Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to	 
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts (18-JAN-07, GAO-07-225T).  
                                                                 
The July 2005 London subway bombings and July 2006 rail attacks  
in Mumbai, India dramatically revealed the vulnerability of	 
passenger rail and other surface transportation systems worldwide
to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for increased focus
on the security of these systems. This testimony, which is based 
primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail	 
security (GAO-05-851) and selected program updates obtained in	 
January 2007 provides information on (1) how the Department of	 
Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks posed by terrorism
to the U.S. passenger rail system; (2) actions TSA and other	 
federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail 
systems; and (3) rail security practices implemented by domestic 
and selected foreign passenger rail operators.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-225T					        
    ACCNO:   A64964						        
  TITLE:     Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership     
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts 		 
     DATE:   01/18/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Mass transit					 
	     Passengers 					 
	     Rail security					 
	     Railroad industry					 
	     Railroad safety					 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Comparative analysis				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 

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GAO-07-225T

   

     * [1]Background

          * [2]Overview of the Passenger Rail System
          * [3]Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terroris
          * [4]Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Pass
          * [5]Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a

     * [6]DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems
     * [7]Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Pass

          * [8]DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail S
          * [9]TSA Issued Rail Security Directives, but Faces Challenges Re
          * [10]TSA Has Taken Other Actions to Strengthen the Security of th

     * [11]U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions t

          * [12]U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Prac
          * [13]Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail
          * [14]Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used

     * [15]Conclusions
     * [16]Contact Information
     * [17]GAO's Mission
     * [18]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [19]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [20]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [21]Congressional Relations
     * [22]Public Affairs

Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday, January 18, 2007

PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY

Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security
Efforts

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director Homeland Security and Justice
Issues

GAO-07-225T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on federal
efforts to secure rail and surface transportation systems. Since September
11, 2001, TSA has focused much of its efforts and resources on meeting
legislative mandates to strengthen commercial aviation security. However,
TSA has recently placed additional focus on securing surface modes of
transportation, particularly in the area of passenger rail security.
Surface transportation, which includes passenger and freight rail, mass
transit, highways, and pipelines, are inherently open and difficult to
secure. One of the critical challenges facing these federal agencies, and
rail system operators they oversee or support, is finding ways to protect
rail systems from potential terrorist attacks without compromising the
accessibility and efficiency of rail travel. The Madrid commuter rail
attacks in March 2004, London rail bombings in July 2005, and Mumbai,
India train bombings just last year, highlight the vulnerabilities of
passenger rail and other surface transportation systems and made clear
that even when security precautions are put into place, these systems
remain vulnerable to attack. While securing surface transportation systems
is a daunting task--a shared responsibility requiring coordinated action
on the part of federal, state, and local governments and the private
sector--it is important nonetheless to take the necessary steps to
identify and mitigate risks to these systems.

As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders involved
in securing surface transportation modes, including passenger rail, can
sometimes lead to communication challenges, duplication of effort, and
confusion about roles and responsibilities. Regarding passenger rail
security, key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stakeholders with
critical roles include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
which is responsible for securing all modes of transportation, and the
Office for Grants and Training (OGT), which provides grant funds to rail
operators and conducts risk assessments for passenger rail agencies.
Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have
responsibilities for passenger and freight rail safety and security. In
addition, public and private passenger rail operators also share
responsibility for securing their systems.

At the federal level, another significant challenge related to securing
passenger rail systems involves allocating resources based on risk. Within
and among all modes of transportation, there is competition for resources,
as federal, state, and local agencies and transportation operators seek to
identify and invest in appropriate security measures to safeguard these
systems while also investing in other capital and operational
improvements. Moreover, given competing priorities and limited homeland
security resources, difficult policy decisions have to be made by Congress
and the executive branch to prioritize security efforts and direct
resources to areas of greatest risk within and among transportation modes
and across other nationally critical sectors.

In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best
allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has
recommended, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 provides that a risk management approach be employed to guide
decision making related to homeland security resources. A risk management
approach entails a continuous process of managing risks through a series
of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing
and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative security measures, selecting
which measures to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those
measures.

My testimony today focuses on the progress federal agencies and domestic
passenger rail operators have made in setting and implementing security
priorities in the wake of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the
security practices implemented by foreign passenger rail operators. In
particular, my testimony highlights three key areas: (1) the actions that
DHS and its component agencies have taken to assess the risks posed by
terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system; (2) the actions that TSA and
other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S.
passenger rail system; and (3) the security practices that domestic and
selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented to mitigate
risks and enhance security. My comments today are based on GAO's September
2005 report addressing the security of the U.S. passenger rail system and
selected updates on this program obtained in January 2007.^1 This report
was based on work at DHS, DOT and Amtrak, as well as work that included 32
passenger rail operators in the U.S., and 13 passenger rail operators in 7
European and Asian countries. We conducted our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

^1GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, [23]GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2005).

We have been requested by the Chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee to conduct a follow-on review of passenger rail security, which
we expect to initiate in the near future. In addition, we have been
requested to assess the security of other surface modes of
transportation--including freight rail, commercial vehicles and highway
infrastructure--which we have underway or will initiate later this year.

In Summary:

           o The DHS Office of Grants and Training has developed and
           conducted risk assessments of passenger rail systems to identify
           and protect rail assets that are vulnerable to attack, such as
           stations and bridges. TSA has also begun to conduct risk
           assessments, including a threat assessment of mass transit and
           passenger rail and assessments of individual critical rail assets.
           While TSA has begun to establish a methodology for determining how
           to analyze and characterize the risks identified, the agency has
           not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of the U.S.
           passenger rail system. Until TSA completes this effort, the agency
           may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets
           and help guide security investment decisions about protecting
           them. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has
           not yet completed a framework to help federal agencies and the
           private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and
           comparing risks to transportation and other critical sectors.
           Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it
           may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors,
           prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly.

           o Before and after September 11, 2001, FTA and FRA undertook a
           number of initiatives to enhance passenger rail security,
           including conducting security readiness assessments, providing
           grants for emergency response drills and training, and developing
           security awareness programs for rail passengers and employees. In
           March 2004, after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid,
           TSA issued security directives for passenger rail and mass
           transit. These directives were intended to establish standard
           protective measures for all passenger rail operators, including
           Amtrak. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have
           questioned the extent that these directives were based on industry
           best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor
           compliance with the directives. In the 15 months since the
           completion of our work on passenger rail security, TSA has
           reported taking additional actions strengthen the security of the
           passenger rail system. For example, TSA has tested rail security
           technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and
           issued a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and
           freight rail security, among other efforts. TSA has also taken
           steps to better coordinate with DOT regarding rail security roles
           and responsibilities. The memorandum of understanding between DHS
           and DOT has been recently updated to include specific agreements
           between TSA and FTA and FRA to delineate security-related roles
           and responsibilities, among other things, for passenger rail and
           mass transit.

           o Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted
           during our prior work on passenger rail security had taken a range
           of actions to secure their systems. Most had implemented customer
           awareness programs to encourage passengers to remain vigilant and
           report suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility
           of security personnel, increased the use of canine teams to detect
           explosives, enhanced employee training programs, upgraded security
           technology, tightened access controls, and made rail system design
           improvements to enhance security. We also observed security
           practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their
           governments that are not currently used by the domestic rail
           operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, which could be
           considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail
           operators randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to
           help keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign
           governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security
           technologies and best practices. While introducing any of these
           security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political,
           legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they nevertheless warrant
           further examination. Since our report on passenger rail security
           was issued, TSA has reported taking steps to coordinate with
           foreign passenger rail operators and governments to identify
           security best practices.

In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we recommended,
among other things, that TSA establish a plan with timelines for
completing its methodology for conducting risk assessments and develop
security standards that reflect industry best practices and can be
measured and enforced. These actions should help ensure that the federal
government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail
assets based on risk, and evaluate, select, and implement measures to help
the passenger rail operators protect their systems against terrorism. In
addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS, in collaboration with
DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine the feasibility, in a risk
management context, of implementing certain security practices used by
foreign rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the
report's recommendations. As of January 2007, DHS had not provided a
formal response indicating if or how it has implemented these
recommendations.

Background

Overview of the Passenger Rail System

Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22
states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light rail).^2
Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad tracks and provide
regional service between a central city and adjacent suburbs. Commuter
rail systems are traditionally associated with older industrial cities,
such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Heavy rail
systems--subway systems like New York City's transit system and
Washington, D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on fixed rail lines within a
metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of traffic.
Amtrak operates the nation's primary intercity passenger rail service over
a 22,000-mile network, primarily over freight railroad tracks. Amtrak
serves more than 500 stations (240 of which are staffed) in 46 states and
the District of Columbia, and it carried more than 25 million passengers
during FY 2005.

Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks

According to passenger rail officials and passenger rail experts, certain
characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems make them
inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore difficult to
secure. By design, passenger rail systems are open, have multiple access
points, are hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, have no
barriers so that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In
contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation system is housed in closed and
controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of passenger rail
systems can leave them vulnerable because operator personnel cannot
completely monitor or control who enters or leaves the systems. In
addition, other characteristics of some passenger rail systems--high
ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location
(large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--also make them
attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass
casualties and economic damage and disruption. Moreover, some of these
same characteristics make passenger rail systems difficult to secure. For
example, the numbers of riders that pass through a subway
system--especially during peak hours--may make the sustained use of some
security measures, such as metal detectors, difficult because they could
result in long lines that could disrupt scheduled service. In addition,
multiple access points along extended routes could make the cost of
securing each location prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic
impacts of security enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a
difficult challenge.

^2The American Public Transportation Association compiled this fiscal year
2003 ridership data from FTA's National Transit Database. These are the
most current data available. Rail transit systems in the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics.

Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Passenger Rail Systems

Securing the nation's passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility
requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local
governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these
systems. Since the September 11th attacks, the role of federal government
agencies in securing the nation's transportation systems, including
passenger rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to September 11th, FTA and
FRA, within DOT, were the primary federal entities involved in passenger
rail security matters. In response to the attacks of September 11th,
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which
created TSA within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring
the security of all modes of transportation, though its provisions focus
primarily on aviation security.^3 The act also gave TSA regulatory
authority for security over all transportation modes, though its
provisions focus primarily aviation security. With the passage of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA was transferred, along with over 20
other agencies, to the Department of Homeland Security.^4

Within DHS, the Office of Grants and Training (OGT), formerly the Office
for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), has become the federal source for
security funding of passenger rail systems. ^5 OGT is the principal
component of DHS responsible for preparing the United States for acts of
terrorism and has primary responsibility within the executive branch for
assisting and supporting DHS, in coordination with other directorates and
entities outside of the department, in conducting risk analysis and risk
management activities of state and local governments. In carrying out its
mission, OGT provides training, funds for the purchase of equipment,
support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance,
and other support to assist states, local jurisdictions, and the private
sector to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism. OGT
created and is administering two grant programs focused specifically on
transportation security, the Transit Security Grant Program and the
Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. These programs provide
financial assistance to address security preparedness and enhancements for
passenger rail and transit systems. During fiscal year 2006, OGT provided
$110 million to passenger rail transit agencies through the Transit
Security Grant Program and about $7 million to Amtrak through the
Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program.

^3Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

^4Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

^5OGT originated within the Department of Justice's Office of Justice
Programs in 1998 as the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). Pursuant
to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ODP was transferred to DHS in March
2003. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, S 403(5), 116 Stat. at 2178 (codified at 6
U.S.C. 203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security
consolidated ODP with the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination to form the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness (SLGCP). SLGCP, which reports directly to the DHS
Secretary, was created to provide a "one-stop shop" for the numerous
federal preparedness initiatives applicable to state and local
governments. Recently, SLGCP was incorporated under the Preparedness
Directorate as OGT.

While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all
transportation modes, FTA conducts safety and security activities,
including training, research, technical assistance, and demonstration
projects. In addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its
grant-making authority. FRA has regulatory authority for rail safety over
commuter rail operators and Amtrak, and employs over 400 rail inspectors
that periodically monitor the implementation of safety and security plans
at these systems.^6

State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private
industry are also important stakeholders in the nation's rail security
efforts. State and local governments may own or operate a significant
portion of the passenger rail system. Passenger rail operators, which can
be public or private entities, are responsible for administering and
managing passenger rail activities and services. Passenger rail operators
can directly operate the service provided or contract for all or part of
the total service. Although all levels of government are involved in
passenger rail security, the primary responsibility for securing passenger
rail systems rests with passenger rail operators.

^6FRA administers and enforces federal laws and regulations that are
designed to promote safety on railroads, such as track maintenance,
inspection standards, equipment standards, and operating practices. FRA
exercises jurisdiction over all areas of railroad safety pursuant to 49
U.S.C. S 20103.

Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk Management
Approach

Risk management is a tool for informing policy makers' decisions about
assessing risks, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions
of uncertainty. In recent years, the President, through Homeland Security
Presidential Directives (HSPDs), and Congress, through the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, provided for federal agencies
with homeland security responsibilities to apply risk-based principles to
inform their decision making regarding allocating limited resources and
prioritizing security activities. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the
U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets
that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them,
select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then
develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort.^7 In
addition, DHS issued the National Strategy for Transportation Security in
2005 that describes the policies the DHS will apply when managing risks to
the security of the U.S. transportation system.^8 We have previously
reported that a risk management approach can help to prioritize and focus
the programs designed to combat terrorism. Risk management, as applied in
the homeland security context, can help federal decision-makers determine
where and how to invest limited resources within and among the various
modes of transportation.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also directed the department's
Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to use
risk management principles in coordinating the nation's critical
infrastructure protection efforts.^9 This includes integrating relevant
information, analysis, and vulnerability assessments to identify
priorities for protective and support measures by the department, other
federal agencies, state and local government agencies and authorities, the
private sector, and other entities. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 further define and establish critical infrastructure protection
responsibilities for DHS and those federal agencies given responsibility
for particular industry sectors, such as transportation. In June 2006, DHS
issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which named TSA
as the primary federal agency responsible for coordinating critical
infrastructure protection efforts within the transportation sector.^10 The
NIPP requires federal agencies to work with the private sector to develop
plans that, among other things, identify and prioritize critical assets
for their respective sectors. As such, the NIPP requires TSA to conduct
and facilitate risk assessments in order to identify, prioritize, and
coordinate the protection of critical transportation systems
infrastructure, as well as develop risk based priorities for the
transportation sector.

^7National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: 2004). The
9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission created in late
2002, to prepare a complete account of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the
immediate response to the attacks. The Commission was also mandated to
provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.

^8The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires
the Secretary of Homeland Security, working jointly with the Secretary of
Transportation, to develop, prepare, implement, and update, as needed a
National Strategy for Transportation Security and transportation modal
security plans. Pub. L. No. 108-458, S4001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3710-12
(codified at 49 U.S.C. S 114(t)).

^9In 2006, DHS reorganized their Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection division. The functions of the Directorate of Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection were moved to the Office of
Intelligence Analysis and Office of Infrastructure Protection.

To provide guidance to agency decision makers, we have created a risk
management framework, which is intended to be a starting point for
applying risk based principles. Our risk management framework entails a
continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions, including
setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating
alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and
monitoring those initiatives. DHS's National Infrastructure Protection
Plan describes a risk management process that closely mirrors our risk
management framework.

Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first step
in applying risk management principles and helps to ensure that management
decisions are focused on achieving a purpose. These decisions should take
place in the context of an agency's strategic plan that includes goals and
objectives that are clear and concise. These goals and objectives should
identify resource issues and external factors to achieving the goals.
Further, the goals and objectives of an agency should link to a
department's overall strategic plan. The ability to achieve strategic
goals depends, in part, on how well an agency manages risk. The agency's
strategic plan should address risk related issues that are central to the
agency's overall mission.

^10HSPD-7 directed the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security
to collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security and
transportation infrastructure protection. In 2003, DHS designated TSA as
the lead agency for addressing HSPD-7 as it relates to securing the
nation's transportation sector.

Risk assessment, an important element of a risk based approach, helps
decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate the
effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative
determination of the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the
severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk assessment in a homeland
security application often involves assessing three key elements--threat,
vulnerability, and criticality or consequence. A threat assessment
identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis of factors such as
capabilities, intentions, and past activities. A vulnerability assessment
identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and
suggests options to address those weaknesses. A criticality or consequence
assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in terms of
specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and the
economy, as a basis for identifying which structures or processes are
relatively more important to protect from attack. Information from these
three assessments contributes to an overall risk assessment that
characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or low and provides
input for evaluating alternatives and management prioritization of
security initiatives. The risk assessment element in the overall risk
management cycle may be the largest change from standard management steps
and can be important to informing the remaining steps of the cycle.

DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Additional
Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments

DHS component agencies have taken a variety of steps to assess the risk
posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. The DHS OGT developed
and implemented a risk assessment methodology intended to help passenger
rail operators better respond to terrorist attacks and prioritize security
measures. Passenger rail operators must have completed a risk assessment
to be eligible for financial assistance through the fiscal year 2007 OGT
Transit Security Grant Program, which includes funding for passenger rail.
To receive grant funding, rail operators are also required to have a
security and emergency preparedness plan that identifies how the operator
intends to respond to security gaps identified by risk assessments. As of
January 2007, OGT had completed or planned to conduct risk assessments of
most passenger rail operators. According to rail operators, OGT's risk
assessment process enabled them to prioritize investments based on risk
and are allowing them to target and allocate resources toward security
measures that will have the greatest impact on reducing risk across their
system.

TSA has also begun to assess risks to the passenger rail system. TSA had
completed an overall threat assessment for both mass transit and passenger
and freight rail modes. TSA also conducted criticality assessments of
nearly 700 passenger rail stations and had begun conducting assessments
for other passenger rail assets such as bridges and tunnels. TSA plans to
rely on asset criticality rankings to prioritize which assets it will
focus on in conducting vulnerability assessments to determine which
passenger rail assets are vulnerable to attack. For assets that are deemed
to be less critical, TSA has developed a software tool that it has made
available to passenger rail and other transportation operators for them to
use on a voluntary basis to assess the vulnerability of their assets.
Until all three assessments of passenger rail systems--threat,
criticality, and vulnerability--have been completed, and until TSA
determines how to use the results of these assessments to analyze and
characterize the level of risk (high, medium, or low), it will be
difficult to prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment
decisions about protecting them. Finalizing a methodology for assessing
risk to passenger rail and other transportation assets and conducting risk
assessments are also key steps used in producing the Transportation Sector
Specific Plan (TSSP) required by HSPD-7.^11 According to TSA, the TSSP and
supporting plans for each mode of transportation have been completed and
are currently being reviewed by DHS and the White House Homeland Security
Council. As of January 2007, TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk
assessment of the passenger rail system.

As TSA, OGT, and other federal agencies, including DOT, move forward with
risk assessment activities, DHS is developing a framework intended to help
these agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. This framework
is intended to help the private sector and state and local governments
develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and vulnerability across
infrastructure types and across entire economic sectors, develop
consistent terminology, and foster consistent results. The framework is
also intended to enable a federal-level assessment of risk in general, and
comparisons among risks, for purposes of resource allocation and response
planning. DHS has informed TSA that this framework will provide
overarching guidance to sector-specific agencies on how various risk
assessment methodologies may be used to analyze, normalize, and prioritize
risk within and among sectors. Because neither this element nor the
framework as a whole has been finalized or provided to TSA or other
sector-specific agencies, it is not clear what impact, if any, DHS's
framework may have on ongoing risk assessments conducted by, and the
methodologies used by, TSA, OGT, and others, and whether or how DHS will
be able to use these results to compare risks and prioritize homeland
security investments among sectors. Until DHS finalizes this framework,
and until TSA completes its risk assessment methodology, it will not be
possible to determine whether different methodologies used by TSA and OGT
for conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments generate
disparate qualitative and quantitative results or how they can best be
compared and analyzed. In addition, coordinated risk assessments will help
TSA and others avoid duplicative efforts and determine whether other
agencies' risk assessment methodologies, and the data generated by these
methodologies, can be leveraged to complete assessments required for the
transportation sector.

^11HSPD-7 defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for
DHS, sector-specific agencies (those federal agencies given responsibility
for transportation, energy, telecommunications, and so forth), and other
departments and agencies. The Directive instructs federal departments and
agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of
critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of
terrorist attacks.

Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security

In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security
conducted by the FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA
issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March
2004 terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal and
rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent that these
directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion
about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. Since the
completion of our work on passenger rail security, TSA has reported taking
additional actions to strengthen the security of the passenger rail
system. For example, TSA has tested rail security technologies, developed
training tools for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December
2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts.
TSA has also taken steps to better coordinate with DOT regarding rail
security roles and responsibilities. The memorandum of understanding
between DHS and DOT had been recently updated to include specific
agreements between TSA and FTA and FRA to delineate security-related roles
and responsibilities, among other things, for passenger rail and mass
transit.

DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security

Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, FTA and FRA, within DOT,
were primarily responsible for the security of passenger rail systems.
These agencies undertook a number of initiatives to enhance the security
of passenger rail systems after the September 11th attacks that are still
in place today. Specifically, FTA launched a transit security initiative
in 2002 that included security readiness assessments, technical
assistance, grants for emergency response drills, and training. FTA
instituted the Transit Watch campaign in 2003--a nationwide safety and
security awareness program designed to encourage the participation of
transit passengers and employees in maintaining a safe transit
environment. The program provides information and instructions to transit
passengers and employees so that they know what to do and whom to contact
in the event of an emergency in a transit setting. FTA planned to continue
this initiative, in partnership with TSA and OGT, and offer additional
security awareness materials that address unattended bags and emergency
evacuation procedures for transit agencies. In addition, FTA has issued
guidance, such as its Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit
Agencies, which recommends measures for passenger rail operators to
implement into their security programs to improve both security and
emergency preparedness. FTA has also used research and development funds
to develop guidance for security design strategies to reduce the
vulnerability of transit systems to acts of terrorism. In November 2004,
FTA provided rail operators with security considerations for
transportation infrastructure. This guidance provides recommendations
intended to help operators deter and minimize attacks against their
facilities, riders, and employees by incorporating security features into
the design of rail infrastructure.

FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail security
since September 11, 2001. For example, it has assisted commuter railroads
in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak's security plans, and helped
fund FTA security readiness assessments for commuter railroads. In the
wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings in March 2004, nearly 200 FRA
inspectors, in cooperation with DHS, conducted inspections of each of the
18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to determine what additional security
measures had been put into place to prevent a similar occurrence in the
United States. FRA also conducted research and development projects
related to passenger rail security. These projects included rail
infrastructure security and trespasser monitoring systems and passenger
screening and manifest projects, including explosives detection. Although
FTA and FRA now play a supporting role in transportation security matters
since the creation of TSA, they remain important partners in the federal
government's efforts to strengthen rail security, given their role in
funding and regulating the safety of passenger rail systems. Moreover, as
TSA moves ahead with its passenger rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA
are continuing their passenger rail security efforts.

TSA Issued Rail Security Directives, but Faces Challenges Related to Compliance
and Enforcement

In May 2004, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail industry
to establish standard security measures for all passenger rail operators,
including Amtrak.^12 However, as we previously reported, it was unclear
how TSA developed the requirements in the directives, how TSA planned to
monitor and ensure compliance, how rail operators were to implement the
measures, and which entities were responsible for their implementation.
According to TSA, the directives were based upon FTA and American Public
Transportation Association best practices for rail security. Specifically,
TSA stated that it consulted a list of the top 20 actions FTA identified
that rail operators can take to strengthen security. While some of the
directives correlate to information contained in the FTA guidance, the
source for many of the directives is unclear. Amtrak and FRA officials
also raised concerns about some of the directives. For example, FRA
officials stated that current FRA safety regulations requiring engineer
compartment doors be kept unlocked to facilitate emergency escapes^13
conflicts with the TSA security directive requirement that doors equipped
with locking mechanisms be kept locked. Other passenger rail operators we
spoke to during our review stated that TSA did not adequately consult with
the rail industry prior to developing and issuing these directives.

With respect to how the directives were to be enforced, rail operators
were required to allow TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations, or
tests based on execution of the directives at any time or location. TSA
officials stated the agency has hired 100 surface transportation
inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and
enforce compliance with TSA's rail security directives. However, some
passenger rail operators have expressed confusion and concern about the
role of TSA's inspectors and the potential that TSA inspections could be
duplicative of other federal and state rail inspections. TSA rail
inspector staff stated that they were committed to avoiding duplication in
the program and communicating their respective roles to rail agency
officials. According to TSA, since the initial deployment of surface
inspectors, these inspectors have developed relationships with security
officials in passenger rail and transit systems, coordinated access to
operations centers, participated in emergency exercises, and provided
assistance in enhancing security. We will continue to assess TSA's
enforcement of rail security directives during our follow-on review of
passenger rail security.

^12TSA issues security related regulations and directives pursuant to its
49 U.S.C. S 114(1) rulemaking authority.

^13See 49 C.F.R. S 238.235.

TSA Has Taken Other Actions to Strengthen the Security of the Passenger Rail
System and Coordinate Its Efforts with Other Federal Agencies

In January 2007, TSA provide us an update on additional actions they had
taken to strengthen passenger rail security. We have not verified or
evaluated these actions. These actions include:

National explosive canine detection teams: Since late 2005, TSA reported
that it has trained and deployed 53 canine teams to 13 mass transit
systems to help detect explosives in the passenger rail system and serve
as a deterrent to potential terrorists.

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams: This program is intended
to provide teams of law enforcement, canines, and inspection personnel to
mass transit and passenger rail systems to deter and detect potential
terrorist actions. Since the program's inception in December 2005, TSA
reported conducting more than 25 exercises at mass transit and passenger
rail systems throughout the nation.

Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security Information Sharing Network:
According to TSA, the agency initiated this program in August 2005 to
develop information sharing and dissemination processes regarding
passenger rail and mass transit security across the federal government,
state and local governments, and rail operators.

National Transit Resource Center: TSA officials stated that they are
working with FTA and DHS OGT to develop this center, which will provide
transit agencies nationwide with pertinent information related to transit
security, including recent suspicious activities, promising security
practices, new security technologies, and other information.

National Security Awareness Training Program for Railroad Employees: TSA
officials stated that the agency has contracted to develop and distribute
computer based training for passenger rail, rail transit, and freight rail
employees. The training will include information on identifying security
threats, observing and reporting suspicious activities and objects,
mitigating security incidents, and other related information. According to
TSA, the training will be distributed to all passenger and freight rail
systems.

Transit Terrorist Tool and Tactics: This training course is funded through
the Transit Security Grant Program and teaches transit employees how to
prevent and respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
explosive attack. According to TSA, this course was offered for the first
time during the fall of 2006.

National Tunnel Security Initiative: This DHS and DOT initiative aims to
identify and assess risks to underwater tunnels, prioritize security
funding to the most critical areas, and develop technologies to better
secure underwater tunnels. According to TSA, this initiative has
identified a list of 29 critical underwater rail transit tunnels.

TSA has also sought to enhance passenger rail security by conducting
research on technologies related to screening passengers and checked
baggage in the passenger rail environment. TSA conducted a Transit and
Rail Inspection Pilot. The pilot was a $1.5 million effort to test the
feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to screen
passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for
explosives. TSA officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses,
the screening technologies and processes tested would be very difficult to
implement on heavily used passenger rail systems because these systems
carry high volumes of passengers and have multiple points of entry.
However, TSA officials added that the screening processes used in the
pilot may be useful on certain long-distance intercity train routes, which
make fewer stops. Further, TSA officials stated that screening could be
used either randomly or for all passengers during certain high-risk events
or in areas where a particular terrorist threat is known to exist. For
example, screening technology similar to that used in the pilot was used
by TSA to screen certain passengers and belongings in Boston and New York
rail stations during the 2004 Democratic and Republican national
conventions. According to TSA, the agency is also researching and
developing other passenger rail security technologies, including closed
circuit television systems that can detect suspicious behavior, mobile
passenger screening checkpoints to be used at rail stations, bomb
resistant trash cans, and explosive detection equipment for use in the
rail environment.

More recently, in December 2006, TSA issued a proposed rule regarding
passenger and freight rail security requirements. TSA's proposed rule
would require that passenger and freight rail operators, certain
facilities that ship or receive hazardous materials by rail, and rail
transit systems take the following actions:

           o Designate a rail security coordinator to be available to TSA on
           a 24 hour, seven day a week basis to serve as the primary contact
           for the receipt of intelligence and other security related
           information.
           o Immediately report incidents, potential threats, and security
           concerns to TSA.
           o Allow TSA and DHS officials to enter and conduct inspections,
           test, and perform other duties within their rail systems.
           o Provide TSA, upon request, with the location and shipping
           information of rail cars that contain a specific category and
           quantity of hazardous materials within one hour of receiving the
           request from TSA.
           o Provide for a secure chain of custody and control of rail cars
           containing a specified quantity and type of hazardous material.

Public comments on the proposed rule are due in February 2007. TSA plans
to review these comments and issue a final rule in the future.

With multiple DHS and DOT stakeholders involved in securing the U.S.
passenger rail system, the need to improve coordination between the two
agencies has been a consistent theme in our prior work in this area. In
response to a previous recommendation we made,^14 DHS and DOT signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by which the two
departments could improve their cooperation and coordination for promoting
the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods throughout
the transportation system. The MOU defines broad areas of responsibility
for each department. For example, it states that DHS, in consultation with
DOT and affected stakeholders, will identify, prioritize, and coordinate
the protection of critical infrastructure. The MOU between DHS and DOT
represents an overall framework for cooperation that is to be supplemented
by additional signed agreements, or annexes, between the departments.
These annexes are to delineate the specific security related roles,
responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass transit, rail,
research and development, and other matters. TSA signed annexes to the MOU
with FRA and FTA describing the roles and responsibilities of each agency
regarding passenger rail security. These annexes also describe how TSA and
these DOT agencies will coordinate security related efforts, avoid
duplicating these efforts, and improve coordination and communication with
industry stakeholders.

^14Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges, [24]GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 2003).

U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure Rail
Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May Exist

U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure their
rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the
United States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions
included both improvements to system operations and capital enhancements
to a system's facilities, such as tracks, buildings, and train cars. All
of the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted have implemented some
types of security measures--such as increased numbers and visibility of
security personnel and customer awareness programs--that were generally
consistent with those we observed in select countries in Europe and Asia.
We also identified three rail security practices--covert testing, random
screening of passengers and their baggage, and centralized research and
testing--utilized by foreign operators or their governments that were not
utilized by domestic rail operators or the U.S. government at the time of
our review.

U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices

Both U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have
implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their systems.
A summary of these efforts follows.

Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used signage
and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if they
observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32 domestic
rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer awareness
program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign rail
operators we visited also attempted to enhance customer awareness. For
example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a customer
awareness program.

Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S. rail
operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security
personnel they utilized since September 11th, to provide security
throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility of
their security personnel. Several U.S. and foreign rail operators we spoke
with had instituted policies such as requiring their security staff, in
brightly colored vests, to patrol trains or stations more frequently, so
they are more visible to customers and potential terrorists or criminals.
These policies make it easier for customers to contact security personnel
in the event of an emergency, or if they have spotted a suspicious item or
person. At foreign sites we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased
the number of their security officers throughout their systems in recent
years because of the perceived increase in risk of a terrorist attack.

Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail operators we
contacted, 21 were suing canines to patrol their facilities or trains.
Often, these units are used to detect the presence of explosives, and may
be called in when a suspicious package is detected. In foreign countries
we visited, passenger rail operators' use of canines varied. In some Asian
countries, canines were not culturally accepted by the public and thus
were not used for rail security purposes. As in the United States, and in
contrast to Asia, most European passenger rail operators used canines for
explosive detection or as deterrents.

Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we
interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff,
either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many cases,
this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and persons
and how to respond to events once they occur. For example, the London
Underground and the British Transport Police developed the "HOT" method
for its employees to use to identify suspicious items in the rail system.
In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for packages or items
that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not Typical of the environment.

Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and foreign rail
operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious behavior as a
means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail operators we
contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral screening. Abroad, we
found that 4 of 13 operators we interviewed had implemented forms of
behavioral screening. All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we
contacted have ruled out an airport-style screening system for daily use
in heavy traffic, where each passenger and the passenger's baggage are
screened by a magnetometer or X-ray machine, based on cost, staffing, and
customer convenience factors, among other reasons.

Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had embarked on
programs designed to upgrade their existing security technology. For
example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had implemented a form
of closed circuit television (CCTV) to monitor their stations, yards, or
trains. While these cameras cannot be monitored closely at all times,
because of the large number of staff that would be required, many rail
operators felt that the cameras acted as a deterrent, assisted security
personnel in determining how to respond to incidents that had already
occurred, and could be monitored if an operator had received information
that an incident may occur at a certain time or place in their system.
Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we visited had CCTV systems
in place. In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail operators we interviewed had
installed new emergency phones or enhanced the visibility of the intercom
systems they already had. As in the United States, a few foreign operators
had implemented chemical or biological detection devices at these rail
stations, but their use was not widespread. Two of the 13 foreign
operators we interviewed had implemented these sensors, and both were
doing so on an experimental basis. In addition, police officers from the
British Transport Police--responsible for policing the rail system in the
United Kingdom--were equipped with pagers to detect chemical, biological,
or radiological elements in the air, allowing them to respond quickly in
case of a terrorist attack using one of these methods.

Access control: Tightening access control procedures at key facilities or
rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to enhance
security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger rail
operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized access
at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32 U.S.
operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities and
stations. All 13 foreign operators had implemented some form of access
control to their critical facilities or rights-of-way.

Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase security, passenger rail
operators in the United States and abroad have been, or are now beginning
to, incorporate security features into the design of new and existing rail
infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For example, of the 32 domestic
rail operators we contacted, 22 of them had removed their conventional
trash bins entirely, or replaced them with transparent or bomb-resistant
trash bins, as TSA instructed in its May 2004 security directives. Foreign
rail operators had also taken steps to remove traditional trash bins from
their systems. Of the 13 operators we visited, 8 had either removed their
trash bins entirely or replaced them with blast-resistant cans or
transparent receptacles.

Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security
into the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we
visited, 11 had attempted to design new facilities with security in mind
and had retrofitted older facilities to incorporate security-related
modifications. For example, one foreign operator we visited was
retrofitting its train cars with windows that passengers could open in the
event of a chemical attack. In addition, the London Underground
incorporates security into the design of all its new stations as well as
when existing stations are modified. We observed several security features
in the design of Underground stations, such as using vending machines that
have no holes that someone could use to hide a bomb, and sloped tops to
reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top of the machine. In
addition, stations are designed to provide staff with clear lines of sight
to all areas of the station, such as underneath benches or ticket
machines, and station designers try to eliminate or restrict access to any
recessed areas where a bomb could be hidden.

Figure 1 shows a diagram of several security measures that we observed in
passenger rail stations both in the United States and abroad.

Figure 1: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Passenger Rail
Environment

Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail in Securing Its
System

In our past work, we found that Amtrak faces security challenges unique to
intercity passenger rail systems. First, Amtrak operates over thousands of
miles, often far from large population centers. This makes its route
system more difficult to patrol and monitor than one contained in a
particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in responding to
incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside the Northeast
Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks and in stations
owned by freight rail companies. This means that Amtrak often cannot make
security improvements to others' rights-of-way or station facilities and
that it is reliant on the staff of other organizations to patrol their
facilities and respond to incidents that may occur. Furthermore, with over
500 stations, only half of which are staffed, screening even a small
portion of the passengers and baggage boarding Amtrak trains is difficult.
Finally, Amtrak's financial condition has never been strong--Amtrak has
been on the edge of bankruptcy several times.

Amid the ongoing challenges of securing its coast-to-coast railway, Amtrak
has taken some actions to enhance security throughout its intercity
passenger rail system. For example, Amtrak initiated a passenger awareness
campaign, began enforcing restrictions on carry-on luggage that limit
passengers to two carry-on bags, not exceeding 50 pounds; began requiring
passengers to show identification after boarding trains; increased the
number of canine units patrolling its system looking for explosives or
narcotics; and assigned some of its police to ride trains in the Northeast
Corridor. Also, Amtrak instituted a policy of randomly inspecting checked
baggage on its trains. Lastly, Amtrak is making improvements to the
emergency exits in certain tunnels to make evacuating trains in the
tunnels easier in the event of a crash or terrorist attack.

Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the United
States

While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems
are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we
identified three foreign practices that were not currently in use among
the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted as of September 2005, nor
were they performed by the U.S. government. These practices are as
follows.

Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited utilized
covert testing to keep employees alert about their security
responsibilities. Covert testing involves security staff staging
unannounced events to test the response of railroad staff to incidents
such as suspicious packages or setting off alarms. In one European system,
this covert testing involves security staff placing suspicious items
throughout their system to see how long it takes operating staff to
respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian rail operator's security staff
will break security seals on fire extinguishers and open alarmed emergency
doors randomly to see how long it takes staff to respond. TSA conducts
covert testing of passenger and baggage screening in aviation, but has not
conducted such testing in the rail environment.

Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 have some
form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in place. Prior
to the July 2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in the
United States were practicing random passengers or baggage screening.
However, during the Democratic National Convention in 2004, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) instituted a system of
random screening of passengers.

National government clearinghouse on technologies and best practices:
According to passenger rail operators in five countries we visited, their
national governments had centralized the process for performing research
and development of passenger rail security technologies and maintained a
clearinghouse of technologies and security best practices for passenger
rail operators. No U.S. federal agency has compiled or disseminated
information on research and development and other best practices for U.S.
rail operators.

Implementing covert testing, random screening, or a government-sponsored
clearinghouse for technologies and best practices in the U.S. could pose
political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the
differences between the U.S. and these foreign nations. Many foreign
nations have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public transportation
systems for decades, compared with the United States, where rail has not
been specifically targeted by terrorists. According to foreign rail
operators, these experiences have resulted in greater acceptance of
certain security practices, such as random searches, which the U.S. public
may view as a violation of their civil liberties or which may discourage
them from using public transportation. The impact of security measures on
passengers is an important consideration for domestic rail operators,
since most passengers could choose another means of transportation, such
as a personal automobile. As such, security measures that limit
accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause
inconvenience could push people away from rail and into their cars. In
contrast, the citizens of the European and Asian countries we visited are
more dependent on public transportation than most U.S. residents and
therefore may be more willing to accept intrusive security measures.
Nevertheless, in order to identify innovative security measures that could
help further mitigate terrorism- risks to rail assets--especially as part
of a broader risk management approach discussed earlier--it is important
to consider the feasibility and costs and benefits of implementing the
three rail security practices we identified in foreign countries.
Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail industry associations, and rail
systems we interviewed told us that operators would benefit from such an
evaluation. Since our report on passenger rail security was issued, TSA
has reported taking steps to coordinate with foreign passenger rail
operators and governments to identify security best practices. For
example, TSA reported working with British rail security officials to
identify best practices for detecting and handling suspicious packages in
rail systems.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the July 2005 London rail bombings made clear
that even when a variety of security precautions are put into place,
passenger rail systems that move high volumes of passengers daily remain
vulnerable to attack. DHS components have taken steps to assess the risks
to the passenger rail system. However, enhanced federal leadership is
needed to help ensure that actions and investments designed to enhance
security are properly focused and prioritized so that finite resources may
be allocated appropriately to help protect all modes of transportation.
Specifically, both DHS and TSA should take additional steps to help ensure
that the risk management efforts under way clearly and effectively
identify priority areas for security-related investments in rail and other
transportation modes. TSA has not yet completed its methodology for
determining how the results of threat, criticality, and vulnerability
assessments will be used to identify and prioritize risks to passenger
rail and other transportation sectors. Until the overall risk to the
entire transportation sector is identified, TSA will not be able to
determine where and how to target limited resources to achieve the
greatest security gains. Once risk assessments for the passenger rail
industry have been completed, it will be critical to be able to compare
assessment results across all transportation modes and make informed,
risk-based investment trade-offs. It is important that DHS complete its
framework to help ensure that risks to all sectors can be analyzed and
compared in a consistent way. Until this framework is complete, it will be
difficult for agencies to reconcile information from different sectors to
allow for a meaningful comparison of risk.

Apart from its efforts to identify risks, TSA has taken steps to enhance
the security of the passenger rail system. The issuance of security
directives in 2004 was a well-intentioned effort, but did not provide the
industry with security standards based on industry best practices. It is
also not clear how TSA will enforce these directives. Consequently,
neither the federal government nor rail operators can be sure they are
requiring and implementing security practices proven to help prevent or
mitigate disasters. While foreign passenger rail operators face similar
challenges to securing their systems and have generally implemented
similar security practices as U.S. rail operators, there are some
practices that are utilized abroad that U.S. rail operators or the federal
government have not studied in terms of the feasibility, costs, and
benefits. In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we
recommended, among other things, that TSA establish a plan with timelines
for completing its methodology for conducting risk assessments and develop
security standards that reflect industry best practices and can be
measured and enforced. These actions should help ensure that the federal
government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail
assets based on risk, and evaluate, select, and implement measures to help
the passenger rail operators protect their systems against terrorism. In
addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS, in collaboration with
DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine the feasibility, in a risk
management context, of implementing certain security practices used by
foreign rail operators. DHS generally agreed with the report's
recommendations, but as of January 2007, the agency has not told us what
specific actions they are taking to implement them. We will continue to
assess DHS and DOT's efforts to secure the U.S. passenger rail system
during follow-on work to be initiated later this year.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this
time.

Contact Information

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512- 3404. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include John Hansen, Assistant Director, Chris Currie, and Tom
Lombardi.

Related GAO Products Released Since September 11, 2001

Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk
Can Help Guide Security Efforts. [25]GAO-06-557T . Washington, D.C.: March
29, 2006.

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize
and Guide Security Efforts. [26]GAO-06-181T , Washington, D.C.: October
20, 2005.

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize
and Guide Security Efforts. [27]GAO-05-851 . Washington, D.C.: September 9
2005.

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize Resources.
[28]GAO-05-357T . Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.

Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail
Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. [29]GAO-04-598T . Washington,
D.C.: March 23, 2004.

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. [30]GAO-03-1154T . Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges. [31]GAO-03-843 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail
Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed. [32]GAO-03-435 . Washington, D.C.:
April 30, 2003.

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-term
Challenges. [33]GAO-03-616T . Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.

Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
Challenges. [34]GAO-03-263 . Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002.

Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. [35]GAO-02-1075T .
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002.

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D.C. 20548

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-225T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [43]GAO-07-225T , a testimony before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate

January 18, 2007

PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY

Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security
Efforts

The July 2005 London subway bombings and July 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai,
India dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail and other
surface transportation systems worldwide to terrorist attack and
demonstrated the need for increased focus on the security of these
systems.

This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on
passenger rail security (GAO-05-851) and selected program updates obtained
in January 2007 provides information on (1) how the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has assessed the risks posed by terrorism to the U.S.
passenger rail system; (2) actions TSA and other federal agencies have
taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and (3) rail security
practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail
operators.

[44]What GAO Recommends

GAO's September 2005 report recommended, that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) complete its methodology for conducting risk
assessments, and develop rail security standards that reflect industry
best practices. GAO also recommended that DHS determine the feasibility of
implementing certain security practices used by foreign rail operators.
DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the report's recommendations.

The DHS Office of Grants and Training has conducted risk assessments of
passenger rail systems to identify and protect rail assets that are
vulnerable to attack, such as stations and bridges. TSA has also begun to
conduct risk assessments of passenger rail assets. While TSA has begun to
establish a methodology for analyzing and characterizing risks, as of
January 2007, the agency has not completed a comprehensive risk assessment
of the U.S. passenger rail system. Until TSA does so, the agency may be
limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide
security investments. DHS has also begun developing a framework to help
agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for
analyzing and comparing risks among and across different transportation
sectors. However, until this framework is finalized, it may not be
possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and
allocate resources accordingly.

After September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation initiated a
number of efforts to improve passenger rail security. After its creation,
TSA also took a number of actions, including issuing rail security
directives, testing rail security technologies, developing training tools
for rail workers, and issuing a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding
passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal
and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's
directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion
about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. DHS and DOT
also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that delineated the two
departments' respective roles and responsibilities for promoting the safe,
secure, and efficient movement of people and goods throughout the
transportation system. TSA has recently completed specific agreements with
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) to further delineate security-related roles and
responsibilities for passenger rail.

U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken
actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer
security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the
use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training
programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger
rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the
U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For
example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use
covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While
introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal,
fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has
reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail
security.

References

Visible links
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-851
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-843
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-557T
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-181T
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-851
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-357T
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-598T
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1154T
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-843
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-435
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-616T
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-263
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-1075T
  43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-225T
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