessful without controller participation. The input of current air
    traffic controllers who have recent experience controlling aircraft is
    important in considering human factors and safety issues because of the
    controllers' familiarity with existing operating conditions. Our work on
    past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack of
    stakeholder or expert involvement early and throughout a project can lead
    to cost increases and delays.

    The air traffic controllers' labor union, the National Air Traffic
    Controllers Association (NATCA), has not participated in NGATS since June
    2005 when FAA terminated a labor liaison program that assigned air traffic
    controllers to major system acquisition program offices and to JPDO. FAA
    had determined that the benefits of the program were not great enough to
    justify its cost. Nonetheless, several stakeholders who serve on the
    Institute Management Council and the IPTs said they were concerned about
    the lack of air traffic controller involvement with JPDO. The NGATS
    Institute Management Council includes a seat for the union, but a NATCA
    official told us that the union's head had been unable to attend the
    council's meetings. According to JPDO officials, the council has left a
    seat open in hopes that the controllers will participate in NGATS as the
    new labor-management agreement between NATCA and FAA is implemented.
    Additionally, an official with the Institute noted that the council plans
    to reach out to the air traffic controllers in an attempt to obtain their
    future participation.

    Establishing Credibility with Stakeholders That the Government Is Fully
    Committed to NGATS Presents a Challenge

    Establishing credibility was viewed by the majority of our expert
    panelists as the primary challenge facing JPDO. This view partially stems
    from past experiences where the government has stopped some modernization
    efforts after industry invested in supporting technologies. For example,
    FAA developed a datalink communications system that transmitted scripted
    e-mail-like messages between controllers and pilots. One airline invested
    in this technology by equipping some of its aircraft, but because of
    funding cuts, among other things, FAA canceled the program. We have also
    reported that some aviation stakeholders have expressed concern that FAA
    may not follow through with its airspace redesign efforts and are hesitant
    to invest in equipment unless they are sure that FAA will remain committed
    to its efforts.20 One expert suggested that the government might mitigate
    this issue by making an initial investment in a specific technology before
    requesting that airlines or other industry stakeholders purchase
    equipment.

    Stakeholders' belief that the government is fully committed to NGATS will
    be important as efforts to implement NGATS technologies move forward.
    Achieving many of the benefits of NGATS will require actions by FAA as
    well as by users of the system--airlines and general aviation. For
    example, JPDO has identified ADS-B as a new air traffic surveillance
    system that will be critical to NGATS. ADS-B would replace many existing
    radars that track aircraft location and speed with less costly
    ground-based transceivers. FAA views ADS-B as a cornerstone technology for
    NGATS that will increase NAS capacity, efficiency, and safety. However, to
    achieve the full benefits of ADS-B, FAA must develop policies and
    regulations and install the ground infrastructure to support ADS-B, while
    users of the system must install ADS-B-compatible equipment on their
    aircraft.

    20GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural
    Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management
    Tools, [41]GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).

    FAA has developed plans for implementing ADS-B over the next 15 to 20
    years. FAA plans to award a contract for acquiring the ground
    infrastructure for ADS-B in July 2007 and is developing an ADS-B
    rulemaking, scheduled for issuance in 2009. FAA's initial deployment plans
    focus on areas of the nation that do not have radar surveillance, such as
    the Gulf of Mexico. During this initial deployment, FAA plans to further
    develop ADS-B interfaces with its existing ATC systems. According to FAA,
    the agency is also working with national and international organizations
    to ensure that the concerns of the aviation community are recognized and
    addressed. FAA plans to deploy ADS-B nationwide by 2013.

    However, full utilization of ADS-B depends not only on government efforts,
    but also involves decisions by nonfederal stakeholders about what
    equipment to purchase and the timing of such purchases. With ADS-B for
    example, an official of RTCA's ADS-B working group noted that the cost and
    expected benefits of equipping aircraft to take full advantage of ADS-B is
    a key issue for users of the system.21 On the cost side, the expert said
    that equipping existing aircraft to communicate with the ground stations
    may not be cost prohibitive for regional and large commercial airlines,
    but equipping these aircraft to be able to utilize ADS-B's full
    capabilities could require cost prohibitive modifications. Consequently,
    the expert noted that carriers plan to install equipment to utilize
    ADS-B's full capabilities only as they order new aircraft. He also said
    that carriers could have full-capability ADS-B installed on new aircraft
    that they are ordering now, except that specifications do not yet exist.
    Concerning the benefits of equipping aircraft to fully utilize ADS-B, the
    expert noted that the extent of some of these benefits are dependent on
    FAA decisions that have not yet been made, such as whether FAA will grant
    responsibility to pilots for maintaining safe separation distances and
    what technologies will provide a backup system for ADS-B. The expert
    believed that some air carriers were hesitant on ADS-B due to concerns
    that FAA might not follow through with deployment of full ADS-B
    capabilities.

    21Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission for
    Aeronautics, RTCA is today known just by its acronym. RTCA is a private,
    not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based performance
    standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee,
    and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA's policy,
    program, and regulatory decisions. RTCA includes an ADS-B working group
    within its air traffic management advisory committee. The ADS-B Working
    Group includes representatives of air transport, avionics manufacturers,
    business aviation, Department of Defense, and general aviation.

    Credibility of JPDO's efforts could also be impacted by perceptions
    regarding the progress of NGATS planning efforts. For example, some
    members of our expert panel told us that, although JPDO has produced much
    activity, they did not feel the effort had demonstrated sufficient
    progress. Some stakeholders we spoke with felt the Integrated Plan and
    Progress Report have not contained detailed implementation plans or
    interim milestones. According to one stakeholder, JPDO's 2005 Progress
    Report lacked information related to the evolution of an implementation
    plan, definition of research needs, and some discussion of relative costs
    and funding for NGATS, or a definitive plan to produce these vital pieces
    of information. While JPDO officials recognize that some stakeholders have
    been critical of JPDO's progress to date, these officials believe that
    given JPDO's mission--to involve partner agencies and nonfederal
    stakeholders--progress will happen at a more measured pace.

    Our own technical expert in enterprise architecture examined JPDO's draft
    Concept of Operations and determined that it does not yet include key
    elements such as scenarios illustrating NGATS operations; a summary of
    NGATS' operational impact on users and other stakeholders; and an analysis
    of the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for
    NGATS.22 According to our technical expert, the draft Concept of
    Operations lacks an overall description that ties together the five
    areas--air navigation service operations, flight operations, network
    centric infrastructure services, shared situational awareness services,
    and security management services--that the draft document covers. Our
    expert believes that the five areas are currently disjointed and that the
    document only provides some details for one area--the air navigation
    service operations. As noted earlier, JPDO officials are currently
    incorporating stakeholder comments into the draft Concept of Operations
    and will release another version.

    22Our senior level technologist reviewed JPDO's Concept of Operations for
    the Next Generation Air Transportation System, version 0.2, dated July 24,
    2006, by comparing it with the IEEE Standard 1362-1998 for concept of
    operations documents.

    JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization, but Challenges Remain

    Vision 100 calls for harmonization activities and some progress has been
    made in facilitating harmonization, although challenges remain in creating
    modernized systems that are globally interoperable. FAA and the European
    Commission signed an MOU in July 2006 to ensure coordination between the
    aviation modernization programs in Europe and the United States. According
    to the MOU, FAA and the European Commission intend to explore and discuss
    opportunities for implementing common or interoperable technologies and
    synchronizing time lines in the development of regulations, standards,
    procedures, research and development, and other activities to be agreed
    upon later. The MOU provides broadly for these activities to be
    accomplished through information exchanges, coordination of studies, and
    participation in working groups and consultative bodies. JPDO is currently
    working with the European Commission to plan regular technical interchange
    meetings to conduct peer reviews of NGATS and SESAR developments. Two of
    these meetings are tentatively planned for fiscal year 2007, according to
    JPDO officials.

    JPDO's Global Harmonization IPT (led by FAA) is planning cooperative
    activities and has made some progress, although the IPT is still early in
    its planning activity. The Global Harmonization IPT, whose mission is to
    harmonize equipment and operations globally and to advocate the adoption
    of U.S.-preferred transformation concepts, technologies, procedures, and
    standards, is led by managers from ATO's Operations Planning Services
    International and FAA's Office of International Aviation. The IPT
    finalized its charter in March 2006 and is working to develop an
    international strategy and outreach plan. As part of this effort, JPDO and
    FAA officials have met with officials from various parts of the
    world--including Europe, Canada, China, Japan, and Mexico--to assess the
    potential for cooperative NGATS demonstrations. JPDO officials noted that
    there are working visits and ongoing negotiations with China and Japan on
    MOUs, and ADS-B activities in Australia and East Africa. Internally, the
    Global Harmonization IPT also plans to raise awareness of harmonization
    issues within the other IPTs as they consider performance requirements for
    NGATS.

    FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully Implement NGATS

    Institutionalizing ATO's recent improvements in management and acquisition
    processes will be critical to the successful implementation of NGATS. FAA
    will be challenged to fund operation of the current air traffic control
    system while simultaneously funding the implementation of and transition
    to NGATS technologies and systems. FAA will also be challenged to obtain
    the expertise needed to implement a system as complex as NGATS.

    Institutionalizing Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition Processes
    Will Be Critical to the Successful Implementation of NGATS

    As the primary entity responsible for implementing NGATS, FAA will need to
    ensure that the management reforms it has recently instituted continue.
    Since 1995, we have designated FAA's ATC modernization program as high
    risk because of systemic management and acquisition problems. Realization
    of NGATS's goals could be severely compromised if these problems carry
    over into FAA's implementation of NGATS, which is an even more complex and
    ambitious undertaking than past ATC modernization efforts.

    FAA has recently taken a number of actions aimed at improving its
    management practices. FAA hired a Chief Operating Officer in 2003 and
    established the performance-based ATO in early 2004 to operate and
    modernize the air traffic control system. Since the establishment of ATO,
    the Chief Operating Officer has been focusing on implementing more
    businesslike management and acquisition processes to address the cost,
    schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued ATC modernization
    over the years. Under the new structure, FAA is a flatter organization,
    with fewer management layers, and managers are in closer contact with the
    services they deliver. FAA has also taken some steps to break down the
    vertical lines of authority, or organizational stovepipes, that we found
    hindered communication and coordination across FAA. To increase
    accountability, FAA has established a cost accounting system and made the
    units that deliver services within each department responsible for
    managing their own costs. In addition, managers are evaluated and rewarded
    according to how well they hold their costs within established targets.23

    Finally, FAA is revising its acquisition processes, as we recommended,24
    and is taking steps to improve oversight, operational efficiency, and cost
    control. To ensure executive-level oversight of all key decisions, FAA has
    revised its Acquisition Management System to incorporate key decision
    points in a knowledge-based product development process. Moreover, as we
    have reported,25 an executive council now reviews major acquisitions
    before they are sent to FAA's Joint Resources Council.26 To better manage
    cost growth, this executive council also reviews breaches of 5 percent or
    more in a project's cost, schedule, or performance. FAA has also issued
    guidelines for disclosing the levels of uncertainty and imprecision that
    are inherent in cost estimates for major ATC systems and has begun to base
    funding decisions for system acquisitions on a system's expected
    contribution to controlling operating costs.

    23Our work has shown that it is important, when implementing
    organizational transformations, to use a performance management system to
    assure accountability for change. See [42]GAO-03-669 .

    24GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has Improved, but
    Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure Results,
    [43]GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).

    25 [44]GAO-05-23 .

    To its credit, FAA has taken steps to institutionalize these
    improvements--that is, provide for their duration beyond the current
    administration at FAA and ATO by ensuring that the reforms are fully
    integrated into the agency's structure and processes at all levels and
    have become part of its organizational culture. FAA's strategic plan,
    titled "Flight Plan 2006-2010," contains a strategy to implement corporate
    systems, policies, programs, and tools to build a results-oriented,
    high-performance workforce. FAA's Human Capital Plan includes a goal to
    create a results-oriented culture and strategies for implementing
    performance management and compensation systems that focus on achieving
    results.

    FAA has also established a performance goal and begun tracking metrics for
    acquisitions. The goal for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 was to have 80
    percent of its system acquisitions on schedule and within 10 percent of
    budget. The goal gradually increases to 90 percent by fiscal year 2008.
    The increase will make FAA's acquisition performance goal consistent with
    targets set in the Department of Transportation's strategic plan and will
    comply with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.27 To date,
    FAA reports that it has been meeting its performance goal.

    Our past work identified FAA's lack of a constructive acquisition
    workforce culture as a key factor contributing to problems in its ATC
    modernization program. We view FAA's changes as important steps toward
    institutionalizing a results-oriented culture. Using a performance
    management system to define responsibility and ensure accountability for
    change is a key practice that can help agencies transform their cultures
    so that they can be more results oriented, customer focused, and
    collaborative. However, transforming organizational cultures requires
    substantial management attention. The experiences of successful
    transformations and change management initiatives in large public and
    private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or more until
    such initiatives are fully implemented, and cultures are transformed in a
    sustainable manner.

    26The Joint Resources Council is an executive body consisting of associate
    and assistant administrators, acquisition executives, the Chief Financial
    Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and legal counsel. The council
    makes corporate-level decisions, including those that determine whether an
    acquisition meets a mission need and should proceed. The council also
    approves changes to a program's baseline, budget submissions, and the
    National Airspace System's architecture baseline.

    27Pub. L. No. 103-355.

    Finding Resources to Implement NGATS and Operate the ATC System Poses a
    Challenge

    The cost of operating and maintaining the current ATC system while
    implementing NGATS will be another important challenge in transitioning to
    NGATS--a system that, as noted, is broader in scope than the current ATC
    system and will require funding for security technologies and
    environmental activities, as well as ATC technologies. Finding
    opportunities to reduce costs or realize savings could mitigate this
    challenge. Implementing the new technologies envisioned in the operational
    concept for NGATS could provide opportunities for reducing costs. For
    example, NGATS envisions more use of satellites for surveillance and
    navigation, which could allow FAA to decommission some of its ground-based
    navigational aids, such as compass locators, outer markers, and
    nondirectional radio beacons. FAA also is working to reduce costs by
    consolidating its administrative activities, currently decentralized
    across its nine regions, into three regions, and anticipates an annual
    savings of up to $460 million over the next 10 years.

    Until FAA has completed its estimates of both NGATS costs and cost savings
    that it will be able to achieve between now and 2025, it will not be able
    to determine how far these cost savings will go toward financing NGATS.
    Nonetheless, one expert has preliminarily estimated that FAA's current
    expected savings through infrastructure and operational efficiencies will
    be well below the amount needed to support NGATS capital funding.28 While
    more information is needed to estimate the amount of any shortfall with
    greater confidence, even the preliminary estimate signals the extent of
    the resource challenge.

    28Aviation Management Associates, Inc., The "No New Money" Scenario for
    the Next Generation Air Transportation System (Alexandria, VA: Oct. 1,
    2005).

    FAA Faces Challenges in Obtaining the Expertise Needed to Implement a System as
    Complex as NGATS

    A lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA's past management of
    ATC modernization projects. Although the personnel flexibilities that
    Congress authorized in 1995 allowed FAA to establish criteria for
    outstanding performance and match industry pay scales for needed
    expertise, industry experts continue to question whether FAA will have the
    technical expertise needed to implement NGATS--a task of unprecedented
    complexity, according to JPDO, FAA, and other aviation experts. A panel of
    experts that we convened in 2004 to discuss FAA's ATC modernization
    program noted that a shortfall in technical expertise was the key
    technical factor affecting modernization.29 The panelists said that FAA
    sometimes lacked the technical proficiency to "scrub" project proposals
    early on for potential problems and to oversee the contractors who
    implemented its modernization projects.

    The need for expertise also extends to the tasks of contract
    administration. According to a 2005 study by the Merit Systems Protection
    Board,30 at least 50 percent of the government's contracting officer
    representatives--the government's technical experts who are responsible
    for developing and managing the technical aspects of contracts--reported
    needing training in areas such as contract law, developing requirements,
    requesting bids, developing bid selection criteria and price
    determinations, and monitoring contractor performance.

    Recognizing the complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the
    possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it
    without assistance, we have identified potential approaches for
    supplementing FAA's capabilities. One of these approaches is for FAA to
    contract with a lead systems integrator (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a
    prime contractor that would help to ensure that the discrete systems used
    in NGATS will operate together and whose responsibilities may include
    designing system solutions, developing requirements, and selecting major
    system and subsystem contractors. The government has used LSIs before for
    programs that require the integration of multiple complex systems. Our
    research indicates that, although LSIs have certain advantages, such as
    the knowledge, understanding, skills, and ability to integrate functions
    across various systems, their use also entails certain risks. For example,
    because an LSI may have significantly more responsibility than a prime
    contractor usually does, careful oversight is necessary to ensure that the
    government's interests are protected and that conflicts of interest are
    avoided. Consequently, selecting, assigning responsibilities to, and
    managing an LSI could pose significant challenges for JPDO and FAA.

    29GAO, National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air
    Traffic Control Modernization Program, [45]GAO-05-333SP (Washington, D.C.:
    April 2005).

    30U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Contracting Officer
    Representatives: Managing the Government's Technical Experts to Achieve
    Positive Contract Outcomes (Washington, D.C.: December 2005).

    Another approach that we have identified involves obtaining technical
    advice from federally funded research and development corporations to help
    the agency oversee and manage prime contractors. These nonprofit
    corporations are chartered to provide long-term technical advice to
    government agencies in accordance with various statutory and regulatory
    rules to ensure independence and prevent conflicts of interest. FAA
    officials indicated that they are considering these two approaches to help
    address any possible gaps the agency may have in its technical expertise.
    However, FAA has not yet formally explored its strengths and weaknesses
    with regard to the technical expertise and contract management expertise
    that will be required of it to define, implement, and integrate the
    numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the transition to NGATS.

    Conclusions

    Transforming the National Airspace System to accommodate what could be
    three times the current demand for air transportation services by 2025,
    providing appropriate security and environmental safeguards, and doing
    these things seamlessly while the current system continues to operate will
    be an enormously complex undertaking. As JPDO notes in its Integrated
    Plan, there has never been a transformation effort similar to this one
    with as many stakeholders and as broad a scope. As JPDO nears the end of
    its third year of operation, it has done a significant amount of work to
    create an organizational structure that facilitates the federal
    interagency collaboration and stakeholder participation that must occur
    for the office to be successful in its mission. JPDO has made significant
    strides in meeting its planning and coordination role as set forth by
    Congress.

    However, there are some practices important to institutionalizing the
    collaborative process that JPDO has not yet established. These practices
    could improve the office's chances for long-term success. Clearly defining
    roles and responsibilities of all the parties at all the organizational
    levels is fundamental to such a large and complex collaborative effort. To
    date, JPDO has established its basic organizational structure but has not
    yet refined the roles and responsibilities within those structures.
    Particularly important will be the ability of JPDO and ATO to define their
    roles and responsibilities and form a collaborative environment for
    planning and implementing the next generation system. Also important to
    JPDO's success are establishing mechanisms for dispute resolution,
    leveraging resources, and ensuring the involvement of all crucial
    stakeholders in the planning for NGATS. While JPDO has incorporated
    numerous stakeholders from industry, academia, and state and local
    governments into the IPTs, current air traffic controllers represent one
    important group of stakeholders who are not participating at this time.

    Other areas important to NGATS need to evolve further. JPDO has begun the
    process of developing cost estimates with the series of workshops that it
    is holding, and these workshops should be very helpful to JPDO in
    obtaining crucial stakeholder input on cost issues. However, much work
    remains before any type of reliable and comprehensive estimates for NGATS
    costs can be expected. Without cost information, Congress is handicapped
    in its efforts to plan accordingly for NGATS. It will be important, as the
    enterprise architecture takes shape, that JPDO expedite its efforts to
    provide Congress with credible cost estimates that include costs for all
    of the JPDO partner agencies, as well as costs related to training,
    technology development, and demonstration projects.

    Another important area is ensuring global harmonization on systems and
    procedures so that international travel and commerce are not harmed by
    incompatible modernization efforts. The establishment of JPDO's Global
    Harmonization IPT and the recent signing of the MOU between FAA and the
    European Commission should begin to address the many issues involved with
    harmonization, but it is not yet clear what specifically will be done to
    further international cooperation. Finally, as noted, the complexity of
    the effort to transform the nation's air transportation system is
    staggering. FAA will be challenged to have in place the technical and
    contracting expertise needed to manage the transition to NGATS.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    Because of the importance of the successful planning and implementation of
    NGATS and the need for effective collaboration between diverse
    organizations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation
    direct JPDO to take the following five actions:

               o To better institutionalize its practices and expectations for
               interagency collaboration and stakeholder involvement, JPDO should
               finalize and present to the Senior Policy Committee for its
               consideration and action the MOU among the partner agencies to
               define their roles and responsibilities related to NGATS planning
               and development.

               o Clarify the roles and responsibilities between JPDO and ATO in
               the planning, development, and transition from JPDO to FAA for
               implementation of NGATS.

               o Develop written procedures that formalize agreements with OMB
               regarding the leveraging of partner agency resources and the
               identification of NGATS-related programs within agency budgets.

               o Develop written procedures for dispute resolution at all levels
               of the JPDO organization.

               o To better ensure the involvement of all key stakeholders in the
               NGATS planning process, determine whether key stakeholders and
               expertise are not represented on JPDO's integrated product teams,
               divisions, or elsewhere within its organization. For example, JPDO
               should consider the addition of active, subject matter expert air
               traffic controllers to its integrated product teams.

               We are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct
               FAA to take the following action:

               o Given the technical complexity of the implementation of NGATS
               and FAA's past experiences, undertake a formal exploration of
               FAA's strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical
               expertise and contract management expertise that will be required
               to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs
               and systems inherent in the transition to NGATS. For example, FAA
               should work to determine whether it will need to contract with an
               LSI, federally-funded not-for-profit corporation, or other
               technical or managerial entity to assist in the implementation of
               NGATS.

    			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

               We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce,
               Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; JPDO; NASA;
               and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for
               their review and comment. NASA provided written comments, which
               are reprinted in appendix IV. Transportation, FAA, JPDO, Homeland
               Security, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy provided
               technical clarifications and additional information, which we
               incorporated into this report as appropriate. FAA and JPDO neither
               agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but said they would
               consider them. Commerce and Defense had no comments on the draft
               report.

               NASA generally agreed with the report's contents, but highlighted
               three items that the agency felt were important. First, NASA
               believes that its return to fundamental aeronautics research will
               be critical to the success of NGATS and is uniquely suited to
               NASA's core expertise. NASA stated that until the enterprise
               architecture, operational improvement road maps, and integrated
               capability work plans are developed, any assertion of a technology
               development gap is highly speculative and cannot be factually
               substantiated. As our report points out, NASA plans, to its
               credit, to address the research and development needs of NGATS.
               However, as our report also points out, numerous experts and
               stakeholders with whom we spoke believed that NASA's move toward
               fundamental research does create a technology development gap and
               that it is unclear at this time what entity will do the
               developmental work for NGATS technologies prior to transitioning
               these technologies to an acquisition program. Our work has shown
               that developing technology to higher levels of maturity help avoid
               cost, schedule, and performance problems later, as systems are
               acquired. For example, we have reported that cost overruns,
               schedule delays, and performance shortfalls occurred in the
               Department of Defense's weapons acquisitions, in part because the
               technologies were transitioned to acquisitions before they were
               fully developed. Second, NASA noted that, while it leads the Agile
               Air Traffic System IPT, implementation of the system will be the
               responsibility of FAA. We agree and do not intend to suggest in
               our report that an agency's leadership of an IPT implies that an
               agency is necessarily responsible for implementation of related
               systems. We modified the text accordingly. Finally, NASA notes
               that the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget Request and run out
               for NASA aeronautics research projects a relatively flat, not
               declining, funding profile. However, as we have noted in a recent
               report, when converted into 2005 dollars, NASA's proposed
               aeronautics research budget will decrease by nearly 30 percent
               from $906 million in 2005 to $647 million (in 2005 dollars) in
               2011.31

               As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
               contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
               until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send
               copies of this report to interested congressional committees and
               the members of the JPDO Senior Policy Committee, JPDO Board, and
               the JPDO Executive Director. We also will make copies available to
               others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at
               no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

               If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
               please contact me on 202-512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact
               points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
               Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
               contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

               Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
    			  Director, Physical Infrastructure
               Issues

    31GAO-06-920.

    			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

               We examined (1) the status of the Joint Planning and Development
               Office's (JPDO) efforts to plan for the Next Generation Air
               Transportation System (NGATS), (2) the key challenges facing JPDO
               as it moves forward with its planning efforts, and (3) the key
               challenges facing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as it
               implements the transformation while continuing its current
               operations.

               To determine the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS and
               the challenges that the office faces, we discussed JPDO's plans
               and products with the office's Director, Deputy Director, division
               heads, and the leaders of each JPDO integrated product team (IPT).
               We reviewed relevant literature and JPDO publications, including
               JPDO's December 2004 Integrated Plan, 2005 Progress Report, and
               draft NGATS Concept of Operations. We reviewed previous GAO
               reports on the National Airspace System, air traffic control
               modernization, and federal interagency collaboration. We reviewed
               the National Academy of Sciences' 2005 report on JPDO entitled
               "Technology Pathways: Assessing the Integrated Plan for a Next
               Generation Air Transportation System." We assessed the status and
               challenges of JPDO's framework for facilitating coordination among
               its partner agencies by comparing JPDO's efforts to date against
               selected key practices that we have reported can enhance and
               sustain federal collaborative efforts.1 We selected five of eight
               practices as criteria for this review because they are significant
               to building the framework needed for any collaboration and are
               particularly important to JPDO at this early juncture in its
               collaborative efforts. The key practices used for this assessment
               include defining and articulating a common outcome, establishing
               mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, identifying and
               addressing needs by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and
               responsibilities, and reinforcing agency accountability for
               collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.2 We
               assessed JPDO's efforts to obtain the participation of nonfederal
               stakeholders by obtaining the perspectives of nonfederal
               stakeholders involved with JPDO and drawing on our body of work on
               stakeholder involvement. We assessed JPDO's technical planning
               efforts for NGATS by comparing JPDO's practices with those that we
               have found to be effective in developing enterprise
               architectures.3 We also obtained the perspectives of nonfederal
               stakeholders whose organizations are represented on the Institute
               Management Council of the NGATS Institute, and interviewed
               nonfederal stakeholders who represent the aviation industry on
               various IPTs. We met with FAA's Chief Architect to discuss how
               FAA's enterprise architecture for the National Airspace System
               would be integrated into that for NGATS, as well as cost estimates
               for NGATS. We also discussed NGATS cost estimates with a member of
               FAA's Research, Development and Engineering Advisory Committee
               (REDAC) and obtained information on REDAC's estimate of future FAA
               costs under NGATS. We did not review in detail the methodology or
               assumptions that REDAC used to develop this estimate.
               Additionally, we observed two NGATS Investment Analysis
               Workshops--one held with commercial and business aviation
               stakeholders and one held with general aviation stakeholders. One
               of our senior level technologists from our Applied Research and
               Methods team, who has been involved in our past work on enterprise
               architectures and has contributed to our federal guide on
               enterprise architecture, reviewed JPDO's draft Concept of
               Operations by comparing it with the Institute of Electrical and
               Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Standard 1362-1998 for concept
               of operations documents.4 We also conducted a one-day panel of
               aviation experts during which we sought their perspectives on the
               status of JPDO's planning efforts and the challenges that it faces
               in planning for NGATS. For more detailed information on the expert
               panel, see appendix II.

               Because international harmonization is a key element of NGATS and
               the European Union has embarked on a concurrent venture known as
               the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme
               (SESAR), we obtained information on the plans for SESAR and
               discussed harmonization issues with officials in France, Belgium,
               and the Netherlands.

               To determine the challenges that FAA faces in implementing NGATS,
               we met with the agency's Chief Operating Officer to discuss how
               FAA would integrate the many expected components of NGATS into
               FAA's modernization plans. We also discussed FAA's implementation
               plans for System Wide Information Management and Automatic
               Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, two key elements of NGATS, with
               these programs' respective program management officials and drew
               upon our work examining FAA's program to modernize the National
               Airspace System.

               We conducted our work between July 2005 and September 2006 in
               accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    1 [47]GAO-06-15 .

    2The remaining three practices include establishing compatible policies,
    procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries;
    developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and
    reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through
    performance management systems.

    3An enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for understanding and
    planning complex systems. JPDO anticipates that the NGATS enterprise
    architecture will provide the means for coordinating among the partner
    agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
    development activities, and integrating equipment. See [48]GAO-05-266 .

    4IEEE is a nonprofit, technical professional association that develops
    standards for a broad range of global industries, including the
    information technology and information assurance industries and is a
    leading source for defining best practices.

    			  Appendix II: Results of Expert Panel Voting

               We contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a
               panel of experts and stakeholders. Our panel was held on March 2,
               2006, at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. The
               panel consisted of 14 experts from the aviation industry and
               academia, one of whom served as the panel's moderator. (See table
               2.) We worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify
               and select panelists who were knowledgeable about the efforts of
               the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and could respond
               to our questions about JPDO's achievements and challenges. The
               panelists were asked to provide their views during several
               sessions held during the day.

    Table 2: Names and Affiliations of Expert Panelists

    Name                 Affiliation
    Ronald R. Fogleman   Principal, Durango Aerospace, Inc.; Chief of Staff,
    (moderator)          U.S. Air Force (retired)
    Langhorne Bond       President, International Loran Association; Federal
                            Aviation Adminiatration (FAA) Administrator (retired)
    Carol Carmody        Director of Transportation Initiatives, The National
                            Academy of Public Administration
    Jerald M. Davis      President, Foxfire Inc.; FAA (retired)
    Soeren Fischer       Vice President Strategy & Communication, Air Traffic
                            Alliance
    Mark Hansen          Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental
                            Engineering, University of California-Berkeley
    John B. Hayhurst     Senior Vice President, The Boeing Company (retired)
    Richard E. Heinrich  Director, Strategic Initiatives, Commercial Systems,
                            Rockwell Collins, Inc.
    Bill Jeffers         Senior Director, FAA Programs, ARINC; FAA (retired)
    Richard Marchi       Senior Advisor, Airports Council International-North
                            America
    Amy R. Pritchett     David S. Lewis Associate Professor of Cognitive
                            Engineering, School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia
                            Institute of Technology
    Dorothy Robyn        The Brattle Group, Inc.
    William F. Wangerien Vice President, Operations, Planning, and Reliability
                            Control, Delta Airlines, Inc. (retired)
    Christopher Wickens  Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at
                            Urbana-Champaign

    Sources: GAO and National Academy of Sciences.

    Following a welcome and introductions, the panel moved into the four
    sessions, as follows:

               o Session One: Overview of JPDO. In this session, the Chief
               Operating Officer of FAA and the Acting Deputy Director of JPDO
               each gave a presentation and answered questions from the
               panelists. The Chief Operating Officer discussed the challenges of
               running a complex air traffic organization. The Acting Deputy of
               JPDO explained how the office is organized to attract public and
               private sector expertise. These officials departed prior to the
               second session.

               o Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges. The
               panelists were asked to identify what they considered to be JPDO's
               major achievements of the past 2 years and why. Following that
               discussion, they were asked to identify the major challenges ahead
               for JPDO and how those challenges might hinder JPDO's ability to
               move forward with planning and developing the next generation air
               transportation system (NGATS).

               o Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges. The
               panelists were asked to identify strategies that JPDO could use to
               address the challenges identified in session two.

               o Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation. Panelists
               were asked to discuss how the different accountability and
               authority mechanisms of the JPDO and Single European Sky Air
               Traffic Management Research Programme (SESAR) could affect the
               success of each effort. They were also asked to what extent
               harmonization is important and why. Finally, they were asked what
               lessons were learned from other collaborative efforts between
               nations or cabinet-level departments.

               At the end of the last three sessions, panelists were asked to
               respond to questions that summarized the issues discussed. For
               example, at the end of the second session, panelists were asked to
               select what they considered to be the top achievements from the
               full list of the achievements that they generated during the
               discussion.1 For another session, panelists were asked about their
               level of concern on issues related to the level of coordination
               between Europe and the United States. In an attempt to provide
               context for the achievements and challenges as well as the other
               voting results, we examined the transcript to obtain statements in
               support of the most widely held views for each question. The views
               expressed by the panelists were their own and do not necessarily
               represent the views of GAO or the National Academy of Sciences.

    			  Session Two: Identifying JPDO�s Achievements and Challenges

               During the second session, panelists discussed what they
               considered to be JPDO's major achievements over the past 2 years.
               At the end of the discussion, the panelists generated a list of
               what they considered to the JPDO's most significant achievements,
               in no particular order. To differentiate the relative significance
               of the achievements, each panelist was asked, in a series of three
               questions, to vote for the achievement he or she believed was the
               first, second, and third most significant. To produce a rank order
               of items on the list, achievements identified as the first most
               significant were assigned three points, the second most
               significant achievements were assigned two points, and the third
               most significant were assigned one point. The weighted values for
               each achievement were summed and then ordered from the
               achievements with the highest number of points to the lowest. (See
               table 3.)

               Table 3: Expert Panel Votes on Top Achievements of JPDO

    			  Expert panel votes--achievements            Rank
    Established process (IPTs, NGATS Institute)    1
    Senior-level interest                          2
    Established products (plans, organization)     3
    Provided vision                                4
    Agency coordination, common dialogue           5
    Began efforts to integrate budgets             6
    Jump start: looking backward for continuity    7
    Involvement of private sector                  8

               Source: GAO.

               Note: When weighted rankings resulted in a tie, the tie was broken
               by determining which category had the highest number of votes in
               the first round, and, if necessary, the second round.

               Panelists identified JPDO's top achievement as establishing a
               process for conducting work related to the planning of NGATS. This
               included setting up the integrated product teams (IPT) and the
               NGATS Institute. One panel member said that JPDO had established a
               process. Another panelist stated that JPDO had taken "a
               significant step forward" by developing a process that brought
               people from different groups together in the same room to talk
               about building the aviation system of the future. Another panelist
               credited JPDO with establishing the NGATS Institute.

               Panelists felt that senior-level interest was the second most
               significant achievement. For example, JPDO's Senior Policy
               Committee includes cabinet-level representation. During the
               discussion, one panelist said he believed that the level of
               interest shown by people within different cabinet departments and
               other agencies was good.

               Finally, panelists identified the development of products,
               including plans and organizational structures, as the third most
               significant achievement. For example, one panelist said that
               having JPDO produce a product (i.e., the Integrated Plan) that
               Congress asked for, and delivering it on time, was a major
               achievement. Another panelist felt that JPDO provided continuity
               when it decided to incorporate Automatic Dependent
               Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information
               Management (SWIM) into its future plans. Too often, the panelist
               said, plans do not take into account past research and lessons
               learned.

               During the second session, panelists also identified what they
               thought were the top three challenges facing JPDO. To produce a
               list of challenges, we followed the same general procedure used to
               identify JPDO's major achievements as described above. That is,
               the panelists were asked a series of three questions and the
               answers were weighted to generate a single ranking. (See table 4.)

               Table 4: Expert Panel Votes on Top Challenges Facing JPDO

    Expert panel votes--challenges             Rank
    Credibility (roadmap, detailed plan)          1
    Lack of national priority                     2
    Collaborate with rest of the world            3
    Lack of comprehensive plan                    4
    Responsibility without authority              5
    Clarify relationship of JPDO/ATOa             6
    Tension between mission and politics          7
    Enterprise architecture accomplishments       8
    Impact of annual budget process         (Tie) 9
    Unclear mandate                         (Tie) 9

               Source: GAO.

               aATO is FAA's Air Traffic Organization.

               Note: When weighted rankings resulted in a tie, the tie was broken
               by determining which category had the highest number of votes in
               the first round, and, if necessary, the second round.

               Panelists identified establishing credibility as the top challenge
               facing JPDO, due to FAA's past track record in air traffic control
               modernization, the lack of detail in the Integrated Plan, and a
               lack of air traffic controller and/or union involvement. For
               example, one panelist noted that early investors in previous
               modernization attempts did not always get the payback from their
               investment in new technology because of a lack of follow-through
               on programs that would use that technology. Some panelists were
               worried that the NGATS effort will simply be another failed effort
               at modernization. Second, some panelists felt that the Integrated
               Plan's lack of meaningful details directly impinged on JPDO's
               credibility. For example, one cited the National Research
               Council's evaluation of the Integrated Plan and said the plan was
               more "an aspirational vision than an integrated plan."2 A second
               panelist said the only thing new in the JPDO vision was that it
               contained some information about security. Another said, "We're
               not convinced they're looking at the personnel issues, the
               aircraft issues, the economic issues, [or] the way to motivate
               people." Third, panelists also cited a lack of air traffic
               controllers' or union involvement in JPDO's process as a problem.
               Controllers have to be brought on board as equal partners or
               JPDO's efforts are "not going to work," said one panelist.

               Panelists cited the second biggest challenge facing JPDO as the
               fact that NGATS is not viewed as a national priority; the
               panelists devoted a considerable amount of discussion to this
               topic. One panelist stated that "changing the airspace" needs to
               be made a presidential priority in order to get enough interest to
               align budgets and resources and to execute the program. In the
               words of another panelist, "...until there is some clear national
               priority given to this whole idea of the next generation airspace
               or plan or concept...it's going to be a series of band-aids and
               stops and starts."

               The need to collaborate with the rest of the world was considered
               the third most significant challenge facing JPDO because the
               office will have to work with both the International Civil
               Aviation Organization (ICAO) and SESAR, the panelists said.3
               Collaboration is necessary to harmonize as many aviation
               procedures as possible, panelists said. One panelist noted that
               because of ICAO's international role, it was really crucial that
               JPDO, FAA's ATO, and FAA keep ICAO informed. For example, the
               panelist said, "talk to them, brief them, collaborate with them,
               so that when there is a solution or a decision made about how to
               go forward, that it's not sprung on the rest of the world, but the
               rest of the world has some awareness of how we got there."

    			  Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO�s Challenges

               In the third session, panelists were asked to discuss strategies
               that they felt JPDO could use to address the challenges that the
               panelists had identified in session two. At the end of the
               discussion, panelists generated a list of what they considered to
               be the most significant strategies, in no particular order.
               Panelists were asked in a series of questions to identify which
               strategies, in their opinion, should be implemented within the
               next 1-2 years, the next 3-5 years, and beyond 5 years. The
               results for each question below were ranked by the number of
               votes. (See tables 5-7.)

               Table 5: Short-term Strategies for JPDO

    			  What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the
    short term (within the next 1-2 years)?                    Number of votes
    Outsource the development of the plan                                    5
    Appoint, support, and sustain strong leadership                          4
    Restructure the plan (stakeholder, requirements, metrics)
    and gap analysis                                                         3
    Presidential directive                                                   1
    Formalize collaborative structure with SESAR                             1
    Define stakeholders (European model, other analyses)                     0
    Better explain the economic consequences of doing nothing                0
    Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-ATO relationship
    and address legislative responsibilities                                 0
    Total                                                                   14

               Source: GAO.

               Five of the 14 panelists identified outsourcing the development of
               the NGATS plan as critical to JPDO's efforts in the short term
               (i.e., the next 1 to 2 years). According to the panelists,
               outsourcing to a contractor or group of contractors would have
               several benefits, including a more businesslike approach, more
               rapid completion of the planning, and more opportunity for a range
               of aviation companies to be involved (including some companies
               from other countries). One panelist felt that JPDO's bureaucracy
               and political constraints impaired its ability to develop the
               business and technical plan needed for the future. Another
               panelist believed that without outsourcing, JPDO may not succeed,
               something that could delay development of the system by three to
               five years. "And this is not a time that we can afford that," the
               panelist said.

               The second critical short-term strategy for JPDO, according to the
               panelists, is appointing, supporting, and sustaining strong
               leadership. Panelists said they were concerned about the turnover
               in leadership at JPDO. One panelist stated, "They haven't had
               sustained, strong leadership," noting JPDO had had three
               directors, while another negatively remarked about JPDO's
               "revolving door structure." One panelist also noted that, unlike
               Europe, the United States has no highly placed public official who
               acts as an advocate for the plan. In Europe, for example, the Vice
               President of the European Commission spent time advocating in
               addition to her regular duties. The panelist said that the
               leadership of this official is one of the single biggest
               differences that explain where the United States is versus where
               the European Union is today.

               The third short-term strategy that panelists believed was critical
               to JPDO is restructuring the parts of the plan that relate to
               stakeholders, requirements and metrics, and performing a gap
               analysis. JPDO "ought to at least look at the European model as a
               place to start defining stakeholders," one panelist said.
               Panelists also urged that the NGATS plan be restructured to
               incorporate metrics. The plan, one panelist said, is a large
               design problem that should be approached by figuring out what the
               metrics are, as well as the core issues and requirements. The plan
               should describe work being done and provide a clear statement of
               the metrics that should be achieved by 2025, as well as the
               interim milestones. Panelists additionally stated that a "gap"
               plan should be developed to identify areas that might fall between
               the ATO's and JPDO's efforts. The gap plan would need to be
               comprehensive, understandable, and explain who will do what and
               when it will be mandated.

               Table 6: Midterm Strategies for JPDO

    			  What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the
    midterm (within the next 3-5 years)?                       Number of votes
    Restructure the plan (stakeholder, requirements, metrics)
    and gap analysis                                                         3
    Outsource the development of the plan                                    3
    Formalize collaborative structure with SESAR                             3
    Appoint, support, and sustain strong leadership                          2
    Better explain the economic consequences of doing nothing                2
    Presidential directive                                                   1
    Define stakeholders (European model, other analyses)                     0
    Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-ATO relationship
    and address legislative responsibilities                                 0
    Total                                                                   14

               Source: GAO.

               Panelists again identified restructuring the plan and conducting a
               gap analysis, as well as outsourcing the development of the plan,
               as two of the key midterm (3-5 years) strategies for JPDO. The
               panelists also identified establishing a structure that formalizes
               collaboration with SESAR as a third midterm strategy. One panelist
               said that JPDO should work with ICAO to come up with a structural
               framework for a full exchange between JPDO and SESAR--one that
               extends beyond the exchange of a few experts.4 Collaboration is
               important not only between JPDO and SESAR but also for the
               companies involved, the panelist said. For example, because Boeing
               and Rockwell Collins are working with SESAR, they contribute their
               views about technology, which will then become incorporated to
               ensure interoperability. In addition, panelists noted the
               importance of a collaborative structure is to help define a common
               set of performance requirements, especially for the airlines.
               "They want one set of procedures to be able to fly from A to B.
               And this is not only Europe, but worldwide," one panelist said.

               Table 7: Long-term Strategies for JPDO

    			  What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the
    long term (more than 5 years)?                             Number of votes
    Formalize collaborative structure with SESAR                             5
    Restructure the plan (stakeholder, requirements, metrics)
    and gap analysis                                                         3
    Appoint, support, and sustain strong leadership                          2
    Outsource the development of the plan                                    2
    Better explain the economic consequences of doing nothing                1
    Presidential directive                                                   1
    Define stakeholders (European model, other analyses)                     0
    Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-ATO relationship
    and address legislative responsibilities                                 0
    Total                                                                   14

               Source: GAO.

               Panelists identified the four most important long-term (more than
               5 years) strategies for JPDO as (1) formalizing a collaborative
               structure with SESAR; (2) restructuring the plan; (3) appointing,
               supporting, and sustaining strong leadership; and (4) outsourcing
               the development of the plan, as discussed above.

    			  Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation

               The fourth session focused on global harmonization and
               cooperation. Panelists were asked to discuss how the different
               accountability and authority mechanisms of JPDO and SESAR could
               affect the success of each effort. They were also asked to what
               extent harmonization is important and why. Finally, they were
               asked what lessons were learned from other collaborative efforts
               between nations or other cabinet-level departments. The panelists
               were then asked to vote on the questions below. In this case, the
               possible answers were generated by GAO prior to the expert panel.
               (See table 8.)

               Table 8: Importance of JPDO Involvement in Harmonization Efforts

    			  JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an
    essential component for the success of NGATS. Do you:      Number of votes
    Strongly agree                                                          10
    Agree                                                                    2
    Strongly disagree                                                        0
    Neither agree nor disagree                                               0
    Disagree                                                                 2
    Don't know                                                               0
    Total                                                                   14

               Source: GAO.

               Panelists overwhelmingly agreed that JPDO's involvement in global
               harmonization is essential for the success of NGATS. Panelists
               said that involvement in global harmonization efforts results in
               information sharing that benefits all member countries, largely
               through ICAO. One panelist noted that ICAO has a fairly good track
               record in helping member states reach agreement on harmonized
               standards. Panelists also noted that such collaborative efforts
               can result in sharing of best practices, as well as a working
               relationship with the European Union's SESAR effort. For example,
               one item for collaboration between JPDO and SESAR is resolving
               time frames for completion. JPDO has 2025 deadline, while SESAR's
               is 2020. "Gaps in things like that could be closed with
               cooperation and collaboration," one panelist said.

               Table 9: Level of Coordination between Europe and the United
               States

    			  Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe
    and the United States, we should be:                       Number of votes
    Very greatly concerned                                                   7
    Greatly concerned                                                        4
    Moderately concerned                                                     1
    Somewhat concerned                                                       1
    Not concerned                                                            1
    Total                                                                   14

               Source: GAO.

               Most panelists said that they were very greatly concerned, or
               greatly concerned, about the current level of coordination between
               the United States and Europe regarding global harmonization. (See
               table 9.) One panelist stated that the existing concept of
               operations was developed with considerable coordination with other
               countries and thought that JPDO's credibility would be harmed if
               it unilaterally developed a concept of operations. Another
               panelist added that the United States had worked closely with
               Europe to develop Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures,
               which helps increase international travel capacity. In less than
               10 years, this project went from an idea to a system that a number
               of people and countries supported, the panelist said. That
               achievement was done with very close coordination among the FAA,
               the U.S. aviation industry, and the European authorities and
               experts, the panelist said.

               Table 10: Preparation for Success

    			  Which initiative is better organized for success? Number of votes
    Europe                                                         12
    Too early to tell                                               2
    United States                                                   0
    Don't know                                                      0
    Total                                                          14

               Source: GAO.

               Panelists overwhelmingly said Europe's SESAR initiative was better
               organized than JPDO for success. (See table 10.) They cited
               several reasons, including SESAR's public-private partnership that
               focuses on letting industry develop the European plan. They also
               raised concerns that there was a lack of leadership with the U.S.
               effort, that there had been much activity but little progress, and
               that the sheer size of JPDO's bureaucracy would hinder progress.
               In discussing the area of public-private partnerships, one
               panelist noted that SESAR's organization was industry-centric, as
               opposed to the U.S. effort, which involves a service provider or
               political-centric activity. One panelist stated that "[W]e have
               two different models. I think one is headed toward success and one
               is going to be fraught with the problems of the past. So a
               solution-oriented answer is a more deeply focused industry set of
               implementations as opposed to an advisory role." Another panelist
               expressed concern that FAA has a tendency to pick a project de
               jour and that project is now JPDO. Noting JPDO's complex
               organizational chart, the panelist said, "[It] is nothing compared
               to the complexity that's been built into the processes down at the
               IPT level." The panelist said that people are being asked to make
               very large commitments of time to participate in multiple
               subgroups on each of eight IPTs, plus the NGATS institute. "I'm
               just concerned that there's an awful lot of process here and not
               much substance," said the panelist.

    1Panelists voted electronically at the end of the last three sessions
    using voting equipment provided by GAO.

    2National Research Council of National Academies Technology Pathways:
    Assessing the Integrated Plan for a Next Generation Air Transportation
    System (Washington, D.C.: 2005).

    3ICAO was established in 1944 by 52 nations whose aim was to assure the
    safe, orderly and economic development of international air transport.
    ICAO serves as the global forum for civil aviation.

    4It should be noted that on July 18, 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding
    (MOU) was signed between FAA and the European Commission. This MOU
    establishes a framework for cooperation between the FAA and the European
    Commission.

    			  Appendix III: SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization Initiative

               The Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme
               (SESAR) is in some ways the European equivalent of next generation
               air transportation system (NGATS). While both initiatives are
               designed to increase the capacity of their respective air traffic
               management systems to meet expected increases in demand, SESAR is
               also intended to address Europe's historically fragmented
               airspace. Europe's patchwork of national systems has led to
               inefficiencies, capacity constraints, and delays. European
               countries have individually developed their air traffic management
               systems, but this uncoordinated development risks duplication of
               effort, significant additional cost, and unnecessary delays in the
               introduction of new equipment. The European Organisation for the
               Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), ATM 2000+ Strategy, and
               other initiatives had attempted to address these issues by
               obtaining collaboration among the numerous stakeholders. However,
               these efforts did not always include all stakeholders, and
               progress was impeded because consensus could not be reached.
               Hence, the delays continue and problems are expected to worsen
               with the expectation of at least a doubling of demand by 2020.

               To more forcefully address these issues, the European Parliament
               and member states agreed on regulations that were entered into
               force in April 2004 creating a "Single European Sky." In contrast
               to past efforts by Eurocontrol, the Single European Sky
               legislation provides more authority to unify and harmonize air
               traffic management equipment and procedures throughout Europe and
               establishes various mechanisms to help ensure the participation of
               stakeholders. To carry out the Single European Sky vision, the
               European Commission and Eurocontrol created the SESAR project,
               which is divided in two major phases: definition and
               implementation, and is expected to last until 2020.

               The definition phase of SESAR started in March 2006 and will last
               2 years. Planning done under the definition phase is being handled
               by a 29-member SESAR Consortium that includes airlines, air
               navigation service providers, airports, and suppliers. The SESAR
               Consortium is performing the planning under a contractual
               arrangement with Eurocontrol that calls for specific time lines
               and deliverables. The SESAR Consortium has formed a 10-member
               executive committee to make decisions on deliverables, to make
               other key decisions, and resolve disputes. To ensure that the
               future users of the new system--the airlines--have a major say in
               the outcome of the definition phase, four of the executive
               committee members are representatives of airlines. The remainder
               of the committee is composed of three members representing air
               navigation service providers, two members representing airports,
               and one member representing suppliers.

               The day-to-day management of the definition phase is run by the
               Air Traffic Alliance--a consortium of Airbus, EADS, and
               Thales--following a call for tender for a project manager by
               Eurocontrol. The Air Traffic Alliance answered the call and won
               the contract, which calls for the delivery of a Master Plan that
               will lay out a mission for the future Single European Sky and a
               roadmap for implementation. The European Commission and
               Eurocontrol have provided 60 million euros ($76 million) to fund
               the project definition phase with half provided by each
               organization.1

               The SESAR Consortium is a bottom-up organization, meaning that the
               aviation industry is essentially developing the ATM roadmap for
               final approval by Eurocontrol and the European Commission. The
               definition phase has been organized into six sequential
               deliverables and 20 work packages. A mixture of consortium members
               will work on each package, to ensure the appropriate use of
               expertise and consideration of viewpoints. For example, airlines,
               air navigation service providers, suppliers, and Eurocontrol, will
               work on the Master Plan. The first deliverable, a report
               describing the current air transport situation, identifying
               critical issues, and recommending ways to address these issues was
               published in July 2006.2

               In addition to the SESAR members, several associations are project
               associates, such as the International Air Transport Association,
               which represents commercial airlines, and the European Cockpit
               Association, which represents pilots. Project associates,
               including U.S. companies Boeing, Rockwell Collins, and Honeywell,
               are also involved in this phase of the project.

               The second phase of SESAR--implementation (2007-2013)--will focus
               on systems design and producing the key systems components. The
               commission has proposed using a joint undertaking to implement the
               Single European Sky. A joint undertaking is a legal entity that
               permits a mixture of public and private funding and was also used
               to implement Europe's Galileo satellite navigation system. The
               plan for the joint undertaking, however, has not yet been
               finalized under the European Union's procedures. Tentative plans
               to fund the development phase (2008-2013) call for $381 million
               annually.3 One-third of the funding would come from the
               commission, one-third from Eurocontrol, and one-third from
               industry.

    1To convert euros to U.S. dollars, we used 1.26855, the foreign exchange
    rate for September 19, 2006, as published in The Washington Post.

    2SESAR Consortium, Air Transport Framework: The Current Situation,
    DLM-0602-001-03-00 (July 2006).

    3To convert euros to U.S. dollars, we used 1.26855, the foreign exchange
    rate for September 19, 2006, as published in The Washington Post.

    			  Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
    			  Administration

    			  Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    			  GAO Contact

               Gerald Dillingham, (202) 512-2834, or dillinghamg@gao.gov

    			  Staff Acknowledgments

               In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to
               this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Jay Cherlow, Kevin Egan,
               Colin Fallon, Brandon Haller, David Hooper, Heather Krause,
               Elizabeth Marchak, Edmond Menoche, Faye Morrison, Taylor Reeves,
               Richard Scott, and Sarah Veale.

               Staff Acknowledgments

    			  The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
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    Highlights of [57]GAO-07-25 , a report to congressional requesters

    November 2006

    NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

    Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National
    Airspace System

    In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)
    to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a
    transformation from the current air traffic control system to the "next
    generation air transportation system" (NGATS) by 2025. Housed within the
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven partner agencies:
    the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland
    Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA);
    and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. FAA will have
    primary responsibility for implementing NGATS. This report addresses (1)
    the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges
    facing JPDO, and (3) the key challenges facing FAA as it implements the
    transformation. To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant documents,
    interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, and conducted an expert
    panel.

    [58]What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends that JPDO institutionalize its practices for interagency
    collaboration and assess stakeholder involvement, and that FAA assess its
    needs for technical expertise. JPDO and FAA commented that they plan to
    consider GAO's recommendations. NASA highlighted the impact of its
    refocused aeronautics research. GAO incorporated the other agencies'
    technical comments as appropriate.

    JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordinating with its
    partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with its
    authorizing legislation and with several practices that GAO's previous
    work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration. JPDO's
    partner agencies have agreed on a vision for NGATS and on eight strategies
    that broadly address the goals and objectives of NGATS. JPDO has been
    developing an enterprise architecture (or blueprint) for NGATS and plans
    to use the enterprise architecture and stakeholder input from investment
    analysis workshops to develop a realistic cost estimate for NGATS.

    JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative effort,
    addressing planning and expertise gaps, establishing credibility with
    stakeholders, and harmonizing its work with other countries' efforts to
    modernize their own air traffic management systems. To date, JPDO has not
    established some practices significant to institutionalizing its
    collaborative process, such as formalizing roles and responsibilities.
    Such practices are important because JPDO is fundamentally a planning and
    coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and financial
    resources needed to continue developing plans and system requirements for
    NGATS.

    FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to NGATS, faces challenges
    both in institutionalizing the management reforms that it has made in
    recent years that have contributed to its ability to meet its goals for
    air traffic control system acquisitions and in obtaining the financial and
    technical resources needed to implement NGATS. FAA also faces challenges
    in finding ways to reduce costs or realize savings to help fund the costs
    of transitioning to NGATS while continuing to operate and maintain the
    current system. Finally, FAA faces challenges in obtaining the technical
    and contract management expertise needed to define, implement, and
    integrate the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the
    transition to NGATS.

    Seven Partner Agencies Form the Joint Planning and Development Office

    References

    Visible links
      36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-266
      38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-584G
      40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-920
      41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-154
      42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
      43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-23
      44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-23
      45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-333SP
      47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-266
      57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25
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