Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Approaches Used by Foreign Countries May Provide Useful Lessons for Managing U.S. Radioactive Waste

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Approaches Used by
Foreign Countries May Provide Useful Lessons for Managing U.S.
Radioactive Waste (21-MAR-07, GAO-07-221).

GAO has reported on limitations in the management of U.S.
low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW ranges from very
low-activity to higher-activity waste. To identify potential
approaches to overcome these limitations, GAO was asked to
examine the extent to which other countries have (1) LLRW
inventory databases, (2) timely removal of higher-activity LLRW
from waste generator sites, (3) disposition options for all LLRW,
and (4) requirements that LLRW generators have financial reserves
to cover waste disposition costs, as well as any other approaches
that might improve U.S. LLRW management. GAO primarily relied on
a survey of 18 countries representing leading LLRW generators to
identify their management approaches and to compare them with
U.S. survey results and with approaches suggested by LLRW
generators, disposal operators, and regulators in the United
States.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-221
ACCNO: A67085
TITLE: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Approaches Used
by Foreign Countries May Provide Useful Lessons for Managing U.S.
Radioactive Waste
DATE: 03/21/2007
SUBJECT: Databases
Facility management
Nuclear waste disposal
Nuclear waste management
Nuclear waste storage
Radioactive waste disposal
Radioactive wastes
Regulation
Strategic planning
Toxic substances
Comparative analysis
Policy evaluation
Foreign governments

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-07-221

* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Comprehensive National LLRW Inventory Databases Are Widely U

* [4]Most Countries Have Comprehensive National Radioactive Waste
* [5]Countries Take Steps to Ensure Reliability of Information in
* [6]Countries Use Inventory Databases to Track and Manage LLRW
* [7]Domestic Experts Support Need for More Comprehensive LLRW In

* [8]Methods for Promptly Removing Higher-Activity LLRW from Wast

* [9]Most Countries Encourage and Enforce the Prompt Removal of H
* [10]Most Countries Use a Variety of Approaches to Facilitate the
* [11]Domestic Experts Support Need to Evaluate Methods for Facili

* [12]Central Storage and Alternative Disposal Options Are Widely

* [13]About Half the Countries Make Disposal Options Available for
* [14]Most Countries Have Central Storage for LLRW Lacking a Dispo
* [15]Most Countries Make Alternative Disposal Options Available f
* [16]Domestic Experts Support Need to Examine Alternative Disposi

* [17]Financial Assurance Requirements and Other Approaches Are Us

* [18]Half of the Countries Require All Non-Utility LLRW Generator
* [19]Some Countries Use Other Financial Approaches to Reduce Gove
* [20]Domestic Experts Support the Need to Evaluate Financial Assu

* [21]National Radioactive Waste Management Plans Are Considered I

* [22]Many Countries Have Developed Radioactive Waste Management P

* [23]France
* [24]Germany
* [25]Spain

* [26]Domestic Experts Support Need to Evaluate the U.S. LLRW Mana

* [27]Conclusions
* [28]Recommendations
* [29]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [30]GAO Contact
* [31]Staff Acknowledgments
* [32]Management of LLRW
* [33]Management of Sealed Radiological Sources
* [34]GAO's Mission
* [35]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

* [36]Order by Mail or Phone

* [37]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [38]Congressional Relations
* [39]Public Affairs

Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

March 2007

LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

Approaches Used by Foreign Countries May Provide Useful Lessons for
Managing U.S. Radioactive Waste

GAO-07-221

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6
Background 9
Comprehensive National LLRW Inventory Databases Are Widely Used to Track
and Manage LLRW 11
Methods for Promptly Removing Higher-Activity LLRW from Waste Generator
Sites Are Widely Used to Reduce Safety and Security Risks 17
Central Storage and Alternative Disposal Options Are Widely Used to
Facilitate Management of LLRW 22
Financial Assurance Requirements and Other Approaches Are Used by Most
Countries to Reduce Government LLRW Recovery Costs 30
National Radioactive Waste Management Plans Are Considered Important for
Managing LLRW 33
Conclusions 36
Recommendations 38
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38
Appendix I Recent GAO Findings and Agency Actions on LLRW Management 42
Appendix II Scope and Methodology 47
Appendix III Survey of LLRW Management Approaches Response from United
States 52
Appendix IV Volume and Location of LLRW in the United States 68
Appendix V Status of Class B and C Waste Disposal and Potential Effects of
Reduced Access to South Carolina Disposal Facility 74
Appendix VI Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Our
Response 83
Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Energy and Our Response 94
Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 100
Related GAO Products 101

Tables

Table 1: IAEA Suggested Radioactive Waste Classification System 10
Table 2: Listing of Domestic LLRW Stakeholder Group Respondents 50
Table 3: Total LLRW Disposed at the Three Operating Commercial LLRW
Disposal Facilities as of 2005 69
Table 4: Total Disposed LLRW at the Four Closed Commercial Disposal
Facilities 70
Table 5: Total LLRW Disposed at the Three Commercial LLRW Disposal
Facilities during 2005 70
Table 6: LLRW in Storage or Disposal at DOE Sites 71
Table 7: Transuranic Waste Disposed of or in Storage Awaiting Disposal at
WIPP 72
Table 8: Central Storage and Disposal of Disused Sealed Radiological
Sources Recovered by DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project 73
Table 9: Class B and C Waste Type Groups 75
Table 10: Total Class B and C Waste Disposed at Richland and Barnwell by
Waste Type Group, 2001-2005 76
Table 11: Number of Generators That Disposed of Class B and C Waste at
Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type and Waste Type, 2001-2005 77
Table 12: Range of Class B and C Waste Disposed Annually at Richland and
Barnwell by Generator Type, 2001-2005 79
Table 13: Distribution of Class B and C Waste Disposed Annually at
Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type, 2001-2005 80
Table 14: Distribution of Non-Utility Class B and C Waste Disposed
Annually at Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type, 2001-2005 80
Table 15: Disposed Class B and C Waste at Richland and Barnwell by LLRW
Compact, 2001-2005 81
Table 16: Class B and C Waste Disposed at Barnwell from Atlantic,
Northwest, and Rocky Mountain Generators, and Other Generators, 2001-2005
82
Table 17: Number of Waste Generators That Disposed of Sealed Radiological
Sources at Richland and Barnwell Ranked by Compact, 2001-2005 82

Figures

Figure 1: Contents of National Radioactive Waste Inventory Databases 13
Figure 2: Management Approaches for National Radioactive Waste Inventory
Databases 15
Figure 3: Management Approaches for Tracking and Managing LLRW 16
Figure 4: Methods to Facilitate Prompt Removal of LLRW from Generator
Sites 20
Figure 5: LLRW Disposal Options and Management Responsibilities 24
Figure 6: Central Storage Options for LLRW 25
Figure 7: Disposal Options and Exemption Methods for Managing Very
Low-Level Radioactive Waste 27
Figure 8: Financial Approaches to Reduce Government Costs to Recover LLRW
31
Figure 9: Number of Generators That Disposed of Class B and C Waste at
Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type and Waste Type, 2001-2005 78

Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy
GTCC greater-than-class C
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
LLRW low-level radioactive waste
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 21, 2007

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman
Chairman
The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate

Academic, industrial, medical, utility, and government entities in the
United States, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE)--commercially
disposed of at least 15-million cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste
(LLRW) in 2005.^1 LLRW substantially includes debris, rubble, and
contaminated soils from facility decommissioning and site cleanup, as well
as items such as rags, paper, liquid, glass, metal components, resins,
filters, and protective clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity
or contaminated with radioactive material. In addition, LLRW includes
sealed radiological sources that are no longer used (disused) for their
authorized use in agriculture, education, industry, medicine, and research
applications. Sealed radiological sources contain radioactive material
encapsulated, or sealed in metal to prevent its dispersal. At the present
time, commercial disposal options are available for almost all LLRW in the
United States. However, during the mid-1990s there was a period of time
when a disposal facility was not available for some LLRW, and most waste
generators are now facing the prospect of another disposal shortage in
2008 if the state of South Carolina restricts access as planned to a key
LLRW disposal facility. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers
future disposal costs and availability to be uncertain. The uncertainties
surrounding disposal costs and availability and other limitations in LLRW
management are taking on even greater significance as the United States
embarks on developing new nuclear power plants, which would eventually
create even more LLRW. Moreover, according to NRC, many non-utility
generators of LLRW do not have the physical or financial capability to
effectively manage disposal shortages and may have to curtail beneficial
uses of radioactive material.

^1LLRW is defined by exclusion; that is, LLRW is defined in statute as
radioactive waste that is not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear
fuel, or certain byproduct materials, such as tailings or waste produced
by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore
processed primarily for its source material content 42 U.S.C. S 2021b(9).

The principal federal legislation governing the disposal of LLRW is the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, as amended. The LLRW Policy Act,
among other things, assigns to the states and the federal government
responsibility for providing disposal availability for LLRW.^2 NRC has
divided the radioactive waste covered by the act into categories of
increasing levels of hazard, beginning with class A, followed by B, C, and
greater-than-class C (GTCC) waste, although there is no statutory upper
limit or lower limit for the level of radioactivity required to declare a
material to be LLRW. In addition, the act required DOE to provide
technical assistance to the states, establish a computerized database to
assist the states and DOE in monitoring the management of LLRW, and to
report annually to the Congress on the management of LLRW by the states.
However, DOE no longer receives specific appropriations to provide
technical assistance--except for some funding to maintain a database of
LLRW disposed at commercial facilities--and its reporting requirements
terminated effective May 2000. NRC--or when authorized an Agreement
State--is responsible for licensing LLRW disposal facilities.^3 In
addition, NRC is responsible for overseeing and regulating all nuclear
power plants, and for promulgating rules governing the safe and secure use
of nuclear materials. The Agreement States must adopt and implement
requirements that are compatible with NRC's standards.

The LLRW Policy Act promotes greater LLRW disposal capacity on a regional
basis and more equitably distributes responsibility for managing this
waste among the 50 states. As an incentive for states to manage LLRW on a
regional basis, the Congress consented to the formation of interstate
agreements, known as compacts, and granted compact member states the
authority to refuse to accept LLRW from other compacts or unaffiliated
states. There are currently three licensed commercial LLRW disposal
facilities, each operating under different access and licensing
restrictions, and none developed under the regional compact structure as
authorized in the LLRW Policy Act. One of these disposal facilities is in
Clive, Utah, and it accepts almost all the nation's class A waste. Another
commercial LLRW disposal facility is in Barnwell, South Carolina, and it
accepts almost all of the nation's class B and C waste. The third
commercial disposal facility is in Richland, Washington, and it receives
class A, B, and C waste from the 11 states of the Rocky Mountain and
Northwest LLRW Compacts. DOE is currently studying the feasibility of
disposal options for GTCC waste.

^2The states are responsible for providing near surface disposal of class
A, B and C wastes as defined in 10 C.F.R. S 61.55, with the exception of
three types of federal waste--DOE waste, Navy waste from decommissioning,
and waste from nuclear weapons program research, development, testing, and
production. DOE is responsible for providing disposal for a fourth
category of LLRW, known as greater-than-class C waste, and the disposal of
waste that it owns and generates.

^3NRC provides assistance to states expressing interest in establishing
programs to assume NRC regulatory authority under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended. Section 274 of the act provides a statutory basis under
which NRC relinquishes to Agreement States portions of its regulatory
authority to license and regulate byproduct materials (radioisotopes);
source materials (uranium and thorium); and certain quantities of special
nuclear materials. The mechanism for the transfer of NRC authority to a
state is an agreement signed by the governor of the state and the NRC
chairman, in accordance with section 274(b) of the act. There are
presently 34 Agreement States.

GAO has reported on limitations in the management of U.S. LLRW.^4 We have
examined the contents of the LLRW commercial disposal inventory and
national source tracking system databases; safety and security of stored
class B, C, and GTCC waste; availability of LLRW disposition options; and
issues facing DOE's ability to recoup costs for the recovery of disused
sealed radiological sources. More specifically, we reported in 2004 on the
scope and reliability of U.S. LLRW inventory information and found that
DOE's commercial LLRW disposal database (1) did not contain data on all
disposed LLRW, (2) did not capture information on LLRW that is produced
and stored at waste generator sites, and (3) had data inaccuracies. We
also found that the then proposed national source tracking system database
would not have captured almost all the disused commercial sources that DOE
had recovered from licensees. International authorities consider disused
sealed radiological sources held in local storage at user premises waiting
for disposal or return to manufacturer to be at greatest risk of becoming
an orphan source.^5

We also reported on the safety and security of storing class B, C, and
GTCC waste at non-utility waste generator sites, such as industrials,
medical and non-DOE governmental users of nuclear material. We found that
NRC does not place general time limits on local storage of any LLRW nor
does it require waste generators to return their disused sealed
radiological sources to a source supplier. However, NRC explained that its
existing licensing and inspection programs are adequate to ensure the
safety and security of stored LLRW. Nevertheless, we also found that
adding additional information on the storage of disused sealed
radiological sources to the then proposed national source tracking system
would assist DOE's ongoing source recovery program to remove these sources
from waste generator sites. We also reported on the adequacy of LLRW
disposition options and found that greater federal oversight was needed to
monitor LLRW storage and disposal conditions in light of uncertainties
surrounding future disposal availability for class B and C waste. Finally,
we commented on the lack of financial mechanisms for DOE to recoup the
costs of recovering, storing, and disposing of thousands of disused sealed
radiological sources from their holders who in some cases do not have
capacity to store or dispose of them. We found that NRC did not require
all non-utility waste generators, particularly those possessing sealed
radiological sources, to ensure that funds are available to cover future
LLRW disposition costs.

^4GAO, Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve
Security of Sealed Radiological Sources, [40]GAO-03-804 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 6, 2003); GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability
Adequate in the Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future
Shortfalls, [41]GAO-04-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004); GAO, Nuclear
Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded Recovery of
Sealed Radiological Sources, [42]GAO-05-976 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2005); and GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Future Waste Volumes and
Disposal Options Are Uncertain, [43]GAO-04-1097T (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
30, 2004).

^5An orphan source is a source that is not under regulatory control,
either because it has never been under regulatory control, or because it
has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen, or transferred without proper
authorization.

NRC and DOE accepted many of the recommendations made in these GAO reports
and they have taken other actions to improve the management of LLRW. Other
actions include a current strategic assessment of NRC's regulation of LLRW
that is intended to identify and prioritize staff activities. According to
NRC officials, this assessment will consider the recommendations made in
GAO reports and other recent reports including those from an NRC chaired
task force on radiation source protection and security, the NRC Advisory
Committee on Nuclear Waste, and the National Research Council.^6 We were
informed this assessment currently lacks a systematic review of approaches
taken by other countries to manage their LLRW. DOE is also designing a
complex-wide strategy to optimize the disposition of its low-level waste
and mixed low-level waste. Appendix I contains a more detailed discussion
of GAO findings and agency actions on LLRW management.

^6Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force, The Radiation
Source Protection and Security Task Force Report (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
15, 2006); Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, ACNW White Paper: History
and Framework of Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in the
U.S. (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 30, 2005); and National Research Council,
Improving the Regulation and Management of Low-Activity Radioactive Wastes
(Washington, D.C.: 2006). The current version of the advisory committee's
report is on the NRC's Web sites under NUREG-1853.

Given our past reports on LLRW management and NRC and DOE responses to our
recommendations, you asked us to identify approaches taken by other
countries to manage their LLRW, and whether any of these approaches might
be applicable in the United States. Specifically, you asked us to
determine the extent to which other countries have: (1) comprehensive
national LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal of higher-activity
LLRW in storage at waste generator sites, (3) disposition options for all
LLRW, and (4) requirements to assure that non-utility LLRW generators have
adequate financial reserves to cover all waste disposition costs. We also
agreed to report on any other approaches that we identified in the course
of our work that might support improvement in the management of LLRW in
the United States.

To conduct our work, we primarily relied on the results of a survey of 20
foreign countries representing the leading generators of LLRW, reviews of
reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA),^7 and interviews with representatives from U.S. LLRW
stakeholder groups. These countries, along with the United States, account
for 85 percent of the world's installed nuclear power plant capacity.
While countries generate similar radioactive waste, there is variation in
the way they classify this waste. Our survey relied on the suggested IAEA
waste classification scheme that defines two categories of LLRW,
short-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (lower-activity
LLRW) and long-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste
(higher-activity LLRW). The IAEA is also considering adding another class
of radioactive waste--very low-level radioactive waste--which some
countries already use in managing LLRW. Eighteen of the 20 foreign
countries responded to our survey to identify their use of management
approaches to address our four research objectives.^8 NRC collaborated
with DOE and other LLRW stakeholder groups to complete a U.S. response to
our survey. In addition, we visited LLRW facilities and interviewed
officials in France, Japan, and Sweden. We chose these countries because
of their extensive experience with nuclear power generation and with
constructing and operating LLRW disposal facilities. We also interviewed
representatives of U.S. LLRW stakeholder groups regarding their knowledge
of approaches used in other countries and their opinions on new approaches
that might help improve LLRW management in this country. For the most
part, these representatives provided little awareness of approaches used
in other countries. Those interviewed represented federal and state
nuclear regulatory authorities, commercial LLRW disposal operators, state
LLRW compact commissions, and other groups. As not all representatives
provided a response to questions about each LLRW management issue, our
content analysis of the interviews captures opinions from only those
representatives that responded to each issue. We also reviewed a variety
of documents provided to us by these representatives. We identified and
assessed the reliability of various waste inventory databases in an
attempt to describe the volume and location of LLRW in the United States.
We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of our report. We conducted our review between September 2005 and February
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix II. Appendix III provides the response of the United States to
the survey of LLRW management approaches.

^7IAEA was established within the United Nations to promote safe, secure,
and peaceful nuclear technologies. NEA is a specialized agency within the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, an intergovernmental
organization of industrialized countries.

^8The 18 countries that responded to the survey included Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and United Kingdom. The two countries not responding to the survey were
the Czech Republic and South Korea.

Results in Brief

Most countries we surveyed use comprehensive national radioactive waste
inventory databases to assist in the management of LLRW. Thirteen
countries indicated that their inventory databases typically contained
information on all waste types--10 of which specifically inventoried very
low-level radioactive waste--the storage of waste at generator sites,
including disused sealed radiological sources, and all waste generator
types in their countries. In addition, 15 countries indicated that they
take steps to increase the reliability of the information collected by
ensuring its completeness, accuracy, and timeliness. Almost all countries
use these databases to track the location and quantities of radioactive
waste to forecast future disposal capacity needs. Most of the U.S. LLRW
stakeholder group representatives who responded to this issue generally
supported the usefulness of developing comprehensive national LLRW
inventory databases. The NRC chaired task force also commented on the need
to evaluate including more source categories in the national source
tracking system.

Fourteen of the 18 countries we surveyed use methods to promptly remove
higher-activity LLRW from generating sites in order to reduce safety and
security risks. These countries both encourage and enforce the timely
removal of disused sealed radiological sources to prevent the uncontrolled
exposure of workers and the public to radiation. Some of these countries
also place general time limits on the storage of these sources at
generator sites. To facilitate the removal of this higher-activity LLRW,
almost all countries surveyed require that sealed radiological sources be
returned to their suppliers or to central waste storage when they are no
longer in use. Most of these countries also have established orphan source
recovery programs to collect sealed radiological sources that have been
abandoned or lost. Some U.S. stakeholder group representatives who
responded to this issue and the recent report from the NRC chaired task
force generally supported the need to evaluate methods that could be used
to facilitate the removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused
sealed radiological sources, from non-utility waste generator sites.

Ten of the 18 countries we surveyed have disposal options for
lower-activity LLRW and 6 other countries have plans to build such
facilities. While only 3 countries indicated that they have a disposal
option for higher-activity LLRW, 14 countries reported that they have
central storage facilities for this waste. Moreover, 13 countries
indicated that they have clearance or unrestricted removal of very
low-level radioactive waste from regulatory control as LLRW, and 8
countries indicated that they have disposal options for this waste. The
U.S. LLRW stakeholder group representatives who responded to this issue
were split on the need for central storage options for higher-activity
LLRW when a disposal option is not available, but most of them supported
exempting very low-level radioactive waste from regulatory control as
LLRW. The NRC chaired task force and other reports have commented on,
among other related issues, the need to reexamine disposal options for
LLRW.

Half the countries we surveyed indicated that their nuclear regulatory
authorities require all non-utility LLRW generators to have sufficient
financial assurances to cover the removal of radioactive waste from their
sites. In addition, seven of the countries use other financial assurance
approaches to ensure that the government is reimbursed for any sealed
radiological sources that it may need to recover from non-utility LLRW
generators. More than half of the U.S. LLRW stakeholder group
representatives who responded to this issue and the recent report from the
NRC chaired task force commented on the need to improve the financial
assurance structure for some LLRW generators in the United States. The
task force report suggested that NRC evaluate some approaches that are
similar to those used in some other countries to ensure that radioactive
material users have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs.

We also found that 12 of the 18 countries surveyed rely on national
radioactive waste management plans to guide the management of their
radioactive wastes and that the United States lacks such a plan. Several
of these plans required the management of radioactive waste from a
national perspective and specified one administrative entity as
responsible for coordinating their development. In addition, there was
often a requirement in the plans for periodic public reporting of LLRW
conditions. While the usefulness of such a plan was not sought through a
question in the survey or specifically raised in interviews with U.S. LLRW
stakeholder group representatives, most of the representatives and recent
reports on LLRW management mentioned the need to evaluate alternative ways
to manage LLRW.

To improve the management of LLRW in the United States and address a
potential disposal shortage for higher-activity LLRW in 2008 and other
management concerns, we are recommending that the Chairman of NRC and the
Secretary of Energy evaluate and report back to the Congress within 1 year
on the usefulness to the United States of (1) adopting the LLRW management
approaches used in the countries that are discussed in this report, and
the steps and any authorities necessary for their implementation, if
deemed appropriate; and (2) developing a U.S. radioactive waste management
plan, and the potential costs, steps, and any authorities necessary to
develop such a plan, if deemed appropriate.

NRC and DOE generally agreed with the recommendations in a draft of our
report, but raised a number of issues regarding their implementation.
Specifically, they suggested other means through which they could report
the results of their evaluations to Congress and they questioned the
benefits of developing a national radioactive waste management plan. We do
not take issue with how NRC and DOE may choose to report to the Congress;
as long as the Congress gets the information it needs, the reporting
format is a secondary consideration. In addition, in response to NRC and
DOE suggestions, we revised our recommendation regarding the development
of a national radioactive waste management plan to clarify that the
agencies first evaluate and report on the usefulness of such a plan, and
then conduct other analysis if deemed appropriate. However, based on the
experience of other nations, we continue to believe that a national
radioactive waste management plan has merit. We responded to specific
comments from NRC and DOE in appendix VI and VII, respectively, and
incorporated technical changes in this report where appropriate based on
detailed comments provided by the agencies. The State Department did not
comment on our draft report.

Background

The 30 countries in the world that generate electricity from 435 nuclear
power reactor units face the need to manage the radioactive wastes that
are generated from these units as well as the waste generated by
non-utility users of nuclear materials. The United States is a large
generator of radioactive waste with its 104 nuclear power reactors and
thousands of radioactive material licensees. These countries, including
the United States, contribute to and are guided by advice from
international organizations on approaches to manage radioactive materials.
The principal international organizations are IAEA and NEA. For example,
countries may voluntarily use IAEA standards to demonstrate implementation
of the obligations set forth in the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,
which the United States has signed. According to IAEA, the Joint
Convention recognizes and reinforces the internationally held view that
radioactive waste management is an issue of national concern, but that the
development, implementation, and maintenance of national programs for
radioactive waste management must be carried out with due regard to
internationally-endorsed criteria and standards.^9 Moreover, for
contracting parties to various international safety conventions, IAEA
standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective
fulfillment of their obligations. One example of these criteria and
standards is the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources.^10 This code, which the United States has agreed to
work toward implementing, is intended to guide countries in developing and
harmonizing policies, laws, and regulations pertaining to sealed
radiological sources. The code states, among other things, that the
nuclear regulatory authority in each country should establish a national
registry of radioactive sources to track the possession of these sources.
At a minimum, the code recommends that the nuclear regulatory authority in
each country include sources in categories 1 and 2 of the five source
categories defined by IAEA. These two categories contain sources with the
highest level of radioactivity. However, the code suggests that the
nuclear regulatory authorities also give appropriate attention to sources
in the other three categories, as they would pose health and security
risks when aggregated in harmful quantities.

^9IAEA, Radioactive Waste Management: Status and Trends-Issue#2 (Vienna,
Austria: Sept. 2002) 11.

^10IAEA, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
(Vienna, Austria: Jan. 2004).

IAEA has also put forth suggested guidance on a general system for
classifying radioactive waste to facilitate communication and information
exchange among countries. In general, U.S. class A, B, and most of class C
waste would fall into IAEA's category of short-lived low- and
intermediate-level radioactive waste (lower-activity waste), and the
remaining 25 percent of class C waste and all of GTCC waste would be
within IAEA's long-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste
category (higher-activity waste). IAEA acknowledges that spent or disused
sealed radiological sources are not considered waste in certain countries,
such as the United States, but considers that the safe management of such
sources is achieved by compliance with the requirements for managing
radioactive waste. Table 1 provides a description of the suggested IAEA
radioactive waste classification scheme.

Table 1: IAEA Suggested Radioactive Waste Classification System

Waste class Typical characteristics Disposal options
1. Exempt waste Activity levels at or below No radiological
clearance levels, which are restrictions
based on annual dose less than
0.01 mSv^a
2. Low- and Activity levels above clearance
intermediate- levels and thermal power below
about 2 kW/m^3b
level waste
2.1 Short-lived waste Restricted long-lived Near-surface or
radionuclide concentrations geological disposal
facility
2.2 Long-lived waste Long-lived radionuclide Geological disposal
concentrations exceeding facility
restricted short-lived waste
3. High-level waste Thermal power above about 2 Geological disposal
kW/m^3 and long-lived facility
radionuclide concentrations
exceeding limitations for
short-lived waste

Source: IAEA, Radioactive Waste Management: Status and Trends-Issue #2
(Vienna, Austria: Sept. 2002) 24.

amSv (millisivert) is a unit of radiation dose measurement. Two and a half
millisieverts is the national average dose of background radiation from
all sources.

bkW/m^3 is kilowatts per cubic meter of thermal power.

IAEA presently does not define a category for very low-level radioactive
waste, but such a category is under consideration. IAEA has drafted for
consideration by its member states a new waste classification system that
would add more waste categories, particularly categories for low-activity
radioactive waste. This proposed system would have six categories: (1)
exempt waste, (2) very short-lived waste, (3) very low-level waste, (4)
low-level waste, (5) intermediate-level waste, and (6) high-level waste.
The very low-level waste category might be considered the lower spectrum
of class A waste, and include materials with very limited radioactivity,
such as contaminated soil and rubble from decommissioned power plants.

Finally, IAEA issued a Safety Standard guide in 2005 regarding the
management of waste from the use of radioactive material in medicine,
industry, agriculture, research and education.^11 IAEA stated that a
national strategy for the management of radioactive waste should be
developed in accordance with the safety objectives and principles. A
strategy is necessary in order to define the infrastructure and the means
to be adopted for the management of radioactive waste. IAEA stated that a
key element in the strategy is the extent to which national and regional
waste management facilities are developed rather than managing the waste
at a number of locations where it arises.

Comprehensive National LLRW Inventory Databases Are Widely Used to Track and
Manage LLRW

^11IAEA, Management of Waste from the Use of Radioactive Material in
Medicine, Industry, Agriculture, Research and Education, Safety Guide No.
WS-G-2.7 (Vienna, Austria: 2005).

Most Countries Have Comprehensive National Radioactive Waste Inventory Databases

Thirteen of the 18 countries are considered to have comprehensive national
radioactive waste inventory databases that typically contain information
on a wide range of waste types, locations of stored waste, waste
generators, and the possession of sealed radiological sources. Almost all
countries (17/18) indicated that their inventory databases include
short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste as well as long-lived
intermediate-level waste. In addition, 10 countries indicated that their
inventories also include very low-level radioactive waste, 13 include
long-lived low-level waste, and 14 include high-level waste. All 17
countries that have national radioactive waste inventory databases
indicated that they capture waste data from all generators in their
countries, which could include academic, government, industrial, medical,
and nuclear reactor sources of LLRW. In regard to tracking the location of
waste, 14 countries indicated that their radioactive waste inventory
databases capture waste in storage at generator sites. For example, France
indicated that its national radioactive waste inventory database records
the types of radioactive waste located at all waste generator sites,
central storage, and disposal sites.

Countries Take Steps to Ensure Reliability of Information in Their
Inventory Databases

The countries in our survey also maintain national registries of sealed
radiological sources, including those in use, storage or disuse. Most
countries indicated in their survey responses that their national
radiological source registries go beyond the minimum of category 1 and 2
suggested in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources. Fourteen of 18 countries indicated that their
national source registries include all category 1, 2, and 3 sources, and
nine of these countries also include category 4 and 5 sources. The nine
countries with comprehensive source registries were Denmark, Finland,
France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Slovak Republic, and Switzerland.
While the survey did not seek information on the number of sources in a
country, the countries with comprehensive source registries include those
that may have a relatively small number of sources to track, such as
Denmark, to those countries that have much larger numbers to track, such
as France and Japan. Figure 1 summarizes the comprehensiveness of the
national radioactive waste inventory databases in the countries we
surveyed.

Figure 1: Contents of National Radioactive Waste Inventory Databases

Legend: 0M - Yes, o - No; NR - No response; NA - Not applicable

Note: Denmark responded to questions about the contents of its national
radioactive waste inventory database, although it will not be established
until 2007. Countries are ordered according to their nuclear electricity
generation at the beginning of 2006, as reported by NEA. The last four
countries in the table currently do not have nuclear electricity
generation, but Italy did in the past, and the other countries have
nuclear research reactors. The United States would be the largest nuclear
electricity generator if listed.

Countries Take Steps to Ensure Reliability of Information in Their Inventory
Databases

The countries in our survey try to increase the reliability of their
radioactive waste inventory databases by taking steps to ensure that the
information collected is complete, accurate, and timely. Almost all
countries (15/18) indicated that they have at least one control in place
to verify the completeness and accuracy of information in their national
radioactive waste inventories. These controls include periodic inspections
of the waste at generator sites, checking generator waste inventory data
submissions against past and projected waste from the generator, and
periodic audits of the waste inventory records maintained by the
generator. For example, in the United Kingdom, the information provided by
LLRW waste generators is reviewed and checked for consistency with
previous inventory information and against similar types of waste.
Moreover, independent assessments are undertaken to provide upper-bound
estimates of total radioactivity of the waste at generator sites. The
waste generators are also required to obtain a letter of compliance to
package their waste before final waste processing. At the time the letter
of compliance is issued, the waste data is reviewed, and if found
insufficient, the waste generator may be subject to a further audit.

Although almost all countries (17/18) have a national authority or waste
management organization responsible for maintaining their national
radioactive waste inventory databases, countries varied in how information
is transmitted to the entity managing the inventory and the frequency of
information submission. Currently, only 2 of the 18 countries require the
submission of waste data through a secure website. The most common methods
for data submission were use of e-mail, standard mail, fax, and by phone.
Most of the countries (12/18) indicated that their national radioactive
waste inventory databases receive data from waste generators annually or
more frequently. Survey results indicated that inventory updates every 6
months or less are obtained from waste generators in Denmark, Mexico,
Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, and Switzerland. Figure 2 summarizes the
approaches used in the countries surveyed to manage their national
radioactive waste inventory databases.

Figure 2: Management Approaches for National Radioactive Waste Inventory
Databases

Legend: 0M - Yes, o - No; NR - No response; NA - Not applicable

Note: Denmark responded to questions about the management of its national
radioactive waste inventory database, although it will not be established
until 2007. Countries are ordered according to their nuclear electricity
generation at the beginning of 2006, as reported by NEA. The last four
countries in the table currently do not have nuclear electricity
generation, but Italy did in the past, and the other countries have
nuclear research reactors. The United States would be the largest nuclear
electricity generator if listed.

Countries Use Inventory Databases to Track and Manage LLRW

Sixteen of the 18 countries in our survey indicated that they use their
national radioactive waste inventory databases to forecast waste volumes,
plan for disposal capacity, and track the location of disused sealed
radiological sources. Thirteen countries indicated that they publicize
information from their national radioactive waste inventory databases on
what is stored and disposed of to gain community acceptance for siting
these facilities. Sixteen of the countries indicated that they keep
records of the location and status and use of sources in their national
source registries. Figure 3 shows the responses for each country.

Figure 3: Management Approaches for Tracking and Managing LLRW

Legend: 0M - Yes, o - No; NR - No response

Domestic Experts Support Need for More Comprehensive LLRW Inventory Databases

Most representatives of domestic LLRW stakeholder groups who responded in
interviews to this issue (19/25) supported the need to establish a more
comprehensive national radioactive waste inventory database in the United
States. Over half of these representatives commented that such an
inventory would allow LLRW stakeholders to forecast waste volumes and to
plan for future disposal capacity requirements. However, some
representatives felt that a more comprehensive national radioactive waste
inventory database would not be necessary. For example, one representative
argued that the cost-effectiveness of adding more reporting requirements
to include the storage of class B and C waste might not be justified given
the small quantities of this waste that are generated each year.

A recent report of the interagency Radiation Source Protection and
Security Task Force, chaired by NRC, addressed the scope of the current
national source tracking system, which currently tracks the possession of
category 1 and 2 sources. The task force suggested that NRC conduct a
comprehensive analysis of category 3 sources for possible inclusion in the
National Source Tracking System. The task force found that category 3 and
lower-activity sources comprise a major portion of those sources
voluntarily identified as surplus, excess, or unwanted in the commercial
sector. Moreover, the task force found that the U.S. metal recycle
industry claims that category 3 sources are those more commonly misplaced
or abandoned by industry, resulting in potential contamination of the
metal recycling process with operational and financial impacts.

Methods for Promptly Removing Higher-Activity LLRW from Waste Generator Sites
Are Widely Used to Reduce Safety and Security Risks

Fourteen of the 18 countries we surveyed use methods to promptly remove
higher-activity LLRW from generating sites in order to reduce safety and
security risks. These countries both encourage and enforce the timely
removal of disused sealed radiological sources to prevent the uncontrolled
exposure of workers and the public to radiation. Some of these countries
also place general time limits on the storage of these sources at
generator sites. To facilitate the removal of higher-activity LLRW, almost
all countries surveyed require that sealed radiological sources be
returned to their suppliers when they are no longer in use. Most of these
countries also have established orphan source recovery programs to collect
sealed radiological sources that have been abandoned or lost. Some U.S.
stakeholder group representatives who responded to this issue and the
recent report from the NRC chaired task force generally supported the need
to evaluate methods that could be used to facilitate the removal of
higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused sealed radiological sources,
from non-utility waste generator sites.

Most Countries Encourage and Enforce the Prompt Removal of Higher-Activity LLRW
from Generator Sites

Most countries we surveyed (14/18) indicated that their nuclear regulatory
authority encourages the removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially
disused sealed radiological sources, from generator sites, and half of the
countries enforce the prompt removal of these sources. Some of the
countries that require the prompt removal of these sources also place time
limits on how long LLRW can remain in storage at waste generator sites.
Seven countries indicated that they limit the amount of time that LLRW can
remain in storage at non-utility waste generator sites, and four other
countries impose time limits only when waste generators have a disposal
option for the waste. For example, in Sweden, depending on the facility,
waste generators can only hold disused sealed radiological sources for 6
months to a year and a half, and any other LLRW intended for storage at a
waste generator site for more than 2 years must be registered with the
national regulatory authority.

Most Countries Use a Variety of Approaches to Facilitate the Removal of
Higher-Activity LLRW from Generator Sites

Almost all countries we surveyed (15/18) indicated that they require that
sealed radiological sources be returned to their source supplier or to a
central storage facility when they are no longer in use. The general
support for this LLRW management approach might be attributable to
international guidance on managing sources. All countries in our survey
have agreed to follow the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security
of Radioactive Sources, which recommends that nuclear regulatory
authorities attach clear and unambiguous conditions on the use of sources,
including, where applicable, agreements regarding the return of disused
sources to a supplier. In addition, the Council of the European Union
Directive 2003/122 states that all member countries must establish
requirements that a holder of a sealed radiological source return the
source to the supplier, place it in a recognized installation, or transfer
it to another authorized holder without undue delay after termination of
the use, unless otherwise agreed by the nuclear regulatory authority. For
example, in France, the supplier of sealed radiological sources is
responsible for the sources it sells. Once the purchaser of a source
ceases to use it, the holder must immediately return it to the supplier
who is responsible for accepting it unconditionally. Until the source user
can prove that the source has been returned to a supplier, the user
retains responsibility for it. Only three countries, two of which are
non-European Union member countries, indicated that they do not currently
impose this regulation on source holders.

Most countries we surveyed (11/18) indicated that they have government
programs to recover higher-activity sources that are not under regulatory
control (orphan sources). Once again, there is international guidance in
this area. The IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources recommends that nuclear regulatory authorities
establish provisions to recover and restore appropriate control over
orphan sources. Moreover, the Council of the European Union also
recognized that despite the existence of an appropriate regulatory
framework to control these higher-activity sources, they still may be
abandoned or lost. Council Directive 2003/122 states that all member
countries shall ensure that their nuclear regulatory authorities are
prepared to or have assigned responsibilities for recovering orphan
sources. This directive also states that the nuclear regulatory
authorities in these countries shall be notified of any changes in the
situation of a higher-activity source, such as its location and use, and
to register these changes. Nine countries, including three non-European
Union countries, indicated that holders of sealed radiological sources are
required to notify the nuclear regulatory authority when a source has
become disused, and most countries (14/18) indicated that their authority
verifies this information by periodically inspecting the storage of
disused sources at user sites. Eleven countries indicated that a
government entity is given responsibility for managing an orphan source
recovery program; 3 countries give this responsibility to a
non-governmental entity. For example in Japan, the Japan Radioisotope
Association is responsible for recovering and storing sealed radiological
sources and other radioisotopes from users of these radioactive materials.
The association, regulated by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology--the Japanese ministry responsible for regulating
medical uses of radioisotopes--is funded through fees collected by users
of these materials. Figure 4 provides a summary of the methods used by
countries in our survey to facilitate the prompt removal LLRW,
particularly disused sealed radiological sources from waste generator
sites.

Figure 4: Methods to Facilitate Prompt Removal of LLRW from Generator
Sites

Legend: 0M - Yes, o - No; NR - No response; NA - Not applicable

Note: Countries are ordered according to their nuclear electricity
generation at the beginning of 2006, as reported by NEA. The last four
countries in the table currently do not have nuclear electricity
generation, but Italy did in the past, and the other countries have
nuclear research reactors. The United States would be the largest nuclear
electricity generator if listed.

Domestic Experts Support Need to Evaluate Methods for Facilitating the Removal
of Higher-Activity LLRW from Waste Generator Sites

The representatives from domestic LLRW stakeholder groups who responded in
interviews to this issue generally agreed that the United States should
consider exploring methods for promptly removing higher-activity LLRW from
waste generator sites. Eleven of 27 representatives supported imposing
time limits on storing higher-activity LLRW at non-utility waste generator
sites, but not for radioactive wastes that are allowed to decay in storage
within a reasonable amount of time. For example, several representatives
suggested that LLRW generators should be treated the same as generators of
hazardous waste. The generators of large quantities of hazardous waste are
required to remove waste from their sites within 90 days, unless they
receive authorization for long-term storage of this waste. However, other
representatives were not in favor of establishing time limits for waste
storage, for the most part because of uncertainties surrounding disposal
availability in the United States. Some of the representatives noted that
placing time limits on the storage of higher-activity LLRW could only be
justified if it posed a safety and security risk. In this respect, almost
all representatives (25/26) suggested that having a requirement that
disused sealed radiological sources be returned to their source supplier
would be an effective way to promote more timely removal of these sources
from waste generator sites.

The NRC chaired task force reported that while existing measures to ensure
the safety and security of higher-activity sealed radiological sources are
adequate, the current disposal system is prompting some users into
long-term storage of their disused sources and otherwise creating
significant disincentives for properly disposing of these sources. The
report noted that the lack of a legal disposal pathway or the high costs
of disposal due to the lack of alternative disposal options will
perpetuate this situation until the disposal system changes. The task
force report suggested that the U.S. government should encourage suppliers
to provide arrangements for the return of disused sources. The task force
noted that holding a source in storage longer than 24 months usually
indicates the lack of a strategy to use or dispose of the source. As a
result, the task force suggested that NRC consider a new requirement for
licensees to review and document the reasons for storing higher-activity
sources for longer than 24 months. Moreover, the task force suggested that
once disposal options are available for GTCC waste (equivalent to
long-lived intermediate-level waste), NRC should also consider requiring a
maximum time limit on long-term storage of disused sealed radiological
sources that would be considered GTCC waste when packaged for disposal.

Central Storage and Alternative Disposal Options Are Widely Used to Facilitate
Management of LLRW

Ten of the 18 countries we surveyed have disposal options for
lower-activity LLRW and 6 have plans to build such facilities. While only
3 countries indicated that they have a disposal option for higher-activity
LLRW, 14 reported that they have central storage facilities for this
waste. Moreover, 13 countries indicated that they have clearance or
unrestricted removal of very low-level radioactive waste from regulatory
control as LLRW and eight countries indicated that they have disposal
options for this waste. The U.S. LLRW stakeholder group representatives
who responded to this issue were split on the need for central storage
options for higher-activity LLRW when a disposal option is not available,
but most of them supported exempting very low-level radioactive waste from
regulatory control as LLRW. The NRC chaired task force and other reports
have commented on the need to reexamine the disposal options for LLRW.

About Half the Countries Make Disposal Options Available for Most Lower-Activity
LLRW

About half of the countries in our survey indicated that they currently
have a disposal option for lower-activity LLRW, but few have a disposal
option for higher-activity LLRW. Ten of 18 countries indicated that they
have disposal options available for lower-activity LLRW, and 10 have
reported plans to build new or additional disposal facilities for
lower-activity LLRW. While only 3 countries indicated that they currently
have a disposal option for higher-activity LLRW, 14 have reported plans to
develop a disposal facility for such waste.

Other countries have made a variety of organizations responsible for
providing and operating the existing or planned disposal facilities,
including national regulatory authorities, nuclear utility organizations,
and commercial waste management companies. In the 10 countries that have
disposal facilities for lower-activity LLRW, only 2 indicated that a
national organization is responsible for both providing and operating this
disposal facility. The other eight countries indicated that these
responsibilities were given to other combinations that sometimes included
nuclear utilities and commercial waste management companies. In the 14
countries that are planning to build disposal facilities for
higher-activity LLRW, 6 indicated that a national organization would be
responsible for providing and operating the future disposal facility and 3
indicated that it would be another organization. The other countries
indicated either a mix of responsibilities or they did not respond to the
question. For example, the Netherlands has reported that it has decided to
delay a final decision on developing a disposal facility and instead
construct an engineered surface storage facility with sufficient capacity
for all radioactive waste generated in a period of at least 100 years.
However, if a disposal facility is ever constructed, this country
indicated in its survey that its nuclear regulatory authority would be
responsible for providing the facility and a national waste management
organization would be responsible for operating it. In regard to the cost
of disposal, half of the countries indicated that disposal fees are
currently or anticipated to be set nationally, based on waste type. Two
countries indicated that such fees are currently based on negotiations
with disposal operators according to waste type. Mexico indicated use of
both a national fee schedule and negotiated fees. Figure 5 provides a
summary of LLRW disposal availability and management responsibilities
across the countries in our survey.

Figure 5: LLRW Disposal Options and Management Responsibilities

Legend: 0M - Yes, o - No; NR - No response; NA - Not applicable

Most Countries Have Central Storage for LLRW Lacking a Disposal Option

Most countries we surveyed currently have interim or long-term central
storage options for some LLRW. Thirteen countries reported that they have
central storage options available for lower-activity LLRW. Six countries
reported that they have both disposal and some central storage options for
this waste. Fourteen countries reported that they have central storage
options for higher-activity LLRW, sometimes at large waste production
sites as in France. For the most part, these countries do not have a
disposal option for higher-activity LLRW, although Norway indicated that
it had disposal and interim storage options for the long-lived,
intermediate-level waste. Figure 6 provides a summary of the central
storage options available in the countries we surveyed.

Figure 6: Central Storage Options for LLRW

Legend: 0M - Yes, o - No; NR - No response

Most Countries Make Alternative Disposal Options Available for Very Low-Level
Radioactive Waste

Most countries provide alternative disposal options for very low-level
radioactive waste either by removing such waste from regulatory control as
LLRW or providing special disposal arrangements. Almost all countries
(15/18) indicated that their nuclear regulatory authorities exempt this
waste from regulatory control as nuclear material, thus allowing
alternative disposal options for the waste. The countries use various
approaches to remove very low-level radioactive waste from regulatory
control as LLRW, including general exemption, case-by-case exemption, and
clearance. The most frequently cited approach used by the countries was
exemption (15/18), followed by clearance (13/18), and then case-by-case
exemption (11/18). For example, according to a May 2005 updated nuclear
development report submitted by Japan to the NEA, Japan followed IAEA
guidance to amend its "Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material,
Nuclear Fuel Material and Rectors" to introduce a clearance system for
materials, such as scrap metals and concrete used in nuclear
installations. Half the countries in our survey indicated that they use
all three management approaches.

Some countries in our survey indicated that they have alternative disposal
options for very low-level radioactive waste. These options included
disposal at municipal landfills, nuclear power plants, and in special
facilities for such waste. Eight countries indicated that they have
disposal options for very low-level radioactive waste. For example, in
Sweden, this radioactive material is cleared for unrestricted use or
disposal as conventional non-radioactive waste. Sweden reported that, in
2004, approximately 660 tons of very low-level radioactive waste was
cleared for disposal at municipal landfills and approximately 550 tons of
melted scrap metal was cleared for recycling. In contrast, France does not
have a clearance threshold below which radioactive waste is no longer
considered a radioactive hazard. Instead, France uses a case-by-case
exemption process to allow for the disposal of very low-level radioactive
waste in a special repository that was commissioned in 2003. The French
government reported that this facility represents another essential
component of France's overall system for radioactive waste management and
that it will accommodate most of the waste resulting from the
decommissioning and dismantling of facilities in which radioactive
substances have been used. Figure 7 provides a summary of the disposal
options and exemption methods used by countries in our survey for managing
very low-level radioactive waste.

Figure 7: Disposal Options and Exemption Methods for Managing Very
Low-Level Radioactive Waste

Legend: 0M - Yes, 0m - No; NR - No response

Domestic Experts Support Need to Examine Alternative Disposition Options for
Some LLRW

The representatives of domestic LLRW stakeholder groups who responded in
interviews to this issue as well as findings reported by some groups
generally supported the need to evaluate alternative disposition options
for some LLRW. In regard to developing central storage options for
higher-activity LLRW when a disposal option is not available, the
representatives were split in their support. Those in favor (13/27) noted
that having a central storage option would encourage the efficient and
timely removal of higher-activity LLRW from waste generator sites. For
example, one representative commented that facilities such as hospitals,
academic institutions, and some industries may have limited on-site
storage space, restrictions placed on waste storage time in their license,
or possession limits for radioactive material, which would need to account
for the radioactivity in the stored waste. Those opposed (14/27) to
developing central storage options for LLRW generally rejected this
approach as an unnecessary step prior to disposing of the waste--a step
they also saw as potentially increasing safety and security risks. For
example, one representative commented that developing central storage for
LLRW that does to have a disposal option would only detract from finding
an ultimate disposal solution.

The representatives from LLRW stakeholder groups were more supportive of
the need for NRC to adopt a clearance rule in lieu of the current
case-by-case exemption process for allowing very low-level radioactive
waste to be removed from regulation as LLRW. Most representatives (19/25)
who responded in interviews to this issue commented that a clearance rule
would promote more rapid removal of very low-level radioactive waste from
waste-generating sites or in some cases negate the need for the on-site
removal of this type of radioactive waste. They also suggested that this
action would expedite the cost-effective disposal of this waste by
reducing administrative burdens, lowering disposal costs, and saving space
in licensed LLRW disposal facilities for higher-activity LLRW. For
example, one representative commented that knowing up front what type of
radioactive waste would not require nuclear regulatory authority review
prior to disposition could reduce the need to plan for storage space,
shipment, and disposal of such waste as LLRW. Another representative
commented that a clearance rule would provide a clear and consistent
exemption for very low-level radioactive waste across the Agreement States
and non-Agreement States. Several representatives supported the adoption
of a clearance rule, but cautioned that public resistance and other
factors have impeded previous NRC attempts to adopt this approach. Some
representatives contended that exempting very low-level radioactive waste
from disposal as LLRW might prompt LLRW disposal operators to increase the
cost of disposing of the other LLRW to compensate for the lost revenue
from no longer receiving large quantities of very low-level radioactive
waste.

The NRC chaired task force report concluded that a number of challenges
are associated with disposing of all categories of commercial sealed
radiological sources because of the limited number of available disposal
facilities, the lack of options to dispose of all types of radioactive
waste, and the high cost of disposal. The task force found that commercial
LLRW disposal has evolved from an essentially free-market system to a much
more constrained and costly system today. However, the task force did not
identify any immediate security concerns related to the higher-activity
sources under review because licensees are required to safely and securely
store these sources, and DOE has a program to recover sealed radiological
sources that represent a threat to public heath, safety, and security.
Nevertheless, the task force noted that because of uneven implementation
of the LLRW Policy Act, several issues affect the disposal of
higher-activity sources, such as the possible closure of the South
Carolina LLRW disposal facility to non-compact member states. The task
force recommended that the U.S. government evaluate the waste disposal
options as outlined in the 2004 and 2005 GAO reports addressing this
issue.^12

The recent National Research Council report on Improving the Regulation
and Management of Low-Activity Radioactive Wastes also commented on
disposal options for low-activity waste (very low-level radioactive
waste). The report noted that the United States could benefit from greater
consideration of standards and practices developed internationally to
institute risk-based management of very low-level radioactive waste. The
report noted that European Commission and IAEA standards already provide
guidelines for wastes that pose insignificant risks to be cleared or
exempted from control as radioactive material. The report recommended that
the United States give greater consideration to the international
consensus standards surrounding alternative disposition options for very
low-level radioactive, including disposal with other non-hazardous wastes,
or disposal in special facilities suitable for such waste. The report did
not conclude, however, that exemption or clearance should necessarily
imply the free release of this waste into general commerce.

Finally, NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste similarly commented on
the need to examine alternative options for the disposition of some LLRW.
The committee's December 2005 white paper referred to previous
recommendations the committee made to NRC with respect to concerns about
the interim storage of LLRW at waste generator sites. The committee found
that no evidence exists that on-site storage of waste can be safe and
secure over the expected life of the waste and that the proliferation of
on-site storage at waste generator sites across the country will only
increase the probability of an adverse event. The white paper also
discusses past initiatives by NRC to examine regulations governing future
development of assured isolation facilities (central storage facilities)
for LLRW. The committee found that only one Agreement State, Ohio, had
such regulations as of the end of 2005. The committee report noted that in
January 2004, the Commissioners directed NRC staff to defer action on the
development of an assured isolation rule, but to annually review the need
for further action in this area.

^12GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability Adequate in the
Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future Shortfalls,
[44]GAO-04-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004); and GAO, Nuclear
Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded Recovery of
Sealed Radiological Sources, [45]GAO-05-967 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2005).

Financial Assurance Requirements and Other Approaches Are Used by Most Countries
to Reduce Government LLRW Recovery Costs

Nine of the 18 countries we surveyed indicated that their nuclear
regulatory authorities require all non-utility LLRW generators to have
sufficient financial assurances to cover the removal of radioactive waste
from their sites. In addition, seven countries use other financial
assurance approaches to ensure that the government is reimbursed for any
sealed radiological sources that it may need to recover from non-utility
LLRW generators. More than half of the representatives from U.S. LLRW
stakeholder groups who responded to this issue and statements in the
recent report from the NRC chaired task force indicated some need to
improve the financial assurance structure for some LLRW generators. The
task force report suggested that NRC evaluate some approaches that are
similar to those used in some other countries to ensure that radioactive
material users have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs.

Half of the Countries Require All Non-Utility LLRW Generators to Meet Financial
Assurance Requirements

Half of the countries we surveyed indicated that they require all
non-utility LLRW generators to set aside sufficient financial reserves to
cover waste disposition costs. These countries more often provide disposal
options for lower-activity LLRW and generally provide central storage for
higher-activity LLRW. In addition, three countries indicated that they
have plans to impose financial assurance requirements on all non-utility
LLRW generators. For example, Japan indicated that it planned to develop
these requirements, but could not predict when they would be implemented.

Some Countries Use Other Financial Approaches to Reduce Government Orphan Source
Recovery Costs

Some countries have taken approaches to reduce the potential government
costs of recovering orphan sealed radiological sources that are no longer
under regulatory control. The Council of the European Union Directive
2003/122 states that all member countries must organize campaigns to
recover orphan sources left behind by past activities, and suggests
campaigns include financial participation by member countries in the costs
of recovering, managing, and disposing of these sources, as well as in the
review of records on the sealed radiological sources being used at
research institutes, material testing institutes, and hospitals. This
directive also requires that member countries ensure establishment of a
system of financial assurance requirements or other equivalent means of
reimbursing the government for its costs in recovering orphan sources. As
a means to reimburse the government for orphan source recovery costs, 5
countries in our survey indicated that users of sealed radiological
sources have established common funds to pay the LLRW disposition costs by
source users. Moreover, 2 countries indicated that sealed radiological
source recovery funds have been established by source suppliers to cover
similar disposition costs for these companies. For example, in France, the
association of source suppliers and manufacturers contribute to a common
fund to reimburse the government for recovering sealed radiological
sources from any supplier or manufacturer that is unable to disposition
them. In cases where the supplier cannot be identified, the government is
reimbursed by an insurance system implemented by the source manufacturers.
In addition, France indicated on its survey that under the new radiation
protection regulations consideration is being given to examining the
benefits of adding financial guarantees to this system. Nine countries
indicated that they either require a disposal fee at the time that a
source is purchased or are planning to impose such a fee to ensure that
funds are available to reimburse government for the costs of recovering
orphan sources. Figure 8 provides a summary of the financial approaches
used by the countries in our survey to reduce government costs of
recovering LLRW.

Figure 8: Financial Approaches to Reduce Government Costs to Recover LLRW

Legend: 0M - Yes, o - No; NR - No response; NA - Not applicable

Domestic Experts Support the Need to Evaluate Financial Assurance Approaches

The potential usefulness of financial assurance approaches that were
identified through our survey was reflected in interviews with domestic
LLRW stakeholder group representatives. More than half of the
representatives (8/14) who responded to this issue in interviews commented
on the need to improve the financial assurance structure for LLRW
generators in the United States. These representatives suggested
approaches to improve financial assurances, such as new rulemaking by NRC,
periodic updating of the level of financial assurance requirements for
LLRW generators, and providing a mechanism for small businesses that
cannot self-guarantee financial assurance to otherwise provide this
assurance. In addition, some of the representatives (5/16) supported the
imposition of a disposal fee at the time of source purchase to help
promote a more cost-effective disposal system and more predictable
disposal costs for source users. For example, one representative noted
that imposing such a fee has merit, but obtaining a commitment or
obligation to pay the disposal fee would be an important first step.

The NRC chaired task force found that sealed radiological source users are
moving disused sources into prolonged storage because they are not
required to have financial assurance to cover the disposal costs or
otherwise appropriately dispositioning their disused sources. The report
reiterated the concern that prolonged storage of disused sources can lead
to possible misuse, abandonment, loss, or theft. Further, the task force
found that the cost of source disposal can often be high, prompting the
holders of disused sources to delay disposal either by choice or economic
necessity. The task force identified three options to improve financial
assurance coverage that were in many ways similar to approaches used to
varying extents in other countries. The first option is to broaden NRC
financial assurance requirements to include those entities that have lower
thresholds of radioactive materials. This option would ensure that
adequate funds are set aside by these entities to cover their waste
disposition costs. However, the task force found that this action alone
would not cover government costs of recovering orphan sources or sources
for which there is no responsible or financially capable party. Thus, two
other options were proposed that include (1) assessing a source-specific
surcharge at the time of source acquisition or throughout a source's
service life to pay the costs of disposal, and (2) assessing a universal
disposal surcharge on all licensees of radioactive material (not limited
to sealed radiological source holders) to cover waste disposition costs.
The task force recommended that NRC evaluate these alternative financial
assurance options and include the impacts on the regulated community,
implementation approaches, and the involvement of stakeholders.

National Radioactive Waste Management Plans Are Considered Important for
Managing LLRW

We also found that 12 of the 18 countries surveyed rely on national
radioactive waste management plans to guide the management of their
radioactive wastes. Several of these plans required the management of
radioactive waste from a national perspective and specified one
administrative entity as responsible for coordinating their development.
In addition, there was often a requirement in the plans for periodic
public reporting of LLRW conditions. While the usefulness of such a plan
was not sought through a question in the survey or specifically raised in
interviews with U.S. LLRW stakeholder group representatives, most of the
representatives and recent reports on LLRW management mentioned the need
to evaluate alternative ways to manage LLRW in the United States.

Many Countries Have Developed Radioactive Waste Management Plans That Are
National in Scope and Formulated by One Administrative Entity

At least 12 of the 18 countries in our survey have national radioactive
waste management plans or draft plans to guide the management of this
material. The 12 countries included Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. While the other countries may also have such plans, we
did not ask whether they had one in our survey. We identified the 12
countries with management plans through a review of recent IAEA and NEA
country reports. The management plans from France, Germany, and Spain
contain strategies to address all radioactive waste types. They are
formulated by either a national level ministry or national waste
management organization, often through consultation with other stakeholder
groups. The management plans are approved by the parliament, with in some
cases requirements for periodic reporting of waste management conditions
back to the governing body.

France

In 2003, the national nuclear regulatory authority of France formulated a
national plan for the management of radioactive waste and reusable
material. The development of this plan involved many stakeholders,
including the national waste management organization, waste producers,
elected representatives, and professional associations. According to the
2006 Program Act on the Sustainable Management of Radioactive Materials
and Wastes, the national management plan will evaluate existing management
approaches for radioactive materials and waste, identify foreseeable needs
for storage or disposal facilities and the time frame for storage as well
as assess the management approaches for radioactive wastes that do not yet
have a path to disposal. The Program Act also states that the national
plan for managing radioactive materials and wastes will be updated and
reported to the parliament by the nuclear regulatory authority every 3
years.

Germany

According to a 2006 update report to NEA on the status of German
radioactive waste management, in late 2001 Germany amended its Atomic
Energy Act to request that the Federal Ministry for the Environment
prepare and submit a national waste management plan. At the same time it
amended this act, the parliament decided to phase out the use of nuclear
energy for commercial electricity generation. According to the report, the
draft plan, which is expected to be approved by parliament in 2007,
addresses the strategic management of all radioactive waste, provides an
inventory of existing radioactive waste, forecasts further waste
production, delineates waste management planning for the next few years,
and contains recommendations and required actions. The national
radioactive waste inventory, for the first time, captures all types of
radioactive waste, including high-level waste, waste from research,
medicine, and industry; decommissioning waste from nuclear power plants;
and uranium mine and mill tailing waste. Until a final disposal site in a
deep geologic formation is available for all radioactive waste, the plan
calls for the German federal states to construct and operate regional
interim storage facilities for all non-utility waste generators, and
requires nuclear power plants to provide interim on-site waste storage.

Spain

In 2006, Spain adopted its sixth general radioactive waste plan. This plan
replaces the previous plan enacted 7 years ago. As stated in the plan,
this document contemplates the strategies, the necessary actions, and the
technical solutions to be developed in the short-, medium-, and long-term
to ensure the adequate management of radioactive waste, the dismantling
and decommissioning of nuclear and radioactive facilities, and related
activities, including the economic and financial measures required to
carry them out. Further, this document states that this plan is the basic
reference document that clearly and concisely addresses all the strategies
and actions to be undertaken in Spain with regard to the different fields
of radioactive waste management and the dismantling of facilities, along
with a corresponding study of economic and financial conditions. The plan,
among other components, presents the data related to radioactive waste
generation, programs for removal, the capacity of disposal facilities as
well as costs and revenues. Every 4 years or whenever requested by the
cognizant ministry, the national waste management organization develops a
new radioactive waste management plan, which is submitted to government
and then reported to the parliament. The national waste management
organization, a state-owned company established in 1984, has been given
the responsibility for radioactive waste management and decommissioning of
nuclear facilities. In addition to this action, the national waste
management organization must draw up an annual report describing the
actions taken during the previous financial year and any incremental
revisions that need to be made to the general radioactive waste plan.

Domestic Experts Support Need to Evaluate the U.S. LLRW Management System

There was general agreement among the representatives from the LLRW
stakeholder groups that the management of LLRW in the United States needs
improvement. Most of the representatives who responded to questions
associated with this issue (22/29) suggested that the time is right to
explore alternative approaches to make the LLRW disposal system more
predictable (reliable) and stable (cost-effective). Many of the
representatives cited the proposed closure of the South Carolina disposal
facility to non-compact waste generators as the reason to explore these
alternatives approaches. However, one representative cautioned that while
the present disposal system in the United States is not what was
envisioned in the LLRW Policy Act, it is an alternative that has generally
provided disposal availability to most waste generators. As we did not
directly ask the representatives about the need for a national radioactive
waste management plan at the time of the interviews, we have no basis to
tabulate their reaction to this specific LLRW management approach.

The National Research Council of the National Academies recently reported
on improving the regulation and management of low-activity waste in the
context of the U.S. LLRW management system. The report recommended that
regulatory agencies develop integrated strategies to implement
risk-informed regulation for very low-level radioactive waste. According
to the report, such a strategy would require continued integration and
coordination among the regulatory agencies, including NRC, DOE, the
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Defense, and other federal
and state agencies. Moreover, the report recommended that government
agencies continue to explore ways to improve their efforts to gather
knowledge and opinions of stakeholders, particularly public stakeholders.
While the report did not go so far as to recommend the establishment of a
national radioactive waste management plan, it did find that the current
patchwork of regulations is complex and inconsistent--leading in some
instances to inefficient management practices and possibly to increased
overall risk in the system.

Finally, in May 2006, the NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste agreed
to examine issues surrounding the shortcomings in the national LLRW
management system. The committee solicited industry and stakeholder views
regarding the future role of NRC in the area of commercial LLRW
management, noting that NRC staff is updating its LLRW strategic plan
following NRC-directed program reductions. In an August 2006 letter to the
NRC Commissioners, the committee recommended that an examination be
undertaken of how NRC and the Agreement States are preparing to regulate
potential increases in the storage of class B and C waste if and when the
LLRW disposal facility in South Carolina closes to waste generators in
non-compact states and no alternative options become available. While the
committee did not call for developing a national radioactive waste
management plan, it seemed to suggest the need for contingency planning in
the context of a strategic approach to NRC's involvement in LLRW
management.

Conclusions

The 18 countries surveyed rely on a wide variety of approaches to manage
their LLRW. However, the extent to which each country uses these LLRW
management approaches varied across the surveyed countries. Based on
previous GAO reports, other pertinent reports, and responses to GAO's
survey, it appears that the United States relies on these approaches to a
lesser degree or not at all. In some cases, NRC has already evaluated the
merits of implementing some of these approaches and rejected them or is in
the process of evaluating the usefulness of a few other approaches.
Comments from representatives of U.S. LLRW stakeholders groups as well as
statements and recommendations in recent reports related to LLRW
management indicate that the application of approaches similar to those
used in other countries may improve the management of U.S. radioactive
waste. The management approaches identified in this report include methods
to improve the:

1. Comprehensiveness and usefulness of national radioactive waste
inventory databases

o inventory all types of radioactive waste by volume,
location and generator type;

o inventory the possession and status of use of
sealed radiological sources in more than category 1
and 2;

o designate a national authority to manage the
radioactive waste inventory databases;

o take steps to verify the completeness and accuracy
of these databases;

o require waste generators to submit waste inventory
information to the national authority at least once a
year; and

o use the radioactive waste inventory databases to
forecast future waste volumes, and to inform the
public on volumes of waste at central storage and
disposal facilities.

2. Prompt removal of higher-activity LLRW, primarily disused
sealed radiological sources from waste generator sites

o establish on-site storage time limits for
non-utility waste generators, at least when disposal
options are available; and

o implement other methods to facilitate the removal
disused sealed radiological sources, such as
requiring time limits on the use of sources, return
of disused sources to a supplier, and users to notify
the nuclear regulatory authority when the source
becomes disused.

3. Disposition options for all LLRW

o provide disposal options for all LLRW or central
storage options for higher-activity LLRW produced by
non-utility waste generators if a disposal option is
not available; and

o provide alternative disposal options for very
low-level radioactive waste by either removing this
waste from review by the nuclear regulatory authority
as LLRW, or providing special disposal options for
this waste.

4. Financial assurance requirements on all waste generators to
reduce government disposition costs

o require that all non-utility LLRW generators have
sufficient financial reserves to disposition their
radioactive waste; and

o implement methods to ensure that funds are
available to reimburse government for any costs to
recover and disposition radioactive materials,
including requiring the establishment of insurance
funds for entities that receive disused sources back
from their users, and a disposal fee upon purchase of
any sealed radiological sources.

In addition to the survey results, we also identified another management
approach used in most countries--national radioactive waste management
plans--that also might provide lessons for managing U.S. radioactive
waste. IAEA guidance supports the development of a national strategy to
define the infrastructure and the means to be adopted for the management
of radioactive waste. Currently, the United States does not have a
national radioactive waste management plan and does not have a single
federal agency or other organization responsible for coordinating LLRW
stakeholder groups to develop such a plan. Such a plan for the United
State could integrate the various radioactive waste management programs
that reside at the federal and state levels into a single source document.
A national plan could assist those interested in radioactive waste
management to identify waste quantities and locations, plan for future
storage and disposal development, uncover research and development
opportunities, and assess the need for regulatory or legislative actions.
For example, there are no national contingency plan, other than allowing
LLRW storage at waste generator sites, to address the impending closure of
a key LLRW disposal facility. The availability of a national plan and
periodic reporting on waste conditions might also provide the Congress and
the public with a more accessible means to monitor the management of
radioactive waste and provide a mechanism to build greater public trust in
the management of these wastes in the United States.

Recommendations

In order to improve the management of LLRW in the United States and
address a potential shortfall of disposal availability for higher-activity
LLRW in 2008 and other management concerns, we recommend that the Chairman
of NRC and the Secretary of Energy evaluate and report back to the
Congress within 1 year on the usefulness to the United States of:

o Adopting the LLRW management approaches used in the countries
discussed in this report, and the steps and any authorities
necessary for their implementation, if deemed appropriate.

o Developing a U.S. radioactive waste management plan, and the
potential costs, steps, and any authorities necessary to develop
such a plan, if deemed appropriate.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of our report to NRC, DOE, and the State
Department for their review and comment. The State Department did
not comment on the draft report. NRC and DOE generally agreed with
the recommendations in our draft report, but raised a number of
issues regarding their implementation. Specifically, they
suggested other means through which they could report the results
of their evaluations to Congress and they questioned the benefits
of developing a national radioactive waste management plan. While
we recognize the long-standing experience and international
leadership of NRC and DOE in the field of radioactive materials,
the intent of our report is to discuss the approaches used in
other countries. Based on our findings, we are recommending that
NRC and DOE collaborate in reviewing, and in some cases perhaps
reconsidering, the management approaches identified on pages 36-37
of this report for their potential usefulness in the United
States. We believe the Congress would benefit from a collaborative
evaluation or reevaluation of these approaches to ensure that the
best management approaches are used in the United States.

NRC stated that it has already evaluated many of the LLRW
management approaches and is in the process of evaluating some
others as part of a strategic assessment of its LLRW program to
ensure that NRC's regulatory framework will continue to ensure the
safe management of LLRW. Further, NRC stated that it prefers to
evaluate LLRW management approaches through ongoing efforts and to
report on these evaluations in its annual letter to the Congress
that addresses progress in completing actions in response to
recommendations in multiple GAO reports. NRC also raised some
concerns about our recommendation to evaluate and report on the
development of a national radioactive waste management plan in
specific comments accompanying its letter. While NRC did not
disagree with this recommendation, it pointed out that the costs
to develop a U.S. radioactive waste management plan would be
significant and the benefits unclear, particularly given the
complex composition of the current U.S. system. NRC noted that
legislative changes would likely be needed before the development
of a plan could substantially improve the U.S. system.

DOE stated that it regards the report as a useful comparison of
U.S. LLRW programs with comparable international programs. DOE
accepted the recommendation to evaluate the international
approaches summarized in our report, but did not agree that a
report to the Congress is necessary at this time. DOE offered to
brief the Congress on the status of its radioactive waste
management efforts if asked to do so. Regarding the development of
a national radioactive waste management plan, DOE stated that a
single document synthesizing the activities of numerous agencies
and entities involved in radioactive waste management would
facilitate understanding of these complex programs. However, DOE
commented that it is concerned that development of such a document
would provide limited utility to the actual implementation of
these strategies yet would require diversion of significant
resources from actual waste management efforts. Moreover, DOE
suggested that the U.S. Second National Report for the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management provides a summary of the
existing national waste management strategies, issues, and
progress.

We recognized in our report that NRC has evaluated some of the
LLRW management approaches in the past and is currently evaluating
some others. We also found that many of the U.S. LLRW stakeholder
representatives that we interviewed and some recent U.S. LLRW
management reports generally supported the reevaluation, if not
use of many of the management approaches identified in our report.
We believe that the Congress would benefit from a consolidated
report that contains the evaluations of these LLRW management
approaches as they apply to the U.S. situation. In regard to
reporting, we do not take issue with how the agencies might
collaborate together and with other LLRW stakeholder groups on
reporting back to the Congress on these management approaches as
long as the evaluations are comprehensive.

We acknowledge the concerns of NRC and DOE regarding our draft
recommendation to evaluate and report on the development of a
national radioactive waste management plan. We have revised this
recommendation to clarify that the agencies need to evaluate and
report on the usefulness of such a plan and conduct further
analysis if deemed appropriate. We still conclude that the use of
a national radioactive waste management plan in most other
countries in our survey and our own assessment of its potential
benefits, as reflected on pages 37-38 of this report, indicates to
us that there is value in further evaluating this management
approach. In addition, in our view, the U.S. national report to
the Joint Convention provides useful information on radioactive
waste management, but the waste inventory information in this
report is not comprehensive and the document does not contain
strategies to guide the management of radioactive waste. The
letters from NRC and DOE, along with our responses to their
specific comments are contained in appendix VI and VII,
respectively.

We will send copies of this report to the appropriate
congressional committees as well as to the Chairman of NRC and the
Secretary of Energy. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or at [email protected]. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members that
made contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII.

Gene Aloise
Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Appendix I: Recent GAO Findings and Agency Actions on LLRW
Management

GAO reports have addressed various aspects of low-level
radioactive waste (LLRW) management in the United States.^1 We
reported in 2004 on the scope and reliability of national LLRW
inventory information and found that the Department of Energy
(DOE)'s commercial LLRW disposal database did not contain data on
all disposed LLRW, did not capture information on LLRW that is
produced and stored at waste generator sites, and had data
inaccuracies. We recommended that DOE take steps to correct
internal control weaknesses and shortcomings in the usefulness and
reliability of this database, which DOE claims it has for the most
part accomplished. More recently, we reviewed the U.S. report to
the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which commits the
United States to, among other things, report on its national
inventory of radioactive waste, but does not prescribe how this
should be done or the level of reporting detail regarding the
location and quantities of LLRW. The U.S. report includes the
location and quantities of DOE's radioactive waste in storage and
disposal as well as the commercially-generated LLRW that has been
disposed of, but less comprehensive coverage of the location and
quantities of non-DOE LLRW in storage around the country. The
response of the United States to the GAO survey highlighted some
gaps in the U.S. radioactive waste inventory. The United States is
also committed through its signing of the Joint Convention to take
steps to ensure the safe possession, remanufacture, or disposal of
disused sealed radiological sources. One step in this direction is
the establishment of a national radioactive source registry in
support of the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources. We recommended in our 2005 report that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE, in collaboration with
the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force, evaluate
and report on how its source registry (National Source Tracking
System) could be designed and implemented to improve DOE's ability
to identify and track sources that may need DOE recovery and
disposal.^2 We found that 98.5 percent of the disused sealed
radiological sources that DOE had recovered as of June 2005 would
not have been included in the National Source Tracking System.
NRC's final rule on this source tracking system stipulates the
tracking of only category 1 and 2 sources, although NRC indicated
that additional sources could be added through subsequent
rulemaking.^3 NRC has no plans to monitor the status of sealed
radiological source use in this tracking system. However,
according to NRC officials, the online version of the tracking
system will allow licensees to voluntarily provide information on
whether a source has been put in storage and will no longer be
used. Appendix IV contains an assessment of what is known about
the volume and location of LLRW in the United States.

In regard to the safety and security of stored class B, C, and
GTCC waste, we reported in 2004 about the possible increase in the
storage of this higher-activity LLRW at generator sites because,
among other reasons, generators may decide to store their waste
on-site because of high disposal costs. While NRC does not place
time limits on the storage of LLRW, NRC claims that its licensing
and inspection programs for waste generators provide assurance
that stored LLRW will remain safe and secure. Moreover, NRC
contends that with the exception of disused sealed radiological
sources, LLRW does not present an attractive target for
adversaries. In regard to the safety and security of sealed
radiological sources, NRC reported that it has conducted
vulnerability assessments, imposed new security measures on those
licensees that possess category 1 and 2 sources, and it is
reviewing the adequacy of its guidance for long-term LLRW storage
as well as possible updates to this guidance. NRC officials
informed us that the new security measures also apply to licensees
who possess aggregations of category 3 or lesser-activity source
categories that would meet or exceed the category 2 radioactivity
threshold. In addition, they told us that NRC requires the timely
removal of radioactive material as part of the decommissioning
process. Nevertheless, the response of the United States to the
GAO survey indicated that NRC does not enforce the removal of
disused sealed radiological sources from licensees that generate
this waste or require them to return their disused sources to the
source supplier. As we reported in 2005, NRC works with DOE to
identify disused sealed radiological sources at user sites that
should be recovered because they pose a safety and security risk.
The Conference on Radiation Control Program Directors also
provides a clearinghouse service for users to disposition their
disused sources. We noted, however, that the lack of information
to track the number and status of sealed radiological sources that
may require recovery and disposal in the future limits DOE's
ability to effectively plan and budget for its recovery and
disposal efforts and to monitor the performance of its source
recovery program.

We also reported on LLRW disposal options in the United States,
which are affected by federal and state nuclear regulatory
authorities, commercial LLRW disposal operators, and LLRW compact
commissions. We found in our 2004 report that there appears to be
sufficient disposal capacity for class A, B, C waste, but
uncertain future access to a disposal facility for class B and C
waste. In our 2005 report, we found that there was some central
storage for GTCC waste, essentially for disused sealed
radiological sources recovered by DOE, but no disposal
availability. These reports and others have commented on the many
factors affecting the predictability of disposal availability and
disposal costs. For example, NRC and the Agreement State
regulators are involved in granting the approval of LLRW disposal
facilities and the classes of waste that can be accepted. They
also have discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to exempt very
low-level radioactive waste from regulation as LLRW, thus
providing waste generators with more disposal options for this
waste.^4 According to NRC officials, approvals for waste
generators in states under its jurisdiction have been granted for
small quantities of waste--averaging about 2 per year over the
past 6 years--however, no comparable information is available on
the 34 Agreement States. NRC officials also told us that the
agency has attempted to improve the transparency of this process
for a number of stated reasons, including the anticipation that
there will be large amounts of this waste from nuclear power plant
decommissioning. NRC has evaluated and decided to defer action on
a rule that would exempt very low-level radioactive waste from
having to go through regulatory review as LLRW. The LLRW compact
commissions can also affect the predictability of the disposal
system because they have discretion to restrict access to disposal
facilities as well as to charge variable disposal fees based not
only on waste type but the type of generator. Likewise, commercial
disposal facility operators can affect the predictability of the
disposal system. For example, the operator of the disposal
facility that accepts almost all of the class A waste charges
variable disposal fees based on the generator of the waste. Waste
generators, such as DOE and nuclear power plants, which dispose of
large volumes of class A waste, can negotiate lower disposal fees
per volume of waste than generators that dispose of much smaller
quantities of this waste. Appendix V contains a discussion of the
type of waste and waste generators that would be affected by
reduced access to the South Carolina disposal facility. For
example, of the 671 waste generators that sent disused sealed
radiological sources to the South Carolina disposal facility
between 2001 and 2005, only 70 would be allowed to do so after
mid-2008.

In our 2005 report we commented on the limitations on DOE's
ability to recoup its costs for recovering disused sealed
radiological sources from non-utility waste generators. The
response of the United States to the GAO survey indicated that not
all non-utility waste generators, particularly those possessing
sealed radiological sources, are currently required to ensure that
funds are available to cover future LLRW disposition costs. NRC
officials told us that they are revising the financial assurance
regulations aimed at addressing sites that permanently cease
radiological operations without adequate funds to complete
decommissioning. The revised regulations are intended to address
problems with funding large, complex sites that may include
extensive soil and groundwater contamination. The disposal of
disused sealed radiological sources is not part of this
rulemaking. For non-Agreement States, NRC officials indicated that
about 5 to 10 small businesses possessing sealed radiological
sources go bankrupt each year. However, NRC officials informed us
that they have no information on the annual number of bankruptcies
in the 34 Agreement States. In cases where waste generators do not
have the funds to cover the cost of removing, centrally storing,
or disposing of their higher-activity disused sealed radiological
sources, the U.S. government has covered these costs. One of NRC's
performance goals is to reduce the potential for unnecessary
federal government funding to clean up sites if licensees go
bankrupt and have insufficient financial reserve to cover these
costs. According to NRC officials, the potential expansion of the
financial assurance requirements for its licensees will ensure
that they can meet their responsibilities to cover the cost to
disposition a broad range of radioactive materials, including
sealed radiological sources. NRC officials note that this
initiative may also help reduce the cost of DOE's program to
recover disused sealed radiological sources. Nevertheless, DOE
officials told us that the department has no basis to charge waste
generators to recover and store disused sealed radiological
sources that would generally constitute GTCC waste when disposed
of because there is presently no disposal option for this waste
and thus no basis to determine a service fee schedule. In our 2005
report, we recommended that NRC and DOE evaluate mechanisms to
reduce government costs of recovering, storing and disposing of
higher-activity LLRW. The response of the United States to the GAO
survey indicated that NRC does not require a disposal fee at the
time of purchase or require that source users and suppliers
contribute to a recovery fund.

Finally, in reviewing the U.S. report to the Joint Convention on
the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, prepared by DOE in cooperation with
other federal agencies, we noted that while the report describes
existing national policies and practices for managing radioactive
waste, it does not constitute a national radioactive waste
management plan. However, the Joint Convention does not mention
the need for such a plan and there is no requirement in U.S.
legislation for a federal agency to prepare a plan. While the LLRW
Policy Act required DOE to report to the Congress annually on
national LLRW conditions, the provision, which terminated
effective May 2000, it did not require a national radioactive
waste management plan. DOE officials have, however, provided us
with a draft copy of the department's strategy to optimize the
disposition of DOE low-level and mixed low-level radioactive
waste. Similarly, NRC officials told us that their
responsibilities to oversee the use, storage and disposal of
radioactive materials do not include development of a national
radioactive waste management plan. However, NRC officials informed
us that in light of new challenges, influences, and issues facing
LLRW management today, they are currently conducting a strategic
assessment that will identify and prioritize staff activities to
ensure a stable, reliable, and adaptable regulatory framework for
effective LLRW management.

^1GAO, Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve
Security of Sealed Radiological Sources, [47]GAO-03-804 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 6, 2003); GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability
Adequate in the Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future
Shortfalls, [48]GAO-04-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004); GAO, Nuclear
Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded Recovery of
Sealed Radiological Sources, [49]GAO-05-976 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2005); and GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Future Waste Volumes and
Disposal Options Are Uncertain, [50]GAO-04-1097T (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
30, 2004).

^2The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established an interagency task force
under the leadership of NRC to evaluate and provide recommendations to the
President and Congress relating to the security of radiation sources in
the United States from terrorist threats, including acts of sabotage,
theft, or use of a radiation sources in a radiological dispersal device.

^3National Source Tracking of Sealed Sources: Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg.
65,686 (Nov. 8, 2006).

^4NRC notes that other measures for controlling the hazard from these
materials could be implemented at the disposal facilities, for example at
disposal sites under the regulatory control of the Environmental
Protection Agency that can accept hazardous materials.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

In our review, we examined the extent to which foreign countries
have (1) comprehensive national LLRW inventory databases, (2)
timely removal of higher-activity LLRW in storage at waste
generator sites, (3) disposition options for all LLRW, and (4)
requirements to assure that LLRW generators have adequate
financial reserves to cover all waste disposition costs. We also
examined another management area that surfaced during our review
pertaining to the use of national radioactive waste management
plans. Our examination primarily relied on a survey of radioactive
waste management officials in countries, along with the United
States that account for 85 percent of the world's installed
nuclear power plant capacity. To better understand the context of
managing LLRW in other countries, we also spoke with radioactive
waste management officials and visited disposal facilities in
France, Japan, and Sweden. To describe the status of LLRW
management in the United States, we obtained responses from NRC to
the same questionnaire sent to other countries, interviewed NRC
and DOE officials as well as representatives from a wide range of
domestic LLRW stakeholder groups, and reviewed past GAO reports
and other pertinent documents.

Specifically, we developed, pretested, and sent out questionnaires
to 20 countries to identify foreign experiences in managing LLRW.
The countries included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. These countries, along
with the United States, are represented on the NEA Radioactive
Waste Management Committee.^1 The questionnaire contained 32
questions and potential answers that were distributed across the
four areas of LLRW management under review. Respondents were also
given an opportunity to specify other responses not listed and to
provide additional comments on most of the questions. Appendix II
provides the questionnaire and the responses from the United
States. To increase the potential response rate to the survey, we
attended a March 2006 meeting of the NEA Radioactive Waste
Management Committee in Paris, France, to discuss our interests in
surveying the representatives of foreign countries who attended
the meeting. While at this meeting, we also reviewed a draft
questionnaire with representatives from the NEA and IAEA. We
further reviewed the draft questionnaire with radioactive waste
management officials that we met with in France and Sweden.
Several e-mail messages were sent to all 20 countries prior to
administering the survey in order to confirm the appropriate
country official to receive the questionnaire and to encourage
each of them to participate in the survey. All but two countries,
the Czech Republic and South Korea, responded to our survey (a
90-percent survey response rate). For the most part, we accepted
the responses provided by each country; however, in a few cases we
contacted country officials to clarify their responses to some
questions, and we took other steps to ensure more complete
responses to all questions. We then tabulated frequencies for each
question across the countries.

We made site visits to France, Japan, and Sweden to speak directly
with representatives from the nuclear regulatory authority, waste
management organization, and waste generators about LLRW
management in their country. These countries were selected because
they are large generators of radioactive waste and they represent
both European Union and non-European Union member countries on the
NEA Radioactive Waste Management Committee. We sent out questions
in advance of our meetings with these representatives and we used
our time with them to obtain a better understanding of why
different management approaches were taken and the experiences of
stakeholder groups with them.

We identified and examined foreign country and international
documents addressing the management of radioactive waste to
supplement the information we obtained from our survey. These
documents included radioactive waste management reports that
countries are required to submit to IAEA under international
agreements, national radioactive waste management reports and
updates prepared for the NEA Radioactive Waste Management
Committee, and information that we obtained during our visits to
the three countries. For example, we used these documents to
describe the extent to which countries use central storage
facilities for LLRW, formulate radioactive waste management plans,
and apply specific management approaches. In some instances, we
used these documents to check the responses provided by countries
on their questionnaire.

We interviewed NRC and DOE officials and representatives from a
diverse group of domestic LLRW stakeholders to describe the
current LLRW management situation in the United States and to
identify approaches that might be applied to improve the
management of LLRW corresponding to our four research objectives.
The interviewees represented nuclear regulators at the federal and
state levels; LLRW disposal operators; advisory groups including
the Conference on Radiation Control Program Directors, Department
of Defense's Low-Level Radioactive Waste Executive Agent, National
Research Council of the National Academies, and NRC Advisory
Committee on Nuclear Waste; pertinent associations, including the
Council on Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals, the Health
Physics Society, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, and the
Nuclear Energy Institute; and private consultancies. The Health
Physics Society is a scientific and professional organization
whose 6,000 members specialize in occupational and environmental
radiation safety, and the Nuclear Energy Institute represents all
nuclear power plant operators. We conducted a content analysis of
33 domestic interviews; coding responses as either agreeing, not
agreeing, or not responding to a common set of questions addressed
in each interview (respondents are shown in table 2). These
responses were then quantified for statistical analysis. In
addition to interviews based on a standard list of questions, in
the course of our review we also conducted informational
interviews with the Energy Policy Research Institute, Army Corps
of Engineers, Exelon Nuclear, and program officials at DOE.
Moreover, we reviewed several pertinent reports, including a
report of the NRC chaired Radioactive Source Protection and
Security Task Force, a report from National Research Council, and
a report of the NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste.^2 The
formation of the interagency NRC chaired task force and periodic
reporting requirements were mandated in the Energy Policy Act of
2005.

Finally, we examined LLRW inventory data from several sources to
estimate the volumes, types, locations, and generators of LLRW in
the United States and what is now received at the LLRW disposal
facility in South Carolina from non-compact member states. For the
most part, we relied on data from DOE's Manifest Information
Management System and from the U.S. report to the Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management. We determined that these data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Our
assessment of what is known about the location and volume of LLRW
in the United States is covered in appendix III. The status of
class B and C waste disposal in the United States, as well as the
impact of closing the South Carolina disposal facility to
non-compact member states, slated for 2008, is contained in
appendix V.

We conducted our review between September 2005 and February 2007
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Table 2: Listing of Domestic LLRW Stakeholder Group Respondents

Number Domestic LLRW Stakeholder Group Respondent
1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2 Organization of Agreement State-Alabama
3 Organization of Agreement State-Arkansas
4 Organization of Agreement State-Louisiana
5 Organization of Agreement State-New York
6 Organization of Agreement State-North Carolina
7 Organization of Agreement State-Texas
8 Organization of Agreement State-Washington
9 Organization of Agreement State-Wisconsin
10 State of South Carolina, Bureau of Land and Waste Management
11 State of South Carolina, Bureau of Radiological Health
12 State of South Carolina, South Carolina Energy Office
13 State of Texas, Department of State Health Services
14 State of Utah, Division of Radiation Control
15 American Ecology
16 Duratek (now Energy Solutions)
17 Envirocare (now Energy Solutions)
18 Waste Control Specialists
19 Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors
20 Department of Defense's Low-Level Radioactive Waste Executive Agent
21 National Research Council of the National Academies
22 NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste
23 Council on Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals
24 Health Physics Society
25 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum-Director
26 Michigan Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority
27 Midwest Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission
28 Northwest Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission
29 Southeast Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission
30 Southwest Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission
31 Nuclear Energy Institute
32 JTG Consulting, Inc.
33 MRT, Inc.

Source: GAO interviews with representatives from LLRW stakeholder
groups.

^1The Radioactive Waste Management Committee is an international committee
made up of senior representatives from regulatory authorities, radioactive
waste management agencies policy-making bodies, and research and
development institutions. The committee is under the NEA, which is a
specialized agency within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, an intergovernmental organization of industrialized
countries.

^2Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force, The Radiation
Source Protection and Security Task Force Report (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
15, 2006); National Research Council, Improving the Regulation and
Management of Low-Activity Radioactive Wastes (Washington, D.C.: 2006);
and Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, ACNW White Paper: History and
Framework of Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in the U.S.
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 30, 2005).

Appendix III: Survey of LLRW Management Approaches: Response
from United States

Appendix IV: Volume and Location of LLRW in the United States

The United States is required under international agreement to
prepare a national report on the safety of spent fuel and
radioactive waste management that includes an inventory of
radioactive waste in the country.^1 Even though the DOE has taken
lead responsibility for preparing this inventory, there is no
designated agency responsible for managing a national LLRW
inventory database. The reported information includes data from
DOE's own radioactive waste inventory, as well as publicly
available information that is compiled from a variety of sources,
including DOE's Manifest Information Management System containing
information from the three LLRW disposal operators, EIA spent fuel
database, Broker and Processor database, and other sources. While
DOE can report on the radioactive waste it has in storage or has
disposed of, there is limited information on the storage of waste
at non-DOE sites. DOE has reported some LLRW storage at waste
brokers and processor sites, and the GTCC waste stored at
commercial nuclear power plants. NRC and Agreement State
radioactive materials licensees are supposed to maintain records
of the nuclear material that they possess, but information on the
status of use of these materials, particularly disused sealed
radiological sources, is not centrally collected. The Electric
Power and Research Institute collects proprietary data from
nuclear power plant operators on the annual generation of LLRW,
but not on the storage of all LLRW, which is constantly changing.
The institute estimates that an average plant generates about
12,000 cubic feet of LLRW each year.

The following tables provide some information on non-DOE and DOE
radioactive waste volumes and locations. DOE classifies its
radioactive waste somewhat differently than waste generated by NRC
and Agreement State licensees. DOE reports four classes of
radioactive waste, not including mixed waste, that include
high-level waste, transuranic waste, low-level waste, and 11(e)(2)
byproduct material.^2 DOE's low-level waste category and
transuranic waste would clearly fall within the NRC waste
classification scheme. Low-level waste would be generally
categorized as class A, B, or C waste, and transuranic waste would
be categorized as greater-than-class C waste. DOE's 11(e)(2)
byproduct material is a special category of radioactive waste.

According to NRC officials, 11(e)(2) byproduct materials and other
types of radioactive waste exists in the United States but are not
considered LLRW under NRC regulations. The National Research
Council of the National Academies has reported that the principal
origin of uranium and thorium ore processing waste comes from the
recovery of this material for DOE or civilian nuclear
applications. Typical examples include mining and mill tailings,
process residues, soils and contaminated equipment. Similar waste
comes from naturally occurring and technologically enhanced
naturally occurring radioactive materials. The principal origins
of these materials are from the recovery and processing of mineral
resources not related to nuclear applications, and municipal water
treatment. Examples of these materials include commercial ore
mining residues, phosphate mining and fertilizers, scale and
sludge from oil and gas production, water treatment filters,
resins, and other sludge. There are large volumes of these wastes,
but limited information on the actual quantities that remain at
sites around the United States.

Table 3: Total LLRW Disposed at the Three Operating Commercial LLRW
Disposal Facilities as of 2005

Class C
waste Total
Class B volume volume
Disposal Class A waste waste volume (cubic (cubic
Facility Location volume (cubic feet) (cubic feet) feet) feet)
Barnwell Barnwell, 24,815,969 1,643,933 825,833 27,285,735
South
Carolina
Envirocare Clive, Utah 66,295,270 0 0 66,295,270
Richland Richland, 13,450,191 137,056 137,233 13,724,480
Washington

Source: Manifest Information Management System data and United States of
America Second National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,
October 2005.

Table 4: Total Disposed LLRW at the Four Closed Commercial Disposal
Facilities

Closed commercial disposal Total volume
facilities State (cubic feet) Beatty Nevada 4,854,178
West Valley New York 2,721,843
Maxey Flats Kentucky 4,777,368
Sheffield Illinois 3,119,486
Total 15,472,875

Source: DOE Integrated Database Report 1997, all four facilities were
closed prior to 1993.

Table 5: Total LLRW Disposed at the Three Commercial LLRW Disposal
Facilities during 2005

Class
Class A B
waste waste Class C Total Barnwell Barnwell,
volume volume waste volume South
Disposal (cubic (cubic volume(cubic (cubic Carolina
facility Location feet) feet) feet) feet) 25,111 9,367 8,535 43,013
Envirocare Clive,
Utah 15,471,876 0 0 15,471,876
Richland Richland,
Washington 19,906 7 191 20,104
Total 15,516,893 9,374 8,726 15,534,993

Source: Manifest Information Management System data and information
provided by DOE on waste disposed in 2005.

Note: The total waste disposed at Envirocare (now Energy Solutions) in
2005 includes class A waste from the Department of Energy.

Table 6 provides information on LLRW that is currently on DOE sites,
either in storage or in disposal. The information in this table comes from
the waste inventories of each DOE site that has LLRW, as reported in the
2005 U.S. National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent
Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

Table 6: LLRW in Storage or Disposal at DOE Sites

Total volume (cubic
State Installation feet)
Idaho Idaho National Laboratory 2,509,390
Kentucky Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 335,489
Nevada Nevada Test Site 27,259,391
New Mexico Los Alamos National Laboratory 7,592,653
New York West Valley Demonstration Project 575,276
New York Brookhaven National Laboratory 2,048
Ohio Ashtabula Environmental Management
Project 108,204
Ohio Fernald Environmental Management
Project 59,962,962
Ohio Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 536,783
South Carolina Savannah River Site 27,168,738
Tennessee Oak Ridge Site 22,054,009
Washington Hanford Site 81,641,859
Multiple states Small facilities 353
Total 229,747,155

Source: United States of America Second National Report for the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, October 2005.

Table 7 provides information on transuranic waste disposed at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located in southeastern New Mexico. This
facility can only accept defense-related transuranic waste.

Table 7: Transuranic Waste Disposed of or in Storage Awaiting Disposal at
WIPP

Volume in
Volume storage
disposed awaiting
of at disposal Hanford Washington
WIPP at Site
(cubic WIPP(cubic
DOE site State feet) feet) 52,972 1,539,719
Idaho Idaho
National
Laboratory 204,825 2,171,852
Lawrence California
Livermore
National
Laboratory - 12,431
Los Alamos New Mexico
National
Laboratory 24,720 441,433
Nevada Test Nevada
Site - 28,781
Oak Ridge Tennessee
Site - 86,097
Rocky Flats Colorado
Site 529,720 -
Savannah South
River Site Carolina 250,734 459,091
Small -
Quantity
Sites 20,836 21,754
West Valley New York
Demonstration
Project - 30,017
Total 1,083,807 4,791,175

Source: 2004 Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Compliance Recertification
Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation, and the United
States of America Second National Report for the Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, October 2005.

Table 8 shows the number of disused sealed radiological sources that have
been collected and sent to disposal by the former DOE Off-Site Source
Recovery Project, which is now under the DOE's Global Threat Reduction
Initiative.

Table 8: Central Storage and Disposal of Disused Sealed Radiological
Sources Recovered by DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project

Location of collected sealed radiological Total number of
sources in storage or disposed State sources
Sealed radiological sources in storage
Los Alamos National Laboratory New Mexico 9,920
Los Alamos National Laboratory (for Pu 239 New Mexico 1
sources)
National Naval Medical Center Maryland 22
Nevada Test Site - Pu 239 Storage Nevada 39
NSSI Sources and Services Inc. Texas 484
Southwest Research Institute Texas 135
Sealed radiological sources in disposal
Barnwell South Carolina 474
Nevada Test Site Nevada 345
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant New Mexico 2,397
Total 13,817

Source: DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project, June 28, 2006.

Note: The disused sealed radiological sources in storage are not
considered to be waste until they are packed for disposal.

^1As a contracting member of the International Atomic Energy Agency Joint
Convention, the United States is required to submit a national report that
must include the following: radioactive waste that is being held in
storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities,
radioactive waste that has been disposed of, and radioactive waste that
has resulted from past practices.

^2"11(e)(2)" refers to "tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or
concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for
its source material content," as described in section 11(e)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that defines "byproduct" wastes. 42 U.S.C. S
2014(e)(2). These wastes arise in the recovery of uranium and thorium from
nuclear energy applications.

Appendix V: Status of Class B and C Waste Disposal and Potential Effects
of Reduced Access to South Carolina Disposal Facility

Limiting waste generator access to the LLRW disposal facility in South
Carolina to only the three compact member states by mid-2008 will require
waste generators to store their class B and C waste until another disposal
option becomes available. We reported in June 2004 that 99 percent of the
class B and C waste disposed in this country went to the Barnwell, South
Carolina, disposal facility, the only option available to waste generators
in 39 states. Generators in the 11 other states have access to the LLRW
disposal facility in Richland, Washington. In total the class B and C
waste that is disposed at both of these facilities amounts to slightly
less than 0.5 percent of all LLRW that was disposed of commercially in the
United States between 1999 and 2003.

We conducted a further analysis of data in the DOE managed Manifest
Information Management System for 2001 to 2005 for the waste generators
that use the two disposal facilities that can accept class B and C waste
(Barnwell, South Carolina, and Richland, Washington), and the types and
quantities of waste disposed at these facilities during this time period.
In order to compare the waste types disposed as these two facilities, we
had to come up with a categorization scheme that captured the different
types of class B and C waste. For the purpose of our analysis, we
consolidated these waste types into groups as shown in the table 9.

Table 9: Class B and C Waste Type Groups

Waste type group Waste type
Dry active waste (DAW) Charcoal
Incinerator ash
Soil
Demolition rubble
Glassware or labware
Compactable trash
Non-compactable trash
Oil, gas, EPA or state hazardous, Paint or plating
paint or plating (OGEP)
Liquids and sludge Aqueous liquid
Evaporator bottoms/sludge/concentrates
Solidified liquids
Filters, filter media & resins Filter media
Mechanical filter
Cation ion-exchange media
Mixed bed ion-exchange media
Non-cartridge filter media
Equipment and material Contaminated equipment
Activated material
Activated reactor hardware
Sealed radiological sources Sealed source/device
Sealed sources
Biological materials Animal carcass
Other Other
Dry solid
Non-compacted dry active waste
Solidified chelates
Combination

Source: GAO determination from analysis of Manifest Information Management
System records.

Table 10 shows the volume and activity of the class B and C waste that was
disposed between 2001 and 2005 by waste type group. Filters, filter media,
and resins contributed the greatest volume of waste (44 percent of total
disposed volume), but only about 3 percent of total disposed activity.
Equipment and materials, by contrast, contributed only about 28 percent of
the total disposed volume but accounted for 86 percent of the disposed
activity. According to a nuclear industry official, contaminated equipment
and material is highly radioactive and will need to be stored on-site
similar to spent fuel rods, if there is no disposal option for this type
of waste.

Table 10: Total Class B and C Waste Disposed at Richland and Barnwell by
Waste Type Group, 2001-2005

Volume (in cubic feet) Activity (in curies)
Waste type group Total Percent Total Percent
Dry active waste 7,849 5 34,490 2
Oil, gas, EPA or state
hazardous, paint or plating 1 0 0 0
Liquids and sludge 2,222 2 7,729 0
Filters, filter media and 63,814 44 63,825 3
resins
Equipment and material 39,856 28 1,797,562 86
Sealed radiological sources 4,995 3 92,287 4
Biological materials 18 0 86 0
Other 25,335 18 83,044 4
Total^a 144,090 100 2,079,023 100

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

aColumn percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 11 shows the number of generators of a particular waste type
distributed across the generator types. No total is provided for the
number of different generator types because in some cases one generator
may be disposing of different types of waste. Providing a total by
generator type would result in an over count of the total number of
generators.

Table 11: Number of Generators That Disposed of Class B and C Waste at
Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type and Waste Type, 2001-2005

Waste type Group Academic Government Industry Medical Utility Total
Dry active waste 19 20 60 3 45 147
Oil, gas, EPA or state 0 0 0 0 1 1
hazardous, paint or
plating
Liquids and sludge 1 1 7 0 8 17
Filters, filter media 0 6 6 0 65 77
and resins
Equipment and material 1 4 7 0 31 43
Sealed radiological 158 125 286 100 29 698
sources
Biological materials 1 0 1 0 0 2
Other 8 60 29 2 58 157

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

a"Sealed Sources" and "Other" Includes one U.S. Army waste generator
outside of the United States.

Figure 9: Number of Generators That Disposed of Class B and C Waste at
Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type and Waste Type, 2001-2005

Note: The amounts across the chart above do not add to 854 because some
generators disposed of more than one type of waste.

Table 12 shows that the volume of class B and C waste ranges from year to
year across the waste generator types. The average volume of class B and C
waste between 2001 and 2005 was about 28,800 cubic feet.

Table 12: Range of Class B and C Waste Disposed Annually at Richland and
Barnwell by Generator Type, 2001-2005

Volume (in cubic feet) Activity (in curies)
Generator Average Min Max Total Average Min Max Total
Academic 113 51 263 564 139 10 337 694
Government 916 220 1,643 4,581 20,135 111 88,159 100,673
Industry 1,308 712 2,285 6,542 15,888 7,906 30,213 79,442
Medical 36 23 61 178 7 2 16 33
Utility 26,445 17,054 33,698 132,225 379,636 122,851 499,854 1,898,182
Total^a 28,818 18,060 37,950 144,090 415,805 130,880 618,579 2,079,024

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

aColumn percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Note: DOE recognizes that as the industry category includes brokers and
processors that collect waste from other generator categories, the
contribution of waste disposed by industry generators is overestimated;
however, DOE has not done the analysis to determine the extent of this
overestimation.

The next two tables provide a distribution of class B and C waste (both
volume and activity) disposed at Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to 2005
by waste generator type. Table 13 shows that utilities contributed the
about 92 percent of the volume and 91 percent of the activity of class B
and C waste disposed at Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to 2005. Table 14
shows the distribution of class B and C waste across generator types
excluding utility generators. In this table, industry disposed of about 55
percent of class B and C waste, which amounted to about 44 percent of the
total activity. Government, on the other hand, contributed about 39
percent of the volume, but about 56 percent of the activity.

Table 13: Distribution of Class B and C Waste Disposed Annually at
Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type, 2001-2005

Percent of Volume (in cubic Percent of Activity (in
feet) curies)
Generator Richland Barnwell Total Richland Barnwell Total
Academic 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government 18.8 3.0 3.2 1.1 4.9 4.8
Industry 37.7 4.2 4.5 96.4 2.9 3.8
Medical 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Utility 42.9 92.2 91.8 2.5 92.2 91.3
Total^a 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

aColumn percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 14: Distribution of Non-Utility Class B and C Waste Disposed
Annually at Richland and Barnwell by Generator Type, 2001-2005

Percent of Volume (in cubic Percent of Activity (in
feet) curies)
Generator Richland Barnwell Total Richland Barnwell Total
Academic 0.8 5.1 4.8 0.0 0.4 0.4
Government 32.9 39.1 38.6 1.1 62.5 55.7
Industry 66.1 54.3 55.1 98.9 37.0 43.9
Medical 0.1 1.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total^a 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

aColumn percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 15 shows the total volume and activity of class B and C waste, by
compact, that was disposed of at both Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to
2005. The last two columns show the percent contribution that each compact
made to total volume and activity of disposed class B and C waste at
Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to 2005. If Barnwell closed to non-compact
states and the current pattern of disposal remained the same, waste
generators in these states would accumulate over 100,000 cubic feet of
class B and C waste over a 5-year period.

Table 15: Disposed Class B and C Waste at Richland and Barnwell by LLRW
Compact, 2001-2005

Richland Barnwell Total Percent
Compact Volume Activity Volume Activity Volume Activity Volume Activity
Appalachian 0 0 10,417 499,433 10,417 499,433 7.2 24.0
Atlantic 0 0 38,196 215,884 38,196 215,884 26.5 10.4
Central 0 0 4,306 13,286 4,306 13,286 3.0 0.6
Central
Midwest 0 0 15,520 480,153 15,520 480,153 10.8 23.1
Midwest 0 0 6,235 74,168 6,235 74,168 4.3 3.6
Northwest 1,448 19,257 280 161 1,728 19,418 1.2 0.9
Rocky
Mountain 69 1,402 5 0.1 74 1,402 0.1 0.1
Southeast 0 0 21,991 329,245 21,991 329,245 15.2 15.8
Southwestern 0 0 6,490 7,774 6,490 7,774 4.5 0.4
Texas 0 0 5,345 6,680 5,345 6,680 3.7 0.3
Unaffiliated 0 0 33,787 431,582 33,787 431,582 23.5 20.8
Total^b 1,517 20,659 142,572 2,058,366 144,089 2,079,025 100 100

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

aIncludes one U.S. Army waste generator outside of the United States that
accounted for 16.34 cubic feet of waste that contained 27.4 curies of
activity.

bColumn percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 16 summarizes one way to show the affects of eliminating access to
waste generators in 36 states that will not have disposal access for class
B and C waste in 2008 because they are not affiliated with the Atlantic,
Northwest or Rocky Mountain Compacts. Using the past 5 years of disposal
data as an indicator, the closing of Barnwell to these generators would
affect 73 percent of the disposed volume and about 90 percent of the
disposed activity. Almost all of the remaining volume going to Barnwell
would come from the Atlantic LLRW Compact.

Table 16: Class B and C Waste Disposed at Barnwell from Atlantic,
Northwest, and Rocky Mountain Generators, and Other Generators, 2001-2005

Barnwell Percent of Barnwell
Compact Volume Activity Volume Activity
Atlantic, Northwest, and Rocky
Mountain 38,482 216,046 27.0 10.5
Other 104,091 1,842,320 73.0 89.5
Total 142,573 2,058,366 100 100

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

aColumn percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Another way to illustrate the affects of eliminating access to the
Barnwell disposal facility is the number of waste generators that would no
longer have a place to dispose of their disused, sealed radiological
sources and would thus have to store these sources on-site. Table 17 shows
the compacts where these generators are located.

Table 17: Number of Waste Generators That Disposed of Sealed Radiological
Sources at Richland and Barnwell Ranked by Compact, 2001-2005

Impacted by Barnwell
Compact Total generators Percent of total closure
Unaffiliated 138 20 138
Southeast 98 14 98
Southwestern 92 13 92
Appalachian 82 12 82
Midwest 82 12 82
Atlantic 70 10
Texas 45 6 45
Central Midwest 43 6 43
Central 21 3 21
Northwest 17 2 0
Rocky Mountain 9 1 0
Total^a 697 100 601

Source: Manifest Information Management System records for 2001-2005.

aExcludes one U.S. Army waste generator outside of the United States.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Our
Response

See pages 38-40 for GAO's response to this letter.

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of the appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

See comment 13.

See comment 14.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

NRC provided 14 specific comments about our report accompanying its
letter. Our response to each comment follows.

1. We acknowledge that our past reports have not found the lack of
a national radioactive waste management plan as a limitation in
the management of LLRW in the United Sates. Nevertheless, in the
course of conducting our study, we found that most countries in
our survey use national radioactive waste management plans to
guide the management of these wastes. Our report discussed the
LLRW Policy Act, but not to extent that we have in previous GAO
reports, and we agree with NRC that the act has not achieved its
desired outcome of establishing regional disposal facilities for
LLRW. NRC's suggestion that legislative changes would likely be
needed before the development of a national radioactive waste
management plan could substantially improve the U.S. system is in
line with our recommendation to evaluate the steps involved in
developing such a plan. Finally, we considered NRC's concerns
about the potential costs and unclear benefits of developing a
national radioactive waste management plan and observe that an
evaluation of these concerns would be better placed in the report
we recommended that NRC and DOE prepare for the Congress.

2. We believe that the complexity of the U.S. LLRW management
system should provide a further rationale for evaluating the
usefulness of developing a national radioactive waste management
plan that could integrate the various radioactive waste management
programs that reside at the federal and state levels into a single
source document.

3. While the LLRW stakeholder group representatives that we
interviewed did not identify a need to develop a national
radioactive waste management plan, we believe that their support
for the need to evaluate alternative ways to manage LLRW in the
United States is consistent with our recommendation to evaluate
the usefulness of developing such a plan. We acknowledge that much
of the information on radioactive waste management is already
available from a variety of sources. We concluded on pages 37-38
of our report that a national radioactive waste management plan
could help integrate these activities into a single source
document.

4. We concur with NRC that in some instances an integrated
approach by federal and state authorities is needed to make
progress toward improvement in the U.S. system. In our view, one
way to bring stakeholders together to discuss ways to improve
radioactive waste management would be in the context of developing
a national radioactive waste management plan. NRC and DOE can
decide the most appropriate means to evaluate the usefulness of
developing such a plan and who should participate in the process.

5. As our report notes, we reviewed the national reports to the
Joint Convention of the countries surveyed and other international
reports addressing each country. For the most part, our survey was
designed to collect information that was not available in these
existing reports.

6. We commented in our report on the agencies' engagements in
international information exchanges regarding radioactive waste
management practices. We also observe that NRC and DOE encouraged
us to collect information on the LLRW management approaches used
in other countries, as this information was not readily available
from other sources.

7. In our view, the LLRW management approaches identified in this
report should help direct NRC's strategic assessment of its LLRW
program. Moreover, NRC should include in its report to Congress
the results of any previous and ongoing evaluations of the LLRW
approaches that we cited in our report.

8. We provided the response of the United States to the survey in
appendix III of our report.

9. We commented on NRC's evaluation of and decision on a rule to
facilitate the disposition of certain solid materials with no, or
very small amounts of residual radioactivity (very low-level
radioactive waste) in appendix I of our report. We observe that
NRC's current position on this issue contrasts with the management
practices of most other countries and differs from the opinions we
obtained from most LLRW stakeholder representatives.

10. We identified some of the current gaps in financial assurance
requirements for those licensed to use radioactive materials in
the United States in appendix I of our report. We also pointed out
in our report that there is no national database on those
licensees that move into bankruptcy and cannot afford to
disposition their sealed radiological sources. Our report
identified approaches used in some other countries to reduce the
government cost to recover and disposition these disused sources.

11. Interpretation of terms is always an issue with
questionnaires. We pretested the questionnaire in two other
countries and with international experts to identify problematic
terms. We attempted to use terms that are generally understood
internationally by referring to NEA and IAEA technical guidance,
and reports from other countries.

12. We revised our report to clarify this point.

13. We revised our report to clarify this point.

14. The purpose of our report was to determine the extent to which
other countries use LLRW management approaches in areas that GAO
has identified as needing some improvement. We did not attempt to
identify approaches other countries use to increase the safe use
of radioactive materials.

The Chairman, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, provided 6 specific
comments about our report with the NRC letter. Our response to each
comment follows.

1. While the totality of the various federal and state programs
addressing LLRW management may be comprehensive when aggregated,
we view this collection of programs as not representing a national
radioactive waste management plan. We identified some potential
benefits of such a plan on pages 37-38 of this report.

2. We referred to the Advisory Committee's 2006 letter in our
report, but the final report of the advisory committee was not
available when we sent the draft copy of our report to the NRC. We
have added a reference to the final version of the advisory
committee report in our report.

3. We point out that a third of the countries in our survey are
not members of the European Union. Our survey found that most
countries take a national perspective to the management of LLRW;
however, those entities that are responsible for providing and
operating LLRW disposal and storage facilities are not always
government agencies. For example, the LLRW system in Japan relies
primarily on nuclear utility companies, operating under stringent
government regulation, to construct and operate radioactive waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.

4. We reviewed country reports, including those provided to NEA,
IAEA, and the Joint Convention, as a check on and supplement to
the information that we obtained directly from the 18 countries in
our survey.

5. We did not recommend in our report that the United States needs
to exempt certain radioactive wastes from regulation. Our report
identifies LLRW management practices in other countries, and the
level of support for these approaches among representatives from
LLRW stakeholder groups and in some recent LLRW management
reports. We commented on NRC's evaluation of a rule to exempt very
level radioactive waste from regulation as LLRW in appendix I.

6. We provided the response of the United States to the survey in
appendix III of our report.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Energy and Our Response

See pages 38-40 for GAO's response to this letter.

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of the appendix.

See comment. 5

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 10.

See comment 9.

See comment 8.

See comment 7.

See comment 6.

DOE provided 10 specific comments about our report in accompanying its
draft letter. Our response to each comment follows.

1. We have revised the title of our report.

2. Our report discussed previous actions by the agencies to
respond to our recommendations and to evaluate some of the LLRW
management approaches that are similar to those identified as in
use in other countries. This discussion is in appendix I of our
report. In our view, the fact that some of these LLRW management
approaches have already been evaluated by NRC and DOE does not
lessen the need for their inclusion in a report to the Congress.

3. We revised the draft recommendation to more clearly reflect the
need to evaluate and report on the usefulness of developing a
national radioactive waste management plan and to conduct further
analysis if deemed appropriate. Our views on the potential
usefulness of such a plan are provided on pages 37-38 of this
report.

4. We revised our second recommendation to clarify this point.

5. The purpose of our report was to identify the extent to which
other countries use approaches to address four areas of U.S. LLRW
management that we identified in previous reports as having some
limitations. We did not recommend adopting any of the approaches
identified as in use on other countries, only to evaluate and
report to the Congress on their usefulness to improve management
of this waste in the United States.

6. In our view, assigning responsibility for waste disposal in the
LLRW Policy Act is not synonymous with establishing a national
radioactive waste management plan. We revised our recommendation
to clarify that NRC and DOE need to evaluate and report on the
usefulness of developing such a plan. We did not suggest how the
agencies should conduct this evaluation or which entities should
participate in the evaluation process.

7. We did not attempt to provide a detailed discussion of how
market forces operate in the United States in the disposition of
commercial LLRW in our report. This level of discussion was not an
objective of our report. Our previous reports have described the
conditions surrounding the management of LLRW in the United
States.

8. Our report associates disused sealed sources with
higher-activity LLRW, as this is, for the most part, international
practice. Our report further states that a holder of a disused
source can return it to a supplier, place it in a recognized
installation (central storage or disposal facility), or transfer
it to another authorized holder when it is no longer wanted.

9. We cannot comment on this DOE observation, as the department
provided no specific information to substantiate this claim. We
believe that our characterization of the findings and
recommendations of the task force report are accurate. Moreover,
we referenced a previous 2005 GAO report that provides more
information on the origin and purpose of the radiation source
protection and security task force. Our intent in referring to the
task force and other recent reports was to point out that these
reports suggested and recommended approaches that were similar to
what other countries indicated in our survey that they use.

10. We agree with DOE that not all storage of radioactive waste is
unsafe. Our report referred to international experts that claim
that the storage of disused sealed radiological sources at user
sites poses a greater risk of being lost from regulatory control.

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841 or at [email protected].

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Daniel Feehan, Assistant Director,
and Kevin Bray, John Delicath, Doreen Feldman, Bart Fischer, Peter Grana,
Susan Iott, Erin Lanier, Thomas Laetz, and Amanda Miller made key
contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Management of LLRW

Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Future Waste Volumes and Disposal Options Are
Uncertain. [51]GAO-04-1097T . Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.

Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability Adequate in the Short
Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future Shortfalls.
[52]GAO-04-604 . Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2004.

Low-Level Radioactive Wastes: States Are Not Developing Disposal
Facilities. [53]GAO/RCED-99-238 . Washington, D.C.: September 17, 1999.

Nuclear Regulation: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure Accumulation of
Funds to Decommission Nuclear Power Plants. [54]GAO/RCED-99-75 .
Washington, D.C.: May 3, 1999.

Radioactive Waste: Answers to Questions Related to the Proposed Ward
Valley Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility. [55]GAO/RCED-98-40R
. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 1998.

Radioactive Waste: Interior's Continuing Review of the Proposed Transfer
of the Ward Valley Waste Site. [56]GAO/RCED-97-184 . Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 1997.

Radioactive Waste: Status of Commercial Low-Level Waste Facilities.
[57]GAO/RCED-95-67 . Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1995.

Radioactive Waste: EPA Standards Delayed by Low Priority and Coordination
Problems. [58]GAO/RCED-93-126 . Washington, D.C.: June 3, 1993.

Nuclear Waste: Connecticut's First Site Selection Process for a Disposal
Facility. [59]GAO/RCED-93-81 . Washington, D.C.: April 5, 1993.

Nebraska Low-Level Waste. [60]GAO/RCED-93-47R . Washington, D.C.: October
14, 1992.

Nuclear Waste: New York's Adherence to Site Selection Procedures Is
Unclear. [61]GAO/RCED-92-172 . Washington, D.C.: August 11, 1992.

Connecticut Low-Level Waste. [62]GAO/RCED-92-137R . Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 1992.

Nuclear Waste: Slow Progress Developing Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities. [63]GAO/RCED-92-61 . Washington, D.C.: January 10,
1992.

Nuclear Waste: Extensive Process to Site Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility
in Nebraska. [64]GAO/RCED-91-149 . Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1991.

Regional Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Sites--Progress Being Made,
But New Sites Will Probably Not Be Ready by 1986. [65]GAO/RCED-83-48 .
Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1983.

Hazards of Past Low-Level Radioactive Waste Ocean Dumping Have Been
Overemphasized. [66]GAO/EMD-82-9 . Washington, D.C.: October 21, 1981.

Existing Nuclear Sites Can Be Used for New Powerplants and Nuclear Waste
Storage. [67]GAO/EMD-80-67 . Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1980.

The Problem of Disposing of Nuclear Low-Level Waste: Where Do We Go From
Here? [68]GAO/EMD-80-68 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1980.

Legal Authority of a State Governor to Impose Limitations on the Use of a
Licensed, Privately Owned, Low-Level Nuclear Waste Burial Facility.
GAO-B-194786. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1979.

The Nation's Nuclear Waste--Proposals for Organization and Siting.
[69]GAO/EMD-79-77 . Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1979.

Need for Greater Regulatory Oversight of Commercial Low-Level Radioactive
Waste. [70]GAO/EMD-78-101 , Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1978.

Major Unresolved Issues Preventing a Timely Resolution to Radioactive
Waste Disposal. [71]GAO/EMD-78-94 . Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1978.

Nuclear Energy's Dilemma: Disposing of Hazardous Radioactive Waste Safely.
GAO-103414. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 1977.

Nuclear Energy's Dilemma: Disposing of Hazardous Radioactive Waste Safely.
[72]GAO/EMD-77-41 . Washington, D.C.: September 9, 1977.

Institutional and Jurisdictional Issues in Nuclear Waste Management.
GAO-102168. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 1977.

Improvements Needed in the Land Disposal of Radioactive Wastes--A Problem
of Centuries. [73]GAO/RED-76-54 . Washington, D.C.: January 12, 1976.

Management of Sealed Radiological Sources

Border Security: Investigations Successfully Transported Radioactive
Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations. [74]GAO-06-545R
. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.

Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded
Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources. [75]GAO-05-967 . Washington,
D.C.: September 22, 2005.

Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of
Sealed Radioactive Sources. [76]GAO-03-804 . Washington, D.C.: August 6,
2003.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to
Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. [77]GAO-03-638 .
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Actions Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery
of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources. [78]GAO-03-483 . Washington, D.C.:
April 15, 2003.

(360632)

GAO's Mission

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
[email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470

Congressional Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548

Public Affairs

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-221 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [86]GAO-07-221 , a report to the Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate

March 2007

LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

Approaches Used by Foreign Countries May Provide Useful Lessons for
Managing U.S. Radioactive Waste

[87]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE
evaluate and report on the usefulness of (1) adopting the identified
management approaches, and the steps and any authorities necessary to
implement them; and (2) developing a U.S. radioactive waste management
plan, and the costs, steps, and any authorities necessary to do so. NRC
and DOE generally agreed with these recommendations, but raised a number
of issues regarding their implementation.

Academic, industrial, medical, utility, and government entities in the
United States, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE), disposed of at
least 15 million cubic feet of LLRW in 2005. This waste includes debris,
rubble, soils, paper, liquid, metals, and clothing that have been exposed
to radioactivity or contaminated with radioactive material, and sealed
radiological sources that are no longer useful for industrial or other
applications (disused). Other countries that have nuclear reactor units
and use radioactive materials in other ways manage the residual LLRW in
some ways that are different than in the United States. Of the countries
surveyed, GAO found that:

o Most countries indicated they have national radioactive waste
inventory databases that include information on all waste
generators, waste types, storage locations, and disused sealed
radiological sources, and that they use them to forecast future
disposal capacity needs.
o Most countries indicated they facilitate the timely removal of
higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused sealed radiological
sources, from generator sites to enhance safety and security,
including requiring the return of a disused source to a source
supplier.
o Most countries indicated they have disposal options for
lower-activity LLRW, central storage options for higher-activity
LLRW, and alternative disposal options for very low-level
radioactive waste that in most cases does not require an exemption
review by a nuclear regulatory authority.
o Half the countries indicated they impose financial assurance
requirements on all waste generators to cover disposition costs,
and most of these countries also use other approaches to reduce
government costs to recover higher-activity LLRW, such as
requiring a disposal fee at the time that a sealed radiological
source is purchased.

GAO also found that most countries surveyed use national radioactive waste
plans to guide the management of their radioactive wastes. Many
representatives from LLRW generators, disposal operators, regulators, and
others told GAO that the application of similar approaches to those used
by other countries might improve the management of U.S. radioactive waste.

An Interior and Exterior View of the LLRW Disposal Facility in France

References

Visible links
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-804
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-604
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-976
43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1097T
44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-604
45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-967
47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-804
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-604
49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-976
50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1097T
51. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1097T
52. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-604
53. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-238
54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-75
55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-98-40R
56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-97-184
57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-95-67
58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-93-126
59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-93-81
60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-93-47R
61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-92-172
62. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-92-137R
63. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-92-61
64. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-91-149
65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-83-48
66. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/EMD-82-9
67. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/EMD-80-67
68. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/EMD-80-68
69. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/EMD-79-77
70. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/EMD-78-101
71. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/EMD-78-94
72. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/EMD-77-41
73. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RED-76-54
74. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-545R
75. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-967
76. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-804
77. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
78. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-483
86. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-221
*** End of document. ***